john w. garver - mao, the comintern and the second united front

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Comment: Mao, the Comintern and the Second United Front

Author(s): John W. GarverSource: The China Quarterly, No. 129 (Mar., 1992), pp. 171-179Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the School of Oriental and AfricanStudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/654602

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Comment: Mao, the Comintern and theSecond United Front

John W. Garver

Sheng and I are in essential agreement that between mid-1935 andlate 1936 repeatedinterventions by the Comintern induced changesin CCP policy which brought it successivelycloser to a united frontwith Chiang Kai-shek. We disagree about whether there weresignificant discrepanciesbetween CCP and Comintern line on thisissue at specific points. I argue there were. Sheng arguesthere werenot. The Comintern did not itself adopt a truepolicy of a united front

with Chianguntil late 1936, Shengimplies. The Comintern'spolicy ofa united front with Chiangevolved slowly, and as it inched towardsthis goal it communicatedthe ideas to Mao who adopted them fullyand promptly. Mao was amenable to Stalin'sadvice, Sheng says; hewas sensitive and responsive to Cominterndirectives. Any discre-pancies between Comintern and CCP lines were differences ofemphasis, not of substance,accordingto Sheng.I, on the other hand,arguethat Mao's policy was consistently more anti-Chiangthan theComintern's.

There is no question thatCominternpolicytowardsChiangevolvedslowly during 1935-36. Sheng cites the continuing anti-Chiangrhetoric in Cominternstatements in late 1935 to prove that Moscow,like Mao, did not truly favour a united front with Chiang. In doingthis Shengdiscounts the novel statements of willingness to unite withChiang which were buriedamongstthe hostile anti-Chiangrhetoric nComintern statements of November-December 1935. It is thesesubtle proposals of unity, concealed within otherwise hostile state-ments, that I andother scholarshave stressed.Sheng focuseson what I

consider to be backgroundrhetoric.The Jiuguobaoappeal of 7 November 1935 is a prime example.

Heretofore there has been a consensusthat this statement'sassertionthat undercertainconditions Chiangmight be included in the unitedfront representeda call for unity with him. Not so says Sheng. Shengstresses instead the anti-Chiangrhetoric of the article, and concludesthat it was not designedto encourageChiang to form a united frontwith the CCP,but to discredit him. There are severalproblems withthis conclusion. First, no one disputes that Wang Ming inched

towards the idea of unity with Chiang. On the one hand, Wang sawthe need to unitewith him andreluctantlyconceded thatneed in the 7November article. On the other hand, Wang still saw Chiang as theenemy of the Chinese people. This inconsistencycan be explained ineither psychological or tactical terms. In terms of the former, it takestime for a person's mind to achievewhat RobertJervis calls irrationalcognitive consistency. It took time, in other words, for Wang toconvince himself that all argumentspointed in the same direction,that since Chiang was to be united with against Japan he was no

longer a vile class enemy. In terms of tacticaladvantages,Wang may



172 The China Quarterly

have desired to cover himself against charges of naivety shouldChiangrejectproposals of unity.Neither the cognitive northe tactical

explanationdenies the significanceof Wang'snovel roposal of unitywith Chiang.

Other articles in Jiuguo aoand Jiug:uohibaoater in Novemberand December 1935 were even more conciliatory towards Chiang,referring to him as Mister and Commander. These statementshave been wellresearched,but it maybe useful to quote one here as anexample. A manifesto drawn up by the CCP Cominterndelegationand issued in the name of the CCP in Jiug:uohibaon 9 December1935 said: No matterwhether the forces of CommanderChiang,no

matterwhetherthe forces of any other partyor faction . . . all shouldimmediatelybury old hatreds. . . immediately suspend all civil war,point all gun barrelstoward the outside, and fight unitedly againstJapan. l

Sheng dismisses such statementsbecause in February1936, afterthe CCP had launchedits EasternExpeditionacrossthe Yellow Riverinto Shanxi,Jiuguohibao'sreatment of Chiangshowed increasedhostility, in Sheng's words. To Sheng this is proof that any shift inComintern line towardsChiang in late 1935 was merepropaganda

and not sincerebelief. Here I would make two points. First, evenduringFebruary-March,Jiuguohibao'sreatmentof Chiangwasstillmuch more generous than that of Hongsezkongguon Baoan.Secondly and more importantly,Wang Ming and the ECCIhadeveryinterest in maintaining the appearanceof unity between Baoan andMoscow. Unity towards the outside is one of the fundamentalprecepts of democratic centralism. Had Comintern publicationscontinued to refer to Chiangas Commander while the Red Armywas makingwar in Shanxi,interrlaldifferenceswould havebeen made

open to the public.The idea that a desire to discredit a person (ChiangKai-shekinthis case) is an indication that that person is deemed to be outsidethe united front shows fundamentalmisunderstandingof the Lenin-ist concept of a united front. The internationalcommunist move-ment during the 1920s and 1930s was filled with debate over themerits of a united front from above as opposed to a unitedfrontfrom below. Much of this debate was about how best to discreditclass enemies (social democrats, progressive bourgeois politiciansand so on) with

whom the proletariat might find it expedient tounite. To imagine that, from a Leninist perspective, a desire tounite with someone precludedefforts to discredit that personis

simply wrong.Sheng and I reachdiametricallyopposedconclusionsregarding he

Cominternmessagethat Lin Yuying carried to Baoan in November

1. Cited in YangYunruoand YangGuisong,GongshanguoCihe Zhongguogeming(The Cominternand the ChineseRevolution) Shanghai:Shanghairenminchubanshe,1988), pp. 354-55.



Comment on Sheng 173

1935. Relying primarilyon Zhang Guotao and Otto BraunI argued

that Lin told the CCP to unite with ChiangKai-shek.Relyingon the

minutes of a CCP Politburo meeting of 23 December 1935, Shengargues that Lin brought an endorsement of continuing civil war

against Chiangand specificallyof the CCP drive into open lines of

communication with Mongolia. Sheng interprets this as Stalin's

endorsementof the CCP'sdrive into Shanxi the next February.

HereI think that Shengis correctand I waswrong,at least as faras

the content of Lin's message about Chiang.Unfortunatelythis does

not settle the issue. Lin Yuying's mission remains shrouded in

mystery. When did he leave Moscow? Under the best of circum-

stances movement between Moscow and Baoan took weeks in 1935.Moreover,Lin apparentlymade at least one failed attempt to reach

northernShaanxi before he eventually succeeded. Consequentlyhe

mayhave been in transitforseveralmonths.If he left Moscowshortly

after the Seventh Congresshe may have conveyed the line of that

Congressbefore it was revised and updated by Wang Ming in mid-

August. (The CCP'sWayaobaoResolution of December 1935 called

for a broad anti-Japaneseunited front from above, but excluded

ChiangKai-shekand provided that the Chinesesoviet regimewas to

be the nucleus of the united front.) If Lin left Moscow with WangMing's mid-Augustline in mind (in case of captureLin carriedno

writtenmessage),the ambiguitiesof Wang'sthinkingaboutChiangat

that point may have been too subtle to have been conveyed fully to

Baoan. Nor can we rule out the possibility that the wishes and

perspectives of Lin's boss, Mao, shaped the message he delivered.

Given theseuncertainties, he overridingconsiderationto me remains

the dramaticdiscrepancybetween articles in Jiuguo shibao and the

CCP'sWayaobaoResolution in December 1935regardinghe desired

role of ChiangKai-shek. It Lin Yuying accurately conveyed the

Comintern'smessage, it must have been an old message.

Stalin'sstatedwillingnessto armthe CCPand Cominternendorse-

ment of CCP efforts to win over ZhangXueliangand YangHucheng

in 1935 and 1936 figure prominently in Sheng's argument. His

argument s this: since Stalinwas readyto armthe CCP,and since he

supportedthe CCP'seffortsto bringZhangand Yangandtheirforces

into an anti-Japanese, anti-Chiang base in China's north-west, it

followsthat Stalinstill supporteda policy of civil waragainstChiang.

The fact that Mao was still pursuing a policy of civil war against

Chiang is not, therefore, evidence that Mao was out of step with

Stalin. This is a non sequitur.To Stalin,ChiangKai-shekand the Republicof Chinawerethe big

fish. Mao Zedongand the CCP were the little fish. But there was no

guaranteethat the big fish would bite and, in that case, the little fish

was better than nothing. Soviet-Japanese relations deteriorated

rapidlyafterSeptember1931. Stalinrespondedby courtingthe ROC.

As I noted in my article in The China Quarterly,Japanese-German

negotiations over a possible anti-Soviet alliancebegan in late spring




1935. The success of those negotiationspresentedan extremelydiretwo-frontthreat to the USSR. The ROCcould play an importantrole

in counteringthis threat should Chiangdecide to adopt a policy ofresistance to Japan. But would Chiang do this, or would he reachsome sort of compromisesettlementwithJapan?Stalinhadno wayofknowing.

In the event that Chiang settled with Japan, a well-armedCCPcould be ratheruseful. A CCP-controlledstate in China'snorth-westwould be even better. But in termsiof contribution to enhancingSoviet security, Red guerrillaarmies to harassJapaneseforces or aRed buffer state south-eastof Mongoliacould not begin to compare

with resistance to Japan by the ROC under Chiang Kai-shek. TheSoviet governmentand the Cominternworkedto induce Chiangtoswing the ROC into resistanceto Japan. One aspect of this was theComintern'seffort to push the CCP to moderate its policy towardsChiang. A major factor inclining Chiang towards settlement withJapan was fear that the CCP would use the opportunity of anROC-Japan war to undermine GMD rule. Stalin wanted Mao tomoderate CCP policy to ease these fears. But Stalin still needed tokeep alive the option of a CCP bufferstate should Chiangdecide to

appeaseJapan. Stalin wanted to keep his options open until Chiangandthe ROCwere committedagainstJapan,hence his expressionsofwillingnessto arm the CCP and his supportfor the CCP'sefforts towin over Zhangand Yang.

Forty years ago Allen Whiting found multiple and sometimescontradictory Soviet policies toward China during 1917-24.2 Thecontradictions between the requirementsof these multiple policiessometimes created problems for Moscow, Whiting concluded, butSoviet leadersfelt no need to forgoany possiblyadvantageousareaofactivity for the sake of logical

consistency. Soviet policies in 1936regarding he desirabilityof a CCP-GMD anti-Japaneseunited frontand the creation of a CCP-led anti-Japanese state bordering onMongolia seem to have been similar. The driving force of Sovietpolicy was not logical consistency but a desire to exploit allopportunitieswhich uncertainfuturedevelopmentsmightprove to beprofitable.It seems that Mao enthusiasticallyembracedsome Sovietpolicies (the north-weststrategy),but was not so enthusiastic aboutothers (a united front with Chiang).RepeatedCominterndirectiveswere necessaryto prompthim to adopt the latterpolicies.

The concept of trust plays, I believe, an inordinately argeroleinSheng'sanalysis;he arguesthat since Stalin did not trust JapanandChiangKai-shek, it would not have made sense for him to push theCCP towards a united front with Chiang. There are two problemswith this analysis.First, trust is an unmeasurableconcept, at leastunless one uses psychometrictechniques. Debate about trust is a

2. Allen S. Whiting, Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924, (Columbia:ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1953).




little like debate about theologicalpropositionswhich are inherently

unverifiable.Secondly,whetherornot Stalinpushedthe CCPtowards

a united frontwith Chiangwas not a function of his trust n Japan,Chiang Kai-shek, or anyone else. I frankly doubt if Stalin trusted

anyone, includinghis closest comrades.Even afterthe Sino-Japanese

war began, Stalin continued to fear that Chiang would make peace

with Japan and abandon the ROC'salignmentwith the USSR. As I

read it, fear of abandonment and betrayal was a constant of the

politics of that time and place.Given his fear of a GMD or Japanese double cross, why would

Stalin push the CCP toward a united front with Chiang?Precisely

becauseof his awarenessof the contingentnatureof Chiang'sandtheROC's alignments.Chiang'sreluctanceto resist Japan was based

largelyon his fear that the CCP would use the opportunityof Sino-

Japanesewarto expandRed power.If Chiangcouldbe persuaded hat

the CCP was willing to accept certainrestrictionsdemandedby him,

then he wouldbe morewillingto lead the ROC to resistJapan and

Soviet securitywould be correspondinglyenhanced.Thereareseveralcuriouslacunasin Sheng'sanalysis.He ignoresthe

evidence, cited in notes 22 and 42 of my ChinaQuarterlyrticle,that

in the weeks after the Seventh Comintern Congress Wang Mingmodified the anti-Chiangline he and others had presented at the

congress, and moved to include Chiang in the united front. Chen

Yun's delegation brought word of the devastation of China's Red

forces duringthe Long Marchand this led Wangto conclude that a

viable anti-Japaneseunited front would have to include Chiangand

the GMD. Sheng instead cites publicboasts by Wang about CCP

strength. He then concludes that any moderation in Wang's anti-

Chiangstance in late 1935 was more a matterof propaganda han

sincerebelief in Chiang'swillingnessto form a national united frontwith the CCP. I am not preparedto discuss either the sincerityof

Wang's motives or his belief in the probabilitythat Chiang would

respond favourablyto a call for unity. It does seem to me, however,

that the 7 November 1935 Jiuguobaoarticledid representa call for

unity with Chiang; t certainlysaidthat suchunitywouldbe desirable.

There is a substantialamountof evidence suggesting hat, contrary

to what Sheng asserts, Stalin did not endorse the CCP's drive into

Shanxi in February 1936. There is convincing evidence that Stalin

authorizedCCPmilitary efforts to reachMongolia'sborders.It was

Mao, however, who drew up the plan to do that via central and

northern Shanxi and Suiyuan. The CCP could have reached Soviet

lines via Ningxia or Gansu,as it triedto do laterin 1936afterfurther

consultationwith Moscow. For reasonsI outlined in my 1988 ChinaQuarterlyrticle, CCP expansion into north China at that juncture

threatened to undermine Soviet diplomacy toward the ROC and

Japan.Sheng ignores Stalin's statements in March 1936, several weeks

after the EasternExpeditionwas launched,expressingconcernabout




the dangerof Japan launchinga war of aggression.He recognizesonlyback-handedly he implications of the Eastern Expeditionon Soviet

peace diplomacy toward Japan, and ignores Otto Braun's strongobjections to the EasternExpedition on thesegrounds.He ignores thequestions raised by Jiuguo hibao egarding the possible adverseinternationalpolitical consequences of the expedition, as well as thefact that it was Jiuguo hibao, ot Baoan, that announced its end inMarch. He also ignoressubsequent Soviet reports,cited in note 82 ofmy ChinaQuarterlyrticle,that the Comintern directlycensured theinitiation of the Easterncampaign. Sheng'sbasis for overturning hisconsiderablebody of evidence suggestingCominterndispleasurewith

the Eastern Expedition is the fact that Lin Yuying broughtto BaoanStalin's approvalof a drive to Mongolia'sbordersand that the plan forthe Eastern Expedition was drawn up subsequently.Posthoc ergopropter oc.One of Mao's stratagems or dealing with Stalinand theCominternwasto takeMoscow'sformulationsand creatively nterpretthem in a manner he felt conducive to the expansion of revolutionarypower in China. This may have been the relationshipbetween Stalin'sapproval of a CCP effort to open lines of internationalcommuni-cation and Mao's decision for a drive into central Shanxi.

Sheng notes that in June 1936, shortlyafter the end of the EasternExpedition and after regularradio contact was re-established,Maowas suddenly aware of Chiang [Kai-shek]'shope that an advanceby the Chinese Red Army to the Suiyuan-Chahar-OuterMongoliaborder (i.e. the objective of the second and third stages of the EasternExpedition) would incite a Japanese-Soviet war. These wereexactly the sort of objectionsenumerated by Otto Braun in his early1936 letter to the CCP Politburo criticizingthe EasternExpedition.How did Mao come to accept the objections of this German

interloper? How did Mao gain his sudden awareness into therequirementsof USSR peacediplomacy?WasMao's newunderstand-ing a result of Cominterninstruction? Soviet sources assert it was.

Soon after the EasternExpedition WangMing discussedin Jiuguoshibaohe factors pushing Chiang towards an anti-Japaneseunitedfront. Shengdismisses this because Wangtalked only of two sets ofcircumstances.Then when the CCP continued its efforts, in Sheng'swords, to splitthe GMD fromwithin andundermine ChiangKai-shek, the chieftain of Chinesetraitors, Shengconcluded that this was

fully in agreementwith WangMing's stanceat the time. The basisfor this conclusion is, apparently, he fact that Wang had previouslycited only two factors pushing Chiang toward anti-Japanesenational unity. In reachingthis conclusion Sheng ignores the mid-1936warningsofTheCommunistInternationalthat allinternecinewarfare n China facilitates the dark and dirty actions of the Japaneseplunderers, and of Wang Ming himself that one should notplace. . . Chiang Kai-shek in the same category as the Japaneseplunderers. These were cited in notes 97 and 100 of my ChinaQuarterlyrticle.




Shengsays that an ECCIdirectiveof 15 August 1936 said thatthe

ECCIwas in agreementwith the CCP'sunited frontpolicy conveyed

in the Wayaobao Resolution. I have not seen the 15 August 1936ECCIdirective, but I doubt that at that late date Moscowendorseda

policy of revolutionarywar against Nanjing. It would be helpful if

Sheng provided us with a more extensive quotation from this

document. Sheng also asserts that the ECCI's 15 August 1936

directiveendorsedCCPleadershipof the united front.Thequotation

he cites to document this, however,concernsthe CCP'spolitical and

organizationalindependence within the united front. Leadershipof

the united front and independence within the united front are two

ratherdifferentthings.Sheng'scontentionregardingECCIsupportfor civil war againstthe

Nanjinggovernmentin August 1936 does not squarewith the ECCI's

July 1936 critiqueof CCPpolicy. Followinga CCP radioreporton its

work in early July, the ECCI discussed China. It concluded that

because the CCP was relatively weak while the danger posed by

Japanese aggression was great, the CCP should unconditionally

abandon the struggle for soviet power and seek instead a united,

democratic republic. Specifically, the CCP should work to draw

Chianginto the united front.This wasa directcritiqueof CCPpolicy.Strangely,Shengcites the articlein the AustralianJournalof ChineseAffairs in which I present this evidence, but does not consider its

significance. Instead he cites Dimitrov defending the CCP againstWangMing'scriticismandconcludesthatthis demonstratesharmony

between Dimitrov and Mao. Again a non sequitur.Shengmay misunderstandmy argumentregarding Maoversusthe

Comintern. I have not arguedthat Mao openly rejectedComintern

directives, or that he was, in Sheng's words, antagonistic and

confrontational owardsthe Comintern.Mao recognizedthe advan-

tages he derived from Moscow: intelligence about world affairs;a

degree of leverage with foreign governments, including Nanjing;

support and publicity by communist-led front groups around the

world;medical treatmentin Soviet hospitalsfor his cadres;and some

training,equipmentand money. Mao also hoped that Moscowwould

arm the CCP. Even more, he hoped that at some point the SovietUnion would go to war againstJapan,welcome the CCP'sarmiesas

an ally, and that the CCPwould liberate substantialareasof China

in co-operationwith the Soviet army. He retainedthese latterhopes

right up to the Sino-Sovietfriendshiptreaty of August 1945. In short,Mao understoodvery well that it was not in his interest to alienate

Stalin.But he also felt that Moscow's frequent directives were often

somewhatout of touch with Chineserealities.Whenthis wasthe case,

Mao would make some partialmove to satisfy Moscow demands orinterpretMoscow'sordersin a way that he thoughtconducive to the

expansion of revolutionarypower in China. In the instant case this

meant launchingthe EasternExpedition, supportingthe liang guan




revolt, and continuing revolutionary civil war against Chiang Kai-shek and the Nanjing government. When Mao creativelyinterpreted

Comintern directions in this manner, however, he made profusedeclarations of loyalty to Moscow. Even as late as the zhengfengcampaign of 1942-44 when Mao decisively eliminated Sovietinfluence within the CCP, he presented it as a virtual emulationcampaign of Stalin. Because of this, I cannot accept Sheng's use ofMao's professions of loyalty to the Comintern to prove he was notdeviating from Cominternpolicy.

Finally, there is the question of the Zunyi Conference.Sheng saysMao had Comintern support for the changes in leadershipmade at

that conference. I say he did not. First, Sheng ignores the extensiveand first-handevidence regardingStalin'sAugust 1938 endorsementof Mao's leadership of the CCP-evidence discussed in length onpages 75-80 of my 1988 book cited by Sheng in his second note.Secondly, there is substantialevidence that from 1935 to 1938 WangMing and his supporterswere unhappy with and sought to undo theresults of the Zunyi Conference. Some of this evidence is referencedby note 35 of my ChinaQuarterlyrticle. More is presented in my1988 book.Thirdly,there is the fact that ChenYun'sdelegationwhich

was dispatched to Moscow by the CCP Centre with the explicitpurpose of gaining Comintern endorsement of the Zunyi decisionscame into conflict with WangMing. Lastly,Bo Gu and Otto Braun,indisputablyMoscow loyalists, were the major losers at Zunyi.

Shengpresents two sorts of evidence to substantiatehis thesis thatthe Comintern endorsed Mao's moves at Zunyi. The first arestatements in Comintern and Soviet publications lauding Mao justbefore and after Zunyi. These statements are, it seems to me, ratherdifferent from an explicit statement by Stalinto the effect that Mao

is the leader of the CCP. Such a statement is what I call anendorsementof Mao's leadership and came only in August 1938.Short of such an endorsement, the Comintern had good reason topraise Mao. He did have very considerable nfluence in the ChineseParty and its army, and unless the Cominternwanted to alienate himand thereby undermine its own influenceinside China, at least untilthe Comintern was in a position to remove him or hem him in, itneeded to praise him. Mao needed certainthings from Moscow, butMoscow also needed certainthings from Mao.

Sheng's second category of evidence is the fact that Cominterninstructions after Zunyi often worked in Mao's favour especiallyregardingMao's strugglewith Zhang Guotao. It is clear that Moscowfavoured Maoover Zhang,butwhile important,this is not the same asan explicit endorsement of Mao's leadershipby Stalin.

We shouldbewareof readingback into history the understandingoflater generations. Stalin and his Cominternapparatchikin Moscowhad little reasonto oppose Mao in 1935. Theyhad no way of knowingthat over the next decade he would repeatedly deviate fromComintern line and ultimately emancipatethe CCP from Moscow's




control. From Moscow's perspective, Mao must have seemed to be aparochial but resourceful and effective revolutionaryleader. More-

over, Mao understood that he needed Soviet support. WhyshouldnstMoscow have expected that he could be educated to become a loyalinternationalist? In other words, I doubt if Mao's assumption ofparamount leadership at Zunyi met Comintern opposition. Nor isthere any evidence, that I know of, suggesting his. But neither did ithave Comintern endorsement. That endorsement came only in theautumn of 1938 in a power-for-policytrade-off between Mao andStalin.

john w. garver - mao, the comintern and the second united front

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