jack ray thomas - the evolution of chilean socialist marmaduke grove

7/29/2019 Jack Ray Thomas - The Evolution of Chilean Socialist Marmaduke Grove

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The Evolution of a Chilean Socialist: Marmaduke GroveAuthor(s): Jack Ray ThomasReviewed work(s):Source: The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Feb., 1967), pp. 22-37Published by: Duke University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2511539 .

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The Evolution f a Chilean ocialist:MarmadukeGrove

JACK RAY THOMASO APRIL 19, 1933, representatives rom several smallreform artiesmetin theMunicipal Theater at San-tiago to create the Socialist Party of Chile. Fiveyears later this heterogeneous rganizationhad grown sufficientlynnumbersand resourcesto play a leading role in the formation fPedro AguirreCerda's Popular Front government.n thisformativeperiod the party leadership consistednot of doctrinairesocialistsinspiredby Karl Marx but ratherof mendevotedto welfarestatism.Typical of this breed of non-Marxian,nontheoretical ocialist wasColonel MarmadukeGroveVallejo, career armyofficer,enatorfromSantiago, and secretarygeneral of the Socialist Party.Chilean socialism prior to 1933 developed slowly with frequentcrises and agonizing reverses. It evolved from and later comple-mentedthe labor movement,whichhad expanded rapidly after theturnof the centuryunder the bold leadershipof Luis Emilio Reca-barren. In 1909Recabarren'seffortsorefruitwiththe establishmentof the Workers' Federation of Chile (FOCH), and in 1912 he or-ganized the Workers' Socialist Party. Both groups were initiallymoderate,designedto "cultivate amicable relationswith the publicpowersand administrative uthorities,while adheringcloselyto thespiritof the statutes. . Yet a fewyears later the workers ban-doned these principlesand openly embracedMarxism. In 1922 theSocialistWorkers' Party votedto join the Communistnternational,and by 1925 Communistswere n positions fpower n FOCH.1Meanwhile,many Chileans who sought social and economicad-vancementrefused to accept the alliance with communism.Dis-illusioned socialists formed a numberof political parties, but theyall proved ineffectiven national politicalwarfare. For a fewyearseach of these partieswent its own way until finally t became clear* The author is Assistant Professor of History at Bowling Green State Uni-versity.Research for this article was made possible by a grant from the HenryL. and Grace Doherty Foundation.1 Alberto Edwards Vives and Eduardo Frei Montalva, !istoria de los partidoschilenos (Santiago, 1949), 158.

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THIE EVOLUTION OF A CHILEAN SOCIALIST 23to the various leaders that socialism could succeed in Chile onlythrough he concerted ction of a single party. Once this idea wasaccepted,it was only a short step to the creation of the SocialistParty in 1933.Marmaduke Grove was a leader in the socialist unificationmove-ment. As a youth n 1891he became enmeshed n the Congressionalistrebellion against President Jose Manuel Balmaceda, when govern-menttroops mprisonedhis fatherforoutspoken riticism fthe Bal-maceda government. nfuriated,the young Grove attempted o jointhe rebel army in Copiap6, his hometown. As he was leaving withthe troops,however,his mother ookhim from the train because hewas only thirteenyears old.Another mpulsive ct of Grove's formative ears occurred at theNaval Academy, which expelled him in 1894 for participation n astudent revoltagainst the school directors. Undaunted,Grove man-aged to gain admittance to the MilitaryAcademy in Santiago andsubsequentlygraduated with the rank of second lieutenant. Evenas an army officer e failed to curb his impetuosity, nd he couldnever really accept the regimentation f a military ife. On occasionhe verbally assailed his superiors, nd at one point he openly chal-lengedordersgivenhimby a generalstaff fficer. or a timeGroveescaped expulsion only because other officersndulged in the sameactivitieswithoutfearofpunishment.Disciplinehad brokendown nthe Chilean armyafterthe loss of dedicated officersn the War ofthe Pacific and the defection f the navy and some armyunits fromthe Balmaceda government n the 1891 insurrection.Grove s out-spoken attitude and his desire for quick action led him into severalinsurrections nd finally did cost him his commission, hough notuntil he had risen to the rank of colonel and had servedfor thirtyyears. Even dismissalfromthe service did not alter his personality,and he remaineda volatile, mpulsiveman of action throughout islife.Grove came to socialismby a digressiveand implausibleroute.From his father, leadingmember f the Radical Party in Copiap6,he early learned to identifyhimselfwith theaspirationsof therisingmiddle classes. Later,when his profession ookhim to William II'sGermanyon a militarymission,he appeared to espouse a morecon-servativeprogram.Friends noted that Grove admired the order,thediscipline,and political stabilitywhich he felt characterized mon-archical government.2Upon his return to Chile, however, Grove

2 CAtmara e Senadores, Sesiones ordinaries,May 28, 1934, 119.



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24 HAHR I FEBRUARY I JACK RAY THOMASbecame ncreasingly oncernedwith social problems, houghhe couldnot accepta genuinely ocialistsolution. In 1927,duringan extendedtour of duty in Europe as military attache,he praised the Englishpolitical systemfor sincerelyrespectingpersonal liberties, n sharpcontrast, e said,with theprevailing ack offreedomn Chile.3 Withthe passage of years,then,Grove vacillatedbetween onservatismndliberalism. There is no evidence that he accepted socialism priorto the establishment f the short-lived ocialist Republic of Chilein 1932.On several occasions before1932 Grove expressed deep concernfor the unhappy lot of Chile's lower classes. In the 1920 presiden-tial electionhe openly supportedthe reform andidate,Arturo Ales-sandri Palma; again in 1924 he aligned himself with a group ofarmyofficers ho bitterlyresentedcongressional pathy toward theeconomicproblemsof the poor.4 Staging a barracks revolt, theyforced congressto pass the social legislation which Alessandri hadvainly urged upon that conservative-dominatedody forfour years.AlthoughGrove took no part in this insurrection, e attemptedtojustifyhis brotherofficers' onduct n a series of articlespublishedin the Santiago newspaper,La Nacwn. By nature sanguine andidealistic,Grovebelieved that social and politicalreforms, enefitingnot only the lower classes but the middle and upper segmentsofsocietyas well, would inevitably ccompanya militaryuprising. Ahealthy, progressive economy,he asserted, meant prosperityforcapitalistsand workers like.5In La NacwinGroverepeatedlyurged electoralreformsn orderto reduce thenotorious otingfrauds. To combat heprevalent busesofmultiplevotinghe proposeda uniform egistrationystem nclud-ing identification ards with photographsand fingerprints.Grovealso pointedto thenecessity or a national civil servicereform.Fartoo many government ositionswent to incompetent r untrainedindividuals, he wrote,solely because of their political and familyconnections.He suggested instituting n the national level an ad-ministrativemethodwhich had been employedsuccessfullyat theMilitarySchool. Aptitudetestsshould be givento all aspirants,andthe personwiththehighest core should be offeredhe job first.He

3 Marmaduke Grove, Toda la verdad (Buenos Aires, 1929), 55.' Marmaduke Grove, " Las elecciones del afo 20 y la ' movilizaci6n de D.Ladislao! '," Claridad (Santiago), February 12, 1938.6 Marmaduke Grove, " Sepamos esperar, La Naci6n (Santiago), October4, 1924.



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THE EVOLUTION OF A CHILEAN SOCIALIST 25believed that this system, f conscientiously mployed,would notonly eliminate orruption ut also improvethe caliber and efficiencyof government orkers.6

In the weeks immediatelyfollowing the military revolt, theofficer-dominatedovernment-which had forced Alessandri intoexile-developed oppositionwithin its own ranks. To restore theofficers'nity of purposeGroveurgeda unitedmilitary ront gainstthe forcesof politicalreaction. In his view the militarygovernmenthad a fourfold bjective: (1) to cleanse the administrativeervices;(2) to inauguratefiscalreform; (3) to revisethe constitution o asto make the governmentcceptableto themajorityof Chileans; andfinally 4) to adopt laws whichwould ease the plightofthe laboringclasses. Grovebelieved that all militaryofficers howishedto createa progressivenation would supportthis program.7By November clash betweentheyoungerofficersnd their moreconservative uperiors appeared imminent.After the overthrow fPresident Alessandri in September the revolutionaryofficers adformed wo separate organizations, he Government unta, composedof three older, conservativeofficerswho actually administeredthegovernment,nd the Military Junta, made up of several youngerofficers ho acted only as advisers. Predictably,frictiondevelopedbetweenthe two organizations, s the youngerofficersecame suspi-cious of their superiorsand jealous of theirpredominant ole in thegovernment.The youngerofficerslso favored more liberal policies,and they resented the GovernmentJunta's obvious drift towardconservatism.Grovehimselfbegan to doubtthe liberal nature of thisprofessedreformmovement;for to his surprise and displeasure the rulingcommittee id not appear as concernedwith social justice as he hadexpected. His suspicionsseemedto be confirmed henthe Conserva-tive Party openlysupportedthemilitarygovernment.8 emporarily,however,Grove chose to cling to his illusions concerning he Gov-ernmentJunta,and he attemptedto persuade the public-and per-haps himselftoo-tthat his fellow officers ad no desire to governChile in a dictatorialfashion. Once again using the columnsof LaNaeion,he asked the country o retain its confidencen the military

oMarmaduke Grove, "Reforma indispensable," La Naci6n, October 7, 1924.'Marmaduke Grove, "La uni6n hace la fuerza," La Naci6n, November 11,1924 and Marmaduke Grove, " Serk necesario levantar una horca . . . ," LaNacion, November 6, 1924.8 Marmaduke Grove, " Declaraciones sospechosas," La Naci6n, November20, 1924.



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26 HAHR I FEBRUARY I JACK RAY THOMASorganization nd assured the Chilean people that it had nothing tofearfrom ts leaders.9Soon after this, however, Grove learned that the GovernmentJunta had pledged support to a Conservative andidate in a forth-comingpresidential lection. This alarming announcement onvincedhim and otherofficersf fieldgrade that they mustnowwrest powerfrom heir superiors. Late in December the Government unta pre-cipitateda revoltby dissolving he subordinategroup withoutprevi-ous noticeor even a satisfactory xplanation. This peremptory ctionprovoked the military insurrection of January 23, 1925, led byMajor Carlos Iba'nez del Campo and Lieutenant Colonel Grove.

After their successfulrevolt ba'nez assumed the post of ministerofwar while Grove was appointedchiefof the air force.10Using hisnew post as a stepping stone, ba'nez became the virtual dictator ofChile in 1927. As part of a policy designed to eliminate oppositionIba'nez named Grove military ttache to France and England. Oncein Europe Grove joined a group of Chilean expatriates, ed by ex-President Arturo Alessandri, in a conspiracy against the Iba'nezregime. Participationin this plot led Grove to thinkmorein revo-lutionary erms nd to examinemore closelythe problemof militaryinterventionn politics. Curiously, he was not concerned with theharm such action mightdo to the civil government, ut he fearedinstead tsill effectspon thearmedforces."I wish," hewrote, thatdestinywould permitthe armed forcesto remain . . . outside thepolitical strugglesthat divide and malign, persevering n its pro-fessionaltasks that serve to unite and dignify.""But Grovehimself ould not remain aloof frompolitics. He con-tinuedto attackthe Iba'nezgovernment or ts arbitrary ule and itstrampling f civil liberties,while,at the same time,he lashed out atpoliticians n generalfor their errors n judgment, heircorruption,and their ack ofpatriotism.He wrote etters o Iba'nezprotesting iserstwhileco-conspirators policies; he wrote letters to friendscon-demning ba'nez; and he made his unfavorable views knownto thepress. Finally exasperated, Iba'nez charged Grove with complicityin the Alessandriconspiracy nd in August 1928 sent to the Senate arequest for Groves dismissal fromthe service. When the Senate

9 Marmaduke Grove, " No hay por qu6 alarmarse, La Nacion, December8, 1924.10Ej6reito de Chile, Comando en Jefe, Direcci6n del Personal, Datos Bio-grdficos del ex-coronel (F) Don Marmadulke Grove Vallejos [sic], Santiago,November 3, 1961 (Mimeographed)." Grove, Toda la verdad, 20.



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THE EVOLUTION OF A CHILEAN SOCIALIST 27approved this proposal Grove found himselfstranded in Europewithno meansof support.12One of the charges eveled against Grove at the time of his ex-pulsionwas that of Communist ympathies nd activity,a chargewhichwould be repeatedwithgreatsuccessfouryears ater. In 1928,whenthe issue first rose, Grove flatlydenied any associationwiththe Communist arty, adding pointedlythat he had frequentlyde-nounced its political philosophy. In his own defensehe wrote: "Itis a verycurrent rror . . to view the supporters f workerbetter-ment as enemies of capitalists,when on the contrary,worker or-ganizationswill produce . . . the greatestunderstanding mongthetwogreat currents f humanity-Labor and Capital-without whosecommon ccord all social work would be ephemeral. ..."13 Suchthoughts llustrateGrove's political philosophyat this stage of hiscareer. He was obviouslyneithera communistnor a socialist, al-thoughbythis time he had committed imself o a programbywhichtheplightof Chile's lower classes could be eased. Althoughfavoringsocial reform, e did not advocate the destruction f Chile's politicalsystem,but sought instead reforms o strengthen is countrybothpoliticallyand economically.Had the socialistsbeen more attractiveduring these years theymight have lured Grove into a more activerole in the movement, ut the bickering mongthe small partiesonlyrepelledhim.In the early 1930s, however,Grovemoved even closer to social-ism. His cordial relationshipwith Eugenio Matte, founder of theNew Public Action Party,and probablythemost nfluentialChileansocialistofhis time,hastened Grove's drift oward thesocialistcamp.At the same time socialistswere beginning o put aside theirdiffer-ences,and talk of unification ecame commonplace.Marxian phrasesnow appeared in Groves writingsand, after his election to theSenate in 1934, in his speechesas well.He remainedessentially n exponentofwelfare statism,however,and constantlysought methods to incorporatethe army into hisschemesfor social reform.As early as 1918, while a general staffofficer,rovehad proposeddividing he cityof Santiago intosections,each with its own militaryunit. Officersnd men would contributefood to needy children iving in their sections and generally lookafter the unfortunate. This humanitarian idea died in infancy,primarily ecause the armytransferredGroveto the Escuela Militar

12 Ibid., 117.13 Ibid., 124.



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28 HAHR FEBRUARY I JACK RAY THOMASbeforehe could initiatehis plan.'4 In companywithotherofficerstthe militaryschool,however,Grove procured a list of the poorestchildren ttending ublic schools n thevicinity f the military stab-lishment.Sincethese chools ackedfacilities o providewarm unches,the militaryschool served the childrenfood purchased with con-tributions rom oldiers and civiliansworking n the area.15Throughout he 1920s and early 1930s Grove continuedto lookto the armedforces for social and political leadership,emphasizingat the same timethat the actual administration f affairs hould beleft in civilianhands.-'sPerhaps for this reason he did not hesitateto use theAir Force to launch an insurrectionn 1932,which ed tothe so-called Socialist Republic of Chile. The movement eemed topromisea genuinereformationf Chilean society;yetwithintwelvedaystheofficerorpshad shifted ts allegianceto a conservativeuntaand shipped Grove off nto exile on Easter Island.Languishing n the South Pacificwithhis fellowexile Matte anddisillusionedby his betrayal,Grovefinally ealizedthatonlybroadlybased civilian support could bringabout the needed reforms.Fromthat moment,he workedto build a powerfulpolitical organizationdedicatedto the establishmentf socialism n Chile. Grove's efforts,along with the work of many others, ed to the formationof theSocialist Party of Chile in April 1933. Once unified, he party nolongerplaced faith n themilitary s a vehiclefor reform ut reliednow on legal processesto achieve its objectives. With partysupportGrovehimselfmanagedto win a Senate seat in 1934.As a Socialist, Grove resentedthe communist abel his brotherofficersad fixedupon him,a label which,he asserted,was nothingmorethan an excuse by whichthe officersoughtto justifyhis un-warrantedexile.17By 1936 political opponentswere chidingGrovefor his antimilitary ttitude,whichhe indignantlydenied, arguingthat "companions in arms . . . know that Marmaduke Grove wouldnever do anythingthat could be termeddetrimental o the pro-fessional dignityof our armed institutions.'8 To prove his goodwill Grove continuallybroughtbefore congressmatterswhich heconsidered ssentialformilitaryprogress. On one occasion,when a

14 Marmaduke Grove, " Acci6n social del ejercito," Claridad, February 10,1938.1 Marmaduke Grove, "Las fuerzas armadas al servicio de los nifios,"Iari-dad, February 17, 1938.6Alberto Alzamora, "IEntrevista con Grove," Hoy, November 26, 1936, 17.17 Carlos Barella, " No proclamo el derecho a la venganza, dice Grove,Zig-Zag, November 5, 1932, 4.18 Alzamora, Hoy, November 26, 1936, 17.



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THE EVOLUTION OF A CHILEAN SOCIALIST 29debate raged over the construction f a new cavalry school,Grovevoted against the proposal on the groundsthat the site chosenwastoo far fromSantiago. He argued that such a movewould create ahardshipfor themen and their families,while the school's establish-ment n an isolatedarea would deprivethe cadets of cultural oppor-tunitiesunavailable outside Santiago.1'9From his Senate seat Grovefrequentlypleaded for financialbenefitsfor retired militaryper-sonnel with nadequate pensions.As ministerof national defense during the short-lived ocialistRepublicGrovehad had an unprecedented pportunity o implementsocialistdoctrines.Yet theregimedid not establish socialistsystem,and its only notable change was an attempt o aid the lower classeswithinthe framework f the existing political structure. The gov-ernmenthad earlier instituted he Caja de Credito Popular, whichgranted ashloans to individuals, aking s collateralhouseholdgoods,clothing,tools, or indeed, almost any personal possession. Whenthefull forceof the 1929 worldwidedepression truck,manypeopledepositedas securitythe very implementswith which they earnedtheir ivelihood.Withoutthese toolstheycould not obtainwork, ndwithout job theycould not raise moneyto redeemtheir tools. Toremedy his situationDecree Law 15 ordered the agency to returnequipment eft as collateral on loans. The governmenttselfwouldthen assume the responsibilityfor unsupported loans.20 By actssuch as these Groveunmistakablydemonstrated hat he had no in-tentionof establishing socialist government. nstead, he centeredhis attention n the condition f theunderprivileged,eeking hroughlegislation o ameliorate heirpoverty nd suffering.After the fall of the Socialist Republic, Grove remained onEaster Island for about four months,returningas a presidentialcandidate on electionday, October31, 1932. Thoughhe failed in hisbid forthepresidency, e neverthelessmade a strong howing, lacingsecondbehind Arturo Alessandri n a fieldof fivecandidates.Following his defeat at the polls, Grove worked for the socialistcause as enthusiastically s he had formerly arried out his militaryduties. Politics,however, equiredconsiderable actand a conciliatorynature, neitherof whichGrovepossessedto any marked degree. Hesoon ran afoul of the Alessandri government ecause of his causticand unrelenting riticism.Governmentgentstook himinto custodywhilehe was on a speakingtour in the southand senthiminto exileonMelinka sland. Because the Melinkaclimatewas extremely arsh,

9 Camara de Senadores, Sesiones extraordinarias, November 15, 1934, 524-526.20 ContralorfaGeneral de la Repuoblica, Recopilaci6n de decretos eyes, 1932.



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30 HAHR I FEBRUARY I JACK RAY THOMASGrovepetitionedfor a transfer o Easter Island. The governmentrecognizedhis plightand moved himnot to Easter Island but to aprison n Santiago forreasonsof health. Meanwhile hesenator fromSantiago died in office, nd the Socialist Party nominatedGrove asits candidate in the special election. Finally, on the day of his re-lease fromprison, the people of Santiago elected him their repre-sentative o the Senate.In his maiden speech, anxiously awaited by both friends anddetractors, roveannounced hat Chileansocialismhad as its primaryobjective the "profound and revolutionary ransformation f oureconomic nd political life. . ." CitingH. G. Wells, Grovepointedout that social revolutionsdo not arise fromplots and conspiraciesbut constitute nstead symptoms f social distress. He argued: "Solong as profound ocial maladies are not remedied, o long as thereis no solutionput forth for Chile's economic and political ills, noone can speak of order . . as our plutocracydoes. But the SocialistParty, n its program, ccepts as a basic point the confrontation ndsolution,with revolutionarymethods, of Chile's problems. WithMarxismas its guide, theparty will solvethe economic, olitical, andsocial problemsthat confront s. 21

These problems,Grovebelieved,stemmed n part from the verynatureof capitalism,whichdivided society nto twogroups, the richand thepoor. With thepassage of timethis division had sharpened,particularly n Chile. The few who exploitedthe bulk of the popu-lation traditionally ncounteredno opposition,he said, since Chile'slower classes had inheriteda servile mentality. Confrontedwithsuch a challenge,the Socialist Party promisedto unite intellectualand manual workers n an effort o construct socialist state. To-gether hese elementswouldpursuetheirgoal but onlythrough eace-ful acts, forsakingviolenceand bloodshed.22During his early years in the Senate Grovefrequentlydeploredthe lack of civil libertiesin Chile, particularly among reformele-ments. When Alessandri becamepresident second time n 1932,heimmediately bandoned the ideals whichhad guided his first erm.Instead of advocatingadditional social reformhe joined with moreconservativeelements and concentratedon the restorationof po-litical stabilityafter eight years of anarchy and dictatorship. Toachieve this end he drastically curtailed civil liberties and dealtseverelywith his opponents,particularlyGrove and the socialists.Greatlydisappointed n Alessandri,Groveargued that the presi-

21 Ca6mara de Senadores, Sesiones ordinarias, May 23, 1934, 98.22 Ibid., 100.



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THE EVOLUTION OF A CHILEAN SOCIALIST 31dent had falsely accused his supportersof communism nd hadalienated the majorityof Chileans by organizingforcesoutside thelaw, such as the RepublicanMilitia, to combatthis nonexistentmen-ace. The conservatives,Grove insisted,were using Alessandri,andwhentheyhad no further eed forhis services, heywould drivehimfromoffice.Grove promised to support Alessandri, the constitu-tionallyelected president,wheneverhe mightbe attacked. He askedonly that Alessandri guarantee freedom n the subsequentelection,thathe dissolve llegal armedforces, speciallythe Republicanmilitia,and thathe grantto socialists"plain and simpleliberties.23One of Grove's greatestfearswas that Alessandriwould refusetorestorefree elections. For two years Grovehammered way at thenecessityfor open balloting. By late 1936 he was apparentlycon-vinced that Alessandri would permit unrestrictedvoting and, ofgreater importance, hat the presidentwould abide by the will ofthe electorate. But, at the same time, political persecutionscon-tinuedthroughout he country, s police arrested ocialistsand com-munists, mprisoning ome and deportingothers. Participants in arailroad strikeremained n jail whiletheircase wentto the SupremeCourt, despite a lower court decisiongrantingthemfreedom. Stillothers hroughout he countrywere held in custodywithout pecificcharges, n clear violationoftheircivil liberties.24Of such conditionsGrovewrote n the socialistweeklyConsignaand in a nationalmaga-zine: "Two roads are open to us-one of force, . . the other oflegality.... If thegovernmentontinues n itsunnecessary epression,surelythefirstwill be imposed; if it respects helaw and guaranteesthe rightsof citizens, he secondwill carryus to triumph."25While the government arassed the socialists n the mid-thirties,attackscame also from he ChileanNazi Party. In the Senate Groveprotestedthat the activitiesof the National Socialist movement nChile had been markedby destruction f private property nd lossof life. He pointedout that in 1934 theNazis assaulted participantsat a socialist rally, leaving one dead and several wounded. A yearlater Nazis in Concepcionmurdered a socialist leader in his own

23Alberto Alzamora, Boy, November 26, 1936, 22.24 Camara de Senadores, Sesiones extraordinarias,March 24, 1936, 203.25 "Grove explica el origen de algunos acontecimientos . . ," Boy, February26, 1936, 10. The day following the publication of these lines the governmentannounced that it would convene congress and request extraordinaryfaculties,citing as one reason the words of Grove which the government harged threat-ened the use of force to gain power. Boy maintained that this was a deliberatemisinterpretation f Groves words, demonstratingthat the governmentdid notwish to respect civil rights.



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32 HAHR FEBRUARY JACK RAY THOMAShome,while in May 1936 they attackedthe sellers of Consigna,in-juring themand destroyingheirpapers. Throughall this his partyrefused o retaliate,he said, eventhough hegovernmentfferedhemno protection.26While Grove carriedthe socialist cause to the Senate and to thenation,he workedwithinthe partyto gain more influence.By 1934he achieved some success, becomingone of the top party leaders.Because of his more nfluential ositionGrove's speechesnow turnedon several occasions to philosophical socialist arguments,and hebegan to examine his own brand of socialism. Earlier, beforehiselectionto the Senate, he said: "To seek an absolute social equalityis an absurdity, biologicalabsurdity. It cannotbe. It mustnot be.Yet, I knowthat to all it is necessaryto give the same possibilities.Great, intelligentmen have been born in destitution nd poverty.Some managed to overcome it: Michelet, the French historian,almostdied of hungerat nine. At fortyhe was a lightas bright sthe EiffelTower. How manymoreMicheletshave goneundiscoveredbecause theyhad not themeans '27 How were these"possibilities"for everyone o be attained? For Grove,as for othersocialists,theroot of the problem could be found in economics. If economicequality could be achieved,he felt,the other nequalitieswould soondisappear. Therefore,the Chilean oligarchy, along with Britishand NorthAmerican companies,mustbe forcedfrompowerand theirholdingsnationalized. This would end the exploitationof Chileanlabor and bring dignityas well as a higherstandard of living toChileanworkers.28A related matterof even greater consequencefor Grovewas theagrarian problem. For him it was the "touchstoneof futurestrug-gles." Some twothousandfamilieshad inherited manorialmental-ity fromthe colonial days of the Spanish encomenderos, e said.Now stepsshouldbe takento alterthisattitude:The SocialistPartydoes not want and to exist withoutmen,and menwithoutand. It understandshat n thepresentystemroductions hap-hazardand thatsmallproprietors . . havenot received he benefitsndassistanceowhich hey reentitled. he Socialist artywillhelp . . theseindividuals hohavestrugglednd createdwealth; t willbe inflexiblenitsgreat truggleo deliver he and to thosewhowork t. . . Thegreatdestroyersrethosewhopay starvation ages nd makeof thecampesinoabeastof burdenwho eats an unwholesomeracker nd who receives ome

26 Catmarade Senadores, Sesiones ordinaries, June 15, 1936, 386.27Carlos Barella, Zig-Zag, November 5, 1932, 4.28 Cdmara de Senadores, Sesiones ordinarias,May 3, 1934, 101.



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THE EVOLUTION OF A CHILEAN SOCIALIST 33few centavos s salary afterhavingdelivered ll his effortso the greedypatr6n.29

Part of the agrarian problem, s Grove saw it, was the nature ofcreditin Chile. Credit, he maintained,had been created to benefitthe poor and humble of society,but it had quickly deterioratedntoa meansby which thewealthyenrichedthemselves t the expenseofthe entire economy. Through this unintended use of credit a falseprosperityhad developed which endangeredChile's economic struc-ture. At the same time misuse of credit aided in creating a mal-distribution f wealth and an attitudeamong those in power whichenabled them to ignorethe fact that many Chileans were deprivedof the necessitiesof life. All in all, the rural Chilean worker, ikehis urban brother, xisted on the fringeof Chilean life, denied eventhe barest essentials n a systemdominatedby those who possessedpower and privilege.30Grove s solution to these problemswas an economic overhaul.As a step in thisdirectionhe proposedthe creationof a governmentagencyin charge of wheat and related crops. The agencywould boempowered o buy all the wheat producedin the country t a fixedprice,thus eliminating he middleman who elevated the price paidby the consumer.The same agencywould expropriate he principalmills and bakeries,therebycontrollingboth flour and breadstuffs.All this would be financedby the state with the consumer as themajor beneficiary.3'Four years later Grove set forthhis ideas in a more detailedfashion n his proposed agrarian reform aw. In his speech to theSenate introducing he proposal he argued that his bill, if enacted,would utilize the land to its fullestcapacity and, at the same time,provide obs forthe greatestpossiblenumber of workers.Moreover,it would be a step in the directionof a completetransformationfthe socio-economictructureof Chile. This alone would be of im-mense value since the old traditional concept of a privileged fewand an underprivilegedmajoritywould be destroyed.32n additionthe law would have three positiveeffectsn Chile, he believed. Firstit would preventanyone capable of working he land from rentinghis acreage for profit. Next it would expropriateand make pro-ductive all lands not cultivated,thereby nding agriculturalunder-production, ne of Chile's greatesteconomicproblems. Finally the29 Ibid., May 23, 1934, 100.

30 Ibid.' CaOmara e Senadores, Sesiones extraordinarias,January 16, 1935, 1517.32 COmara de Senadores, Sesiones ordinaries, August 29, 1939, 1715.



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34 HAHIM FEBRUARY I JACK RAY THOMASlaw would enable vast numbers of people to find employmentnrural areas, not as near-serfsbut rather as dignified,productiveworkingmen.33 his measure followedGrove's other proposals intooblivion, as the traditional parties controlled more than enoughyotesto prevent uch radical legislation.Along with agrarian reform,Grove believed that if the nationwere to progress, he educational systemwould have to be reconsti-tuted. If the masses could be educated,he thought, heywould thensee clearlythe inequality and miseryof society and bringpressureupon the state forchange or, better till,elect a socialist governmentwhichwould make the needed reforms.Grove had always been in-terested n education,both withinhis ownfamily nd at thenationallevel. He lectured his children, particularlyhis sons, on the ad-vantagesof education forthe individual and for the nation.34Afterhis electionto the Senate Grove's interest n education deepened. Indebate on the 1935 budget he deplored the extensive amount ofmoney pent by theMinistries f Justice and Interior for protectionof the government romsubversionand violence, while public in-struction eceiveda minimal mount, venthoughmore than a thirdof the population remained lliterate.35 In the following ession hecharged that the government ad ignored education,that facilitieswere lacking, and that teacherswere underpaid and undertrained.In emphasizinghis point Grove declared that six or seven studentswere sometimes orcedto share a single textbook,while each monthteachers pent a portionof theirpaltrysalaries to furnishwashroommaterialsfor which the schoolbudget providedno funds.36As an initial step to end thesemiserableconditionsGroverecom-mended five housandnew schoolsand fifteenhousandmoreteachersalongwith fundsforthepurchaseof neededteachingmaterials. Buthe recognizedthis as only a partial solution. Adults as well aschildrenmustbe educated. A large segment f thepopulationwhichthe government ompletely gnoredhad never had the opportunityto attendschool. In the entirecountry here were only thirty-threenight schools staffed y sixty-two eachers,he said. Grove insisted

33 Ibid., 1724.14 Letter, Marmaduke Grove to his son Marmaduke, Paris, December 12, 1q28.This and other personal letters belonging to Grove are in the possession ofGrove's brotherHugo, who now lives in Vifia del Mar, Chile.6 CaGmarade Senadores, Sesiones extraordinarias, November 26, 1934, 695.It is significantthat Grove chose to cite two ministrieswhich received a largeportion of the budget but omitted mention of the military which also rankedhigh in its budgetary share. By this omission Grove's fondness for the militarywas once again clearly illustrated." Camara de Senadores, Sesio'nes ordinaries, June 25, 1935, 581.



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THE EVOLUTION OF A CHILEAN SOCIALIST 35that provision should be made to educate these adults along withtheir children and thereby attack the illiteracy problem from twodirections.37

Grove regardededucationas a means not onlyto improve he lotof theindividualbut also as a methodto further he socialist cause.Through educational institutions taffedwith socialists the Chileanyouthwould be subjected to socialist dogma, he asserted, nd wouldbecome believers. Of course, education would also prepare thosewho would be technicians and specialists in the economyof thefuture. Nor could anyone deny education's cultural advantage, hefelt. Moreover,Grove saw in academic training a means to generatenationalism mong his countrymen.While he attempted o unite theworker parties of Latin America and occasionally spoke of inter-national cooperation,Grove believed that Chile should stand aboveall othercountries n its cultural endeavors. Education alone couldmakethis possible.38Althoughhe recognizedthe need for reform n the educationalsystem nd cried out for civil liberties,Grove himself drew a nicedistinction etweenextensiveuse of communicationsorpropagandapurposes nd thought ontrol, nd fortheenlightenmentfthepublic.In 1936 he announced that the Socialist Party,once in power,wouldcontrol ll means of cultural propaganda such as movies,radio, andtheaterbecause theseprovided themostefficient ethodof educatingpublic opinion. Yet Grove did not look upon such action as con-flictingwithcivil iberties. He argued: "The control f the press andof the meansof propagandawill be realizedpreferably s an instru-ment of culture. Freedom of thoughtand expressionwill be re-spectedto the end of permitting he widest revolutionary oleranceand interest f the workers." In addition Groveadvocatedreorgani-zationand enlargement f the servicesof libraries,nd museums ndthe creationof cultural missions. Education and cultural advance-mentwould be the exclusivefunction f the state.39As a socialist, Grove deploredcapitalism and exalted collectiviza-tion. He demanded a society n which all men would possess dignity.Yet his overridingconcern was not with theoreticalprinciples,butwith the immediate problems faced by Chile's unfortunate. Hedirectedhis energytoward ameliorating he conditionof the lowerclasses while,at the sametime,protecting heirrights. Consequently,he spent little time in a conscious attemptto build a philosophy f

3"Ibid., 580.38 CAmara de Senadores, Sesiones extraordinarias,April 14, 1936, 321.39 Ibid.



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36 HAHR I FEBRUARY I JACK RAY THOMASsocialism,freelyadmitting hat his knowledgeof Marx was limitedand his understanding f Marxian socialisminfinitesimal.40Grovewas strongly nfluenced, owever,by the English FabianSocialist, H. G. Wells. He read much of Wells' work and quotedfrom t frequently,when he foundthathis own views approximatedthe Wellsian approach. Yet he differed ithWells in one fundament-al area-the roleof the militaryn society.While the Fabians inflexi-bly opposedmilitarynterferencen politics,Grove was confident-atleast until 1932-that the military establishment ould bring aboutthe desiredsocial reforms.The unhappy experiencewith his fellowofficersfter the collapse of the Socialist Republic temperedthisview,but Groveretained his fondnessfor Chile's armed servicestothe end of his life.Although Grove s socialism centered in practical problems,hewas an ineffectual olitician. A militaryofficerccustomedto com-mand,he was too often mpatientwithdiplomatic anguage and con-ciliation. He never understoodthat compromises an integralpartof political life. Yet he enjoyed great popularitywith the people,who identified asily with this romanticfigure-the participant inso many militaryrevolts,a man who had suffered xile on EasterIsland, and who had been elected to the Senate while confined ojail in Santiago. Few Chileans had lived so adventurousa life,anda largenumberfound themselvesttracted o his colorfulpersonality.As the ournalistTancredo Pinochetput it,he was a symbolic anneraroundwhich Chile's poor could rally.4'UnfortunatelyGrove's habitual concernwith the poor and theuninfluential lso reduced his political effectiveness. he record ofSenate activity n the 1930s shows Grove's many attemptsto gainredressfor retiredmilitarymen, for people living in substandardhousing, r for a booksellerwho ran afoul of thegovernment's orno-graphic laws. He was often preoccupiedwith trivialmattersof nointerest o such an august body as the Chilean senate but vital tothose involved. It is largely for this reason that Salvador Allende,currentleader of Chilean Socialism, could remark upon Grove sdeath n 1954 thatthe Senatorwas a humanist: "He understood hatat the base of all social problemswas man-the concreteman, . . .theman who works, uffers,nd hopes. . . . Thus for [Grove] social-

40 In his ignorance of Marxism Grove was not alone. Oscar Waiss, a Chileancommunist turned socialist, wrote that the socialist leadership in the 1930s wasnot concerned with philosophical principles, but was preoccupied with practicalproblems. Oscar Waiss, El drama socialists (Santiago, 1948), 25-26.41 Asies (Santiago), May 13, 1938.



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THE EVOLUTION OF A CHILEAN SOCIALIST 37ism was humanism ecausethe elements f socialism ive inmen.... " 42Thoughhe failed to secure congressional pproval for social re-form aws, Grove's activities in the Senate did serve to unite theunderprivileged nd to publicize their plight. In the midst of thebattle against poverty, qualor, and miseryhe reacted much as abeleaguered ommanderwhomustdeal firstwiththeimmediate rob-lem and afterwardthink in termsof a long-range,more profoundplan. Grove handled or tried to handle the immediatedifficulty,finding ime only on rare occasions to explore the theoretical ndphilosophical answers to the overall problemsof Chilean society.Nevertheless, he rapid growthof the Socialist Party in the 1930sowed much to this man. Neitheran accomplishedpoliticiannor anadvanced thinker,MarmadukeGrove Vallejo was instead a friend,protector, nd spokesman for all the anonymous, ittle people ofChile who had for too long seemed unimportant o politicians andintellectuals.

42 COmara de Senadores, Sesiones extraordinarias, May 18, 1954, 2204.

jack ray thomas - the evolution of chilean socialist marmaduke grove

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