36 The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin

BACKGROUND

W ith the 1998 publicationof its new capstonemanual, Canada’s Army,1the Canadian Army

adopted a doctrine more explicitlyoriented to the morale aspects ofconflict. Explanations and refinementsof this doctrine, the ManoeuvristApproach to Operations, also calledmanoeuvre warfare by some armies(hereafter referred to as ManoeuvristOperations), have been published insubsequent manuals and described invarious forums.2 Although the broadutility of Manoeuvrist Operations as adoctrine for the Canadian Army hasbeen questioned3, the basic tenets ofthis doctrine are in this writer’s opinionrelatively self-evident, well grounded inthe art of war, and flow from theexperience of human history.

However, this doctrine, along withits critically related mission commandphilosophy, has become wrapped up inthe discussions about the currentlypopular, perceived revolution inmilitary affairs (RMA). This inter-mingling of the two concepts hasresulted in Manoeuvrist Operation’slogical and common sense approach tomilitary operations becoming lost forsome officers, including, seemingly,certain in positions of responsibility.

The danger of such confusion is thatit can lead to unproven theory beingpresented and accepted as irrefutablefact. This, in turn, might convince thearmy to structure, equip and train itselfin a manner that could set up theconditions for defeat in the future.Such a defeat would very likely lead tothe death or injury of many youngCanadian soldiers who had entrustedtheir lives and future hopes in goodfaith to sound doctrine and pro-fessional leadership. Two of the most

dangerous beliefs that have beenclaimed or implied by some proponentsof a misunderstood ManoeuvristOperations/RMA doctrine are that theuse of Manoeuvrist Operations:

a. will guarantee victory. The effectthat this idea has had in certainquarters is that military oper-ations can be undertaken lightlyby poorly prepared forces; and

b. mean that an army will notactually be required to fight,other than perhaps a few skir-mishes and long-range precisionstrikes. Such thinking is contraryto our own doctrine4 but thispernicious idea has tangiblyaffected the army.

In an earlier ADTB article5 I soughtto highlight some of the fallaciesascribed to this Manoeuvrist Operations-RMA doctrine and to relate it to ourequipment’s capability to carry it out.This earlier article based its commentson theoretical operational researchstudies undertaken by the OperationalResearch Division in Ottawa. We are not,however, limited solely to theoreticalanalysis in our consideration of thestrengths and limitations of any concept,doctrine or slogan. A study of history canalso teach us lessons that permit a betterunderstanding of our profession and itsfundamental truths. I believe thatconsideration of the Israeli attack in theSinai Peninsula in 1967 offers one suchsituation and can provide some usefulinsights into the validity of the two beliefsin the previous paragraph.

AIM

T he aim of this paper is to drawsome lessons about the application

of Manoeuvrist Operations from theIsraeli experience in the 1967 SinaiCampaign.

OVERVIEW OF THE SINAICAMPAIGN IN THE SIX-DAY WAR

General

The history of Israel’s unhappyrelations with its Arab neighbours

has filled many books and news reports,and has been the basis for numerousmovies over the past 50+ years. Thus, itis likely familiar to most readers, tosome degree at least. I would, however,first like to provide an overview of the1967 Sinai Campaign to ensure acommon baseline for discussion.

The 1956 Israeli-British-French-Egyptian War did not address the basicconcerns of Israel and Egypt and set thestage for future fighting. Additionally, itled to:

a. critical humiliation of theformerly dominant MiddleEast colonial powers, Britainand France, thus reducingexternal supervision of theMiddle East;

b. the first United Nations (UN)peacekeeping force; and

c. a significant enhancement ofthe prestige of Egypt’s leader,Gamal Nasser, and byextension of his anti-colonialand anti-Israeli stances.6

The 1956 war gave the Israeliseleven years of relative peace, althoughwith continued Palestinian attacksinside Israel.7 These attacks createdsufficient tension and uncertainty inIsrael that it sought Soviet support in1966 to have the Syrians influence thePalestinians to reduce these raids.8Nasser involved himself and his army ina war in Yemen that absorbed much ofhis attention and his army’s energy.8 Healso became embroiled in a series of

The 1967 Sinai CampaignSome Lessons About the Manoeuvrist Approachto Operations

by Major L.R. Mader, CD

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arguments with Syria, Saudi Arabia, andJordan. These squabbles and theYemeni war reduced Arab unity,distracted the Egyptians from a furtherconflict with Israel, and reducedNasser’s prestige in the Arab world.10

The Road to War

The crisis leading up to the 1967Arab-Israeli War is generally

considered to have started on 7 April1967 when Syrian and Israeli fighteraircraft fought a battle that cost Syria sixplanes.11 Nasser, as a self-styled leader ofthe Arab world, felt the need todemonstrate Egyptian strength and hisanti-Israeli credentials.12 He may alsohave truly believed that Israel wasplanning a pre-emptive strike againstSyria to stem further Palestinian raids.13

Thus, to demonstrate his support forSyria, on 14 May 1967 Nasser orderedthe mobilization of the Egyptianmilitary reserves and the massivereinforcement of the Sinai garrison.14

Nasser’s concerns about Israeliintentions may have been heightenedby Soviet information that was, perhapspurposefully, deceptive.15

Within a three-week period, thegarrison of the Sinai Peninsula grewfrom less than two infantry divisionsand some armour to over six division-size formations—two of which werearmoured.16 These moves were carriedout with such extensive press coveragethat when Nasser realised the threatagainst Syria did not necessitatereinforcement of the Sinai he wastrapped by his own propaganda. Nassercould not cancel the deploymentswithout being seriously embarrassed.17

By the start of the war Nasser hadtaken two other actions that seriouslyworried the Israelis. He obtained thewithdrawal of the UN force in theSinaix18 and closed the Strait of Tiranto Israeli shipping, effectively cuttingoff Israel from Far Eastern oil and theIndian Ocean.19 Israeli worries werefurther increased by the hate-filledrhetoric flowing out of various Arabcapitals and media.20

Whether Nasser actually intendedto attack Israel or whether he gotinvolved in a game of brinkmanship

that went very badly wrong is not reallyclear. This question is less importantthan the fact that his actions and theirconsequences created great fear and apolitical crisis21 in Israel that virtuallyguaranteed the Israelis would attack theEgyptian Sinai garrison that was sodangerously close to vital Israelipositions.

Israel mobilized 60,000 to 70,000reservists in mid-May in response to theEgyptian build-up. Once it had done so,Israel needed a relatively quick solutionto the crisis, as its economy could notafford the absence of so many workersfor any lengthy period of time22. SinceNasser would not, or could not, backdown, the only solution to the crisis waswar.

By 1967, the Israeli nationalstrategy was to use pre-emptive attacksto carry any war quickly to the enemy’sterritory to gain depth23 and spareIsraeli cities, civilians and industry fromthe destruction of war.24 This wasnecessary to avoid heavy casualties,damage to Israel’s relatively sparse

infrastructure, and consequently puttinga serious strain on the Israeli society.Such a strain might lead to theweakening of the Israeli social cohesionand will to fight. This cohesion and willwere essential as the Israelis knew thatthey could not win a single decisive,lasting military victory. Rather, Israelhad to keep defeating the Arab armieseach time they returned for a“rematch.”25

Geography of the Sinai 26

The Sinai Peninsula is a triangularbody of land between Egypt in

Africa and the former Palestine (Gaza,Israel and the West Bank) in Asia. Itcovers 61,000 square kilometres and isabout 160 kilometres wide by 280kilometres deep. The Peninsula wasessentially unpopulated in the 1950sand 1960s (population estimated at

between 100,000 – 400,000). The majorurban area, al-Arish27 on theMediterranean coast, had a populationof about 40,000 in 1967. Map 1 showsmany of the features described in thefollowing paragraphs.

The Peninsula can be thought ofconsisting of three sectors for militaryplanning purposes, northern, centraland southern. The northern sectoralong the Mediterranean coast is desertwith broad expanses of sand dunes thatare difficult to traverse with vehicles.Low ridges offer many opportunitiesfor laying out defensive positions. Asingle poorly maintained, paved roadfollowed the coast. This area favouredthe defender.

The central sector is the mostamenable to the conduct of an attack.The ground here is a mixture of hardsoil and sand. However, many deep, drywatercourses (wadis) and steep stonehills hamper manoeuvre in this area. Amountain range runs north to southalong the western side of the Peninsulanear the Suez Canal. This range is

traversed by a number of passes,notably the Mitla, Giddi and Khatmiapasses. The Khatmia Pass (not shown) isto the east of Ismailia and north of theGiddi Pass on the Central Route. Theonly two major east-west routes to crossthe Peninsula, other than theMediterranean coastal road, werefound in this sector. The SouthernRoute, the Pilgrim’s Way, was a dirttrack that ran from the Suez Canalthrough the Mitla Pass and on to Eilatin Israel. The Central Route was thebest all-weather road in the Sinai in1967. It runs from Ismailia on the SuezCanal, through the Khatmia Pass andthen on to Israel via Bir Gifgafa andAbu Ageila.

The southern sector of thePeninsula is barren and bleak.Mountains, including Mount Sinai at2,637 metres altitude, dominate this

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half of the Peninsula. Routes in thisarea are unpaved and do not lendthemselves to use by large mechanizedforces. Thus, this half of the Sinai doesnot really contribute to an attacker’s ordefender’s plan, other than by notbeing useful to the opponent.

The Sinai itself offers little of directmilitary value. It is, however, a bufferzone of significant strategic value toEgypt and Israel. Consequently, militaryplanners need to secure the three routesthrough the northern and centralsectors in order to control movementthrough the buffer zone. Progress in the1956 Sinai Campaign had been based onthe Israeli ability to secure these routesto get to the militarily and politicallyimportant Suez Canal.

Egyptian Deployment

By 5 June 1967, the evolution of thecrisis meant that four Egyptian

infantry divisions and two armoureddivision equivalents were deployed inthe Sinai. Outside of the Sinai, to thenortheast, in the Gaza Strip, theEgyptians had a fifth infantry division(20th Palestine).

The weight of the Sinai deploy-ment was along, or near, the Pilgrim’sWay with the two armoured divisions(4th Armoured and Shazli Force) andan infantry division (6th). An infantrydivision (7th) defended the southernGaza Strip/Mediterranean coastal road.Another division (2nd Infantry) pro-tected the eastern end of the Central

Route at Abu Ageila and Qusaymah,preventing any Israeli advance westwardon the one good paved road. The finalinfantry division (3rd) was deployedbehind the Abu Ageila/Qusaymah areaon the Central Route in the Gebel Libniarea.28 An infantry brigade was initiallydeployed at Sharm al-Sheikh until watershortages forced most of the garrison tobe withdrawn. See Map 1 below.

This deployment provided the Sinaigarrison with a strong defensive layoutcovering the principal routes west to theSuez Canal. It also placed three divisionson, or near, the Southern Route in thecentral sector, providing the ability tocarry the war to southern Israel, possiblycutting off the port of Eilat.

Egyptian Weaknesses

T he process of tripling the Sinaigarrison led to problems that

created fundamental weaknesses in theEgyptian defence. These problems weremade worse by other decisions that didnot flow directly from the garrison’shurried expansion. In addition to long-standing problems of low educationlevels among its soldiers, a deleteriousclass structure and a shortage ofcompetent regimental officers,30 on theeve of the Israeli attack, the Egyptianarmy in the Sinai suffered from thefollowing additional problems.31

a. The Egyptian general staff createdan extra level of command forthe Sinai front on 15 May 1967and inserted it between the Sinaifield army commander and thecommander-in-chief in Cairo. Thefront commander had responsibilityfor operations without the necessaryauthority to take appropriate in-dependent action. The first frontcommander arrived in the Sinaia week before the war with only asmall staff. He had little exper-ience with the Sinai as his previousposting had been as commanderof the Egyptian forces in Yemen.

b. Weaknesses at the highest com-mand level were aggravated bythe change of all of the army’s 12 divisional commanders anddivisional chiefs of staff in the fewweeks before the start of the war.M

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Map 1: Initial Egyptian Deployment 29

7th Div

3rd Div

6th Div

2nd Div

4th Armd Div

Shazli Armd“Div”

As with the front commander,divisional commanders were soonto lead their formations intobattle not really knowing theirunits, subordinate commandersand troops, or the ground.

c. These new commanders would noteven benefit from a well-establishedwar plan for the defence of theSinai as the existing plan waschanged significantly four timesin the three weeks prior to thestart of the war; and

d. The inclusion of large numbersof reservists into the existing fieldformations was done in a mannerthat undermined cohesion. Bythe start of the war, over half ofthe Egyptian army, other thanthe Yemeni expeditionary force,was composed of reservists. Manyof the reservists were not welltrained due to budget cuts andtheir integration was done in amanner that undermined unitintegrity at the battalion level.

I srael i Readiness for Batt le

General. In spite of the strategicweakness of Israel, and unlike the

Egyptian army, the Israeli ground forceswere well prepared for battle. Thisstrength was based on doctrine, morale,training, air superiority, intelligence,and command and control. A briefsummary of these six factors will explainthe Israeli strengths and highlight somepoints of interest.

Doctrine. The doctrinal confusionthat had existed in the Israeli armyduring the 1956 war about whether tobase the army’s force structure oninfantry formations or armouredformations had been settled in favour ofthe latter. The Israeli armoured corpshad been expanded in terms of numbersand equipment between 1956 and 1967.The entire army, led by the armouredcorps, had been integrated into thenational strategy of pre-emptive strikeand carrying any war to the enemy’sterritory as quickly as possible.32

Morale. The history of Israel fromits founding, and the rhetoricemanating from various Arab media

and capitals, made it easy to see the roleof the Israeli army as that of protectingthe nation and civilian population fromdestruction. From the Egyptian soldier’sviewpoint it was far less clear why hehad been mobilized and sent to theSinai. Thus, the Israelis would enter thewar with the clear advantage of knowingwhy they were fighting.33

Training. The Israeli army ingeneral had maintained a high level oftraining. Its structure was based on thepart-time citizen soldier and theconcept that reserve brigades had to beable to mobilize very quickly and fightas well as regular army formations.34

The reserve brigades’ performance had

been improved, after some unhappyexperiences during the 1956 war, by thereassignment of older (over 40)reservists from combat brigades.35

These individuals were now used insecond line roles. The reserve brigadesmobilized in mid-May 1967 in responseto Nasser’s actions had benefited fromtwo weeks of intensive training in thefield to refresh their skill levels.36

Air Superiority. The Israeli pre-emptive strike on the Arab air bases atthe start of the war is famous. Thisattack quickly destroyed over 300 Arabaircraft and gave Israel air superiority.The Israeli army could subsequentlycall for heavy air support without facinga similar threat. Control of the air alsogave the Israelis superiority in airbornereconnaissance and surveillance.

Intelligence. The Israeli forces of the1967 campaign did not have thesophisticated technology favoured bycurrent proponents of RMA. However,thanks to Israeli superiority in the air andother intelligence gathering assets, theywere able to follow the flow of the battle.So much so that at a critical moment inthe campaign the Israelis knew that theEgyptians were withdrawing in adisorderly fashion towards the SuezCanal. Israeli commanders then decidedthat they had the opportunity to smashthe Egyptian army.37

Command and Control. From itsformation, the Israeli army hademphasised an informal, innovativecommand style, colloquially known asorganised chaos,38 that saw the plan as“merely a basis for change.”39 This styledemanded that units “ … stick to the‘maintenance of aim’ and continue toadvance until their objective isgained.…”40 The Israeli training systemsought to ensure that “(A) …commander should be so trained as tomake him as little dependent on hissuperior as possible in deciding how toact.”41 The command and control systemfrom general HQ through geographiccommand, multi-brigade task force(ugdah), and brigade had been

developed intensively between 1956 and1967.42 The commander the IsraeliSouthern Command, Brigadier GeneralGavish, used a mission command style ofleadership. Ugdah commanders weregiven general orders and then left toaccomplish their mission bearing inmind the task, their forces, and their ownpersonalities43. It is claimed that theIsraelis only had a plan for the first day ofthe campaign and that the rest wasimprovisation based on how the battleunfolded.44 In 1967, the Israelis alsobenefited at key places and situationsfrom the high level of trust essential tothe mission command philosophy.45

I srael i Campaign Plan

General. In support of its nationalstrategy of pre-emptive strike,

Israel planned to use three ugdahs andthree independent brigades for asurprise attack into the Sinai and theGaza Strip. An infantry brigade coveredthe north-eastern end of the Gaza Stripwhile an armoured brigade covered thesouthern Negev Desert. A weak infantrybrigade covered the northern Negevand tied up part of the 2nd EgyptianInfantry Division around Qusaymah,south of Abu Ageila. The heart of theIsraeli Southern Command’s strikingpower was three combined arms ugdahscommanded, from south to north, by Generals Sharon, Yoffe, and Tal

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respectively.46 In order to deflectEgyptian attention from this force, theIsraelis carried out a deception planwith dummy tanks to reinforce thearmoured brigade in the south.47 Thiseffort was directed at convincing theEgyptian high command that theIsraelis would attack from the southernNegev, repeating the 1956 advance tothe Mitla Pass. In actual fact, the Israeliplan made the southern Sinai of minorimportance in the campaign. TheIsraelis believed that the Strait of Tiranwould be opened automatically with thedefeat of Egypt’s Sinai garrison.48

Israeli Overall Plan. The campaignplan called for the defeat of theEgyptians in a three-phase operation.The first phase would be the pene-tration of the forward line of defencesat al-Arish on the Mediterranean coast

and at Abu Ageila on the CentralRoute. In the second phase, Egypt’ssecond line of defences would bedestroyed around Gebel Libni, in thearea of the 3rd Egyptian InfantryDivision. In the final phase the Israelisplanned to move rapidly to the Giddiand Mitla Passes, east of the Suez Canal,and cut off the Egyptian army.49

Detailed Plan. In the north, theIsraeli plan was for General Tal’s ugdahwith three brigades (two armoured [7th Armoured and Aviram’s50] and areduced paratroop [Raful Eitan’s202nd]) to break into the Gaza Strip atits base at Rafah and then advance west-ward along the Mediterranean coastalroad to al-Arish. From there, it would bothcontinue west on the coastal road andsend a force into the northern centralSinai towards Gebel Libni. On the Cen-

tral Route, Sharon’s ugdah with threebrigades (14th Armoured, Col Adam’sinfantry, and 80th Para) and additionalspecial elements was tasked to capturethe Abu Ageila fortified area. Once thiswas completed Sharon’s force was thento advance south and cut off anyEgyptian retreat along the SouthernRoute towards the Mitla Pass. Sharonwould co-operate with Col Albert’sindependent armoured brigade advanc-ing on al-Thamad from the southernNegev. Yoffe’s ugdah of two armouredbrigades (Col Shadni’s and Col Sela’s)would deploy initially between Tal andSharon. From here, these two brigadescould support either ugdah in the eventof trouble. Their primary purpose,though, was to push through to GebelLibni and help Tal defeat the Egyptian3rd Infantry and 4th Armoured Divisionsin that area51. Map 2 provides a simpli-fied presentation of the Israeli plan.

Unfolding of the Campaign53

General

The actual campaign unfoldedessentially as the Israelis had planned,except that the Egyptian defencesinitially held out more resolutely thanexpected. Then the entire Egyptianarmy collapsed, an event on which theIsraelis could not plan. Map 3 shows theflow of the four days of fighting.

Events of 5 June

The Israeli air strikes on theEgyptian air bases started withoutwarning at 07:4554 on 5 June 1967.These attacks caught Field MarshalAmer, the Egyptian commander-in-chief, his air force chief, and G3 in theair on the way to inspect the Sinaigarrison and meet all seniorcommanders at Bir al-Thamada. Amer’sairborne presence enroute to the Sinaihampered the initial air defenceresponse to the Israeli strikes as theEgyptians were concerned aboutshooting down his plane. The seniorEgyptian leadership was caught out ofposition and took some time to get backto their command posts. Some com-manders returned to their formationsthat evening, some 12 hours after thewar began, as they did not wish to travelby daylight. In addition to creatingM

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Map 2: Israeli Plan52

physical dislocation, the air strikes hada profoundly negative effect on themorale and resolve of several keycommanders. Field Marshal Amercould not bring himself to tell Nasser ofthe disaster and contemplated suicide.

General Tal’s ugdah attacked thesouthern end of the Gaza Strip at 08:15.The lead brigade (7th Armoured)broke into the defences after a toughfight and then headed south on thecoastal road towards al-Arish. Follow-onbrigades had to fight their way throughthe bypassed Egyptian forces, employ-ing air strikes in some cases.

General Sharon’s ugdah started its advance towards the Abu Ageilafortified area around 08:15. Thecommander of the 2nd EgyptianInfantry Division, which covered AbuAgeila, did not return to his commanduntil the end of the day. Sharon’s forceexperienced some initial fighting eastof Abu Ageila. Air strikes were requiredto help soften the position.

The other Israeli forces—mainlyYoffe’s ugdah, the infantry brigadeopposite Qusaymah and Col Albert’ssouthern Negev armoured brigade—held their positions or made supportingmoves. Yoffe’s ugdah advanced anarmoured brigade between Tal andSharon, preventing any reinforcingnorth-south movement by the Egyptianforces. Advancing over loose sand, thatthe Egyptians had thought wasimpassable, the Israeli brigade got intoa position at the Bir Lahfan crossroadswhere it encountered elements of anEgyptian armoured brigade and amechanised brigade. Fighting carriedon throughout the night. This actionprevented the Egyptian frontier forcesbeing reinforced from Gebel Libni.

Field Marshal Amer expected themajor Israeli attack to occur in thesouthern Sinai along the SouthernRoute. Therefore, he kept large forcesin that area to counter this attack. Thus,the northern Egyptian garrison forcesfaced the bulk of the Israeli ugdahsessentially unsupported in the criticalearly hours of the war.

By the end of 5 June, Egypt’s airforce was effectively destroyed and the

Egyptian command and control systemwas already starting to break down. TheIsraelis, for their part, had brokenthrough the southern end of the GazaStrip and were advancing on al-Arish onthe Mediterranean coastal road and onAbu Ageila on the Central Route.

Events of 6 June

During the night of 5/6 June,Sharon’s ugdah launched its assault onthe Abu Ageila fortified area. Theattack followed a very complex, tightlycontrolled plan. The Israelis hadlearned through difficult experience inthe 1956 battle for Abu Ageila thatsome situations require tight control toensure that misplaced initiative and poorco-ordination do not make a toughbattle harder. This night attack involved:

a. independent deep manoeuvre byan armoured battlegroup;

b. heliborne infantry insertionsbehind the Egyptian artillery;

c. an infantry brigade attack;

d. an armoured advance at night tomeet the infantry brigade, and

e. the largest artillery fire plan to datein the history of the Israeli army.

The Abu Ageila position was effect-ively captured by 06:00.

Yoffe’s second armoured brigadethen pushed through the Abu Ageilaposition and joined his first brigade atthe Bir Lahfan crossroads. Israeli airstrikes and the superiority of the IsraeliCenturion tanks over the Egyptian T-55s combined to turn the tide of thisbattle. By 10:00 the battle at Bir Lahfanwas over with the Egyptians in retreat.

On the coastal road, Tal’s troopscaptured al-Arish around 09:00. Fromhere, Tal sent troops towards GebelLibni to support Yoffe’s ugdah. Otherelements of Tal’s force would pushsouth down the coastal road towardsthe Suez Canal later.

The forces of Yoffe and Tal met atGebel Libni where they surrounded theEgyptian garrison. Supported by air

strikes they attacked the Egyptian forcesoutside the Gebel Libni airfield. Ele-ments of this force, the Egyptian tanks,withdrew west after fighting the Israelis,leaving the infantry and artillery behind.These followed soon after, their moraleundermined by their abandonment. De-spite these defections, the airfield itselfwas still strongly defended. This forcedTal’s and Yoffe’s brigades to spend thenight refitting around the airfield.

One of the most important events ofthe campaign occurred at about 16:30 on6 June when Field Marshal Amer gaveway to panic.55 It is claimed that duringthe campaign he issued conflicting andconfusing orders56 which effectively hadthe Egyptian army abandon its battlepositions and run west for the SuezCanal. No phases were given for thewithdrawal of a force of six divisions. TheEgyptians were told “ … to reach the westbank (of the canal) in one day’s time.”l57

This collapse at the highest levels mayhave been due, in part, to the shock ofthe early Israeli victories in the air and onthe ground at Rafah and Abu Ageila. Itwas likely also partially a result of therealisation that the Egyptian highcommand had completely misread theIsraeli intentions and campaign plan.

General Gavish knew from intelli-gence sources that the Egyptians weregoing to run for the Canal. Seeking tobenefit from this situation, he met withhis three ugdah commanders in the lateafternoon and ordered them to breakthrough the Egyptians and cut them offfrom the Suez Canal.58 Yoffe was order-ed to get tanks to the Mitla and GiddiPasses and cut off the retreating Egyp-tians. Tal was to follow the Central Routethat ran west towards the Suez Canal.

By the end of 6 June, the Israelishad captured Abu Ageila and al-Arishand advanced to Gebel Libni on theCentral Route. The Egyptian com-mander-in-chief had ruined any chancehis army had to reverse these defeats byordering it to “run for the Suez Canal”.The Israelis were taking risks to smashtheir disorganised enemy.

Events of 7 June

At daybreak Yoffe’s and Tal’s forcescaptured the Gebel Libni airfield. They

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then headed in separate directions tocut off the Egyptians.

Shadni’s brigade of Yoffe’s ugdahreached Bir Hasana by 09:00. Groups ofvehicles from this brigade becameintermixed with Egyptian vehicles,shooting up retreating columns as theymoved westward. The brigade reachedthe eastern end of the Mitla Pass at18:00 with only nine Centurion tanks,the rest of Shadni’s tanks havingbroken down or run out of fuel. TheEgyptians also had Centurion tanks andin the confusion they allowed theIsraelis to take up fire positions at theentrance to the Pass without con-fronting them. There, Shadni’s troopswere able to destroy many Egyptianvehicles, assisted by the Israeli air force.

Further north, Tal’s troops had tofight harder to reach the Khatmia Passand were less successful. Battles/skirmishes were fought on the roadwestward towards Bir Gifgafa. In oneskirmish, Tal was able to obtain badlyneeded fuel from Egyptian supplyvehicles. At the eastern mouth of theKhatmia Pass, the Israelis becameinvolved in a major battle with Egyptianforces coming north. Israeli losses werehigh in the fighting for the KhatmiaPass and the Israelis even had to endurean Egyptian air attack. Tal was unable toclose the Khatmia Pass, allowing largeportions of the 4th Egyptian ArmouredDivision to escape during the night of7/8 June. The Israelis were even drivenback from the positions that they hadoccupied in order to fire onto theEgyptian columns.

Early in the morning, a compositeforce from Tal’s ugdah, built on theregular Paratroop Brigade, left KhanYunis in the south end of the Gaza Strip,headed towards the Suez Canal alongthe Mediterranean coastal road. Thisforce met little resistance until reachingthe small coastal town of Romani, some60 kilometres east of Port Said on theSuez Canal. There, the composite forcerefuelled and rested for the night beforeattacking the town the next morning.

At the eastern end of the CentralRoute, Sharon had rested his force forthe remainder of 6 June while awaitingthe capture of Qusaymah by the weak

infantry brigade that had been coveringit. When this brigade advanced on 7 Juneit discovered that the Egyptian 10thBrigade had slipped away in the dark.Then, Sharon set off with the 14thArmoured Brigade towards Nakhl on theSouthern Route to find the EgyptianShazli Force. At a long ridge, the GebelKharim, he ran into outposts of the 6thEgyptian Infantry Division and foundthat this division was still holding its de-fensive positions. Since it was already dark,Sharon waited until daybreak to attack.

At Sharm al-Sheikh, adjacent to theStrait of Tiran, an Israeli naval andparatroop force captured the Egyptianposition on the morning of the 7th.Part of the paratroop force was thencarried by helicopter in the afternoonto the western coast of the Sinai.

By the end of 7 June, the Israeliswere pressing the Egyptians every-where in the Sinai. They had strongpositions at the Mitla Pass and hadreached the town of Romani on theMediterranean coastal road. Sharm al-Sheikh had fallen and Sharon’s ugdahwas pressing the Egyptian divisionsalong the Southern Route in thecentral sector. Despite their numerousdisadvantages, many Egyptians werestill making the Israelis fight for theirvictories. Tough fighting would benecessary to secure the eastern end ofthe Khatmia Pass.

Events of 8 June

On the morning of 8 June, Tal’srefitted forces advanced methodicallytowards the Khatmia Pass aided by air

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Map 3: Overview of the Campagn59

strikes. By 16:00 the Israelis haddestroyed about 40 tanks for the loss oftwo. The Egyptians broke off the battleand tried to escape through the Pass.There, they were delayed by a massivetraffic jam and bombed and napalmedby the Israeli air force. Tal’s forces wereable to push through, meeting littleresistance and reaching the Suez Canalearly on 9 June.

The composite force on theMediterranean coastal road attackedRomani at dawn and was able to pushon towards the Suez Canal. This forcewas hampered by various Egyptian unitsand air attacks. Eitan, the force’scommander and a future chief of theIsraeli General Staff, was wounded inone of the skirmishes. The Israelis onlyreached Qantara and its railway bridgeover the Suez Canal around 20:00.During this advance they were aided bymore Israeli air strikes. They then hadto fight the Egyptians through the nightto capture the city and eastern end ofthe bridge by dawn on 9 June.

Shadni’s brigade set off throughthe Mitla Pass at about dawn andreached the western end of the Pass bynoon. Here, it met up with a force ofIsraeli paratroopers that had been

landed in blocking positions. Theseforces reached the Suez Canal abouttwo hours after Tal’s troops on 9 June.

Yoffe’s second brigade (Sela’s)raced to the Giddi Pass to cut off theescape of the Egyptian forces headedthat way. This brigade got into a fightwith an Egyptian T-55 battalion. Hereagain, the superiority of the Centurionover the T-55 shone through. By 19:00the Israelis had fought their way throughthe Pass, aided by heavy air strikes. Fromhere, they moved to the Suez Canal andspread out along its eastern bank.

In the south central Sinai, whenSharon advanced against the GebelKharim position he discovered that theEgyptians had withdrawn once again.Sharon pushed on to Nakhl, cutting off

the second brigade of the 6th EgyptianInfantry Division and ambushing it. Thisbrigade was trapped between Sharonand Albert’s brigade from the southernNegev. Further, the Egyptians had beenbombed by relays of Israeli aircraft eversince leaving their defensive positions.The brigade desperately and repeatedlytried to fight its way through Sharon’sforce but was destroyed.

By the end of 8 June the Israelis wereclosing up to the Suez Canal and the Straitof Tiran was open to Israeli shipping. Thesurviving Egyptian forces were fleeing theSinai on foot and swimming the SuezCanal. For the Israelis, their war aims hadbeen accomplished and they turned theirstrength to fighting the Jordanians andSyrians.

Aftermath

The Six-Day War ended on theSinai front on 8 June when Egyptaccepted a UN cease-fire call. It finallyended on 10 June with a UN cease-fireon the Syrian front. Bitter recrim-inations broke out in Egypt, as thepopulation, fed a steady diet of victorycommuniqués, realised what hadoccurred. Nasser, by adroit manoeuvres,managed to retain power.60 The Arab

world was swept by a wave of fierce rageagainst Israel, and the United Kingdomand United States.61

Wholesale court-martials wereundertaken against Egyptian officerswho had, or were said to have, failed intheir duty.62 In order to avoid such afate, Field Marshal Amer, expecting tobe the scapegoat for the disaster,committed suicide.63 New seniorofficers were appointed to rebuild theEgyptian army and the old classstructure was broken up by grantingofficer commissions to competentindividuals of humbler birth.64

Within a relatively short time theSoviet Union had replaced 70% of theequipment lost in the war.65 The Sovietsalso provided equipment of newer

designs and thousands of instructors tohelp the Egyptians to master modernwarfare.66 This permitted a major and pro-found rebuilding of the Egyptian army.

The Egyptians never accepted thatthe war was lost. They continued tofight the Israelis. Even before theIsraeli-reckoned outbreak of the War ofAttrition in 1969,67 the Egyptiansattacked when and how they could.Egyptian commando and artilleryattacks were being carried out againstthe Israelis along the Suez Canal withinthree weeks of the end of the Six-DayWar.68 The Israeli destroyer Eilat wassunk off the Mediterranean coast ofEgypt in October 1967.69 Palestinianguerrilla attacks resumed immediatelyafter the war, supporting the efforts ofthe regular armed forces and helpingto restore Arab self respect.70 Theseterrorist attacks also spread outside ofIsrael, bringing the Arab-Israeli conflictto peoples who had nothing to do witheither party. Clearly, being defeated wasnot going to bring the Egyptians, or theArabs in general, to the peace table.

At the same time, the Israelisbecame arrogant and complacent, failingto assess whether they had won the 1967Sinai Campaign or whether the

Egyptians had lost it. Some Israelisalso came to believe that they couldredraw their nation’s borders inpursuit of a narrow vision of aGreater Israel.71 Another, moretraumatic war six years later and the

arrival of an Egyptian president readyto risk assassination and domesticturmoil72 were needed before Israel wasable to achieve even a “cold peace” withEgypt.

LESSONS FOR THE CANADIAN ARMY

G eneral. Some may challenge therelevance of the 1967 Sinai

Campaign to Manoeuvrist Operationsand armies benefiting from therevolution in military affairs. Clearly, theIsraelis did not have the panoply of hightech, computer-based equipment sobeloved of RMA enthusiasts. However,such tools are only a means to an end.Further, it is not the possession of such tools that is most important in“RMA-warfare” but rather the relativedominance in their use over the enemy.

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Some may challenge the relevance of the 1967 Sinai Campaign to Manoeuvrist Operations…

44 The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin

In 1967, the Israelis had a clear technicalsuperiority over the Egyptians, par-ticularly after the Egyptian air force hadbeen destroyed. The air superioritygained by this destruction allowed theIsraelis to carry out deep strikes againstEgyptian formations and facilities thatwere far from the front lines.Additionally, General Gavish’s eaves-dropping of the lower level Israeli tacticalcommand radio nets, and the use of mostof his staff as “eyes and ears” with hisforward formations, gave him asituational awareness somewhat similarto what digital command and controlsystems are trying to provide. Hismethods even allowed him to correctconfusion at the brigade level.73 I believethat the campaign offers lessons that weslough off at our peril.

Utility of Manoeuvrist Operations.The first obvious lesson from the cam-paign is that Manoeuvrist Operations canwork. In four days, an Israeli force of 10brigades, supported by overwhelmingair power, routed a defending forceroughly twice its strength andbenefiting from strong positions. It didthis without ever having to engage overhalf of the Egyptian force in majoroperations.74 The Egyptian army lost80% of its equipment in the Sinai andsuffered over 55,000 casualties.75

Having fought through the Egyptianforward defences and realising that theEgyptian morale had collapsed at thehighest command levels, the Israeliswere able to advance through theEgyptians, completing their rout. It canbe argued that the Egyptian army wasnot defeated in the Sinai but rather thatits commander-in-chief, Field MarshalAmer, was overwhelmed by events andthat his morale and ability to commandwere destroyed; exactly what ManoeuvristOperations seek to accomplish.

Risk of Casualties. The second lessonis that Manoeuvrist Operations are nota magic recipe to avoid casualties. Infour days of fighting the Israelis lostsome 300 dead and 1,100 othercasualties in the Sinai Campaign, abouta 2% casualty rate. Most of these lossesoccurred in the early break-in battleswhen the Egyptians fought well andbenefited from their prepareddefences.76 These losses were tinycompared to those of the Egyptians and

what was accomplished. However, onecannot assume that the Canadianpeople and the Army are ready forsimilar numbers of casualties, otherthan in a conflict involving a nationalinterest perceived as vital by theCanadian population and government.

Need for Traditional CombatCapabilities. The third lesson flowsdirectly from the second. Most of theIsraeli losses were suffered in the earlybreak-in battles. Some in the Canadianarmy have argued that modern wardoes not actually require fighting. Ineffect, they have argued that RMA, anall-seeing intelligence system andManoeuvrist Operations will protect usfrom the “tedious” business of fighting.Such a course of events in war isobviously to be desired. However, armiesthat build themselves based on wishesand ignoring unpalatable things arefrequently defeated when they finally getinvolved in a war. Thus, the lesson is that,while preparing for a high tech,Manoeuvrist Operations type of war, theCanadian Army must be prepared tocarry out combat operations of the moretraditional types, including directassaults on the terrain the enemyconsiders very important or his centre ofgravity, such as natural/man-madefortified areas and urban complexes

Value of Strategy/Doctrine. Thefourth lesson is what can be achievedwhen a nation and its armed forcesdevelop a valid strategy and use it wisely.The Israelis developed a strategy of pre-emptive attack and carrying the war tothe enemy’s territory quickly. Theirarmed forces, particularly the air forceand army, were developed toimplement such a war. Equipment,training, force structure and planningwere driven by the strategy’srequirements. This focus led to astunning Israeli victory. The CanadianArmy faces different circumstancesthan those faced by the Israelis in the1960s. However, the same requirementexists to build a coherent army that isable to carry out the missions assignedby its government. It has been arguedelsewhere77 that the Canadian Army isnot buying equipment that meets therequirements of its ManoeuvristOperations doctrine. Further, a seniorCanadian army officer was recently

overheard to comment that the Army isneither teaching nor using ManoeuvristOperations.78 If we do not equip for, teach or employ ManoeuvristOperations, it is unlikely that we willreap their benefits.

The Influence of Luck and RandomFactors. The fifth lesson is that conflict isnot a structured activity regulated byimmutable scientific rules. Rather, it is astruggle between opposing human wills.Thus, all of the results of an action orplan cannot be predicted. At best, onecan try to identify likely outcomes andtrends. No one can be sure if fuel truckswill be captured or lost, whether unitswill attack bravely and effectively orfumble in disorder, when units will getlost or misunderstand their orders, etc.Preparing for conflict does not lend itselffully to the discipline and skills of theaccountant and efficiency expert. Suchskills are important to developing andsustaining an army, however, the frictionof war means everything will not go asyou wish or plan. All armies and militaryplans must contain a depth of reservesand flexibility of decision making to caterfor the unexpected. No doctrine canalter this basic fact; at best, it can seek tomitigate the effects of confusion andenemy action.

Limits of Manoeuvrist Operations.The final lesson is that while ManoeuvristOperations won an astounding victoryfor the Israelis in 1967, they did not bringpeace. Military operations are not asubstitute for diplomacy and statesman-ship at the highest levels. To paraphraseClauswitz, they are simply an extension ofpolitics by other means, not a panacea.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

T he Israeli experience in the Sinaishows the promise of Manoeuvrist

Operations and highlights some lessonsabout them. The Canadian Army shouldlearn from these lessons in support of itsown application of this doctrine. Doingotherwise would be to ignore a warningoffered by history and possibly to placeour own troops needlessly at risk in somefuture conflict.

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ENDNOTES

1. Canadian Government, B-GL-300-000/FP-000 (CFP 300), Canada'sArmy – We Stand on Guard for Thee, Canadian Government Publications, 1998.2. See Canadian Government, B-GL-300-001/FP-000 (CFP 300[1]),Conduct of Land Operations – Operational Level Doctrine for the CanadianArmy, as found on the Defence Intranet, 2000 and the Canadian ArmyLessons Learned Centre’s Dispatches (Vol. 5, No. 1) devoted toManoeuvrist Approach to Operations.3. See for example Misunderstanding Mars and Minerva: The CanadianArmy’s Failure to Define an Operational Doctrine, LCol Hope, ADTB Vol. 4,No. 4., pp. 16 to 35.4. Among other references see Canada’s Army, pp. 101, 102 and 114.5. Major L. Mader, Manoeuvrist Operations: Some Thoughts on Whether WeHave Got It Right, ADTB Vol. 3, No. 4/Vol. 4, No. 1., pp. 50 to 53.6. See J.N. Westwood, The History of the Middle East Wars, Toronto: RoycePublications, 1984, pp. 64 to 66.7. See John Laffin, The Israeli Army in the Middle East Wars 1948 – 73,London: Osprey Publishing, 1982, p. 14.8. See The History of the Middle East Wars, p. 82.9. See ibid., pp. 69 to 71, and Dr. George W. Gawrych, Combat StudiesInstitute Research Survey No. 7 Key to the Sinai: The Battles for Abu Ageila inthe 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars (hereafter Key to the Sinai), FortLeavenworth Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, p. 75.10. See The History of the Middle East Wars, pp. 82 to 83, and Key to theSinai, p. 75.11. See A.J. Barker, Six Day War, New York: Random House, 1974, p. 10,Key to the Sinai, p. 74, and The History of the Middle East Wars, p. 82.12. See Key to the Sinai, p. 75.13. See Six Day War, p. 10.14. See Key to the Sinai, p. 75.15. See Six Day war, p. 11, and The History of the Middle East Wars, p. 82.16. See Six Day War, p. 13, and Key to the Sinai, p. 75.17. See Key to the Sinai, p. 75.18. See Six Day War, pp. 13 and 14.19. See Six Day War, pp. 15 to 19, and Key to the Sinai, p. 76.20. See Six Day War, pp. 18 and 19, and Bernard Michal, Les guerresisraélo-arabes Volume 3, Geneva: Editions Farnot, 1975, pp. 108 and 109.21. See Les guerres israélo-arabes Volume 3, pp. 115 to 120, and Six Day War,pp. 18 to 21.22. See Six Day War, p. 33.23. Israel in 1967 had a ratio of only 13 square miles of territory to eachmile of frontier. John D. Burtt, Organized Chaos Israeli Defense Doctrine andTactics, Strategy and Tactics Magazine Number 168 (hereafter OrganizedChaos), Lancaster: Decision Games, 1994, p. 12.24. See Six Day War, p. 31, The Israeli Army in the Middle East Wars 1948 - 73,pp. 3, 14 and 15, Key to the Sinai, pp. 67 to 69, and Organised Chaos, p. 14.25. See Organized Chaos, p. 14 for an expansion of this idea as well as TheIsraeli Army in the Middle East Wars 1948 – 73, p. 3.26. This section is a synthesis of information found in Key to the Sinai, pp. 3 to 6.27. Numerous spellings can be found for the names of places in theSinai. In order to simplify matters, and where relevant, I have used thespellings shown on the accompanying maps.28. See Six Day War, p. 75 and Key to the Sinai, p. 79.29. Extracted from Key to the Sinai, p. 79.30. See John Keegan, World Armies Second Edition, Detroit: Gale Research

Company, 1983, p. 169, Six Day War, p. 43, and The History of the MiddleEast Wars, pp. 64 and 113.31. See Key to the Sinai, pp. 76 to 80.32. See ibid., p. 125.33. See The History of the Middle East Wars, p. 26.34. Ibid.35. See Key to the Sinai, p. 72.36. See ibid., p. 91.37. See Martin van Creveld, Command in War, London: HarvardUniversity Press, 1985, p. 201.38. See ibid., p. 198.39. See Key to the Sinai, p. 71. 40. See Command in War, p. 196.41. See ibid., p. 198.42. See ibid., p. 198, and Key to the Sinai, pp. 70 to 71.43. See Command in War, pp. 198 to 201.44. See ibid., p. 200.45. See Key to the Sinai, pp. 97 to 98. 46. See The History of the Middle East Wars, p. 87, Key to the Sinai, p. 93, andSix Day War, p. 79.47. See Key to the Sinai, p. 78, and Six Day War, p. 77.48. See Six Day War, p. 78.49. See Key to the Sinai, p. 88.50. Sources are quite vague about the identification of Israeli brigades andbattalions. Where known, their formal names are given. If this is not possible,the name of their commander is used, if known. In some cases, neither thenames of some brigades nor that of their commanders are known.51. This force structure is developed from the often contradictoryinformation in Key to the Sinai, pp. 88 to 92 and 96, The History of the MiddleEast Wars, p. 87, The Israeli Army in the Middle East Wars 1948 -73, p. 16, KatzSamuel M., Israeli Elite Units Since 1948, London: Osprey Publishing, 1988,p. 14, and Israeli Defence Force (IDF) website as of 7 December 2001.52. Extracted from Key to the Sinai, p. 89.53. This description of the events of the Sinai Campaign is a synthesis ofthe sometimes contradictory text in Key to the Sinai, pp. 99 to 127, TheHistory of the Middle East Wars, pp. 85 to 95, Six Day War, pp. 60 to 65 and75 to 101, The Israeli Army in the Middle East Wars 1948 -73, pp. 16 to 18, Lesguerres israélo-arabes, Volume 3, pp. 149 to 214, Israeli Elite Units Since 1948,pp. 14 to 15, and the IDF web site as of 07 December 2001. Except whereconsidered important, endnotes will not be given for each fact cited.54. All timings cited are Israeli time, which was one hour earlier thanEgyptian time.55. See Key to the Sinai, p. 118.56. See The History of the Middle East Wars, p. 91.57. See Key to the Sinai, p. 118.58. See Command in War, p. 201.59. Extracted from Key to the Sinai, p. 119.60. See Six Day War, pp. 148 to 152.61. See ibid., pp. 152 to 153.62. See The History of the Middle East Wars, p. 113.63. See ibid., p. 91.64. See ibid., p. 113.65. See The Israeli Army in the Middle East Wars 1948 -73, p. 20.66. See The History of the Middle East Wars, pp. 115 and 116.67. See The Israeli Army in the Middle East Wars 1948 - 73, p. 21.68. See Israeli Elite Units Since 1948, p. 17.69. See The History of the Middle East Wars, p. 116.70. See Six Day War, p. 159, and Israeli Elite Units Since 1948, p. 15.71. See The History of the Middle East Wars, p. 110.72. See World Armies Second Edition, p. 173.73. See Command in War, pp. 199 to 200.74. See Key to the Sinai, p. 126. The Israelis did not have to fight anymajor engagements against the two Egyptian armoured divisions, aninfantry division and an infantry brigade.75. See The History of the Middle East Wars, p. 95, and Six Day War, p. 100.76. See The History of the Middle East Wars, p. 88, Six Day War, p. 100, andKey to the Sinai, p. 70.77. Manoeuvrist Operations: Some Thoughts on Whether We Have Got It Right,ADTB Vol. 3, No. 4/Vol. 4, No. 1.78. This comment was made as part of a privileged platform and istherefore not attributed here.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR…

Major Les Mader is a graduate of CMR de Saint-Jeanand the Army Command and Staff Course Division 2 atRMCS Shrivenham. He has served in field artillery and airdefence units in Gagetown, West Germany, Valcartier andCyprus. He is currently serving with the OperationalResearch Division in NDHQ. He would like toacknowledge the editorial advice of Major R.J. Round,RCD, Mr K.A. Mader and Mrs D. Mader and the mapreproduction assistance of Sergeant J.A.M. Marcoux, RCA.