it all starts with training

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It All Starts with Training

Crisis Prevention and U.S. Foreign Aairs Agencies

John Norris, Abigail Long, Sarah Margon, and David Abramowitz December 2011


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It All Starts with TrainingCrisis Prevention and U.S. Foreign Aairs Agencies

John Norris, Abigail Long, Sarah Margon, and David Abramowitz December 2011

About Humanity United

Humanity United is a oundation dedicated to building peace and advancing human reedom. At home and

in the corners o the globe where these ideals are challenged most, we lead and support eorts to lit upthe voices and will o people, ensure good governance and the rule o law, engage markets and business as

a orce or change, and encourage the exploration o promising ideas and innovations to end conict and

slavery. All with the belie that everyone has the right to a lie that is peaceul and ree. Learn more at

www.HumanityUnited.org.


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Contents 1 Introduction and summary

6 The need for better crisis prevention training

at State and USAID

14 The civil-military training divide

24 Competing conflict assessment tools

28 Recommendations

32 Conclusion

33 About the authors

34 Acknowledements

35 Endnotes


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v cee Amea Pgess | i All Sas w tag: css Peve ad U.S. Feg Aas Agees

Source: http://www.undorpeace.org/global/library/cr-11-14-s-ailedstatesindex2011-1106q.pd

The Fund or Peace 2011 Failed States Index underscores he enormiy o

challenges acing U.S. diplomas and developmen expers around he world

oday. Te repor ranked 177 naions based on heir respecive levels o sabiliy

and he social, economic, and poliical pressures ha hey ace. Te color-coded

map above denes hose counries wih increasingly darker shades o red as

hose mos a risk o v iolence and upheaval, while hose in increasingly darker

shades o green are seen as susainably sable. Our repor, I All Sars wih

raining, explores he undamenal quesion o how we can beter prepare

Americas oreign policy expers o deal wih his complex, dangerous, and

rapidly changing environmen.

Failed States Index 2011


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1 cee Amea Pgess | i All Sas w tag: css Peve ad U.S. Feg Aas Agees

Introduction and summary

Signicanly improved raining courses and proessional developmen

opporuniies are criically needed a core U.S. oreign aairs agencies,

namely he Deparmen o Sae and Unied Saes Agency or Inernaional

Developmen, or USAID. Wihou enhanced raining, diplomas will coninue

o lack he broad range o ools hey need o deal wih he many complicaed

and challenging global issues hey regularly encouner wheher on he ground

or back in Washingon.

A key ool is being beter a conic prevenion given he increasing regulariy

wih which poliical insabiliy can emerge anywhere in he world. Secreary o

Sae Clinon noed, Wih he righ ools, raining, and leadership, our diplomas

and developmen expers can deuse crises beore hey explode.1

Wih he righ raining, diplomas and developmen expers can advance

democracy, galvanize economic growh, and srenghen he rule o law beore a

conic emergesno aer.

As poliical dynamics around he globe coninue o shi unexpecedly, prevening

and responding o expensive and desrucive global crises will need o be a cor-

nersone o our oreign policyparicularly i he Unied Saes wans o become

more eecive inernaionally and avoid cosly engagemens over he long run. In

order or ha o happen, our diplomas and developmen expers need o possess

he righ skill se and ools.

Tis paper looks a curren conic prevenion raining in oreign aairs agencies

and how his raining can be improved.

Recent government reviews highlight why conflict prevention matters

Te Obama adminisraion has conduced a broad series o reviews on how U.S.

diplomacy and developmen are organized and conduced around he globe.


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Cenral o all o hese reviews is ha he Unied Saes needs o do a ar beter job

o prevening, miigaing, and resolving violen conics and crises.

Te reviews include, mos noably, he Quadrennial Diplomacy and

Developmen Review, or QDDR, released in December 2010, a Presidenial

Sudy Direcive on Global Developmen policy issued in Sepember 2010, andhe recen Presidenial Sudy Direcive on prevening mass arociies announced

in Augus o 2011.2 USAIDs recenly released policy ramework incorporaes

many o he goals o improved crisis prevenion idenied in hese reviews ino

is policy prioriies and operaing principles.

Te QDDR is admirably blun in recognizing ha he U.S. approach o prevening

and managing crises is usually oo slow and ad hoc. Te U.S. governmen oen

ailed o bring appropriae experise o bear and largely ailed o insiuionalize

even basic lessons learned.3

A number o saisics rom he QDDR make clear how pressing conic preven-

ion is or he Unied Saes:

Close o 60 percen o Sae and USAIDs oreign assisance goes o 50 coun-

ries ha are in he mids o, recovering rom, or rying o preven conic

or sae ailure.4

More han 25 percen o Sae and USAIDs personnel serve in he 30 counries

classied as highes risk or conic and insabiliy.5

More han 2,000 civilian personnel are currenly deployed o Aghanisan and Iraq. 6

Prevenion is also cos eecive: According o he Carnegie Commission on he

Prevenion o Deadly Conic, or every $1 dollar spen on prevenion i would

cos $60 o inervene miliarily aer violence erups. 7

Moreover, Brown Universiys Coss o War Projec esimaes ha he oal cos

o he ongoing U.S. involvemen in Iraq, Aghanisan, and Pakisan has been

more han $3 rillion.8

While ha number is an esimae, i makes obvious hahe U.S. governmen remains willing o expend enormous resources responding

o crises while shorchanging even modes invesmens in beter raining our

ocials o preven hem.

The U.S.

government

remains willing

expend enormo

resources

responding

to crises while

shortchanging

even modest

investments in

better training o

ocials to preve

them.


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Tis approach resuled in he Unied Saes conribuing almos hal o oal

world miliary expendiures las year. (see Figure 1)

Te QDDR issued his clarion call:

We start by embracing crisis and conict prevention andresolution; the promotion o sustainable, responsible, and

eective security and governance in agile states; and oster-

ing security and reconstruction in the aermath o conict

as a central national security objective and as a core State

mission that must be closely supported by USAID and many

other U.S. government agencies.9

Te QDDR dedicaed an enire chaper o Prevening

and Responding o Crisis, Conic and Insabiliy, and

esablished a new undersecreary or civilian securiy,democracy, and human righs whose primary role includes

prevening and responding o crisis and conic, securing

democracy, and advancing human righs.

Te QDDR also creaed he new Bureau o Conic

and Sabilizaion Operaions, or CSO, wihin he Sae

Deparmen. I ocially launched in November 2011,

and i builds on he ormer oce o he Coordinaor or

Sabilizaion and Reconsrucion, which was esablished in 2004 o lead,

coordinae, and insiuionalize U.S. governmen civilian capaciy o preven or

prepare or posconic siuaions and o help sabilize and reconsruc socieies

in ransiion rom conic or civil srie.

Like he QDDR , he Presidenial Sudy Direcive on U.S. Global Developmen

policy called or a beter balance o civilian and miliary power o address conic,

insabiliy, and humaniarian crises, and he adminisraions recen Presidenial

Sudy Direcive on mass arociies idenied mass arociies and genocide preven-

ion as a core naional securiy ineres and moral responsibiliy.

Similarly, USAIDs 2011-2015 policy ramework noed ha he agency would

develop new approaches o equip sa and parners wih he skills o analyze and

respond o dynamics o conic and insabiliy.10

Source: Credit Stockholm I nternational Peace Research Institute; http://www.sipri.

research/armaments/milex/actsheet2010.

Figure 1

A big piece of the pie

Top 10 shares o world military expenditures, 201

42.8%

3.7%3.6%

3.6%

25.3%

China

7.3%

5.8%

2.8%

2.8%

2.3%


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So on paper, crisis prevenion is a U.S. governmen prioriy. ranslaing he

adminisraions rheoric ino realiy, however, is remendously dicul, and iwould likely require ar more disrupive changes o curren sysems han any o

hese reviews acknowledge. Te USAID policy ramework is an imporan sar,

bu unless signican insiuional reorm occurs in he near uure no meaningul

change will happen.

Beter raining is only one piece o he puzzle. Policymakers need o orego he

insinc o manage he inbox and ocus greaer atenion on over-he-horizon hreas

beore hey become ull-blown crises. rue conic prevenion requires policymak-

ers o make recommendaions when inormaion is imperec and he coss o acion

are high. In a consrained budge environmen he margin or error is slim.

Bu ransorming how U.S. civilian agencies address conic prevenion will

demand more han major insiuional shisi will also require a much

larger and more dicul o execue sea change in he culures o boh he Sae

Deparmen and USAID wih suppor rom Congress, as we deail in he paper.

Sill, raining is a good place o sar. Our research or his paper made abundanly

and someimes painully clear ha he sae o conic prevenion raining a

boh Sae and USAID remains shockingly limied, ad hoc, and uncoordinaed.raining has litle or no link o career advancemen, as opposed o our miliary

branches, and i is oen seen as an inconvenience raher han an asse.

Many o he U.S. governmen ocials making key decisions on conic preven-

ion a Sae and USAID hold almos zero ormal raining in he basic preceps

Throughout the paper we use the term crisis prevention in its broadest sense to

include everything rom the use o conict early warning systems to eorts to help-

ing a nation build durable peace as it emerges rom a conict.

Crisis prevention is oten divided between direct prevention and structural

prevention. Direct prevention reers to immediate, short-term eorts to avert

a deadly crisis or conict such as intensied senior-level negotiations or

deploying a peacekeeping orce in the midst o escalating tensions. Structural

prevention eorts are longer term and seek to address underlying causes and

triggers o potential violent crises through economic development or build-

ing more accountable and equitable institutions.

What is crisis prevention?


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ha would allow hem o be eecive in his role. Tis is no o blame hose

dedicaed ocials and educaors currenly conducing conic prevenion rain-

ing in aliaion wih Sae and USAID. Insead, i is a serious indicmen o he

broader sysem in which hese rusraed ocials nd hemselves embedded.

Tis paper explains why crisis prevenion raining or ocials a he SaeDeparmen and USAID needs o be improved, evaluaes he insiuional

changes in crisis raining arising rom he QDDR and oher ocial reviews, and

makes a number o pracical recommendaions o srenghen his raining going

orward amid an era o increasing ederal budge auseriy.

Te paper also explores he sark dierences beween how raining is

approached in he U.S. miliary as opposed o he civi lian oreign aairs agen-

cies, and looks a he compeing conic assessmen models among he civilian

agencies hemselves.

Our key recommendaions o improve crisis prevenion raining include (all are

discussed in greaer deail laer in his repor):

ying promoions direcly o conic prevenion raining Giving pos bid preerence o hose Foreign Service ocers who complee a

ceried core curriculum in conic prevenion raining Requiring all incoming Sae and USAID ocers o ake a basic course on

conic prevenion11 Providing or addiional raining or Foreign Service ocers deploying o a

conic-prone counry Requiring Foreign Service ocers o complee a year o advanced raining o be

eligible or promoion o Senior Foreign Service Esablishing he personnel capaciy or civilian inernaional aairs agencies o

do beter raining Creaing a new cone wihin he Foreign Service dedicaed o conic prevenion Synchronizing USAIDs operaing expenses wih is program budge

As he map rom he 2011 Failed Saes Index a he beginning o his repor

illusraes, he number o counries around he globe a risk o unres and whole-sale violence remains disurbingly high. Unless he Unied Saes can ge ahead

o his curve and do a beter job in crisis prevenion and miigaion, he coss o

Americaand is naional ineresswill remain unenable.


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The need for better crisis prevention

training at State and USAID

Some Sae Deparmen ocials argue ha diplomacy is conic prevenion,

and o some exen his is rue. Diplomas are expeced o analyze he poliical

siuaions in counries where hey are deployed and acively engage wih various

paries o a conic or even help negoiae soluions o problems.

Bu in realiy, eecive direc and srucural conic prevenion (see ex box in

he inroducion) require a specic se o skills ha go beyond he day-o-day

managemen o bilaeral relaionsa dicul ask in and o isel. Tese skil lsrequire specic raining in early warning and conic analysis; conic miiga-

ion, mediaion, negoiaion, and resoluion; and posconic peacebuilding and

reconciliaion. Righ now, Sae and USAID ocials are no receiving adequae

raining in hese areas.

Tis secion explores he curren raining sysems in place a Sae and USAID,

he key oces wih responsibiliies or crisis prevenion, and why a larger

culural shi will be required i we wan he U.S. governmen o ge beter a

prevening crises.

Lack of conflict training for foreign officers

Early in heir careers, mos Foreign Service ocershose individuals charged

wih carrying ou he oreign policy o he Unied Saes and aiding U.S. cii-

zens abroada he Sae Deparmen will spend ar more hours learning boh

diplomaic proocol and how o screen visa applicans han hey will learning how

o aver a crisis or conic a heir pos. According o some, mos young Foreign

Service ocers may seek more insrucion on proper able eiquetebecausehey perceive ha such skills are a pah o advancemenhan honing heir abili-

ies o engage in successul mediaion, negoiaion, or idenicaion o poliical

aul lines wihin a sociey.


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On he whole, he diplomaic corps remains remarkably poor a analyzing and

undersanding risk simply because i is given so litle raining in his regard. Tere

is currenly no sandard cericaion or deermining who is a rained conic

prevenion proessional wihin he U.S. governmen.

Tis is even more remarkable since he U.S. governmen is dealing wih a serieso susained crises on he ground. A large percenage o USAID and Sae o-

cials have now done roaions hrough Aghanisan, Pakisan, and Iraq over he

las decade because o he policy prioriy assigned o hem by boh he Bush and

Obama adminisraions. In hese setings, ocers gained considerable exposure

o conic and posconic programming on a large scale. Ye hese same se-

ings made obvious how litle raining senior ocials a Sae and USAID have

in conic prevenion.

Ocers headed or Sudan, Pakisan, Iraq, and Aghanisan do ge some special

raining o work in hese specic environmens, bu i is sill lacking and has onlyrecenly become somewha regularized.

Mos Sae and USAID ocers headed or Aghanisan, or example, receive

our o ve weeks o specialized raining, wih a good porion o his ocused on

deensive driving and personal securiy. Given he complexiy o he siuaion

in Aghanisan, i is dicul o imagine how such raining would suce in giv-

ing hem he educaional grounding and skill ses hey need o succeed in such a

harrowing environmen. Te litle raining oered has oen relied on clichd and

oversimplied vignetes raher han rigorous analysis.

By conras, during he Vienam conic, USAID ocers received several monhs

o raining in addiional o language raining in preparaion or a our o duy.

In shor, no conic prevenion rainings are mandaory or he civilian oreign

aairs agencies in he U.S. governmenonly securiy and Aghanisan-specic

rainings are. As one rusraed rainer complained, Te basic gap is ha here is no

raining or conic prevenion in he U.S. Governmen. While his is an oversae-

men born o exasperaion, conic prevenion raining remains sarkly minimal.

(We provide a more deailed exploraion o raining and how i leaves ou conic

prevenion insrucion in he Civil-miliary raining divide secion o his repor.)

On the whole,

the diplomatic

corps remains

remarkably poor

at analyzing and

understanding ri

simply because

it is given so little

training in this

regard.


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Recent changes at government offices that handle conflict

prevention arent enough

The Conflict and Stabilization Operations Bureau

Diplomas began o realize in he aermah o Iraq and Aghanisan ha he U.S.

governmen needed a more robus capaciy o preven crises and manage growing

sabilizaion operaions in counries emerging rom srie.

Acknowledging his new realiy, Congress auhorized he creaion o he Sae

Deparmens Oce o he Coordinaor or Reconsrucion and Sabilizaion in

2004. Te oces mission was, o lead, coordinae and insiuionalize U.S. govern-

men civilian capaciy o preven or prepare or posconic siuaions, and o help

sabilize and reconsruc socieies in ransiion rom conic or civil srie12

Te QDDR, released in 2010, placed a large emphasis on he oce. I urned

i ino he Conic and Sabilizaion Operaions Bureau, which will emphasize

prevenion bu add some raining eors.

Te shi o a ull-edged bureau is sill ongoing, and his reorganizaion will bring

a Senae-conrmed assisan secreary o he helm o he bureau while also help-

ing o reocus prioriies and capabiliies. Ineviably, he change will also help raise

he prole o he bureau as i indicaes a reprioriizaion o he Sae Deparmens

abiliies o developmen and address crises, conics, and sabiliy issues.

Te Civilian Response Corps is a key par o he Conic and Sabilizaion

Operaions Bureau. Te corps serves as a sand-by pool o employees rom nine

dieren U.S. governmen agencies ha are specially rained and equipped o

deploy rapidly o provide conic prevenion and sabilizaion assisance o

counries in crisis or emerging rom conic.13 Civilian Response Corps mem-

bers have been previously deployed o Uganda, Cenral Arican Republic, Chad,

he Democraic Republic o he Congo, Sudan, Somalia, Kosovo, Haii, Yemen,

Aghanisan, Pakisan, he Kyrgz Republic, and Sri Lanka.

Te Response Corps consiss o hree secions: acive, sandby, and reserve. Tese

iles indicae heir relaive readiness and are no a uncional division o labor.


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In he rs year o acive membership in he Response Corps, members are required

o ake eigh weeks oal o raining, including a basic raining course. Tis basic wo-

week course, Foundaions in Conic Prevenion and Response, is augh a he

Foreign Service Insiue. Acive members also ake he hree-week long course on

whole o governmen planning or reconsrucion and sabilizaion, which covers

inegraed assessmen and planning or sabilizaion and response operaions. Telas course hey are required o ake is he inensive hree-week Securiy or Non-

radiional Operaing Environmens, which is largely ocused on personal securiy.

In his course, individuals are augh evasive driving echniques, educaed on mine

awareness, amiliarized wih rearms, and given oher basic skills o help prepare

hem or living in highly hazardous environmens.

In year wo o acive membership, members are required o ake more raining

ha hey mus nd elsewhere, and members are given a air amoun o laiude

in selecing relevan addiional coursework rom he U.S. Insiue o Peace, he

Foreign Service Insiue, or elsewhere.

Sandby members are required o ake he same hree courses as acive members

excep on a dieren schedule. In heir rs year, sandby Response Corps mem-

bers are required o ake he wo-week long basic raining course a he Foreign

Service Insiue (he oundaions course described above), aer which hey can

be called upon o deploy. Pre-deploymen, sandby members are supposed o

(bu no are always able) o ake he securiy or nonradiional operaing environ-

mens course as well as any counry-specic raining.

Te Sae Deparmen originally required an eigh-week-long basic raining course

or all Response Corps members (acive and sandby), bu ha was signicanly

reduced due o operaional and budgeary concerns.

U.S. governmen ocials who spoke wih he auhors noed ha he wo-week,

basic-raining course is insucien. In order or members o be genuinely pre-

pared or he challenging environmens ha hey are asked o ener he course

lengh should be a leas eigh weeks. Noably, here are virually no mid-level

courses oered or Response Corps members seeking o gain deeper experise

in a paricular area or jus looking o enhance and srenghen heir skills.

Te QDDR makes a number o recommendaions o dramaically increase and

empower he sandby componen o he Civilian Response Corps. Some o hese

include increasing he number o paricipaory governmen agencies (hough he


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QDDR did no ideniy such agencies by name); expanding sandby membership

o include Foreign Service naionals, ederal reirees, and Peace Corps voluneers;

and increasing incenives and exibiliy or ederal employees o paricipae.

While he creaion o he Conic and Sabilizaion Operaions Bureau and he

Civilian Response Corps are good seps, in many ways hey ake he weigh oo all he oher bureaus a he Sae Deparmen o address conic prevenion

concerns by assigning conic prevenion o a specic bureau. Tis is paricu-

larly rue or he regional bureaus wih he greaes say in seting policy on he

ground in specic counries in conic or a r isk o enering ino conic. I he

Conic and Sabilizaion Operaions Bureau is o be genuinely eecive i will

need o oser beter, and more inerconneced, relaionships wih each regional

and uncional bureau.

Bu he idea ha a Washingon-based ocewhich only recenly became a ull-

edged bureauis supposed o coordinae he ineragency response o conicsby dispaching a eam o a counry in order o analyze a conic, prescribe solu-

ions, and make is voice heard a a sucienly senior level has no meshed well

wih operaional realiy.

Te Oce o he Coordinaor or Reconsrucion and Sabilizaions perormance

beore i was ransormed ino he Conic and Sabilizaion Operaions Bureau

underscores ha poin. Despie some successes in he eld i is dicul o cie a

crisis or conic where he oce was ruly he lead in response.

Furher, Capiol Hills suppor or he Oce o he Coordinaor or

Reconsrucion and Sabilizaion was epid a bes, and Congress requenly cus

unding or ha oce well below he presidens budge reques.

Equally worrisome was a endency o sa his oce wih a hodge-podge o

ocers drawn rom oher assignmens or hired on shor-erm conracs, wihou

necessarily having senior-level, conic-prevenion experise.

Reversing hese rends will be a key challenge or he head o he new Conic and

Sabilizaion Operaions Bureau once a nominee is conrmed.

A similar dynamic, hough less severe, is playing ou a USAID, where oces

wih specic roles in conic prevenionincluding he Conic Managemen

and Miigaion oce and he Oce o ransiion Iniiaivesoen operae

Doing confict

prevention on

the cheap, and

with the wrong

skills, is a recipe

or disaster.


15/40


a he periphery o core decisions abou developmen prioriies made in he

respecive regional bureaus.

Tis is no o argue ha hese specialized oces should no exis. Tere are cerainly

core pars o crisis prevenion ha demand highly specialized opical experise. Te

QDDR isel argued ha he crises and conics associaed wih sae weakness andinsabiliy are some o he hornies problems Sae and USAID ace:

Such conicts have rarely been simple, but today they are dened by their

complexity. Tey oen involve multiple actions within states and are driven by

a mix o religious, ethnic, ideological, political, economic, and geographic actors.

Tey are ignited or sustained by the actions o governments, insurgent groups,

criminal organizations, and terrorist networks. Increasingly, we see the eects o

climate change, urbanization, growing youth populations, ood insecurity, and

natural disasters providing a spark to long-simmering grievances. International

experts in conict prevention and response use terms like complex politicalemergencies and complex peace operations to describe their eld.14

Te QDDR chaper on conic prevenion ocuses overwhelmingly on insiu-

ional soluions and he creaion o specialized oces much more han shiing

he overall insiuional ehos. In he QDDR, conic prevenion, as a mission, is

largely assigned o he Sae Deparmens newly creaed undersecreary or civil-

ian securiy, democracy and human righs, who oversees he Bureau o Conic

and Sabilizaion Operaions and a number o oher oces.

Bu despie a newly redrawn organizaional char a he Sae Deparmen, he

challenge o making Sae and USAID beter a crisis prevenion remains. Tas

because wihou a shi in insiuional ehos, specialized bureaus can reinorce

he endency o boh insiuions o relegae crisis prevenion o he periphery

raher han making i a cenralized skill-se required or all diplomas.

An institutional shift is necessary

o couner his problem, Sae and USAID need o updae heir undersandingo he criical ools needed or diplomacy and developmen. Given he evolving

naure o odays world, smar oreign policy requires a beter undersanding o

conic prevenion, miigaion, and response. Te core pillars o our diplomaic

eors are hisorically rooed in poliics, economics, adminisraion, and consular


16/40


issues, bu hose are no longer sucien. As he QDDR makes clear, we need o

broaden our lens and deepen our undersanding o his seismic shi.

Clearly, boh Sae and USAID need highly proessional cadres o individuals who

make conic prevenion and response heir vocaion and work on he ground

in muliple complex emergencies. I anyhing, he oces a Sae and USAIDengaged in conic prevenion deserve greaer resources and more senior sang.

Bu or crisis prevenion o gain racion a Sae and USAID he specic skills

required o preven and respond o crises need o be mainsreamed ino raining

and educaion a he broades level across boh insiuions. Scaling up proes-

sional developmen opporuniies is vial o ensure 21s cenury diplomas have

he skills and ools hey need. Knowledge o conic analysis and prevenion

raining have o be widely embedded wihin he ool kis o all ocers a Sae and

USAID and inculcaed as a value rom he earlies sages i he spiri o he QDDR

and oher reviews are o become realized.

Tis would mean ha every Foreign Service ocer should be amiliar wih basic

preceps in conic prevenion as hey discuss elecions wih local poliical paries.

Every developmen exper a USAID should be cognizan o how aid may iname

local ensions i crisis prevenion is no buil ino basic program design. Every

ambassador should beter undersand he many drivers ha radiionally push coun-

ries oward a civil war or regional conic. And all embassy sa should undersand

he essenial role developmen programming can play in helping counries rebuild

rom and move pas conic and he pracical seps used o inuence a beter course.

Insead, we operae in a sysem where small, no paricularly inuenial oces

are called upon only aer i is abundanly apparen ha a counry is headed deep

ino a conic, and he recommendaions rom hese oces are hen passed on o

people who are ill-equipped o inerpre or use hem.

Te primary uncion o he respecive conic prevenion oces a Sae and

USAID should be providing early warning o policymakers abou conic while

aciliaing conversaions among diverse sakeholders and oering highly echnical

experise when neededno direcing all conic prevenion.

And conic prevenion a Sae needs o be embraced rom he very op down,

no oered as some modes inusion o botom-up insigh or experise. I ambassa-


17/40


dors and depuy chies o missions are no adequaely rained in crisis prevenion,

i is dicul o see how hey can guide U.S. policy a momens o grea crisis.

Finally, o be as eecive as possible, boh agencies need o work ou heir long-

sanding ur batles. Te QDDR assered ha he Sae Deparmen would lead

on all poliical crises and conics, while USAID would lead on all naural disas-ers.15 Tis division, however, seems arbirary since i doesn adequaely reec

he hisoric role USAID has played on crises response or he consrucive role o

operaional response oces such as USAIDs Oce or ransiional Iniiaives.

Since he QDDR was issued, Sae and USAID have largely negoiaed who would

be given he lead on any paricular conic or crisis on an ad hoc basis. Tis does

no seem o be a recipe or eecive managemen over he long erm.

Robus diplomaic and developmen skills, as well as sucien resources, are

needed i he Unied Saes is o play a lead role in conic prevenion arena.Doing conic prevenion on he cheap, and wih he wrong skills, is a recipe or

disaser ha can be avoided i a realisic plan or addressing hese ineragency di-

erences can be addressed.


18/40


The civil-military training divide

Differences in training and promotion

Criical o a discussion o conic prevenion raining a Sae and USAID is a clear

undersanding o he sharp dierence in raining beween he U.S. miliary and is

civilian counerpars. Te U.S. miliary akes raining very seriously and uilizes i

well. A Sae and USAID, raining remains an underunded aerhough.

Tis secion makes he poin ha expanding conic prevenion raining a heseoces will require major changes in heir raining habis, which no only pu very

litle ocus on conic raining bu orego oher ypes o essenial raining as well.

Te miliary oers useul examples o how hey can improve. Te blame, however,

can be placed enirely a he agencies ee because he dierences in raining can

also be raced back o dierences in unding and human resources beween he

miliary and civilian oreign aairs agencies.

Te las 10 years are somehing o an aberraion wih repeaed up-empo deploy-

mens. Bu he U.S. miliary has always viewed raining as undamenal o how

i grooms new enrans and prepares hem or advancemen. In sark conras o

civilian oreign aairs agencies, he miliary goes o grea lenghs o nurure he

skills needed or ocers o assume progressively larger and more imporan duies

and commands as heir careers progress.

Former Secreary o Sae Colin Powell was ond o noing he miliarys penchan

or raining by observing ha 6 ou o his 30 years in he miliary were spen in he

classroom.16 Te average Foreign Service ocer is lucky o spend six monhs o a

30-year career in raining.

The average

Foreign Service

ocer is lucky to

spend six mont

o a 30-year care

in training.


19/40


Recruitment

One o he rs obvious dierences beween he miliary and civilian oreign

aairs agencies is in he recruimen process isel. Te U.S. miliary has always

reasoned ha new enrans would need considerable raining. Regardless o previ-

ous experience or background, new members o he U.S. miliary are given exen-sive rainingo inculcae shared values, o guaranee ha all members o he

orce share cerain basic skills, and o provide more specic raining in designaed

areas o experise unique o heir service or responsibiliies.

Te raining programs or each branch o he miliary include he basic raining

oered by each branch as well as opions such as Reserve Ocers raining Corps,

Ocers Candidae School, and he courses oered hrough numerous academic

insiuions such as Wes Poin, he Naval Academy, and he Air Force Academy.

In sharp conras, he civilian inernaional aairs agencies make a consisen assump-ion ha new employees walk in wih an appropriae educaional background and new

employees, as smar generaliss, will be able o pick up and learn heir duies.

I is requenly rue ha civilian inernaional aairs agency ocers are beter

educaed han miliary recruis. Bu as one beleaguered rainer commened, he

assumpion ha an undergraduae or masers degree adequaely prepares a new

employee o preven crises in dicul inernaional setings is jus silly.

In essence, he raining and educaion screen or he civilian agencies is a he

personnel hiring sage raher han once employees are brough onboard. In many

ways, his approach is a vesige o an earlier era when he Foreign Service was

deliberaely populaed wih he bes and he brighes rom Eas Coas universi-

ies. Such recruis were seenby din o heir educaion and more cosmopolian

upbringingso be beter suied o serve as diplomas in ar-ung poss.

Ye such an approach is badly oudaed given he demands on he oreign and civil

services in odays world. And he Foreign Services culure, where ocers are

assumed o be an exper raher han rained o be so, makes i dicul or many

ocers o acknowledge he limis o heir knowledge or o openly ask or assis-ance rom expers in conic prevenion.

odays global rends o rapid populaion growh, climae variabiliy, urbanizaion,

uneasy democraizaion, and growing energy compeiion (and conic) make his

approach o alen managemen anachronisic and inimical o our naional ineres.


20/40


Training

As one miliary rainer amiliar wih he civilian agencies observed, new employ-

ees ge almos no raining across he board.

Te iniial raining given o ocials a Sae and USAID includes no mandaorycourse work in crisis prevenion, and he overall raining is remarkably cursory

in imporan respecs. Te mandaory six-week ull-ime A100 course or new

Foreign Service ocers is ocused heavily on basic adminisraive deails, han-

dling o classied inormaion, and he uncioning o he Foreign Service isel.

Mos A100 classes spend only several hours giving Sae Deparmen ocers an

even basic undersanding o he role o USAIDmuch less he underpinnings o

eecive crisis prevenion or developmen more broadly.

Such a gap is all he more sriking given ha Sae coninues o assume progres-

sively greaer responsibiliy or managing crisis prevenion and developmen, andhe QDDR appoined Sae he lead in any siuaions relaed o complex emergen-

ciesperhaps he mos dicul porolio relaed o crisis prevenion.

A100 sudens go on o oreign area and language sudies relaed o heir specic

assignmens, which remain he bread and buter o he Foreign Service Insiues

overall approach. Tese are useul and imporan skills, bu hey are no subsiue

or a broader underpinning o pracical raining and skills ha hey will need

hroughou heir careers in diplomacy generally and conic prevenion more

specically. Te baseline assumpion remains ha hese young Foreign Service

ocers will learn hese skills along he way.

Useul courses or all incoming Foreign Service ocers could include ideni ying

drivers and causes o conic; conic analysis and early response developmen;

negoiaions and mediaions skills developmen; conic-sensiive approaches o

developmen; and principles o good governance. Courses oered o mid-level

ocers could include inernaional humaniarian law, peacekeeping and inerna-

ional conic resoluion, and civil-miliary coordinaion.

Te siuaion a USAID is equally sark. A new employee in he agencys Oceo ransiion Iniiaives, one o he lead oces dealing wih crisis prevenion and

posconic response, usually receives abou a ull week o raining, wih a leas

hal o ha ime cenering on adminisraive issues.


21/40


Te Developmen Leadership Iniiaive is probably he closes USAID comes o

a proessional developmen model. Te iniiaive was launched in 2008 wih con-

gressional suppor as a muliple-year eor designed o double USAIDs Foreign

Service workorce by 2012. Ye raining hrough his iniiaive is largely argeed a

junior-level ocers. (Some mid-career recruis have also been brough in as par

o he iniiaive.)

Because so many o USAIDs employees ocus on a specic secor or area o aciv-

iy, raining on imporan cross-cuting issues such as crisis prevenion is largely

an aerhough. Even ocers a USAID who specialize in democracy and gover-

nance, healh, or agriculure sill need a basic grounding in do-no-harm, conicanalysis, and conic prevenion, and his should be a undamenal par o how

USAID does is work.

While he agency and is Conic Managemen and Miigaion oce has devel-

oped a number o innovaive courses in conic prevenion and early warningas

While there have been a number o well-received conict

prevention trainings by and or U.S. government ofcials,

they are too ew in number and insufciently available to

all interested oreign aairs ofcials.

Nonetheless, a general review suggests some o those

areas o training that would be most benecial or State

and USAID ofcers regardless o whether or not they are

deemed conict specialists or not, including how to:

Locate and understand conict drivers and sensitivities

such as economic disparity, ethnic tensions, or

competition or resource

Undertake a basic conict prevention diagnosis

(including or political transitions, boundary disputes,

religious/sectarian conicts)

Spearhead conict-sensitive development and

reconstruction programs that place projects within

a broader ramework o understanding o social and

political dynamics

Plan or conict prevention and response

Exercise crisis decision making and approach a situation

through a collaborative interagency process that

includes State, USAID, and the Department o Deense

(including determining which agency is in the lead)

Work closely with civil society

Work with and appropriately engage the military

Certainly the trainings oered to U.S. government ofcials

will require constant monitoring and evaluation to

determine what actually works on the ground. But given

the overarching absence o broad-based training in this

area, oering expanded courses that enable the creation

o a common baseline among all Foreign Service ofcerssuch as the Foreign Service Institutes Foundations o

Conict Prevention and Response course (see the Recent

changes at government ofces that handle conict

prevention arent enough section under The need or

crisis prevention and training at State and USAID) would

go a long way to mainstreaming the issue.

Key areas for conflict prevention training


22/40


has he Sae Deparmens Bureau o Conic and Sabilizaion Operaionsrela-ively ew ocers end up aking hese courses because such raining is no seen as

an essenial duy, and he courses are oen limied o hose individuals designaed

o he mos war-orn o locales. USAIDs Conic Managemen and Miigaion

oce currenly runs abou eigh courses a year wih roughly 25 sudens per class,

mos o whom are rom USAID.

Promotion

Te U.S. miliary, in addiion o placing much greaer emphasis on inducion and

pre-commission raining or is new employees, is very deliberae in ensuring ha

as ocers move orward wih heir careers hey sep ou o daily acion duy o

paricipae in exended raining a roughly he 3-, 5-, 10-, and 20-year marks.

A hese juncures, ocers are given he appropriae raining o adequaely pre-

pare hem o lead larger and more complex orces and operaions. In he 20h year,

senior ocers atend insiuions such as he Naval War College or are sen o For

McNair or heir CAPSONE rainingjoin-service proessional miliary educa-

ion courses or newly promoed brigadier generals and rear admirals.

Mos miliary ocers see raining as undamenal o heir career advancemen,

and in ac excelling a mid- and senior-career raining is essenial o rise o he

highes ranks o he U.S. armed orces.

With a clear need or increased proessional development on crisis prevention, a number o

reputable nongovernmental organizations have stepped in to ill the gap. These organiza-

tionsincluding Human Rights First, the Raphael Lemkin Center, and the Mass Atrocity

Response Operations Project at Harvard Kennedy Schoolgenerally oer training courses and

simulations that range rom a daylong seminar to a ull week.

The organizations bring together policy practitioners, military ofcers, renowned academics, and NGO

advocates to analyze and discuss crisis prevention rom a range o perspectives. The goal o these

orums is to oster a community o practitioners who can act on crisis situations when they arise.

Ironically, many o these sessions are aimed at members o the U.S. militarymainly because State and

USAID are oten unable to provide sufciently senior participants because o overall resource shortages.

Civil society fills the conflict-training gap


23/40


Te conras wih he civilian agencies is alarming. A boh Sae and USAID

here is litle cenralized mandaory mid- and senior-level career raining, and

none in conic prevenion.

Indeed, boh Sae and USAID are remarkable anomalies. I is rare or any proes-

sional discipline o have such a complee lack o a proessional developmenmodel in odays world.

Consider, or example, he ongoing proessional developmen o medical proes-

sionals, who are required o ake proessional developmen courses on an annual

basis o say up o dae in heir paricular eld. Coninuing medical educaion

credisa cerain number o which are required in order o say board ceried

help docors learn abou new research and echnological advancemens.

As opposed o he miliary, mos Sae and USAID employees do no see a direc

incenive in being beter rained because such raining is no direcly linked oheir likelihood o promoion.

In ac, jus he opposie is more oen rue. Civil servans and Foreign Service o-

cers are oen relucan o ake raining because hey worry heir bosses will see i

as aking away rom heir core responsibiliies and/or hey would be absen rom

pos. Tis nding was reeced in a January 2011 Governmen Accouning Oce

repor on raining a he Sae Deparmen.17

Limied human resources oen make i challenging or any mission or embassy

o eel ha hey can lose any personnel o raining. Foreign Service Boards, which

deermine promoions, are rigorous. Bu employee evaluaions, compleed by a

supervisor, are he overwhelming deerminan o success or a candidae in ron

o hese boards and no heir relaive raining.

So i a supervisor balks a an opporuniy or proessional developmen i acually

oers incenive no o paricipae. Supervisors a boh Sae and USAID have a

requenly recognized endency o send ocers hey can spare o raining raher

han he mos promising or compeen ocers under heir command.

Te botom line is ha litle is likely o change as long as proessional develop-

menand paricularly prioriizaion o conic prevenionplays no par in

promoion, salary, or roaion deerminaions or Sae and USAID. In addiion,


24/40


Source: Credit the Center or Global Development; http://www.cgdev.org/sectionassistance/budget.

he Foreign Service model or reviews ends o creae an environmen where ak-

ing minimal risks and atering superiors is he sures pah o advancemen.

Te same Governmen Accouning Oce repor cied above also noed:

Alhough Sae has several pracices in place o ideni y raining needs, he

deparmen lacks a sysemaic, comprehensive raining needs assessmen processclearly incorporaing all bureaus and poss, paricularly a he occupaional and

individual levels. 18

Differences in capacity and operations

While i is easy o see ha he culure o raining is vasly dieren beween he

U.S. miliary and he civilian inernaional aairs agencies, i is imporan o

undersand he undamenal operaional realiies ha uel hese divisions.

Firs and oremos, he Penagon has adequae numbers

o personnel and sucien operaing unds (he so-called

raining oa) ha i can aord o make compulsory

raining a core componen o is approach o personnel.

I can also oer volunary raining ha sa ocers are

encouraged o ake in order o develop heir skills

wheher in specic areas or in personnel managemen.

Te graph shows jus how much more in resources

he Penagon ges hrough he ederal budge han

inernaional aairs.

Te miliary is able o creae space or raining hrough is

ransien, rainee, Holdee, and Suden designaion. Tis

allows he miliary o mainain sang levels a a signi-

can percenage over hose designaed o is specic poss

because o he numbers o soldiers a any ime ha are in

ransi, raining, a hospial, or school. I raining is longer

han several weeks, ocers are assigned o he rainingposwhich allows heir command o have anoher

ocer ll heir posiion. Tis allows he miliary o have is

ocers engage in lenghy rainings beween major assign-

mens wihou leaving oher poss shor-saed.

Figure 2

A major reason why the military can affo

more training than foreign affairs agenc

Federal budget composition, iscal year 2010

1.5%

83.6%

International affairs Defense Other

14.9%


25/40


Te civilian agencies do no have comparable mechanisms. Tey ace much more

o a zero-sum game where raining oen comes a he expense o an embassy or

USAID mission. And i creaes a dynamic where raining courses a Sae and

USAID oen end up being laughably shor or he complexiy o he issues hey

addressall because managers eel hey canno aord o le someone leave heir

pos or oo long.

Congress had agreed a he beginning o he Bush adminisraion o creae such

headroom hrough he Diplomaic Readiness Iniiaive, an adminisraion eor

o address shoralls in boh he oal numbers o diplomaic sa and heir respec-

ive skills, bu he addiional personnel were consumed in he eor o sa up he

U.S. presence in Iraq and Aghanisan. Te execuive and legislaive branches should

reurn o his bargain immediaely.

As one genocide prevenion rainer observed, I is hard or people rom Sae o

carve ou wo weeks or raining unless he order comes rom on high, and i hasn.

Congress rarely quesions he miliarys need or resources o keep is orce rained

and ready. Te relevan commitees are generally supporive o and rouinely

deending he Deense Deparmens iniiaives. A he same ime, Congress

consisenly underunds operaing expenses a Sae and USAID ha would allow

hese insiuions o mainain a beter-rained and more capable core o proes-

sionals. Te relevan commitees oen ake a criical approach o hese agencies

policy and unding iniiaives.

In general, congressional deense commitees see heir role as supporing he

Penagon, whereas he oreign aairs congressional commitees view heir role

more as oversigh and criique.

Even recen dra proposals rom Congress o scale up raining don ocus on

providing crisis prevenion raining or all Sae Deparmen employees. Insead

he language akes a more myopic view and prioriizes

Foreign Service ofcers assigned to a position, department or agency or at a

post overseas with responsibilitiesin countries or regions that are at risk o, in,or are in transition om conict or civil strie.19

No corresponding language in any appropriaion bill helps resource hese already

underunded areas.


26/40


Tis rend is radiionally mos egregious a USAID. Congress consisenly

reduces or keeps a he agencys operaing expenses even during periods when

is programmaic responsibiliies and unding have risen, paricularly over he

las decade. Operaing expenses are oen he rs choice or congressional cus a

USAID, no a las resor.

Such an approach is pennywise and pound oolish. I beter-rained ocers a

Sae and USAID were able o eecively preven a handul o crises or speed heir

resoluion he cos savings would be enormous.

Obviously he absence o personnel overhead a Sae and USAID makes i hard o

do adequae raining on any issue, including crisis prevenion. Sa is so slim, and

he lack o inducion raining is so severe, ha mos Sae and USAID personnel rise

hrough heir careers ocused on he immediae ask a hand wihou ever experienc-

ing he broader operaional and concepual raining ha could help hem excel.

Indeed, a Foreign Service ocer could rise o be an ambassador in a counry a

risk o major conic wih no ormal raining in developmen, early warning, eec-

ive ways o resolving elecoral or ehnic violence, or advanced mediaion ech-

niques. Indeed, many dedicaed and well-meaning Foreign Service ocers were

conrmed or such poss in recen years.

Sae and USAID boh badly need more proessional developmen opporuni-

ies. Leadership in boh insiuions needs o make clear ha raining, educaion,

and career developmen are core culural values ha underpin heir agencys

eeciveness. raining mus incorporae languages and culural dierences rom

he very beginning, bu we also need o couple his knowledge wih ha o crisis

prevenion and posconic work. And developing pracical road maps o address

he underlying operaional and budge obsacles o beter raining is essenial and

mus be considered during upcoming budge batles.

Te QDDR recognized he dieren raining playing eld beween Sae and

USAID and he U.S. miliary:

Building training into career tracks requires increased resources and high-levelcommitment to ensure employees have the time to pursue periodic and long-

term training. For our personnel to be successul, they must have the space, the

time, and the incentives to make training a critical part o their careers. Te U.S.

militarys approach to training and continuing education recognizes and reects

this act. State and USAIDs approach must do the same20


27/40


Recognizing he raining dierences beween he miliary and civilian agencies is

necessary, bu i isn sucien. Having he Foreign Service Insiue develop pro-

posals is one hinginvesing he poliical capial o he secreary o sae, USAID

adminisraor, and oher senior adminisraion ocials in working collaboraively

wih Congress o push hese long overdue changes hrough is somehing else

enirely. Litle evidence suggess he adminisraion is willing o make he kind oconcered push required o level he raining playing eld.

As ormer Naional Securiy Adviser Bren Scowcro recenly noed, On-he-

job raining alone is no longer a sucien mehod, i i ever was, o develop a U.S.

diplomaic service ha is second o none.21

Scowcro argued ha he eeciveness o he U.S. diplomaic corps, like ha o

heir miliary counerpars, should res on a sysemaic regime o educaion, raining,

and proessional preparaionone ha is linked o heir career advancemen.

Ta sysemaic regime o educaion and raining simply does no exis when i

comes o our civilian oreign policy insiuions, and changes around he margins

will no make ha happen.


28/40


Competing conflict assessment tools

Few would argue agains he U.S. governmen developing a common ool o assess

poenial conics and crises in key counries. Ye eors oward ha end are

slowed a imes by ineragency and ineroce rivalries and a ailure o collaborae.

Te resul has been a sysem where no only are mos employees no well rained

in conic prevenion, dieren oces and agencies coninue o approach how

each poenial conic is assessed hrough very dieren lenses.

In many ways, he Ineragency Conic Assessmen ramework, or ICAF, isdesigned o be he common ool or conic assessmen wihin he governmen.

Te Sae Deparmen describes he ICAF as a ramework ha can be used o

help people rom dieren U.S. governmen deparmens and agencies work

ogeher o reach a shared undersanding o a counry s conic dynamics and

consensus on poenial enry poins or addiional U.S. governmen eors.22

Te Sae Deparmen also noes, An ICAF allows an ineragency eam o iden-

iy poenial enry poins or uure U.S. governmen eors in conic preven-

ion and conic ransormaion, bu i does no make direc recommendaions

or program design.23

Te problem is ha he ICAF has no consisenly achieved is goal o nururing

a shared view o conic dynamics across agencies, hough some ocials main-

ain ha signican progress was made in recen years.

Dieren agencies, including he U.S. miliary, coninue o use heir rival conic

assessmen ools in wha has become a airly sove-piped process because hey

do no eel ully vesed in he ICAF model. Some complain ha he ICAF has

become an excessively complex, almos heological insrumen, and ha mem-bers o he Sae Deparmens Bureau o Conic and Sabilizaion Operaions

rea he ICAF as somehing ha only he mos highly rained expers could

undersand or apply.


29/40


Tis mechanisic approach only serves o preven he ICAF rom gaining broader

racion across agencies insead o providing a sysem ha could be more widely

used, applied, and undersood. A small oce a he Sae Deparmens insis-

ence ha is analyical ool, and only is analyical ool, be applied across he

Deparmen o Deense and USAID as well as hroughou he res o he Sae

Deparmen only ensures he ICAFs marginalizaion.

In realiy, he U.S. governmen mainains muliple conic assessmen rame-

works, and mos ocials coninue o see he idea o having one widely used

conic assessmen ramework as unlikely.

Tis goes o he broader poin: Te abiliy o analyze, preven, and resolve conics

should be widely sharedno held as some secre language among a selec ew.

Tere are some imporan modes seps in ha direcion. Te Bureau o Conic

and Sabilizaion Operaions, he Oce o Conic Managemen and Miigaion a

USAID, he independen U.S. Insiue o Peace, and he Foreign Service Insiuealready provide some useul coursework and raining on conic prevenion.

Te Oce o Conic Managemen and Miigaion rainings appear well designed

and well received, and i is noeworhy ha much o his raining has relied on in-

house experise raher han ouside conracors. Ineres is growing in he course,

and i is oen oversubscribed. Te Oce o Conic Managemen and Miigaion

sa noes hey are being asked o oer more coursesincluding o U.S. govern-

men ocials working overseas.

Having junior and mid-level sa rained by senior managers abou real siua-

ions hey are likely o ace in he eld is o obvious bene, and he Oce o

Conic Managemen and Miigaion course adops some o he beter lessons

rom he miliary side o he governmen. Similarly, he popular U.S. Insiue

o Peace course on prevening elecoral violence seems o nd he righ balance

beween heoreical underpinnings and pracical applicaion or many Foreign

Service ocers.

All hese eniies are looking a how hey can reach more sudens wih heir

classes. Despie heir high qualiy, however, relaively ew Sae and USAIDemployees go hrough hem. Tis should come as no surprise, hough. As we

poined ou in he previous secion, wihou a signican inusion o resources or

direcion rom senior managemen ha such courses be made mandaory, only

a handul o employees a Sae and USAID will bene rom his insrucion,

including very, very ew employees a mid- or senior-career levels.


30/40


Meanwhile, he enire Oce o Conic Managemen and Miigaion sa is only

abou 20 people. So here are clearly limis on he sheer numbers o people he oce

can rain, paricularly given ha raining is no is only mandae. Because o ime and

budge pressures, he inroducory course by he Bureau o Conic and Sabilizaion

Operaions on conic prevenion was reduced rom eigh weeks o wo.

In general, no well-packaged and accredied suie o conic prevenion courses

bundles ogeher he dieren oerings ino a coheren core o raining or an

up-and-coming conic prevenion exper in he U.S. governmen. A simple

online locaion wih all conic prevenion courses oered by governmen

agencies and U.S. Insiue o Peace lised or a cross posing o all courses on he

various sies would a leas ackle he lack o awareness by governmen employ-

ees o oher courses.

Tere are also several problems wih curren raining hrough all hese avenues.

Firs, i is imporan o noe ha much, bu cerainly no all, o he conic rain-

ing expansion in recen years a boh Sae and USAID has ocused paricularly on

sae-building given he experiences o Aghanisan and Iraq. Bu such major U.S.-

dominaed sae-building exercises will likely be somehing o a hisorical anom-

aly. Much more emphasis needs o be placed on helping preven crises beore hey

reach an acue sage.

Second, here needs o be ar more growh and proessional developmen in he

classic ools in his arena: eecive mediaion, conic analysis, and early warning.

And hird, here could be ar greaer coherence in approach across agencies

here is no reason why he miliary and civilian agencies could no develop a much

more unied approach o raining in conic prevenion han we have seen o dae.

Criical o he success o a unied approach would be ensuring genuine leadership

rom he civilian agencies and no miliary dominance, which would only perpeu-

ae he exising imbalance.

As radiional hubs or raining o he Foreign Service and he U.S. miliary

respecively, he Foreign Service Insiue and he Naional Deense Universiycould play a real leadership role in his regard. Bu again, hey would only be able

o exercise his leadership i direced o do so rom senior-mos levels.

Te Foreign Service Insiue does oer a basic course ha we menioned earlier,

Foundaions o Conic Prevenion and Response, a wo-week program more


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appropriae o pre-conic engagemen han a posconic engagemen course

augh by experienced ormer Sae and USAID ocials.

Like some o he oher course work cied here, his is a useul bu ar rom su-

cien eor o properly rain ocers headed or he eld. Tis course is mandaory

or members o he Civilian Response Corpsa sandby group o civilians drawnrom nine ederal agencies providing deployable experise in inernaional conic

prevenion and sabilizaionand sa o he Bureau o Conic and Sabilizaion

Operaions, bu no he Foreign Service more broadly.


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Recommendations

In sum, conic prevenion raining and assessmen ools coninue o be handled

in an episodic and ad hoc ashion. And hey lack broad sraegic inpu and direc-

ion rom Sae and USAID managemen. Almos all o he educaors involved in

raining Sae and USAID ocers agree ha broader conic prevenion raining

or sa a boh agencies would be enormously useul, and hey remain eager o

engage on ha ron. Ye again, litle will change wihou major changes in direc-

ion, sang, and resources.

Here we oer recommendaions or how Sae, USAID, and Congress can

improve crisis prevenion raining going orward:

State and USAID

Tie training, including in conlict prevention, directly to promotion at State

and USAID. Te QDDR noed, o ensure ha personnel are recognized and

rewarded or developing new skill ses, as resources permi, raining and deail

assignmens will be included in he Foreign Service Promoion Core Preceps,

and be considered in promoions.24 Bu wih he QDDR approaching is rs

anniversary since release i is unclear wha progress has been made in imple-

mening his recommendaion.

Cross list all U.S. government agencies and U.S. Institute o Peace, the U.S.

Holocaust Museum, the Center or Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies,

and the Auschwitz Institute o Peace and Reconciliation and other credible NGO

courses on confict prevention and make them available or all State and USAID

employees. Many ocials a Sae and USAID remain relaively unaware ohe range o courses currenly available, and an eor should be made o more

cenrally ideniy such career enhancemen opporuniies and widely disrib-

ue hem o sa.


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Require Foreign Service oicers to complete a year o advanced training

relevant to their speciic competency to be eligible or promotion to Senior

Foreign Service. Te pauciy o mid-career raining a Sae and USAID badly

undercus he abiliy o boh insiuions o groom uure senior leaders. Te

Deparmen o Deense sends heir bes and brighes o he Naional Deense

Universiy because hey see hem as uure leaders. Te lack o comparableraining in our civilian oreign policy insiuions is an embarrassmen. USAID

and Sae should dramaically expand he number o sudens hey send o he

Naional War College. Tis one-year program is viewed as he gold sandard or

he developmen o senior leadership, emphasizing sraegic hinking, leader-

ship, and ineragency cooperaion.

Create a new cone or career track called conlict prevention and analysis within

the State Department Foreign Service. Tere are ve career racks, or cones,

or Sae Deparmen Foreign Service generaliss:25 consular aairs, economic

aairs, managemen aairs, poliical aairs, and public diplomacy. Te creaiono a new cone on conic prevenion and analysis would guaranee sronger in-

house experise on conic prevenion, resoluion, and managemen over ime,

and make sure such experise ges embedded hroughou enry- and senior-level

Foreign Service ocers. Obviously here would be echnical deails o work ou

as o how he conic prevenion and analysis ocers would relae o oher o-

cers, paricularly hose handling poliical aairs. Bu his can be properly man-

aged, as could he discussions ha would need o ake place wih he American

Foreign Service Associaion.26 USAID does no have a cone sysem, bu one

where here are a variey o echnical backsops or specic areas o experise.

One o hose backsops is currenly crisis sabilizaion and governance, and all

members o ha backsop now receive USAIDs Oce o Conic Managemen

and Miigaions wo-day course. Oher backsops should receive a leas basic

raining in conic prevenion as i relaes o heir specializaions.

State Department

Give bid preerence or posings o hose in he Foreign Service who complee a ceri-

ed core curriculum in conic prevenion raining. Along he lines o more closelyconsidering raining when looking a promoions, Sae and USAID should oer

preerenial posing bids o ocers who complee a ceried core curriculum in con-

ic prevenion. Tis would mean ha ocers who ake conic prevenion raining

and serve in crisis-prone counries will be more likely o be saioned a a pos o heir


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choosing laer in heir careers. Such bid preerences were given o ocers who served

in Iraq and Aghanisan and can serve as a powerul incenive.

Make an A100 conlict prevention-training course mandatory or all incoming

Foreign Service oicers and provide or advanced training in person or remote

beore deployment to a conlict-prone country. Even i new ocers are in aconsular, economic, or poliical cone a basic A100 course on conic preven-

ion should be made mandaory. Tis would be a new course developed speci-

cally or his purpose. Similarly, beore deploymen o a conic-prone counry,

Foreign Service ocers should receive advanced raining on conic prevenion

eiher in he classroom or hrough disance learning opions.

Revert the Civilian Response Corps basic training course rom the current

two-week length back to the original eight weeks. A wo-week course is simply

insucien o address he myriad o issues ha a member could poenially

ace when in he eld. As members are only required o ake he class once, aneigh-week course can have a more long-erm impac han he curren wo-week

course. Tis is especially necessary as he Response Corps draws rom many

non-oreign-aairs agencies.

USAID

Require all USAID sta to take the Oice o Conlict Management and

Mitigations course Conlict Prevention 102 (C102) regardless o their backstop.

USAID is predominanly developmen ocused, bu all USAID sa and

conracors should be required o ake he C102 class o have a beter under-

sanding o conic drivers, concerns, and prevenion echniques. Given he

close links beween developmen and eecive conic prevenion, such ground-

ing would serve USAID ocers hroughou heir careers.

The administration and Congress more broadly

Establish the personnel headroom or capacity or civilian international aairsagencies to do better training. Te adminisraion and Congress should pro-

vide and susain addiional personnel posiions or raining equivalen o 15 per-

cen above he sa level required or regular assignmen. As a recen Simson

Cener repor, Forging a 21s Cenury Diplomaic Service or he Unied Saes

Even i new

ocers are in a

consular, econo

or political cone

a basic A100

course on conf

prevention

should be made

mandatory.


35/40


Trough Proessional Educaion and raining, argued, his remains he single

mos imporan sep ha would pu he civilian agencies on more equal oo-

ing wih heir miliary counerpars and allow or susained, eecive raining

hroughou he career o ocers.27 Tis recommendaion will no happen,

however, unless i is embraced by senior leadership a Sae, USAID, and

he Whie House. And in odays budge crunch, i wil l also require ha headminisraion make clear wha aciviies i will cease or curail o help ree up

budge resources oward his end.

Synchronize the operating expenses o USAID with the program budget.

In general, USAID should have is operaing expenses pegged o is overall pro-

gram budge so ha he wo remain more eecively synchronized and sounder

long-erm planning is possible. Because USAIDs raining has radiionally been

drawn rom is operaing expenses, he endency o increase program unds

wihou concurren increase in operaing expenses has mean ha many core

personnel uncions, such as raining, have been badly underunded.

Congress should request a GAO report looking at USAIDs hiring patterns. Te

lack o an explici career rack and he absence o proessional developmen

opporuniies requires an overhaul o USAIDs hiring prioriies. A GAO repor

would presen an objecive invesigaion and analysis o how conic prevenion

could be embedded wihin any recommended hiring changes.

Review the Interagency Conlict Assessment tool to determine how it can be

improved, including a determination o how ICAFs conduct to date has been

used by policymakers. Te Naional Securiy Council should chair a review o

he ICAF and how i is currenly being employed. Te ulimae goal o his review

should be o produce a common sysem ha is used by Sae, he Deparmen o

Deense, and USAID, building upon he ICAFs srenghs while making he sys-

em more broadly usable by all hree insiuions. Ta will save boh money and

lives in he long run.


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Conclusion

As he Unied Saes coninues o grapple wih signican insabiliy around he

globein Libya, Somalia, Aghanisan, Iraq, Pakisan, and beyondour naions

unwillingness o inves in raining our oreign aairs personnel in conic preven-

ion remains as rusraing as i is bafing. Modes changes and modes inves-

mens ha would help shape a ar more knowledgeable and eecive work orce

ar beter able o ideniy, preven, and manage crises is undeniably in he naional

ineres. Such raining would beter serve he oreign aairs agencies, and i would

make i so our miliary personnel are less likely over ime o be deployed in direcconic. Ta will save boh lives and reasure in he long run.


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About the authors

John Norris is he Execuive Direcor o he Susainable Securiy and

Peacebuilding Iniiaive a American Progress. He has served in a number o

senior roles in governmen, inernaional insiuions, and nonpros. John

previously served as he Execuive Direcor o he Enough Projec a AmericanProgress. John was he chie o poliical aairs or he U.N. Mission in Nepal as

ha counry ried o emerge rom a decade-long war. Previously, John served

as he Washingon chie o sa or he Inernaional Crisis Group, conducing

exensive eldwork and senior-level advocacy or resolving conics in Souh

Asia, Arica, and he Balkans. Earlier in his career John served as he direc-

or o communicaions or U.S. Depuy Secreary o Sae Srobe albot. He

also worked as a speechwrier and eld disaser exper a he U.S. Agency or

Inernaional Developmen. John is he auhor o several books, including he

Disaser Gypsies, a memoir o his work in he eld o emergency relie, and

Collision Course: NAO, Russia and Kosovo. John has published commenary inTe Washingon Pos, Los Angeles imes, Wall Sree Journal, and elsewhere.

He has a graduae degree in public adminisraion.

Abigail Long is he associae or policy and governmen relaions a Humaniy

Unied. Abigail helps o suppor Humaniy Unieds advocacy and oureach

eors o he U.S. governmen, mulilaeral insiuions, inernaional non-

pros, and oher key organizaions. She received a bachelor o ars degree in

inernaional relaions and Spanish rom Syracuse Universiy.

Sarah Margon is he Associae Direcor o he Susainable Securiy and Peacebuilding

Iniiaive a American Progress. Beore joining he Cener, Sarah was a senior oreign

policy advisor o Sen. Russ Feingold (D-WI) and also served as sa direcor o he

Senae Foreign Relaions Subcommitee on Arican Aairs. Prior o her ime in he

Senae, Sarah was a policy advisor or humaniarian response and conic a Oxam

America. A Oxam Sarah ocused on a number o conics in Arica as well as criical

peace and securiy issues such as civilian proecion, conic prevenion, and securiy

secor reorm. Sarah has also worked or he Democracy Coaliion Projec, he Cener

or Naional Securiy Sudies, and George Soross Open Sociey Insiue. A erm

member a he Council on Foreign Relaions, Sarah has a masers degree rom heWalsh School o Foreign Service a Georgeown Universiys and an undergraduae

degree rom Wesleyan Universiy. Sarah has raveled widely hroughou Arica and

Souheas and Souh Asia.


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David Abramowitz is vice presiden or policy and governmen relaions a

Humaniy Unied. Prior o joining Humaniy Unied, David served as chie

counsel o he House Foreign Aairs Commitee, where he was responsible or

advising he commitee on such maters as inernaional law, inernaional jusice,

and global human righs and democracy issues, including racking in persons

and promoing democracy assisance. He has worked on legislaion ranging romhe racking Vicims Proecion Ac o 2000 and he Wilberorce racking

Vicims Proecion Reauhorizaion Ac o 2008 o legislaion implemening he

U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperaion Agreemen and he recommendaions o he

9/11 Commission. Prior o joining he commitee sa in 1999, David worked

a he oce o he legal adviser o he Deparmen o Sae or 10 years on arms

conrol, he Middle Eas, and legislaion relaing o oreign relaions. David holds

a bachelor o ars degree rom Kalamazoo College and a juris docor degree rom

he Universiy o Michigan.

Acknowledements

Humaniy Unied paricipaes in he Prevenion and Proecion Working

Group ha is convened by he Friends Commitee on Naional Legislaion. Te

Prevenion and Proecion Working Group is a coaliion o human righs, reli-

gious, humaniarian, ani-genocide, peace, and oher organizaions dedicaed o

improving U.S. governmen policies and civilian capaciies o preven violen con-

ic, mass arociies, and proec civilians hreaened by such crises. Tis repor

was inspired by discussions wihin he group, and members provided valuable

inpu during is preparaion.

Te auhors would like o hank a number o individuals and organizaions or

heir helpul commens and suggesions during he review process including

Bridge Moix and Mary Saa a he Friends Commitee or Naional Legislaion

and Sally Chin a he Mass Arociy Response Operaions Projec a Harvard

Universiy. Addiional hanks go o Marin Wolberg-Sok, graduae inern wih

CAPs Susainable Securiy and Peacebuilding Iniiaive, and CAPs ireless

ediorial and ar eams.


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Endnotes

1 te Fs Quadeal Dplmay ad Develpme revew: Lead-g tug cvla Pwe QDDr, (Sae Depame ad USAiD,2010), avalale a p://www.sae.gv/dumes/gaza-/153108.pd.

2 te QDDr was eleased Deeme 2010, e Pesdeal De-ve U.S. Glal Develpme Ply Sepeme 2010, ad ePesdeal Sudy Deve Mass Aes Augus 2011.

3 te Fs Quadeal Dplmay ad Develpme revew, p. 123.


5 id.

6 id.

7 Peveg Deadly c (new Yk: te caege cmmss Peveg Deadly c, 1998).

8 F a ulle expla ese ss, see: css Wa, avalale ap://sswa.g/.


10 See USAiD ply amewk, page 31. avalale a: p://www.usad.gv/ply/plyamewk_sep11.ml

11 A pese, USAiD eques spealzed ag ly se dvduals eued as ss, salza, ad gveaespealss.

12 bueau c ad Salza opeas, avalale a p://www.sae.gv/s/s/au/dex.m.

13 cvla respse cps: W We Ae, avalale a p://www.vlaespseps.gv/w/dex.m.



16 cl Pwell, My Amea juey: A Augapy (new Yk:radm huse, 1995).

17 Gveme Aug oe, Depame Sae: AddalSeps ae needed impve Saeg Plag ad Evalua

tag Sae Pesel, (2011), avalale a p://www.ga.gv/pdus/GAo-11-438t.

18 id.

19 ts laguage s luded rep. bemas da Glal Paesp

A Se 2034 (1), le 12, page 245. te ll as ye eedued.


21 Sms cee ad e Amea Aademy Dplmay, Fgga 21s-ceuy Dplma Seve e Ued Saes ugPessal Edua ad tag (2011), avalale a: p://www.aademydplmay.g/pulas/Fgg%20a%2021s%20ceuy%20Dplma%20Seve%20-%20Full%20c-e.pd.

22 bueau c ad Salza opeas, avalale a p://www.sae.gv/s/s/au/dex.m.

23 id.


25 Feg Seve spealsspvde mpa eal, supp, admsave seves 19 aee aeges, ludg dsad pysa asssas, e maageme spealss, mamaageme spealss, dplma seuy ages, ad umaesue spealss. Ea aegy as spe equemes egad-g edua ad expeee.

26 te Amea Feg Seve Assa, AFSA, s e pes-sal assa e U.S. Feg Seve ad e exlusve a-gag age all Feg Seve emplyees e ve egafas agees.

27 Sms cee ad e Amea Aademy Dplmay, Fgga 21s-ceuy Dplma Seve e U ed Saes ugPessal Edua ad tag.


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