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DEEPEPISTEMICVICES

IanJamesKidd,UniversityofNottingham

ForthcominginJournalofPhilosophicalResearch,2019

Abstract

Although the discipline of vice epistemology is only a decade old, the broader project of

studyingepistemicvicesandfailingsismucholder.Thispaperarguesthatcontemporaryvice

epistemologists ought to engagemore closelywith these earlier projects. After sketching

somegeneral arguments in sectionone, I then turn todeepepistemic vices: oneswhose

identityandintelligibilitydependsonsomeunderlyingconceptionofhumannatureorthe

natureofreality.Thefinalsectionthenoffersacasestudyfromaviceepistemictraditionthat

emergedinearlymodernEnglishnaturalphilosophy.

I.INTRODUCTION

Viceepistemologyemerged,overthelastdecade,asthestudyoftheidentityandsignificance

ofthecharactertraits,attitudes,andwaysofthinkingthat,invariousways,tendtoobstruct

inquiry—aninfluentialconceptiondubbed‘obstructivism’(Cassam2019).1Themorefamiliar

epistemic vices include arrogance, dogmatism, inflexibility, closed-mindedness, and other

featuresofagentsopposedto thecorrespondingvirtuesof themind–curiosity,humility,

open-mindednessandsoon–whicharethepurviewofvirtueepistemology(cf.Zagzebski

1996). Virtue and vice epistemology collectively constitute what wemight call character

epistemology,reflectingaconvictionthatthestudyofepistemicactivityoughttoinvoke,to

somesubstantivedegree, theepistemiccharactersof individualor collectiveagents.Such

charactersaretypicallycomplexanddynamic,consistingofboththestrongstabletraitswe

callvirtuesandvices,alongsideothersthatareweakerandlessstable.Mostepistemicagents’

characterswillbedappled,consistingofwell-developedvirtuesandvices,alongsideanarray

oflessstableandlesswell-formeddispositions.

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Although the discipline of vice epistemology is only a decade old, the broader

philosophical project of studying our epistemic vices and failings is much older. Ancient

Indian,Greek,andChinesephilosopherschallengedsophistry,prejudice,dogmatism,willed

ignorance, and other obstacles to virtue, reason, and wisdom, as do contemporary

philosophers,whether‘post-truthpolitics’,epistemologiesofignorance,andothersignsof

concernaboutourindividualandcollectiveepistemicfailings.Thepositiveexpressionofthis

concern is what Nicholas Wolterstorff (1996) called ‘regulative epistemologies’, overtly

normativeprojectsaimedatfacilitatingtheproperuseanddirectionofour individualand

collectiveepistemicconduct.Analysisandameliorationofourepistemicvicesandfailingsis

acrucialdimensionofthisregulativeenterprise.

In this paper,my claim is that contemporary vice epistemologists ought to attend

morecloselytothemethodsanddeliverancesofhistorians.Insectionone,Iofferasetof

arguments forwhat an historical vice epistemology and then, in sections two and three,

developacasestudy–asophisticatedearlymodernEnglishtraditioninvice-epistemology.

My claim is that an historical perspective indicates the existence of deep conceptions of

epistemicvice:onewhoseform,identity,andintelligibilityareonlyexplainableadequatelyin

relation to a deeper underlying conception of human nature or the nature of reality – a

Weltbild,perhaps.Iarguethatepistemichubrisisonesuchdeepepistemicvice,insofarasit

presupposes a conceptionof humanbeings’ epistemic capacities and situationwithin the

widerorderof reality,oneshaped,withinearlymodernEnglishnaturalphilosophy,byan

underlyingpostlapsariananthropology–aconceptionofhumanbeingsasfallen,corrupted

creatures.

Althoughviceepistemologyisrelativelyyoung,mostworksofarhastendednottobe

stronglyhistoricalinthesensesjustoutlined.OtherthanduereferencetoAristotelianvirtue

theory, there tends not to be intensive engagement with the historical contexts and

contingencyofthevicesofthemind.Giventhenascentstateofthediscipline,thisisnota

signofanyentrenchedahistoricality,especiallywhencomparedtoitssisterdiscipline,virtue

epistemology.Thelastfewyearshaveseenmorehistoricallysensitivework,eithersearches

forprecursorvirtueepistemologists–HumeandNietzsche,say–orapplyingvirtue-epistemic

resourcestothehistoryofphilosophyandofscience(cf.Alfano2016;Gelfert2013;Roberts

andWood 2007). I hope vice epistemology will also come to develop its own historical

sensibility,withthispaperbeingacontributiontothatend.

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Additionalgroundsforconfidenceinan‘historicalturn’ istheincreasinginterest in

epistemicvirtuesandvicesamongintellectualandculturalhistorians(cf.PaulandvanDongen

2017;Paul2016;Pauletal2016).Over the last fifteenyears,historianshaveturnedtheir

attention to questions of epistemic character – of what Steven Shapin dubs ‘scientific

personae’,normativeidealsstipulatingthesortsofqualitiesconstitutiveofgoodscientists.In

his book, The Scientific Life, Shapin explains his interest as the relationship between the

‘authorityofknowledge’and ‘thevirtuesofpeople’andthe ‘characterofknowers’ (2008:

xvi).Shapintracesthewaysnormativeconceptionsofthescientificself–‘personae’–shape

thearrayofepistemicvirtuesandvicesjudgedsalientinparticularsocial,institutional,and

historicalcontexts.Withineighteenthcenturynaturaltheology,wefindthehumbleandpious

GodlyNaturalist, a figuredistinct from theambitious, confidentVentureCapitalist of late

moderntechnoscience–variationsoccludedbyahistoricalandacontextualtalkofthevirtues

andvicesofthemind.

Aclassicstudyofthecontextualandcontingentnatureofepistemicvirtuesandvices

iscuriositas,atraitreviledasanepistemicandspiritualvicebymedievalChristians,onlyto

berehabilitated,duringtheRenaissanceandEnlightenment,asanintegralepistemicvirtue.

Inhismagisterialbook,TheLegitimacyoftheModernAge,HansBlumenberg(1983)argues

thatthatsatisfyingexplanationofcuriositas’schangingstatus,fromvicetovirtue,requires

systematic attention to theological, and cultural developments. Although Blumenberg

focusesonasinglecharactertraitinasinglehistoricalperiod,subsequenthistorians,suchas

LorraineDastonandPeterGalison(2007),offerwiderstudies.Theychartedtheemergence

and evolution of a set of broad conceptions of objectivity and the virtues stipulated as

constitutive of the objective inquirers. ‘Mechanical objectivity’, animated by an ‘ideal of

purity’,requiredstrictexclusionofintrudingidiosyncrasiesandminimizationofthesubjective

preferences of the inquirer. The virtues of mechanical objectivity therefore included

attentiveness,discipline,andself-restraint.Otherconceptionsofobjectivity,suchas‘truth-

to-nature’or‘trainedjudgement’,stipulatedtheirownsetsofvirtuesandvices.Bystudying

them,weseetablesofvirtuesandvicesdevelopinginresponsetochanging‘regulativeideals’,

practicalandepistemicagenda,andprojectsofenquiry.

Someofthehistoriansengagewithworkinvirtueepistemology,althoughcriticizing,

albeitpolitely,itsahistoricality.Epistemologistshavebeenslowertoreturntheinterest,and

soopportunitiesforcollaborationaremissed.Naturally,theclaimisnotthatallprojectsin

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viceepistemologynecessitatetheincorporationofhistoricalmethodsandresults.Adoption

ofhistoricalmethodsmustbemotivatedbyasenseoftheirrelevancetoone’squestionsor

concerns.Mymodestproposalisthatthatcertainworkinviceepistemologywouldbenefit

fromengagementwithhistoricalmethodsandscholarship(cf.Kidd2014,2017a,2018a).

II.VICECONCEPTS

Manyoftheconceptualresourcesofviceepistemologyaredrawnfromanalyticcharacter

epistemology. Additional resources become necessary, however, for theorizing epistemic

vicesandfailings,whichoftenhavedistinctiveaetiologies,structures,andmanifestationsto

ourepistemicpractices.FamiliarAristoteliananalysesdonotalwayshelp–manyvirtuesare

flankedmorethantheusualtwovices,andthevicesofdeficiencyandexcessdonothaveto

beequal innumber–andvicesarenotalways inversionsoftherelatedvirtues(cf.Crerar

2018).Moreover,therearemanymorevicesthanvirtuesofthemind,somorewaystofail

epistemicallythantoflourish.Tofindtheseadditionalresources,wecanturntohistory.

Considertwosuchexamples:epistemiccorruptionandcapitalepistemicvices.

(i)Muchcontemporaryviceepistemologyfocusesonanalysis,description,andappraisalof

thevicesofthemind,tasksthatnecessarilyinvoketheetiologicalquestionofhowindividual

andcollectiveepistemicagentscometoacquireordeveloptheirvariousvicesandfailings.

Certainly,manyviceepistemologistsevincethissortofinterest,withMirandaFricker(2007:

55, 58, 163) and José Medina (2012: 34, 42), for instance, exploring the ways certain

experiencesandsocialconditionscan leadtothe ‘erosion’or ‘deterioration’ofanagent’s

epistemiccharacter,whichistherebyunabletodevelop-‘thwarted’or‘inhibited’.

Concernsaboutcharacterologicalharm,includingtheerosionofepistemicvirtuesand

the acquisition or exacerbation of epistemic vices, is familiar from earlier generations of

feministandcritical race theorists.African-AmericanandAfro-Caribbean theorists suchas

W.E.B.DuBois,FranzFanon,andAiméCesairedescribehowsubjectiontosystemic racial

oppression ‘leaves its stamp’ on the oppressed, ‘sensitizing’ and ‘collapsing’ a subject’s

epistemicconfidenceandcharacter–how,forDuBois(2015:153,154),racialoppressionhas

‘leftitsmarkontheNegrocharacter’,whichhasbeen,asCesaire(2000:7)explained,‘skillfully

injectedwith… inferiority complexes, trepidation [and] servility’.2 Such termsbelong toa

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characterologicalvocabulary,ofcourse,withtrepidationandservilitybeingincludeamong

whatMedinacallsthevicesoftheoppressed.

Associationsbetweenepistemicviceandsocialoppressiongoesbackfurther,atleast

intoanearlymodernEnglishtraditioninviceepistemology,initiatedbyMaryAstell.Her1694

book, A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, analyses socially patterned deficiencies in the

educational opportunities then afforded to upper class English women. Their curriculum

affordsonly‘frothandtrifles’,affordingwomennoopportunitiestocontemplate‘nobleand

sublimeTruths’,anepistemicallyasphyxiatingenvironmentexacerbatedbytheentrenched

sexistassumptionthatwomenpossessedonlya‘degradedreason’(2002:62)–aclaimAstell

rejects as incompatible with faith in God’s providential goodness. The harmful

characterologicaleffectsofthiseducationalenvironmentisexpressedinAstell’s(2002:62)

lament that it fuels the development in women of a set of ‘Feminine Vices’, such as

submissivenessandsuperficiality,bywhichtheirepistemiccharactersare‘degeneratedand

corrupted’. As a further consequence, the sexist convictions about women’s ‘degraded

reason’ are confirmed, since the vices tend to impairwomen’s epistemic agency inways;

therefore,thoseconvictionsbecomerealizedinaself-sustainingsystem.

Astellwastheearliestfigureinthisvice-epistemictradition,tomyknowledge,andits

second most distinguished member was Mary Wollstonecraft. Writing a century later in

Vindicationof theRightsofWomenof1792, thesamegenderedpatternsofepistemically

corrupting education are continued toongoing critique.Wollstonecraft ’s strategywas to

trackwaysthatthetransplantationofsexistsocialnormsintoeducationalpracticestended

todeprivewomenofopportunitiesforthecultivationandexerciseofepistemicvirtues. In

one example, if ‘women are not to be contradicted in company’, she argues, they are

effectivelylockedoutofthedialecticalpracticesthatwouldenablethemtodevelopvirtues

likeclarity,carefulness,andtenacity(1995:ch.4,passim).Instead,theytendtodevelopwhat

Wollstonecraftscathinglydubs‘negativevirtues’,suchasdocilityorpatience,incompatible

with the ‘vigorous exertion of the intellect’ required for robust epistemic agency. Such

educational experiences are therefore corrupting, stifling the ‘dispositions’ required for a

virtuousandactive‘temperofmind’(1995:ch.4,passim).

Whatthesecriticsaredescribingisthephenomenonofepistemiccorruption.Bythat

term, I refer to experiences or activities that promote the development and exercise of

epistemicvicesand/orfailtoencouragethecultivationandexerciseoftheepistemicvirtues

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(cf.Kidd2018b).Thisconceptgathersthediverserhetoricsof‘erosion’and‘deterioration’of

character cited earlier, and is useful for two related reasons. First, it captures a genuine,

deleteriousphenomenon,reflectingthefactthatournascentsetofepistemicdispositions

evolveunder the influenceofall sortsof factors,whichshapetheirdevelopment into the

stableformswecallvirtuesandvices.Corruptingconditionsfeedvicesandstarvevirtues,so

requireidentificationandnullification,tasksinformedbytheseearlierprojects.Second,the

phenomenon of epistemic corruption can challenge the agenda and methods of vice

epistemology.Battaly (2016a)andCassam (2016) characterize thebadnessof thevices in

relationtoepistemicvalues, insofarasbeingviciousmakesoneabadthinkerorobstructs

enquiry,respectively.Epistemiccorruptioniscertainlybadintheserespects,buttheydonot

gofarenoughincapturingthebadnessofthevices,sincethismustalsoincludefacilitating,

entrenching,andconcealingsocialoppression.Ifso,analysesofcertainepistemicvicesmust

beaxiologicallypluralistic,invokingepistemicandnon-epistemicvalues–aloveoftruthand

a commitment to social justice, for instance, allied to Nancy Dumas’s liberatory virtue

epistemology(2017)andRobinDillon’s(2007)feministcriticalcharactertheory.

Ithereforeproposeatypeofoppressivistviceepistemology,whichissensitivetothe

epistemicallyobstructiveandsociallyoppressiveaspectsofviciousagency(cf.Kidd2018c).

Withrootsincriticalracetheoryandfeministepistemology,contemporaryexampleswould

includeFricker,Medina,andAlessandraTanesini,whoagreethatepistemicvicesareboth

epistemicallyandsociallyobjectionable.Indeed,badthinkingandepistemicobstructioncan

interact in mutually reinforcing ways with social oppression – the epistemic is political.

Developing oppressivism is a task for the future, startingwith developing amethodology

sensitivetoMedina’s(2012:30)insightthat‘epistemiccharactertraits…haveadistinctive

sociogenesisforsubjectswhooccupyaparticularsociallocation.’Socialpositionalityaffects

thetypesorrangesofepistemicvicetowhichoneissusceptibleandthetypesofepistemic

resources,challenges,anddangersthatonefaces,andshoulddiscourageasocialtalkofThe

EpistemicAgentandacontextualtalkofTheEpistemicVices.Instead,oppressivistsshouldbe

alerttothe‘sociogenesis’ofthevices,thecontingenciesofepistemic(anti)socialization,the

suboptimalities of agents’ epistemic formation, and the roles played by epistemically

corruptingsocialconditions.Suchaetiologicalsensitivitysignificantlycomplicatesthetypical

criticalpracticeofchargingotherswithepistemicvice(cf.Kidd2016c).

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With theconceptofepistemiccorruption inplace, Inowturn toanother–capital

epistemicvices.

(ii) Sinceviceepistemologistsare identifyinganddescribingmanyvices, theywill soonbe

facedwiththetaskoftaxonomy,ofcogentlyorganizingtheepistemicvicesandfailingsbeing

identified.Taxonomyhasnotoccupiedmuchattentionsofar,thoughareresourcesavailable

inthehistoryofphilosophyandtheology, frompredecessorswhosoughttoorderhuman

vicesandfailings–ethicists,moralists,theologians,andothers.Suchtaxonomiesofsins,vices,

andfailingshadtobejustified, lesttheyevincearbitrarinessorprocrusteanartificiality,as

withJudithShklar’s(1984)listof‘ordinaryvices’,inheritedfromMontaigne,whichgaveno

criteriaforselection,andomittedsuchplausiblecandidatevicesaslaziness.

Withoutendorsinganyone,Iproposethreepotentialtaxonomicstrategies,twoare

drawnfromcontemporarywork,theotherfromtheearlyChristianvicetradition.

Consider,forastart,anactivity-basedtaxonomy.Thesegroupthevicesaccordingto

thetypesofepistemicactivitywhichtheytypicallyaffectorobstruct.Considertheactivities

ofcommunicatingclaims,ideas,possibilities,andotherepistemicgoods.Ifdonewell,these

evinceasetofwhatwemightcallvirtuesofarticulation,whichwouldincludeclarity,lucidity,

andprecision.Butthisalsosetsupacorrespondingsetofvicesofarticulation,suchasvagary,

dullness,andimprecision.Thisstrategyhastheadvantageofnotconfiningvicestoasingle

setofactivities: imprecisioncanbemanifested inquestion-askingorstandard-setting.But

thispointstoamaindisadvantageoftheactivity-basedstrategy:someviceswillmanifestso

widelyacrossourepistemiclivesthattryingtoclassifythembyactivitywillbefutile.Avice

thataffectsverymanyorallactivitiescannotbeclassifiedintermsofaspecialrelationshipto

anyspecificsetofactivities.

Asecondpossibilityarechallenge-basedtaxonomies.Itakemycueherefromoneof

thefewtaxonomiceffortsinvirtueepistemology–JasonBaehr’s(2011:21)groupingofthe

epistemicvirtuesintermsofnine‘challenge-relevantdemands’.Thesearegenericchallenge

encountered by inquirers in the course of their activities, including those of ‘initial

motivation’,‘focusing’,‘integrity’,and‘endurance’.Theepistemicvirtuesarecharactertraits

thatenableanagenttoappropriatelyrespondtothosedemandssoastoenableinquiryto

continue.Curiosity,forinstance,isavirtueenablingagentstomeetthedemandsof‘initial

motivation’, since it generates a desire to acquire epistemic goods (cf. Watson 2019).

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CombiningBaehr’s accountof inquiry-relevant challenges andCassam’sobstructivism,we

mightdefineepistemicvicesascharactertraits,attitudes,andwaysofthinkingthatobstruct

inquirybyimpairinganagent’scapacitytoappropriatelyrespondtothevariousdemandsof

inquiry.

In his discussion, Baehr does not apply this taxonomic strategy to the vices. This

promptsthequestionofwhetheritcanbe,and,ifso,howeffectiveitwouldbe.Ithinkcertain

vicescouldbeclassifiedinthisway–forinstance,incuriosityandinsensibilityascharacter

traitsthatimpairanagent’scapacitytomeetchallengesofinitialmotivation.Butothervices

are less easily handled, such as the vice of epistemic laziness. Usually, it has been

conceptualized inrelationtothechallengesof initialmotivationandendurance.3 (Roughly

speaking,alazyagentfailstostartortostickwithinquiries–whichmightbetwosubsetsof

asinglemotivationalchallengesthatoccursbeforeandduringinquiry.)Butthisistoonarrow:

lazinesscanaffectanagent’scapacitytorespondtoalloftheinquiry-relevantchallenges–if

andhowoneinitiatesandcontinuesinquiry,butalsoifandhowonefocusesinvestigations,

evaluatesevidence,andattempts toactwithepistemic integrityand flexibility. If so, then

epistemic laziness is auniversal vice, that impactson thewhole rangeof inquiry-relevant

challenges,suchthatitcannotbeclassifiedusefullyinrelationtoanyonetypeofchallenges

(seeKiddMS).

A third taxonomic strategy is taken from the history of the early Christian vice

tradition,asdescribedbyRebeccaDeYoung(2009)inherbook,GlitteringVices.Bythefourth

centuryAD,theologianshaddrawnuponbiblicalandphilosophicalsourcestoidentifyahuge

arrayofvices,sins,andhumanfailings.Thefirstknownlistsoftheviceswerecompiledby

Evagrius of Pontus (346-399 AD), a Desert Father concerned with the moral and other

temptations faced bymonastics. Some are familiar to us (anger, gluttony, avarice) while

othersarelessso(vainglory,acedia–aspirituallyinflectedlaziness).JohnCassian(360-430)

andPopeGregory(540-604)thensystematicallyorderedtheselistsintoasetofsevencapital

vices,subsumingsomeanddiscountingothers.Criticssoonprotestedthatthevicesincluded

intheseofficiallistswereneitherthecommonestnortheworst,anobjectioncompounded

by the fact that these vicesdidnot correspond to theprincipal virtues, suchas faith and

courage.Ananswercameintheconceptofa‘capitalvice’,thosewithaspecialgenerative

capacitytoproduceoractasthesourceofothervices.Cassianusesanorganicmetaphor,

describingthecapitalvicesasthe‘roots’fromwhichothervicesare‘offshoots’,whileothers

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preferaquaticimagery:theterm‘capitalvice’comesfromtheLatincapit,meaning‘head’,as

in ‘source’ or ‘wellspring’, such that the capital vices are, as DeYoung (2009: 29 and 33)

‘singledoutbecausetheyare“sourcevices”…thatserveasanever-bubblingwellspringof

manyothers.’

Ihavesuggestedelsewherethattheremaybecapitalepistemicvices(cf.Kidd2017b).

Thesehaveaspecialcapacitytoactastherootsorsourcesofothers,givingthemaprivileged

ontologicalstatusthat,inturn,givesthemaspecialtaxonomicstatus.Whethertheideacan

becashedout isataskforanothertime,pendinginvestigationofasetof issues,ofwhich

three stand out. First, what is the nature of the putative ‘capitality’ relationship – it is

conceptual,causal,orpsychological?Second,towhatconceptionoftheontologyofepistemic

vicewouldacceptanceofcapitalepistemicvicescommitus?TheChristianvicetheoriststook

thevices tobe trackinggenuinemoral categories,meaning that, for them, capital vices–

moral and spiritual ones, at least – are discovered rather than created or imposed. But

contemporaryviceepistemologistsdemur,withCassam(2017)arguingforan‘impositionist’

account,bywhichboundariesbetweenvicesare imposedbyus in relation toourspecific

interestsandconcerns,notdiscoveredasexistingobjects.Athirdworry–sharedwiththe

othertaxonomicstrategies–isthatanyvicecould,infact,functioncapitallyasthesourceor

rootofothers.Assessingthispossibilityrequires,attheleast,carefulinvestigationofarange

ofcandidatecapitalepistemicvices.

Inlatersectionsofthispaper,mysympathyforanimpositionistaccountwillbecome

clear.Ioffertheconceptofcapitalepistemicviceshereasacontributiontotheefforttomap

out the range of options available to vice epistemologists once they begin the task of

taxonomy.

III.LISTSOFVICES

Itisobviousthattherearemanyepistemicvicesandfailings.Ashortlistwouldeasilyexceed

thedozensketchedbyLindaZagzebski(1996:162)inherbook,VirtuesoftheMind.Wemight

divide the epistemic vices into two types. Familiar vices are those entrenched in our

vocabularies fordescribing formsofepistemiccharacterandconduct,naturallyandeasily

springing to mind, as it were – arrogance, dogmatism, laziness, inflexibility,

closedmindedness, and so on. Esoteric vices are those that do not feature in prevailing

vocabularies,despitetheirtrackinggenuineformsofepistemicviciousness.Examplesinclude

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epistemic self-indulgence and epistemicmalevolence (cf. Baehr 2010, Battaly 2010). Over

time, many vices will flux between categories, becoming more or less familiar with the

vagariesof timeandculture.Historically, thishappens to themoralvices, too,withonce-

familiarvices likecupidityandconcupiscencehavingnowbecomeesoteric–signsofwhat

DeYoung(2009:26)callsthe‘fluidityofthevicetradition.’

The plurality and variability of our epistemic vices and failings offers a further

argumentforanhistoricalviceepistemology.Byexploringhistorically,wecanidentifyand

retrievevices thatwereoncerecognizedbutsince lapsed intoobscurity.Certainvicesare

perennials,tobesure,enduringinhistoryasstablefeaturesofourepistemicvocabularies.

Buttherearealsotransientvices,onesconfinedtoparticularculturesorhistoricalperiods

andwhichdisappearedwhentheypassed.Anexampleistheviceoftestimonialinjustice–

roughly, adisposition toallownegativeprejudices todeflate the testimonial credibilityof

persons againstwhomone is prejudiced (cf. Battaly 2017–whousefully remindsus that

Frickerdoesconceiveoftestimonialinjusticeasavice).Althoughtestimonialinjusticeisan

entrenchedfeatureofhumanepistemiclife,itsdescriptionasaviceonlyoccurredinthelate

20thcentury.Itdidsoagainstacertainculturalandintellectualcontextshapedbyfeminist

and black activism, social epistemology, egalitarian political values, and so on (cf. Kidd,

Medina,andPohlhausJr.,2017,PartsIIandIII).

By searching historically, we can track how certain vices emerged, evolved or

disappearedinrelationtochangingsocialandintellectualcontexts.Notalloftheviceswe

findwillbeintelligibleorrelevanttocontemporarylife,giventhevariationsintheconvictions,

enthusiasms,andsensibilitiesofdifferentcultures.Butnorshouldweruleoutthepossibility

thatothersmaybe.Evenifnot,theystillteachusthingsabouttherangeofformsofepistemic

depravityidentifiedbyearliergenerations.

A particularly rich array of epistemic vices and failings was identified in the Late

BaroqueandearlyEnlightenmentEuropeancultures,describedbySariKivisto(2014)inThe

Vices of Learning. Its title refers to critical discourses of that period devoted to vitia sive

errores eruditorum – ‘the vices and errors of scholars’, hybrid ethico-epistemic failings to

which the new scholarly classeswere judged particularly susceptible. Tables of ‘scholarly

vices’were constructed fromexistingmoral and religious concepts, intellectual and social

norms, and satirical and polemical tropes. Using this complex inheritance, a range of

traditional sins and failings gradually, explains Kivisto, ‘acquired new meanings and

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interpretationsinascholarlycontext’,aspartofamorepositiveprojectto‘constructanideal

type of scholar’ (2014: 6, 259). Scholarly vices of the period included many of Christian

vintage,mostobviouslypride,whileotherswererootedinahistoricallynewerEnlightenment

concernforsociability.Manyhavesplendidnames–titulomania,logomachia,andmisocosmy

–butnonesurviveintomodernlistsofepistemicvices,evenifmanyoftherelevantepistemic

behaviorsarestillfamiliar.

ThescholarlyvicesdescribedbyKivistoareonesetofoptionsfromasingleperiodof

Europeanculturalandintellectualhistory.Otherperiodsofferusmanyothers,beyondthose

ofearlyChristianandearlymodernEuropeanculture.Insteadofpilingupexamples,Isimply

affirmthathistoricalresearchescangiveusasetofnewepistemicvicesandfailings.Naturally,

someofthesetransientvicesfadedforgoodreasons,mostobviouslywiththedissolutionof

theirsurrounding‘formsoflife’.TheearlyChristianviceofacediawasembeddedinaformof

monastic life, indexed to its particular values, imperatives, and temptations (cf. DeYoung

2009:ch.4).Itceasedtoexistwhenthatformoflifedissolved,evenasotherviceswithwhich

itwaslisted,likegluttonyandpride,didpersistinnew,alternativeforms.

Othertransientvicesmaybequitedifferent.ThescholarlyvicesdescribedbyKivisto

were indexed to what were then newly emerging scholarly structures, where pursuit of

authorityandesteemcouldfueldesiresforfameandfutilequarrelling.It’snotcynicismto

suggestthatsuchcorruptingsocialandprofessionalstructuresarestillinplace,ofteninmore

complex and entrenched forms. If so, there is value in our scrutinizing vitia sive errores

eruditorumtoseewhich,ifany,applytocontemporaryacademicculture.

Underlyingthesepointsisadeeperoneaboutthecontingencyoftherangeofvices

thathavebecomeentrenchedinourepistemicimagination.Itisclearthatourinheritedtable

ofthevicesisincompleteandpartial,whichisunsurprising,giventhatitwasnottheresultof

carefuldesignanddeliberation.Manydevelopmentsinfluencethekindsofvicesandfailings

thatwerecognize: theologicaldebates,moralcultures, socialmovements,andmuchelse.

Suchcontingencies influencenot justthespecificviceswerecognize,butalsothebroader

rangesthosewerecognizefallinto(apointmadebyhistorically-mindedandfeministvirtue

ethicists).

ThatworkcallsattentiontoatendencywithinWesternmoralphilosophyofthelast

few centuries to privilege a certain range of moral values: confidence, autonomy,

independence–andsoon–whilemarginalizingothers,includinglove,care,anddependence.

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Such contingences have many sources, including demographic biases, deep-rooted

masculinist prejudices, ongoing marginalization of those with caregiving roles, andmany

others.Whateverthecauses,acleareffectistheprivilegingofasetofprometheanmoral

virtues such as confidence, creativity, and self-sufficiency—as feminist theorists, care

ethicists,andothershavedocumented.Asaresult,therangeofvirtuesandconceptionsof

flourishingcomestobecontingentlydelimitedinwaysthatoughttoberesisted.

An interesting question is whether the range of epistemic vices (and virtues) we

currently privilege evinces a similar degree of contingent constriction. Certainly, a

contemporary focus on the epistemic vices surrounding humility is partly a legacy of the

enduringinfluenceoftheChristiantradition,evenifthefidelityofsubsequentconceptionsof

Christianhumilitytothattraditionaremorecomplexthanisrealized(cf.Pardue2013).Other

writers discuss deeper forms of influence – ones shaping a more heterogeneous set of

epistemic character traits.Neil C.Manson (2012)argues that ‘the standard conceptionof

epistemicvirtue’operative incontemporaryepistemology tends tocharacterizevirtuesas

‘traitsanddispositionsrelevanttoacquiringknowledge’.Butthis‘acquisitionist’conception

is,heargues,‘partialandunbalanced’,insofarasit‘downplaysorignoresthefactthatthere

arevirtues innotseekingknowledge’ (2012:240).Mansondubstheseoccludedtraitsand

dispositions‘virtuesofepistemicrestraint’,whichareignoredbymostvirtueepistemologists,

whopreferacquisitionistvirtues,suchascuriosity, inquisitiveness,and loveofknowledge.

Similar claims are made by Richard Smith (2006, 2016), who advocates for ‘virtues of

diffidence’,suchasreserve,reticence,anddiscretion.

MansonandSmitharguethattherangeofepistemicvirtuescurrentlyrecognizedand

esteemedwithinvirtueepistemologyisundulynarrow.Thesetofoccludedvirtuesincludes

thoseofrestraintanddiffidence,characterizedbyaquietistratherthanactiviststanceon

epistemicagency.Withtwocaveats,Isharetheirworries.First,manyepistemicvirtuescan

surelytakeacquisitionistor ‘restrained’or ‘diffident’forms:epistemiccouragecaninvolve

bold,muscularactions,butalsoarefusalorreluctancetoinitiateorperformepistemicacts.

Second,thereareatleasttwowaysaconceptionofepistemicvirtuecanbe‘unbalanced’or

‘partial’–calltheseinclusion-partialityandaspect-partiality.Aconceptioncanfailtoinclude

asetofvirtuesoritcanincludeonlycertainoftheiraspects,orboth(socouragemightbe

included,butonlyinitsactivistforms).Similarpointssurelyalsoapplytoepistemicvices.Our

conceptionsofvicemaycontingentlyfailtoincludecertainvicesortheymayfailtorecognize

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certainaspectsofthosevicesthatwedo.Comparethepluralityofvicesofhumilitythatwe

recognizewiththedearthoftermsforthevicesopposedtocuriosityorcourage–ataskmade

easier when we turn to other philosophical and cultural traditions with quite different

conceptionsofepistemicvirtueandvicearequitedifferent.Moregenerally,ifcertainranges

ofvirtuesarebeingoccluded,so tooarecertainrangesofvices.Byadoptinganhistorical

stance,wemaybeabletoidentifycertainpatternsandpartialities inourconceptionsand

tablesofepistemicvirtueandvice.

Theexistenceoftransientepistemicvicesandimbalancesinourconceptionsofvice

pointstoamoregeneralvalueofadoptinganhistoricalperspective.Thisisthedisclosureof

thecontingencyofourepistemicimaginations–ofthewaysthatourwaysofthinkingabout

formsofepistemiccharacterareshapedbysocialandhistoricaldevelopmentsthatmaynot

haveobtained.Itshouldbeclearthatourinheritedepistemicimaginationisnotaproductof

carefulsustainedprocessesofdeliberationanddecision.Itwasaresultofacomplexarrayof

eventsanddevelopments–theological,cultural, intellectual–andthevariousconvictions,

prejudices,andenthusiasmsthattheyreflectedandsustained.Thismeansthattherangeof

epistemicvicesandfailingsthatwecanperceiveisacontingentproduct,highlydevelopedin

certainrespectsbutobscureandundevelopedinothers.Somevice-clustersareexploredin

detail,whileotherslanguishwhiletheyawaitsystematicinvestigation.Thesepointsmatter

tosomeofthedeepaimsofviceepistemology:todeepenourawarenessof,andsensitivity

to,therangeofourepistemicvicesandfailingsmanifestinindividualandcollectivecharacters

andconduct,toenableustobetterarticulateourdiscontentsandappraisecriticallyourways

ofsocializingepistemicagents,andtochartourmorefullythepluralityofformsofepistemic

excellenceanddepravityofwhichhumanbeingsaresoevidentlycapable.Suchenrichment

ofourepistemicsensibilitiesisliabletobechallengedbythepersistenceofundetectedand

uncorrectedimbalancesandpartialitiesinourwaysofthinkingaboutthevicesofthemind.

InthissectionIhavesketchedasetofgeneralargumentsinsupportofagreaterattentionto

historicalmethodsandresultsbyviceepistemologists.Doingsocanoffernewvice-concepts

andnewvicesandvariousformsofunderstandingandinsight,forinstanceintothehistorical

contingencyofourconceptionsofepistemicvice.Inthenextsection,Iconsiderafurtherset

ofargumentsforanhistoricalviceepistemology.

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IV.DEEPCONCEPTIONSOFEPISTEMICVICE

Animportantinsightofhistoricalviceepistemologyisthatourepistemicvicesandfailingsdo

notfloatfreeofpractices,projects,andcontexts.Ourepistemicvicesareexpressedthrough

our epistemic practices, manifested within our projects of inquiry, and shaped by wider

culturalandintellectualcontexts.Thechanginghistoryofcuriositasoffersaclearcasewhere

changingconceptionsoftheformandnormativestatusofacharactertraitwas intimately

relatedtochangingtheologicalandnatural-philosophicalpracticesandprojectsthatwerein

turnanimatedbythechangingculturalshiftsfromlatemedievaltoRenaissancehumanistto

earlyEnlightenmentculture.Ifso,theidentityandintelligibilityoftheviceofcuriositascannot

beunderstoodadequatelyinisolationfromthesedeeperstructures.Inthissection,Iwantto

generalizethisclaimbyarguingfortheexistenceofwhatIshallcalldeepepistemicvices.

A deep conception of epistemic vice is one whose identity and intelligibility is

determined by the set of practices, projects, or contexts within which it is embedded.

Explanationoftheseviceswillrequireonetoappealtothosedeeperfeatures.Whatwemight

call‘shallowexplanations’wouldexplaintheidentityandstatusofavicebylocatingitwithin

thearrayofpracticesinwhichtheytypicallymanifestortheparticularprojectsofinquirythey

obstruct.Bycontrast, ‘deepexplanations’willappeal tosomethingmore fundamental–a

worldview,Weltbild,ormetaphysicalvision.(‘Depth’,here,isadescriptive,notevaluative,

term.) Idonotclaimthatallepistemicvicesareormustbeconceptualizeddeeply in this

sense,northatallworkinviceepistemologyoughttobuildinshallowanddeepexplanations

oftheirpracticesorprojectsofinquiryordeepermetaphysicalvisions.Onlycertainvicesand

certainkindsofvice-epistemicworkwouldneedto‘godeep’.

Theideaofdeepconceptionsofepistemicvicesislargelyneglectedwithincharacter

epistemology, but less so among historians. Among character epistemologists, only Bob

RobertsandW.JayWoodhaveexplicitlyarguedthatcertainepistemicvirtuesandvicesare

‘indexedto’and‘presuppose’suchdeepobjectsorgroundsas‘conceptionsofhumannature

and the nature of the universe’ or ‘metaphysical commitments and world-views’. Our

conceptionsofepistemicvirtueandvice,theyargue,are‘madethemoredeterminatethe

morewelocateourselveswithinatraditionthatincludesaparticularunderstandingofhuman

natureandthenatureoftheuniverse’(2007:23,82,155,189).Buttheyleavetheoperative

term‘indexing’undefined.Onwhatwemight(non-derogatively)callashallowreading,their

claimmaybethatvirtuesandvicesarehistoricallycontingent,comingandgoingasthese

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conceptionsandworldviewschange.Butonadeepreading,theclaimmightbethatthevery

existenceandintelligibilityofcertainvirtuesandvicesdependsuponthoseconceptionsand

worldviews.

ItisthelatterreadingthatIwanttodefendhere.Iwanttoargue(a)therethatwas

anactivevice-epistemologicaltraditioninearlymodernEnglishnaturalphilosophyand(b)it

hadasetofepistemicviceswhoseidentityandintelligibilitywasultimatelydeterminedbya

deepconceptionofhumannature–ofourbeing‘fallen’creatureswithdefectiveepistemic

abilities and that (c) this background conception substantially shaped the range of vices

conceptuallyavailabletotheearlymodernEnglishnaturalphilosophers.Myhopeisthatthis

casestudyisabletoprovide‘proofofconcept’fordeepepistemicvices.

Theterm‘naturalphilosophy’isusedtorefertotheearlierstagesofwhatwewould

nowadaysdubnaturalscience,whichwascertainlytakingformbythelatefifteenthcentury.

Englandwasacentralsiteofnaturalphilosophicalinquiry,bothinpracticalresearches–or

whatscholarsdub‘experimentalnaturalphilosophy’–andmoretheoreticalreflectiononits

methods.Thepracticalandtheoreticaldimensionswerenotsharplydistinct,ofcourse,since

amaintaskfornaturalphilosopherswastodesignandtojustifymethodsofinquiry.Mostof

theactiveexperimentalistsofthedaywerealsoengagedindebateaboutwhatwetodaycall

epistemologyandphilosophyofscience.

Anintegralfeatureofthesephilosophicaldebateswasanacutesenseofthenatural

deficienciesandinadequaciesofhumanepistemiccapacities.Initsearlierstages,thissense

wasarticulatedusingpathologicaldiscourses–of‘diseasesandinfirmitiesofthemind’and

themany‘defectsandimperfections’evidentfromsoberscrutinyoftheunderstanding.Much

of this pathological language reflected interests in medicine and physiology common to

learnedmenoftheperiod.ButIsuspectitalsomarkedsomethingdeeper:thefactofthere

beingdifferencesbetweenthevariousdiscoursesofepistemicdeficiencies.Earlierinhistory

the hamartiological discourses dominated owing to the cultural and intellectual

entrenchmentofChristianityinEurope.Butdiscoursesfocusedonsintendedtodownplay

theameliorativerolesofhumanoverdivineagency.Sinfulcreatures,stainedbyoriginalsin,

lack the spiritual and moral capacities required for self-amelioration. Pascal (1980, §45)

lamented that our ‘wretchedness’ – ourbeing ‘full of natural error’ – is so extensive and

profound that it ‘cannot be eradicated except through grace’. SinceonlyGod’s grace can

repair our moral, spiritual and epistemic deficiencies there was very little grounds for

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confidenceintherestorativepotentialofhumanagency.Suchpessimismbecamemuchless

compellingonceattentionshiftedtodiscoursesofpathology–diseaseentailscure,weakness

entailsstrength,anddefectsentailrepair.

Theconceptualizationofhumanepistemicdeficienciesinthecategoriesofpathology

startedtoencourageanewandmoreconfidentsensethattheymightbecorrectedthrough

formsofhumanagency. SoranaCorneanu (2011)documents theemergence,withinearly

modern English natural philosophy, of a new medicalized rhetoric of ‘cure’, ‘regimens’,

‘disciplines’, and ‘cultures’–all aimedat ‘the cureandperfectingof thehumanmind’by

offeringways to ‘diagnose the stateof one’s cognitive and affective faculties’ and, if and

where possible, ‘to cure their infirmities and cultivate their strengths.’ Underlying the

epistemologicalandmethodologicalviewsofBoyle,Locke,andtheircontemporarieswasa

therapeuticprojecttodevelop‘ananatomyofcapacities,limits,anddistempers,aswellasa

view about the possibility and need of a cure and cultivation thatmay shape a virtuous

inquirer’ (2011: 2, 220). Corneanu demonstrates that the dominant discourse was

pathological, but I want to argue that it slowly evolved into a characterological one that

conceivedofourepistemicdeficienciesintermsofvices.

V.FROMIDOLSTOVICES

Theearliestfigure inthisstory isFrancisBacon(1561-1626). InNewOrganon,of1620,he

describedasetof‘IdolsoftheMind’,which‘doviolencetotheunderstandingandconfuse

everything’(2000:§44).Thesefallintoroughlytwotypes.TheIdolsoftheTribeandtheCave

areinnatedeficiencies:theformeraregeneralfeaturesofhumannature,likeourtendency

toperceivemoreorderinthingsthanexists.Thelatterrefertoidiosyncrasiesofindividual

persons. By contrast, the Idols of theMarketplace and the Theatre are socially acquired

deficiencies,arisingfrominadequaciesinourlanguageorphilosophicalsystemsandfromour

interactionswithotheragents(acquiredbiases,say).AnobviousfeatureoftheIdolsisthat

theyincorporatearangeofepistemicvicesandfailings.ItseemsobviousthattheIdolsare

notthemselvescharacterologicalvices,butratherwaysoftheorizingcertaintypesofnatural

oracquiredepistemicdeficiencies.

Intothemid-1660s,however,thepathologicaldiscoursegraduallybegantoshiftinto

amoreovertlycharacterologicaldiscourseofvice. JosephWright, JosephGlanvill,Thomas

SpratandotherluminariesofEnglishnaturalphilosophyallbegintospeakintermsofvices.

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Wrightcriticizesavicehecalls‘distraction’,amarkofinquirerswhoare‘desirousofvarietie

andalteration’andthereforeincapableofproperconcentrationandperseverance.Glanvill–

aprescientchampionofnaturalscience–castigatescredulityandobstinacy,apairofvices

arisingfromourtendencytomake‘precipitatejudgments’,toreceive‘allthings’inaspiritof

‘promiscuousadmission’.Insteadofbeingcarefulanddiscerning,thecredulouswillaccept

anythingwhiletheobstinatewillabandonorrevisenothing.Sprat–afounderandthefirst

historianoftheRoyalSociety–stateshistargetviceinhis1661bookVanityofDogmatizing.

Heactuallytargetsapairofvices–dogmatismandscepticism–whicharisefrom‘anover-

hasty,andprecipitantconcluding’beforeinquiryiscompleteand‘aversionfromassigning’of

anycausetoaneffect.Eachvicereflectsadysregulationinthemind’spowersofassent.

Suchremarksoftenmingleavocabularyofvicewithoneofdiseaseanddistemper.I

suspectamainreasonforthegradualshiftfromcategoriesofdiseasetovicewasthatthe

latterofferedmorefine-grainedresourcesforarticulatingourepistemicfailings.Generictalk

of‘distempers’ofthemindisonething,butthereisavarietyandcomplexitytoalanguage

ofvices–ofcredulity,distraction,obstinacy,dogmatism,scepticism.Bythelate1660s,we

findthefulleststatementofthenaturalphilosophicalvice-epistemictraditionintheworkof

JohnLocke.InspiredbyBaconandothernaturalphilosophers,muchofLocke’sepistemology

wasconcernedwithappraisalofthelimitsofhumanunderstanding.Itsbroadconvictionwas

that our epistemic capacities in their natural, untutored state aredeficient in oneof two

respects.First,ourpowersofreasonandunderstandingarelimited,althoughalsopotentially

capableofenhancement.ThroughoutBoyle’s1681DiscourseonThingsaboveReason,there

islongdiscussionsofthe‘dependencyandlimitednessofourNatures’andthe‘limitednature

oftheIntellect’.Butthetonewasnotquietist.Boylearguedthatthe‘mostnobleandgenuine’

functionofReasonistoturnitspowersinwardbyengaginginthe‘perfectiveaction’ofself-

appraisalofitscapacitiesanddeficiencies:themind‘notonlysee[s]otherthingsbutitself

too,andcandiscern…whateverinfirmitiesislaboursunder’(quotedinCorneanu2011:117).

Second,Lockeinheritedanacutesensitivitytothenaturalandacquiredcorruptionsofthe

mind,althoughhethereisnomentionofIdolsoftheMind.MuchoftheEssayConcerning

HumanUnderstandingusestheinheritedpathologicalvocabulary,aswhenLockeexplainshis

projectasbeingto‘study…ourownabilitiesanddefects’,‘peculiarendowmentsandnatural

fitnesses,aswellasdefectsandweaknesses’(Locke1968:421).Butinhisverylatewritings,

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what emerges is a fully-developed discourse of vice, the best example being the

posthumouslypublished1706essay,‘OntheConductoftheUnderstanding’.

OriginallyintendedasthefifthbookofarevisededitionoftheEssay,the‘Conduct’is

usuallycoupledwithSomeThoughtsConcerningEducationasaconcisestatementofLocke’s

viewsoneducationaltheoryandpractice.Certainly,bothworksdiscussthe importanceof

educationtothecultivationoftheunderstanding–ofchildrenandadults–andthewider

politicalimportanceofepistemicallywell-conductedcitizens(cf.TarcovandGrant’seditor’s

introduction to Locke 1996; Yolton 1998). But there is also a further dimension of the

‘Conduct’, one neglected in the existing scholarship: its status as an exercise in vice

epistemology.Muchoftheessayisconcernedwithsketchingoutarangeofepistemicfailings

–of‘Vices[that]opposeormenaceourEndeavours’,asLockesaysinstrikinglyobstructivist

terms (Locke Essay, §3.5.18). I count at least thirteen – such as ‘haste’, ‘anticipation’,

‘resignation’,and‘despondency’-whichtendtoclusteraroundfailuresofepistemicdiscipline

andself-control.LikeGlanvillandotherEnglishphilosophersoftheperiod,arunningconcern

iswithfailurestoproperlyregulateourepistemicagency–theviceofhaste,for instance,

marks an inquirer whose rushes through the proper procedures of inquiry in ways that

jeopardiestheintegrityoftheirconclusions(cf.Locke,SomeThoughts,§25).

Isuggestthatthereisanexplicitexerciseinviceepistemologyunderlying‘Conduct’.

Itrepresentsamaturecharacterologicaldiscourseofepistemicdeficiencyinvirtueofhaving

fourfeatures.First,anexplicitvocabularyofvices,somefamiliarandsomeesoteric.Second

isanexplicitconcernforepistemiccharacter–itsvariousvirtuesbutalsoitsmanyvices.As

Corneanu(2011:163)explains,bythetimeof‘Conduct’,Lockehas‘movedfirmlytowarda

conceptionofthecharacteroftherightfulknower,andofhispersonalepistemicexcellence.’

Although the concern with virtues and excellences is important to a characterological

discourse, so, too, is concern with vices and corruptions. The third component of a

characterologicaldiscourseisananalysisoftheeffectsofvicesonpracticesandprojectsof

inquiry. Lockedoes this inhisdescriptionsofhowhaste,anticipationandothervicesand

failings ‘oppose’or ‘menace’ourvariousepistemic ‘Endeavours’.Thedespondent inquirer

abandons inquiries once they becomedifficult and so confine themselves to low-hanging

epistemicfruit,therebyfailingtoacquireepistemicgoodsbutalsotoeffectivelymeasurethe

scopeoftheircapacities.

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Afurtherpairoffeaturesofacharacterologicaldiscourseisanactiveconcerntogive

anaccountoftheaetiologyofourepistemicvicesandfailingsand–closelyrelated–asetof

effectiveameliorativepractices.Lockeandhiscontemporarieswerenotconcernedsimplyto

describeourepistemicdeficiencies,vices,andfailings,butrathertocorrectornullifythemin

whateverwaystheycould.BaconarguedthatthehistoricalpersistenceofIdolsoftheMind

hadsystematicallyimpairedearlierprojectsofinquiry,hencehisconfidenceintheprojects

of natural philosophy that were Idol-proofed by his ‘Great Instauration’. Despite their

pragmaticapplications,theseprojectshadadeepertherapeuticpurpose,namelytonullify

the‘Idolsofthemind’atboththeagentialandcollectivelevelsthroughthecentralizationand

methodologicaldisciplineofinquiry.Suchtherapeuticidealsrequired,inpractice,anaccount

oftheaetiology–theoriginsandsources–ofourepistemicdeficiencies,which,inturn,could

indicateeffectiveameliorativestrategies.

Therewereatleasttwovice-epistemictraditionsinearlymodernEnglishphilosophy.

The educative tradition focused on the epistemically corrupting tendencies of prevailing

educationalsystems,theirtendencytopromote,atleastinwomen,variousofthevicesof

themind.Within thenatural philosophical vice-epistemic tradition, thedevelopmentof a

characterologicaldiscoursecamelater.Overthecourseofthesixteenthcentury,weseea

steadyshifttowardsdiscoursesthatfocusedonvice,eveniftheothercategories,ofsinand

disease,continuedtorumbleawayinthebackground.

Myoutstandingtask is toarguethatat leastsomeofthevicesofthisperiodwere

deeplyconceptualized,insofarastheywereindexedtoaconceptionofhumannatureorthe

natureofreality.Idothisbyofferinga‘deep’explanationofanotherwisepuzzlingfeatureof

thelistsofvicesoftheperiod—afailuretoarticulateaviceof‘epistemichubris’.Theabsence

ofthisviceinvitesexplanation,sinceitreflectsanexaggeratedorinflatedestimationofthe

scopeandstrengthofhumanepistemiccapacities–ofreasonandunderstanding–whichwas

preciselytheconcernofearlymodernEnglishnaturalphilosophy.

Toexplaintheunusualabsenceofhubris,Iarguetheirviceepistemologywasindexed

toaconceptionofhumannatureasintrinsicallycorruptedbothepistemicallyandspiritually

bytheoriginalsininheritedfromtheFallofMan.Thisconceptiondidnotprovidewhatthe

viceofhubrisrequires:anestimationofthefullarrayofhumanepistemiccapacities.

VI.HUMILITYANDITSVICES

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TheearlymodernEnglishnaturalphilosophersesteemedarangeofepistemicvirtues,none

morethanthosereflectiveofwhatSoranaCorneanucalls ‘epistemicmodesty’.Arangeof

dispositions, habits, and attitudes fall under that label, such as preferences for a

‘nondogmaticstyleofdiscussionandpresentation’,and‘prudentinquiryratherthanpositive

assertion,fortheprobableratherthanfortheinfalliblycertain’(Corneanu2011:99f).This

cultureofepistemicmodestyhadmanysources:therevivalofskepticism,culturalrepertoires

ofgentlemanly truth-telling, the irenicminimalismof theAnglicanReformation,and–my

focus in this section – a postlapsarian theological anthropology, one that emphasizes the

‘fallen’statusofhumanbeings,theirintrinsicallycorruption,asinheritorsoforiginalsin(cf.

Popkin2003,Shapin1994,Shapiro1983).

Withoutdenyingtheimportanceoftheothercontextualsources,Iproposethatthe

earlymodernEnglishviceepistemologywasdeeplyindexedtowhatCorneanu(2012:99)calls

an‘anthropologicalconceptionofhumanfrailtiesandcapacities’.Initsgeneralform,human

beings were conceived as initially possessing an exalted array of epistemic capacities,

expressed in Christian mythology as ‘Adamic wisdom’, consisting of knowledge and

understandingofaremarkablescope,depth,andcertitude.Unfortunately,ourpriorstateof

epistemicandmoralexcellencewasspoiled,profoundlyandirrevocably,bytheFall.During

themedievalperiod,theologiansdifferedintheirjudgementsabouttheextentandseverity

ofourepistemicandspiritualcorruptionsufferedbypostlapsarianhumanbeings.

Theoptimists,suchasThomasAquinas,maintainedthatthe‘lightofnaturalreason’,

since it ‘pertains to the species of the rational soul’, can never be ‘forfeit’, even by so

profoundlydestructiveaneventas theFall (cf.SummaTheologiae1a.95,1).Without such

optimisticestimationsofournaturalanduntarnishedepistemiccapacities,theentireproject

ofrationaltheologywouldappearfutile.Butthepessimists,pre-eminentlySaintAugustine,

demurred:ourepistemicandmoralnatures,although‘atfirstfaultlessandwithoutanysin’,

havebeenprofoundlycorrupted,sincetheFall‘darkensandweakens’ourcapacities,which

continuetooperateonlythankstodivineillumination(OnNatureandGrace3.iii).4

The long story of the gradual entrenchment of the more pessimistic Augustinian

anthropologiesisnotmyconcernhere.Whatmatters,formypurposes,isthat,bythelate

1500s,ithadcometopermeateEnglishnaturalphilosophy.Itwasaccepted,interalia,that

oursensoryfacultiesaredulled,ourpassionsunbalanced,andourepistemiccapacitiesunable

topenetratetothe‘essences’ofthings,offeringonlythemodestprospectofaslow,collective

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accumulation of, at best, probable knowledge (cf. Harrison 2007: 6f). The general

epistemological significance of these anthropological convictions to earlymodern English

philosophy should be clear – its modest empiricism, for instance, and emphasis on

collectivizedinquiry.

Lessobvious,asitstands,ishowthisvisionofhumannatureasepistemicallydamaged

goodscangroundasetofepistemicvices.PutinthetermsIintroducedearlier,thequestion

is how a set of epistemic vices can be inflected by being indexed to a postlapsarian

anthropological conception.An important clue is thecultureofepistemicmodesty,which

indicatestherangeofviceslikelytobeofspecialconcerntotheEnglishnaturalphilosophers.

Mostobvious,at least to themodern imagination,arearroganceanddogmatism,but the

former has a rather minimal presence during this period. Bacon, for one, argues that

‘arroganceandpride’aremarksoftheIdolsoftheTribe,whichmanifests, for instance, in

preferencestobelievewhatisconvenientratherthanwhatistrue(quotedinCorneanu2011:

22). Others offer more indirect criticisms of arrogance, as in Sprat’s (1667: 33-34)

condemnationofthosewhoarenot‘willingtobetaught.’

Themore obvious vice of humility thatmost animated the earlymodernswas, of

course,dogmatism,the‘greatdisturberofourselvesandoftheworld’,saysGlanvill(1661:

225),‘maintain’duponthedepravedobstinacyofanungovern’dspirit.’Similar,iflessvivid

protests echo through the earlymodernwritings, as a ‘disease’ or vice of themind, that

contrastswiththe‘docile’inquirercelebratedbyBoyle(1999-2000:xii.304-5),fullypossessed

ofthe‘modest,humble’dispositionsofwhatSprat(1667:46)dubsthe‘CharacterofaTrue

Philosopher’.Withintheseandcountlesssimilarremarks,dogmatismemergesasaprimary

epistemicvice,astatusjustifiedinrelationtotheunderlyinganthropology.

Although no definitive conception of dogmatism prevailed during the period, its

general features werewell-established. The dogmatic person refuses to engagewith the

viewsandcriticismsofothers,theyassertbeyondwhattheycanestablish,andtheyarenot

abletoproperlydetectdeficienciesintheirknowledgeandunderstanding.Thishasvarious

badeffectsoninquiry—forinstance,dogmaticinquirersfailtoreconsidertheirviewswhen

goodreasonsaregivenfordoingso,hencetheimportanceplacedonbothempiricismand

collectiveinquiry.Butdogmatismalsoreflectsabadpsychology,sinceitentailsignoranceof

one’s capacities, what Corneanu (2011: 98) calls a stubborn ‘misevaluation of ourselves’.

Manyearlymodernnaturalphilosophicalpracticeswere intendedtonullifyorcorrectour

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innatesusceptibilitytodogmatism,suchasthecomplexarrayof‘rulesofassent’togovern

ourrelationstoepistemicclaims.Thissusceptibilitytotheviceofdogmatismwas,ofcourse,

explained and rendered intelligible by reference to an underlying conception of human

nature.Sincedogmatismwasunderstoodasavicerootedinimbalancedpassionsandother

distempers,itsultimaterootswereour‘fallennatures’.

I think early modern conceptions of the vice of dogmatism were indexed to this

postlapsariananthropology,aswereothervices,suchascredulityandobstinacy.Butthere

areotherviceswhichwemightexpecttofindincludedintheearlymodernlistsofthevices

of themind that are notable by their absence. These include a vice thatmarks a radical

deficiencyofhumility–namelyhubris,whichrarelyfeaturesinthehistoricalorcontemporary

tables of the vices of themind. A hubristic agent assumes or asserts their possession of

epistemic capacities of a type, scope, or strength unavailable to them. But earlymodern

Englishnaturalphilosophylackedaconceptionofourepistemiccapacities,meaningthatthey

couldnotsustainaconceptofepistemichubris.

Theonlysustainedstudyofhubris,conceivedasbothanepistemicandexistentialvice,

isofferedbyDavidE.Cooperinhis2002book,TheMeasureofThings.Ifollowthemaindetails

ofhisaccount:theviceofhubrisreflectsanagentwithanexaggeratedestimationofthetype,

scope,andstrengthofhumanepistemiccapacities.Inearlierhistoricalperiods,hubriswas

oftenarticulatedintermsofpretensionstothestatusandpowersofGod,atendencythat

onlybegantorecedeintheseventeenthcentury–adevelopmentchartedbyEdwardCraig

(1987)inhisbookTheMindofGodandtheWorksofMan.Whatmarksouttheepistemically

hubristicagent isasetofvicioustendencies,onesmostobviouslymanifest inthesortsof

epistemicambitionstowhichanagentaspires—perhapsto‘acquireinsightintotheorderof

realityasGodhasdisposedit’,tociteoneofCraig’sexamplesofaguidingmedievalepistemic

ambition(cf.Craig1987:224).Althoughthepossibilityofsuchinsightwasaffirmedbymost

medievalChristiantheologians,itsrealizationwasonlypossiblewithactivedivineassistance

– a form of humility embedded in the doctrine of divine illumination. The pretension to

dispense with that assistance by asserting or assuming our possession of such epistemic

capacitiesishubristic.

Since the vice of hubris concerns assumption or assertion of an inflated set of

epistemic capacities, there are important differences between it and closely related vices

such as arrogance and dogmatism. A person can be arrogant or dogmatic without their

23

necessarilysupposingtheydoorcouldpossessanexaggeratedsetofepistemicpowers.On

thecharacterizationofarrogancedevelopedbyRobertsandWood,itconsistsofadisposition

to draw illicit inferences to some entitlement, such as the entitlement to pronounce

authoritativelyonatopicwithoutdueexpertise.Butthearrogantpersondrawsinferences

fromtheir social status,whereas thehubristicperson infersspecialentitlements fromthe

exaltedcapacitieswhosepossessionandmasterytheypresuppose.(Obviously,arroganceand

hubriscanfeedoneanother:apersonmightsupposetheyenjoyanelevatedstatusdueto

theirpresumedexaltedcapacities).Indeed,ononerecentinfluentialaccount,whatI’mcalling

hubrisemergesasasub-viceofarrogance.DennisWhitcomb,HeatherBattaly,JasonBaehr,

and Daniel Howard-Snyder (2017) characterise arrogance in terms of ‘over-owning one’s

strengths’,whichincludes‘thedispositionstoover-estimateone’sstrengths’,whichwould

makeepistemichubris–aradicaloverestimationofone’sepistemicstrengths–asub-viceof

arrogance.

Inthecaseofdogmatism,RobertsandWoodidentifythisasadispositiontorespond

irrationally to attempts by others to engage them in epistemic activity – derogating or

otherwiseresistingothers’effortstoinformorcriticizethem,say.Butthisformoftheviceof

dogmatismentailsmisuseratherthanmisestimationofone’scapacities:thedogmatistmight

beperfectlycognizantofthescopeandstrengthoftheirepistemicabilities—theyjustfailto

exercisethem,whereasthehubristicpersonactsastheydobecausetheytakethemselvesto

besofantasticallyepistemicallyequippedthattheyhavenoneedoftheinstructionorcritical

engagementofothers.Althoughoneneednotbehubristictobedogmatic,thesetwovices

canbemutuallyamplifying.

I propose that there is a conceptual space for a distinct vice of epistemic hubris,

understoodasaradicaldeficiencyofhumility(cf.Kidd2015,2016b).Itisoftenmostclearly

visibleinthesortsofepistemicambitionsaninquireradoptsorregardsasavailabletothem.

I may be hubristic if my guiding ambitions are ones beyond the capacities currently or

prospectivelyavailabletome.Astrongerformofhubriswouldbeanindividualmakingclaims

thatcouldonlybemadewithconfidenceifonecouldperformepistemictasksbeyondthe

abilitiesofevenalargecommunity,suchas,suchasreconstructingandassessingalternative

waysthathistoryandculturecouldhavegone(cf.Kidd2016c).

Isuspectthathubrisisoftenmislabeled,contributingtoitsabsencefromourlistsof

thevices.WhenKantcriticizes‘dogmatists’,suchasLeibniz,theobjectionwasnotthatthey

24

refusedtoengagewithanimportantsetofobjections.Itwas,rather,thattheirmetaphysical

ambitionspresupposedacapacitytodescribethewaytheworldis‘initself’,independentof

humansensibilityandconception. In sodoing,explainsCooper (2002:159),philosophers,

suchasLeibniz,‘creditedhumanbeings,impossibly,withthecapacitytotranscendthelimits

ofunderstanding, togainaccess to things-in-themselves.’ Since this is, at leastwithin the

termsofKant’stranscendentalidealism,anepistemiccapacitywelack,theirfaultisactually

hubris.

Interestingly,theviceofepistemichubrisdoesnotappearwithinthewritingsofthe

earlymodernEnglishnaturalphilosophers.Thisispuzzlingforthreereasons.First,concerns

with hubris are obviously pertinent to the guiding concern to determine what epistemic

powershumanbeingsdoorcould,intothefuture,possess.Second,acultureofepistemic

modesty inevitablybuilds inanespecialconcernwithfailurestoachieveandexercisethat

virtue.Ifhubrismarksthemostradicaldeficiencyofhumility,thenitoughttobecentralto

their concerns. Third, the practical ability to properly prosecute the emerging projects of

natural science presupposedhaving a sense ofwhatwould count as attainable epistemic

ambitions. Given these reasons to expect a concern with hubris to emerge within early

modern English natural philosophical vice epistemology, its absence stands in need of

explanation.

VII.HUMANNATUREANDEPISTEMICHUBRIS

Iproposethattheabsenceofhubriscanbeexplainedinthedeepsensebyconsidering in

closerdetailacrucialfeatureoftheprevailingpostlapsariananthropology.Theviceofhubris

alwayspresupposesacertainconceptionofwhatourepistemiccapacitiesare–oftherange

ofourcapacities,theirstrengthandscope,andthepossibilities(ifany)oftheirbeingaltered,

whether of degradation or enhancement. Conceptions of the vice of hubris are always

coupledorindexedtoaconceptionofourepistemicsituationinthewiderorderofthings.

Thehubristicagentisonewho–absurdly,futilely–presupposestheir‘beingabletoescape

theconstraintswhichtheircreaturelyconditionmightbethoughttoimpose’(Cooper2002:

169).Butitshouldbeclearthattheformandfixityoftheseconstraints,thesortsofepistemic

limitsthey‘impose’,andtheextent(ifany)towhichtheymightbetranscended,canonlybe

articulatedviaasophisticatedaccountofour‘creaturelycondition’–Kant’stranscendental

idealism,say.Ifso,thenitseemspossiblethatsomeconceptionsofourepistemicsituation

25

maybeabletosustainastableconceptionoftheviceofhubris–theymaybeincomplete,for

instance.

.Butwhatwasnotknown,duringthisperiod,waswhatthescopeandstrengthofour

epistemiccapacitieswouldbeonce theyhadbeendisciplined,cured,orcultivated. Itwas

cleartotheearlymodernnaturalphilosophersthatourcapacitiesastheystandwereinan

inauspicious condition – ‘defective’, ‘weak’, vicious, corrupted. But there was no such

confidenceaboutthe‘upperlimits’ofourepistemiccapacitiesintheirfullydevelopedstate,

for the simple reason that, for the entirely of our postlapsarian existence, they were

corruptedbyourinheritedoriginalsinandthenbyfailuresofself-disciplineandthefailings

inheritedfromoursocialsystems.

This uncertainty about the scope and strength of our epistemic capacities had an

important consequence for earlymodernEnglish vice epistemology. This visionof human

naturecouldlendidentityandintelligibilitytoacertainrangeofvices,namelythosewhich

presupposeourpervasiveepistemic infirmities.Certainly, this is themain featureofearly

modernEnglishvicessuchascredulity,dogmatism,andobstinacy–allfailuresofepistemic

conductarisingfrominsufficientresponsivenesstoour‘weak’and‘defective’capacities.But

thatsameconceptioncouldnotsustainavicesuchashubris,forintheabsenceofashared

understandingoftheactualscopeandlimitsofourepistemiccapacities,itwasimpossibleto

makemeaningfulchargesofhubris.Conceptionsoftheviceofhubrisarealwaysindexedtoa

certainanthropologicalormetaphysicalconception–anaccountofourepistemiccapacities

andsituationthatenablesjudgementsaboutwhatwouldcountashubristicconduct.Inthe

absenceof a complete anthropological conception that specified the ‘upper limits’ ofour

powers,theconceptualspaceforaviceofhubriscouldnotbefilled.

We clearly see this pervasiveuncertainty about the status andupper limitsof our

epistemiccapacities inLocke’swritings,mostvisiblyandexplicitly in theEssayConcerning

Human Understanding. In the opening ‘Epistle to the Reader’, he explains the original

inspirationforhisepistemologicalprojectasbeingaconversationwithfriends,earlyin1671,

aboutmatters ofmorality and revealed religion. Unfortunately, little to no progress was

made,withcriticismsoneveryside,whichsuddenlyinspiredinLockeacrucialinsight:

Afterwehadawhilepuzzledourselves,withoutcominganyneareraResolutionof

thoseDoubtswhichperplexedus,itcarneintomyThoughts,thatwetookawrong

26

course; and that, before we set our selves upon Enquiries of that Nature, it was

necessarytoexamineourownAbilities,andsee,whatObjectsourUnderstandings

were,orwerenotfittedtodealwith(2008:4)

The insight was that the inquiry had begun without any a clear understanding of the

sufficiency of their epistemic capacities for the task at hand. The group had implicitly

presumed that their ‘Abilities’ were ‘fitted’ to deal effectively with thematters in hand.

Locke’srealizationwasthatthesufficiencyofhumanepistemiccapacitiesmustitselfbemade

anobjectofsustainedinquiry,apointreiteratedthroughouttheEssay:

IfwecanfindoutthoseMeasures,wherebyarationalCreatureputinthatState,which

Manisin,inthisWorld,may,andoughttogovernhisOpinionsandActionsdepending

thereon,we need not be troubled, that someother things escape our Knowledge

(Essay§1.1.6)

Weseeherethreerelatedpoints.First,anuncertaintyaboutthepotentialupper limitsor

‘Measures’ofourepistemiccapacities.Second,asenseofepistemicmodestyintheexplicit

affirmationthatsomethingsdo–andmightperhapsforever–‘escapeourKnowledge’.Third,

a reference toananthropologicalconception,whichLockerefers toasanaccountof ‘the

State,whichMan is in’. Since that conceptionwaspremisedonournatural andacquired

epistemicinfirmities,itmakesperfectsensethatLocke’sconcerniswiththevicesofhumility

andofdiscipline–dogmatismandlaziness,themainthemesoftheEssayand‘OftheConduct

of the Understanding’. Those are the vices that can be most effectively indexed to an

anthropologicalconceptioninclusiveofaprofoundsenseofourinfirmities.Itwaseasierto

give identity and intelligibility to vices of infirmity in a cultural and intellectual climate

dominated by a vision of human beings as epistemically corrupt, infirm,weak, defective,

vicious.Inthisclimate,focusandconcernnaturallyshiftedtowardsvicesthatarticulatedour

infirmities.

Letmesumup:earlymodernEnglishnaturalphilosophywasanimatedbyanabiding

senseofthepervasivenessofinnateandacquiredhumanepistemicfailingsanddeficiencies,

atraditionwhosefullestexpressionisLocke’sessay‘OftheConductoftheUnderstanding’.

Although shaped by a whole constellation of cultural, religious, and intellectual

27

developments,whatseemscentralwasapostlapsarianconceptionofhumanbeingsas‘fallen’

creatures,whoseepistemiccapacitiesweredamaged,severelyifnotirreparably,bytheFall.

But the underlying anthropological conception was incomplete, since it emphasized the

currentlyimperfectscopeandstrengthofourcapacitiesintheircurrentuncultivatedform–

but not their potential future status, once properly cultivated and restored. Since that

conceptionwasincomplete,itcouldnotprovideabasisforarticulationofaviceofhubris,

eventhoughitreflectedepistemologicalconcernswiththelimitsofknowledgeandproper

conduct of the understanding central to the concerns of the period. This confirms the

predictionthatconceptionsoftheviceofhubrisalwayspresupposesomedeeperconception

ofourepistemiccapacitiesandsituation.Whennosuchdeepconceptionisavailable,itwill

notbepossibletoarticulateaconceptionoftheviceofhubris.

VII.CONCLUSIONS

Thispaperarguedforanhistoricalviceepistemology,informedbythemethodsandresults

ofhistoricalscholarship,whichaffordnovelandvaluableconcepts,examples,andinsights,

notleastaccesstoprecursorexplorationsofepistemicvicesandfailingsandtheirrelationsto

political theory,natural science,andotherareasof intellectualandculturalactivity.More

importantly,historicalcasestudiesprovideexamplesofdeepconceptionsofepistemicvice,

withonecandidatebeingepistemichubris,itselfgroundedinanunderlyinganthropological

andmetaphysicalvisionofhumans’epistemicsituationwithintheorderofthings.

Acknowledgements

IamgratefulforthecommentsandencouragementofJasonBaehr,QuassimCassam,Charlie

Crerar,DavidE.Cooper,SoranaCorneanu,HermanPaul,BobRoberts,AlessandraTanesini;

ananonymousreferee;andaudiencesinCardiff,Leiden,Nottingham,OxfordBrookes,and

the2017PacificAmericanPacificAssociationmeetinginSeattle.Initialstagesofthisresearch

werefundedbyanAddisonWheelerFellowship.IofferspecialthankstoHeatherBattalyfor

herinvitationtocontributetothisissue,forherpatiencewhilewaitingforit,aswellasfor

hercomments.

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Endnotes

1TheTheearliestpaperdevotedspecificallytoepistemicvicethatIknowofisSwank(2000).2IamgratefultoAlessandraTanesiniforthesereferences.3See,forinstance,Zagzebski,VirtuesoftheMind,152,andMedina,TheEpistemologyofResistance,68.IgiveafulleraccountoftheseclaimsinKidd(MS).4Aquinas,Augustine,andthewiderChristiantheologicalcontextaredetailedatlengthinHarrison(2007),abooktowhichIammuchindebtedinthissection.