YEMEN: Profile of Al-Islah Ideology and prospects of the Yemeni Congregation for

Reform and the Muslim Brotherhood Movement in Yemen

Daniel Brett | Dunya Solutions | January 2016

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Contents

Executive summary ............................................................................................................... 4

1. Islah before 2011 ............................................................................................................... 5

1.1 Foundation and evolution ........................................................................................... 5

1.2 Break with the Saleh regime ........................................................................................ 6

1.3 Ideology........................................................................................................................ 7

2. Islah in government ........................................................................................................... 9

2.1 Rise as a revolutionary force ....................................................................................... 9

2.2 Islah's decline ............................................................................................................. 10

2.3 Regional relations ...................................................................................................... 11

3. Islah's prospects .............................................................................................................. 13

3.1 Popular support ......................................................................................................... 13

3.2 Response to sectarianism .......................................................................................... 14

3.3 Regional relations ...................................................................................................... 15

4. Islah in Aden .................................................................................................................... 16

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Executive summary

Founded in 1990 as a party loyal to the Saleh regime, Islah is an Islamist party that draws its power from the urban-based Muslim Brotherhood, the more rural Northern tribal leadership and Sunni clerics.

The party supported the Saleh regime's conflict with the Yemeni Socialist Party in the conflicts that emerged in the mid-1990s.

As the Muslim Brotherhood gained prominence in the party, it adopted a more pragmatic approach as well as greater independence from the Saleh regime, eventually openly opposing him and joining in alliance with its former leftist adversaries.

The party's manifesto is less radical than other Brotherhood groups and it takes a more pragmatic strategy in dealing with other political actors, shifting alliances where it sees it can advance towards power. However, it retains radical Salafist influences, including Al-Qaeda sympathizers.

Following the overthrow of President Saleh, the party gained control over ministries and gain leverage within the Yemeni military. However, this proved to be short-lived as the party's key military ally, Maj Gen Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, was effectively dismissed by the Hadi administration. The ousting of Hadi from Sanaa by Houthi militants, who overcame troops loyal to Mohsen, further diminished the party.

Islahi tribal militants have managed to defend some of the party's strongholds and in some areas have played a crucial role in routing the Houthis, but many tribal leaders that bankrolled the group have left Yemen and their business interests have been disrupted by conflict.

The party's popularity waned when it started exercising power with many accusing it of self-interest, corruption and mismanagement as well as being a vehicle for tribal interests, while its influence has diminished as a result of civil war. However, its popularity may now be rising again, albeit only in areas that it has been able to defend with the support of sympathetic tribes.

As an organised party with some political pedigree, eventually regional powers in conflict with the Houthi and the forces loyal to former president Saleh will have to strike deals with Islah. There are fears that should Islah be sufficiently diminished, Sunni tribes will be driven further into the hands of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State and the civil war will turn from regional and tribal-based interests to a polarizing sectarian conflict akin to those seen in Iraq.

For all its pragmatism and claims of "moderation", Islah retains a long-standing radical Salafi element that has sympathies for terrorist groups, including Hamas and Al-Qaeda. The absence of tribal leaders who had checked their power and the decline of the more technocratic, urban organisation of the Brotherhood following Hadi's ousting could well put radicals on the ascendant.

In Aden, Islah is led by one of the more pragmatic figures in of the party, Insaf Ali Mayo, and the governor is a party member. Although Islah has seen its offices in Aden violently attacked by Southern secessionists and the party is opposed to federalism, Mayo has called for their continued involvement in reconciliation talks and blamed Houthis for inflaming Southern frustration.

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1. Islah before 2011

1.1 Foundation and evolution

Islah's roots are in the Muslim Brotherhood, which established its first cell in Yemen in

the early 1960s. The Muslim Brotherhood is a social, religious and political movement

that was launched in Egypt in 1928, drawing on anti-imperial, pan-Arabist and pan-

Islamist discourses to address social inequalities, economic mismanagement and

political marginalization.

Since its inception, Yemen's Muslim Brotherhood has relied on strong tribal

affiliations and religious zeal within Yemeni society. Tribal identity remains core to

political positioning in Yemen and regardless of Islamist positioning, tribal influence is

the basis for political organization. With support from Saudi Arabia, the Brotherhood

sought to confront Communism and supported the regime of President Ali Abdullah

Saleh during the wars for the central regions, 1978-82.

Islah was established on 13 September 1990. According to the party's founder and

president Sheikh Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar, it was formed as the political arm of

the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen as part of a deal with Saleh with the aim of opposing

the Yemeni Socialist Party. The Yemeni Socialist Party had been Saleh's partner in the

unification of Yemen, but Saleh had sought a counter-balance to socialists outside the

partnership since his own party, the General People's Congress, could not openly

oppose them.

Brotherhood, Yassin Abd al-Aziz al-Qubati, to head the Ministry of Education, boosting

its social role. Indeed, education became the party's most crucial institutional

powerbase that later became a point of contention with the Saleh regime.

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1.2 Break with the Saleh regime

Saleh's alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood's Yemeni branch began upon the party's

founding in Aden when Saleh came to power in 1978. The alliance's raison d'etre came

to an end after the Brotherhood helped Saleh oust the socialists following the 1994 war.

Having achieved victory against his erstwhile unification partners, Saleh sought to

degrade Islah even as the party supported his presidential candidacy. In 1996, the

Brotherhood rose to the top of the organization. The Brotherhood-oriented leaders

quietly built the backbone of the party, happy to benefit from Ahmar's patronage but

remaining distant from tribal structures. The consolidation of Muslim Brotherhood's

power within Islah preceded the party's move into opposition in 1997, even though

Ahmar and Zindani remained loyal to Saleh. The Brotherhood's rise to control the party

machinery also marked a more pragmatic approach that is unusual in the context of the

wider, global Muslim Brotherhood movement.

In 2001, President Saleh dismantled the scientific institutes system which Islah

had used to spread its philosophy in the education system and attract recruits and was

crucial to the power of its Salafist wing. The Brotherhood's control of this parallel

madrassa education system dated back to the reign of President Ibrahim al-Hamdi,

1974-77.

In 2006, Islah supported Saleh's opponent Faisal bin Shamlen in the presidential

election, marking a final break between the two allies. Sheikh Ahmar died in 2007 and

his son, Hamid, became Saleh's most prominent adversary as well as an important

source of funding for Islah.

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Parties (JMP, al-Liqa al-Mushtarak), which included its former adversaries in the Yemeni

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president and his ruling party. Islah then launched grassroots meetings countrywide to

sell it. The party also called for a delay in the 2009 parliamentary elections. Its goal was

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to force the government to rewrite election laws and force Saleh to abide by term limits

agreed to in 2006, which would have seen his rule end by 2012.

1.3 Ideology

Islah's ideology is not merely a political expression of the Muslim Brotherhood's Islamist

ideology. While some critics see it as a Sunni fundamentalist movement, others see it as

headed by corrupt businessmen and/or a collection of tribal militias. In reality, Islah is

an association of groups that have taken different positions over the years on issues as

fundamental as supporting democracy and accommodating Saleh. This diversity has not

created substantial divisions or fragmentations.

At its inception, the three factions that jointly comprised Islah - the Brotherhood,

the Salafists and tribal leaders - together were seen as posing a formidable threat to

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political elite.

Islah drew support from tribal affiliates from outside the Brotherhood with Sheikh

Ahmar, the paramount sheikh of the Hashid tribal confederation, its most powerful

tribal ally. Ahmar's attraction to Islamism was largely driven by his social conservatism

and material ties to Saudi Arabia. Several tribal and Salafi figures had ties to President

Saleh and others within the ruling party, but they also enjoyed popular support far

greater than that of the Brotherhood leaders, who could command only a modest

following in major cities and on university campuses.

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Brotherhood-aligned technocrats, who were more interested in a disciplined modern

party of government, also deferred to Ahmar.

The other prominent figure brought into Islah was Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, who

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with the Salafi ideological current as well as expressing sympathies for Al-Qaeda. He

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founded of the Iman University under the Saleh regime as well as founder of various

educational and morality movements that are focused on Islamist dawa.

However, the party's organizational authority remained firmly in the hands of the

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them protection. While Islah has ideological roots in Islamism, it has pursued a strategy

of opportunistic self-preservation. Within the group, the Brotherhood's Islamist aims

have had to be balanced with Saudi-oriented Salafist hardliners and a tribal faction that

has its own resources and financial largesse.

Islah has been a comparatively pragmatic Islamic party. Its political manifesto

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The manifesto, which is less dogmatic than its counterparts in other countries,

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rhetoric, pragmatic factors have also increasingly trumped theological considerations.

Islah differs from other Islamist parties in the Arab world in its nominal focus on

individual liberty, freedom of choice, and democracy, as well as on reforms based on

Islam.

However, the party is also an umbrella for radical Islamists such as al-Zindani who

is a leading member of the Hamas funding network, the Union of Good. Although its

manifesto has only an oblique reference to Israel, it retains some links to international

terrorism. As such, its commitment to democratic values must be seen in the context of

its desire for self-preservation and its gradualist approach to achieving power.

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2. Islah in government

2.1 Rise as a revolutionary force

As in other Arab Spring movements, through Islah the Muslim Brotherhood sought to

capitalize on mounting popular opposition to Saleh and fuelled the youth rebellion with

its organizational strength and did so with Qatar's support. However, it did not instigate

the uprising and was more conciliatory to Saleh, urging him to agree to a negotiated

exit and seeking out allies in the ruling party. Indeed, it sought to want to maintain the

structure of the state - particularly the continued power of the al-Ahmar clan - with

Saleh out of power. As such, it was less revolutionary than its Egyptian counterpart.

The Saudi-sponsored Gulf Initiative ousted Saleh and the reconciliation

government saw ministerial positions divided between the JMP and Saleh's People's

Congress. Islah sought to use the Brotherhood's influence in the revolution to

monopolize power, even at the expense of its JMP allies. During the National Dialogue

Conference (NDC) that began in March 2013, the Islahi leadership largely advocated for

consensus and pro-actively sought to support the transition process and interim

President Abd Rabuh Mansur Hadi.

Through Islah, the Brotherhood controlled key cabinet positions. Through their

alliance with the Saudi-backed Salafist military leader Maj Gen Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar,

they enlisted their supporters into the army and security services. Having sidelined its

JMP allies, Islah quickly found its own role marginalized as the structures that sustained

its quest for power fell apart.

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2.2 Islah's decline

The rise of the Houthis since 2014 and their alliance with Saleh has been largely at

Islah's expense. By mid-2014, Islah fighters were embroiled in a number of skirmishes

with the Shi'a Houthi movement that ended in a decisive defeat in Amran, the de facto

Islahi capital and the heartland of the Hashid tribe and the Al Ahmar family. Weakened

militarily and politically marginalized, Islah suffered a further setback when the head of

the post-uprising government and Islah confidant, Prime Minister Mohammed Salem

Bassendwah, resigned in September 2014.

Within a few months after the Houthis' September 2014 takeover of Sanaa, Islah

lost its grip over most government institutions, the army and the media. These

institutions had been key to its goal of consolidating its hold in the anti-Saleh

revolution. More fundamentally, the tribal, Islamist, technocratic and military alliances it

once enjoyed have weakened as these groups have pursued increasingly divergent

political strategies. The ease with which the Houthis overran Islahi strongholds,

particularly in urban districts of Sanaa where the party had been electorally successful a

few years before, indicated that the party was ill-prepared for conflict.

By the time of the Houthi take-over, Maj Gen Mohsen's influence had already been

much reduced. He was effectively sacked by President Hadi who disbanded the First

Armored Division which was under his command. Evidence of his decline came in his

attempts to ward off the Houthi rebellion in Sanaa, which saw him disobey presidential

orders to lead a military campaign backed by his loyal officers. His attempt to hold

Sanaa failed and Houthis consolidated their power over the capital, imposing their own

government.

Tactically, Islah has remained in a quandary over its response to the Houthis,

often standing aside as the Shia militants expanded their territory. At times, it even

assisted the Houthis by mediating between them and some local tribes. At other points,

it has actively fought Houthi insurgents, while in some areas it has been virtually

eradicated.

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have been prevented from fleeing the country or detained by Houthi militiamen outside

of the capital. In April 2015, Houthis kidnapped up to 140 Islah members including

Mohammed Qahtan and Hassan al-Yaeri, two leading figures in the party, and other top

leaders. The Islah members were targeted after issuing a statement declaring support

for the Saudi-led Operation Decisive Storm.

More fundamentally, the al-Ahmar clan led by Hamid al-Ahmar and the Hashid

tribal federation it heads has waned in the face of the Houthi rebellion. Most tribal

leaders have fled Yemen. Hamid al-Ahmar fled to Turkey and returned to Aden in

February 2015. While he struggles to manage his business empire, Islah's access to

funding and the media will be hindered.

Islah has been increasingly split between those who seek a more consensual,

pragmatic approach to political change - albeit one in which they would ultimately act

as the power behind the throne - and the radical ideological element identified with al-

Zindani. Additionally, the party has seen a disconnect between the strategy of its

increasingly embattled Sanaa-based leadership and local Islahi leaders. This has been

exacerbated by the civil war and the country's institutional melt-down.

2.3 Regional relations

The Muslim Brotherhood has been sidelined at a regional level, both as a popular

ideological force and in its relations with the region's governments. Having become a de

facto state in Syria and Iraq with 'wilayats' in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, the

Islamic State has muscled out the Brotherhood in its quest to monopolize and dominate

Sunni radicalism. With Western support, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have also cracked

down against the transnational Brotherhood.

Islah had sought to play their allies in the Qatari and Turkish governments against

the Saudis in the emerging regional rivalries that emerged amid the Arab Spring

movement. Tensions with Riyadh heightened following the June 30 Movement that

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ousted the Muslim Brotherhood from power in Egypt, a move that was supported by

Saudi Arabia. At the same time, its alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and

the hostility of the Houthi movement in Yemen brought it into conflict with Iran.

Its relationship with the global Muslim Brotherhood movement has meant it has

little sympathy from the UAE, which considers the movement to be a terrorist

organization. Tensions with the UAE surfaced in November 2015 when the UAE blamed

Islah for delays in its military operations to expel Houthi fighters from the key

southwestern province of Taiz, the most populated governorate after Sanaa. Emirati

State Minister for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash tweeted that "had it not been for the

failure of Islah and the Muslim Brotherhood to act," Taiz would already have been

"liberated".

The accusation was perhaps unfair as Islah and tribal militants had fought off

Houthi attacks on Taiz city. Taiz is an Islahi stronghold that would have fallen

completely to the Houthi had the party not maintain a powerbase there. Yasin al-

Qubaty, head of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen, hails from this governorate while

Islahi sheikh Hamud al-Mikhlafi gained prominence in 2011 defending the

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has also long had a network of activist Salafi charities, in particular the al-Hikma

association, which has cooperated with Islah. Emirati accusations and opposition to

Islah could, rather, frustrate the task of pushing back Houthi incursions.

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3. Islah's prospects

3.1 Popular support

Amid civil war, Islah is attempting to portray itself as the political actor that can fill a

middle ground between a Yemeni state dominated by Houthis and Saleh's clique and a

Sunni jihadist opposition. In reality, its power is much diminished and the Brotherhood's

old adversaries are stronger as a result of the civil war. The left and the Southerners

have traditionally had a bad relationship with the Brotherhood due to Islah's support for

Saleh's military campaign in the mid-1990s and this has weakened its pursuit of power.

The Houthis were able to attract and recruit some national and leftist leaders, thus

stripping the Brotherhood of their credibility among their allies.

However, there is an enduring relationship between some tribes and Islah that

gives the party continued local relevance. The party's influence and capacity to remain

a powerful influence was witnessed in the long-running stalemate in Marib, east of

Sanaa, where Houthi militiamen faced strong tribal resistance. Marib's new governor,

Sultan al-Arada, is an Islah leader. Islah also carries some support within the military

and the armed forces' Chief of Staff Mohammed al-Maqdisi is a party sympathizer.

The true extent of Islah's support is hard to gauge as there have been no national,

competitive elections in Yemen for nearly a decade (the last was the 2006 presidential

election) or comprehensive opinion polling. While its influence likely varies by district,

the power and resources Islah accumulated before and during the revolution - even

now they are weaker - are likely to ensure it remains a major player. Moreover, thanks

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believed to be on the rise again.

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3.2 Response to sectarianism

Politically, Islah remains pragmatic, even as the environment in Yemen has shifted

towards sectarian polarization. The party retains a strong hard-line ideological element

and al-Zindani remains an influence, but the Salafis are not dominant for now. In 2004,

the US labeled al-Zindani a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist" due to his close

association with Osama bin Laden. In 2010, he called for a jihad should the US go to

war with Al-Qaeda in Yemen.

The extent to which Islah can achieve Islamist ends is currently limited by

realpolitik and the negotiation of a complex political and social landscape. It has been

unable to organize in its own right, without wider institutional and political alliances. As

a result, it has supported the Yemeni President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, who the US

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it might be expelled from Yemen with a coalition victory, Islah needs Hadi to attain

power again.

While Islah has not declared jihad and continues to pursue independence from Al-

Qaeda, Islamic State and the Houthis, the decline in tribal power and largesse may yet

prompt it to take a more ideological stance. Tribal leaders had represented a

conservative resistance to more radical elements and with many now outside the

country with their business interests frustrated by conflict, there is a risk that some

Islahi elements will align with Al-Qaeda.

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regional, economic, symbolic, historical, and interpersonal factors, However, current

circumstance are a breeding ground for Sunni jihadist groups that form Islah's main

rivals. If Islah were to join forces with Al-Qaeda, it would be due to concerns over self-

preservation. Although under current circumstances this is not a probable scenario,

Islah or its more hard-line factions and tribes would be minded to join forces with Al-

Qaeda if Hadi's forces are pushed back and the conflict takes on a more overtly

sectarian nature. In this scenario, Islah could split or become irrelevant.

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3.3 Regional relations

Saudi Arabia could be crucial to Islah's continuity, even though the Kingdom has turned

hostile. For all the tensions with Riyadh, Islah has supported Saudi Arabia's military

operations against the Houthis. The Saudis also have an interest in maintaining Islah's

presence in the political landscape. J k g g H

competitor, if alternative Islamist movements, such as Islah are marginalized. Under

King Salman, Saudi Arabia is also minded towards greater unity among Sunni groups

fighting the Houthis.

Since the Houthi takeover, Maj Gen Mohsen and al-Zindani are widely believed to

have found refuge in the Kingdom, highlighting the persistence of historical ties

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hostility to the Muslim Brotherhood may be dissipating somewhat.

The Saudis will want a Sunni alternative to the jihadists and alienating Islah could

prove counter-productive, particularly if Yemen follows Iraq's plunge into sectarianism.

While Qatar is likely to favor rapprochement with Islah, the UAE will resist as it has

taken a strong stance against the Muslim Brotherhood both at home and abroad.

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4. Islah in Aden

Islah's influence in Aden is complicated by its poor local perceptions and a mixed

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governor of Aden in 2012-2013 did not generate sympathy for the party among citizens

of the South. During the NDC negotiations, the party's opposition to federalism also

suggested that the Islamist project was connected with a unitary Yemeni nation and

disconnected from Southern independence, which has alienated it from many

southerners.

The current chief of Islah's Aden bureau is Insaf Ali Mayo, who holds a seat in

parliament. Mayo presents himself as a "moderate" and has frequently called for

greater inclusion of southerners, including secessionists, in the political process.

Strategically, this enables him to overcome a key limitation to the party's appeal in the

south as well as beyond Yemen. He may also be seeking to appease the Southern

Movement, which in 2013 burned down Islah's Aden headquarters as well as destroying

its offices in other towns - Islah had accused Iran and Saleh loyalists of backing the

attacks at the time.

His statements and his willingness to meet with US officials, as evidenced in

leaked US diplomatic cables, suggests he is pragmatic rather than ideological. Whether

this indicates political moderation, as he claims, is a moot point.

He stands in stark contrast to the hard-line approach of al-Zandani in seeking

rapprochement with the US. In 2010, he lobbied the US to reopen its Aden consulate

and sought a partnership with the US against Saleh, urging it to be more supportive of

"moderates". However, this should be seen in the context of the Yemeni Muslim

Brotherhood's opportunistic desire for powerful alliances, even when they apparently

contradict its ostensible political program, rather than evidence of "moderation".

Mayo's attempts to court US support have not stopped him from criticizing US

policy in the war on terrorism. He has claimed that US drone attacks on Al-Qaeda

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targets have fuelled support for the terrorist group. He said: "There is more hostility

against America because the attacks have not stopped al-Qaeda, but rather they have

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psychological acceptance of al-Qaeda because of the US strikes."

Mayo may have been seeking to gain the allegiance of members of the powerful

southern Awlak tribe whose members have increasingly been drawn to Al-Qaeda as US

drone strikes have targeted their lands. Al-Qaeda recruiter and spokesman Anwar al-

Awlaki, who was killed in a drone strike in 2011, was a member of the tribe. Again, in

this instance, Mayo's disdain for Al-Qaeda's rise is at variance with al-Zadani's Al-Qaeda

sympathies.

In relation to the Southern issue, Mayo has appeared outwardly sympathetic and

his approach towards reconciliation long predates the 2011 uprising. He has blamed the

Houthis for alienating the South in peace talks. He said: "The Southerners were part of

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reaching conciliation between the North and the South. It was attended by numerous

figures from the Southern Al-Hirak movement, and a feasible vision for solving the

Southern issue was reached during these meetings."

Mayo said, however, that recent events in the country, such as the Houthi seizure

of Sanaa, had resulted in some of the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference

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Based in Aden, Mayo is likely to represent a more pragmatic figure, seeking

alliances in order to retain Islah's relevance in the region. He may also be seeking a role

in any future unity government that would include Houthis and southern groups.