IV. State Politics: Uttar Pradesh, 1984-2000s

1. Background and Socio-Political Milieu: pre-1980s

Uttar Pradesh (UP) may be the only state where the notable Dalit-based

political party has been flourished until the present time. The political contour in the

post-independence UP until the 1980s, when the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) started

struggling to gain support from the lower-caste groups, was quite different from that of

nowadays, however. Christophe Jaffrelot noted that northern India including UP

lagged behind to include the newly emerging groups, i.e. the lower castes in the political

system by not giving them appropriate representation in spite of their numerical

strength. 1 He sought to find out the historical source of this distinction in its

demographic feature and socio-economic situation. He suggested the two points

reviewed below with contrasting to the region of Maharashtra.

First of all, structure of the caste system and its demographic composition

shows a big difference in the two states. As we already saw in the previous chapter on

Maharashtra, 'three-fold' caste system with the absence of Kshatriya and Vaisha castes

is prevalent in the South India and Deccan. In the northern states like UP, the caste

system is traditionally the closest to the varna model with its four-fold orders and the

Untouchables. The population of upper varna is more numerous in the North:

according to the 1931 Census, the last Census which included the caste infotmation,

upper varna represented 22.1 per cent of total population in United Provinces

1 Christophe Jaffrelot, India's Silent Revolution-The Rise of the Low Castes in North Indian Politics, New Delhi:

Permanent Black, 2003, p. 6.

126

particularly. 2 Different land settlement system the British had introduced to the

different regions also made a distinctive development in societies. In northern India

where zamindari system prevailed, hierarchy of peasant society was solidified, while

south India where the ryotwati system was more systematically implemented, was more

conducive to the formation of social equality.

Land settlement system and caste structure together affected the north Indian

society to enlarge the dominant role of agrarian elites in the local power structure.3

Demographic and ruling dominance of upper castes in the hierarchical society, unlike

south India and Deccan, encouraged the conserv-ative ideologies and restricted the

opportunities for lower-caste movement. Pattern of colonial politics also contributed

to form the upper class, most of which constituted by upper castes, and let them

dominate the society. A study revealed that the most important men of the Congress

during the late colonial period, especially during the Civil Disobedience Movement,

were drawn from the ranks of small zamindars, pattidars and upper tenants and from

variety of upper castes and sub-castes. 4 With the middle and upper middle class

dominating the political milieu, bulk of landless group, mostly lower and avarna castes

could not establish their own base in the political field or in the social movement.

Though differehces in caste composition and land settlement system are the

probable hints to explain the socio-political backwardness of lower castes in UP, the

upward mobility and movement of lower castes were not totally absent from UP.

2 Extracted from the subsidiary table 1. Census of lndie1931. United Provinces of Agra and Awadh, vol. 18 part 1,

Report, Allahabad: The Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, United Provinces, 1933, pp. 619-20.

3 Jaffrelot, op. cit., pp. 7-8. 4 Zoya Hasan, 'Power and. Mobilization: Patterns of Resilience ~nd Change in Uttar Pradesh Politics', in Francine R.

Frankel and M.S. A. Rao (eds.), Dominance and State Power in Modem India: Decline of a Social Order vol. 1,

New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989, p.148.

127

Rather, it has developed various traditions of lower-caste movement from the colonial

period onwards, from sanskritization to socio-religious movement and political

mobilization. The late colonial period saw the boom of caste sabhas including those of

lower castes. But these caste sabhas failed to take the substantial issues like economic

inequality or material uplift: Instead, they stuck more to the socio-religious status of

their castes. Social movements targeting lower castes also existed in UP as we see the

cases of Arya Samaj, Adi Hindu movement, both of which were of religious

characteristics but with different implications, and the activities of Anti-Untouchability

League, later Harijan Sevak Sangh. While the Arya Samaj pursued social reforms

from the religious point of view within the existing social structure, Adi Hindu

movement, which developed in later period, claimed their 'pracheen nivasi' status of

India with adi Hinduism as their separate religion,5 aiming at 're-inheriting the ancient

rights which they had been deprived of. ' 6 The activities of Harijan Sevak Sangh, were

considerably active in the northern states like UP drawing a number of followers

' especially among the sweeper castes and co-opting them in the strong trend of GID,Idhl_~ .}

way of Harijan uplift movement, but still limited yet to achieve the structurat'social .. ··..::· -.

transformation or to change the social environment of untouchables. 7 Though the

leaders of Adi Hindu movement were not aloof from the political activities in the

institutional politics especially during the visit of the Indian Statutory Commission and

during the Round Table Conferences, it was Chamar caste who was most seriously

5 Nandini Gooptu, Th~ Politics of the Urbarr Poor in Early Twentieth-Century India, Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press,2001,p. 176.

s Ibid., p. 163.

7 M.S. Gore, The Social Context of an Ideology: Ambedkar's Political and Social Thought, New Delhi: Sage, 1993,

pp. 139-40.

128

involved in the political activism for the independent political identity. The Chamar

movement included various facets of contemporary social movements from

sanskritization to political mobilization and religious conversion. 8

Politics in UP during the 1950s and 1960s was roughly assumed as a form of

coalition of district faction leaders.9 Factionalism formed an essential element in the

first phase of institution building in many states including UP. Politically advanced

groups who played an important role in the INC from the colonial period continued to

hold the essential position in the post-independence political scene.10 At the same time;

the INC traditionally has paid much attention to the SC, as a result of which it was

granted their electoral support. Strong tradition of Gandhian campaign of anti-

untouchability and the affirmative action to allow the SC to access to education and

bureaucracy facilitated the INC to successfully project itself as the natural

representative of the SC. The SC did not develop their own political organizations or

the base of social movement. Lower-caste movement in UP has seen a series of small,

widely separate and weak movement unlike in the southern states and the Bombay

Presidency. It did not develop a radical feature of anti-caste ideology, eit!J.er.

The early Ambedkar movement in UP grew in the context of political,

development of colonial period and the Ambedkar's emancipation ideology for the

Depressed Classes (DC) was infused among the most numerous untouchable caste,

Chamar or Jatav. This brief inflow of the Ambedkar movement in the 1940s and 1950s

a For Chamar movement, see Owen M .. Lynch, The Politics of Untouchability: Social Mobility and Social Change in a

City of India, New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1969.

9 About the factional politics in UP, see Paul R. Brass, Factional Politics in an Indian State, The Congress Party in

Uttar Pradesh, Berkeley: University of Ca~fomia Press, 1965.

to Jaffrelot argues that the local notables played a central role in the Congress in the 1950s and 60s throughout the

north India. Op. cit., pJ).48-88.

129

resulted in the establishments of branches of the Scheduled Castes Federation (SCF) in

different places of the United Provinces, such as Agra and Allahabad. When the SCF

suffered decisive defeat winning only two seats in Bengal and in the Central Provinces

and Berar in the 1942 elections, the returns from the United Provinces suggests that the

SCF had succeeded in building up an urban organization in some towns. It had been

able to attract a modest degree of support, though not in the position to appeal to the SC

in rural area. 11 Despite the SCF was completely defeated in the provincial elections of

1946, it continued to grow and improve its organization, particularly outside the ·

Bombay Province where it had little importance previously. The branches of the SCF

established in UP area, later converted to the Republican Party of India (RPI) in 1957 in

accordance with their headquarter. The movement influenced the cultural life also, so

that a considerable number of the SC members, largely Jatavs, converted to Buddhism

after the death of Ambedkar in 1956.

It is interesting to point out that UP was the state where the RPI won most of its

seats, though Maharashtra remained its stronghold. Chhedi Lal Sathi 12 cardinally

constructed the organization of the SCF and later the RPI in UP. He started working

11 In urban places like Agra, Allahabad, and Kanpur, a number of the SCF candidates won in the primary elections

and some of them polled considerable votes in the general elections, while in rural constituencies only two

candidates were returned from the primary elections and did badly in the general elections. Jan Duncan, Levels,

the Communication of Programmes, and Sectional Strategies in Indian Politics, with Reference to the Bharatiya

Kranti Dal and the Republican Party of India in Uttar Pradesh State and A/igarh District (UP), Ph. D. thesis,

University of Sussex, 1979, pp. 218-9; P. D. Reeves, B. D. Graham and J. M. Goodman, A Handbook to Elections

in UttarPradesh 1920-51, Delhi, 1975, pp. 315andpassim.

12 According to Duncan, Sathi was from a poor Kewat (fishing caste) family but educated and taken care of by the

Congress leaders. He once worked as a typist in the UP Congress office and was a secretary of Lal Bahadur

Shastri, and then secretary to G. V. Pant when he was a Chief Minister. Later he was attracted by Ambedkar into

the SCF in 1952. Duncan, op. cit., pp. 107-8.

130

with the SCF in 1952 and became the first president of the RPI in UP. The brighter

results of the elections for the RPI candidates in UP came in the 1960s, when their

Maharashtrian colleagues seemed to fade away due to their poor performance in the

elections. The RPI won three Lok Sabha seats and eight State Assembly seats from UP

in the 1962 election,13 in which the factional strife within the INC enabled the RPI to

make valuable alliances with rebel Congressmen in some constituencies like Aligarh.

However the most important factor in this election Was the ability of the RPI to draw

together the supp~rt of the rural Jatavs and the urban Muslims. 14 Although the

supporters of the SCF and the RPI had built up substantial followings among Jatavs,

earlier under the political leadership ofB. R. Ambedkar, and in the late 1950s and 1960s

with a programme of radical economic demands, they had not had a numerical strength

to successfully challenge the INC without forming alliances with other groups. In

1962 the RPI was able to form a pact with the Muslims of the district who had generally

supported the INC in the previous elections. This alliance resulted in the victory of

eight RPI candidates in the Assembly elections, out of which three were Muslims,15 and

the party also won three Lok Sabha seats in UP, while the party suffered failure of

election with no winning candidate in other states. B. P. Maurya, 16 an MP from

13 Election Commission of India, Statistical Report on General Elections, 1962 vol.l, New Delhi, 196?, p. 63; Election

Commission of India, Statistical Report on General Election, 1962 to The Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh,

New Delhi, 1962, p. 15.

14 Detailed analysis on the 1962 Lok Sabha election in Aligarh constituency appeared in Paul R. Brass, caste,

Faction and Party in Indian Politics vol. 2 Election Studies, Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1985, pp. 207-79.

1s Election Commission of India, op. cit.

16 He was from an agricultural labourer family and professor of law, by profession. He had learnt to read and write

with a Catholic priest and joined the Congress in 1941, inspired by Gandhi who visited his hometown. Later he

was associated with the Jatav movement, and joined the SCF in 1948 after meeting Ambedkar. Becoming the

most popular RPIIeader in UP, he contested the Aligarh Lok Sabha seat unsuccessfully in 1957, but won the same

131

Aligarh Lok Sabha constituency, showed the example of successful alliance between

Jatavs and the Muslims who were disgruntled by the INC, as his 1962 election slogan

says: 'Jatav Muslim bhai bhai; Hindu kaun kahan se aye?' 17 Though his electoral

success was on account of demographic concentration of Jatavs in his constituency, he

was able to broaden his base beyond his caste through the alliance with the Muslim

community.

Though the RPI started to instigate its socio-economic issue by launching the

land satyagraha in Maharashtra and recalled economic issues in its Charter of

Demands, 18 this political tradition declined from the mid-1960s onwards and UP branch"·

of the RPI became fragmented as its Maharashtrian headquarter was being disunified.

Moreover, the INC ably and actively co-opted local Dalit leaders, which accelerated

decline of the RPI. One of the notable examples is the case of B. P. Maurya, who

initially was a popular RPI leader and finally joined the INC in the early 1970s after

being defeated as a RPI candidate in 1967. He was made a Minister of State for

Agriculture and Industry later under the Congtess government. Chhedi Lal Sathi, who

laid the foundation stone of the RPI in the northern Indian region, particularly UP,

followed the same route. He joined the INC in 1970 and was made a General

Secretary ofUP Congress in 1973.19

For a long while since the collapse of the RPI, UP did not see a strong trend of

Dalit-centred party whose leadership is held by Dalits themselves. Most of the Dalit

seat in 1962. For the information on B. P; Maurya, see Jaffrelot, op.cit., pp. 108-9.

11 Lynch, op.cit., p. 102.

1s P. G. Jogdand, Dalit Movement in Maharashtra, New Delhi: Kanak Publications, p. 65; see previous chapter of this

thesis also.

19 Jaffrelot gives stories of their joining the Congress from his own interviews with Maurya and>Sathi. Jaffrelot, op.

cit., pp. 112-3.

132

leaders were co-opted to the INC and the local Dalit networks formally or informally

organized were fizzled out or merged into the local Congress organizations. Sociali~ts,

such as the Socialist Party led by Ram Manohar Lohia, acted as defenders of the lower

castes to fill the vacuum of the Dalit leadership with a certain degree of success. Soon

Charan Singh attracted the lower castes focusing on kisan identity amalgamating both

caste and class category.20 The merger of above two groups partly led to the formation

of· the Janata Party, whose government decided the implementation of Mandai

Commission's recommendation for the OBC quota, later in 1990. For Dalit groups,

the INC was still their cardinal agency for representation throughout the mid- and later

1970s and the 1980s. There was a short revival of the Bharatiya Republican Party in

the 1989 general elections, failing to win even a single seat. Even a small number of

votes the party gained21 were mainly non-Dalit Congress votes brought about from the

alliance with the INC and with the Samajwadi Party. The possibility of revival ofDalit

political party with its own force seemed to fade out in UP, similar to the experience in

Maharashtra.

With the fall of the RPI, a political brainchild of Ambedkar failed to be

developed into a powerful Dalit-based party of the present day. Instead, the seed of

new movement of Dalit in north India was planted originally in Maharashtra under the

strong influence of Ambedkar movement, and its political outcome started to bear fruit

in UP later period under the banner of the BSP.

20 About the lower-caste politics against ~e Congress which was embracing the SC and upper castes in UP, see

ibid., pp. 254-304.

21 The Bharatiya Republican Party got 0.19 per cent of total votes and 7.99 per cent from 11 constituencies they

contested. Election Commission of India, Statistical Report on General Elections, 1989 to the Ninth Lok Sabha

vol. 1, New Delhi, 1990, p. 96.

133

2. Emergence ofKanshi Ram's Movement and its Ideology

As we observed above, many circumstances made UP lack of Dalit

consciousness and sustained Dalit movement. Though there was the meager SCF-RPI

tradition, it showed its limitations being unable to grow up as a fi.Ill-fledged Dalit party.

It was only after the 1980s when Kanshi Ram's new movement has increasingly

broadened its base to the northern India especiaily to UP and Punjab, where the RPI had

had a certain organizational base in the earlier decades. Though there have been the

RPI's renewed efforts to establish a unified Dalit political power under the name of

Bharatiya Republican Party in the late 1980s, it proved to be a failure. Coincidently, it

was in Maharashtra, homeland of the RPI, where Kanshi Ram started his first

organization as the form oflabourers' union in 1978.

Personality of Kanshi Ram and his devotion to the movement seem to have

been main reasons for its initial success to gain a footing in the northern states. Born

as a Raidasi Sikh, a community of Punjabi Chamar converted to Sikhism, Kanshi Ram

did not suffer from extreme poverty or caste discrimination in his early age.22 Family

background of Kanshi Ram follows the most common examples of the nineteenth and

twentieth century social reformers. With small landed background, he was educated

and got the B. Sc. degree thanks to his parents eager to educate their children. Then,

he secured a reserved position in the government office... When he was transferred to

the Department of Defence Production and started to work in a munitions factory in

Pune in 1958, the conditions of Maharashtrian Dalit workers shocked him because he

22 Following accounts on the life and early activities of Kanshi Ram are based on Mendelsohn and Vicziany, op. cit.,

pp. 219-22; Abh~y Kumar Dubay, Kanshi Ram, New Delhi: Rajkamal Prakashan, 1997; Kusum MedhwaJ,

Bharatiya Rajniti ke Alodankarta Kanshi Ram, Udaipur: Mulnivasi Prakashan, 2002, pp. 11-33.

134

had not encountered untouchability and discrimination until then. He was not involved

in the Dalit movement initially but his outlook underwent a sudden change in 1965

when he became caught up in a struggle initiated by other SC employees to prevent the

abolition of a holiday commemorating Ambedkar's birth anniversary. During this

conflict Kanshi Ram encountered profound prejudice and hostility of the upper-castes

members against Dalits, which was a revelation to him. Then he instantly absorbed

the radical ideas on caste, readingAmbedkar'sAnnihilation ofCaste.

Kanshi Ram was introduced to the political ideas of Ambedkar by D. K.

. . Khaparde, his Mahar Buddhist colleague and friend at the munitions factory. Kanshi

Ram and Khaparde together began formulating ideas of an organization for the educated

employees from the Scheduled and Backward castes. Such an organization would

work against harassment and oppression by upper-caste officers, and also enable the

often inward-looking occupants of reserved positions to give reward to their own

communities. They began to contact people of the same mind in Pune. Around this

time Kanshi Ram abandoned marriage and family life, largely because he felt it did not

fit into a life dedicated to the public concerns. He finally left his job in the munitions

factory in 1971 because he had already made up his mind to concentrate only on social

activities, and the organization was by then strong enough to meet his basic needs.

In 1971 Kanshi Ram and his colleagues established the Scheduled Castes,

Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes and Minorities Employees Welfare

Association, registered under the Pune Charity Commissioner. Despite the

Association's inclusive reach, its aggressively Ambedkarite stance ensured that the most

of its members were Mahar Buddhists. Within a year of its establishment, more than

one thousand members j-oined the·· association and it was able to open an office in Pune.

135

The organization attracted many of the members from the Defence Department and the

Post and Telegraph Department, and had its first annual conference addressed by the

then Defence Minister, Jagjivan Ram.

Kanshi Ram's next organizational step was to create the basis of a national

association of the SC government servants. As early as in 1973 he and his colleagues

established the All India Backward and Minority Employees Federation (BAMCEF),

and a functioning office was established in Delhi in 1976. Although the stated objects

of the new organization were essentially the same as those of the earlier body, the

rhetoric had grown bolder. It urged that deeply agitated government employees from

the SC, out of their inherent timidity, cowardice, selfishness and lack of desire, should

be rays of hope for their brethren in miserable situation?3 BAMCEF was relaunched

with greater fanfare on December 6, 1978, the death anniversary of Ambedkar, with two

thousand delegates joining a procession to the Boat Club Lawns in New Delhi.24

By the mid-1970s Kanshi Ram had established a broad network of contacts

throughout Maharashtra and the adjacent regions. During his frequent train trips from

Pune to Delhi, he adopted a habit of getting down at major stations along the way-

Nagpur, Jabal pur and Bhopal, among others-to contact sympathizers of his movement

and to try recruiting them to the organization?5 After shifting to Delhi in 1978, he

toured exhaustively Punjab, Haryana and UP, as well as further into Madhya Pradesh for

the purpose of organizing sympathizers. Parallel to his work among the educated

employees, Kanshi Ram was also contacting a wider audience with simple presentations

of Ambedkar's teachings. Thus in 1980 he organized a road show called 'Ambedkar

23 BAMCEF Bulletin, February 1974, p. 2.

24 The· Oppressed Indian vol. 1 no. 2, Apr!! 1979, pp. 18-22.

25 Mendelsohn and Vizciany, op. cit., p. 221.

136

Mela on Wheels', which he kept up for more than 2 months with a team of activists. It

was an oral and pictorial account of Ambedkar's life and views, together with

contemporary materials on oppression, atrocities and poverty. Between April and June

1980 the show was carted to thirty-four destinations in nine States of the north.26 It not

only unified the local leaders of BAMCEF but also appealed to the intellectuals outside

the organization, who sympathized with Ambedkar's ideology.

Though the SC constituted most part of the membership of BAMCEF,27 its

monthly organ, The Oppressed Indian, showed constant efforts to embrace other parts of

the downtrodden and minorities, such as the tribal, Muslims, backward castes etc.

Volumes of its organ covered issues related to the tribal people, along with the religious

minorities?8 The issue of reservation for the OBC w~ also dealt in depth in the

volumes published around 1981, which would draw attention of the OBC members.29

The personnel of other minority groups also participated in the activities of BAMCEF.

Among its contributors and speakers of various meetings including 'Ambedkar Mel a,'

Muslim and Christian name& were shown along with some of the known names from

OBC, such as Dauji Gupta, former Mayor of Lucknow and Jang Bahadur Patel, who

later became a President of UP branch of the BSP. BAMCEF also endeavoured to

broaden its regional basis throughout the country. Its organ continuously conveyed the

news on the organizational efforts including the openings and activities of its branches,

26 The Oppressed lnqian vol. 2 no. 4, June 1980, pp. 1f~20; vol. 2 no. 5, July 1980, pp. 7-17.

27 Mendelsohp and Vizciany estimate the proportion of membership as ninety per cent of Untouchables and ten per

cent of the tribal and, backward caste people. Mendelsohn and VtZciany, op. cit., p. 222.

28 For example, one issue of the magazine covers the function for celebration of Prophet Mohammed's birthday at

Nagpur. The Oppressed Indian vol. 2 no. 1, 1980, p. 6.

29 The Oppressed Indian vol. 3 no. 1, 1981, for example, had several special r-eports on reservation issue and more

articles on OBC reservation and debates.

137

especially the local offices scattered over many states like West Bengal, Karnataka etc.

But its organizational base still remained in Maharashtra in the initial period and rapidly

spread to the northern regions like UP, Delhi and Punjab. In the early volumes of The

Oppressed Indian, we can notice a strong influence of the Maharashtrian Dalit

movement, especially of Buddhism, probably related to its origin and human resources

of the organization.

From its beginning, BAMCEF had overtly propagated Ambedkar's ideology.

BAMCEF's motto, 'Educate, Organise and Agitate', was adopted from Ambedkar, and

its activities were formally divided into a number of welfare and proselytizing objects.

Its organ spared some space for the writings of Ambedkar in most of the issues.

BAMCEF propagated not only Ambedkar's ideology but also introduced other non­

Brahmin social reformers such as Jotirao Phule, 30 Periyar, 31 Shahu Maharaja/2 and the

religious leaders with reform mind such as Guru Ghasidas. 33

BAMCEF has a special significance as a backbone of the movement since it

has long been able to support the movement as its fmancial source. The major

contribution of BMCEF to the movement was supplying funds and a dedicated cadre of

workers regularly to the BSP. As a trade union of the government servants, its

members belonged to the middle class and BAMCEF collected regular membership fee

and even extra fund for the BSP after its formation. 34 One of the Maharashtrian

30 The Oppressed Indian vol. t nos. 6-7, 1979, pp. 9-16; vol. 3 no. 6, 1981, pp. 14-25.

31 The Oppressed Indian vol. 2 no. 7, 1980; pff. 6-10.

32 His portraits along with other leaders were presented and garlanded at the functions appeared a video clip made

for 'Bahujan Film.' This clip was given by a BAMCEF member in Mumbai.

33 The Oppressed Indian Vol. 2 no. 12, 198.1, pp. 16-7; vol. 3 no. 10, 1981, pp. 20"-1. Guru Ghasidas is a leader of

the Sathnamis from Bilaspur, Madhya Pradesh.

34 Sudha Pai, Dalit Assertion and the Unfinished Democratic Revolution-The Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttat Pradesh,

138

workers recalled an occasion of delivering Kanshi Ram a purse of forty thousand rupees

collected from Maharashtra in 1984.35 Kanshi Ram himself also affirmed at a press

conference that the half of the 8C officials in UP were the sympathizers of the B8P and

they supported financially through BAMCEF. 36 A constant need for fund to run the

political body caused dissent within BAMCEF and fmally became one of the important

reasons of its split.

Kanshi Ram's first attempt to shift the movement from social level to more

political one was to form a body capable of mobilizing the larger part of Dalits. The

Dalit Soshit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti (D-84) was formed as 'an organisation for

agitation' in December 1981.37 It was conceived as a political organization parallel to

BAMCEF, which was a trade-union type of social organization. But finally it was

formulated as a quasi-political party, partly because the government servants were

forbidden to participate in the electoral politics. Two organizations had the same

President, Kanshi Ram, shared the office, and many of the members. As D-84 was

claimed to be for agitation, its activities were separate from those of BAMCEF, an

organization of educated employees to strengthen the non-political roots of the

oppressed and exploited society.

Beginning his political activities, Kanshi Ram started to utter his political ideas.

New Delhi: Sage, 2002, pp. 10~7.

35 Mendelsohn and Vicziany, op. cit., p. 222.

36 He further said there was no .economic crisis for the party since they[BAMCEF] got him 1 0 lakh for the convention.

Amar Ujala, Decer'nber 9, 1986. He said BAMCEF donated money which helps in running the party as late as in

1990. Kanshi Ram's interview in Sarita, March 2, 1990. Reprinted ir. ~.4. RAkela (ed.}, Kanshi Ram-Press ke

aine men, Aligarh: Anand Sahitya Sadan, 2001, pp. 47-50.

37 While Sudha Pai says it was formed on September 24, 1982, I will follow the BAMCEF organ announcing its

launch on December 6, 1981, death anniversary of Ambedkar. Pai, op. cit., p. 91; The Oppressed Indian vol. 3

no. 10, 1981, p. 4.

139

Kanshi Ram mentioned 'munber game' when he announced the launch of D-S4 saying

as follows:

The SC, the ST, the OBC and the religious minorities accounted for

about 85 per cent of the total population-··have been the most subjugated···and

oppressed society [of India]. After the exit of the British and with the

introduction of adult franchise, ···the ruling class required to go to these 85 per

cent oppressed and exploited Indians for votes. For this purpose, ···felt the

necessity of-··political pimps produced from these 85 per cent helpless Indians.

···these political pimps stand exposed causing deep frustration amongst the 85%

helpless masses.··· In such situation a strong need was felt for an organization

which could launch struggles for the 8? percent helpless Indians.·· ·38

This logic of political agitation was continued to 'Poona Pact Denunciation Programme'

and again reflected in Kanshi Ram's book, Chamcha Age. This book, published in

1982, the 50th anniversary of the Poona Pact, blamed the Pact as anti-Dalit: The Poona

Pact, deprived the SC of the right of separate electorate, made the political elites from

the Scheduled and the backward castes dependent upon the upper castes. Now they

have to reject the role of chamchas of upper-caste-centered mainstream party and begin

to work for their own community breaking the caste hierarchy and inequality. 39

D-S4 or~anized 'prachar yatra' to awaken the masses, among which the main

event was the 'message of the D-S4: miraele of two feet and two wheels' between

38 Ibid.

39 Kanshi Ram; Chamcha Age-Era of Stooges, New Delhi, 1982. Hindi version was also published later. Kanshi

Ram, S. S. Gautam (tr.), Chamcha Yug, New Delhi: Sidharth Books, 2006.

140

March 15 and April 17 1983. Hundreds of cyclists including Kanshi Ram himself

rallied 3,000 km distance covering thirty-five places in seven states of northern India in

forty days.40 The Oppressed Indian proposed that the objective of this rally was 'to

awaken and educate our people.' It continued to argue as follows:

···their [85 per cent of the oppressed and exploited people] movement

today become the tools in the hands of the ruling castes. Their habits have been

so spoiled that they never fee] shame when they are used by others. Whenever

raJJies are organized by political parties to show their strength, these poor SC/ST,

OBC and minorities people rush to ride their vehicles and are paid for this. They

are happy to go and strengthen the hands of their oppressors and exploiters.··· 41

Most of the so-caJJed Ambedkarites shout the slogans of 'Ambedkar

Zindabad' and immediately after that they fall at the feet of Indira Gandhi or Atal

Behari Vajpayee and ask for a ticket.42

A"slogan coined after the formation of D-S4 well expressed the ideology of 15

per cent rule over 85 per cent, which read 'brahm[i]n, bania, thakur chor, baki sab he[i]n

D-S4'. Roughly translated, this slogan means that Brahmins, Banias and Raj puts are

thieves, while the rest of society are their victims. The same article cited above gave .-:·

the meaning of an important symbolism bicycles stand for. Bicycles are most common

means of transportation for the most part of Indian masses. Though they are

habituated to go by buses and trucks as they are always doing for other political parties,

40 The Oppressed Indian vol. 5 no. 2, 1983, pp. 22-4.

41 Ibid., p. 23.

42 Ibid.

141

all convenient transportations including trucks, tractors, buses, cars and rail are in the

hands of capitalists and power holders. These facilities cannot be available for the

oppressed; therefore, bicycles are the only and best weapon for them in their agitation.43

A report on the 1988 Lok Sabha by-election in Allahabad 44 briefed the

ideology of agitation flowing under the political strategy of the BSP. It said Dalits,

Muslims, Christians and Shudras were the original inhabitants of India while Hindus

came from outside and enslaved them. It seems to have been drawn from the reversed

version of Aryan theory by Phule, 45 but the BSP version put Muslims and Christians in

addition to Dalits and Shudras, unlike the Phule's one. Message in it is clear that the

BSP wanted to include not only Dalits but also others like Shudras and the religious

minorities in the category of 'Bahujan.' Kanshi Ram once emphasized that the BSP

did not talk only for Dalits but for Bahujan and he did not even use the word Dalit but

Bahujan, in an interview with media. 46 While the first point gives the historical

identity of Bahujan, the second point talks about the present situation of them: 'Upper

castes have treated us like animals. No one was ready to coronate Shivaji because he

was a Shudra. Upper castes never have respected us till today, and they will hot do in

the future.' And the third, 'the oppressed has full right to avenge the oppressors.' It

was a typical form of anti upper-caste ideology. Sometimes, he n~ver minded using an

expression like 'python' to refer to the Lok Dal, the BJP, the Janata Dal (JD) and the

43 Ibid., p. 24.

44 India Today, June 30, 1988, p. 35.

45 Jotirao Phule, P. G. Patil (tr.), Slavery, Collected Works of Mahatma Jotirao Phule Vol.1, Bombay: Education

Department, Government of Mahara.shtra, 1991. (En!J!ish translation ot·Gulamgiri, first published in 1873)

46 Chouthi Duniya, April2-8, 1989. Interview with Kanshi Ram. Reprinted in M~ R Akela (ed.), op. cit., pp. 23-30:

142

Communist Party, categorizing them the 'upper-caste parties. ' 47

Though D-S4 fielded forty~six candidates for the 1982 Assembly elections in

Hariyana, 48 it had limitations of a quasi-political party. The organization too much

overlapped with BAMCEF in matters of finance and human resources. So, Kanshi

Ram took the plunge and formed the BSP which was a full-fledged political party. D-

S4 organized another bicycle rally which was planned to end at Delhi and to proclaim

the formation of the BSP in 1984. And within just one year, it became one of the

important players in UP politics because Mayawati, for the first time, made a prominent

step at the Lok Sabha by-election in the Bijnor constituency. Many activities of D-S4

had been done by old members from the Pune days, most of whom were still in the

position of government servants. Moreover, their political loyalty was mainly toward

the various factions of the RPI. So the appearance of the BSP, a potential rival of the

RPI, as a sister organization of BAMCEF may be uncomfortable for those old members

from Maharashtra. There were also strains arising from Kanshi Ram's will for the

total domination of all three organizations. These strains grew more severe over the

next two years, and in early 1986 a major split took place. 49 Kanshi Ram announced at

that time that he was no longer willing to work for any other organization than the

BSP.50

This positional change of Kanshi Ram in the organizations seems to have been

caused by the evolvement of Kanshi Ram's understanding of and strategy for social

47 Ibid.

48 The Oppressed Indian vol. 4 no. 4, 1982, p. 18.

49 There were more splits in BAMCEF even after Kanshi Ram got off his hands from the organization. There are

four different bodies under the name of BAMCEF. On the first division of BAMCEF in 1994, see DVvol. 14 no. 2,

1994, p. 10.

~ Mendelsohn and Vicziany, op. cit., p. 222.

143

change. He no longer believed in the primacy of social reform. Rather, the capture

of political power emerged as a main object of the movement, as is the case of all other

political parties. It was the administrative power that would bring about the desired

social change, not vice versa. So this perspective led him to 'power first, policy later'

attitudes, as he declined to spell out policies on the basic issues such as the

liberalization of the Indian economy or the land reforms. 51 His view was that such

issues were irrelevant to the project of gaining political power, and that the appropriate

policies would fall into place once the power is attained. His political scenario of

India is a kind of holy war on the part of the bahujan samaj against their manuwadi

oppressors. This was a stance of pure fundamentalism, but it also set him and his party

free to engage in the most ruthless pragmatism in the name of capturing power, 52 which

we will trace in the later part of this chapter.

3. Development of the BSP in Early Phase:

Consolidating Dalit Vote under the Name of Bahujan

The BSP first started off their political activities in Punjab, Kanshi Ram's home

state, but his primary political task in the real sense was to break off the connection

between the Chamars of UP and the Congress. Approach to the Chamar may have

been possible without a great difficulty because of the party's earlier history, originated

from the soil of the Ambedkar movement in Maharashtra, which the UP Chamars partly

shared with. It was the time of political transformation that the long-term Congress

51 Chouthi Duniya, Apri12-8, 1989. lnterview.witb.Kanshi Ram. Reprinted in M. R. Akela (ed.), op. cit., p. 28.

52 Mendelsohn and Vicziany, op. cit., 223.

144

decline became a landslide, when Kanshi Ram started to set up the party organization

and to make trenches. In its initial steps, the BSP could not but to make some

dissonance with the RPI in the course of absorbing the human resources of the latter.

For example, in the 1984 general elections, the BSP fielded the former RPI

(Khobragade) member Man Singh for the Agra constituency.53 There was a clash on

the party symbol between the two parties in the 1985 Assembly elections.54 Since the

BSP tired to make a foothold among Chamars, this clash seemed to be natural.

From its initial phase, Chamar/Jatav in UP constituted the most important base

of the BSP. Chamars are the most numerous caste among the SC in UP as are the

Mahars in Maharashtra. Sections of Chamars, called themselves Jatav, especially from

the western UP area had been actively involved in the movement led by Ambedkar from

the mid-twentieth century, as mentioned earlier. Their recent political history, that they

had provided the strongest base for the SCF and its successor, the RPI in UP, apparently

made it easy to impart their support to the BSP. Though the BSP had clashed with the

RPI and its supporters during the process of transfer of support, the tactics of agitation

of D-S4 and the early BSP, blaming the Dalit politicians by calling them 'chamcha,'55

seems have worked effectively. Chunk of Chamar/Jatav voters switched to the support

for the BSP from their traditional support for the RPI-INC. Moreover, castes of the

party leaders would have affected people's sentiment in the level of undercurrent.56

Both the strength and the weakness of the party is that the primary 'vote bank',

53 Amar Ujala, December 14, 1984.

54 Elephant has been a traditional symbol of the RPI and again recognized as the RPI symbol in1985 in UP. Amar

Ujala, February 10, 1985.

55 Hindi word meaning yesman or flatter.

56 It is not coincidental that Ghamar-caste; with its comparative advance in the economic and educational level and

the political awareness of its member, produced eminent political leaders.

145

Chamars, are relatively evenly spread across the state. As a researcher rightly pointed

out, this spread gives the BSP a chance of a large number of seats, but at the same time,

makes it logically impossible to win even a single seat without strong support from

other communities. 57 But the result of the early elections proved that the BSP has not

solved the problem of how to mobilize all or, at least, most of the SC. In its early

phase, it gained 9.41 per cent of the total votes in the 1989 UP Assembly Elections,

while the SC population constituted 21.05 per cent of UP population, as appeared in the

1991 Census report. 58 The problem that dogged Ambedkar has thus repeated itself in

UP, though Kanshi Ram's Chamars are both more numerous and numerically more

dominant among the Untouchables than were Ambedkar's Mahars in the western part of

the country.

The formal entry of the BSP into UP was made in a by-election in 1985 for the

Lok Sabha seat of Bijnor, in which its candidate was Mayawati. She is a Jatav, a

daughter of a minor government official in Delhi, and her father impressed on his

children the importance of education for upward mobility and gave interest in

contemporary Dalit's problems. She had completed her BA and LLB from the

University of Delhi and started to teach in a government school from 1977 while

preparing for the examination for the Indian Administrative Service. Mayawati had

made a contact with Kanshi Ram at a BAMCEF meeting in 1977 and had gradually

been drawn into his organization. Impressed by her forthright speech, Kanshi Ram

57 Mendelsohn and Vicziany, op. eft., p. 219.

58 Election Commission of India, Statistical Report on General Election, 1989 to The Legislative Assembly of Uttar

Prades.'J, New 091ni, 1989, p. 15; Office 0f Registrar Gene!a!, Gov~mm~mt 0f !nd!a, Scheduled' Castes and

Scheduled Tribes, Census of India 1991, Data Production No.: 00-052-1991Cen-CD, 1991.

146

persuaded her into joining the political arena. 59 Her opponents in the Bijnor

constituency included Ram Vilas Paswan from the Lok Dal and Meira Kumar, Jagjivan

Ram's daughter, representing the INC, who won the seat as expected. Mayawati held

the third position following the two prominent Dalit leaders, securing more than sixty

thousand votes, 60 and attracted public attention. She was described as a threatening

candidate with a vulgar language by a local media. 61

By 1989 the BSP had put in five years a solid organizing work in UP and also

in the neighboring regions of Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Delhi, and parts of Haryana.

Their growing agitational work in UP was so active that it caused a worry to the

Congress leadership. 62 Meanwhile the political contour in UP has been changed in the

vortex of Ram Janmabhumi movement and following communal politics instigated by

the Sangh Parivar organizations. The BSP tried to favorably use this opportunity to

broaden its support base. Since the BSP in this early phase wanted to form an alliance

ofBahujan Samaj, among which the Muslim community was one of the most important

participants, the party made its efforts to gain Muslim supports. Kanshi Ram had

selected organizers and candidates from a variety of social backgrounds, especially from

the Muslim community, which was a significant effort to overcome its innate limitation

as Dalit-based, or more narrowly Chamar-based party. One of his organizers was Dr.

Mahsood Ahmed, a lecturer of the Aligarh Muslim University who had become

s!J About Mayawati's life, see Shailendra Sengar, Mayawati Bahujan se Sarvajait'tak, Delhi: Book li Publishing

House, 2008, pp. 1-19; Ajoy Bose, Behenji A Political Biography of Mayawati, New Delhi: Viking, 2008.

60 http://eci.nicJn/eci_main/ByeEiectionlbye_election.asp

s1 Amar Uja/a, December 12, 1985.

62 There was a news coverage that Shiela Dikshit had worried about D-S4 activities after touring some districts In UP.

______ She expressed her fear on their br~<'lking unity of society, while affirming that Dalit community was not leaving­

Congress. Amar Ujala, December 18, 1986.

147

disillusioned with the INC. He joined BAMCEF and then switched to D-S4 in 1983 as

a full-time organizer and fund raiser. Ahmed later took charge of the whole of the

eastern UP for the BSP. 63

The BSP continued the mass rallies to awaken the people. One of the biggest

was a remarkable cycle rally in 1988. Kanshi Ram launched all-India level cycle rally

on the Independence Day of 1988. The rallies of cyclists started from 5 comers of the

country to symbolize 5 types of social awareness programme, i.e. struggle for equality,

struggle for annihilation of caste, struggle against untouchability, discrimination and

exploitation. It was fmalized with a massive rally in Delhi on March 27, 1989.64 It

should be noted that its awareness programme was fully devoted to the social issues,

except 'struggle against exploitation' which can mean both social and economic

exploitation. It reflects that the party's policy, in this early phase, was concentrated on

the caste issues, on the basis of which other parties were blamed for lacking the national

vision and having the lopsided perspectives.

Between 1984 and 1989, the BSP contested many elections without winning a

single seat, but its base among the SC was increasingly broadened. In the 1984

general elections, the BSP secured more than one million votes65 amid a sweeping of

the INC which won all eighty-five UP Lok Sabha seats but two. In the 1985 UP

Assembly elections, the INC shrank back from its sweeping in the 1984 general

elections, while the Lok Dal and the Janata Party advanced and the BSP got four per

63 Mendelsohn and Vicziany, op. cit., pp.224-5. But he finany joined: the SP blaming the Kanshi Ram's anti-Muslim

bias in 1994.

64 Chouthi Dun~~a. April2-8, 1989. Reprinted in M. R. Akela (ed.), op. cit., pp. 23-30.

ss Jaffrelot, op, cit., p. 395.

148

cent of total votes. 66 Its performance continued to be remarkable in the series of by-

elections. In December 1985, the BSP candidate Mayawati revealed herself with

notable result in the Bijnor by-election as mentioned above. In the 1987 by-election,

the same candidate contested in the Hardwar constituency again stood second position

against the Congress candidate, but getting much more votes than Ram Vilas Paswan.67

Kanshi Ram started to be projected as a real national figure since the crucial Allahabad

Lok Sabha by-election of July 1987. It was a three-cornered contest among Sunil

Shastri of the INC and V. P. Singh of the opposition and Kanshi Ram. The BSP

show~d the most enthusiastic campaign with the rhetoric of overthrowing upper caste

political power: vote hamar a, raj tumhara nahin chalega, nahin chalega. 68 He

obtained eighteen per cent of the total vote while Shastri had twenty four per cent and V.

P. Singh fifty two. 69 It is noticeable that he got sixteen per cent of the backward caste

vote. 70 In the same year in the three UP Assembly by-elections, Kashipur, Patti, and

Rath constituencies, the BSP obtained 19.63 per cent of the total votes, holding the

second position in two constituencies and the third position in one. 71

The years of organizational efforts bore fruit in 1989 and 1991. The BSP

started to contest in the southern states of Kerala, Kamataka, Mahar.ashtra, Andhra

Pradesh and West Bengal from 1989. In the UP Assembly elections and Lok Sabha

66 Gail Omvedt, 'Kanshi Ram and the Bahujan Samaj Party', inK. L. Sharma (ed.), Caste and Class in India, Jaipur:

Rawat Publications, 1994, p. 159.

67 http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/ByeEiectionlbye_election.as!}

sa India Today, June 30, 1988, pp. 30-R

69 http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/ByeEiectionlbye _election.asp

10 India Today, July 15, 1988, p. 35.

71 The BSP's share of vote is prominent among the other opposition parties which got mere 2-3 per Cent, though the

INC polled the 52.87 per cent of total votes. Calculated from by-elections data· in

http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/ByeEJectionlbye_election.asp.

149

polls of UP between 1989 and 1991, the BSP's share of vote varied only marginally

between 8.7 and 9.4 per cent.72 But this impressive vote produced a disappointing

number of seats-in 1989 the party won thirteen out of 425 State Assembly seats, and in

1991 it won twelve. The party won only two Lok Sabha seats from UP and one from

Punjab in 1989, and one from UP and another from Madhya Pradesh in 1991;73 Kanshi

Ram himself subsequently won a by-election from UP in 1992. With this limited

electoral success in restricted regions, it can be possibly considered prominent among

the Dalit political forces, especially ·after the wane of the Dalit political party built by

followers of Ambedkar, UP became a state of central importance as far as Dalit politics

is concerned.

But the whole history of the party suggested that there could be little electoral

success without an alliance with another major force, though the party established a

social and regional base while it fought all the elections alone. 74 The BSP in this

period, kept focusing on the message that the oppressed sections should unite in

assuming the political power. Accordingly, its ideology was hostile towards upper

castes and the political parties supported by them. Its initial limitation of being

confined to and dependent too much on Chamar/Jatav was overcome in some senses, as

n Election Commission of India, Statistical Report on General Elections 1989 to the Ninth Lbk Sabha vol. 1, New

Delhi, 1990, p. 86; Election Commission of India, Statistical Report on General Elections, 1991 to the Tenth Lok

Sabha vol. 1, New Delhi, 1992, p. 62; Election Commission of India, Statistical Report on General Election, 1989

to The Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh, New Delhi, n.d., p: 15; Election Commission of India, Statistical

Report on General Election, 1991 to The Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh, New Delhi, n.d., p. 15.

73 Ibid.

74 Its early policy was fighting the elections alone. Kanshi Ram affirmed that 'we do not believe in politics of

compromise. It will be difficuH for our party to get developed independently.' But he did not deny there were

offers for coalition from various parties. Kanshi Ram's interview in Sarita, March 2, 1990. Reprinted in M. R.

Akela (ed.), op. cit., pp. 47-50.

150

we see the case of getting support from Pasis, 75 but it was not getting large support

from the other section of society such as OBC or religious minorities not to mention

upper castes. Caste-wise voting patterns in the 1988 Alahabad Lok Sabha by-election

show that support for the BSP was mainly from the Dalit voters and that the party was

not getting broad support from Muslims or OBC.76

The changing social milieu would have brought about chances for the BSP to re­

shape the political contour. The early 1990s was characterized by two different

political mobilizational strategies, communa177 mobilization instigated by the Ayodhya

issue and caste mobilization caused by the Mandai Commission Report. The 1991

General elections and the UP Assembly elections were naturally carried out in the

context of this milieu. The BSP resisted the BJP's attempts to create a huge chunk of

'Hindu' vote bank, clearly expressing its traditional intimacy with the Muslim

community. As one of this effort, an inquiry committee was set up by the BSP to make

an inspection on the communal riots and the affected area. It took a critical stance on

the riotous people, arguing that they tried to 'divide temple and mosque' and were the

75 Among the SC other than Chamars/Jatavs, only Pasis appear to have voted for the BSP in large numbers. The

Valmikis voted solidly for the BJP in the 1993 Assembly elections, and a sole Valmiki in the Lok Sabha elected in

1991 represented the BJP, though in 1980 he had been elected for the Janata Party. Many of the Dhobis too

have recently voted for the BJP. The Chamars are more numerous, better educated and more successful in

acquiring reserved positions than the other SC, and this tends to produce resentment. Mendelsohn and Vicziany,

op. cit., p.225.

76 The result of exit poll shows that Kanshi Ram got only two to four per r.e~t of vote from different upper -castes, five

per cent from Muslims, and sixteen per cent from other Hindus (mostly OBC), while drew 58 per cent of vote from

Dalits. India Today, July 15, 1988, p. 35.

n Here, 'communal' is being used to mean 'religiously communat.' The word 'communal' originally meant 'related

or of communities of all kinds' including religious communities, caste communities, linguistic communities etc. but

since the 1990s ·when th6 rc!lgku.Js ccmmunalism overwhelmed other kinds of communalism, it has been often

used to exclusively mean 'religiously communal.'

151

same who against the reservation. It argued that the victimized Muslims had no

problem with their neighboring Dalits but had problem with upper-caste Hindus. 78

Kanshi Ram also blamed the leaders of the BJP for their 'spitting communal venom in

the name of Ram-Roti. But what they are actually struggling for is not Ram-Roti but

power.' 79 By opposing the communal stance of the BJP, the BSP was able to project

itself as a 'secular' lower-caste party, hostile to the upper castes, with an agenda of Dalit

uplift.

The collapse of the INC, the split of backward-caste votes between the JD and the

SP and the hostility to the JD from upper-caste Hindus due to the implementation of the

Mandai Commission Report, allowed the BJP to create a single massive Hindu vote­

bank in the 1991 UP state Assembly elections.80 Accordingly, many political parties

including the BSP had to fight against the Hindutva mobilization. The BSP's main

political target in the 1991 elections was to reduce the voting rate for the BJP from 32

pet cent to 20 per cent. Highlighting that the BJP is a communal power, Kanshi Ram

said he would meet the target by visiting youth population in the villages of UP.81

Kanshi Ram also tried to make an electoral alliance with the Samajwadi Janata Party of

Chandrashekhar, Devi Lal and Mulayam Singh Yadav, which could have been a non-

Congress secular front, but failed. 82 Despite the sweeping victory of the BJP due to the

Hindutva mobilization, the BSP sustained similar support it had before. In the UP

78 Amar Ujala; December 30, 1990.

79 Dainik Jag ran, April 21, 1991.

80 Sudha Pai, Uttar Pradesh: Agrarian Change Electoral Politics, N~w Qa!hi: S~,ip;a Publieatioos;c1993, pp. 128-9.

61 Sunday Mail, September 29, 1991. Reprinted in M. R. Akela (ed.), op. cit., pp. 39-40. He used the interesting

rhetoric for the Hindutva character of the BJP saying 'BJP wiH improve your next life, so let it be, but this life is in

the hands of the BSP only.'

82 Sudha Pai, Dalit Assertion and the Unfinished Democratic Revolution, p. 162.

152

assembly elections in 1991, it obtained only one seat less than what it obtained in the

1989 elections and secured 9.44 per cent of votes, which was even 0.03 per cent point

more than its share of vote in the 1989 elections. 83

By the way, the BSP did not play an active role in the Mandai issue, just

declaring its agreement to the principle of reservation. Kanshi Ram was of opinion

that reservation for the OBC was not an important issue, though he welcomed a certain

percentage of reservation for the OBC. Rather, he asked for the reservation for the

laiidless farmers and the labourers of unorganized sector. 84 Though he changed his

attitude later, 8~ it may have been out of political consideration in order to embrace the

OBC voters. His speeches in the various occasions asserted that 'reservation is not our

demand but our right. It is the matter of participation' and that 'our party will fight

until the recommendation of Mandai Commission will be enforced completely.'86 No

matter what the stance of the BSP was, it seemed clear that Kanshi Ram was critical on

the institution of reservation itself, which is, according to him, a short-time solution.87

He once described that reservation is a 'crutch'-useful for a cripple, but a positive

handicap for someone who wants to run on his own two feet. 88

83 Election Commission of India, Statistical Report on General Election, 1989 to The Legislative Assembly of Uttar

Pradesh, New D~lhi, n.d., p. 15; Election Commission of lnctia, Statistical Report on General Election, 1991 to The

Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh, New Delhi, n.d., p. 15.

84 Sunday Mail, September 29, 1991. Reprinted in M. R. Ake!a(ed.), op. cit., pp. 39-40.

85 He demanded the modification on the implementation of the OBC reservation from 27.5 per cent to 52 per cent,

which is their population proportion. Navbharat Times, November 24, 1991. Reprinted in M. R. Akela (ed.), op.

cit., pp. 37-8.

86 Anuj Kumar (ed.), Bahujan Nayak-Kanshi Ram ke Avishmarlniya Bhashan, Delhi: Gautam Book Centre, 2000,

pp. 97-8 and passim.

87 Ibid.

88 Mendelsohn and Vicziany, op. cit., p. 224(interview in 1996). Kanshi Ram's uneasy sentiment for the reservation

153

The BSP somehow constructed its tranches in the northern India, especially in

UP, until the early 1990s, increasingly growing its share of vote and achieving a little

electoral success. It could not embrace various communities other than Dalit

communities and Muslims, to a certain extent, however, with its ~arly election strategy,

'ekla chalo re'. In the storm of Mandal-Masjid controversies, it failed to take a step of

big progress, just keeping its usual share of vote and a small number of winning

candidates. Something else would be needed to broaden its social basis, so as to

capture the political power, its goal of priority.

4. Achieving Power through Coalition Politics

The BSP undertook a huge modification in its electoral strategy 1993 onwards.

There was already a prelude of it in the 1991 elections, when Kanshi Ram tried an

electoral alliance with the Samajwadi Janata Party but in vain. An alliance with other

party was realized in the 1993 UP Assembly elections, which also meant a big change in

the party's electoral strategy. Its first alliance partner was the SP of Mulayam Singh

Yadav, split from the Samajwadi Janata Party. According to the existing number of the

MLAs, the BSP became a junior partner, with the commitment of Chief Ministership for

Mulayam Singh Yadav in case of winning. Titerefore, difference of the objectives of

alliance was obvious: the SP was seeking power, and the BSP, number. The BSP

moved doser to the SP attending and organizing joint rallies in a large number. 89

appeared when he said that Bahujans could condescend to the Brahmins by giving them reservation proportional

to their own meager population once they come into power throughout India. Ibid.

89 Adeed Markaz, Mar~h 14--20, 1993 (Reprinted in Akela (ed.}, op. cit., pp. 83-4); Amar Ujala, April? and 25, 1993.

154

Since the SP was getting strong support of the OBC, especially of the Yadav

caste,90 it realized the possibility of the SC-OBC cooperation against upper castes.

During the election campaign for the UP Assembly in 1993, the BSP activists coined

and used the slogan: 'tilak, taraju, talwar, maaro unko joote char. ' 91 This slogan

derogatorily means that Brahmins, Banias and Rajputs, each identified by a slighting

term, should be beaten with a shoe-a traditionally demeaning form of punishment

because of the ritual impurity of leather, and at the same time leather can be a symbol of

Chamars because of their traditional occupation in the caste system. This provocative

slogan is full of anti-upper caste sentiment, and it served as a simple and dramatically

offensive marker of the party's ideological position at the time of making first coalition

with the OBC.

In the particular context of UP in 1993, the demolition of the Babri Masjid on

December 22, 1992 led Dalits, the backwards, and Muslims to politically come together

and to form an electoral alliance against the Hindutva force. In the aftermath of the

destruction of the Babri Masjid, Muslims have been puzzled about their political

support and leadership. They have turned away from the INC for its alleged culpable

failure to prevent the demolition of the mosque, and have given considerable support to

the SP and some to the BSP. These two lower-caste parties, with support of the

Muslim community, effectively opposed to the communal mobilization of the BJP by

joining the backwards and Dalits together. The BJP tried to unite the entire Hindu

community with an opportunity of the Babri Masjid issue but the Hindutva ideology did

oo Yadav, a nomenclature for the various herding castes in the states of north India, is a upwardly mobile,

intermediate peasant caste. They started to advent in the political field in recent years producing many well­

known political leaders, one of whom is Mulayam Singh Yadav.

91 Mendelsohn and Vicziany, op. cit., p. 223.

155

not appeal to the lower castes, who never felt themselves being part of the Brahminical

system. Moreover, following the announcement of implementing the Mandai

Commission report by the V. P. Singh government in 1989, caste-based mobilization had

become more capable to unite the Dalit and the backwards in UP. The 1993 elections

had marked the culminating point of the anti-upper caste mobilization. Therefore, the

SP-BSP alliance was the united front of the backwards-Dalit forces, joining together

through 'Mandai' issue, against the communal upper-castes camp awakened by 'Masjid'

stir. Though this coalition failed to be marked by the diversification of the 'bahujan'

under it, not receiving support of the whole OBC,92 it had a backing of the Muslim

community instead, which would add the weight of anti-communal coalition.

The BSP's coming into power in UP as a junior partner of the SP was a

noteworthy event because a political party based on Dalits' support and led by Dalit

leadership became a part of power probably for the first time in Indian history. Seen

from the perspective of the early ideological pursuit of the BSP, it was a huge leap

towards the fulfillment of the mission to bring together Dalits, the backward castes and

to some extent Muslims in the same political platfonn of bahujan samaj. The coalition

government lasted only for 18 months, from November 1993 to June 1995, however.

The coalition between Dalits and the backwards proved to be vulnerable. There had

been so many inner tensions in the coalition of the two parties at the political level, and

at the social level as well.

The political levels of problems included the personality clashes betwt;en the

leaders of two parties. Mulayam Singh Yadav did not like Kanshi Ram's constant

92 About 28 per cent of the backwards, mainly upwardly mobile Kurmis and Lodhis, voted for the BJP. Pai, op. cit.,

p.163.

156

interference in running the government and the authoritarian style of Mayawati also

caused problems. Mayawati also complained about maltreatment of the Ministers

from the BSP in the Mulayam Singh-led government as early as March 1994. She

further blamed it, calling 'Manuwadi.'93 More seriously, Mulayam Singh attempted to

isolate the BSP in the coalition by absorbing its base among the backwards and Muslims.

Two leaders from the respective parties competed to win over support of the Muslim

community but finally Muslim leaders like Mahsood Ahmed and the SP leaders showed

off their closer relationship isolating Kanshi Ram.94 Mulayam Singh's alleged casteist

way of administration and politics also caused tension. He favoured Yadavs, his own

caste members, in recruitment and promotion in the district administration, which came

under the open criticism of the BSP.95 He also tried to absorb the MLAs belonged to

the OBC from other parties into his own party in order to hustle the BSP out of coalition

govemment.96 The BSP, along with other opposition parties of UP, again blamed the

Mulayam Singh government for its alleged census irregularities after the catastrophic

defeat in the Panchayat elections in 1995.97

The social level of reason for the collapse of coalition government was the

inability of the SP and the BSP to unite the backwards and the Dalits, in the broadest

93 Amar Ujala, March 9, 1994.

94 Finally, Mahsood Ahmed, the young BSP Education Minister has resigned from the UP cabinet alleging the anti­

Muslim bias of the BSP chief Kanshi Ram. A new Muslim BSP Minister was taken in his place but it was a big

1oss for the party considering that Ahmed had been one of the prime organizers of the party for a long time. DV

voiA3 no~-17,-1994, p. 23.

95 India Today, October 15, 1994, pp. 35-6.

96 The Times oflndia, February 21, 1995.

97 India Today, May 15, 1995, p. 84-5. Kanshi Ram also blamed the SP for its election irregularity and mentioned it

as a pretext of the BJP-BSP coalition. India Today (Hindi), June 30, 1995, p. 52. (Reprinted in Akela (ed.), op. cit.,

p. 182.)

157

sense. It became increasingly clear that there were fundamental differences between

the Dalits and the backwards-particularly, the upper backwards-in the countryside,

which could not be easily overcome. We will take a look at an example of

Chamars/Jatavs, the biggest chunk of the BSP's supporting group. Their traditional

job in the caste system has been the leather-works but they also engaged in the various

village services and agricultural labour. As main purveyors of agricultural work,

Chamars had to confront Jats, the traditional landholding and cultivating peasant caste

in western UP, Punjab and Haryana, while they faced the power of Rajputs as a non-

cultivating landlord caste and intermediary cultivating tenant castes like Kurmis,

Yadavas, etc. in eastern UP and Bihar.98 These kinds of traditional confrontations have

been continuing in the village level and the increasing number of serious atrocities

against Dalits during the Mulayam Singh government in UP caused worries even from

the central govemment.99 In the first five months of the government's tenure, there

were about 60 clashes involving Dalit and the OBC, in which 21 Dalits and three

members of OBC were killed. 100 These murders were reflective of local conflicts

between Dalits and the land-holding intermediary caste groups.101 Shaking hands in

the highest level of political elites could not soothe the grass-root sentiments out of their

everyday lives. And the rise of a new assertiveness among the Dalit groups also led to

98 Gail Omvedt, op. cit., p. 157.

99 Ram Dhan, then Commissioner for SC and ST, expressed his WQrries on UP's situation and blamed the UP

government did not work for the SC. Amar Ujala, August 28, 1994. Another news also covered that Dalit

atrocities had been worst in MP, UP and.Rajasthan. Amar Ujala, August 3, 1994.

100 The Times of India, March 2, 1994. Frontline also reports the case of local BSP leader like Ramautar Paswan

and alleged vengeful murder against it, which are all related with growing clout of Dalits and caste conflicts at local

levet Frontline, March 11, 1994, pp. 4-10.

101 Ibid.

158

conflicts with the backward castes over questions of identity and policies. After the

collapse of the coalition government, the BSP have never pursued an alliance with the

OBC-based party, which means the end of 'bahujan phase' 102 in their electoral strategy.

It also stopped identifying upper castes as enemies. Every social group in any position

of the caste hierarchy started to be considered as its potential ally.

This coalition of the two parties officially broke up on June 2, 1995. The BSP

quickly bagged support of the BJP and the formation of a new government was declared

on the very next day. 103 A new coalition government was formed with support of the

BJP and Mayawati became the first Dalit Chief Minister of UP. The news of the BJP-

BSP alliance was received by surprise because their ideologies and policy lines were

contradictory to each other. The ideological line of the BSP before this incident was

against the Manuwadi and communal forces, and it had blamed the BJP for last several

years for the same reasons. Therefore, this coalition was obviously pragmatic

pursuing their political purpose. Both the parties had clear aims they were targeting

through the coalition. The BJP, highly upper-caste-centered party, hoped to draw

support from the lower-caste groups by establishing the image that the party joined hand

with a 'Dalit party.' The BSP aimed at obtaining the political power, because it had

sought to be a 'ruling race,' as emphasized from the earlier period.

Mayawati clearly revealed that the object of this coalition was 'to stop

1o2 Sudha Pai divided the phase of development of the BSP by its electoral strategy into two, bahujan and post­

bahujan-.

103 The leadership of the party tnoved closer to the -upper-caste parties, the BJP and the Congress. The Congress

in· June 1995 welcomed the decision by the BSP to withdraw the support to the SP-BSP coalition, but was not

keen to support a BSP government. The BJP, on the contrary, immediately offered support to gain support of the

backwards and Dalits. Pai, op. cit., p. 171.

159

Mulayam's goonda rqj,' 104 which did not mean ideological concurrence between the

two parties. Kanshi Ram, the party supremo never stopped blaming the BJP for being

Brahminical, Manuwadi, even after forming the government with support of the BJP.

He reiterated that this coalition is only for a short time, 'in order to fight criminals[the

SP of Mulayam Singh Yadav] together' and he had no future plan of further alliance

with the BJP for the 1996 election. He did not rule out the possibility of future

relationship with Mulayam Singh saying that 'he would support the BSP for his own

interests.' 105 It demonstrates his perspective on the political relationship-everything

depends upon the political interests. His reaction was cool to the point that the BJP is

a communal party, also: 'The BJP is BJP and the BSP is BSP, the ideology of the BJP

is we11-known.' 106 There seems to be not much room for the BSP to justify their

alliance with the communal force. It proved its own character as a casteist party

putting more critical importance on caste and power-which is, according to the party

leadership, vehicle for the advancement of the Dalit community--over the secularism

Issue.

The period of coalition between the BSP and the BJP, there have been massive

activities leading the 'Dalitization' of UP, as the media described. During her period in

office, Mayawati implemented a number of socio-economic and cultural policies

exclusively for Dalits. The formation of the government was-a form of mobilization,

encouraging Dalits to stand up for their rights, even with the support of the BJP.

Mayawati, as the Chief Minister, pursued policies wr .• kh were beneticial mainly to the

Dalits and to a lesser extent, the backwards and the Muslim community, e.g. the

104 India Today, June 3(}, 1995, pp. 48-9.

1os Ibid., p. 52~

106 Ibid.

160

Ambedkar Village Programme,107 the Ambedkar Rozgar Yojana for Dalit women, 27

per cent of the state budget allocation for the OBC, reservation benefits for the lower­

caste Muslims etc. She also erected many statues of Ambedkar and renamed

institutions, towns, districts, etc., after famous lower-caste leaders, such as Phule and

Periyar, which would give her and her party the image and the legitimacy as heir of

Ambedkar and his movement. She also took an opportunity to appoint Dalits in key

positions in the administration at the district and state-level.

The BJP, which did not like those pro-Dalit policies of the Mayawati

government, withdrew its support and the government collapsed on December 17, 1995.

The President's Rule was declared for UP and the 1996 Lok Sabha elections and the

State Assembly elections in the same year were undertaken under the President's Rule.

The uncomfortable relationship between the SP and the BSP, and the BSP's coalition

with the BJP in 1995 obstructed the BSP's inclusion in the new National Front on the

eve of the 1996 Lok Sabha elections. 108 The BSP and the SP could not bring together,

which divided the lower-caste votes, and resulted in the benefit to the BJP. The BSP

did not take part in any electoral alliance but it fielded 12 upper-caste candidates in UP

to draw support from the upper-caste voters without aligned party. 109 Iri terms of votes,

the BSP improved its vote share in the constituencies of UP from 8.7 per cent in the

1991 Lok Sabha elections and 11.12 per cent in the 1993 Assembly elections to 20.61

107 It was initially started by the SP government led by Mulayam Singh Yadav in 1991.

1oa Pai, transformation of the Indian Party System-Lok Sabha Elections 1996', Asian Survey vol. XXXIV, 1996, p.

1178.

109 Kanshi Ram claimed in an interview that it was out of consideration of their slogan 'participation should be based

upon numbers.' Amar Uja/a, April20, 1996.

161

per cent in the 1996 Lok Sabha elections_no However, the BSP was not able to

translate its increased vote percentage into seats, though returns of this general election

were better than any other elections so far it undertook. 111

This problem made the BSP to form an electoral alliance with the INC for the

coming UP A$sembly elections same year. Since the previous issue of Babri Masjid,

which had caused the vehement communal riots, was not valid anymore, the 1996

Assembly elections were characterized by the competition amongst castes blocs. It

was a revival of 'Mandai' issue in the sense that the OBC, represented mainly by the SP,

tried to gather various castes belonged to the OBC category and concerted all its efforts

against upper castes. The INC continued its umbrella strategy to draw votes from all

sections but wanted to keep its traditional vote bank, lower strata of society, by allying

with the BSP. The BSP also needed this alliance with the INC to widen its base

especially among the upper castes and to gain votes from wider spectrum including the

OBC and Muslims. But its strategy to gain support from the OBC proved failure. 112

Realizing the election would be a caste game, Kanshi Ram was reported to have asked

the INC to field 100 Brahmins in the 125 seats allqtted to it, so as to wean the upper

castes away from the BJP and attract them back to the INC.113 In that sense, this

alliance was only in pursuit of the increase of votes, considering the social milieu which

11° Election Commission of India, Statistical Report on General Elections, 1991 to the Tenth Lok Sabha vol. 1, p. 76;

Election Commission of lndia, Statistical Report on General Election, 1993 to The Legislative Assembly of Uttar

Pradesh, New Delhi, n.d., p. 15; Election Commission of India, Statistical Report on General Elections, 1996 to the

Eleventh Lok Sabha-vol. 1, New Delhi, n.d., p. 116.

111 It won a total of eleven seats, six of them in Uttar Pradesh, three in Punjab and two in Madhya Pradesh. Ibid.

112 In the 1996 general eiection, the BSP failed to get broad support from the OBC except Koeris. Brass, 'General

Elections 1996 in UP', EPW vol. XXXII no. 38, 1997, pp. 2403-21; Pradeep Kumar, 'Dalits and the BSP in UP

Issues and Challenges', EPWvol. XXXIV no. 14, 1999; pp. 822-6.

113 The Pioneer, July 9, 1996.

162

would decide the voters' sentiments. Not only alliance, the BSP also posted candidates

from various communities such as the OBC, Muslims and upper castes. It gave about

30 per cent tickets to Dalits and an equal amount to the backwards and some to upper

castes. But the general appearance of its ticket distribution gave an impression of

advancement of the upper-caste members in the party. It also attempted to gain

Muslim votes by including anti-communalism in the agenda of its election campaign,114

promising that it would not form any agreement with the BJP after the elections and

giving tickets to 52 Muslims.115 Newly coined slogan 'Dalit Muslimjagega, Mulayam

Singh bhagega' 116 showed its endeavour to pursue the Muslim support and its

animosity against the SP.

In the 1996 UP Assembly elections, the BSP scored the vote share of 19.64 per

cent, much increased than 11.12 per cent of the 1993 Assembly elections but obtained

the same number of MLAs as in 1993}17 The electoral alliance could not form the

government with the number ofMLAs it held, 67 of the BSP and 33 of the INC, so that

the alliance broke. No party won an overall majority and the central government again

imposed the President's Rule on the state. There was a possibility of forming the

coalition government of the United Front and the INC-BSP but could not be realized

due to enmity between the SP and the BSP. In spite of keeping status quo, the 1996

elections were meaningful for the BSP in the sense that it consolidated the SC as a

114 Kanshi Ram expressed strong dissent against communalism and communal parties, blaming the BJP

encouraging communal activities. Amar Ujala, September 17, 1996.

115 The Times of lndi~. September 8, 1996; The Pioneer, September 18, 1996.

11s Amar Ujala, August 12, 1996.

117 Election Commission of India, Statistical Report on General Election, 1996 to the Legislative Assembly of Uttar

Pradesh, New Delhi, 1997, p. 16.

163

'voting bloc seeking to control their own destiny.'ll 8 In fact, it secured support from

the 65 per cent of the Dalit voters in the 1996 Assembly elections, according to a

survey. 119 But at the same time, support from the other communities, especially from

upper castes and Muslims were still rather low, marking less than I per cent and 4.7 per

cent, respectively. 120 The uppet castes may not be able to sympathetic to its aggressive

anti-upper castes ideology and the Muslims were not ready to give their trust and

support to the BSP due to its former alliance with the BJP.

The political suspension was broken when a six-monthly 'power-sharing

agreement' was reached between the BSP and the BJP after the considerable bargaining.

Earlier, the BSP broke its alliance with the INC on January 27, 1997, presumably

because it started to negotiate with the BJP around this time. 121 Under the new

agreement, each party was supposed to form a government for six months under its own

leader, supported by the other from outside. This agreement was received with

surprise especially by the INC. Kanshi Ram again argued that it did not matter which

of the 'Manuwadi' parties they made an alliance, whether with the Col).gress or with the

BJP: Their task was simply to come into power and change the systel!l from the position

of the government. 122 The BSP formed the government first, on March 21, 1997,

under the Chief Minstership of Mayawati. The BSP-BJP agreement lasted only a little

more than six months. The BSP leadership, eager to implement various programmes

11a Omvedt, 'Dalit Politics', The Hindu, April1, 1998.

11t1 Jaffrelot, op. cit., p. 417.

120 Kanchan Chandra and Chandrika Parmar, 'Party StrategieS in the UP Assembly Elections, 1996', EPW vot.

XXXVII no. 5,1997, pp. 214-22.

121 Yashwant Sinha, a senior BJP leader hinted the possibility of relationship with the BSP in early January. Kanshi

Ram also metA. B. Vajpayee for discussions. Amar Uja/a, January 4, Sand 7, 1997.

122 Amar Ujala, June 15, 1997.

164

to benefit the Dalits, carried foward the various social programmes including Ambedkar

village programme and many others for generating employment, and enhancing

education and health etc.123 The Mayawati-led government also transferred a large

number of civil and police officials to post the Dalit officials instead, in order to ensure

the proper and rapid implementation of various policies.124 The Kalyan Singh-led BJP

government had objected to these policies and stopped most of the Dalit-oriented

programmes when it assumed power on September 1997. Until it officially withdrew

its support for the BJP government on October 21, the BSP has been suffering from the

internal dispute on the question of whether to support the Kalyan Singh government or

not. Only two day after it withdrew its support, a faction of 26 MLAs within the BSP

was split, later to form a new political party, the Janatantrik BSP, and provided support

to the BJP government.125 Withdrawn of support and consequent split of the BSP

ultimately resulted in the stronger BJP government without coalition.

After breakdown of the power-sharing arrangement with the BJP and being

unable to form an alliance with the SP, the BSP went for the 1998 Lok Sabha elections

with no electoral alliance. Mayawati preferred the policy of distributing tickets to non-

Dalits, in a bid to increase seats . and thereby, gain power alone. Setting up for the

general elections, Mayawati sidelined its upper-caste leaders by not giving any post in

the party organization. It looked obvious that the party abandoned its strategy of

attracting the upper castes under the slogan of 'sarva samaj.' The ticket distribution

123 Mayawati conveyed her message' regarding various programmes only 2 days after taking oath. Amar Ujala,

March 24, 1997.

124 The Times of India, March 23, 1997. Kanshi Ram also argued that it is better for the implementation of policies

and the administration if the District Magistrates belong to Chief Minsiter's caste. Amar Ujala, June 15, 1997.

12s The Times of India, October 24, 1997.

165

and organizational setup before the 1998 election hinted its comeback to the old policy

of consolidating its own vote bank. 126 But the party's performance at the 1998 Lok

Sabha elections was disappointing. The BJP won 57 seats and the 36.49 per cent of

the vote in UP/ 27 mainly at the expense of the BSP. The BSP retained its vote~share

of 20.90 per cent but gained only four seats in its original base of eastern districts.U8

Kanshi Ram was also defeated in the Saharanpur constituency, a Dalit-majority area,

while Mayawati retained her seat in Akbarpur constituency reserved for SC. The party

performed well in its traditional stronghold, where it had put Muslim candidates and

gained support of Muslim community.

As the central government led by A. B. Vajpayee could not survive the

confident vote in the Lok Sabh, new general elections were announced in 1999. The

BSP kept the same election strategy of embracing the various caste groups from the

social strata as in the former election: ticket distribution to the various communities

instead of election coalition-Three social groups other than Dalits were identified by

the party for widening its base: the upper castes, the backwards and the Muslims. But

the 1999 elections could have seen some significant modifications to the already

existing strategy. In June 1999, a proposal supported by Kanshi Ram was debated for.

a revival of the SP-BSP alliance in UP, in the fonn of a combine of Dalits, Yadavs,

Muslims and a section of the Thakurs and OBCs.129 The leaders of both parties

attempted to realize the alliance through intermediaries until the early July, but it proved

126 Arnar Ujala, July 4, 1998.

127 Election Commission of India, Statistical Report on General Elections, 1998 to the 12th Lok Sabha vol. 1, New

Delhi, n.d, p. 91, 110.

128 Ibid., pp. 92, 111.

129 Frontline, October 8, 1999, pp. 20..24.

166

to be unsuccessful. The main reason was opposition from Mayawati, who did not

want any alignment with the SP and believed that the BSP could perform well without

any electoral arrangement. Rather, she expected support from the Muslims who were

reportedly moving away from the SP. She ruled out other electoral alliance with any

other party and argued that the party could broaden its base and increase the number of

seats by distributing tickets to the backwards, Muslims and upper-caste candidates.

The BSP, in the 1999 Lok Sabha elections, allotted 20 tickets to Dalits, 38 to

the backward castes and 10 to the upper castes-five Brahmins and five Thakurs in UP.

Moreover, the allocation of the tickets was according to its strength in the total

population in a constituency.130 It fielded Muslim candidates in 17 constituencies, 20

per cent of total constituencies in UP, 131 where it was felt that they were moving away

from the SP. Mayawati also made serious efforts to earn the Muslim support, by

promising them the benefit of reservation if they helped the BSP to gain enough votes,

so as to be a part of the new government, which she pointed out, would enable them to

have their own representatives in power. 132 The party also made considerations on

caste matters in each constituency by fielding a Gujjar in Baghpat, a Kashyap in

K~irana, a Saini in Muzaffarnagar, and a Burman in Hardwar. 133 The party tried to

embrace Brahmins by nominating Brahmin candidates in such constituencies as Sitapur,

where the Brahmins had expressed their displeasure with the BJP. In eastern UP, the

130 Pai, 'SSP's New Election Strategy Pays Off', EPWvol. XXXIV no. 44, 1999, pp. 3099-3101.

131 Election Commission of India, Statistical Report on General Elections, 1999 to the Thirteenth Lok Sabha vol. 1,

New Delhi, n.d, pp. 230-53. Consijtuencies Where the BSP fielded Muslim candidates are Nainital, Amroha,

Moradabad, Bareilly, Pilibhit, Shahabad, Lucknow, Unnao, Bahraich, Maharajganj, Azamgarh, Agra, Bulandshahr,

Hapur, Meerut, and Saharanpur.

132 Amar Uja/a, August 22 and September 7, 1999; The nmes of India, September 8, 1999.

133 The Hindu, August 11, 1999.

167

BSP managed to gain support of Kurmis134 among the OBC and sections of the Most

Backward Classes. The party also developed leadership across the state, among the

castes neglected by other political parties, such as Pal, Shakya, Baghel, Maurya,

Pushkar and Saini among the backwards, and S~awar, Pasi, Dhobi, Valmiki and

Khatiks among Dalits. 135

On the other hand, the BSP had to take risks adopting the election strategy of

pursuing Dalit-Brahmin alliance trying to embrace the upper castes, its traditional

enemy. The first political risk was the diluting exclusive identity as a Dalit political

party, which party leadership was also aware of. Kanshi Ram attempted to justifY the

making union with the upper castes, by arguing that it was adopted precisely for

'quicker growth' and more importantly for 'empowerment of the oppressed.'136 The

second risk that the party faced was a decline of party discipline, because such strategies

promoted a power-oriented political culture in the party. The party's strategy and

policy have always been decided on the basis of gaining power, not of ideology or of

discipline. Pursuing short-sighted returns is now atmosphere of party. The party -.

seems to become more open to various-castes and communities others than Dalits, but at

the same time, it was misused by local politicians for their political purpose. · Many

occasions when the party cadre joined the other parties, often the SP, apparently

134 Kurmis are comparatively low on the scale of prosperity in UP and have had a history of anti-Brahmin radicalism,

as we see Shahu Maharaj of Kolhapur remains a source of inspiration to some of them. And a section of Kurmis

had been members of the RPI. Among the OBC, they also have given the strongest support for the BSP.

Kurmis could see advantage in being associated with a party that was not dominated by the more numerous

Yadavs. Mendelsohn and Vicziany, op. cit., p. 226.

135 Pai, Dalit Assertion and the Unfinished Democratic Revolution, p. 183.

136 Jaffrelot, 'The BSP in north India: No Longer Just a Dalit Party?', Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and

the Middle Eastvol. XVIII no. 1, 1998, pp. 35-51.

168

following their personal gain, demonstrate this problem.137

This tendency continues in the 2000s. Mayawati held the Chief Ministership

again in 2002 for 15 months. After stepping down from the state power in 2003, the

BSP started to mobilize Brahmins under the slogan of 'Brahmin jodo.' Mayawati for

the first time addressed the state-level Brahmin mahasammelan in 2005, as a result of

long-time endeavour. Satish Chandra Mishra, a Brahmin leader, emerged in the party

as a most trusted, 'Mayawati's right-hand man', along with Ramveer Upadhyaya,

another Brahmin. The party fostered leaders from various background including

Muslim and OBC.138 Its electoral success in the 2007 Assembly election proved that

its strategy of sarvajan samaj rightly worked among the various communities, which so

far had been hostile to the party.

The other side of electoral success and gaining power would be an identity

crisis. The BSP started as a Dalit party, representing the interests of Dalits and having

Dalit leadership. Since its main ideology was the demolition of caste inequality, the

party had a strong anti-upper caste character in its initial phase. Its initial coalition

with the SP can be seen as a Dalit-OBC-Muslim coalition to form anti-upper caste front,

i.e. bahujan samaj, with the touch of secularism in the political context of the early

1990s. But with the aim of gaining power as its top priority, the BSP did not mind

much on its ideological inclination and made alliances with various parties. Its

subsequent coalitions had been undertaken without ideological consideration and did

not contribute for broadening b;:tse of the party, unlike its expectation, by and large.

Another change in its electoral strategy of distributing tickets to the various

137 One of this kind of occasions was the formation of 'Loktantrik Bahujan Oat', a split of BSP MLAs, which soon

wanted to be merged with the SPin 2003. The Hindu, September 27, 2003-andMarch 1, 2006.

138 The Week, June 10,2007.

169

communities reflected the party's ideological turning from bahujan to sarvajan.

Finally the BSP claimed itself a political party for all community, not confined to the

bahujan samaj. It again demonstrates the limitation and dilemma as a 'Dalit party'

which can only expect support from the numerical minority.

170