justificatory liberalism - an essay on epistemology and political theory - gerald f. gaus

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G E R A L D F .
G A U S
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OXFORD U N I V E R S I T Y P R E S S
1996
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L i b r a r y
of
Gaus , Gerald
F .
J us t i f i c a t o r y
liberalism : a n essay o n epis temology
and political theory
Includes bibl iographical references and index.
ISB N 0-19-509439-5 (cloth)
ISBN 0-19-509440-9 (paper)
1 . L iberal ism. 2 . Social contract . 3 . Jus t i f icaton (Theory of knowledge)
I .
title.
II .
Series.
320.5 '13—dc20 94-49138
Printed in the
States of
This
book completes , but in do ing so extends , the p ro jec t begun in
Value and Justification. In
t h a t
people conceive
o f
u n d e r -
s tand ourselves and others as capable of pu t t in g aside personal va luing s ,
and o f ac t ing on norms tha t can be
just if ied
of this conception,
I
a r g u ed , w o u l d u n d er m in e
o u r
u n d er s t a n d in g s
o f
life,
l eaving u s wi thou t ra t iona l g rounding
for
are,
I
we are
to the
just if ied
mora l i ty .
In the last chapters of Value and Justification I sketched som e of the
main elements of publ ic ly
just if ied
m oral i ty , foc using on a r ight to p er-
sonal f reedom
the
At the
t im e
I recognized that these were va gu e requ irem ents; I assumed tha t fu r ther
work w ould yield m ore specif ic pol i t ical pr inciples, a jus t i f ica t ion of
cer ta in pol i t ical ins t i tu t ions , and, indeed,
policy
o f a
p u b l i c m o r a l i t y
has
great
o f
w as
w as
no t ,
as I
orig inal ly envisaged, more detai led publ ic jus t i-
f ica t ions—the arguments fo r which were manifes t ly inconc lus ive—but
an an alysis of how pol it ical in s t i tu t io ns cope w ith this inconclusiveness.
T he conception of pol i t ical ins t i tu t ions as simply expressing or con-
f o r m in g
to
way to a
more complex idea ,
that pol i t ical ins t i tu t ions n o t only express what can b e moral ly jus t i-
f ied,
b u t
a lso respond to our pervasive inabil ity to provide decisive
jus t i f icat ions .
All this ra ises a fundamental puzzle: Each of us is commit ted to our
polit ical views,
fo r
H o w
a
a re
T o
solve this puz-
z le we need a much more sophis t ica ted accoun t o f
jus t i f ied
belief than
that employed
A t
a m a z i n g
featu res of con tem po rary pol i tical philosophy is the way in
which i t has taken a " jus t if ica tory tu rn ," yet the w ork of epis tem olo-
gists
an d c ogn it ive psycho log is ts has been a l l but igno red. I bel ieve this
is a
ser ious mis take; ep is temolog is t s
an d
cog ni t ive psycho log is t s have
looked hard
a t
these issues
fo r
an d
sure , l earn ing
f r o m
a lways easy; the ir a rgu -
m e n t s a re r a t h e r m o re t e c h n i c a l an d f o r m a l than is typ ica l in m o r a l
an d
B u t t he
e f for t ,
pol i t ical
phi losophy tha t i s c leare r abou t what i t m eans by jus t i f i ca t ion , and so
a v o i d s m a n y
of the
so
m u c h c o n t e m p o r a r y
w ri ting on p o l it ica l jus t i f i ca t ion . P ar t I o f thi s
book
ep is temology
of
w h a t it is for an i n d i v i d u a l to possess
jus t i f ied
beliefs . I call this a
theory
o f
personal j u s t i f ic a t i o n . B a s e d
o n
I I
deve lops
a theory o f public j u s t i f i c a t i o n — h o w m o ra l c l a i m s c a n b e
jus t i f ied
to
others . F inal ly part III ana lyzes political j u s t i f i c a t i o n — t h e way pol i t ical
inst i tu t ions cope with
the
just i f icat ions.
As wi th every th ing I wri te , th is book has been deep ly in f luenced by
m y c lose assoc ia t ion w i th S tan ley B en n; i f I had been ab le to a rgue
w i t h him a b o u t it, this would have been a m uch be t te r p iece of
philoso-
phy. My w o r k on jus t i f i ca t ion was spurred long ago by Fred D'Agos-
tino; though we disagree about a good deal , I have learned a lo t
f r om
him
and his work, and I t h a n k him for it. My phi losophica l conversa-
t io n s w ith J u l ia n L a m e n t — i n M e lb o u r n e , B r is b a n e , W o l lo n g o n g and
Atlan ta—have been immense ly benef ic ia l . I t i s a lways en l igh ten ing , and
always a j o y , to ta lk phi losophy
with
J u l i a n . As should be c lear to
every reader ,
by the
o f
my
thanks
A
b y
L o re n L o m a s k y w h i l e
w e w e re s h o p p i n g at the Super One s u p e r m a r k e t in D u l u t h ; I w o u l d
l ike
h im for
of the
o ther
shoppers who w e re a bit perp lexed by the loud voices over the fish
c o u n t e r .
I
g re a t l y b e n e f i t e d f ro m c o m m e n t s
on
I and II by
J u l i a n
L a m e n t , F r e d D ' A g o s t i n o ,
John
C h ris M o r ris .
I a lso would l ike to t ha n k S t ev e M a c e d o , J e re m y S h e a rm u r , John
C h a p m a n , E r i c M a c k , D a v id G o w , C a ro ly n M o r il lo , J o n a t h a n R il ey ,
Steve B u c k l e , Ian Shapiro , Wil l iam
Nelson,
Philip Pettit, S t u a r t W a r -
ner , Danie l Shapiro and Jim Fetzer .
I l earned a g rea t dea l f rom var ious p resen ta t ions o f par t s o f the
book.
of
life is
tha t
o ne
p resen ta t ions
to "go
wel l ,"
but one
a lot
m o r e
f r om those that "g o bad ly ," i . e . , in which ques t ions a re asked fo r
which one has no coheren t answer . In a few cases it
took
years f o r me
to f o r m u l a t e an a n s w e r . S o m y t h a n k s to par t i c ipan ts a t seminars an d
sess ions a t the fo l low ing , e spec ia l ly to those w ho em ba rrassed m e: the
North A m e r i c a n S o c i e t y f o r S o c i a l P h i l o s o p h y , t h e I n t e rn a t i o n a l E c o -
n o m i c s
a n d Phi losophy Socie ty , the A m e r i c a n P o l i t i c a l Science A s s o c i -
r x
a t ion , the N ew Zealand D ivis ion o f the A us t ra las ian A ssoc ia t ion o f
Phi losophy,
T he
M u r p h y I n s ti tu t e
o f
P o l it ic a l E c o n o m y ,
the
phi loso-
p h y d ep a r t m en t s o f t h e Un iv er s i t y o f N ew E n g l a n d , L a T r o b e Un iv er -
s i ty , the A us t ra l ian N at iona l U nivers ity , the U nivers i ty o f W ol lon-
gong , and B ow l ing G reen S ta te U nivers i ty , and the po l i tics and
philosophy d ep a r t m en t s a t Vic t o r ia U n iv er s it y in W ell in g t o n , M o n a s h
U nivers ity , and , o f course , the U nivers ity o f M inneso ta , D u lu th .
A
of the
of
appeared
as
" P u b l i c J u s t i f i c a t io n
a nd
D e m o c r a t i c A d j u d i c a t i o n "
in Constitutional
Political Economy (Fa l l 1991). A pre l im inary st a tem ent o f the a rg um en t
of sect ions
12 and 16
as
L a w "
in Ian Shapiro (ed.), Nomos XXXVI: The Rule of Law (New York
Universi ty Press , 1994). Some materia l
f rom
section 9.1, on the idea of
the reasonable, appears in "The Rat iona l , the Rea s o n a b l e , an d J u s t i f i -
c a t io n , "
The Journal o f Poli t ical Philosophy
(1995) .
In i t ia l work o n this book w as u n d er t a k en w h i le I was a Visit ing Fel-
low in Philosophy and Pol i t ics a t the Univers i ty of New England, in
Ar m id a l e , N ew South Wales . I w o u l d l ike to express m y appreciat ion
to the
E n g l a n d
for i ts financial support an d
hospi-
m y
par t s
d u r in g
m y
as a
a t
B ow l ing G reen S ta te U nivers ity .
I am
deeply appre-
ciative
o f the suppor t p rovided by the Cen ter ; I am par t icu la r ly
grateful
to Fred M i ll er, Ko ry Swanson an d S t e rl in g B u r n e t t . M y thanks a lso to
the
for its
generosi ty
in
g r a n t in g a c a d em ic
leaves and f inancial
I would
m y a p -
prec ia t ion to Alan Ryan and Oxford Univers i ty Press fo r thei r ear ly
suppor t o f the p ro jec t .
Duluth, Minn. G. F. G.
March
1995
C O N T E N T S
A B B R E V I A T I O N S x v
1 .
INTRODUCTORY:
E P I S T E M O L O G Y
A N D
1.1 . Ju st i f ica tory L iberalism 3
1 .2 . M ora l E p istemology 5
1.3. Pu bl ic and Personal Ju st i f ica t ion 10
1.4. Plan
of the
I — P E R S O N A L
J U S T I F I C A T I O N
2. B E L I E V I N G
F O R
1 7
2.1 . G iving, H aving, and B el ieving for R easons 17
2.2. Reasons as Causes of
Beliefs
19
2 .3 . Sus ta in ing C auses and Jus t i f i ed Belief 23
2 .4 .
2 5
Reasons
28
3 . THE I N T E R N A L AND E X T E R N A L
P E R S P E C T I V E S 30
3.1. Open and Closed Jus t i f i ca t ion 30
3.2. E xternal is t Ju st i f ica t ion s 32
3.3 . B e lie f C om m itments and Tac i t
Beliefs
35
3.4. R ela t ivism of R easons 38
3.5. R ela t ivism and B el ief Systems 42
4 . TAMING R E L A T I V I S M 4 5
4.1.
to
45
4 .2 . N a t u ra l M e n t a l Lo g i c 4 7
4.3. M utu al In tel l igibi l i ty and the L imits of P lura l ism 48
4.4. St ich 's Object ion to the B r id g e h ea d 52
4.5. Infe rent ia l E rrors 54
4.6 . A re the Sub jec ts R ea lly W ron g? 59
5 . I N F E R E N T I A L JUSTIFICATION 6 3
5.1 .
T he
A r g u m e n t T h u s
F a r 6 3
5 . 2 . F o u r A x i o m s o f
In fe ren t ia l
Ju s t i f i c a t i o n 6 4
6.2. Global Coherentism 76
7.1. Coherence Theories
an d Sel f- Just i f ied Be l ie fs 85
7.2 .
Equilibrium
101
I I — P U B L I C
8. P R I V A T E , S O C I A L , A N D
P U B L I C
R E A S O N E R S 1 1 3
8.1. Private Reasoners
8.4. Moral Demands and Moral Authority 123
8.5. Public Reason and Moral Demands 129
9 .
WHAT
9.2.
Openly
10 .3 .
a s D e f e a t e d
Proposals
10 .4 .
T he Public a n d P r i v a t e 1 71
10.5.
R e f lcx iv i ty Requirement
Is
Misguided
T w o
U n acce p tab le R e sp o n s es
to
P A R T
I I I — P O L I T I C A L
1 2 . THE RUL E OF LAW 195
12.1. T hree A spects
of the
of Law 196
12.2 . The In ternal M oral ity o f Law 197
12.3. R ights 199
and
21 3
L A W - M A K I N G
INSTITUTIONS
215
13.1 . L aw -M aking Ins t i tu t ions
21 5
and
R a n d o m D e m o c r a c y
223
13.5. D eliberative Proc edures
230
1 4 .
14.1.
of the
C onsequent ia l is t Jus t i f ica t ion
of
246
14.2.
The Pr incip le o f E qu al i ty and Po l i tica l E qu al i ty 248
14.3.
On
2 5 8
15.1. T he C hallenge from Social C hoice T heory 258
15.2.
26 0
15.3. Poli t ics , Self- interest , and A dju dic atio n 263
15.4. V ote T rading 26 7
15.5 . A dju dica t ion versus M ediat ion 271
1 6 .
as
275
16 .2 . J u d ic ia l R e v iew 279
16.3. The
M o r a l O b l ig a t io n
to
286
16 .4 . R e v o l u t i o n
an d
U t o p i a n A s p i r a t i o n s
2 88
A N D I T S RIVALS 2 9 2
APPENDIX: LIBE RAL PRINCIPLES IN A
WORLD OF STATES 296
A B B R E V I A T I O N S
The
Exclusive disjunction ("or,
jus t i f i c a t ion
E q u i v a l e n c e
Not
equivalent
J U S T I F I C A T O R Y
L I B E R A L I S M
C H A P T E R 1
I n t r o d u c t o r y : Epistemology a n d
Polit ical
1 .1 Jus t i f i ca to ry
Liberalism
b e
called a justificatory conception of liberalism. On this view, to
quote Stephen Macedo, "[t]he moral lodestar of liberalism is ... the
project of public justification."
"are committed
to a
woman,"
of the
social world should either be acceptable or be capable of being made
acceptable to every last individual."
2
person
as an end is to insist that coer-
cive or political principles be just as jus t i f iable to that person as they
are to us.
Given the actual disagreement in our Western societies over liberal
ideals, it is manifest that
jus t i f i ca tor y
liberalism cannot explicate "pub-
positions,
justificatory liberalism
to vindicate substantive liberal principles. Justificatory liberals require
a normative theory o f justification— a theory that allows them to claim
that some
set of
even given
fac t that
they are contested by some. And this, in turn, appears to call for a
moral epistemology,
in the
moral belief ,
or at
to
a
conception that puts jus t i f i c a t ion
at
the very core o f political philosophy would p r o f f e r a n explicit a n d rich
theory
political
j u s t i f i ca t i o n .
Remarkably,
the
adherents
of
l iberal ism
epis temology,
bu t insist tha t a bs ta in ing f rom presen t ing one is fun da m en ta l to thei r
posi t ion . John Rawls , for ins tance, maintains that "reasonable
jus t i f i -
cat ion" is a "pract ical" and not an "epis temological" problem.
4
are
open to ra t ional d ispute, and so are not in the requ is i t e sense pub-
licly jus t i f ied.
5
Thus Rawls seeks to avoid an y complex ep is temolog ica l
claims,
relying instead
o n
c o m m o n s e n s e
notions
abou t reasonab leness
and d isagreement . T he p r o b l e m , as R a w ls and others see it, is to avoid
content ious epis temological issues and focus on the pract ical pol i t ical
t ask o f secur ing agreement .
6
Consequen t ly , ra ther than " jus t i f ica to ry
l iberal ism," Rawls , Larmore, and o thers describe their view as
"politi-
cal
l iberal ism."
I believe this to be a f u n d a m e n ta l error. If pub l ic jus t i f ica t ion is the
core
of
of
an
liberalism
its
ep is temology .
I shal l argue in part I I that , in
fact ,
not real ly
epis temic commitments; ins tead, they res t their case
on a v a g u e , bu t nevertheless c lear ly erroneous, normat ive theory of
jus t i f icat ion .
9
Just if icatory l iberal ism, I maintain , must ar t icula te i t s
mora l ep is temology ,
and show why i t is to be
p refer red . Some
philoso-
phers bel ieve that this is imp ossible, ins ist ing that ju s t i f ica t ion and pu b-
lic
jus t i f ica t ion a re "essentially contested concepts." Ac c o r d in g to F . B .
D'Agostino,
T o
o f
it is
therefore neces-
sary to sett le qu est ions, a t least to ou r ow n sat isfact ion, which are them selves
properly poli t ical quest ions.
T he
o f
just i f ica t ion
t her e f o r e c a nno t
be beyond or prior to pol i t ics i tself . I t is not a meta-poli t ical project , as some
have
itself
a pa r t o f properly pol i ti ca l a rgum en-
tation.
10
D'Agostino
o f
pub l ic jus t i fica t ion inheren t ly
in -
cline toward
som e pol i t ical prescrip t ions ra ther than o thers . R aw ls 's
"pragmat ic notion o f
jus t i f ica t ion ,"
he
says,
is
inherent ly ant ipaternal is-
t ic , w hereas mo re "rational is tic" acco unts such as the im part ia l specta-
to r
W e
the
o f
dif ferent
of
Let us
D'Agostino
that
a
theory
of
p u b l i c jus t i f ica t ion
wil l not be "neutral with respect to the topics and
o u t c o m es o f
a r g u m e n t a t i o n . "
1 1
it
does
n o t
f o l l o w f r o m t h i s
tha t se t t l ing
on a
p a r t i c u l a r c o n c ep t io n
o f
jus t i f ica t ion is to
set t le
ques t ions tha t
are
a
of
jus t i f ica t ion, we are in
a
posi t ion to ins is t that substant ive pol i t ical views that cannot be jus t i-
fied
w ithin this con cept ion are prop erly ru led out . T hat , for ins tan ce,
the proper theory of publ ic
jus t i f ica t ion
makes it easier to jus t i fy l iberal
than s ta t is t views does n o t show tha t we a re p r e e m p t i n g "properly"
pol i t ical quest ions; it shows, rather, that the proper d o m a i n of the po-
litical is
c i r c u m s c r ib ed
by the
o f
pub l ic jus t i f ica t ion . D 'Agos t ino
disagrees
he is
to
show that any one concept ion of pu bl ic jus t i f ica t ion is superior to the
rest ; consequent ly , the choice of a concept ion must , on his view, i t sel f
be mot iva ted by po l i t ica l p references .
1 2
Ap p ea l s t o w h a t c a n b e p u b -
licly just if ied t h u s a p p ea r
as
to deify
som e po l it ica l p reference s
an d
thereby short-circuit polit ical discussion.
Such skept ical chal lenges cannot be put to rest b y avo id ing mora l
ep is temology and re ly ing ins tead on commonsense no t ions o f just if ica-
tion.
the
skeptic.
F or the ske ptic 's charge is tha t in the end al l theories of ju st if ic at i on
are manifes ta t ions of merely personal moral and pol i t ical preferences .
Consequent ly , avoiding detai led defenses conjoined with the c la im that
everyone agrees with one's ra ther vag ue unde rs tand ing o f jus t i f ica t ion
plays in to
he
j u s t w h a t
one would c la im when t rying to pass off pol i t ical preferences as rea-
son.
13
A n d t he skeptic is r igh t abo u t a t least o n e thing. Polit ical l iberals
such as R a w l s do rely o n a theory o f jus t i f ica t ion tha t is far f rom u n-
controversial . A s
points out , the theory has a s t rong prag-
m at ic ben t , par t o f w hich is a heavy re liance on norm s o f com m onsense
reason ing . B u t , as we shall see, there is overwhelming evidence tha t
such
commonsense methods a re normat ively f l awed . Thus , I sha l l a r -
gue , n ot
o f
but far
f r o m b e in g u n c o n t en t io u s ,
it is one
be re-
jected .
1 .2 M o ra l E p is te m o l o g y
1.2.1
Robustness
In
path against which pol i t ical l iberals warn:
I
develop
a
theory
bel iefs , inc lud ing
those
m o r a l i t y
a n d
sha l l thus approach some cen t ra l
issues
an d
p o l it ic a l p h i l o s o p h y t h r o u g h ep i s tem o l o g ic a l in v es -
contemporary moral and political theory. For most of this century,
moral philosophers have focused on the meaning of moral language or
the metaphysics of morals. Questions such as "What does
'good'
or
'right'
mean?"
and
(or
the staple of metaethics, as well as much normative ethics.
14
Here I
wish to f o c u s instead on "How do we jus t i fy our moral judgments,
both to ourselves and others?"
15
This approach, I think, has a crucial fea tu re sought by political liber-
als, though
2
in
of some competing theory
T
2
'— do not weaken the jus t i f ica t ion of T
1
Robustness is to be con-
trasted with sensitivity; to the extent that the justification of T
l
to various metaphysical and epistemological theories, views of the good
life
and of morality, and so on. That is, Rawls's aim is to articulate a
set
of
regardless
of
which one may someday be demonstrated true—political liberalism will
be
and in
this sense
is a
grea t
merit in a political theory; if the justification o f a political theory
is
highly sensitive to the justification of metaphysical, epistemological,
and moral theories, and to substantive ideals of the good or the holy
life,
order.
17
The question is how much robustness can be achieved, and at
what cost. My central claim in this book is that justificatory liberalism
cannot achieve
jus t i f ica-
tion;
for good or ill, it can only be as strong as the account of jus t i f ica-
tion
on
which
This, however, is consistent with considerable robustness in other ar-
eas. For
example, most
morality. Following David O. Brink, we can characterize moral real-
ism
thus:
M R : (1 )
itself
an
account
jus t i fy
world
or to
"facts." W e c a n thus distinguish theories o f jus t i f ied belief from theo-
ries
o f truth. For a moral realist, a theory o f jus t i f ied belief would
provide the standards for judging whether or not something is true;
Brink,
tified
belief in terms o f coherence (see chap. 6) . Bu t h i s distinctive claim
as
a moral realist is not that justification is a matter o f coherence, b u t
that
moral
beliefs
which is independent of the justified bel ief . Coherentist epistemol-
ogy and realist metaphysics are detachable. One could embrace a co-
herentist moral epistemology but deny the existence of any moral facts
independent of jus t i f ied belief: the only moral "truth," one might say,
is
T he distinction between epistemological an d meta-
physical commitments is perhaps even more obvious in a theory o f
empir ica l
which explicitly combines
belief
with
a
are, Bonjour maintains, jus t i f ied
in believing an empirical claim if it coheres in the right w ay with the
rest
B o s a n q u e t held
both
a coherence account o f jus t i f ied belief and a co-
herence theory of truth.
theory
o f jus t i f ied bel ief—the epistemology—I defend in this
book
m y
this
is
consistent
with
a
range
of
this extent,
at least, I agree with Rawls that questions of the truth or falsity of our
moral judgments
can be
instead f o c u s
o n
whether they a re reasonable a n d jus t i f ied .
2 2
Many students o f meta-
ethics will resist this; the very statement of the problem—"How are
moral beliefs o r judgments to be justified?
— s e e m s
to presuppose what
to
respond
to
of
its many senses, cognitivism is much the same as moral realism—a
metaphysical doctrine
facts
maintaining that moral judgments
c o m m e n t s about robustness
vis-a-vis
notion
o f c o g n i t i v i s m .
However, another version
In
a p p r o p r ia te
to say
beliefs a re
facts or can be
j u d g m e n t s are
cognit ive
insofar as
they
are
g e n u in e j u d g m e n t s t ha t
a re
2 4
pose this sort
aside dis-
pu tes as to whether e th ica l judgments a re t rue o r refer t o m o r a l
facts,
I suppose that they can be just if iable, f i t t ing, appropr ia te , mis taken ,
and
25
C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
m y
is not
f o r m s o f
emot iv ism tha t deny tha t mora l judgments
are
this sense.
H ow ever , m uch o f what I a rgu e is robus t even w i th respec t to var ie-
ties o f emot iv ism.
2 6
We can dis t inguish three broad types of emot ivis t
theories.
B .
B rand t ca ll ed C .L . S teven-
son's
theory
"blind" emot ivism, meaning, roughly, that one 's emot ive
react ions toward X can change indepen den t o f changes in
one's
"cogni-
tive
field."
Hold ing cons tan t one ' s percep t ions ,
beliefs,
one 's emot ive a t t i tudes toward
X m ay
nonethe-
less
change. B rand t a rgued tha t on S tevenson 's b l ind em ot ive theory ,
the rela t ion of moral react ions to o ther
beliefs
jus t i f ica tory. O n e
c a n n o t
say
that
a
is
based
on irrelevant beliefs or con vict ions , bec ause the b l ind theory
holds tha t the emot ive judgments may change freely irrespective of the
cogni t ive
crit icism of Stevenson's theory
tha t i t does no t a l low for genu ine mora l judgments tha t can be reason-
able
o r u n r ea s o n a b l e .
2 8
2.
Affective-cognitive mo ral judgments. B e c a u s e the mos t p laus ib le
accoun ts o f emot ions do no t charac ter ize them as pure ly b l ind , no n-
cognit ive,
react ions , emot ivis t moral theories need not , and
should not , b e bl indly emotivist . F o r example, suppose that the m o d e l
of
a m o r a l j u d g m e n t is som ething l ike : "Y uck T hose are despicable
things ."
the
j u d g me n t i s
composed
a t t i tud ina l response ("Yuck " )
and a cognit ive basis for i t ("I t is appropriate to
feel
this way toward
things with those fea tures . They a re yucky th ings ." ) O n this view,
t h o u g h an a t t i tude is a necessary par t of a mora l response (and so is
emot ive
in one
for
criticism
2 9
S u ch em o t iv e j u d g m en t s
may be
if
they
are
beliefs.
Suppose , fo r ins tance , you a re asked why you bel ieve Hunan
chicken is
and you
r ep l y " W h o w o u l d n ' t
disl ike
Poli t ical Theory 9
covered w i th H ershey 's choco la te syrup? " In th is case you r g rou nd ing
beliefs,
a n d s o y o u r j u d g m en t , i s u n s o u n d .
3 0
3 . Affective-cognitive basic mo ral judgments. T he above theory char -
acterizes e v e r y m o r a l j u d g m e n t as a f fec t ive-cogni t ive . A s a conse-
q u en c e ,
the
space
the
belief
l
2
as (a)
an affective
belief and (b)
affective
logical
difficult
to
show, for example, that one moral belief f o ll o w s f r o m a n o t h er . H o w -
ever,
an
emotive
affective
re-
sponse is a necessary par t of all m o r a l j u d g m e n t s . T he emotivist can
dis t inguish basic
o r
or ig ina l mora l judgments f rom der ived
o r
a
neces-
sary
affective
e l em en t , w h i l e d e r iv ed j u d g m en t s
can be
the basic ones .
is
the first option,
bl ind emot ive theory. Ho w ev er , I th ink it wil l emerge that m y a c c o u n t
is
consis tent with the third , foundat ional , emot ive theory. I wil l defend
the
idea
of
f o u n d a t io n a l j u d g m en t s , t h o u g h
I
shall
in
w h ic h
all m ora l jud gm en ts a re a f fec t ive-cog ni t ive , i s harder to d iv ine . T hough
m u c h
is
Ro bustness Distinguished from Unco ntroversiality
I have t r ied to indicate that the analysis of moral
beliefs
f icat ion
m a y
in
justificato ry liberal. B eing
robus t i s no t the same as being uncon t rovers ia l . A theory may wel l be
consis tent with , say, a var iety of metaphysical views, theories of mean-
ing, personal ideals,
is not to be
o r
a
m a j o r d iv id e b e t w een
m y jus t i f ica tory
l iberal ism
a n d
c o n t em p o r a r y
pol i t ical l iberal ism.
M y a im is to
exp lore
o f
an d
Political Theory
in so doing show w hy liberal democracy is jus t i f ied; it is not to show
that popular consensus o n this justification c a n b e obtained among a ll
reasonable people.
sociologi-
cal sense o f that complex word, the legitimacy o f a liberal regime de-
pends o n widespread acceptance of i ts justification, o r perhaps the jus-
tice of its institutions. A n d i t would be as wonderful as it would be
re m a rk a b l e
if the
best justification
of the
the
grounds
o n which most citizens support it. Nevertheless, a test for the
jus t i f ica-
tion
citizens
with good reasons to support it—is not whether that just i f icat ion is
widely accepted,
or is
uncontroversial.
Which is just as well, for in some respects the account o f just i f icat ion
I present here is controversial. I shall challenge a fundamental
ortho-
doxy
in
same;
reasons fo r belief c a n b e distinguished from reasons to act, a n d norma-
tive
beliefs
this analysis applies
empirical beliefs. Thus
most o f part I is devoted to the general idea o f a rational belief system;
though
topics familiar to moral philosophers such as reflective equilib-
rium (sec. 7.4) will b e considered, the main focus will be on general
epis temologica l
part
with
shall avoid many
of the perplexities an d pitfal ls that plague current discussions o f public
just i f icat ion .
1 .3
and Personal Ju st ificat ion
At the outset, the task o f developing a theory o f justification confronts
a deep
begin
with
an individual system o f beliefs and how, within it, a person just if ies
her beliefs? Or do we commence by examining interpersonal jus t i f ica-
tion—what beliefs
jus t i fy
each other? Contemporary political
philosophers incline toward the latter. T he interpersonal conception o f
jus t i f i ca t ion is most clearly articulated in Jurgen Habermas's discourse
t h e o r y . F o r Habermas, moral
ju s t i f ica t ion
is necessar i ly i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e ,
in
the
reasoned agreement (under idea l conversa-
t iona l cond i t ions) among par t ic ipan t s in the d iscourse . H is discourse
ethics thus supposes that "the
jus t i f ica t ion
o f n o r m s a n d c o m m a n d s
requires that a real d iscourse be carr ied out and thus cannot occur in a
s t r ic t ly monological form, i .e . , in the fo rm of a hypothet ical process of
argumenta t ion occurr ing in the ind iv idua l
mind."
35
catory liberalism
on the
p r im a r y c o m m i t m en t :
to
f icat ion, i t may
wel l seem that nothing
but the
36
Stanley
"[t]oo
of this in terpersonal concern ." H e con t inues :
Within
the
is
located
in the first in-
s tance not in the muster ing of knockdown arguments to persuade or jus t i fy
oneself to others but in the process of individual choice and judgment . Each
person's moral consciousness is something
that
shape.
37
B enn 's analysis of the "m odern con sciousness" sets the stage for the
problem of Rawlsian pol i t ical l iberal ism, namely, that in a p lural is t ic
society such
to
arrive
often
s t i l l reasonable, judgments concerning moral i ty
an d
the good life. Rawls and others call this the supposit ion of reasonable
p lura l ism.
3 8
N ow reasonab le p lural ism can occur only if people arrive
a t reasonab le judgments tha t a re no t pub l ic ly
jus t i f ied; ex hypothesi ,
these are reason able views, b u t they are m a n y in n u m b e r and are incon-
sistent
with
that
b e
P a r t
jus t i-
fied beliefs that a re incompat ib le with each other . This theory o f per-
sonal justification
shows how reasonab le p lural ism is possib le. Pos-
sessing a just if ied set of beliefs does n ot require that the set be publ ic ly
jus t i f ied:
one can
P u b l i c
just i f icat ion ,
I shal l argue, is a far more s t renuous t es t
than persona l just i f icat ion; m a n y o f o u r m o r a l beliefs that are person-
ally
Talk o f personal
justification
runs the risk o f immedia te ly a l iena t ing
some readers , who m ay b e t empted to reject the en t i re accoun t as bi-
ased
toward
an
of
view,
there-
fore
w r o n g h e a d e d
from the
d o es c o m m en c e
with persona l j us t i f ica t ion , there
is
to
s t a n d a b ly
I do not think i t is ei ther b i a s e d o r w r o n g h e a d e d . H o w e v e r ,
12 Introdu ctory: Epistemo logy and Pol i t ical Theory
many readers a re ,
apt to
o v e re s t i m a t e
the
i n d i v i d u a l i s t ic n a t u re
of
the analysis . Later (sec. 8 .2) I shal l t ry to show in what way al l
r e a s o n i n g — i n c l u d i n g
perso na l jus t i f ica t ion— is social ; to say that a l l
reason ing does
p u b l i c
jus t i f i ca t ion
is no t to say
that
it is
thoroug hly p r iva te and asoc ia l . B u t these a re com plex i ssues , the d i s -
cuss ion o f which mus t wai t un t i l we have cons idered
justified
it to
the
ind iv idua l i s t i c charac te r
of the analysis is moderated by three points.
1 . A s
B enn qu i te righ t ly po in ts o u t ,
a
on
persona l jus t i f i ca t ion
is
cons is ten t with recogniz ing tha t an ind iv idua l ' s cogn i t ive and mora l
resources
sense
a
ciples
and
values
are
us,
ex
nihilo. They have been adop ted , incu lca ted , absorbed f rom an enve l -
op ing soc ia l envi ronment ."
3 9
One can
cat ion given such
pluralist ic society
this inheri tance i tse l f i s d iverse and confl ic t ing , and so working out a
just i f ied
2 .
Second ,
shall
see
tha t pe rsona l jus t i f i ca t ion u l t imate ly mus t
b e
respons ive
to the
chal lenges
an d
fully a d e q u a t e
analysis o f pe rsona l jus t i f i ca t ion thus w i ll l ead us to in te rpersona l jus t i -
f ica t ion, so not
even persona l jus t i f i ca t ion
is
s t ric t ly m ono logical .
3. Final ly , I s h a ll a rg u e t h a t w h en m a k i n g m o ra l d e m a n d s on others,
pe rsona l jus t i f i ca t ion i s no t suff ic ient ; such demands mus t be pub l ic ly
jus t i f ied, an d this is indeed a f o r m o f in te rpersona l jus t i f i ca t ion . T he
g a p b e t w e e n
m y
an d
H a b e rm a s ' s , t h e n ,
is
first
appear ,
in te rsu b jec t ive charac te r
o f
reason ing i s
the
j u s t i f i c a t i o n
of
principles
jus t ice ,
and here we agree tha t pu b l ic jus t i f i ca t ion i s the u l t ima te
s t a n d a rd .
4 0
of the book
I ad-
vances a theory o f pe rsona l jus t i f i ca t ion , o r , we might say , a mode l o f
just i f ied
systems of reasons and
the
idea
o f
re a s o n a b l e p l u ra li sm . P a r t
I I
jus t i f i ca t ion .
I shall arg ue that the theories of pu bl ic jus t i f ic at io n ad-
v a n c e d by poli t ical l iberals and o ther " in te rsub jec t iv i s t s ," whi le p rovid-
in g
some insights , are incompat ib le wi th the best theory of jus t i f ied
belief .
on the
of
jus t i f i ca t ion , I
d i s t in gu ish three
m a i n o u t c o m e s o f p u b l i c jus t i f i c a t ion : v ic to ry , defea t , a n d i n c o n c l u -
siveness
(u n d ef ea t ed , u n v ic t o r io u s beliefs). As I said earl ier, I shal l ar-
gue tha t , tho ug h som e subs tan t ive fun da m en ta l m ora l p r inc ip les can be
victor iously publ ic ly
jus t i f ied in our
soc ie ty , thei r number
is
Victorious publ ic
are
fairly
rare in a p lural is t ic society
such as ours; in con t ras t , u nd efea ted , unv ic to r ious jus t i f ica t ions— those
that a re reasonab le b u t a l so con ten t ious—abound . Par t I I I then ana-
lyzes polit ical
w ho
other
with inconc lus ive pub l ic jus t i f ica t ion s . I argue here that the ins t i tu t ions
of l iberal const i tu t ional democracy
are
w a y s
o f
c o m p et in g u n d ef ea t ed p u b l i c j u s t if i c a t io n s
o n substant ive issues o f jus t ice and the c o m m o n good. In this par t I
shal l examine such
topics
as the ju s t if ica t ion of liberal dem ocracy, con-
s t i tu t iona l ism, jud icia l review,
and the
P E R S O N A L
1
Reasons
2.1
for
R e a s o n s
M y ul t im ate con cern in this boo k is w i th m oral , and especial ly pol it i-
c a l ,
just i f icat ion in which part icipants advance to others their reasons
for beliefs, principles, an d policies. B u t part icipat ion in pol i t ical just i -
f icatory discourse presupposes that people enter wi th
beliefs
her
belief
to
others,
she
ordinari ly supposes that she has good reasons for i t . As a par t i c ipant
in
such interperso na l jus t i f ica tory discourse , then, one typical ly en -
deavors to
show
o thers what one th inks a l ready obta ins , namely , tha t
one has good reasons for what one bel ieves. To be sure , as discussion
proc eeds one m ay revise this ini t ial est im ate; w e shal l see in part I I that
the effort to
of ten
resul ts in revision
of one's bel iefs . So I certainly do not wish to deny that interpersonal
discussion is d y n a m i c , an d indeed ul t imately necessary fo r personal jus -
t i f icat ion . Y et n o n e o f t h i s u n d e rm i n e s the p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t a t any
given t ime
o n e
p r o d u c e s
belief
chan g e j u s t b e cau se p a r t i c i p an t s
a re
to
reply
to
queries
ab ou t , an d chal lenges to , their beliefs by poin t ing to specific reasons
su p p o r t i n g t he m .
2
yo u
t ha t yo u r su p p o r t i n g re aso n s
are
of
belief
are
by, or
fo l low f r o m , re aso n s
I
shall call in-
ferent ia l ly j u s t i f i e d .
3
jus t i f ied
belief , it is no t
sufficient
is a
co n c l u si v e a rg u m e n t
to
. b . A t a m i n i m u m , o n e m u s t acce p t R. So m e o n e who
justifies
a
belief
by appeal ing to a reason he does no t accept is not s imply ra-
t ional izing
the belief (see sec. 2.3), but is be-
in g h ypo cr i t i ca l ( sec . 9 .2 .2) . C on sider , fo r i n s t a n c e , A n n a , a F r e u d i a n
therapis t
w h o ,
a f ter
c o n f r o n t i n g re se a rch on the c o m p a r a t i v e effect ive-
ness of v a r i o u s p s y c h o t h e r a p i e s , c o n c l u d e s
t h a t
18
Personal
Justification
B ut she has a l a rge p rac t ice and her pa t ien ts expec t F reud ian exp lana-
t ions , so that is what she gives them. Say, then, she has a be l ief : "Li t t le
Hans has a case o f hys te r ica l phobia"—he is so
afraid
not go out on the
s t ree t .
The
F re u d i a n re a s o n s u p p o r t i n g
the
d i a g n o s is
of n euros i s o r phobia i s "one th ing a lone : the rep lacem ent o f h is fa the r
b y a h o rs e "— h e has displaced his
fear
o f be ing cas t ra ted by his
fa ther
4
Of c o u rs e , A n n a d o e s not bel ieve this ; she believes
tha t L i t t l e Hans ce r ta in ly
has a
but she
does
not
accept
the F re u d i a n a c c o u n t t h a t she passes on to Li t t le Hans's p a re n t s .
She, in
fac t ,
has based her d iagnos is on a N ew A ge se l f -he lp bo ok .
Now
a s s u m e t h a t F re u d i a n i s m a c t u a ll y p ro v i d e s
the
c o r re c t a c c o u n t
an d
t h e N e w A g e
s e lf - h e lp b o o k d o e s n o t . D o e s A n n a ha v e
a
justified
say
sense that
jus t i f ied,
b u t g i v e n t ha t A n n a
rejects
jus t i fy
say
jus t i f ied. B e i n g
jus t i f ied in be lievin g is not the sam e as be ing righ t; as we shall see, it
is possib le to be
jus t i f ied
in ho ld ing a false bel ief . W e s e e here tha t o n e
can
hold
a
correct belief
bu t no t be jus t i f ied in
d o i n g
so .
jus t i f ied
i n b e l i e v i n g B o n e m u s t have or
accept
even this
A s
to be
just i f ied
in be l iev ing one m us t no t on ly have
or possess
, but
Case 1: Alf Believes the
Right
5
are
lovers ,
m a n y
that indicate
tha t B e t ty is u n f a i t h f u l ; he has seen receipts from
little-out-
of- the-way hote ls in her p o c k e t b o o k ( a n d he hasn' t visi ted
such hote ls w i th B et ty s ince their affair b e f o re
she
d ivorced
Charl ie) , she has been working la te every night for two
m o n t h s n o w , she keeps call ing him " D e a re s t F ra n k , " and the
l ike . Alf can be said to have perfect ly good reasons for be-
l ieving B et ty is unfa i th fu l . B ut supp ose that , desp i te a l l the
evidence that B et ty
ha s
a n d n o
coun te revi -
A lf
s imply
refuses to
he
seeks
to
convince h imse l f tha t it could not be t ru e .
6
A s s u m e n o w ,
though , tha t he enro l l s in a night-school sociology cou rse on
"Relat ionships in the '90s" an d discovers that there is a .25
chance
in the
infers
in the
last year.
bel ief ( that B et ty
has
cheated)
he has
g o o d re a s o n s ;
is it a just if ied
be l ie f ?
N o , m o s t o b v i o u s l y b e c a u s e , t h o u g h the belief is jus t i f iab le g iven his
belief
Al f has no t
b a s e d
his
on the beliefs
Believing for Reasons 19
jus t i fy
it. To infer in this way that something with a .25 probability
has
occurred
if Alf had
In
He
believes
the
a jus t i f ied
belief , it is not enough, then, for Alf merely to have good (or even
concl us ive ) reasons for believing b.
7
The last few decades of analytic epistemology have been character-
ized
cau-
tious about following this path by placing too much weight on such
examples.
8
ment
to
As
Jon Elster observes in his analysis of the rationality of wishful thinking
and ideology,
and not to be
jus t i f ied
because they
arid not jus t i f ied
b e c a u s e we sense that they would be just as satisfied were the reasons
to
disappear."
10
To
take
a
dents,
we
getting
the
belief,
one
has
to
make
the
relevant
consid-
erations.
2.2
Reasons
as
Causes
of
Belief
If, then, a belief is jus t i f ied because of its supporting reasons, i t is not
enough that such reasons
basing relation
holds that
"rational beliefs are caused by the reasons which are their grounds."
11
is
inferentially jus-
tified only if he has good reasons for b and these good reasons cause
A lf
c lar i fy ing the
n a t u r e o f this causal link turns out to be a good deal more d i f f i cu l t
than
it
appears.
was
caused
by
the high winds that blew the branch that smashed the glass. In this
instance the wind was the impetus for the change. At first the branch
was
at
rest
caused
a change in the state of the window. Afterward the wind died
down
this
In
this second sense of cause we can say that pillars cause the roof to
r e m a i n
up; the
12
In sections 2.2 and 2.3 I consider sustaining causal accounts of
jus t i f ied
b e l i e f ;
I turn to eff icient causation in section 2.4.
T he
held.
This
suggests
a
counterfactual
e l imina t ing
them would not cause the roof to
drop.
Similarly, we might
say (as a first approximation) that in Alf's belief system S, (3 is
sustained by R
R
w o u l d c a u se B
to
drop
not suff ice.
Putting aside worries about the best way to explicate counterfactuals,
we have at least to take account of the possibility of overdetermina-
tion.
13
To
revert
the
structure, but there is a backup system; cables hung from the outside
would
hold
up the roof in case of pillar failure. In this case, as long as
the
pillars
soon
as
the pillars give way, the cable system will engage and keep the roof
f r o m
counterfactual test:
Even if the pillars were eliminated, the roof would not drop. Yet it
certainly seems that right
engages.
A g a i n , this is no mere philosopher's fancy. In an interesting series of
e x p e r i m e n t s
Lee Ross and his colleagues induced subjects to develop
theories
and
opinions
14
false feed-
b a c k when sorting authentic suicide notes from fictitious ones. On the
basis o f
f u t u r e
abil i ty to make such discriminations. A f te r w a r d the s u b j e c t s were ex -
Believing for Reasons 21
tensively debr iefed , and each sub jec t acknowledged tha t h is o r her
" p er f o r m a n c e"
w as
exper imenters ' manipu la -
beliefs
were based , su b jec t s showed m arked belief persever-
ance. Similar results were achieved
in an
e x p e r i m e n t
in
which subjec t s
were induced to develop theories , on the basis of false evidence , abou t
the rela t ion between f iref ighters ' professional performance and the f ire-
fighters ' scores on a test for risk taking.
Once
f o r me d
la ter that the scores were f ic t i t ious , subjects showed s ignif icant
perseverance
in
is
that the subjects , having developed their beliefs, searched thei r memo-
ries fo r new suppor t ra ther than abandon them.
1 5
fall ing
moved , sub jec t s
m ay
have appealed
to other
the
feedback
beliefs
were discredited .
A more
com pl ica ted cou n ter fac tua l t est
is
to
call
In belief system
of S
would cause
to be
d ropped
as an
of
R as an
e lement
of S
w o u l d c a u s e s o m e
other
reason
in v o k ed .
This seems to cap ture the sort o f m echanism hypothes ized in the belief-
perseverance case in which su bjec ts switched fro m one sustainin g rea-
son to another . We can imagine a ser ies of sustaining rela t ions; as each
sustaining reason
this raises the
worry
tha t , in p rac t ice , the p r inc ip le i s immune f rom
falsification.
belief-
perseverance study, in which the sustaining cause is el iminated and yet
the
to be a
c o u n t e r ex a m p l e
to the
belief -susta ining
an alysis. B ut now the defen de r of the sustaining analy-
sis can a lways invoke some al ternat ive reason R ' t h a t m u s t b e there to
sustain the belief, apparent ly securing the analysis f rom any possib le
c o u n t e r ex a m p l e .
B u t
hy-
pothesizes that there must be an a l ternat ive sustaining rela t ion , but
no th ing fo l lows abou t the imposs ib i l i ty o f falsif icat ion. In any par t icu-
la r
b e
ev o k ed ; if there is no evidence that this occurs , this hypothesis wil l b e
re jec ted .
1 6
On the o ther hand , we may f ind tha t peop le c i t e new evi-
d e n c e
fo r
thei r
o ld
t h a t w o u l d
not be
if the
determined, such that
distinguish
the
sustaining
reason from the backup sustainers. B u t what o f a case o f overdetermi-
nation
in
and the
external cables
would be doing the job simultaneously. In the belief case, too, more
than
one reason may be holding up the belief. It will not do simply to
say
that
of B (or the
r o o f ) an d leave it at that, as reasons can differ in their justificatory
force.
Surely
a
belief-perseverance experi-
ment is that the first set of sustaining reasons were (initially) jus t i f ica-
tory (see sec. 3.1) while the second set were not—they were not sound
reasons.
18
into
a
basing
relation in inferential justification. Still, w e c a n begin in the way this
proposal contemplates, by first identifying the set of al l reasons that
have
a
matter
how widely we characterize this set). If this set were dropped, it would
cause to be
rest
is it
possib le
to drop any elements of the subset and still sustain ? I f we
answer "yes" to the first question and "no" to the second, we have
ident i f ied a
minimal sustaining subset
dropped f r o m R
{min}
without
sets
2
may be member of more than one
m i n i m a l sustaining subset.) Each subset R
{min}
mentary sustaining reason. Having identified each elementary sus-
t a in ing reason, we then would be in a position to distinguish good
sustaining
sound. In analyzing whether is
j u s t i f i e d ,
we might then inquire
whether any of the elementary sustaining reasons a re good reasons fo r
;B; if any
is too
rough; see sec. 5.3).
I shall not pursue this sustaining analysis further, though a great deal
more could
b e
a s
genera l issues
a b o u t the analysis o f counterfactuals. B u t f u r t h e r
levels
Believing fo r Reasons 23
an d sophistication would not, I think, make the core idea either clearer
o r more (or for that matter
less)
compelling.
2.3
Bel ief
I believe something very much like the sustaining ana lysis is correct fo r
just i f ied belief, though I
shall
n o t even attempt to review all the possi-
ble
objections
to
it.
19
However,
is
particularly
g er m a n e to our concern with moral beliefs, and so needs to be con-
sidered.
fallacy."
H e writes:
It is easy to imagine the case of someone who comes to believe something for
the wrong reason and, consequently, cannot be said to be jus t i f ied in the belief,
but
who,
jus t i f ies
his belief. Suppose that a man, M r. Raco, is racially prejudiced and,
as
a result, believes that the members of some race are susceptible to some
disease
to
we may
imagine, is an unshakable conviction. It is so strong a conviction that no evi-
dence to the contrary would weaken his prejudiced conviction and no evidence
in favor would strengthen
scientific evidence shows that only mem-
bers of the race in question are susceptible to the disease. We may imagine as
well that
he has be-
come no less prejudiced as a result of this. Nevertheless, he understands and
appreciates the evidence as well as any medical expert and, as a result, has
reason for his belief that jus t i f ies it. He has discovered that his conviction is
c o n f i r m e d by
scientif ic evidence.
other
race are susceptible to the disease in question. Yet, the reasons that j us t i fy him
in
this belief d o n o t causally explain the belief. T he belief is the result o f preju-
dice, not reason, but it is confirmed by reason which provides the justification
fo r the belief. Prejudice gives M r. Raco conviction, b u t reason gives h im justi-
fication.
20
theories maintain that
the grounds o n which w e init ial ly accept moral principles are not the
g r o u n d s that jus t i fy them. Jean P iage t and Lawrence K o h l b e rg , for in-
stance,
tell
m o r a l
p r inc ip les
b e c a u s e
they ema-
stature
21
On
jus t i fy ing those judgments, thus suggesting that
as the
child develops s h e m a y come to adopt very d i f fe ren t
jus t i f i ca t ion
for a
belief that w as caused by, for example, the desire to please parents.
22
However, these cases are not directly analogous to Lehrer's insofa r as
the original cause for the belief actually is dropped as the new, perhaps
genuine ly
ysis
constraining the ego are still operative in adults, despite the
more sophisticated reasons they
much
like the unsavory M r. Raco; the cause of his moral belief is some u n -
jus t i f ied
a n d perhaps irrational consideration, though h e m a y have
other beliefs that show
Lehrer's case is a strong counterexample to an
eff icient
causal theory
(sec. 2.4) according to which a belief is just i f ied only if the reasons
that originally caused
ment
is
much
too
strong.
We
reasons;
o f
our current moral beliefs must be tied to those original causes, we
would have few i f any jus t i f ied moral beliefs. These problems d o n o t
arise
for a sustaining causal analysis; o n this view, it is not important
why we originally came to hold a belief, but why we now do so. But,
it would seem, Mr. Raco and Dr. Freud still pose a problem for a
sustaining analysis: Right n ow M r. Raco holds his belief for bad rea-
sons,
and
Mr.
Raco is jus t i f ied in his medical beliefs depends on whether they a re
overdetermined. Suppose they are. Employing
the
about
the
disease.
In
this
case we would have no di ff icul ty agreeing that Mr. Raco's medical be-
liefs
a re actually jus t i f ied, because there exists a jus t i f ied sustaining rela-
tion.
But
what
becoming a more decent fellow, the scientific evidence would not
sustain
his
Raco's medical beliefs would
then not be overdetermined; the scientific evidence would not be able
to sustain them. Is the belief still jus t i f ied? Lehrer thinks so; for him
jus t i f ica t ion is a
matter
perhaps
ad -
v a n c e , n o t w h y o n e
believes what
does.
24
L e h re r ' s account, however, does n o t allow us to distinguish rational
w ho m a n i f e s t
obvious
rationality.
25
Consider Alf, into whose head beliefs pop, and stay for a variety of
odd
and
fears ,
goes through
e f for t
to a d j u s t them to what is
j us t i f i ed
or sound.
his
are
free
f loat ing and it is a mere happenstance if they latch onto a "justifying"
basis.
26
Now
A lf
and wishes to raise him closer to the level of an adequate believer.
B u t
test on, for example, epidemiology, on which Alf scores 50
percent. She asks Alf the reasons for his answers, which prove to be as
bizarre as his reasons always are. Subsequently, she gives Al f a list o f
a ll the correct answers and the reasons for them, which Alf memorizes.
He then retakes the test. Because Alf's
beliefs
is
what the benevolent epistemologist says are the correct answers and the
reasons for them—Alf again scores 50 percent, getting the same half of
the questions
belief , because Alf can now cite, in addition to
his
own bizarre reasons, the correct reasons for the 50 percent of the
questions he has always answered correctly. But surely Alf is no better
a believer than
before; some
of his
floating,
that
good
reasons, but this is mere luck and has no effect on
A l f ' s
see, increase
the
jus t i f i c a t ion o f those beliefs. Even epistemic justification is practical in -
sofa r as its outcome impacts on one's belief system. To divorce the
analysis
of
held
ob-
scures this impacting relation.
2.4 Eff icient Causa t ion and Just if icat ion
It
in
believing
R
but, additionally, that
R
sustains his belief . Is it also necessary that R be the e f f ic ien t cause o f
B, , in the sense that it originally caused Al f t o believe i t?
It is use f u l to pause br ie f ly a n d consider w hy f o c u s i n g o n
e f f ic ien t
a s
opposed to s u

justificatory liberalism - an essay on epistemology and political theory - gerald f. gaus

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