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Nathan Anderson INTS3702 Dr. Lewis Griffith 5-30-2012 Bipolar Anarchy: The Consociational Future of International Security Civilization is entering a new age in international security. After WWII, the world
went into an era where the main security threat to the west was a state actor – the Soviet
Union. Nuclear weaponry was both the new threat and the new deterrent, and a sort of
malignant bipolarity was the norm. This sort of bipolarity was demonstrated by two
combating ideologies: Western and Marxist. The truth is, since the conference at Breton
Woods, the creation of the League of Nations, the IMF, and the World Bank, American
hegemony at the end of the Cold War was seemingly inevitable. In this time, the United
States has essentially colonized space and has created an unprecedented sea presence that
might never be matched.1 Despite the fact that the US has become the de facto leader in
policy standardization, globalization has created a new world with new security threats.
Credit expansion (most would argue over-expansion) and differing economic ideologies
(i.e. the American tendency to spend and the Asian tendency to save) have created
economic imbalances that have expounded over time. Meanwhile, nuclear weaponry has
become functionally useless. While economic interconnectedness is the norm around the
globe, China and the US are the two emerging hegemons that will be the focus of the
security debate for the foreseeable future. Gone are the days of state security threats, and
a new era has emerged where global criminal networks and failed states have become the
chief threats to functioning society.
1 Dr. Kevin Archer at the Korbel School has essentially argued that it would take China at least 50 years to catch up to the United States’ offensive capabilities if they should make a commitment to do so.
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At the 2006 World Economic forum, Condoleezza Rice encouraged world leaders
to embrace China as a co-hegemon,2 and she declared that China should be welcomed as
a “responsible shareholder” regarding international security. China, with it’s own
problems – aging population and a fertility rate far below the replacement 2.01, will still
act as a counter to western power because of its massive economy and military
manpower. Indeed, the future of security for the western world is predicated on a new
type of state-regulated global civil society that will not create a global identity, but an
understanding of threats and a bipolar structure aligning states with western or eastern
society. Suddenly the Peace of Westphalia is relevant again, only this time global anarchy
has taken a consociational face through bipolar governance. The sooner developing states
associate with global hegemonic presences, the better off they will be. There will be a
new standardization of security, and that standardization will be an international reality
that is seemingly dominated by western military presence like NATO, and economic
symbiosis between global hegemons. Indeed, NATO controls 17 of the world’s 22
aircraft carriers,3 and while no nation truly matches Asian military manpower, the US and
allied nations are clearly built for an offensive global presence.
It should be clear that the consociational future of globalism is not a rejection of
pluralism, but merely a proliferation of east and west, and states will self-determine based
on this organic global structure. There will be no global identity, and the key elements to
providing global security in the future will be accepting conflicting ideologies in a true
free trade system, accepting the state’s role in international affairs, a realization that
2 Condoleezza Rice addresses the World Economic Forum: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VTwP4n7_8XM 3 http://www.hazegray.org/navhist/carriers/
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poverty and failed states are the responsibility of the developed world, and an organic
and relative standardization of values proliferating an understanding of new threats.
Accepting conflicting ideologies in a true free trade system Globalization has empowered both states and non-state actors. States now have
the ability to coordinate security policy for a hegemonic good through military might.
However, military might may not be the end-all be-all of international security. The Cold
War has left the world with lose weapons, and globalization has empowered networks
seeking unconventional methods of terrorism – without state representation and without
borders.4 Open borders will be essential to the consociation argument, as the lack of
a global governing body means social and economic values can and will transcend
borders. However, this creates a new threat: the ability for rouge groups to organize.
The answer to combating such groups is not an easy one. History has shown that
simple conflicts in ideology can be tough to overcome, but the good news is that the
threat is transnational, and fighting this threat will be an international effort. If the
Cold War united the free world to combat the Soviet Union, then new threats have
almost created a new global solidarity in fighting common enemies that collectively
threaten transnational state security.
Realist theory has triumphed because combating terrorism and rouge states
is indeed in the interest of bipolar international anarchy, which should start to level
economic disparity in the long run. Neoclassical economic theory embraces
equilibration theory. That is, markets will eventually equilibrate based on trade
imbalances: exports follow wealth while manufacturing follows cheap labor. This
4 Joyner/Parkhouse, Nuclear Terrorism in a Globalized World, p.68
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works in the long run, as China’s continued development has created an increased
quality of life5 and even started to send manufacturing back to the developed
world.6 The world economic system is simply too integrated for state actors to act
against their own self-‐interest.
Accepting the state’s role in international affairs
The next step in addressing the future of international security will be accepting
that this is an international reality. The three steps that the bipolar hegemons will have to
take – even in the interest of self-preservation – will be addressing the root causes of
criminal networking, unification against state threats, and accepting the fact that failed
states are the developed world’s problem.
“People’s lives become a lot more expendable in the interest of security and
comfort.”7 Perhaps economic equilibration needs a push, and this is where support for
free trade and open borders come into play. Perhaps the biggest threat to global security
is China’s currency manipulation that threatens equilibration. Nevertheless, China has
amassed massive amounts of wealth – albeit concentrated at the top –while laborers
continue to make low incomes while living in a low cost of living situation. This is why
the ability to cross political, social, and geographical boundaries is the best way to
catalyze an internationalist peace. Essentially, if states are to adopt a new understanding
of threats, they need to understand where the threats come from, and anti-west sentiment
can be addressed through goodwill. The argument is not essentially an argument for
forced proliferation of democracy, but rather meeting international needs symbiotically.
While poverty and destitution might be enablers of terrorism, international criminal 5 Fallows, James. The $1.4 Trillion Question. Atlantic Monthly, 2008. 6 Koerner, Brendan Made in America: Small Businesses Bucking the Offshore Trend, Wired Feb 2011 7 Dr. K. Archer, Korbel School
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networks, different as they may be, are not responses to poverty, but rather a product of
fundamental opposition to statism. Islamic fundamentalists, for example, do not regard
the state, but rather the Caliphate, as directed by the Ummah. However, the appeal of
joining an Islamic terrorist group or international drug cartel is compounded by poor
economic conditions.
Further, using the example of human trafficking, criminal activity is emboldened
by a lack of national cooperation. Not having an understanding of threats makes it easier
for people for lose their state identity and essentially become invisible blips in global
civil society. This is perhaps the best hyperglobalist argument. Since it has been
established that a global reality is unfavorable, it behooves responsible state actors to
standardize understanding of threats in the interest of functional necessity, as well
pressuring rogue states to behave responsibly lest they be cut off from the international
economic network. There has also been recent talk in congress of eliminating financial
aid to rouge states like Pakistan. Eliminating aid to Pakistan the state is probably a good
idea when the Taliban has gained levels of legitimacy in providing for the Pakistani
people, and all evidence supports the notion that Pakistan might be supporting terrorism,
or at the very least not doing enough to combat it. Most Americans can attest that citizens
don’t care if their nation is considered an international pariah when their needs are met,
and that is where goodwill becomes part of the security strategy as it is interconnected
with realist state interest.8 It behooves states to become fully vested in making people
aware of where their aid is coming from, whether or not local governments carry the
notion.
8 See: Charlie Wilson’s war. The end game is vital in dealing with potential new threats.
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State threats can come from legitimate governments. Two legitimate state threats
are Iran and North Korea, two nations that are generally panned by their geographic
neighbors.9 North Korea is the ideal example. This nation has seemingly been able to
completely isolate itself from the global civil society.10 The west has enough footage on
the most secretive nation in the world to give a general idea of the lives that North
Koreans live: starving, famished and destitute. With this information, we have enough
reason to initiate policy beyond the simple politics of communist-era trade embargos
and/or sanctions, and truly unify the west (and east, for that matter) for the sole purpose
of freeing the North Korean people. Internal and external pressures will eventually
introduce the North Korean people to the global market.11
Revolution doesn’t happen at the peasant level. This is especially true in
North Korea, where those who aren’t in the North Korean elite are marginalized,
and are neither organized nor strong enough to revolt. The world is entering an end
of history,12 but the end of history won’t come from an appeal to western values, but
an increasingly top-‐down, consociational, bipolar international global structure.
A realization that poverty and failed states are the responsibility of the developed world
Realism and this international reality is precisely why it is in the collective
interest of states to address non-legitimized governments in states that are breeding
grounds for international criminal activity. Society and governments should be addressed
9 Iran, for example, might be unified against Israel but the Shia majority and the Persian ethnicity create their own problems in dealing with other Middle Eastern States. 10 Part of this has to do with the moment that the state gained its legitimacy – at a time when global isolation is possible. 11 Boynton, North Korea’s Digital Underground, The Atlantic, April 2011, p. 58 12 Fukuyama, Franicis The End of History, Harper 1993
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separately. If revolution doesn’t happen at the peasant level, than foreign aid/sanctions
might not serve their purpose of uniting and encouraging/discouraging governments in
the interest of joining a bipolar world. States should understand that if they wish to
participate in this bipolar world, they will only do so on the terms of the states providing
services (such as goodwill, aid, trade, protection). One would be hard-pressed to think
that Pakistan wants the Taliban in their backyard, but its just part of a complex web of
national interests without regard for international participation in a hegemonic structure.
The United States is the hegemon for western society
An organic and relative standardization of values proliferating an understanding
of new threats is inevitable because the world is more anarchic than most would believe,
it’s just that sovereign states will yield to greater powers for their own self-interest. The
United States has paid for its role as a global hegemon though military expenses,
soldiers’ lives, and less emphasis on domestic affairs. But from the age of nuclear
deterrence, we’ve seen that peace has essentially come from states protecting their own
interest. Evidently, states have been made aware of game theory in that destruction has
become a zero-sum game. Sure, some global commons issues such as global warming
exist - and the security threats that arise from this will be addressed as they arrive13 - but
despite this, states will align themselves with a global hegemon in the interest of state
preservation.
13 There is certainly a threat that comes from an influx of displaced refugees. This further compounds the argument that addressing global warming is best done by preparing states for the future effects of climate change, rather that making the drastic economic commitment to try and stop climate change.
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For example, if the US has effectively colonized space and have essentially
become the de facto manager of the “space” commons, most states have elected to fall
into order with US policy. It’s simply far more convenient than any alternative. Again,
the issues with the commons will be rouge states and non-state actors, which is precisely
where international pressure should lie. While global governance in its purest form is
impractical, hegemonic influence will essentially become said global governance. Few
international agreements have been reached, and the US typically sits out on the ones that
have (like Kyoto and the ICC), but nations continue to look to the US for guidance in
security and global economic issues. The US has more power than these global
institutions, because it maintains its global sovereignty. When the US fails, other states
fail and that is bad for all interested parties.
It is much easier to govern a bipolar world than a purely anarchic world, because
states better understand their own society and economic needs. And the future will be
dictated by communication between the two global hegemons, with the US directing the
west and China dictating the east. Other countries, such a BRIC countries, may enter the
fold further into the future, but their best interests are served by participation in this
hegemonic structure in the immediate future.
Since new threats are either non-state actors, or states that have been ostracized
from the international community, the future of international security will rally around
common threats regardless of social norms. The world is far too integrated economically
for any state to sustainably isolate itself the way North Korea (perhaps the biggest state
threat) has. Citizens in emerging states today have had the luxury of seeing the benefits of
an international system, and this transcends local and global governance. States who buck
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universal human rights or support terrorism will be ostracized as international pariahs,
and as such, will be cut off from the global trough. The next fifty years will see rational
state actors following through with self-interest, succeeding to the two global hegemons.
The US should support a “responsible” China in order to bear some of the international
security burden. Both states should address terrorism at its root cause and make criminal
networks the responsibility of the states that facilitate them. The US and China’s
economic integrations and collective self-interest will allow for a standardization of
security policy and, rather then developing a new global identity, will rally around
common enemies to accept the commonality of threats.