kahn unthinkable 1962

8/10/2019 Kahn Unthinkable 1962

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THINK ING

ABOUT

THE

U

NTH

I

N

K A B LE

B Y HERMAN K A H N

H O R I Z O N

P R E S S N E W

Y O R K 1 9 6 3


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CHAPTER TWO

SOME POSSIBLE

S I Z E S

A N D

S H A P E S

O T H E R M O N U C L E A R W A R

It was the main thesis

of

Chapter One that even

if

one were to

consider thermonuclear war unthinkable, that would not make it

impossible, I t

is

the thesis of

t h i s

chapter that

failure

to think

may even make it more probable that the lethal equipment which

indubitably exists might be used, and, if used, be used more

destructively than necessary. In this chapter, therefore,

I

would

like

to

consider both the possibility

and

character of thermo-

nuclear war.

It

is

well to note at the outset a recurring tendency to under-

estimate the likelihood of war. Ever since the catastrophic and

disillusioning experience of 1914-18 war .has been unthinkable

to

most

people in the West. Many illogically have tended to

assume it was consequently also unlikely or even impossible. In

December,

1938,

only

three

months after Munich, Lloyds of

London gave odds of

3

to 1 that there would

be

no war in 1939.

On August 7 1939

The

London

Daily

Express reported the re-

sults

of a poll of its European reporters. Ten out of twelve said,

No

war this year. Hitler invaded Poland

tbree

weeks later. It

seems fair to suspect that

a

great deal of

wishful

thinking in-

fluenced these predictions.

How War

Might Come

There are many ways in which

a

war might start today.

In

semi-technical jargon, these can

be

put into

four

rough cate-

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gories:

(1 )

Inadvertent War; (2) War as a Result of Miscalcula-

tion; (3) Calculated War; and 4 ) Catalytic War. These

categories doubtless do not exhaust the ways in which a war

might start nor do they represent mutually exclusive possibilities.

Our weapons systems are

so

new, and their impact upon each

other and upon international relations are so little known,

it

would not be too surprising f a war started in some unanticipated

manner.

1. lduertent War. At

the

top of the list I have put the un-

premeditated war, the fearful possibility that war might occur

almost unintentionally as a result of mechanical or hum-= error,

false alarm, self-fulfilling prophecy, or unauthorized behavior. I

believe the current probability of inadvertent war is low. It is at

the top of the

list

for

two

reasons: First, because I believe that

the other ways in which a war might occur today are even less

probable; and, second, because

I

believe that inadvertent war

might well become a much more dangerous possibility in the not

too distant future, partly as a result of the growing number

of

buttons that can be pressed accidentally, but chiefly as a result

of

the proliferation of independent nuclear capabilities in other

countries, each with its own standards of safety and stability.

In a complex industrial society people generally have had

enough experience with broken vacuum cleaners and wrong tele-

phone numbers, not to mention serious public disasters, to com-

prehend the possibility of a catastrophic accident through me

chanical failure or human error. There is a widespread concern

that an electrical circuit might short,

a

relay stick, a switch fail,

or that a button might be pressed accidentally, a message mis-

understood, an aurora borealis, meteor, or flock of geese be

mistaken for an attack, and so on. Such things have happened

and may happen again.

a See

Cha ter Seven for discussion of

this

problem.

Oa

Since Marxist view of history might incline Soviet planners away

from the view that a defective switch could influence history, the Soviets

may not

be

as concerned about this type of problem as the West has been.

On

the

other hand

the Soviets seem even more concemed than we with the

dangers of unauthorized behavior by high 05 r junior 5m nd thus

may take

the

same precautions we

do.

Notwithstanding the possibility of mechanical or human error,

it

is most unlikely that any single mechanical or human error

would trigger an attack unless one side or the other is foolish

enough to buy and install a quick-reacting, non-recallable stra-

tegic weapons system. It is just because radars do occasionally

give false alarms, accidents do happen, and people do make

mistakes that it is essential for both sides to install weapons

systems that have either fail safe or positive control features

built into them, or are large enough and well enough protected

that they need not

be

trigger-happy to survive.

The question of vulnerability influences the probability of acci-

dental war in

an

important way.

If

a strategic weapons system

can accept the enemys attack and still hit back effectively, the

decision maker has time to evaluate and decide-time to be care-

ful. He is not under overwhelming pressure to launch a strike

simply because he thinks he is about to be struck and must launch

a forestalling or spoiling attack before his forces are destroyed.

When the owners of safe systems receive an ambiguous warning,

their decision maker can and would most reasonably react in some

less drastic fashion. He might, for example, act

to

reduce vulner-

ability to enemy attack, or to provide a better posture from which

to hit back. The decision maker can then wait further confirma-

tion. Similarly, if the command and control system is not vulner-

able, then subordinate commanders can confidently wait for their

legal orders before making irrevocable commitments.

Probably the major protection against inadvertent war is the

widespread belief among almost all decision makers that only an

a Fail safe is

a

term borrowed from engineering

and

used to describe a

system whereby bombers can be launched on ambiguous warning fly to a

point of no return, and then

tur

back unless they receive additionai positive

orders to

fly

on. In

this

way the central authorities have additional time to

confirm or deny the validity of the original warning. Such a system intro-

duces an additional vulnerability in the mechanism of retaliation; if the

Enemy can prevent the second communication, he will not be attacked.

Positive control properly refers to systems

which

are, at ail times, under

the control of the central authorities. There is some tendency today for the

latter terminology to replace

the

former, because it is believed that the term

fail safe may arouse anxiety amonfiklaymen (who ask, You mean i t can

fail?). However, the new term

is

ely to arouse anxiety among experts

(they ask, You mean

it has

to work to work?).

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insane man would go to war and that the other side is not insane.

Therefore

the

cautious decision maker will discount any signals

or events that might be construed

as

warning

of

an attack. (It

should

be

noted that, as such, caution makes inadvertent war

less probable; it makes a Pearl Harbor more feasible.) The degree

of

such caution may vary from time to time. A considerable

degree of tension, or some of the temporizing measures which

may be instituted upon

an

ambiguous warning, will tend to

re-

move certain psychological, legal, and physical safeguards.

A

greater load is then thrown on the remaining safeguards. For this

reason several accidents in sequence, or a simple accident during

a period of considerable tension, could be dangerous.

This type of situation might also set in motion a disastrous

self-fulfilling prophecyJ in much the same way that hostility

often breeds hostility.

That

is, one sides defensive action may

be

observed by

the

other which, misinterpreting

it

as aggressive, may

therefore make some defensive move. This

f

misread

in

turn by

the opposite side, confirms the original suspicions. Reactions and

signals may thus

be

set into motion until

a

point of no return is

reached. This is one reason why it is necessary for each side not

only to be cautious and responsible, but also to make sure that

the other understands what is happening. If a temporizing meas-

ure involves doing things which raise apprehensions on the other

side, it is important to allay those apprehensions.

If

either side

fears that a surprise attack on its military forces could result in

unacceptable damage then, unless there is some degree of co-

operation between them, there

is

an ever-present possibility of

a

false preemption-a possibility that the apprehensive side may

launch an attack simply because

it

fears one from the other side

and

thinks

hat only

by

preempting can its forces survive.

The Soviets

are

aware of

the

danger of the self-fulfilling

prophecy. In

a

United Nations Security Council debate on April

21,1958, kady S.Sobolev said:

American generals refer to the fact that u to the present time the

bases as soon as

it

became clear that it was a case of false

alarm. But

what would happen if American military personnel observing their

American planes have taken

off

on their flig

ts

and returned to their

radar screens are

not

able in time to determine that a flying meteor is

not a guided missile and that a flight

of

geese is not a 9ight of bombers?

Then the American planes will continue their flight and will approach

the borders of the Soviet Union.

But in such

a

case the need to insure the security

of

the

Soviet

people would require the USSR to make immediate retaliatory meas-

ures to eliminate the oncoming threat. The Soviet Government would

like to hope that matters will not go so

far.

In

order to get a clearer idea

of

the extremely dangerous character

of acts of the United States [that are] dangerous to peace,

it

is enough

to ask the question what would happen i the military Air Force of

the Soviet Union began to act in the same way as the American Air

Force is

now

acting? After all, Soviet radar screens also show from

time to time blips which are caused by the flight

of

meteors or elec-

tronic interference. If in such cases Soviet aircraft

also

flew out carry-

ing atom and hydrogen bombs

in

the direction of the United States and

its bases

in

other states, what situation would arise?

The air fleets of both sides, havin discerned each other somewhere

over the Arctic wastes or

in

some o er place, apparently would draw

the conclusion natural under those circumstances, that a real enemy

attack was taking place. Then the world would inevitably be plunged

into the hurricane of atomic war.*

t i

Despite their awareness of ths danger the Soviets have empha-

sized disarmament almost to the exclusion of other aspectsof a rms

control, such

as

preventing the self-fulfilling prophecy they de-

scribe. At the 1958 Surprise Attack Conference, they stressed

large political issues and refused to discuss narrow technical

issues.Our own position may have been excessively narrow; but

it is dangerous to wait for a settlement of the political issues

before considering this problem. While it takes two to make an

agreement, even informal implicit agreements or, in some cases,

unilateral concessions or practices may be helpful.

It

is also conceivable that some pathological or irresponsible

person might deliberately try to start

a

war. The Soviets have

made much of the possibility that a deranged or irresponsible

American pilot on airborne alert might take it into his head to

attack Russia alone. Not only are there many safeguards against

this, but it is most unlikely that a single-plane attack would touch

* New

Y w k

Time$,April

22,1958,

p. 10

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off a war.

A

more ominous possibility is illustrated in the novel

Red

Abrt. A determined

SAC

general, who, unknown to his

superiors,

is

sick with an incurable ailment (and whose judgment

and sense of discipline are thus affected), personally decides to

end the Soviet problem once and for all. The clever way he gets

around the elaborate system set up to prevent exactly

t i s

kind of

behavior suggests that no system is proof against everything.

I have already made clear my belief that the current proba-

bility of inadvertent war is low. Moreover, many methods recom-

mended to reduce the probability of war

by

accident might result

in increasing the likelihood of war from one of the other causes.

On the other hand,

I

must also emphasize that nobody can

realistically estimate the probability of inadvertent, or any other

war. It would be hard to convince me that the probability of t is

type of war is higher than, say, one in ten a year. But if it were

that high, the situation would be entirely unsatisfactory. Even if

it

were as low as one in fifty a year, the annual risk would be too

high. (A constant anual probability of one

in

fifty of a war would

mean about an even chance that there would be a war before the

year zo00.

2. War by Miscahtation. Nearly as worrisome as the possi-

bility of inadvertent war is the more or less premeditated war

which might result from a decision maker's miscalculation, mis-

understanding, or failure to think adequately through the conse-

quences of

his

actions.

I

would include in

t is

category wars

resulting from a committal strategy, escalation, or overconfidence.

Many people believe that war by miscalculation is most likely

to

arise through the use or misuse of a committal strategy.* For

example, one side may believe that

if

it makes it clear it is going

to stand i rmin some crisis then, since neither side wants war,

the other side will back down. It then makes whatever announce-

ments and takes whatever actions may be necessary or appro-

priate to give the appearance, and perhaps the reality, of having

committed itself irrevocably.

If,

then, the other side does not

* Peter Bryant, Red Alert (New

York:

Ace Books, 1958).

** For a more detailed consideration

of

these problems see Chapter

Six.

back down, war can result. A graphic if somewhat oversimplified

example of such a situation is given by Bertrand Russell:

This sport

is

called 'Chicken " It

is

played by choosing a long straight

road with a white line down the middle and starting two very fast cars

towards each other from o posite ends. Each car is expected to

keep

the wheels of one side on

g

white line.

As they

approacheach other

mutual destruction becomes more and more imminent. If one

of

them

swerves from the white line before the other, the other,

as

he

passes,

shouts "Chicken " and

the

one who has swerved becomes

an

object of

contempt.

To

win

this

game one must

try

to convince the opponent that

it is not worthwhile for him to be so reckless. One

can

do t h i s by

convincing him that one is totally reckless, oblivious to the dan-

ger, or out of control. These objectives can probably

be

met best

by getting into the car dead drunk, wearing very dark glasses,

and conspicuously throwing the steering wheel out of the window

as soon as the car has gotten up to speed.

If

the opponent is

watching, he will feel under some pressure to

get

out of the way.

However, if the opponent refuses to back down after the

ir-

revocable commitment has been made, it would be irrational to

carry out

this

rationally made commitment. Since both sides may

use the same strategy, it

is

obvious the game may end in disaster.

The game of chicken is an extreme example of the use of

rationality of irrationality strategies, but it illustrates clearly a

situation in which each side can demonstrate logically that by

using a committal strategy it can force the other side to back

down. Yet an observer might correctly conclude that neither side,

or both sides, will back down. Rationality of irrationality

strategies can be important in almost any bargaining situation. It

can make sense to commit oneself irrevocably to do something in

a particular eventuality, and at the same time it may not make

sense to

carry

out the commitment if the eventuality occurs. For

this reason, the success of such a strategy may well depend upon

the taking of some action which in appearance to the other side,

*

Bertrand

Russell, Common Sense and

Nuckat

Warfme (New York

Simon and

Schuster, 1959),

p.

SO.

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and perhaps in fact, removes

the

power to revoke the commit-

ment. The success of

such

a strategy may also depend upon using

it before the other side does.

According to Bertrand Russell, the game of chicken is played

by youthful degenerates and by nations. Actually, it

is

played at

one time

or

another by everyone (even in the raising of chil-

dren), if in less potentially disastrous form. The analogy of the

game of chicken to diplomacy is useful to illustrate a valid point

but, as in the case

of

all analogies,

it

can be misleading if one

ignores the significant differences between the game

as

played

with cars by youthful degenerates and the game as played by.

diplomats. Most bargaining situations involve potential gains and

losses for both sides. The central issue is usually the division of

these gains and losses and not the humiliation of one side or the

other; a major purpose of diplomacy is to prevent a crisis which

can only be settled by the total

and

humiliating defeat of one

side or the other.

Nonetheless, the dangerous game of chicken can occur at the

international level. Barring enforceable alternatives, the less one

is willing to play, the more likely it is that one may have to end

up playing the most dangerous form. Whether we like it or not,

our life, liberty, and security may depend on being willing to

play. As Russell states:

Practical politicians may admit all t h i s , but they argue that there

is

no alternative. If one side is unwilling to risk global war, while the

other side is willing to

risk it

the side which is willing to run the

risk

will be victorious in all negotiations and will ultimately reduce

the other side to complete imgtence. Perhaps -so the practical

politician will argue- it might ideally wise for the sane party to

yield to the insane party

in

view

of

the dre dful nature

of

the altema-

tive,

but, whether wise or

not, no

proud nation will long acquiesce

in

such an ignominious role. We are, therefore, faced, quite inevitably,

with the choice between brinkmanship and surrender.'

The Soviets seem to fully appreciate the advantages of a greater

willingness to risk war. For example, the reader should consider

Sta l i n s remark to our then ambassador, Walter Bedell Smith:

M,

p. 30-31.

We do not want war any more than the est does, but we

are

less

interested in peace than the West, and therein, lies the strength of OUT

position.

Khrushchev's flexible-inflexible time limits for the signing of an

East German peace treaty also suggest that the Soviets, including

the peaceful coexistence bloc now in power, hll y appreciate

both the desirability of appearing committed and the danger of

actual irrevocability.

The possibility of war

as

a result of playing chicken once too

often could go up. Of course, if international bargaining is

carried on with skill and if both sides are cautious, the bargain-

ing

will

tend to take on the aspects

of

a normal commercial

transaction in which both sides gain and both sides lose, the exact

division of the gains and losses depending in large part on their

relative

skill

and stubbornness. However, in

any

long period of

peace, there is

a

tendency for governments to become more

intransigent

as

the thought of war

becomes

unreal, particularly

if there

is

a

background of experiences in which those who stand

irm

do well, while those who

are

reasonable seem to do

less

well.

After awhile the averted war may look less

real

than the tangible

gains and prestige that are being won and lost. It

is

often only

when peace fails that governments can learn

it is

not

feasible

to stand

firm

on incompatible positions. Today there is reason

to hope that we can lessen the dangers of the game of chicken

by careful consideration of how wars might start and be fought.

However, unless workable arrangements are made for effective

arbitration, somebody may play the international analogue of this

game once too often.

War by miscalculation might also result from the process gen-

erally called escalation. ' limited move may appear

safe,

but

set into motion a disastrous sequence of decisions and actions.

One may readily imagine some intensif'ying crisis in which neither

side really believes the issue is big enough to end in war, but

in which both sides are willing to accept some small

risk

of war.

* Time June 13, 1949, quoting a statement

made

by Ambassador Smith

after

his ht lal

eturn

from M O W W .

O An

Escalation

Ladder

is

examined in some det il

in Chaptex

Six.

4s

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Escalation might develop as a result of other parties becoming

involved, as a consequence of the issues taking on new sig-

nificance, or as a result of accident, miscalculation, unauthorized

behavior, or other inadvertent cause. Escalation can also be

deliberate-as in the game of chicken.

The possibility of escalation may be useful in deterring certain

kinds of crises or limited wars. For example, the nuclear-weapons

systems we and the British have in Europe

are

fairly vulnerable

to Soviet attack. Even though they have little second-strike capa-

bility,

the

Soviets might be afraid to destroy them in a limited

European attack, for such an attack could easily escalate intp

all-out war. On the other hand, if the Soviets attacked Western

Europe without destroying these weapons, the Europeans might

take them over-with or without our permission-and use them in

retaliation. Thus

all

forms of military attack might be deterred. A

similar argument is sometimes used in favor of national nuclear

deterrents.

Deterrence by fear

of

escalation might also operate if we decide

to

open

a

route to Berlin

by

force should the Soviets or East

Germans

try

to close it. As of 1962, he Soviets have the capacity

to apply all the Counterforce they need to stop any such limited

action. The purpose of our limited action would not be to over-

whelm Soviet countermeasures, but to make

it

clear that the

stakes

are

large and that we are willing to take a small but

appreciable risk of an all-out war.

Our

action might be effective

precisely because

it

would be so dangerous. On the other hand,

if the Soviets or the

East

Germans were to

try

to close our access

to Berlin, they might be banking on our fear of escalation to deter

our military action. They have already deterred the military

destruction of the Berlin wall, at

least

in

part,

by

relying on our

fear of escalation.

Perhaps it would not be overly suspicious to suppose that t h i s

sort

of thinking underlies, in some measure, the Soviet statement

on its decision to resume nuclear testing. This statement ex-

plicitly disclaims any possibility of a limited military response

without immediate escalation

into

some form of all-out war:

Those who are preparing a new world holocaust are sowing illusions

that a new war, if unleashed, would allegedly be waged without ther-

monuclear

weapons.

But

this

is

a deceit of the peoples.

The experience

of

history teaches that it has never been possible

to keep the fire of war within predeterminedlimits. ars have inexor-

able severe laws of their own. An aggressor starts a war to bring his

victim to its knees and to impose his will on

it.

But even the aggressor

is aware that

in

case

of

defeat the fate that he

was

preparing

for

his

victim will befall him. Therefore each state that takes part

in

the war,

regardless of the fact whether it attacks or defends, will stop at

nothing for attaining victory and will not accept defeat without having

used and spent all means in

its

possession for wagingwar. Under

these

conditions any armed conflict, even insignificant at fist, would

in-

evitably grow into a universal rocket and nuclear war should the

nuclear powers have been

drawn

into it.

The

fact that the threat of escalation is used, perhaps effec-

tively, to deter limited action presents a serious problem for a rms

controllers.

To

the extent that various types of

a r m s

control

measures would reduce the possibility of escalation, to that

extent an important deterrent upon limited actions might also be

decreased. Although

I

feel that this is not sufficient reason for

refusing to adopt arms control measures, many Europeans

are

antagonistic to any reliable limits upon the use of nuclear weapons

precisely because such limitations may indeed make

it

safer for

the Soviets to use or threaten lesser kinds of violence. It may be

that before arms control measures can or should be adopted,

effective substitute deterrents,

less

violent in effect, will have to

be

devised. For this reason, a strengthened conventional force

might be necessary were we to reach a nuclear arms control

agreement.

A war by miscalculation might also result from simple over-

confidence. Overconfidence,

of

course,

can

take many forms-

ranging from ignorance, stupidity, and negligence, through a

*

These Europeans

sometimes

argue that i we make conventional aggres-

sion or other limited actions safer, we should not

be

surprised

i

the Soviets

are tempted or pressured

into

such actions. Once violence has occurred the

possibility of escalation into the use of nuclear weapons is created.

As

a

result, in our attempt to make the use of nuclear weapons less probable, by

arranging for other responses to non-nuclear provocation, we may increase

the

probability of

the eventual

use

of

nuclear weapons.

48

49


8/19

failure to realize that even the most closely calculated paper

plans are still only paper plans with possibly no more than a

tenuous relationship to the real world and the actual course of

events. Overconfidence can be based on a mystical belief in the

manifest destiny of the West or the historical imperative of ulti-

mate victory for the East. It can consist of a mistaken belief by

one side that its force and war plans are such that it can win

without serious damage to itself

if

it

initiates an attack. Lastly,

war through overconfidence can come about because of a mis-

taken belief by one side that it has a sufEcient preponderance of

force or such clever war plans that the other side would aot dare

initiate an attack, no matter what the provocation.

It is almost impossible to imagine a Western government initiat-

ing an attack on the basis of optimistic calculations

unless

the

decision makers have had their judgment affected by desperation.

I

am

ess confident

of

the possible effect of underestimation, over-

estimation, ignorance, or recklessnessin the Communist bloc. The

Chinese clearly underestimate the effects of nuclear war. Hope-

fully, it

will

be some time before they have a significant nuclear

capability, and time may bring them greater wisdom. The Soviet

estimates seem plausible ones. It is hard to tell whether these

estimates are the result of more or less sophistication than the

West has. They talk of the possibility of great destruction and

suffering, but they also talk of survival and recovery by the

victor. They do not seem to be trigger-happy or reckless. They

may underestimate the need for collaboration in controlling

technological development and dissemination of modern weap-

ons. This might make them unwilling to compromise to arrive

at arms control programs that are acceptable to both sides.

If

the

Soviets go to war, however, it is as likely to be the result of

calculation as of miscalculation.

3.

War by Calculation. t is commonly believed that war could

arise only as a result of inadvertence or miscalculation-a belief

based partly on the view that war would automatically result

in mutual annihilation, and partly on the assumption that no

decision maker who is calculating correctly would ever knowingly

take action that entailed an appreciable probability of war. The

first view is demonstrably incorrect, at least today. The second

assumption is not borne out by past or current history. After due

study, a nation might decide that going to war would be the

least undesirable of its choices, and it might be right in its calcu-

lation; we must therefore include h i s unpleasant prospect as one

of the possible ways in which wars could start. The common

statement, 'There is no alternative to peace, may not look

as

convincing when it appears as- No alternative to any kind of

peace, or Peace at any price.

To

mention one often-used example: 15 to 30 million Soviet

citizens were

killed

in World War 11; in addition the Soviet

Union lost about one-third of its wealth. I t is sometimes pointed

out that this was not the result of calculation, and that no alterna-

tives were ever really offered to the Soviets. However, given the

nature of the Nazis and their program, I believe that even the

average Soviet citizen (not to mention the government),

if

pre-

sented with a choice, would have been willing to accept the cost

of World War

I1

in order to achieve

the

position they have since

won, as an alternative to Nazi domination. They might feel them-

selves presented with a similar choice someday. Only

now

both

the risks and the prize would be greater. It is also conceivable that

the West, or the United States alone, could believe itself faced

with a choice between domination and occupation by the Soviets

or China, on the one hand, and substantial casualties and prop-

erty damage, but survival and possibly even victory, on the

other. Faced with such a choice it is not inconceivable that we

might choose to go to war.

One type of war resulting at least partly from deliberate calcu-

lation could occur in the process of escalation. For example,

suppose the Soviets attacked Europe, relying upon our fear of

their reprisal to deter a strategic attack by

us;

we might be

deterred enough to pause, but we might evacuate our cities dur-

ing this pause in the hope we could thereby convince the Soviets

we meant business. If the Soviets did not back down, but con-

tinued their attack upon Europe, we might decide that we would

50

51


9/19

be less badly

off if

we proceeded to attack the Soviet Union.'

The damage we would receive in return would then be con-

siderably reduced compared with what we would have suffered

had we not evacuated. We might well decide at such a time that

we would

be

better off to attack the Soviets and accept a re-

taliatory blow at our dispersed population rather than let Europe

be occupied and so be forced to accept the penalty of living in

the hostile and dangerous world that would follow. This would

be especially likely

if

it appeared to be only a matter of time

before we were next.

possible war by calculation.

A

preventive war might be in the

nature of a preemptive strike, or it might simply be

an

unpro-

voked attack, depending more upon the motivations of those

initiating it than anything else. The so-called

false

preemption

has

already been included in the category of inadvertent wars.

It

can occur where the possessor of a weapons system which

cannot survive an enemy attack might feel it necessary to react

with a forestalling or spoiling attack even in the event of

a

false alarm. There is also the possibility of a more deliberate and

calculated preemption. Almost all authorities agree that at pres-

ent the advantages of striking first are so great

that,

should

there seem to be a high probability that the other side is actually

attacking, it might be better to risk the certainty of a relatively

small retaliatory strike, rather than the high probability of a much

more destructive first blow. Calculated preemption is not unlikely

in the event of a reciprocal fear

of

surprise attack, a situation

very similar

to

the self-fulfilling prophecy. Situations could arise

in which each side felt there was a more or less symmetrical fear

of attack by the other side. In such a situation each side may

feel itself under pressure to preempt because it knows the other

side

is

under similar pressure. Reciprocal fear itself may make

it rational, indeed almost imperative, to strike, even though the

ne of the

scenarios

in Chapter Five discusses this possibility in more

detail.

homas C. Schelling, The Stratem of Conflict (Cambridge,

Mass.:

Hm ar d University Press). See chapter

9,

pp. 207-29.

The so-called #preventive war furnishes another example of

,

fear may be based on a mutual misunderstanding. The danger

of such a situation increases directly with the advantage to be

gained by striking first, and with each side's estimate of the like-

lihood that the other will strike first. The advantage to an enemy

of striking us first will depend

on

the difference between our

striking power before and after he attacks, that

is,

on the vulnera-

bility of our forces. Moreover, his estimate of the likelihood of

our striking him will be influenced by the vulnerability of his

forces to our first strike. As described,

a

preemptive strike

resulting from reciprocal fear of surprise attack is

not

a case of

miscalculation. It

is

a case of correct calculation; though each

side has nothing to fear but fear, the knowledge that the other

side is afraid fully justifies that fear.

Many things could create a real reciprocal

fear

of surprise

attack. For example, suppose that one of our Polaris submarines

accidentally launched some missiles at

our

own country. Even

if

the submarine commander succeeded in informing

us

of what

happened before the missiles landed, the accident could cause

a war. The Soviets might observe these missiles exploding;

if

they did not know where the missiles came from, they might

decide

it

would be too dangerous to wait to find out whether

one of theirs had gone off accidentally. Even if the Soviets knew

that the missiles had not accidentally come from a Soviet source,

he requirement that both sidesbe relative1 invulnerable

has

ed some

analysts to recommend that we deliberately wedenour ability to attack an

enemy's strategic forces and to survive his counterattack.The other side can

then feel safe that we

will

not preempt.

It is

indeed tme that

i

we

eliminatedall capabilities for Type I1 Deterrence

or Im

roved War outcome

(see Chapter Four for definitions) we would have ma&

clear

our peaceful

intentions. We would also have made, at least for a short run a real

contribution to slowing down the a rms race. In addition, the resulting

posture would be a good basis for many es of

a rms

control

n

otiations.

Surrender or unilateral disarmament wo'a

also fulfill

all of %e above

requirements. I mention this because the pure ci

-busting deterrent force

advocated above

amounts to

a dangerous kind

o7

unilateral disarmament,

dangerous both from the viewpoint of the competition between the Soviet

Union and the United States and dangerous because a war can stilloccur,

even though there have been no precautions taken for surviving that war.

We must realize that the stability we want

in

a system

is

more than just

stability against accidental war

or

even against an attackby the enemy. We

also want stabilit against extreme provocation.

See O W

p.

141-44,

for

discussion of M&-stable Deterrence.)

52

53


10/19

they might not believe we would wait to h d hat out. Indeed, we

would o~selvese under some pressure to attack, even

if

we con-

jectured that the Soviets knew nothing about the incident, because

we would not be sure. Even

if

we felt they knew, it might

conceivably appear safer to preempt than to let precious minutes

slip away while we tried to persuade the Soviets that we h e w

they were innocent.

I

have put preemption relatively low on the list of possible

causes of war because I believe that, so long as decision makers

are consciously in control of events, they are more likely to draw

back from pressing buttons and accepting the resulting risks,.

than

of

doing something which would make war inevitable-par-

ticularly at a time and under circumstances not of their choosing.

Nevertheless, the possibilities of trouble are many.

It

would be

wise to reinforce the natural caution of decision makers with

explicit measures, both unilateral and multilateral, to facilitate

communication and persuasion so as to make waiting a safer and

more reasonable course.

A

preventive war need not be

a

preemption. It might be

a

deliberate and calculated attack made without regard to the

immediate likelihood of an attack by the other side, or even the

likelihood that the other side is planning to attack eventually.

One side has only to feel that a war is inevitable-or so likely that

it might as well get the disaster over with as soon as it attains a

sufficient lead, or before more destructive weapons are con-

structed. One side has only to believe it safer, either for itself or

for the world, to seize the opportunity than to wait.

A preventive war might result from

a

technological or other

change to which one side has not reacted adequately. It might

also occur

if

an arms-control agreement broke down with the

result that one side had a considerable lead, because of its pre-

vious success n undetected violations or greater ability to rearm.

The side with a commanding lead might well feel that, rather

than see the world subjected again to all the dangers of an arms

race, it would be accomplishing an essential public service by

* See, e.g., the missilegap scenario, Chapter Five, pp. 150-55.

stopping the race from starting anew.

This

could best be done

by stopping the cause

of

the race-the government of its oppo-

nent. A nation might be willing to start the war soon after

an arms-control agreement ended because the risks of such a war,

even if things went awry, would not be so great

as

they might

have been before the agreement had lowered the level of the

balance of terror.

The likelihood of war breaking out

soon

after a renewed

arms race, but before both sides have fully rearmed, is often

ignored. Most writers focus their attention on the time of the

breakdown, when the posture is more likely to be determined by

the agreement, and on feasible violations of the agreement, and

do not consider adequately the possible situation some months or

a

year or two later. A more dangerous situation, neglected

by

many unilateral disarmers, is what happens after a substantial

degree of unilateral disarmament if we should change our minds

or

even if the Soviets or Chinese should fear that we were about

to change our minds.

Even bilateral disarmament to the point where the weapons

systems would not present such awful potentialities might itself

enhance the possibility of preventive war.

By

reducing the bal-

ance of terror to the point where an aggressor fears only conven-

tial defeat, and not

an

unprecedented catastrophe if his plans

go awry, disarmament

can

reduce the sanctions against, and

create greater pressures toward, preventive war. Where the con-

sequences of a military disaster are reliably and s dc ie nt ly

reduced it will no longer be true that, Even

if

the probability of

success were

90%,

war would still be preposterous. Nine out

of

ten chances are pretty good odds, in a situation where war has

become only immoral and not unthinkable. Moreover, a simple

computation can show that the more missile forces are reduced

the more a relatively slight numerical superiority can offer the

attacker freedom from retaliation-thus adding another tempta-

tion toward preventive war.

Finally, we must also consider the more remote possibility that

one side or the other might deliberately go to war simply to

achieve world domination. Most people (the author included)

54

55


11/19

believe the risks involved in going to war are

so

great today that

no matter how promising an attack might look on paper, the

imponderables and other uncertainties are

so

large that not

even a moderately irresponsible decision maker would go to war

for positive gains, though one like Hitler might.

Though decision makers may be unwilling to go to war for

positive gains, they may go to war if they conclude that it is less

risky to attack than not to do

so.

There are many situations in

which

this

could occur. For example, an internal or external crisis

getting out of hand, especially one deliberately aggravated

by

the opponent, or perhaps merely by his very existence. One

might then be tempted to go to war, not because

it

would be-

inviting, but because it would seem the least undesirable alterna-

tive.*

I believe that the probability of war by calculation s low because

I think this is the place where deterrence is most likely to work

and-perhaps optimistically-that we are going to be competent

about deterrence. If we weaken our deterrent prematurely, how-

ever, the possibility of war by calculation may move to the top

of the list.

Many people interested in disarmament or arms control at

any cost (not to speak of many professional planners) refuse to

take seriously the potential effect of disarmament upon deter-

rence. There are, and in spite of anything we

do

there will remain,

great pressures toward war. While the arms controllers are

going to

try

to balance these effects by making the peaceful

alternatives to war more attractive, there are practical limits to

what they can accomplish, at least for some time. The pressures

toward war are likely to be restrained effectively only

if

the fear

of punishment is not diminished to the vanishing point.

These cautions as to

a r m s

control do not mean that

a rm s

con-

trol should not be pursued with vigor. As I indicate in Chapter

Seven, the uncontrolled arms race also involves fearful

risks.

They

* The scenario in Cha ter Six in which a Berlin crisis escalates to the

point where the Soviets

mi

%t decide, if they had s&cient missiles, to

o

to

war, but would prefer to cfoose some other alternative

if

they did not ta ve

enough missiles, illustrates one possible

role

of calculations and military

power in a premious balance of terror situation.

do mean that an insistence on reasonable and workable arrange-

ments is essential to prevent an even more unstable situation

than we have today. A bad a r m s control agreement may

be

vastly

worse than none at all.

4. Catalytic War.

This last category

is

based on the notion that

some third party or nation might for its own reasons deliberately

start a war between the two major powers. There is a wide range

of possible motivations and means for such an attempt. For

example, some third, fourth, or fifth power in the international

hierachy might wish to improve its relative position by arranging

for the two top nations to destroy each other. It might attack the

United States under circumstances which would suggest a Soviet

attack, counting on

our

retaliation to precipitate a full scale war.

Some people fear the dissemination of nuclear weapons among

ambitious powers because they feel that

such

weapons provide

a particularly handy and dangerous means by which to precipi-

tate the mutual destruction of the Soviet Union and the United

States.

This, however, would not

be

the greatest danger that would

result from the dissemination of nuclear weapons and delivery

systems. Above all else, the risks of destruction would

be

so great

for the triggering power, i discovered, that it is difEcult to

believe any nation would take such a chance. Moreover, by the

time nuclear capability spreads much further, the United States

and the Soviet Union

will

probably put into effect more slowly

reacting systems with a greater number of stops in them before

a

decision for all-out war can be reached.

This

would make it much

harder (though s t i l l not impossible) for an interloper to start

a

war. Most important, however, there are less dangerous and

more likely ways in which a third nations actions can

s t a r t

a war

between two other powers. For example, a nation might

use

diplomacy to embroil larger nations or increase the scope of an

existing conflict. World War I was a catalytic war, set off by

Serbia and Austria.

* World War I

also

had overtones

of

reciprocal fear o surprise attack

and self-ful6lling prophecy, because the

side

which mobilized st

WBS

56

57


12/19

The present alliance systems of the respective major powers are

a likely area for the operation of other powers as catalytic agents.

However, there may be less need today for either major power

to give an ally a blank check, similar to that which Germany

wrote for Austria in 1914. Nevertheless, the existence of allies

on both sides enormously complicates the problem of catalytic

war and contributes to its possibility. As an example, let us

imagine a situation

in

which the Chinese felt hard pressed, pos-

sibly over Formosa, and told the Russians,

We

are going to strike

the United States tomorrow, and you might as well come along

with us, for they will undoubtedly strike you, even if YQU do not

join

our

attack. Indeed a catalytic war seems much more likely

to be touched off by a desperate or vengeful power than an

ambitious one. .

How

a

War

Might Be Fought

If

we believe a war to be possible (not probable-possible),

then we must for several reasons consider how a war might be

fought. In the first place if there are more and less destructive

ways of fighting a war, humanitarian considerations alone require

tha t we make some investigation of the possibilities of limiting

destruction and death. The morality of refusing to think seriously

about the unthinkable is for this reason alone at least open to

question. Second, careful consideration of the ways in which a

war might be fought sheds additional light

on

the possible ways

in which a war might start. We must learn all we can about this,

both to help

us

avoid starting a war inadvertently or by

m i s -

calculation, and to allow us to contribute to preventing a war

being started by others. Third, as will appear in the next chapter,

the more thought one gives to these problems the more possible

it becomes to mitigate some of the disastrous effects of thermo-

nuclear war and to protect

our

values, both from the holocaust

and from the more subtle politico-military forces in the world.

And, last, it might prove essential to the preservation of these

*values, whether we like it or not, to be able to fight, survive and

win a thermonuclear war.

The usual image of war today held by many experts as well

as most laymen can

be

summed up in the phrase orgiastic spasm

of destruction, or, spasm war. Many believe that if one single

button is pressed all the buttons will be pressed, and that some

30minutes or so later missiles will rain enough destruction to

terminate the defender's existence as a nation; subsequently,

some minutes or hours later, a similar rain of death and destruc-

tion will annihilate the attacking nation. Within perhaps an hour

or two the war will be effectively over-both combatants having

received death blows-with only one question left: How bad will

the radioactivity be for the rest of the world?

This is fanciful in 1962; missile forces are s t i l l small and lim-

ited, and the main striking power of both

countries s t i l l

lies in

their bombers which, under most circumstances, also have a

limited capability with respect to total annihilation. The image

of total mutual homicide as a possible consequence of

a

war may

become reasonable in the near future-say the mid- or late sixties

However, even if the offensive forces grow quite large, and coun-

terbalancing active and passive defenses are not procured, it is

by

no

means inevitable that quick mutual annihilation

will

actually result from the use

of

thermonuclear weapons.

I

likely to win It meant that even a defensive mobilization (by

the

Russians

touched

off

a defensive-offensive mobilization (b the Germans),

in

muc

the same way, some believe, that a badly designeb: quick-reacting force can

be touched off by defensive moves by the other side. This example is

probably typical

in

that the actual cause of war is likely to be a

mixture

of

the

four

basic types described.

58

59


13/19

Possible

Types

of Wars-Eight War

Surviving

Situations

Let us now consider eight situations in which an ability to

fight, survive, and terminate a war is likely to be especially useful

or feasible for

us

or for the Soviet Union:

1. Controlled Wars

2.

Inadvertent Wars

3.

Favorable

Military

Circumstances

4.

Chinese Attacks

5

SmallCountries

6

Arms Control

7.

Technological Breakthrough

8 Rise 6f a Hitler

I

do not mean to imply it would

be

sensible for us to attack

the Soviet Union or for them to attack us in any of these situa-

*See pp. 179 87 f W or

a

discussion

on

possible objectives of the

defender.

69


14/19

tions. I mean only that, at least in these situations, the possibility

of

surviving a war might be enhanced or be more important than

in the spasm war situation usually envisaged. In most of these

situations, the desirability of having some war-surviving capabil-

ity will hold even

if

both the Soviet Union and the United States

have bought weapons systems which potentially can over-kill the

other's country several

times,

So long as human beings control the

buttons, this over-kill is not inevitable. Thus we might still be

interested in war plans and capabilities which

could

be used to

fight, survive, and terminate wars in addition to deterring them.

have already been discussed briefly in this chapter. They are at

least' as important and possibly more important than the so-called

spasm war complete with deliberate surprise attacks directed at

civilians. In view

of

this it is surprising that so many laymen and

some experts

direct

all their attention and discussion solely to

the spasm war. Although the rest of the eight listed situations are

probably less likely

than

he first two, or possibly even the spasm

war, they are s t i l l sdkiently likely to Muence our programs.

In theory, any one of the eight situations might justify a special

program tailored to that situation

if

there were no other way to

handle the eventuality. Fortunately, most of the components of a

properly designed military establishment can be valuable in a

wide range of situations; a properly designed defense can con-

tribute in

all

eight situations without the necessity

of

any com-

pletely specialized forces. It

is

important, however, that the

special situation

be

taken seriously and allowed to id ue nc e the

program instead of being merely used as an argument to justify

an existing program which has been neither compromised nor

redesigned with that situation in mind.

I once had a conversation with a senior government official in

which

I

was discussing one of these less important problems, and

he said, Th a t strikes me as being sort

of

a fifth-priority mission.

I said, That is exactly right. It is fifth priority, and, therefore,

up at the top. A fifth-priority problem can be critical in inter-

national a f f a i r s . One of the real dBculties that the United States,

The first

two

situations listed, controlled and inadvertent wars,

.

or perhaps any country, has is paying enough attention to rela-

tively low priority but absolutely important missions.

If we adopted the usual attitude toward second priority in our

private affairs, we might provide milk for the baby, and nothing

else. But we do not live that way. We live complicated lives, and

there are many things we must take care of. The international

situation today is such that fifth-priority eventualities can st i l l ,

if

ignored, lead to catastrophe. Even

if

it is a comforting attitude,

we cannot

be

simple-minded and say, Let us take

care

of the

first-priority mission and nothing

else.

Let me now discuss some of these special situations which

might occur, and in which a war-surviving capability might per-

form a great deal better than could be expected were we to judge

the capabilityonly

in

the spasm war context.

1. Controlled Wars. Such a war would be one in which one

side or the other attempts to use force in a rational and discrimi-

nating way. We have already discussed them. The controlled war

notion is directly opposed to the spasm war, in which each side

is

trying

to

get rid of all its weapons

as

fast as it can in an orgiastic

spasm of destruction.

The controlled war may require withholding tactics, and an

adequate command and control capability for use in deterrence,

bargaining, and negotiation during the war. One way

to

think of

the controlled war

is

as a

limited

general war. This strikes most

people, when they first hear about

it

as a sort

of

academic

absurdity. Yet, President Kennedy declared in his March

2.8,1961

special message on the defense budget:

Our

weapons systems must be usable

in

a manner permitting delib-

eration

and

discrimination

as

to

timing,

scope and targets

in

response

to civilian authority. Our defenses must be secure against proIonged

reattack

as

well as a surprise first attack.

It would seem, therefore, that we have either already adopted

the concept of the controlled war or have at least taken a long

step toward getting the necessary capabilities.

By

and large, Americans, and perhaps most other people, ihd

70

71


15/19

it hard to believe in the possibility of a controlled war.

It

is

difficult for many to believe that once a war starts either they or

the enemy might be deterred from any action against each other

by fear of reprisals. Many have a feeling that thermonuclear war

must be all-out and uncontrolled. This is a naive point of view

for twoadistinct reasons: first, it is not sensible, and second, it

may not be true. Even if one tries to be uncontrolled, he may

find himself being threatened

so

persuasively by an enemy that

he

will

control himself at the last moment.

One reason why we Americans and others

of

the West do not

fully understand these possibilities is that we have been bemused

by the examples of World War

I

and World War II-two of

the

most unlimited wars in history. There was little attempt to nego-

tiate during them. There was a widespread feeling that one did

not negotiate during the course of a war unless one was either

clearly victorious or clearly defeated. The only moral or practical

objective was to destroy the enemy's military power and then to

dictate a peace.

Yet even in World War I1

it

should

be

noted there were ele-

ments of control. If a military planner just before World War

I1

had been asked to list the three most terrifying weapons of the

coming war he would probably not have failed to include

poison gas. Indeed, by 1939 gasses had been made vastly more

deadly than any used in World War I. In the all-out World

War 11, however, no gas was used by either side.

While to most people World War I and World War I1

are

prototypes, actually they were most extraordinary wars. A study

of the history of warfare between civilized nations reveals few

periods

in

which the strategic doctrines of these wars held sway.

The more classical way has almost always been to fight for some

defhite, generally limited objective, or to prevent the enemy from

attaining some such objective. Accepting t h i s view, countries have

tended to make their actions, fighting, pressures, and reprisals

consistent

with

their limited objective, in some sense. Although

modem technology has given nations the ability to fight uncon-

trolled wars greater than any in history, it has also made the sanc-

tions against fighting such wars larger than ever before.

72

We found t h i s out in Korea. Before Korea, few Americans

would believe we could limit ourselves as we did there. In Korea

we learned that just like anybody else we can be deterred, we can

be cautious, we can be responsible.

Moreover, what is equally interesting and unknown to most

Americans is that the Communists in the Korean c o d c t

also

behaved with caution. While we did not attack supply bases and

airfields in China, neither did the Communists interfere with

our

long, vulnerable supply lines by using submarines or mining.

Had purely military considerations prevailed it is clear that

'Chinese and North Korean submarines might have had a field

day in the seas surrounding Korea.*

Americans are no tougher than, say, the Japanese or the Ger-

mans, and these people surrendered rather than fight to the last

man. Similarly, we may be restrained by sufEciently large threats

-after an attack aswell as before.

I

suspect that the main reason why Americans find

it

difficult

to believe a war can be fought rationally or reasonably is that

in our country, for the most part, we do not give force any

rational or reasonable role. We feel that only a law violator, a

criminal,

a

desperado, or a sick or insane person uses force. When

we find somebody

using

force he is not only our enemy,

he

is an

enemy of humanity, and should be exterminated or locked up and

treated, but not negotiated with. We then

go

all out in

our

attempt to control or destroy

him.

This

is, I am afraid, a somewhat naive view. Force has been

around for many years. It has been used by good, bad, and

indifferent people. It has been used rationally aswell as irration-

ally. It is perfectly possible for us or the Soviets to use force

in

a

reasonable fashion, at least in the sense that we need not use it

in a wildly unreasonable and extravagantly reckless fashion.

This is true even though it may be unreasonable, if not im-

moral, to settle disputes by the use of force. Having unreasonably

or immorally decided to use force, one can still wish to see it used

reasonably asopposed to recklessly.Both of the American biases-

* For

a

more thorough discussion

of

these restraints

on

both

sides see

Alan Whiting, hinaCnrr~srhe Ydu (New York: Mllcmillan, 1960).

73


16/19

the unwillingness to initiate the use of moderate levels of force

for limited objectives and the too great willingness, once we are

committed, to use extravagant and uncontrolled force-are poten-

tially dangerous and should be guarded against. These biases

could have most serious consequences unless we deliberately and

consciously think about ways

in

which violence may occur and

still be kept relatively limited-at least as compared to an uncon-

trolled situation.

2. Inadvertent Wars.

It may be especially important to make

plans for fighting, surviving and terminating inadvertent nuclear

war, and such contingency plans may

turn

out to be especially

feasible. A war begun as the result of accident, error, mis-

calculation, unauthorized behavior, and so on, might be much

more destructive than a calculated war precisely because it

is

more likely to be uncontrolled;

it

might also be less destructive

because planning or tactics may be poor, forces unready and

bady positioned (for example, few submarines in range of

planned targets). Before cataclysmic damage had been done both

sides might be especially willing to call off such a war and return

to some version of the status quo. We must be flexible enough to

handle t h i s contingency both to minimize danger from the

weapons that explode and to maintain sufficient control over our

forces so that such a war could be stopped quickly.

3. Especially Favorable Military Circumstances. Although the

possibility is almost always ignored, even an all-out war might

reveal materially favorable or unfavorable military circumstances.

To illustrate the conceivable circumstances, consider these

examples:

Although radar warning of missile attack can theoretically be

reduced to almost zero, we might

be warned by other means.

A

limited war might begin in Europe, and, worse, it might seem to

be getting out of control. At such a time, I assume, we would

be more than willing to evacuate our cities, and, in fact, probably

could not stop the evacuation. People would leave

the

cities, and

the only question would be: Is the evacuation reasonable or

unreasonable? Effective or ineffective? Is the population being

evacuated to places of protection and safety, or to overcrowded,

vulnerable, or otherwise dangerous facilities?

Such an evacuation might take place over a period of days,

weeks or even months, not as an attempt to outrun the ballistic

missile, but as a strategic evacuation after

an

adequate warning,

supplied not by an intelligence agency, but by the local news-

paper. The events that caused the war might also give us ade-

quate warning and allow us greatly to diminish the casualties

from a war.

Another favorable military circumstance might be the failure

of

our

opponent to procure or have fully operational the forces

we thought he would have. Recent history has given us several

examples of almost unpredictable weaknesses materializing in the

Soviet system (for example, their weakness or lagging in:

air

defense, ground launched decoys, aerial refueling, susceptibility

to U 2econnaissance, long-range bomber procurement, intercon-

tinental missile procurement, and

so

on). (See O W p.

202-04

299-300,

440,

or details.

I

also discuss in O W any possible

examples of unexpected U.S.weaknesses; see, for example, pp.

Either we or our enemy might be militarily superior and not

know it. For instance, during the Korean War our fighters had a

number of aerial combat duels

wi th

the fighters of the other side.

It

has been claimed, and there is no reason to doubt it, that for

every one of our planes they shot down, we shot down 16 of

theirs. If I had been discussing fighter duels in 1949, I would not

have had the nerve to so much as conjecture that we might be

16

times more potent than the other side.

I

would not have had

the nerve to suggest, even as a hedge, a program that would

work well

if

we happened to be

16

times better, but would not

work well if we were not.

Things like this do occur. When they do, it can substantially

change the effect of a war. Positioning oneself to exploit a favor-

able possibility but not relying on this possibility

is

very different

from the wishful thinking that assumes the favorable possibility

will

necessarily occur.

~

422-25, 428-33,

34-37.

7


17/19


18/19

defects may not be so serious as those who completely discount

active defense believe. Although the vigorous use of counter-

measures by an attacker would enable him to degrade all systems

known today, we may be able to develop significant levels of

active defense against both planes and missiles. Moreover, even

degraded active defense combined with appropriate

civil

defense

measures could make a large difference in our ability to survive.

The United States is working hard at developing and testing

various defense systems. Mot all the possible improvements which

might emerge from this work are predictable.

If

signscant

im-

provements occur we should be in a position to take advantage .

of them, but we cannot take advantage of such improvements

unless we have started the necessary associated programs.

8.

Rise of a

Hitler. The last, and I hope, the least likely contin-

gency is the rise of another Hitler. Unlike the seven previously

mentioned categories where fighting and surviving a war might

be especially feasible, in this situation it may be essential just

to

be

able to do

as

well

as

we can regardless of the feasibility.

It is

commonplace today to say that Khrushchev is not like

Hitler; he does not seem to be

as

reckless. He

is

not as deter-

mined, not as malevolent.

Some, most notably

A.

J. P.

Taylor, have even said that Hitler

was not like Hitler, that further appeasement would have pre-

vented World War

I1

without German domination of Europe and

perhaps the world. Doubtless Hitler and his government were

relatively cautious in the period 1933-43, compared to the usual

image. He acted more rationally and prudently than most of us

recall, and, in fact, came uncomfortably close to achieving his

objectives. But even then he was an incredible threat to

his

war-

weary, peace-loving opposition.

Today, a Hitler of the type we picture now, one who

is

reck-

less, absolutely determined, and who is crazy or realistically

simulates madness, would have an important negotiating edge.

If

somebody says to you, One of us has to be reasonable and it

is

not going to

be

me, so it has to be you, he has a very effective

bargaining advantage, particularly

if

he

is armed

with thermo-

78

nudear bombs.

If

he can convince you he is stark,staring mad,

and if he has enough destructive power, you will also be per-

suaded that deterrence alone will not work. You must then give

in or accept tlie possibility of being annihilated.

Moreover, no matter what treatment you could expect at his

hands

if

you surrendered, there would always be some who are

It is difficult for Khrushchev to convince us that he is stark,

staring mad because we can

see

he

is

thinking rationally about

some things.

It

may happen that a leader

will

take over some-

where, sometime, who either is mad or convincingly acts that

role. We could check him only by being able to put

our

people in

a place of relative safety

so

we could say, Look,

if

you really

are insane we will fight it out.

If

somebody says,

I

would rather

be Red than dead, he is a coward, and

I

think properly an

object of contempt and scorn. But

if

somebody says, ould

rather have everybody Red than everybody dead, he

is

taking a

reasonable position with which

I

agree.

While

I

would rather have everybody Red than everybody

dead, we must not allow a situation to develop in which such

a

choice is the only one we have.

If

we may have to deal with a

madman or even a reckless blackmailer, we must always have

the ability to say: The survival

of

our people and the human

race are not the questions. Our nation and

our

system can sur-

vive the worst you can do and we are prepared to accept many

casualties rather than surrender.

The real choice would then be between risking some number

of dead to taking no risk of losing lives in a thermonuclear war

with a high probability of being subjected to Red rule. We might

be Red in either case-in the first instance

if

we fight and lose;

in the second if we capitulate without fighting. Of course, accept-

ing a dictated peace calling for Red domination rather than risk-

ing thermonuclear war does not necessarily imply acceptance of

the control. We could still resist by other means ranging from

passive resistance of the Gandhi type to the use of underground

fighting and sabotage.

All

of these alternatives might be of doubt-

ful effectiveness against a

ruthless

dictatorship. That is, with such

-.

prepared to persuade you that fightinghim would be worse.

79


19/19

resistance, we might be Red,

then

dead. All

in

all

it seems

Val-

uable toa t least keep open the option, even if a desperate one,

of fighting and surviving.

We cannot handle

a

Hitler or deal with any of the other many

contingencies facing us with resolve alone. It takes programs.

An enemy or a madman may well have more resolve than

we

have, particularly if he is

not

listening.

kahn unthinkable 1962

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