The University of Texas at Austin

Implications of Climate Change on International Security

Sarah Dunn

EID: SD27626

Foundations of International Relations and Global Studies 320F

Dr. Stephanie S. Holmsten

March 2015

Implications of Climate Change on International Security

“No challenge ­­ no challenge ­­ poses a greater threat to future generations than climate

change.” stated President Barrack Obama on January 20th, 2015 during his State of the Union

Address. Environmental concerns have become increasingly prominent in international relations

over the past three decades. Politicians have begun using the environment as one of their policy

directives to win elections— whether they acknowledge the presence of climate change due to

global warming and are promoting policy changes to ameliorate its negative effects, or they

completely refute its existence and claim that it is ‘nonexistent’ (Carpenter 1). Regardless of the

stance policy makers take, ninety­seven percent of climatologists, or climate scientists, asserted

in a joint consensus titled, “Joint science academies’ statement: Global response to climate

change,” that climate change does exist and that they have strong evidence that the world is

significantly warming (“Climate Change: Consensus” 1). Climate change has many different

effects in different regions across the world and is going to force humans to take action to

mitigate the changes, or adapt to them (“Climate Change: Effects” 1). In this literature review I

plan to review and analyze different perspectives of how the effects of climate change affect

international security. I will first discuss large­scale climate change effects on international

security throughout different regions across the world. I will then narrow the scope to regions

and states that are predicted to be the most affected by climate change and how the status of

development in these places plays a role in their ability to respond to environmental changes.

The effects of climate change are complex and may be direct or indirect. Effects of climate

change are predicted to affect things like the availability of natural resources; migration; human

security; and ultimately, the legitimacy of the government. Due to the nature of this literature

review being how future generations’ international security will be affected by climate change, it

is imperative to be mindful that the claims being made are based on existing

environmental­conflict research but are still highly speculative.

The greatest implication that climate change will have on the international security of

future generations begins with the rise in sea­level (Barnett 8). It is predicted that human­induced

global warming caused by greenhouse gas emissions will cause the global­average surface

temperature to increase 1.4º ­ 5.8ºC by the end of the century (Karas 11­12). Global temperatures

have significantly risen since the 1970s which has caused the world’s oceans to increase in

temperature as well (“Climate Change: How do we know?” 1). The increase in temperature of

the global surface and oceans have warmed so much so that there is evidence of a reduction in

Arctic sea ice, melting of ice sheets in Greenland and Antarctica, and retreating glaciers all over

the world (“Climate Change: How do we know?” 1). This form of climate change poses many

serious problems for regions all over the world because it causes the sea­level to rise which has

consequences which include “coastal submersion, coastal erosion, and saltwater contamination

of fresh water” (Karas 14). The implications of a rise in sea­level on international security has to

do with the availability of resources— including land— which will force people to relocate in

order to survive and meet basic needs (Barnett 7­8).

Authors, Jon Barnett and Mahamat K. Dodo wrote separate articles in which both authors

explain the reasons why sea­level rise would indirectly affect international security. Dodo argues

that sea­level rise is an indirect effect on because people would be moving due to underlying

socio­economic reasons caused by or amplified by climate change (Dodo 6). Barnett argues that

the rise in sea­level caused by climate change could indirectly affect international security by

directly affecting the security of the people at the individual level through the “the destruction

and depletion of their homes or resources” (Barnett 9). In Jon Barnett’s “Security and climate

change,” he states that large­scale migrations of people to other countries, or even within their

own countries, pose serious problems due to sovereignty and border disputes (7­8). Mahamat K.

Dodo in his article, “Examining the potential impacts of climate change on international security:

EU­Africa partnership on climate change,” he expresses similar concerns for large scale

migrations but terms it as “a clash of national identity” (12). These two authors, although

explicitly stating different concepts, are implicitly expressing the similar idea of nationalism.

With a mass migration of people into a foreign country comes Samuel Huntington's idea of the

‘Clash of Civilizations,’ which is the theory that when people from different customs, beliefs,

and cultures are exposed to one another, it tends to create conflict between these cultures. Mass

migration could create overpopulation which could create land disputes as well as cause

problems over who is in power and how the available resources are distributed (Scheffran 19).

Societal impacts of climate change include addressing issues that deal with

availability of “water, agriculture, infrastructure, health, finance, and economics” (Karas 7).

Competition for power and resources always ends with winners and losers which can create

major inequalities that could ultimately threaten human health and life. “According to the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)… about 5 billion people may live in

water­stressed regions by 2025, and climate change effects could further reduce streamflow and

groundwater recharge in many of these regions” (Karas 15). Thomas H. Karas argues that water

scarcity is an extremely influential factor that will play a big role in climate change. Karas

explains that if clean water is scarce, there is going to be less water that will go into agricultural

irrigation, and competition within or between nations for water resources may increase (Karas

15). In addition to this, an increase in global temperature is going to require more water for crops

to grow (Karas 17). This decrease in agricultural productivity may also cause problems for the

economy. Competition for land can also be detrimental to agricultural production and the

economy not only because over­farming may eventually deplete the soil, leaving behind less land

available for agricultural purposes, but also because with mass migration comes the demand for

higher agricultural yields. Adrian C. Newton argues that the major implication that climate

change will have on the international security of countries’ agricultural sector lies in the

“community of organisms in the soil upon which the overall health of the crop substantially

depends” (Newton 4). Newton says the predictability of the consequences of climate change on

“complex and dynamic communities of pests, pathogens, mutualists and parasites” are going to

prove to be very difficult since they are all subject to change in response to environmental

triggers (Newton 4). In contrast with Karas’ belief that water scarcity may drive conflict within

or between nations, Jon Barnett argues that scarcity is not what drives conflicts, but that it is

rather the competition to “gain dominant control” over abundant resources (Barnett 11). Erika

Weinthall, in her contribution to the book “Global Climate Change: National Security

Implications,” says that some of the most important factors concerning water conflicts includes

the capacity of state institutions to adapt, demographics and the quality of the water as opposed

to just the quantity (Weinthall 80). She argues that clean water­scarce countries are not going to

be likely to plan to adapt to the effects that climate change will have on water supplies because

they will be more focused on just trying to procure water to meet very basic human needs.

(Weinthall 80).

Climate change would also have a major effect on human security. Barnett says that the

United Nations Development Program views human security as being “concerned with how

people live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their many choices, how much

access they have to market and social opportunities— and whether they live in conflict or in

peace” (Barnett 14). He goes on to explain that environmental insecurity is not included in this

definition of human security, which makes environmental insecurity the “double vulnerability”

of people that are living in poverty in underdeveloped countries and harsh living conditions

(Barnett 14). What this means is that underdeveloped countries are going to have a harder time

dealing with climate change effects than will developed countries due to their lack of money,

resources— including technology— and infrastructure (Barnett 14). When dealing with climate

change effects, developed countries would be required to learn to adapt to the new environment

but have the resources and power to do so, whereas underdeveloped countries are basically going

to be struggling to survive (Barnett 14). This is important to consider if you take into account the

fact that developed, industrialized countries, particularly the United States and China, are the

states that emit the most greenhouse gases worldwide. In contrast, Bangladesh is a densely

populated developing country that has already begun to experience the rise in sea­level as well as

the corresponding erosion and destruction of their homes and livelihoods (Mirza 2001). As

Monirul Qader Mirza stated in his article “Global warming and changes in the occurrence of

floods in Bangladesh and implications” he states:

In Bangladesh, agricultural crop and dwellings each account for roughly 30 per cent of

the total flood related damage (FEC, 1989). Damage to infrastructure, such as roads,

railways, and waterworks accounts for the remaining 40 per cent. Besides the impact on

physical infrastructure, the damage to socio­economic activities is also significant. Floods

cause a devastating effect on large segments of the population especially those are poor.

Victims are temporarily deprived of their main income and/or forced to sell their assets or

take loans to rebuild their houses (Islam, 2000) (p. 131).

Bangladesh is just one of many developing countries and islands that are going to be

experiencing major rises in sea­levels that will aggravate their living conditions and create more

problems in countries that already have enough of them.

Another major implication of climate change on human security is the spread of

infectious diseases. Jessica Q. Chen of the Washington Post wrote an article titled “Climate

change emerges as disease­related security threat” in which she discusses how one of the most

important things to consider when it comes to dealing with climate change is how to deal with

the spread of new diseases (1). “‘In coming decades, more heat, humidity and rainfall could

allow mosquitoes, ticks and other parasites to spread tropical and subtropical diseases to areas

where they didn't exist previously, infecting populations that haven't built up resistance to them.’

U.S. intelligence and health officials say” (Chen 1). She goes on to explain that serious outbreaks

of diseases could “overwhelm governments” and cause more migration of possibly infected

people to other regions (Chen 2). Author Andrew Price­Smith, in his contribution to the book

“Global Climate Change: National Security Implications, explains the relationship between

climate change and infectious diseases by saying that pathogens and their modes of transmission

are very sensitive to changes in temperature (Price­Smith 87). “Certain regions, such as the arctic

and subarctic regions of the northern hemisphere, the northeastern sector of south Asia, and

Eastern Australia are clearly enjoying increased levels of precipitation” and that certain “vectors

of diseases thrive in wet environments” (Price­Smith 87). He also explains that shifts in

temperature not only affects the rate at which infectious diseases are spread, but they may also

permit the movement of certain diseases to expand into areas that they may not have previously

inhabited (Price­Smith 89). Andrew Price­Smith goes on to mention Robert Fogel, an economic

historian that hypothesized that the health of the population was the main driver of economic

prosperity (Price­Smith 91). He explains how population health and economic prosperity go

hand­in­hand:

If health promotes prosperity, then disease erodes productivity and wealth. At the

microeconomic level, disease erodes productivity through mechanisms such as the

debilitation of workers, increased absenteeism, increased medical costs, reduced savings

and investment, and the premature death of breadwinners. At the sectoral level, disease

imposes a particular burden upon those sectors of the economy that are labor­intensive,

such as agriculture and resource­extraction, and thereby imposes a relatively greater

effect upon the economies of the developing world (Price­Smith 91).

Since infectious diseases are more prominent amongst the poor and middle classes, it usually

exacerbates economic and social inequalities between different socio­economic levels of the

population because people without the money to treat a given illness tend to spread the illness

more quickly and effectively without the proper resources needed to contain or eradicate the

illness (Price­Smith 91). Just as diseases may stress the economic well­being at an individual

level, the impacts of climate change will have very high financial costs, “and in some cases these

are sufficiently large to justify understanding climate change as a security issue” (Barnett 4).

Damage costs of climate change are going to prove to be a very big and important factor

of international security. John Barnett says that measures taken to reduce greenhouse gas

emissions as promised in the Kyoto Protocol agreement will impose heavy costs to national

economies (Barnett 5). Barnett argues that oil­exporting countries are taking on heavy economic

risks while implementing the Kyoto Protocol provisions to their economies because most of its

policies will increase the price for oil which will reduce demand in developed countries, which

account for about 60% of the world’s oil consumption (Barnett 5). He goes on to explain that the

cost of implementing response measures sooner are relatively small compared to the impacts of

climate change in the future (Barnett 5). Thomas H. Karas agrees that climate change will harm

local, national, regional, and perhaps even the global economy (Karas 18). He gives many

explicit examples of how this will occur:

Combinations of some or all of the above phenomena can seriously harm local, national,

or regional economies, and perhaps the global economy. Water scarcities can reduce crop

production, as well as divert worker energies to obtaining family water supplies. Decreased

agricultural productivity may also lead to malnutrition or to higher food prices; it may lead to

migration of farmers to ecologically marginally growing areas or to city slums. Crop losses could

mean loss of agricultural export revenues needed to finance imports. Weather­caused

infrastructure damage harms the businesses dependent on the infrastructure, while repairing the

damage and otherwise coping with disasters diverts resources from productive use. Financially

hedging against climate change effect risks may, in various settings, help or harm insurance

companies; in any case it costs resources. An unhealthy workforce, whether on the farm or in the

city, will be less productive. (Karas 18­19).

David Wagman proposes a different perspective of climate change with a focus on the

United States economy in his article titled, “Economy Trumps Climate Change.” He starts off his

article by saying that “meaningful climate change legislation in the U.S. Congress seems

unlikely any time soon” (Wagman 1). Wagman argues that policymakers are having a hard time

creating policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions because it is considered counterproductive

to the United States economy (Wagman 1). He goes on to explain that most of the United States

population views the environment as more of a “luxury item” that is always put after their own

economic incentives. Similarly, U.S. policymakers will therefore also place policies that are

beneficial to the economy before environmental ones (Wagman 1).

In conclusion, in the light of climate change and how it affects international security,

“survival— the most elemental of human goals and the first duty of all governments— is called

into serious question” (Barnett 3). If they haven't already, government leaders from every

country all over the world are going to forced to begin combating climate change in order to

protect the national and international security of their country, resources and the human security

of their citizens. John Barnett states that an indirect effect that climate change will have on

governments has to do with the internal dimension of state legitimacy (Barnett 4). Governments

for whom the material well­being of their citizens is highly sensitive to external forces such as

trade, or where material well­being is in decline, tend to be more unstable which makes the

country more prone to internal violent conflict (Barnett 4). Furthermore, internal problems within

countries that are expected to be caused by climate change will cause exogenous shocks to other

countries which can create even more insecurity. Some of the other indirect negative effects of

climate change that can undermine the legitimacy of governments include economic decline;

detrimental human health through diseases and the scarcity of clean water and food; undermine

state wealth and military capability; and can exacerbate inequalities between people (Barnett 4).

In contrast, Thomas H. Karas argues that the climate change discussion is going to promote

international cooperation on a multilateral level (Karas 21). He says that the efforts to combat

climate change are going to bring together government leaders from all over the world in order to

form policies and look for solutions to mitigate or adapt to the effects of the changes in climate

(Karas 21). However, just as all the authors cited in this literature hold a consensus that climate

change does, in fact, affect international security. The authors affirm in their arguments that the

legitimacy of governments within their respective states are going to be tested on whether or not

they can protect their citizens from the negative effects and implications that will be brought

about by the change in climate in the decades to come.

References: Barnett, Jon. “Security and Climate Change.” Science Direct. Global Environmental Change, 09

Apr. 2003. Web. 12 Mar. 2015. <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959378002000808>.

Chen, Jessica Q. “Climate Change Emerges as Disease­related Security Threat.” LexisNexisAcademic. The Washington Post, 30 Jan 2011. Web 6 Mar. 2015. <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/1nacademic/?vern=sr&csi=8075&sr=HLEAD(Climate change emerges as disease­related security threat) and date is 2011>

“Climate Change: How Do We Know?” Global Climate Change: Vital Signs of the Planet. Nasa, n.d. Web. 27 Feb. 2015. <http://climate.nasa.gov/evidence/>.

Dodo, Mahamat K. “Examining the Potential Impacts of Climate Change on International Security: EU­Africa Partnership on Climate Change.” SpringerPlus. SpringerPlus, 17 Apr. 2014. Web. 28 Apr. 2015.

“Global Climate Change: Consensus.” Climate Change: Vital Signs of the Planet. Nasa, n.d. Web. 24 Feb. 2015. <http://climate.nasa.gov/scientific­consensus/>.

“Global Climate Change: Effects.” Climate Change: Vital Signs of the Planet. Nasa, n.d. Web. 11 Feb. 2015. <http://climate.nasa.gov/effects/>.

“Joint Science Academies’ Statement: Global Response to Climate Change.” National Academies (2005): 1­2. NationalAcademies.org. National Academies, 2005. Web. 05 March 2015. <http://nationalacademies.org/onpi/06072005.pdf>.

Karas, Thomas H. “Global Climate Change and International Security.” SciTech Connect. SciTech Connect, 11. Nov. 2003. Web. 6 Mar. 2015. <http://www.osti.gov/scitech/biblio/918355­1KbgUY/>.

Mirza, M. (2002). Global warming and changes in the probability of occurrence of floods in Bangladesh and implications. In Global Environmental Change (Vol. 12, pp 127­138). Toronto, ON: Elsevier.

Newton, Adrian C. and Peter J. Gregory. “Implications of Climate Change for Disease, Crop Yields and Food Security.” Euphytica. By Adrian C. Newton. Vol 179. N.p.: Springer Netherlands, 2011. 3­18. Print. Ser. 1.

Price­Smith, Andrew. “On Climate Change and Infectious Disease: Implications for Political Destabilization and Conflict.” Global Climate Change: National Security Implications. N.p.: U of Michigan, n.d. 86­99. Print.

“Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address.” The White House. The White House, 20. Jan. 2015. Web. 6 Mar. 2015. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the­press­office/2015/01/20/remarks­president­state­union­address­january­20­2015>.

Wagman, David. “Economy trumps climate change.” Power Engineering. Nov. 2008: 4. Academic OneFile. Web. 7 May 2015.

Weinthal, Erika. “Water, Climate Change, and Human Security.” Global Climate Change: National Security Implications. N.p.: U of Michigan, n.d. 77­85. Print.