Is America Heading Toward Partisan

Realignment?

Thomas F. SchallerGuest Lectures, Dr. Nick Miller

POLI 100, Spring 2008

Partisan Realignments• Sudden, significant and durable shift in partisanship

– Measurable in partisan changes among both masses (i.e., voting, registration, identification) and elites (i.e., offices held, majority control, parties’ apparatus and resources)

– Realigning elections hallmark the start of a party era/system in which one party dominates for an extended period; deviating elections punctuate that dominance, as the minority party wins presidency, congressional majorities and/or subnational offices

• Partisan cycling effects

– Newly-emergent issues, coupled with the inevitable generational replacement of old voters with new, reduces the dominant party’s control, leaving power at an imbalance

– A period of partisan instability ensues, marked by creative destruction and the rise of splinter or third parties, new coalitions, and party converts

Brief History1860• Lincoln wins with a 40 percent plurality of the vote, but wins re-election decidedly. Slavery provides

issue catalyst that coalesces vestiges of Whigs and nascent parties into Republican Party, which dominates electoral politics for next three decades – interrupted only by the two, non-consecutive deviating terms won by Grover Cleveland, each with only a plurality of the vote.

1896• On the heels of a catastrophic economic downturn, William McKinley wins two terms, commencing

another, albeit distinct period of GOP dominance for the ensuing three decades, interrupted only by the two deviating terms of Woodrow Wilson, each won with only a plurality of the vote.

1932• Fueled by the economic hardships of the Great Depression, Franklin Roosevelt wins the first of four

solid victories (five straight for the Democrats, counting Harry Truman’s 1948 win), with only moderate war-hero Republican Dwight Eisenhower’s two terms interceding between FDR and LBJ.

1968• The partisan wheels come off. Richard Nixon wins with a plurality of the vote, becoming the first

president in American history in his initial election whose party fails to carry at least one chamber of Congress. Though winning in a landslide, he is forced to resign to avoid impeachment.

What follows is a period of dealignment and unprecedented divided (and often divisive) government:– All but Carter’s four years, Clinton’s first two, and Bush43’s recent two are split governments.– Partisan registration and attachments decline, and an entire post-Vietnam, post-Watergate

generation fails to be socialized politically as earlier generations had.– Independents, soft partisans and split-ticketing voting rise.– Two impeachment attempts, various congressional scandals, rejected Court nominations, etc.

AND YET, amid the chaos there is a gradual, quantifiable rise in the Republican Party’s fortunes, hallmarked by Ronald Reagan’s solid election and re-election, the Newt Gingrich-led House revolution and subsequent maintenance of congressional majorities.

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Partisan Control of State Legislatures

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Purple Parity America?• Presidency: George Bush elected by 271-267

electoral vote margin and negative popular vote margin of 0.5% nationally; re-elected by smallest percentage of re-elected presidents in a century.

• Congress: GOP had 30-seat House majority and 10-seat Senate edge before 2006 Dems now have 30-seat House majority, 2-seat Senate majority.

• Governors: Relatively divided—GOP had 28-22 before, Dems now have 28 governors.

• State legislative majorities: Before 2006: GOP 20, Dem 19, split 10; after: Dem 23, GOP 15, split 11.

• State legislators. Prior to 2006 were GOP 49.5; Dem 49.5 – GOP edge was just 64 seats nationally, now a Democratic edge of about 258 seats.

Electoral College Trends• You just lived through the two most stable

presidential elections in American history: Just three states (NH, IA, NM) flipped between 2000 and 2004—the fewest since Washington ran the table back-to-back in 1788 & 1792.

• The map is highly bifurcated: In 1960, an election won by .2% in popular vote, there were 14 “comfortable” statewide wins (10%+), 6 of which were “blowouts” (20%+); by 2000, an election “won” by -.5%, there were 28 comfortable wins, of which 14 were blowouts.

• The Non-Southern calculus is here: Democrats won the popular vote three of past four elections, and got 270 non-southern electoral votes in 1992 and 1996, and came within one state of doing so in 2000 and 2004.

The End of the “Vital Center”

Abramowitz (2007), CCES data

Simon & Schuster

October 2006

Democratic Party Decline in the South, 1960-2004

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The Non-Southern StrategyMakes sense no matter how you slice it: Ideology: Why would the more liberal and progressive of

the two parties start to rebuild itself in the most conservative region of the country?

Demography: Why would a female-led, multi-racial, union-oriented, urban/inner-suburban, more secular party rebuild itself in the least gender-gapped, most racially-polarized, least unionized, most rural and evangelized region?

History: The Northeast and West outvoted the South from 1860-1932; the Northeast flipped and, along with the South, outvoted the West from 1932-1968; the South flipped and, along with the West, outvoted the Northeast from 1968 to today. The West is due to flip next, recreating the same map the GOP used to dominate politics from 1860-1932.

Numerics: The South has basically cast the same share of electors for 13 decades—between 27 percent and 31 percent.

Regional Share of Electoral Votes, 1880-2000

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Where the Seats Were Won

• Governors: 5 of 6 new Democratic governors (84%) won outside the South: AR, CO, MD, MA, NY, & OH.

• Senate: 5 of the 6 new Democratic senators (84%) won outside the South: MO, MT, OH, PA, RI & VA.

• House: 24 of 30 new Democratic House members (83%) from non-southern districts, including 21 from the Northeast and Midwest alone.

• State legislatures: All but two dozen of the 300+ net new Democratic state legislators (92%) from outside the South, including all 10 chambers majorities—and 17 of 18 chambers won during 2004 & 2006 cycles.

• President: Kerry won 14 states by 5+%→183 electors; Bush won 25 by 5+%→213. They split other 12, only one of which is in South: Florida. The remaining 11 are: CO, IA, MI, MN, NV, NH, NM, OH, OR, PA & WI.

Are we poised for a realignment?Yes

• Cyclical effect times out nearly to perfection– 1860 + 36 = 1896 + 36 = 1932 + 36 = 1968 + 36 = 2004!

• Realigning issue of 9/11 (favors Republicans?)– Long-held GOP issue advantage on defense/foreign policy– Bush the incumbent ran hard on post 9/11 realigning issue: terrorism

• Secular demographic trends (favor Democrats?)– Ethnic minority share of population increasing (Hispanics surpass

Blacks)– Progressive “ideopolis” growth (Judis/Teixeira)– Increased social/religious tolerance

No

• Postmodern citizen preference for divided government (Fiorina)– Too many registered independents, self-identified non-partisans– Partisan polarization, inter-party dislike relatively stable

• Electoral system less responsive to political shocks– Redistricting immunizes incumbents of both parties; produces

ideologues– Blue state/red state polarization (from 14/6 in ’60 to 28/14 in ’00)– Parties (or surrogates) equally adept in GOTV efforts and fundraising – Media interest in partisan balance, fractiousness