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BALOCHISTAN

PILDAT ISSUE PAPER

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS | MARCH 2012

Published by

Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency - PILDATHead Office: No. 7, 9th Avenue, F-8/1, Islamabad, Pakistan

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Printed in Pakistan

Published: March 2012

ISBN: 978-969-558-255-8

Any part of this publication can be used or cited with a clear reference to PILDAT.

CONTENTSCONTENTSPrefaceExecutive Summary

Introduction- Ethnic Composition- Resource-rich Province- Under-developed Balochistan

Historical Perspective of Balochistan Accession to Pakistan

Brief Overview of Conflicts

- Intensification of Baloch Insurgency- Basis for Baloch Unrest: the Balochistan Narrative- The Counter Narrative

No Seat at the Table

Addressing Balochistan Grievances: Steps taken by the Federal Government- Implementation of the Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan Package- FC under the Provincial Control- Composition of the Army

Continuing Insurgency- Grievances against the FC- Labelling Perspectives

Looking Ahead: Questions to be Addressed

Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Balochistan Province and the Region

Table 1: Population by Mother Tongue (1998 Census)Table 2: Unemployed – BalochistanTable 3: Trends in Regional InequalityTable 4: Overview of Natural Gas Production & Consumption among the Provinces

th thTable 5: Representation of Balochistan in the 12 and 13 National Assembly of Pakistan

Table 6: Representation of Balochistan in the Senate of Pakistan: 2012Table 7: Parties Representation in the Balochistan Provincial Assembly Table 8: Share in Total Transfers by ProvinceTable 9: Relative Per Capita Transfers by ProvinceTable 10: Ethnic Composition of Pakistan Army

Appendix A: Districts of Balochistan

Issue PaperIssue Paper P I L D A T

March 2012

The Balochistan Conflict

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th thespite 18 Amendment to the Constitution, the 7 NFC Award and the Aghaz-e-Haqooq Balochistan package that have granted unprecedented financial, political and administrative autonomy to Balochistan in line with the demands of the Dnationalist parties and forces, unrest and insurgency in Balochistan have continued. What ails Balochistan in reality?

What are the unmet demands of Balochistan?

Dominant discourse on Balochistan these days is blaming Pakistan's military and security agencies for compounding the scenario in the province. There is a complete and total absence of a counter-narrative from the Federal Government and the Establishment. What is the real issue? Who are the real culprit behind the current quagmire in Balochistan and what is the way forward?

As an indigenous organization, PILDAT believes there is a need to have an objective and fact-based discussion on Balochistan. This Issue Paper attempts to provide a backdrop for an objective discourse.

AcknowledgmentsThis paper has been prepared under the PILDAT project titled Dialogue on Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan which is supported by the British High Commission, Islamabad.

Disclaimer PILDAT and its team have made every effort to ensure the accuracy of the contents of this paper and do not accept any omission or error as it is not deliberate. This paper does not, in any way, reflect the views of the British High Commission, Islamabad or the British Government.

IslamabadMarch 2012

PREFACEPREFACEPREFACE


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alochistan has seen several insurgencies and several military operations to counter these insurgencies. The fifth and on-Bgoing insurgency intensified after the death of Sardar Akbar Khan Bugti who was killed on August 26, 2006 in Kohlu, Balochistan along with 21 security personnel in an operation involving the security forces.

The incumbent Government has made significant efforts to address the grievances of the people of Balochistan. Before assuming office in September 2008 President Asif Ali Zardari apologized to the Baloch nation for years of injustices. Signing of a

th thconsensus 7 National Finance Commission (NFC) award, passage of the 18 Constitutional Amendment, adoption of a package of reforms and concessions called 'Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan' and completion of devolution process envisaged

thin the 18 constitutional amendment have been some of the Government's steps in addressing the long standing concerns of Balochistan.

Despite introducing substantive reforms, the Government has not been able to reap the benefits of these landmark developments. It could neither contain the insurgency nor bring simmering scenario in Balochistan to normalcy. Even though the ruling PPPP at the centre holds a major share of power in the province as well, the party and its provincial leadership does not seem to be able to sell to the people the landmark developments for the betterment of the province.

Insurgency has intensified over these 4 years and Baloch leaders loudly claim civil governments, both in the centre and in the province, are not in-charge and have abdicated their constitutional responsibilities to the security agencies.

For its part, the Military also seems to be making efforts in Balochistan to dispel the impression that it is in-charge in Balochistan; in fact it vehemently denies any involvement in Balochistan by citing the worsened law and order situation as an example claiming that had military been in-charge the law and order situation would have been better. The Chief of Army Staff has publicly announced withdrawal of forces from the Sui town of Dera Bugti pledging that in the future no military operation will be carried out without prior approval of the Provincial Government. In November 2011, the Federal Cabinet decided to put the Frontier Constabulary under the administrative control of the Provincial Government of Balochistan. Not much though seems to have happened on this count as the Provincial Government recently sought the Federal Government's intervention and asked it to help improve its relations with the FC. Contrary to political slogans raised by the nationalists in Balochistan, Pakistan Army has doubled the Baloch representation in the institution from 2 % in 2001 to 4% in 2011 with special steps to speedily bring this representation equal to the percentage of Balochistan population in the country.

This insurgency is manifested in attacks on security forces and non-Baloch settlers. A new pattern of killings has also emerged in Balochistan. Young Baloch persons, mostly those who are known for their nationalist views and activism, go missing and after a few days their dead bodies bearing torture marks are found dumped in some isolated area. There is a discrepancy in figures of missing persons and casualties both as sited by the Federal and Provincial Governments and the Military sources and those offered by the Baloch nationalists.

Balochistan is also well-known for its relative under-development among the federating units of Pakistan. Balochistan's literacy rdrate at 51.5% is the 3 lowest among the four provinces. In terms of missing facilities in Government Schools in 2009-2010,

Balochistan ranks the third amongst the provinces. The number of unemployed persons in Balochistan (0.06 million) constitutes about 20 % of the total number of unemployed persons (3.05 million) in the country which indicates a disproportionately high number (Balochistan constitutes just 5 % of the total population of Pakistan) Generally, Balochistan has seen the lowest annual growth rate among the provinces of Pakistan.

Balochistan has always received a higher per capita transfer of funds from the federation than any other province. However, the magnitude of the transfer has varied, increasing to a high of 2.26 Relative Per Capita Transfer (which means that the per capita transfer was more than twice that of the one that was due by population) in 1991-92. After the 7th NFC, Balochistan's share in total transfers has increased to 9.5% in 2010-2011. It also means that Relative Per Capita transfer of funds to Balochistan has grown to 1.857 in 2010-11, the highest among all federating units of Pakistan.

Major nationalist parties of Balochistan boycotted the 2008 General Election that resulted in their non-representation in National

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYEXECUTIVE SUMMARYEXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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and Provincial Assemblies. The paper questions whether the large-scale redressal of long-standing demands of Balochistan th ththrough 18 Amendment to the Constitution and the 7 NFC Award have not borne fruit because parties to the conflict have not

had a seat at the table?

Raising a number of questions on how to move forward, the paper proposes that there has to be a political agreement on minimum conditions for dialogue.

Pakistan has witnessed a landmark development when on the Supreme Court orders, intelligence agencies produced “missing persons” in front of the Supreme Court. What is the implication of this for the missing persons in Balochistan? How this breakthrough can be taken forward to resolve the issue of Balochistan?

The paper also argues that no legitimate and balanced conversation, and the shaping of a national policy to deal with security related issues, can be complete or effective without seeking a systematic input of the military into it and without respecting the principle of civil-democratic supremacy. This requires a coordinated set-up through which regular input is sought and received. Whether this set-up is named as National Security Council or the Cabinet Committee on Defence is less important than the requirement that it must have a permanent secretariat, support by a dedicated think tank and is pro-active rather than reactive in matters of national security.

The paper also points to the need for a code of conduct by the media to provide a balanced perspective on Balochistan.

A free, fair and credible election in Balochistan, in which all political parties of Balochistan can and must participate freely, is a key requirement to future prosperity of Balochistan. It is only through this process that parties to the conflict can find a seat at the table for addressing Balochistan's issues. How can the parties to the conflict be brought back into the electoral field and how can a free and fair election be made possible in Balochistan are the key questions that need to be addressed at this stage.


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Figure 1: Balochistan Province and the Region

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Introduction

Balochistan, situated in the southwest of Pakistan, constitutes 44% of the total land mass. It covers an area of 347,190 kilometres but is home to only 5% of the total population of the country. Balochistan straddles Iran and Afghanistan to its west and north-west and borders the Arabian Sea in the south.

Balochistan is administratively divided into 30 districts. Figure 1 illustrates these districts and Appendix A provides area and population-wise break-up of the districts of Balochistan.

Ethnic Composition

A number of ethnic groups constitute the people of Balochistan. Three major ethnic groups are Baloch, Pashtoon and Brahvi. Others include Hazaras and who are generally known as “settlers.” Balochistan, despite its scarce population, has an uncommon racial and tribal diversity. Most of the people in the cities and towns understand and speak more than two languages. In addition to Balochi, Pashto and Brahvi, languages such as

1Seraiki and Sindhi. Darri and Persian are also spoken. Table 2 provides a breakup of population in the context of mother tongue.

1. Balochistan Culture and Heritage: http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/menu-culture-and-heritage.html


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Tribal structures dominate political processes in Balochistan, resulting in the prevalence of patron-client networks. The ethnic diversity of the province – with ethnic Baloch people being a bare majority, though contested by Pashtuns, adds to its political fragmentation.

Ethnic nationalism, however, is not the only factor that defines Balochistan. Pro-Islamic political parties, mainly the JUI-F, also hold sway over large chunks of the province. Sunni-Shia divide has also sharpened in the recent months with the increasing incidents of targeted killing of Hazaras who are a Shia tribe of Balochistan.

If the 1998 census is used as a basis, Baloch constitute about 55% of Balochistan population and Pashtun constitute about 30% and 15% others, but Pashtun do not accept these statistics terming the population percentages in the 1998 census to be flawed. Pashtuns also contend that settlers do not constitute less than 10% of Balochistan's population and since they are mostly settled in Pashtun areas, Pashtun and settlers constitute a majority in the province. Pashtuns claim that their population in the province is almost equal to that of Baloch population. Hence Pashtuns demand equal representation in Balochistan.

Experts also believe that since Pashtuns boycotted the 1998 census, the census figures do not completely reflect the population break-up which is roughly at 45% Baloch and 45% Pashtun at the moment.

While Balochistan's Pashtuns may have sympathy for Baloch grievances, they have shunned away and occasionally condemned the violence by the nationalists.

Pashtuns, however, have unequivocally continued to raise the issue of Balochistan rights in the federation. Pashtuns

complain that the province is almost entirely run by the Baloch at the moment. Pashtuns have no quota in jobs and even the convention of a Pashtun being Governor of Balochistan if the Chief Minister is Baloch has been broken this time. They complain that the Governor, Chief Minister, Speaker Balochistan Assembly and even Chief Secretary are all Baloch that is tantamount to the negation of Pashtuns in Balochistan.

Resource-rich Province

Balochistan is considered a resource-rich province. It holds large quantities of coal, gold, copper, silver, platinum, aluminium and uranium. The subsoil holds a substantial portion of Pakistan's energy and mineral resources, accounting for 36 percent of its total gas production. Balochistan is also a potential transit zone for a pipeline transpor ting natural gas from Iran and Turkmenistan to rest of Pakistan and India. The Balochistan coast offers an economic zone potentially rich in oil, gas, and minerals spread over approximately 180,000 square kilometres.

The low population density implies that the province enjoys a potentially high value of natural resources per person. The forbidding topography is home to rich mineral deposits – some of which have been explored and

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2. Population Census Organisation: http://www.census.gov.pk/MotherTongue.htm3. Pashtuns of Balochistan: Majeed Asghar, Daily Jang, February 23, 2011: http://jang.com.pk/jang/feb2011-daily/23-02-2011/col5.htm 4. Pakistan Economic Survey 2010-11: http://finance.gov.pk/survey/chapter_11/12-Population.pdf

Urdu Punjabi Sindhi Pushto Balochi Seraiki Others Balochistan

Total 0.97 2.52 5.58 29.64 54.76 2.42 4.11

Rural 0.21 0.43 5.27 32.16 57.55 1.87 2.51

Urban 3.42 9.16 6.57 21.61 45.84 4.16 9.24

Table 1: Population by Mother Tongue (1998 Census) (Percent) 2

4Table 2: Unemployed - Balochistan

Province/Area

Balochistan

Rural

Urban

2009-2010Total

0.06

0.04

0.02

Male Female

0.03

0.02

0.01

0.03

0.02

0.01

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exploited while yet others remain to be put to economic use. The land mass of the province endows Pakistan with a strategic space that might shorten trade and travel costs between emerging economic regions. The long coastline is not only a possible site of transit routes for trade and travel, but also the gatekeeper of rich marine resources.

Under-developed Balochistan

Balochistan is also well-known for its under-developed status. While the rest of Pakistan is a labour-abundant economy with potential growth modes in agriculture, manufacturing as well as labour-intensive service sectors, Balochistan is relatively scarce in its endowments of human capital, agricultural growth and industrial investment.

According to the latest Pakistan Labour Force Survey rd2009-10, Balochistan's literacy rate at 51.5% is the 3

lowest among the four provinces (Punjab 59.6%, Sindh 58.2%, KP 50.9%) and lower than the overall national literacy rate (age 10 years and above) of 57.7 percent.

Balochistan is also less urbanized than the rest of the country as the 1998 census indicated that only 23.3 % of Balochistan's population is urban, while the current national urban population is 33.4 %.

Unemployment in Balochistan stands at 0.06 million compared to the national volume of 3.05 million unemployed persons in 2009-10. This shows that 5

Balochistan's share in the total number of unemployed persons (20 %) is much higher than its share in the total population (5 %).

Generally, Balochistan has seen the lowest annual growth among the provinces. The only exception, perhaps, is the period 2005-06 to 2007-08 when Balochistan experienced the highest (3.2 %) annual growth rate among all the provinces of Pakistan at a time when the average annual growth rate of entire Pakistan was in the negative (-1.4%).

5. Pakistan Economic Survey 2010-11: http://finance.gov.pk/survey/chapter_11/12-Population.pdf 6. The State of Economy: Devolution in Pakistan, Fourth Annual Report 2011, Institute of Public Policy, Beaconhouse National University:

http://ippbnu.org/files/4AR2011.pdf


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(Annual Growth Rate, Percent)

Urban Rural Total

5.9 10.5 9.1 3.4 6.7 5.6

1.9 8.9 6.1 2.0 2.3 3.0

9.0 8.8 9.1 3.3 5.3 5.0

-3.0 0.5

4.4 9.3 7.8 2.8 5.3 4.7

Table 3: Trends in Regional Inequality 6

Punjab

Sindh

Khuber Pakhutunkhwa

Balochistan

Pakistan

2001-02 to 2005-06 2005-06 to 2007-08 2007-08 to 2009-10

Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total

-3.0 -2.5

-1.3 -0.6 -0.9

2.2 -9.6 -2.9

-7.3 -1.5 -2.7

8.1 -1.6 3.2

-0.3 -2.2 -1.4

-2.5 -0.6

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Historical Perspective of Balochistan Accession to Pakistan

Present-day Balochistan province consisted of the Confederacy of Kalat (which included the principalities of Kharan, Makran and Lasbela) and the British Balochistan before the partition of British India.

The contact between the Khan of Kalat and the British was established in 1838 when the Indian Army crossed over the Bolan Pass to have access to Afghanistan. This contact culminated in entering into a treaty in 1876 under which Kalat gave away the charge of foreign affairs and defence to the British. Under the arrangement, 'Agent to the Governor General (AGG)' popularly known as Political Agents appointed by the British held absolute power and made the Khan of Kalat, a mere spectator in his own ' free country'. As per the Government of India Act of 1935, Kalat was given the status of an Indian state with representation in the Federal Legislature.

Before the independence of Pakistan, the territories now consolidated into the province of Balochistan did not constitute a settled province. Apart from the Quetta district that was administered under the civil law, the rest of the territory operated under a retrogressive quasi-legal framework known as the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR). Because of its peculiar administrative status, the territories in the present-day Balochistan province were left out of the central and provincial constituent assemblies' election held in the settled provinces of British India in December 1945.

The Government of British India had constituted a special body of tribal elders known as “Shahi Jirga” for consultation by the AGG on local issues relating to British Balochistan. Shahi Jirga was a quasi-representative body of the people in line with the tribal culture. The city of Quetta, the administrative capital of British Balochistan had the status of a municipality with its own local elected representatives. It also had a large military cantonment providing as a powerful base of the British control that served as a stabilizing influence on the turbulent politics of the tribes.

During the run up to the partition of British India into two sovereign dominions of Pakistan and India, the (princely) states of India, numbering around 562, were treated

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differently from those of the provinces of British India. The British Government regarded a province as a basic administrative unit that was not to be further sub-divided into two parts during the course of the partition of united India into Pakistan and India. The blue print of the partition till the time of the Cabinet Mission in 1946 was built around the concept of the Muslim majority provinces of British Balochistan, Bengal, NWFP, Punjab and Sindh forming part of Pakistan and the remaining provinces of British India forming parts of India. The Indian states were to be given an option of joining one dominion or the other. The states, despite the repeated pleas by some of them to the British, were not given the option to remain independent.

The last Viceroy (and Governor General) of India Lord Mountbatten submitted his draft recommendations on June 3, 1947 for the partition of India to the British Government wherein he clearly stated that the province of the British Balochistan would form part of Pakistan. It also contained that the choice of the people was to be ascertained through a special way (since the constituent assembly elections were not held in British Balochistan as stated earlier and there were no elected representatives). In

rdthe 3 June draft, all Indian States were to be given the option of joining Pakistan or India. This draft for the first time violated the principle of treating provinces as basic units that were not to be sub-dived, and recommended the division of the Muslim majority provinces of Bengal and Punjab.

On June 29, 1947, the Shahi Jirga of the British Balochistan (as a consultative/representative body of the AGG) along with the elected members of Quetta municipal body, unanimously passed a resolution of forming part of Pakistan (a few non Muslim members, however, did not take part in the vote). This resolution satisfied the legal provision of ascertaining the choice of the people of British Balochistan as required by June 03 draft and when the Independence of India Act was passed by the British Parliament on July 18, 1947, the province of British Balochistan was to become a part of Pakistan without any further qualification or provision.

As the time for independence and division of British India into Pakistan and India approached the appointed date of August 15, 1947, the Khan of Kalat, who enjoyed only a customary over-lordship or a nominal legal suzerainty over the three other states of Kharan, Makran and Lasbela,

7. Baluchistan- Case and Demand. PILDAT Briefing Paper, authored by Mr. Qazi Faez Isa, April 2007: http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/balochistanconflict/BalochistanCaseAndDemand.pdf

8. Rahman, SA. Baluchistan's accession to Pakistan, The Post, dated June 20, 2006

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1955.

The accession of Balochistan, or at least of Kalat, to Pakistan left a bitter taste which nationalist Balochs used as base to build a movement for autonomy or separation. This movement has seen several ups and downs during the past 64 years.

Brief Overview of Conflicts

Since independence, there have been a number of times when the Federal Government resorted to the use of force in stamping its writ in Balochistan:

1. In 1948, as a consequence of the accession of Kalat to Pakistan, Khan's brother, Shahzada Abdul Karim mustered 130 tribesmen to start an insurgency that never quite took off the ground and the matter was brought under control.

2. The second wave of rebellion in Balochistan emerged with the constitutional arrangement of 'One Unit' after October 14, 1955. It was made clear by the Baloch that the constitutional arrangement was not to their liking. The Baloch leaders were of the view that there should be a gradual change with their consensus.

3. With the declaration of Martial Law in October 1958. Anti-state disturbances, however, were par tly sparked by Khan of Kalat's arrest on October 5, 1958, i.e., two days prior to declaration of Martial Law. But in 1962 he asked for forgiveness and was pardoned and released with full amount of Privy Purse.

4. In February 1973 when Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto dismissed the Balochistan Government of Chief Minister Sardar Attaullah Mengal. The Marri and Mengal armed tribesmen and some others took to mountains to fight the Government control that led to heavy actions by the military to restore the situation. This led to escape from Pakistan a few important tribal leaders with the tribesmen to Afghanistan to carry on with their struggle.

5. The 5th and continuing wave of conflict began when tension mounted between the Bugti tribe under the leadership of Nawab Mohammad Akbar Khan Bugti and the Provincial and Federal authorities. The situation continued to deteriorate. Greater autonomy was demanded in a 15 point agenda by late Nawab Akbar Bugti and Mir Balach Marri. It erupted in an armed clash between the Baolch militant forces and the state armed personnel to curb the insurgency from spreading. Nawab Akbar Bugti was condemned by the ruling military regime and considered a part of

approached the British Rulers to seek an exclusive favour of getting the status of a British State instead of being treated like the rest of Indian states. He wanted to keep the state as a British territory outside the newly emerging dominions of Pakistan and India. This was unacceptable to the British in the broader context of the legal framework of the partition and independence of British India and they rejected it. The Indian Independence Act that provided the administrative/legal framework for the independence of British India gave only one option to an Indian State - of joining Pakistan or India while respecting the aspirations of the State subjects.

There was a delay on the part of the Khan for declaring his accession to Pakistan with some discrete intention of an independent or quasi independent status of some kind which was not provided by the Independence of India Act that applied to all the 562 Indian States. While he was withholding the decision on accession, the other three states of Kharan, Makran and Lasbela called off the mutual suzerainty arrangements and separately acceded to Pakistan in March1948 leaving only the state of Kalat taking its time to decide its future.

There are reports that Khan of Kalat also approached the leadership of India regarding the possible independence of Kalat but apparently the Government of India did not encourage him as they felt that an independent Kalat may become a British outpost which may subvert the concept of an independent sub-continent. Khan of Kalat met Quaid-e-Azam twice, who advised him to accede to Pakistan. In the last resort, it is reported, the Khan of Kalat called a meeting of tribal Sardars but none turned up because on February 12, 1948 at Sibi they had promised with Quaid-e-Azam allegiance for Pakistan. The Khan eventually declared accession of the state of Kalat to Pakistan on March 22, 1948.

It is, however, reported that earlier a section of the political leadership of Kalat, including the elected House of Commons and nominated Upper House, took a position against accession to Pakistan. The legal instrument of accession was, however, to be signed by the Khan who eventually did sign it. It is also reported that Armed Forces of Pakistan moved into Kalat following the treaty of accession.

It is also reported that the treaty of accession provided for special provisions of internal autonomy for Kalat which were later not respected by the Government of Pakistan while merging the state into a one unit of West Pakistan in


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the problem. The condemnation bolstered the cause of the Baloch dissidents and made Baloch nationalist heroes.

Intensification of Baloch Insurgency

The killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti on August 26, 2006 proved to be a game-changer in worsening Balochistan conflict. Earlier, except for the Marri tribe insurgents, who, in a guarded way, used to talk about rights beyond the constitutional bonds of the country but practically were taking full part in constitutional activities (like contesting elections and taking oath of allegiance to the country's constitution; in all the previous elections Nawab Khair Baksh Marri himself and his sons had been taking part in elections and wining), the remaining nationalist elements, inclusive of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, never talked / propagated/pursued aims beyond the constitutional parameters of Pakistan.

This conflict prior to 2005 was confined to only 7 per cent of the area of Balochistan (parts of Kohlu and Dera Bugti districts) whereas 2006-onwards, it has engulfed more than half the area of province. After the death of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, most of the disgruntled, unemployed and motivated Baloch youth from many of the remaining tribes of Balochistan have joined the ranks and files of

9insurgents.

Basis for Baloch Unrest: the Balochistan Narrative

i. There have long been endemic and widespread

perceptions among the people of Balochistan that they have been perpetually neglected by the federal authorities in socio-economic development. This perception stems from the fact that Pakistan is a federation and federal fiscal system is expected to bring about equalization among federating units, provision of public services and socio-economic development indicators.

ii. Another common belief among people of Balochistan is that the province is very rich in natural resources especially petroleum gas, coal, minerals, coastal and regional communication/trade potential. The people of the province and the nationalist political leadership believe the province has not been getting a fair share of the proceeds/benefits of exploitation of their natural resources.

iii. There persists a common tendency that Balochistan does not enjoy fair representation in federal services and armed forces, especially senior bureaucracy at the Centre

iv. There persists deeply felt issue of royalty on natural gas especially from the county's largest and oldest gas field Sui. It is believed in Balochistan that well head price of Sui (which forms the basis for calculating royalty payable to the province) was kept low by the Federal Government to cross-subsidize higher priced (at the well head) natural gas from other provinces (who correspondingly receive higher royalty amounts) at the expense of the province of Balochistan.


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10Table 4: Overview of National Gas Production & Consumption among the Provinces

Province Total Gas Produced, MMCf (Percent of Total Production)

Total Gas Consumed, MMCf (Percentof Total Consumption)

Consumption aspercentage of Production

Sindh

Punjab

KP

Balochistan

Total

1,000,415 (70 %)

68,608 (4 %)

26,370 (1 %)

318,188 (22 %)

1,413,581 (100 %)

459,369 (37.59 %)

638,008 (52.21 %)

42,480 (3.48 %)

82,138 (6.72 %)

1,221,995 (100 %)

45.91 %

930 %

161 %

25.81 %

9. The Balochistan Conflict, PILDAT Background Paper (May 2006), authored by Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Abdul Qadir Baloch: http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/balochistanconflict/TheBalochistanConflict.pdf

10. Pakistan Energy Book, 2007The Final Showdown, Newsline Special Report, June 2009

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inefficiency in provincial departments and poor governance in the province. It is generally believed that real issue facing the province is more a case of efficient management of resources rather than the inadequacy of them.

ii. The bureaucracy relating to the federal financial management feels that there was a lack of creative effort in the province in raising its own revenues.

iii. Federal development related organizations commonly hold that the local tribal leaders have been hindering developments in their areas to perpetuate their influence and control. As a corollary, the tribal influentials are commonly blamed for extracting excessive benefits/rents for lett ing some developmental activity in their areas.

iv. Some circles believe that most of the revenues that the province receives through federal transfers end up with the tribal political leaders and chieftains who have used it on buying weapons and mustering the tribal bands. Lack of development, endemic poverty and deprivation among the people, it is suggested, is because of low priority and low attention to the problems of the people.

v. There is yet another conception of utilization of natural gas. Sui gas field was discovered in 1952 and put on production in 1955. Instead of supplying the gas within the province it was taken to all other parts of the country. This cheap source of energy was instrumental in setting up of industries all over the country except the province of Balochistan. Natural gas supply was extended to Quetta 27 years later in 1982. Some even suspect that gas supply to Quetta city was a spin off effect of the higher priority c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r t h e m i l i t a r y garrison/cantonment.Table 4 illustrates the fact that there is a significant role of Balochistan province in meeting the energy demands of the country. It also reflects that Balochistan barely consumes only a quarter of the natural gas that it produces which is the

11least as compared with other provinces of Pakistan. The employment and industrial activities in Balochistan are less outside the agriculture and mining sectors. Therefore, Balochistan lags behind other provinces in terms of economic development.

vi. T h e r e a r e n o l a r g e s c a l e i n d u s t r i e s , international/national enterprises/corporations based in Balochistan that deny the people the benefit of local employment and commerce and the provincial government share of local revenues. This is the result of discriminatory treatment against Balochistan and preferential for Sindh and Punjab. In this connection there is an often repeated demand for relocating head offices of national corporations like Oil & Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL) in Quett

vii. There is a suspicion that the real motivation behind mega projects like Gawadar Deep Sea Port Development in Balochistan is to further economic exploitation of the province. They fear the buying out of the locals at throw away land prices for big gains by the non-locals. Even the employment opportunities, they contend, would go to non-locals for reasons of skills/professional standards. They often cite the case of Sui Gas installations that cover 50 of its operations but limits the local employment to low grade unskilled cadres.

The Counter Narrative

i. There is a selectively held perception among federal bureaucracy, civil and military, about endemic


March 2012


11. The Final Showdown, Newsline Special Report, June 2009

17


March 2012


12. Boycott in Balochistan, Newsline, http://www.newslinemagazine.com/2008/02/boycott-in-balochistan/13. Election Commission of Pakistan, http://ecp.gov.pk/GE/2002/PartiesPostionNA.aspx14. Senate of Pakistan, http://www.senate.gov.pk/15. Election Commission of Pakistan, http://ecp.gov.pk/Senate/2009/PartyPositionSenators.aspx16. Official website of Provincial Assembly of Balochistan, http://www.pabalochistan.gov.pk/index.php/members/party_pos/en/9

thTable 5: Representation of Balochistan in the 12 and th 1313 National Assembly of Pakistan

No Party thSeats in the 12National Assembly (2002-2007)

thSeats in the 13National Assembly (2008onwards)

1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10.

PPPPPMLPMLNMMAPBNP-MBNP-ANAJWPPKMAPIND.

5222-1---2

-2161-1111

Table 6: Representation of Balochistan in the Senate of Pakistan: 2012

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

Seats in Senate fromBalochistan

15(2009)

Seats in Senate fromBalochistan

14(2012)

No Party

PPPP

JUI F

BNP-A

PML

ANP

NP

PKMAP

JWP

MMAP

Ind.

7

5

4

2

1

1

-

-

-

3

3

2

2

4

-

1

1

1

3

5

Table 7: Parties' Representation in the Balochistan 16Provincial Assembly

Seats inBalochistanProvincialAssembly(2008on wareds)

No Party Seats inBalochistanProvincialAssembly(2003-2007)

1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10.11.12.

PPPPPMLPMLNMMAPBNP-ABNP-MANPNational Party PKMAPJWPNPIND.

15191117-31---8

221-17-2-53471

No Seat at the Table

Major nationalist parties of Balochistan boycotted the 2008 General Election that resulted in their non-representation in National and Provincial Assemblies.

Pakhtoonkhawa Milli Awami Party, the Balochistan National Party-Mengal and the National Party boycotted the 2008 General Election with a view that free and fair elections are impossible in the absence of an independent judiciary. The political parties who contested the polls were able to form a coalition government in the province in 2008 (PML, JUI-F and BNP-Awami). It is believed that the nationalist parties' decision to boycott the polls gave greater legitimacy to those nationalists who wanted to quit

12parliamentary politics.

Election to the Senate of Pakistan in March 2012 has further reduced the representation of the parties who had boycotted the 2008 General Election in the Parliament of Pakistan.

19


March 2012


port” as the major reasons of “armed insurrection” in Balochistan.

However the blames of non-integration of Balochistan into Pakistan have all been sorted jointly by the Parliament and major political parties of Pakistan in recent years.

Asif Ali Zardari, Co-chairman of the PPP apologized to the Baloch nation for years of injustices in February 2008. After the 2008 General Election, coalition Government led by the Pakistan People's Party has taken landmark steps to address the grievances of Balochistan. The three key initiatives have been:

1. Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan Package: November 2009

2. 7th National Finance Commission Award: December 2009

3. 18th Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan: April 2010

The Balochistan package included an immediate release of political workers and political dialogue with major stakeholders in the province. It also proposed a fact-finding commission to investigate the circumstances that led to the death of Nawab Akbar Bugti; a judicial inquiry into the killing of three Baloch nationalist leaders; stopping the construction of cantonments in Sui and Kohlu;

Addressing Balochistan Grievances: Steps taken by the Federal Government

In 2004, the then Prime Minister Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain made the first substantive effort to address Baluchistan's issues peacefully. In this endeavor, two parliamentary committees were constituted. The committee headed by Senator Wasim Sajjad was tasked with compiling Balochistan's concerns on constitutional issues such as provincial autonomy and decided on how much control the province should exercise on its natural resources. The second committee headed by Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed was responsible for addressing the Baloch's reservations on military cantonment and mega projects such as the Gawadar Port. While the Committee headed by Senator Waim Sajjad could not complete its task, Senator Mushahid Hussain's committee did an extensive work by meeting all sections of Baloch leadership and compiled a comprehensive report. However the recommendations of the Parliamentary committees were not implemented at that time.

17Writing his analysis in early 2006, Frédéric Grare sited “... central government's suppression of nationalistic aspirations; the absence of economic and social development ... exclusion of the provincial authorities and local population from decisions on major regional projects, most notably the construction of the Gwadar

17. Frédéric Grare, Pakistan: The Resurgence of Baluch Nationalism, Carnegie Papers, January 2006 (Number 65). 2006 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

18. The State of Economy: Devolution in Pakistan, Fourth Annual Report 2011, Institute of Public Policy, Beaconhouse National University: http://ippbnu.org/files/4AR2011.pdf

18Table 8: Share in Total Transfers by Province (Percent)

33.8 65.8 139.4 131.7 316.0 506.7 718.3 1068.7

55.3 45.1 51.3 47.0 47.1 47.3 47.2 46.7

24.0 23.9 24.9 23.8 30.1 29.8 29.3 26.7

12.7 19.0 15.9 17.8 14.4 14.8 15.2 17.1

7.9 12.0 7.9 11.4 8.4 8.0 8.3 9.5

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

1990-1991

1991-1992

1996-1997

1997-1998

2005-2006

2007-2008

2009-2010

2010-2011

Total FederalTransfers toProvinces(Rs in Billion)

Punjab (%)

Sindh (%)

KP (%)

Balochistan(%)

Pakistan

20


March 2012


divisible pool, changed the formula of division of provincial share on the basis of multiple criteria, taking into account special developments needs of the smaller provinces of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, enhanced straight transfers and recognised all taxes on services to be provincial subjects (including the federal excise duty levied on services).

Balochistan has always received a higher per capita transfer of funds from the federation than any other province. However, the magnitude of the transfer has varied, increasing to a high of 2.26 Relative Per Capita Transfer (which means that the per capita transfer was more than twice that of the one that was due by population) in 1991-92.After the 7th NFC, Balochistan's share in total transfers has increased to 9.5% in 2010-2011. It also means that Relative Per Capita transfer of funds to Balochistan has grown to 1.857 in 2010-11, the highest

20 among all federating units of Pakistan.

According to the budget estimates for 2010-11, Punjab's share in total federal transfers was 46.7 percent, Sindh's 26.7 percent, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa's 17.1 percent and Balochistan's 9.5 percent.

Implementation of the Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan Package

In line with the promises made in the Balochistan package, on April 20, 2011 the Chief of Army Staff General Kayani

withdrawing the Armed Forces from these areas; limiting federal agencies' operations to terrorists; and tracing missing citizens.

thThe 7 NFC Award that transfers more resources to the provinces especially to Balochistan, and the 18th Amendment to the Constitution that fully restores a parliamentary democracy while devolving much more authority to the provincial governments are termed as historic changes in Pakistan that have altered and re-adjusted the balance of federal-provincial relations in Pakistan.

thAmong its other major highlights, the 18 Amendment, in line with the demands of Balochistan and other provinces, omitted the Concurrent List containing subjects on which both the Parliament and the Provincial Assembly could legislate and exclusive rights of the provinces to legislate on these subjects were accepted. It was guaranteed that the NFC shall not reduce the share of resources allocated to the Provinces by the previous Commission. Provinces have, thus, become entitled, as of right, to the entire proceeds of the excise duty on oil in addition to the excise duty on natural gas. The Provinces have also been given power to raise domestic or foreign loans with the approval

19of the National Economic Council.

In a depar ture from previous revenue sharing arrangements the 7th NFC Award enlarged the divisible pool of taxes, increased the share of the provinces in the

th19. Impact of the 18 Constitutional Amendment with Special Reference to Federation-Provinces Relations and Demarcation of Roles between the Federation and the Provinces: PILDAT Briefing Paper, authored by Shahid Hamid. July 2010.

20. The State of Economy: Devolution in Pakistan, Fourth Annual Report 2011, Institute of Public Policy, Beaconhouse National University:

21. Ibid, Pp 93

Http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/PAP/Impactofthe18thConstitutionalAmendmentonFederalProvincesRelations-BriefingPaper.pdf

http://ippbnu.org/files/4AR2011.pdf

*Ratio of share in transfers to share in population

21Table 9: Relative* Per Capita Transfers by Province

0.953 0.778 0.884 0.810 0.821 0.824 0.822 0.815

1.030 1.026 1.069 1.021 1.270 1.257 1.235 1.127

0.948 1.418 1.186 1.328 1.043 1.072 1.099 1.234

1.453 2.264 1.491 2.151 1.647 1.569 1.565 1.857

1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000

1990-1991

1991-1992

1996-1997

1997-1998

2005-2006

2007-2008

2009-2010

2010-2011

Punjab

Sindh

KP

Balochistan

Pakistan

21


March 2012


under the package. Senators allege that the government failed to deliver on promised political rapprochement with the estranged Baloch leaders in exile and security related issues. The reasons, they say, is that political rapprochement and security related issues are seemed not to be in control of the civilian government.

The deteriorating law and order situation was also accepted by the Advisor to Prime Minister on Human Rights, Mustafa Nawaz Khokar in the National Assembly, who stated that the number of forced disappearances in Balochistan have increased during the current year. In 2010, he said, cases of 102 forced disappearances were reported while in 2011 the total number of cases was

24206.

FC under the Provincial Control

The Provincial Government of Balochistan has been demanding that the control of Frontier Corps (FC) be placed with them. On November 2, 2011 the Federal Cabinet decided to put the FC under the control of the Provincial Government of Balochistan.

Not much though seems to have happened on this count as the Provincial Government recently sought the Federal Government's intervention and asked it to help improve its relations with the FC. In, response, in a rather strong statement, Prime Minister Gilani asked Frontier Corps and other law-enforcement agencies to respect the mandate of Balochistan Government and help it restore law and order

announced that all forces will be withdrawn from the Sui town of Dera Bugti and replaced by Frontier Constabulary (FC). He also said that in the future no military operation will be carried out without prior approval of the Provincial Government.

The Federal Government claims 80% of the Balochistan package is implemented. Only 27 of 61 proposals are left to be implemented with a year left in the implementation period, which was set at three years. “Had it not been for the missing persons and the mutilated bodies, there would have been an unprecedented forward movement towards improving the situation,” says Prime Minister

22Gilani.

The package includes six constitutional, five political, 16 administrative and 34 economic proposals. The federal and provincial governments are yet to initiate some mega projects that are part of the much-celebrated reforms package, said a 43-page progress report prepared by the

23Establishment Division.

The Government, however, has conceded before the Cabinet that it has not been able to implement one major demand of the people of Balochistan promised in the Balochistan package: constitution of a commission to investigate the circumstances of the death of Nawab Akbar Bugti.

Incidents of killings and kidnapping by 'unknown' agencies in Balochistan have not decreased either as promised

22. PM asks agencies to respect Balochistan govt's mandate, Dawn, March 11, 2012: http://www.dawn.com/2012/03/11/pm-asks-agencies-to-respect-balochistan-govts-mandate.html

23. Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan: 80% work complete, says Gilani: The Express Tribune, November 30, 2011: http://tribune.com.pk/story/299979/aghaz-e-haqooq-e-balochistan-80-work-complete-says-gilani/

24. Balochistan Package: government failed to implement major demand: Business Recorder, February 11, 2012: http://www.brecorder.com/general-news/single/599/172/1152550/

Table 10: Ethnic Composition of Pakistan Army (Percent)

Class Composition 2001 2009 2011

Punjab

KPK

Sindh

Balochistan

Kashmir & Northern Areas

Minorities

Total

61.77

13.65

13.00

2.00

9.29

0.29

100

55.85

14.09

15.92

3.62

9.72

0.80

100

54.50

14.50

17.00

4.00

9.00

1.00

100

22


March 2012


in the province. “The mandate of the Balochistan government has to be respected. The FC is bound to assist

25the provincial administration,” Gilani said reportedly.

Composition of the Army

On December 19, 2011, Baloch Nationalist leader Sardar Ataullah Khan Mengal after meeting with PML-N Chief Nawaz Sharif while commenting about the Army said that, “This is not Pakistan Army. It is Punjabi Army that is indulging in such inhuman acts against the Baloch

26people.”

Latest figures from the Inter Services Public Relations, however, tell a different story. According to the ISPR, Punjabis represent 54% of the Army, down from 61.7% in 2001. Similarly, Baloch have a representation of 4% which has doubled from 2% in 2001. Special efforts to induct more Balochs to the Armed Forces are expected to continue until Baloch share corresponds to its population.

25. PM asks agencies to respect Balochistan govt's mandate, Dawn, March 11, 2012: http://www.dawn.com/2012/03/11/pm-asks-agencies-to-respect-balochistan-govts-mandate.html

26. Balochistan at point of no return, Dawn, December 20, 2011: http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/20/balochistan-at-point-of-no-return-mengal-tells-nawaz.html

23


March 2012


their grievances with Islamabad. But if atrocities continue 29the Baloch will never accept a united Pakistan.”

Responding on the above, FC Inspector General Major General Ubaidullah Khattak outrightly rejected the above. Instead, he charged that 90% of the missing persons were required in a number of criminal cases and that the missing persons have been killed by their own respective organizations.

Grievances against the FC

Currently, the Baloch have more complaints against the FC than the Army itself or the Federal Government. People see the FC, whose composition includes barely 10 per cent of local Baloch, as a troublemaker rather than a solution to the ragging conflict. Balochistan Chief Minister Nawab Mohammad Aslam Raisani blames the FC for allegedly running a “parallel government” within the province. Ministers in his cabinet accuse the FC of sabotaging every attempt to politically reconcile with the enraged Baloch leaders. The nationalists accuse it of whisking away political activists during broad daylight from public places like universities and markets. In one such incident, hundreds of people saw the FC personnel whisking away three Baloch nationalist leaders from Turbat district two years ago. Within a couple of days, all three leaders were

30killed and their bodies were thrown in an abandoned area.

Labelling Perspectives

From the perspective of Pakistan Army, a “military operation” takes places when tanks and helicopters as well

as weaponry are employed to accomplish a goal.

On the other hand, the Baloch equate extra-judicial killings, disappearances, and even the checking at check-posts with “operation.” Every time the Army Chief or the Federal Interior Minister Rehman Malik decline any “ongoing operations” in Balochistan, the Baloch instantly cite the killing or “disappearance” of some young political workers and activists.

In a similar stance, the interpretation of the term

Continuing Insurgency

While proponents of Baloch 'liberation' from Pakistan term thgranting of rights and resources to Balochistan under 18

thAmendment and 7 NFC Award, albeit in their private conversations, to be “more than what they could ever dream of,” insurgency in Balochistan has intensified since after 2008.

This insurgency is manifested in attacks on security forces and non-Baloch settlers. It is estimated that in nearly 1500 attacks by insurgents in Balochistan, over a 1000 civilians have lost their lives while nearly a 100 personnel of law enforcement agencies have sacrificed themselves. This list does not take into account the injured and seriously wounded in these attacks.

In the recent months a new pattern of killings has emerged in Balochistan. Young Baloch persons, mostly those who are known for their nationalist views and activism, suddenly go missing and after a few days their dead bodies bearing torture marks are found dumped in some isolated area. Since June 2010 bodies of at least 233 men have been found dumped in the usual kill and dump operations

27in Balochistan. Since 2008 at least 1200 settlers have also been killed in Balochistan. During the year 2011, 99 such bodies have been found. According to reports 59 settlers have been targeted this year compared to above

28100 in 2010.

However, figures vary as provided through official and unofficial sources. The discrepancy in figures itself, creates serious concerns.

Baloch leaders have been vocal in registering their concerns over the prevailing law and order situation. To this effect, Sardar Ataullah Mengal, a senior leader of the BNP-M warned that “Baloch youths don't want such a Pakistan in which they receive mutilated bodies of their compatriots. It is for them to decide [about their future], because they are being systematically eliminated and forced to seek refuge in the mountains.” He also held out a ray of hope: “If one last effort is made with sincerity, there is a possibility that Baloch youths might agree to discuss

27 Missing Persons: Two bullet-riddled bodies found in Pasni, November 21, 2011::http://tribune.com.pk/story/295092/missing-persons-two-bullet-riddled-bodies-found-in-pasni/

28 Settlers – caught in Crossfire, Dawn, June 29, 2011:http://www.dawn.com/2011/06/29/settlers-caught-in-crossfire-2.htmlBalochistan security review: Sharp fall in target killing of settlers, Express Tribune, December 28, 2011:http://tribune.com.pk/story/312911/balochistan-security-review-sharp-fall-in-target-killing-of-settlers/

29 Balochistan at point of not return, Mangal, Dawn, December 20, 2011: http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/20/balochistan-at-point-of-no-return-mengal-tells-nawaz.html

30. A lasting Solution for, Balochistan, Dawn, July 06, 2011: http://www.dawn.com/2011/04/25/a-lasting-solution-for-balochistan.html

24


March 2012


“development” holds a different understanding. For the government, development projects mean the work at Chamalong Coal mines or the establishment of cadet colleges and cantonments.

On the other hand, the Baloch are sceptical of these measures and consider it a “usurpation” of Baloch

resources under the umbrella of “development.”

25


March 2012


31. Missing Persons Case: Fiery SC lays down the law for spy agencies, The Express Tribune, March 2, 2012: http://tribune.com.pk/story/344312/missing-persons-fiery-sc-lays-down-the-law-for-spy-agencies

Looking Ahead: Questions to be Addressed

1. Development: Grare (2006) terms the latest conflict in Balochistan to have been provoked, “ironically, by the Federal Government's attempt to develop this backward area by undertaking a series of large projects.”

Parliament and Federal Government's initiatives from 2008-2011 to structurally address issues of marginalization of Balochistan have also not positively addressed the unrest in Balochistan.

Is it correct that the large-scale redressal of long-standing demands of Balochistan through 18th Amendment to the Constitution and the 7th NFC Award have not borne fruit because parties to the conflict have not had a seat at the table? In the political parlance, therefore, it is not the nationalist parties with large-scale public support, that have delivered the solutions to Balochistan problems. How should this issue be addressed here onwards?

2. “Political” Solution: The need for a political solution to Balochistan has almost become a rhetorical demand. Emphasis is also placed on finding a solution “through dialogue.” But dialogue with whom and on what conditions?

Chief Minister Balochistan Nawab Aslam Raisani claims that separatists are not ready for talks and want independence. He believes this would lead to civil war and disaster for the province. He also talks of 'foreign hand' behind the unrest.

The Federal Government seems to flip-flop. In recent weeks, Interior Minister Rehman Malik has once again declared immunity to Baloch leadership.

In reality, however, there has to be a political agreement on minimum conditions for dialogue. The unrest in Balochistan needs to be sorted within Pakistan's Federal framework. While the Government insists it will not talk to terrorists in the north-west of Pakistan until they lay down arms, should the same conditions be applied in Balochistan?

3. Missing Persons: February 13, 2012 marked a

milestone in Pakistan's history when on the Supreme Court orders to the Military Intelligence (MI) and Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) seven (7) prisoners were produced in front of the Supreme Court. On March 1, 2012 the Supreme Court reprimanded the intelligence agencies by telling them that they are not above the

31 law. The Chief justice also termed them as the biggest violators of the law of the country. While commenting on the role of Intelligence agencies in Balochistan the Chief Justice said, “You are an arsonist. You have set Balochistan on fire.”

This is a breakthrough as for the first time in recent history, Intelligence Agencies, which largely operate outside the ambit of law, are being held to account by the Supreme Court. What is the implication of this for the missing persons in Balochistan? How this breakthrough can be taken forward to resolve the issue of Balochistan?

4. National Security: What is to be the role of the military in defining and carrying out a national security strategy? It is a national question facing Pakistan over the last 6 decades but it has assumed greater significance in view of the unrest in Balochistan.

The Baloch crisis is not just the unintended outcome of more or less appropriate decisions. The crisis epitomizes the Army's control over key national policies. Since 2004 the Pakistan Army has repeatedly claimed that it is not involved militarily in Balochistan. The Provincial Government claims that the situation is not in their hands since FC is calling the shots. FC is supposedly under the Provincial Government.

Whether the civil Government has abdicated its responsibilities to the Military or it does not enjoy any powers is a moot point. No legitimate and balanced conversation, and indeed the shaping of a national policy to deal with security related issues, can be complete or effective without seeking a systematic input of the military into it. This requires a coordinated set-up through which regular input is sought and received. Whether this set-up is named as National Security Council or the Cabinet Committee on Defence is less important than the requirement that it must have a permanent secretariat, support by a

26


March 2012


32. Report highlights pathetic plight of the media in Balochistan, The News, February 27, 2012: http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-12782 Report-highlights-pathetic-plight-of-the-media-in-Balochistan

33. Media and Terrorism, Report by Committee on Culture, Science and Education, The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Doc. 10557, May 20, 2005.Rapporteur: Mr Josef Jaøab, Czech Republic, Liberal, Democratic and Reformers' Group:

http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc05/edoc10557.htm 34. State of Electoral Reforms in Pakistan: 1st Quarterly Citizens Monitoring Report, PILDAT. February 2012.

Http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/elections/StateOfElectoralReformsInPakistan_CitizensMonitoringReport.pdf

dedicated think tank and is pro-active rather than reactive in matters of national security under the overall supervision of the elected civilian leadership.

5. Media and Balochistan: Pakistan media is up in arms on the PEMRA press advice to TV channels against airing interviews of exiled Baloch leaders, such as Brahmdagh Bugti and Hyrbyiar Marri without editorial control, which, according to the authority, amounts to sedition. There is, however, a crucial need of a perspective by media on Balochistan.

The allegations that media in Balochistan is under 32tight control of FC may be true and is condemnable

and must stop, but unbridled freedom without any ethics or responsibility is also not a media norm anywhere in the world.

It is worth questioning whether providing a platform of publicity, without any editorial control or rules or ethics, to terrorists and separatists who seek to undermine the State of Pakistan is a practice media organizations should indulge in?

Comparative examples in recent history show that the BBC, for an entire decade beginning in 1988, did not broadcast direct statements by representatives or supporters of 11 Irish political and military organizations, especially the Sinn Féin.

While Western Europe enjoys exemplary freedom of information for its citizens and media, a report by the Assembly of the Council of Europe is worth quoting through which it advises media to develop a code of conduct to deal with terrorists acts and threats without contributing to the impact of terrorism and avoid contributing to the aims of terrorists or by

33offering terrorists a platform of high publicity.

6. Free and Fair Election: While Pakistan has made important strides Constitutionally in providing a level playing field to all in Election during the last four

34years, nowhere else is this requirement more crucial than in Balochistan.

Evidence from previous elections, lately the 2008 General Election, suggests that the security and intelligence agencies associated with the armed forces have not allowed the conduct of a free and fair election in Balochistan.

A free, fair and credible election in Balochistan, in which all political parties of Balochistan can and must participate freely, is a key requirement to future prosperity of Balochistan. It is only through this process that parties to the conflict can find a seat at the table for addressing Balochistan's issues.

How can the parties to the conflict be brought back into the electoral field and how can a free and fair election be made possible in Balochistan are the key questions that need to be addressed at this stage.

27



March 2012

No data available for districts marked with *

Appendix A: Districts of Balochistan 35

No. District Area (km²) Population (1998) Density (persons/km²)

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

Awaran

Barkhan

Bolan

Chagai

Dera Bugti

Gwadar

Haranai *

Jaffarabad

Jhal Magsi

Kalat

Kech (Turbat)

Kharan

Khuzdar

Kohlu

Lasbela

Loralai

Mastung

Musakhel

Nasirabad

Nushki*

Panjgur

Pishin

Qilla Abdullah

Qilla Saifullah

Quetta

Sibi

Sheerani *

Zhob

Ziarat

Washuk *

Balochistan Province

29,510

3,514

7,499

50,545

10,160

12,637

2,445

3,615

6,622

22,539

48,051

35,380

7,610

15,153

9,830

5,896

5,728

3,387

16,891

7,819

3,293

6,831

2,653

7,796

20,297

1,489

347,190

118,173

103,545

288,056

202,564

181,310

185,498

432,817

109,941

237,834

413,204

206,909

417,466

99,846

312,695

295,555

179,784

134,056

245,894

234,051

367,183

370,269

193,553

744,802

180,398

275,142

33,340

6,563,885

4

29

38

4

18

15

177

30

36

18

4

12

13

21

30

30

23

73

14

47

112

28

281

23

14

22

19

33. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting: http://www.infopak.gov.pk/districtPK.aspx and Balochistan.Gov.PK: http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=32&Itemid=703

28


March 2012


PILDAT Publications on Balochistan

1. Inter-Provincial Water Issues in Pakistan: Background Paper, January 2011: http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/WaterR/Inter-ProvincialWaterIssuesinPakistan-BackgroundPaper.pdf

2. The Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan Package: An Analysis, Background Paper, December 2009, Authored by Mr. Shahid Hamid: http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/balochistanconflict/PILDATBalochistanPackageAnalysis101209.pdf

3. The Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan Package: An Analysis [Urdu], Background Paper, December 2009, Authored by Mr. Shahid Hamid: http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/Balochistanconflict/PILDATAnalysisAghaazHuqooq-e-BalochistanPackage-UrduDec2009.pdf

4. Rule of Law and Democracy in Pakistan, The Road to the Future Issues in Balochistan, FATA and Civil-Military Equation in Pakistan, Background Paper, June 2008, Authored by Mr. Shahid Hamid: http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/CMR/RuleOfLawAndDemocracyInPakistanIssuesInBalochistanFATAandCivilMilitaryEquationInPakistan.pdf

5. The Balochistan Conflict, Background Paper, May 2007, Authored by Lt. Gen (Retd.) Abdul Qadir Baloch: http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/balochistanconflict/TheBalochistanConflict.pdf

6. Balochistan Case and Demand, Briefing Paper, April 2007, Authored by Mr. Qazi Faez Isa: http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/balochistanconflict/BalochistanCaseAndDemand.pdf

7. Election 2007: Challenges & Prospects with Special Focus on NWFP and Balochistan, National Workshop Report, April 2007: http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/elections/Election2007-ChallengesandProspectsspecialfocusonnwfpandbalochistan-NationalConferenceReport.pdf

8. Dynamics of Federalism in Pakistan: Current Challenges and Future Directions, Briefing Paper, December 2006, Authored by Dr. Hasan Askari Rizvi: http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/FPLGS/DynamicsofFederalismInPakistanDec2006.pdf

9. Overview of the Constitution of Pakistan, PILDAT Briefing Paper, August 2004, Authored by Syed Jaffar Ahmed: http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/constitution/OverviewoftheConstitutionofPakistan-Aug2004.pdf

10. Pakistan Ka Wifaqi Nizam: Pusmanzar, Ertika Aur Derpaesh Challenges (Urdu), Briefing Paper, August 2003: http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/FPLGS/FederalGovernmentSystem-urdu.pdf

11. Federal, Provincial and Local Governments: Demarcation of Roles, Issues and Possible Solutions, Workshop for Members of the Provincial Assembly of Balochistan, Workshop Report, July 2003: http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/FPLGS/FederalProvincialandLocalGovernments-DemarcationofRolesIssuesandpossiblesolution-Quetta.pdf

Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency - PILDATHead Office: No. 7, 9th Avenue, F-8/1, Islamabad, Pakistan

Tel: (+92-51) 111 123 345 | Fax: (+92-51) 226 3078Lahore Office: 45-A, 2nd Floor, Sector XX, Phase III, Khayaban-e-Iqbal, DHA, Lahore, Pakistan

Tel: (+92-42) 111 123 345 | Fax: (+92-42) 3569 3896Web: http://www.pildat.org

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Documents

balochistan province

representation of balochistan

balochistan narrative

balochistan package

haqooq balochistan package

unmet demands of balochistan

senate of pakistan

parties representation