kant's early theory of genius- tonelli

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Kant's Early Theory of Genius (1770-1779): Part ITonelli, Giorgio.

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 4, Number 2, April

1966, pp. 109-132 (Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press

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K ant's E arly T heory

of Genius (1770-1779):Part IG I O R G IO T O N E L L I

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE THEORY OF GENIUS in Kant ' s ph il os oph y was re al iz edcomparatively early in the history of K a n t ] o r s c h u n g , and several works have

been devoted to this subject? But nobody has, until now, tried to reconstruct thedevelopment of Kant's ideas on genius utilizing the materials contained in hisN a c h l a s s , published by Adickes. 2 This is what I s hall att emp t in the presentpaper, limiting the study to the period from 1770 to 1 7 7 9 , coinciding withKant's preliminary works for the elaboration of the C r i t i q u e o ] P u r e R e a s o n .

First I shall try to establish Kant's opinions on genius in the aforesaid span oftime, second, to trace the sources of such opinions in Kant's cultural background.

w Before 1 7 7 0 Kant rarely uses the term g e n i u s . The corresponding notion hasnot yet a clearly defined place in his theories about "empirical psychology" (or"anthropology") and "aesthetics." In 1764 he writes about "the Italian genius"as compared with the spiritual endowment of other nations (II, 244). "Ge nius"here generally corresponds to the English and French notion "g~nie du peuple." sThe word "genius" appears in the same year in some other contexts, with thegenerical meaning of a "power of the mind." *

In 1768 Kant uses, in a letter to Herder, the word "genius," apparentlyidentified with the expression "fertile spirit." ~ Ka nt actua lly is warning H erder

1 See especially: K. Hoffman, Die Umbi ldung der Kant i schen Lehre vom Genie in Sche l lingsSystem des t ransscendentalen Ideal ismus(Bern: 1907, Berner Studien zur Philos. u. ihrerGeschiehte, LIII); R. Schlapp, Ka nts Lehre vom Genie und d ie Ents tehung der "K r i t ik derUr te i l sk ra f t "(G6ttingen: 1901); O. SchSnd6rffer, "Kant' s Definition vom Genie," A l t p r e u s s -ische Monatsschr i f t ,1893, xxx; O. Wichmann, "Kant' s Begriff vom Genie und seineBedeutung~" Deutsche Akademische Rundschau ,Jhg. II, 12 Sem., Folge N. 2; 7, 15 Jan. 1925.Schlapp's work, utilizing Kant's Kolleghef te(or notes taken from his lectures), is peculiarlyimportant.

In Ka nts Gesammelte Schr i ft en ,published by the Preuss i sche Akademie der Wissenschaf ten .This is the edition we refer to in our quotations. We give only the number of the volume andthe page for the pr inted works of Kant , and the number of the volume and that of the Reflexionfor the Nachlass .We refer to the last issue of the Preussische Akademie Ausgabe edition. Weintend to utilize Kant's Nachlassfollowing the same criteria as in: G. Tonelli, Kant , dal l 'es te-tica metafisica all 'estetica psicoempirica. Studi sulla genesi del crit icismo (1754-1771) e sullesue fon t i(Torino: 1955), Memorie della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, Serie 35 Tomo 3,Parte III . See pp. 7-10, 192, 253-255.

3 See Tonelli, op. cir. ,p. 115.4 "Der h6chste Schwung, den das menschliche Genie nahm, um zu dem Erhabenen aufzustei-

gen, bestand in Abenteuern" (II, 255).5 We shall transla te with "spiri t" the peculiar sense of the German Geistas Kant (as we

shall see later) employs it here. Otherwise Geistmay mean in German (among other things) :9 , , , , , , , , ,*soul (= Seele)both as man s soul ~nd as spiri tual creature, ghost (= Gespenst) , chemicalspirit", "wit" ( = Wi t z ) ,or "anthropological characteristic of a time or of a nation," this last

[ i o 9 ]


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110 HIS TOR Y OF PHI LOS OPH Y

against a youthful, mystical exaggeration of this genial fertility, to whose

m o t i o n the calmness of the philosopher's contemplative life is to be preferred.Cri t ic ism 6makes genius more cautious. 7Most probably from this period, come two Ref lec t ions sbearing on our sub-

ject. Genius is referred to art ( K u n s t ) and literature ( s ch6ne Wissenscha ] t en ) ,and opposed to learning (E r l e rnung) and imitation ( N a c h a h m u n g )in litera-ture. Genius is related to the judging intellect (Ver s t and zu u r the i l en ) ,espe-cially as intellect is common sense (gesunde r Ver s t and ) ,but not vulgar commonsense (geme ine r Ver s t and )to which spirit (called here espr i t ) is opposed.Common sense does not apply to genius only, but also to the imitative proc-ess; not only to literature, but to every kind of science.

In this early stage of his psychological ideas, Kant seems to apply the conceptof genius to aesthetic activities only. Common sense is clearly not the same asgenius, but rather a power rul ing it throu gh criticism.

w Afte r 1770 Ka nt gives a terrific devel opmen t to his the or y of genius, as at-tested by the quantity of material, both in the N a c h l a s s and Kol legheI te ,de -voted to it. It is often difficult to date more precisely the Re)~exionenconcerned,inside the decade from 1770 to 1780. Only a rough distinction may be made inthe maj or ity of cases between mat eri als anter ior and poster ior to -----1776. Weshall try therefore to distinguish, when expedient, only between a version probablyanterior and a version probably posterior to this date. One of the most strikingfeatures of the whole period is the rise of the term "spirit" as an equivalent ornear-equivalent of genius. Sometimes they are simply identified2 But moreoften a certain distinction is made between them (although, in general, what isreferred to the one may be referred to the other). Before --1776, spir i t seems tobe a more general notion than genius, comprehending besides genius, taste andright reason (gesunde Vernun] t ,a notion related to "common sense") (XV, N.738). Elsewhere, spirit is "ta len t in general," lO whereas genius is the orig inal ity

sense being the nearest to what we call "spiri t. " (See Grimm's Deutsches WSrterbuch,art."Geist.") In Kant's time, Geistcould not be used as an equivalent of "mind," called thenGemiit,and olfly in later German idealism Geist. Gemi~twas the soul, not in a metaphysicalsense, but as a complex of psychological powers.

6 The mental power enabling one to criticizeis, in the same period, defined by Kant as "com-mon sense" (gesunder Verstand).Criticism may refer both to reason (in logic) and to taste(in art) ; taste is a form of common sense (see Tonelli, op. cir.,pp. 136--137, 140). Here criticismis referred by Kant. to Herder's poetry; it depends therefore on taste.

"Wofern die Critik nicht das Nachtheilige an sich h~tte das Geniefurchtsam zumachen ." "Bey der friihen Auswiekelung Jhrer Talent sehe ich rait mehrerem Vergniigenauf den Zeitpunkt hinaus wo der fruchtbare Geist nicht mehr so sehr getrieben durch die warmeBewegung des jugendlichen Geftihls diejeninge Ruhe erwirbt welche sanft aber empfindungs-roll ist und gleichsam das beschauliche Lehen des Philosophen ist, gerade das Gengetheil yondemjenigen wovon Mystiker tr~iumen" (X, 73-74, Letter N. 40, 9 May, 1768).

8 XVI, N. 1573, and 1582. They are most probably dated between 1760 and 1768, but theycould also be later, up to 1775.

See, for the year 1772, Schtapp, op. cir.,pp. 62-6~ (Genie = Originatgr Between 1770and 1780: XV, N. 819 (where Geistis correlated to Genieand not to Talent).After 1775: XVI,N. 1894 and XV, N. 933 ("Man kan auch das Wort Geist allein stat t genie brauchen"). Some-times the identification is more or less implicit, as the characters referred to one of them are,in another place, referred to the other. For instance, XV, N. 782, N. 932, N. 943, and N. 949.

10 The same m XV, N. 933.


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K A N T ' S E A R L Y T H E O R Y O F G E N I U S 111

( d i s E i g e n t h i i m l i c h e )o f t a l e n t i n g e n e r a l ( X V, :N . 7 6 1 ) . Ta l e n t l e a d s to i m i t a -

t i on , n o t a s a c o p y i n g t o t h e l e t t e r , b u t a s a n i m i t a t i o n o f t h e s p i r i t o f a m o d e l ;t h i s is n o t y e t g e n iu s , b u t t h e b e s t w a y t o r e a c h i t( d e r L e i t ] a d e n v o r d i s g e n ie )( X V , N . 7 78 ).11 T h a t s p i r i t is n o t y e t g e n iu s , a l t h o u g h n e c e s s a r y f o r it , is r e -p e a t e d a l s o i n aK o l l e g h e ] tf r o m t h e y e a r 1 7 75 - 17 7 6 12 ; b u t , h e r e , s p i r i t i s" a p a r -t i c u l a r q u a l i t y ( e i n e b e s o n d e r e E i g e n s c h a ] t )o f t a l e n t . " 13

F r o m t h e p e r i o d a f t e r+-1775,X V , N . 9 2 6 a t t e s t s t h a t s p i r i t is a n a n i m a t i n gt a l e n t , w h e r e a s g e n i u s i s t h e o r i g i n a l i t y o f s p i r it . I n X V , N . 9 3 0, g e n i u s is d e -f i n e d as a n o r i g i n a l s p i ri t . M o r e f r e q u e n t l y , g e n i u s i s c o n s i d e r e d a s s o m e t h i n gw i d e r t h a n s p i r i t , a s i n t h e ( p e r h a p s e a r l i e r ) X V , N . 81 2 , w h e r e g e n i u s i s a m o r eg e n e r a l p o w e r c o m p r e h e n d i n g s p i r i t , s e n s i b i l i t y( E m p f i n d u n g ) ,J u d g m e n t , ~4 a n dt a s t e , a c o n s t e l la t i o n w h i c h w e m e e t v e r y f r e q u e n t l y i n t h e t e x t s u n d e r c o n s i d e r a -t io n . T h e s a m e r e c u r s in X V, N . 8 7 4 , a n d a p p a r e n t l y i n X V I , N . 1 8 47 t o o . X V ,N . 9 7 7 p r e s e n t s a p e c u l i a r s i t u a t i o n w h i c h w e s h a l l d i sc u s s l a t e r : b u t s p i r i t s e e m st o b e s u b o r d i n a t e d t o g e n iu s a s t h e v i v i f y i n g e l e m e n t o f it s s u b o r d i n a t e p o w e r s ,w h i c h a r e in th i s c a se " w i t " a n d " p h a n t a s y , " b e i n g p a r t s o f " i m a g i n a t i o n . " 15

w W e h a v e se e n h o w s p i r it s e e m s t o b e s o m e t h i n g i n t e r m e d i a t e b e t w e e n t a l e n ta n d g e n i u s .TM I t w i ll n o w b e a p p r o p r i a t e t o a t t e m p t a c l a r if i c a t i o n o f t h e n o t i o no f t a l e n t ( Ta l e n t ) .

A c t u a l l y , K a n t m e n t i o n s t h r e e d if f e re n t k i n d s o f m e n t a l p r o d u c t i o n : (1 ) c o p y -i n g, r e q u i r i n g d i l i g e n c e ; ( 2 ) fr e e i m i t a t i o n , r e q u i r i n g t a l e n t ; a n d ( 3) t r u e o r i g i -n a l i t y, r e q u i r i n g g e n i u s .

I n a K o l l e g h e ] to f 1 7 7 5 - 1 7 7 6 ,t h e f i r s t k i n d o f m e n t a l p r o d u c t i o n i s c a l l e d" n a t u r a l d i s p o s i t i o n "( N a t u r e l l ) ,a n d i s t o b e e a s i l y in s t r u c t e d o r r e c e p t i v e t o p r e -c e pt s. Ta l e n t i s a n " e n d o w m e n t "( G e m i ~ t s g a b e ) ,a c a p a b i l i t y to p r o d u c e ( h e r-v o r b r i n g e n )s o m e t h i n g n e w f o l lo w i n g a p p r e h e n d e d r u le s , a n d m u s t b e e d u c a te d .G e n i u s d o e s n o t r e q u i r e m u c h e d u c a t i o n , 17 b e c a u s e i t i s ac r e a t i v e ( s c h S p ] e r i s c h )t a l e n t , i .e ., p r o d u c i n g i n d e p e n d e n t l y f r o m i n s t r u c t i o n s o r r u l e s , is , 19 T h i s d i s t i n c -

11 Fo llow ing aKollegheftf rom 1775-1776, i t i s impossible to t ran sform a ta l ent in to a geniusby educat ion, but i t i s poss ible by educat ion to aw aken genius , i f i t i s a l ready present . Phi loso-phy, the sc ience of genius , cannot be taught , one can only be taught how to phi loso-phize (Schlapp,op. cir.,pp. 125-126). See also w1670 ft.

12 Sc hla pp ,op. cir.,p. 127.13 Ibid .,p. 126.14 We t ransla te wi th Jud gm ent (wi th a J ) the Ge rm anUrteilskraft:l i t e ra l ly "p owe r o f judg-

ing," as d is t inguished f romUrteil,j u d g m e n t .15 We shall tra ns lat eEinbi ldungskraf tw i t h " i m a g i n a t i o n , "Phantasiew i t h " f a n c y, " a n d

Dichtungsverm5genw i t h " p h a n t a s y. "1~ An a t tem pt tow ard an explanat ion of such waver ings in terminolo gy and c lass i f ica tion as

seen in w shal l be made in w167 connect ing them with an ac tual p lu ra l i ty of senses of theword " sp i r i t . "

1~ This i s mea nt in the sense tha t geniusin its peculiaritydoes no t wan t any ins t ruc t ion ,and does not fo l low any rule , but , as we shal l see la ter, genius , presupposing both di l igenceand t a l en t , indirectlyrequires educat ion and rules , butonly as a preparationfor i t s use .

is Schlapp,op. cit.,pp . 123-124. . .19 Frequ ent ly, however, th is t r ic hot om y is presented by K an t in a s impl i f ied way, 1 .e . , as a

dichotom y, d is tinguishing e i ther (a) d i l igence f rom (b) ta len t and genius , or (a) d il !gence andta len t f rom (b) genius. So tha t som et imes the dis t inct ion between ta le nt and genius , or be-tween dil igence and ta lent , pract ica l ly d isappears . See, for some examples , footnotes (22) and(24).


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112 HIST ORY OF PHIL OSOP HY

lion be tween d i l igence and ta lent i s c la r i f ied by a cor responding d is t inc t ion be-

tween copying and imi ta t ing . In XV, N. 920 (af te r 1776) , "copying" ( N a v h t u n ) ,with i ts subspecies of "aping," 20 signif ies "making the same" ( G l e i c h t u n ); on thecon t r a ry, i n " imi t a t i on" ( N a c h a h m e n ) ,only the way of doing the th i ng ( M a n i e r )i s the same, but the conte nt mus t be an or ig ina l inven t io n (Or iq ina l i t~ i t i n de rE r f i n d u n g ) . 2 1This kin d of imi tat ion, makes precise XV, N. 778 (before 1776),provided that i t is that which does not fol low the let ter (as in c o p i e r e n andn a c h 5 ] ] e n ) , but the sp i r it , and i s the bes t prep ara t ion for t rue genia l produc-tio n. 22

Genius wants ins t ruc t ion , 23 as diligence ( F l e i s s ) and talent do, but i t goes be-yo nd the m (XV, N. 899; afte r 1776) .24

Di l igence ( N a t u r e l l , F l e i s s )seems to be suffic ient when something must and canbe done mer ely by fol lowing some predisposed rule ; but , i f ei ther the rule s can-not precede the production, 25 or the y are not sufficient to dete rmin e the product , 2~

20 Called Nachdffen,or imi tati on of the Manier,i.e., of the way of doing some thing (Manier) ,without being able to imitate also the content (Inhalt)of the thing and without any originalnew content.

21 On the relationsh ip between Manierand idea in genius, see w22 Once at least, in 1775-1776, Ka nt contr adic ts his di sti nct ion between diligence and tal ent ,

shortly after having stressed it (see Schlapp, op. cir. ,pp.128-129). On t his occasion ta lent iscalled mechanical.In XV, N. 922 also, talent is cal led mechanical,but united to Fleiss.Ap-parent ly, this is not the free talen t mentioned shortly before. "Mech anism" seems to be bett erreferred to diligence, and free tal en t (as opposed to Me chanismus des talents)seems to be some-what assimilated to genius. See also w

23 See also w24 It mus t be remarked t hat sometimes the dis tinc tion between taleI}t (as spirit) and genius

disappears, at least as both are opposed to diligence: see XV, N. 812 (1769-1778), and XV, N.975 (1775-1778).

25 Kan t seems to mean by this t hat such rules cannot be, in the pr esent case, deduct ivelyestablished, but that they are established empirically, abstracting them from their actualuse, i.e., the rule may be recognized only after one has (as it were, instinctively) acted inaccordance with it. Of course rules abstracted in this way are not unchangeable, but theydepend upon successful acting, which establishes empirically some never completely definedand nondeducible (non a priori)rules of action (or of thinkin g). We are led to this in terp reta -tion by the connect ion, which we shall meet lat er (see footnote 29) between t al en t and Ge-schieklichkeit;now the rules of Geschicklichkeit(or "ab ili ty" ) shall have, in the critical period,at least, the aforesaid characteristic s, in their well*known classifications as h ypotheticalimperatives. It must also be remarked that, if this int erpr etat ion holds, talent may be referredalso to the rules of taste, which have, in this period and before, the same characteristics aswe attributed to the "hypothetical imperatives" (see Tonelli, op. cir.,especially pp. 166-167and 215-216). This int erp re tat ion could be supported by XV, N. 923 (1776-1778) : "Das Tal entkan nicht yon der Leilung und dem Zwangeder Regeln befreyet werden ausser in denienigenStricken, wo die Regel empirisch ist, und un te r der Bed ingung, dass das Tal ent selbstProduktegebe, die zur Regel dienen." This coincides with Kant's theory of Taste. However, XV, N.923 could also be accounted for as a case in which tal ent is identified with genius, the str uct ureof which is, in this, analogous to talent.

2s This is the case, if between what is disposed by rule and the actual pr oduc t the re is a gap,which must be filled by something which we could call "instinctive action," but withouttransgressing certain rules. This may refer to a situati on, where a pa rt of the object is producedfollowing demonstrated rules, but another part following those kind of rules which cannotprecede the exertion (see footnote 25). But possibly it refers to some imperceptible nuanceswhich never can be brought into a rule: in this sense perhaps spirit (as distinguished fromgenius, that is, as implicitly attributed to talent) is called once by Kant das Unbeschreibliche[a kind of je ne sais quoi](Schlapp, op. cir.,p. 127). This could refer to "pl ay" as an elementof art, as in XV, N. 922, in which case "die Regeln nich t die Ausribung m6glich mac hen" ;

the "pl ay" element is referred to genius too. But it is also possible tha t here, as in some other~ laces, talent be equated to genius, and that what cannot be determined by rule is meant to

e a new idea.


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talent is needed. Actually, talent always must be led by rules, but they only

make its action harmonious, 27 they do not produc e anyt hing (XV, N. 922, between1775 and 1778).Talent produces something new, unknown before; but this is not yet the

orig inali ty of true genius: following XV, iN. 969 ( 1776-1778), t ale nt brings themind only to contrivances ( E i n f d l l eor particular devices), but genius brings it to(new) ideas (i.e., to new general principles, as we shall see later).

w Diligence, talent, and genius are not to be considered as pecul iar faculties; butas different wa ys of setting one' s faculties to work. 2s

All of them imply the exertion of several elementary powers; of course, talent

requires some more powers than diligence, and genius some more than talent.From XV, N. 933 and N. 934 ( 1 7 7 6 - 1 7 7 8 ,or perhaps earlier) it is clear that"talent" is only a general word covering what actually is a gamut of differenttalents. It is, however, not clear whether we must identify a "peculiar talent"with an elementary mental power, in so far as it is "spontaneous," or with apeculiar blend of several mental powers which are directed to some more specialachievement within the range of talent in general (see also XV, N. 938, 1772-177S).

Following XV, N. 819 (1769-1778), the most char acteristic eleme ntary powerat work in talent should be Judgment, i.e., the power of distinguishing what is

adapt ed, and wha t is not, to a given idea. ~9Judgment and talent are not genius because, as we shall see later, they presup-pose a g i v e n idea and only find a way (or device) for applying it, whereas geniuscreates a n e w idea. s~

Further, in talent another element is at work (which is not, in turn, a peculiarfa cul ty) , and this is spirit. Spirit, as we saw in w is an inter medi ate elementbetween talent and genius, but it is sometimes, at least as "vivifying but not origi-nal," peculiarly attributed to talent.

~7 I.e., they make it harmonize with the general conditions rendering any action of thatkind possible and effective, but they do not determine the peculiar content of the action.

2, XV, N. 949 (1776-1778) : Genius is not a peculiar power (Kraf t ) ,but a principle of unifica-, " o .

tion of all powers. The same is elsewhere said of splint (XV, N. 933, et al.).das Unterseheldungsverm6gen des Schickliehen, d i desjenigen, was der Idee, welchegegeben ist, nicht widerstreitet" (loc. cit.).This means that Judgment is a capacity for re-lating a peculiar case to a general principle, which has been previously determined. We knowfrom other researches which we shall publish in another place, that Judgment is, in this periodof Kant's evolution, the faculty bridging the gap between a universal p.rinciple, demonstrateda priori ,and a peculiar case, in order to see whether or not this case is comprehended underthat rule, but the universal rule itself does not contain the further particular rule needed todetermine whether the universal rule applies to the case in question or not. Now, a moreparticular rule cannot be deducedin any way, but is every time substituted by a practical exer-tion of the power called "Judgment." In such cases, Judgment is closely related to commonsense (a relation which is explicit, for instance, in XV, N. 819) and to taste, which is sometimescalled "sensible Judgment." (See, for the development of the same questions before 1770,Tonelli, op. cit.,pp. 22-23, 140-143, 157, 161-163, 177 ft.) Thus, the connection or analogy betweenJudgment and talent (as "abil ity" ) is somewhat clarified (see footnotes 25 and 26). The "idea"

referred to shall be classified later as an empir ical ideal(see w and footnote 52).30 Of course, Judgment, as we shall see later, is an ingredient of genius as well as of talent,but the originality of genius is in spirit, not in Judgment.


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A more general notion, corresponding to the sum of all cognitive powers, is that

of "intelligence" ( K o p ] ) , as exposed in a K o l l e g h e ] tfrom the yea r 1775--1776) 1What is important for intelligence is not so much strength (GrSsse ) of every sin-gle power, but th eir jus t proportion, ae Ka nt gives as an example the propor tionbetween wit and intellect, and between m emo ry and J udg men t. aa Also, diligence,talent, and genius seem to be three peculiar kinds of intelligence, or three differ-ent and progressively important stages of grouping and proportioning one'spowers: in fact, Kant exposes his ideas on diligence, talent, and genius immedi-ate ly the rea fte r. 84, 35

The most important character of the powers (constituting genius) is theirproportion, Kant writes elsewhere (XV, N. 841, 1776-78. See also w

w We shall now proceed to inquire abo ut the noti on of spirit, s~ this peculia relement being sometimes referred to talent, sometimes to genius; and this shalllead us to a better understanding of the notion of "genius." We must keep inmind that what is said about spiri t may sometimes be referred to talent, some-times to genius proper, and sometimes it may be an ambiguous character re-ferred to a position in which talent and genius are not clearly differentiated.

We know 37 th at spirit is sometimes c onsidered as " a pe culiar qua lit y of tal-ent"; as such, it is " a principle of vivification" ( d e r G r u n d d e r B e l e b u n g ) .Vivi-fication is defined as "to give a sudden new impulse" ( a u ] e i n m a l e i n e n n e u e nTr leb zu geben) .SsBut, in most cases, spirit is considered as one of the four ele-me nt ar y powers composing genius (i.e., sensibility, Ju dgm ent , spirit, a nd taste).~9As such, spirit also is chiefly the source of vivification of life. Actually, bothsensibility and spirit are sources of movement, of occupation ( B e w e g u n g , B e -sch i i ] t igung) ,but sensibility achieves such aims through sensations, spirit through

31 Schlapp, op. c~t.,p. 118.a2 "K op f1st die Summe aller Erkenntisskr~fte, so wie das Herz die Summe aller Begehrungs-

kritfte ist. Das Ergentumliche des Kopfes kommt auf die Proportion der Gemiitskr~fte an,"ibid.

a6 Ib id .,p. 120.:: Ibid .,pp. 133 sgg.

r~opJis mentioned in connection with talent in XV, N. 933.86 Kant uses, of course, the term Geistbefore 1770, but in senses which generally are rather

distant from "spir it. " In an Essay of 1754, Kan t mentions some people "die einen allgemeinenWeltgeist, ein unfiihlbares, aber ~berall wirksames Prineipium als das geheime Triebwerkder Natur annehmen" (I, 203). In this sense Weltgeistmeans Weltseele,or platonic idea in-forming the world. In the same essay Kant supports a different Weltgeisttheory (I, 211-212) :that is not a soul of the world, but "eine subtile, iiberall wirksame Materie, die bei den Bil-dungen der Natur das active Principium ausmacht . . . . " But the same elementary substanceis considered, one year later (in the Allgemeine Naturgeschichte),as a purely mechanicalprincipleof the universe. The notion of Weltgeistas Wellseele,in German romantic idealism, shall becombined with the cultural concept of esprit du si~clcand evolve into the hegelian notion ofWeltgeist,or Mind of the World, a metaphysical-cultural entity. We shall meet somethinganalogous in Kant, in w Later, in 1755, Ka nt tries to defend Epicurus, whose philosophicalattempt , in spite of its negative results, "der Scharfsinnigkeit eines grossen Geistes gem~sswar" (I, 226). In the present case Kant is rather near to his later notion of spirit. But, ingeneral, Geistmeans either soul, as in I, 322, 359, 360, or mind, as in I, 321. In 1763 Godreceives the attributes of a Geist or immaterial being (II, 87-88). Finally, in the Traiime

eines G eistersehersof 1776, "Geist" is employed passimboth as "soul" and as "ghost."87 Sehlapp, op. cit.,p. 126.6s Ib id .,p. 127.69 See w


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K A N T ' S E A R L Y T H E O R Y O F G E N I U S 1 15

c o n c e p t s , a n d b o t h a r e p e c u l i a r(Eigenti~mlich,w h i c h m e a n s b o t h p a r t i c u l a r

o r n o t - u n i v e r s a l a n d p r o d u c t i v e , o r, i n t h e c a s e o f s p i r it , o r i g i n a l ) .S u c h v i e w s a r e e x p o s e d i n X V, N . 7 7 9(1773-1777),a n d p a r t i a l l y s u p p o r t e db y X V I , N . 1 8 44 a n d N . 1 8 47 ( 1 77 6 -- 1 7 78 ) . I n X V, N . 8 1 2 ( 1 7 6 9 - 1 7 7 8 ) , s p i r i t isc a l l ed " i n t e r i o r l i f e ." F o l l o w i n g X V , N . 8 1 7(1769-1778)s p i r i t m o v e s a n d v i v i -f ie s t h e m i n d : t h i s m e a n s t h a t" i t p u t s t h e m i n d ' s p o w e r s i n a f r e e p l a y . " 40

S p i r i t i s t h e s e c r e t s o u r c e o f l i f e ( X V , N . 8 3 1 ,1773-1778),a n d i t a w a k e n s t h em e n t a l p o w e r s ( X V I , N . 1 8 8 0 ,1776-1778).

N o w , t h i s v i v i f i c a t i o n h a p p e n s t h r o u g h i d e a s 41 ( X V, N . 9 4 2 ,1772-1778).S u c hi d e a s m u s t n o t n e c e s s a r i l y b e k n o w n , t h e y m a y o n l y b e c o n j e c t u r a l(ve rmuthe t ) .B u t a s p i r i t i s originalo n l y w h e n t h e s e i d e as v i v i f y t h r o u g h t h e i rnovel ty a n doriginality (durch das Neue und eigenthi~mliche),a s w e f i n d i n X V, N . 9 4 3( 1 7 7 6 - 1 7 7 8 ) . Originals p i r i t is a p r i n c i p l e o f v i v i f i c a t i o n e n a b l i n g u s t o d o s u c ht h i n g s a s c a n n o t b e p e r f o r m e d e i t h e r t h r o u g h d i li g en c e o r t h r o u g h i m i t a t i o n ( X V,N . 9 3 2 , 1776-1778).S p i r i t v i v i f ie s s e n s i b i l i t y t h r o u g h a n i d e a ; b u t t h i s i d e a m u s tf i r st o f al l v i v i f y t h e i n t e l l e c t ( X V , N . 9 3 3 , 1 7 7 2 - 1 7 7 8 ) . S p i r i t is a n i n t e r i o r p r i n -c i p le o f v i v i f i c a t i o n o f t h o u g h t s , o r o f a l l t a l e n t s ; i t b e g i n s a n e w c o u r s e o f t h i n k -in g (eine neue Reihe der Gedanken); i t i s o r ig ina l , spontaneousv i v i f i c a t i o n , n o td e r i v e d f r o m a n y t h i n g ( X V, N . 93 4,1772-1778).I n t h e l a s t c o n t e x t s , s p i r i t i se q u a t e d w i t h g e n iu s , a s , i n t h e s a m e v i v i f y i n g f u n c t i o n , i n X V I , N . 1 8 9 4 ( 1 7 7 5 -1 7 7 8 ) ; g e n i u s i s a n i n t e r i o rprincipium vitaleo f k n o w l e d g e , in s i s ts X V I , N . 1 9 0 0( 1 7 7 6 - 1 7 7 9 ) .

w A t t e m p t i n g n o w to d r a w s o m e c o n c lu s i o ns a b o u t t h e f u n c t i o n o f s p i ri t, w e m a ys u g g e s t t h a t t h e r e i s a m o r e g e n e r a l s e n s e o f s p i ri t , f o l l o w i n g w h i c h s p i r i t i s d e -f i n ed a s t h e v i v i f i c a t i o n o f m i n d ( i n t e l l e c t p l u s s e n s i b i l i t y ) t h r o u g h a n i d e a( c o n c e p t a priori, u n i v e r s a l r u l e ) . S p i r i t i s t h e n u s e d i n t w o m o r e r e s t r i c t e ds e n s e s . I n a f i r s t s e n s e , a s p e r t a i n i n g t o t a l e n t ( a n d a s t a l e n t i s d i s t i n g u i s h e df r o m g e n i u s ) , i t v i v i f i e s s o m e o b j e c t t h r o u g h apreviously giveni d e a ; i n t h i ss e n se it is v i v i f y i n g a n d i t m a y b e , u p t o a c e r t a i n p o i n t , n e w, a s t a l e n t i s ap o w e r p r o d u c t i v e o f s o m e t h i n gnew ( o r o f a n e w d e v i c e ) b u t f o l l o w i n gappre-hendedr u l e s ( s e e w 1 6 7 n d 4 ) . B u t s p i r i t i s n o t , in t h i s s e n s e , o r i g i n a l . T h i s f i r s tm o r e r e s t r i c t e d s e n s e o f s p i r i t i s, in a n e x p l i c i t f o r m , o n l y p o o r l y r e p r e s e n t e d i nt h e m a t e r i a l u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n , a n d i t s m o r e p a r t i c u l a r p h y s i o g n o m y i s o n l yi n f e r r e d , i n o u r n e e d f o r c l a r i f ic a t i o n , f r o m o t h e r e l e m e n t s a s e x a m i n e d i n w 1 6 74 ,a n d 7 .

I n a se c o n d r e s t r i c t e d s e ns e , m u c h m o r e w i d e l y r e p r e s e n t e d , s p i r i t , a s a n o t

40 This f ree play, as a unif icat ion, must not be confused with the play of wit , explains XV ,N. 819 (1759-1778).This m ay perha ps be con nected w ith XV , N . 943 (1775-1778) :"E s kan unsetwas zur B elebung Anlass geben, ohne ein belebendprincipiumzu seyn z. E. blosse Bilde r,welche die Imaginat ion in Zug br ingen." B ut this m ay be a thi rd , purely sensible kind of p lay(whereas wit has to do w ith concepts too) : "Em pfind ung en bewegen, idee n beleben aus einemprincipio,weil sie einen allgemeinen G run d der th~tig hei t bey sich fi ih ren " (XV, N. 945,1775-1778); "G eis t (genie) : Belebung durch I d e e . . . Belebung durch associ i rte Em pfindungis t anderes a ls d urch ein a llgemein Pr incipium der associat ion vieler Em pfindun gen" (XVI, N.1894, 1775-1778).

41 In this phas e K an t f requ ently identifiesideasand concepts a p riori.


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only spontaneous but also originalspirit, is a synonym of genius, or an element

of it. Such an original spirit is a creator of new ideas. Yet, in the pertinent con-texts, spirit as an element of genius is more generally restricted to its vivifyingfunction, whereas the properly creativeelement is more frequently called genius(as a constellation of powers), and not spirit. Only in a few Reflexionenisspirit completely identified with genius.

w In fact, "genius consists in originality of idea in the production of an object"(XV, N. 812, 1769-1778) ; "it must contain a creative force" (XV, N. 921a, 1775-1778) ; "originality of spirit is genius. Talen t vivify ing the mind is spirit" (XV,N. 926, 1776--1778); genius gives birth to something as a woman gives birth to achild (XV, N. 936, 1772-1778); genius is a power for original production (XV,

N. 1821, 1769-1775),and it creates architectonically(XV, N. 1847, 1776-1778) ;now, architectonic intelligence is a creative spirit (XV, N. 1815, 1770-1777).Aswe saw in w genius is generally defined as a peculiaror originalspirit, not asspirit in general. Only in few places spirit is identified with genius, but still as apeculiar (eigenti~mlich)spirit. On this occasion, Kant calls spirit "a new word"(XV, N. 932, 1776-1778). As a syno nym of genius, spirit mu st be used with outan article ("Man sagt nicht: der Geist, sondern: Geist schlechtin") and withoutattributes, because a more restricted kind of spirit is not genius, or a generalvivification of all talents, but only a particular tale nt (besonder,which is not thesame as eige~ti~mlichor peculiar. Peculiar means original. See XV, N. 933 and N.934, 1772-1778).42

Such views seem to support our explanatory thesis, which in turn accounts forthe waverings in terminology and classification of genius, spirit, and talent, asseen in w

Another distinction shall be mentioned: that between spirit and wit. Wit isrelated to spirit, but spirit is something more, something unfathomable (das Un-beschreibliche),which in turn is not y et genius (1775-1776).43 Following XV, N.819 (1769-1778), spirit and wit are different things, the first vivifies, the secondplays. 44 The same view is supported by XV, N. 943, 1775-1778. 45 Spi rit is ca lledby the French gdnie,because the word "spirit" (esprit) means ]or them"wit"

(XV, N. 944, 1776-1778).For a better understanding of this point it would be necessary to inquire about

the function of wit. Extensive research on this subieet that will be publishedelsewhere yielded a general conclusion, which may be summarized as follows. Inthis phase of Kant's thought, wit is an intermediate power between sensibilityand intellect, whose function is to discover similarities in both sensible represen-tations and concepts, through a process called comparison (Vergleichung).Now,as for its concept-unifying function, in which it is analogous to spirit, it differsfrom spirit, because wit brings about the foresaid unification by comparinggiven particular notions .and reaching a more general concept abstracted from

4~ The same in XV, 938. The reason for this position shall be given in w43 Schlapp, op. cir.,p. 127.44 See footnote 40.,6 "Ein bon motkann witz oder Geist haben. Der Geist ist ernsthaft, aber der Witz spasst."


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their common traits (proceeding from the parts to the whole). Such general con-

cepts are only as valid as their more particular components are, and they may be,if these are empirical concepts, empirical or inductive universals.Spirit does notabstract, from a given material, something already implicit in it, but brings to itsomething new,which, in originalspirit, is a new idea or universal concept a pri-ori, proceeding from the whole to the parts. We must turn now to the considera-tion of the connection between idea and original spirit (or genius).

w Genius is often connected with the notion of idea (See Xu N. 765, N. 765, N.812, N. 934, N. 941, XVI, N. 1849). Not only genius has to do with idea, b ut Judg-ment too. 46 As XV, N. 841 (1776-1778)states, spirit concerns the greatness(Gr~sse, viel Idee),Judgment the regularity (Regelm~issigkeit)of an idea. Moreprecisely, as we find in Xu N. 817 (1769-1778), Jud gmen t establishes a connec-tion between a representation of a particular thing and an idea, so that the figure(Gestalt) of that thing does not contrast with its idea; whereas spirit puts themind into motion, and reaches an idea.

From what we already know, we must understand this distinction as follows:Judgment relates a thing to an already givenidea, spirit creates originally a newidea (but no t everyth ing new is an idea: it may only be a device. See XV, N. 969,1776-1778).

Genius is not conditioned by idea only: there may be a genius in the execution(Aus~bung),which does not renew the content (or idea), but the way of per-forming it (Manier): this is a virtuoso(XV, N. 812, 1769-1778).4~

An idea (called also Einsicht)produced by genius must be easily perceivable(]asslich),and must be easy to communicate and to make understood (verst6nd-l ich gemacht);otherwise genius is fanatical (schw~irmt),as XV, N. 899 (1776-1778) relates. Fanat icism, following XV, N. 921 (1775-1778), extends its ideabeyond any possible experience. A true genius must subject the connection be-tween its product and the leading idea to the proof of intellect and reason, withthe exception of the artists, whose purpose is only to divert (XV, N. 921a, 1775-1778).

Now, what is the function of an idea in mind? This is a very broad question,which cannot be answered in connection with genius only. We know from Xu N.921a, that, in poetry at least, an idea unifiesthe play of sentiments and images.More generally, XV, N. 932 (1776-1778) state s tha t what vivifies in spirit is acertain universalconceived by the mind before any particular, and informing itsproducts. Following XV, N. 945 (1776-1778), an idea is the uni ty of concept as aprinciple for determining a multiplicity in the intuition corresponding to this con-cept, so that every part is related to every other part, as in an animal body; it isnot a composition or association of multiplicity, but a production of it throughan idea, so that in any part the whole is present. In XV, N. 933 we find that agreat idea (vieI Idee)is a unity under several rules; it must be a system,not an

46 As we shall see later (w the idea to which Judgment refers is not necessarily the sameas an idea of genius (spiritual ideal) : it may also be aa empirical ideal.

47 On the relationship between Manierand originality in Talent,see w


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118 H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y

aggregate.A n i d e a i s expressedt h o u g h a s e n si b le m u l t i p l i c i t y w h i c h i s v e r y u n i -

f i e d ; b u t e v e r y s in g l e p r o d u c t ( o r e x p r e s s i o n ) o f t h a t i d e a m o v e s ( o r v i v i f i e s)o n l y i n it s c o n n e c t i o n w i t h s u c h a n i d e a , w h i c h g o e s, i n it s p r o d u c t i v i t y, f a r b e -y o n d a n y p a r t i c u l a r p r o d u c t . 4s A n i d e a m u s t f i rs t v i v i f y i n t e l l e c t a n d t h e n s e n si -b i l i t y.

P h i l o s o p h y is a t r u e h o m e f o r i d e a s ; i d e as a r e c a p i t a l i n a r t t o o . T h e y a r e n o tt o b e f o u n d i n m a t h e m a t i c s , e x c e p t w h e n a n e w m e t h o d i s i n t r o d u c e d ( X V, :N .9 4 3 , 1 7 7 6 - 1 7 7 8 ) .

X V , N . 9 1 8 ( 1 7 7 6 -1 7 7 8 ) m a k e s a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e nempiricala n d spir i tuali d ea s , a n d X V I , N . 2 83 5 ( 1 7 7 6- 1 7 7 7 ) c o n t a i n s a l on g e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e f u n c -t i o n o f i d e a , i n w h i c h g e n i u s i s m e n t i o n e d . B o t h t e x t s c a n b e e x p l a i n e d o n l y i n aw i d e r c o n t e x t .w I t i s i m p o s s i b le t o ta k e i n t o c o n s i d e r a ti o n in t h i s p la c e a ll m a t e r i a l s p e r t i n e n tt o t h e n o t i o n o f " i d e a " i n K a n t ' sNachlassa n d Kolleghe]te.We c a n o n l y s u m -m a r i z e i n a s i m p l i fi e d w a y s o m e g e n e r a l r es u l t s o f a n e x a m i n a t i o n o f th e f o r e -s a id m a t e r i a l s ( i m p l y i n g a ls o X V, N . 9 18 a n d X V I , N . 2 8 3 5 ) , w h i c h w i l l b e p u b -l i s h e d e l s e w h e r e .

G o d , p r i n c i p l e o f a l l t h i n g s , t h i n k s a n i n t e l l i g i b l e w o r l d(mundus a rche typus )w h o s e e l e m e n t s a r e c a l l ed i d e as . T h i s a r c h e t y p a l w o r l d i s a c o n d i t i o n o f t h e p o s s i -b i l i t y o f t h e e x i s t i n g p h e n o m e n a l w o r l d(mundus ech typus ) .E m p i r i c a l o b j e c t s ,e l e m e n t s o f t h i s p h e n o m e n a l w o r l d , o r i g in a t e a s a l i m i t a t i o n o f th e i r a r c h e t y p a lc o u n t e r p a r t s .

I n t h e h u m a n m i n d tw o k i n d s o f i d e as a re to b e f o u n d : ( 1) t h o s e t h a t c a n n o tb e i n t u i t e d o r p e r c e i v e din concreto ( c al le d c o m p a r a t i v e a r c h e t y p a ) , w h i c h a r et h e c o r r e s p o n d e n t s to t h e a r c h e t y p a l i d e as o f G o d , ( 2) t h o s e t h a t c a n b e i n t u i t e din concreto ( c a l l e d f r e q u e n t l y ideals i n s t e a d o f ideas) , w h i c h a r e a d e p a u p e r -a t e d v e r s i o n o f a t l e a s t s om e o f t h e a r c h e t y p a .

Ideas in generala r e a p r i n c ip l e o f u n i t y a n d o r d i n a n c e o f t h e e m p i r i c a l m u l -t i p l i c i t y, b u t a s a total i ty preceding i ts parts ,a n d g e n e r a t i n g t h e m t h r o u g h al i m i t at i o n . T h i s p re c e d e n c e is n o t ( o r i s n o t n e c e s s a r i ly ) t e m p o r a l , b u t m e t a p h y s -i c a l : i .e ., i t is i m p o s s i b l e t o j u s t i f y t h e p e c u l i a r s t r u c t u r e o f t h e p a r t s w i t h o u t r e -f e r r in g t h e m t o e a c h o t h e r a n d t o t h e w h o l e ; t h e i r w h o l e i s a t o t a l i t y o r a s y s t e m ,a n d n o t a n a g g r e g a t e o r a w h o l e c o m p o s e d b y t h e s i m p l e c o n j u n c t i o n o f m e t a -p h y s i c a l l y s e l f- s u f f ic i e n t p a r t s . I d e a l s a r e e i t h e r ( 1 ) e m p i r i c a l , d i v i d e d i n t o ( a )s e n s i b l e , (b ) i n t e l l e c t u a l ; o r ( 2 ) s p i r i t u a l , d i v i d e d a l s o i n t o ( a ) s e n s i b l e , ( b ) i n -t e l l e c t u a l .

Empirical idealsa r e u n i v e r s a l p r i n c i p l e s u n d e r l y i n g e v e r y e m p i r i c a l o b j e c t ,a s a c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e s y n t h e s i s o f t h e u n l i m i t e d s e n s i b le w o r l d o r i t s t r a n s c e n -

48 I t seems to be c lear enough, f rom this passage, tha t "viv if icat ion ," general ly consideredas a character ofcreative genius( i .e . , of a great ar t is t or sc ient is t) , i s also t ran sm it ted to ev ery-body who is in the posi t ion to contemplate or unders tand i ts products or creat ions . The ob-server is led, by the pecul iar s t ructure of this product , beyond the product ' s par t icular i ty,to a universal idea. Only a percep t ion of genius vivifies sym pathe t ical ly one 's in ter ior, s ta tes

XV , N. 943; and this happens b y going back to the idea (underlying a s ingle prod uct) ; i t i snot necessary to know the idea; i t is sufficient to suppose(vermuten)one. This reference of as ingle genial pro duct to a much grea ter idea makes pla in why K an t considers spir i t as some-th ing g iv ing "m uch to th ink abo ut"(viel zu denken),as in X V , N . 95 8, 1776-1778.


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d e n t a l u n i t y ( t h e y s e e m t o b e t h e p r i n c i p a l g n o s e o t o g i e a l e l e m e n t s u n d e r l y i n g

t h e s t r u c t u r e o f a n y o b j e c t ) .Spi r i tua l idea lsa r e , o n th e c o n t r a r y, acrea t ion a u t o n o m o u s f r o m t h e e m p i r i -c a l w o r l d , r e p r e s e n t i n g a nexample o] per fec t ionw h i c h c a n n o t b e f o u n d i n i t , r e -l a t i n g a n o b j e c t t o i tsessent ia l end( t o w h a t i t shou ld be ) .T h e y e n a b l e u s t ojudge o b j e c t s i n t h i s r e s p e c t , a n d t oproduce o b j e c t s ( r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , a c t i o n s ,t h i n g s ) m o r e c o n f o r m i n g t o s u c h s p i r i t u a l i d e a ls . 49

Idea ls in genera lm a y b e ( 1) s p e c u l a t i v e , ( 2 ) a e s th e t i c , ( 3 ) p r a g m a t i c . N o w ,ideas ~~ pe r t ine nt to geniuso r t o o r i g i n a l s p i r i t s e e m t o b e o n e a n d t h e s a m et h i n g w i t h s p i r i t u a l i d e al s 9 I n f a c t s u c h i d e a s m u s t b e n e w a n d o r i g i n a l ( X V , N .8 12 a n d IN . 9 4 3 ) . T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t s o m e o t h e r i d e a s a r e n o t ; t h e s e c o u l d b es p i r i t u a l i d e a ls w h i c h w e r e a l r e a d y k n o w n b e f o re , b u t t h e y m i g h t a l s o b e e m -p i r i c a l i d e a l s .

B u t i t is v e r y l i k e l y t h a t s o m e p r o d u c t s o f g e n iu s a r en o t s p i r i t u a l i d e a l s , b u ti d e a s w h i c h a r e p o s s i b l e o n l yi n abs t r ac to :a c t u a l l y g e n i u s i s o f t e n r e l a t e d t op h i l o s o p h y ( a s w e s h al l s ee l a t e r ) ; a n d s o m e t i m e s m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n c e p t s a n dm o r a l i d e a s a r e s a i d t o b e p u r e , i . e . , n o t r e a l i z a b l ein concre to :s ee X V I I I , I N.4 9 83 , 1 7 7 6 -1 7 7 8 . E t h i c s h a s n o e x e m p l a r b u t e x a m p l e s ( X V I , N . 1 86 9, 1 7 7 6 -

A s w e s h a l l se e l a t e r, g e n i a l id e a s m a y b e e it h e r s p e c u l a t i v e ( p h i l o s o p h i c al ,b e a r i n g o n m a t h e m a t i c a l m e t h o d , e t c .) , or a e s th e t i c ( p e r t a i n i n g t o b e a u t y ) .

w W e m u s t n o w r e f e r a g a i n t o a c o n t e x t w i d e r t h a n t h i s a r t ic l e , i n o r d e r t oe x p l a i n a n o t h e r f e a t u r e o f ge n i a l c re a t i o n .

A s p i r i t u a l i d e a l ( i. e., a n o r ig i n a l i d e a w h i c h m a y b e i n t u i t e din concre to)c o n -s t i t u t e s , a s a n i m a g i n a r y r e p r e s e n t a t i o ni n conc re to , a p ro to type (Urb i ld ) ;a no b j e c t r e a l i z i n g a s e x a c t l y a s p o s s i b le s u c h ap r o t o t y p ei s a n e x e m p l a r ( M u s t e r ,S innb i ld ) . Ru le sa r e n o t i d e a s : a n d a c o n c r e t e r e a l i z a t i o n o f a ru l e i s a nexample( Beispiel) .

E x e m p l a r s c a n n o t b e, p r o p e r l y s p e a k i n g ,i m i t a t e d ; b e i n g u n i q u e r e a l i z a t i o n so f a n i d e a , w h i c h d e t e r m i n e s c o m p l e t e l y t h e i r c o n t e n t, t h e y c a n n o t b e e m p l o y e dt o p r o d u c e s o m e t h i n g" in t h e s a m e w a y b u t w i t h a n e w c o n t e n t " ( a s t h e d e f in i -t i o n o f i m i t a t i o n r u n s , s ee w ; b u t e x e m p l a r s c a n b e c o p i e d t h r o u g h d i l i g e n c e Y

49 Sensible em pir ica l ideals seem to be ident i f iable wi th the general laws of sensibi l i ty an daesthet ic ru les (of tas te) , which do not imply any concept .Intellectual empiricalideas areprobab ly the t r anscenden ta l concep t sa priori. Sensible spi r i tual ideas are apparent ly thesame as aes thet ic ideas in genia l f ine ar t (which is a s imple play of sent iments and imagesruled by an idea) , i .e ., the ae s thet ica l ly perfect repre senta t ion of the species to which the objectper ta in s (see w as in XV , N. 921a.Intellectual spiritualideals , then, should be meant asoriginal philosophical or scientif ic ideas, as we shall discuss in w167and 19. Th e place of tech-nical and e thica l ideas , in respect to th is pa r t i t ion , i s no t c lear. See a lso w167 19, and fo otno tes98 and 99.

50 On ly in XV N 932 and in Schlapp,op eit,pp 165-166 is the te rmidealused in connect ionw~th genres , ins tead of~dea.Anyw ay, K an t f r equen t ly ca ll s idea wh a t co r responds in f ac tto h is def in i t ion of ideal .

~1 "D ie Kt ins te des Fle isses erkennen e in M uster und bedt i r fen es ," XV , N . 812, 1769-1778.Ta lent ( imi ta t ion) , on the con trary, i s f ree f rom an ex em plar : see XV , 922 ( i.e ., i t fo l lows rulesdeterm ining the w ay of doing something, but not the exact c onten t of th is th ing, which is new,i f not genia l ly or ig inal - -see w


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O n t h e c o n t r a r y , e x a m p l e s s e e m t o b e , a s i n s t a n c e s o f ar u l e ( o r o f t h e " w a y o f

p r o d u c i n g a t h i n g " ) , l e a d e r s o f i m i t a t i o n ( a n d t h e r e f o r e p e r t i n e n t t o t a le n t ). 5 2 I ti s c l e a r t h a t p r o d u c t s o f g e n iu s , in s o f a r a s t h e y a r e t h e r e a l i z a t i o ni n c o n c r e t oo f a n o r i g i n a l i d e a , a r e o n e a n d t h e s a m e t h i n g a s e x e m p l a r s : g e n i u si s a n e x e m -p l a r f o r r u l e s . 5a, 54 B u t , a s w e s h a l l s e e s o o n , g e n i u s d o e s n o tf o l l o w a p r e v i o u se x e m p l a r .

N o w , i n b e a u t y , b o t h e x e m p l a r a n d e x a m p l e a r e p r i n c i p le s o f c ri t ic i s m a n dj u d g m e n t : t h e e x e m p l a r , b e i n g t h e m o s t e x c e ll e n t r e a l i z a t i o n o f a c e r t a i n i d e a ,s e r v e s a s a t e r m o f c o m p a r i s o n f o r t h e d e g r e e o f e x c e l le n c e in r e a l i z a t i o n o f a n -o t h e r ( n e w ) i d ea , t h e e x a m p l e , as a t e r m o f c o m p a r i s o n f o r e s t i m a t i n g a d h e r e n c eo f t h e n e w p r o d u c t to t h e ( o l d) g e n e r a l a e s t h e t i c r u le . B e i n g r e f e r r e d t o b e a u t y,b o t h e x e m p l a r an d e x a m p l e a re r e fe r r e d to ta s t e ; m o r e e x a c t l y t h e e x e m p l a r c o n -C e rn s J u d g m e n t , t h e e x a m p l e c o n c e r n s t a s te .

I n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h g e n iu s , X V , N . 8 12 ( 1 7 6 9 -1 7 7 8 ) s t a t e s t h a t g e n i a l a r t isc r e a t i v e , i.e ., it d o e s n o t r e p r o d u c e a n e x e m p l a r a s d i l i g e n c e d o e s, b u t i t p r o c e e d sf r o m a n i d e a . H o w e v e r , in a b r o a d e r s e n s e ( r e f e r r i n g n o t o n l y t o a r t i s t i c p r o d u c t so f g e n i u s , b u t t o s c i e n c e t o o ) i t i s s a i d t h a t , i f a p r o d u c t o f g e n i u s c a n n o t d e t e r -m i n e a n e w g e n i al p r o d u c t , i t is u s e f u l in " d e v e l o p i n g o r a w a k e n i n g g e n i u s . " 55

E x a m p l e s a l s o a r e n o t s u f f i c i e n t , o f c o u r s e , i n d e t e r m i n i n g a g e n i a l p r o d u c t i nt h e w i d e r se n s e ; b u t , a s t a l e n t ( o r i m i t a t i o n ) l e a d s t o g e n i u s ( w t h e s a m e is s a i do f e x a m p l e s . 56

w I n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h th i s p o in t , i t w i l l b e u s e f u l t o t a k e i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h er e l a t i o n s h i p o f g en i u s w i t hr u l e s .

T h e t e r m " r u l e " is n o t u s ed b y K a n t , i n t h is p h a s e , in a t h o r o u g h l y c o n s i s te n tw a y . G e n e r a l l y, h o w e v e r , a d i s ti n c t i o n c a n b e m a d e b e t w e e n a r u le a n d a la w.A r u l e i s m o r e f r e q u e n t l y a n e m p i r i c a l u n i v e r s a l o b t a i n e d b y c o m p a r i s o n ( se e ww h e r e a s a l a w is a l w a y s a t r u e u n i v e r s a l d e d u c e da p r i o r i ( a n i d e a ) . 5 ~

I m i t a t i v e t a l e n t i s l ed b y r u le s , a n d i t m a y , w i t h t h e i r h e l p ,d i s c o v e r m a n yt h i n g s , b u t n o t a n e w m e t h o d . 5s, 59 I m i t a t i v e t a l e n t , h o w e v e r , i s n o t j u s t a s l a v i s hf o l lo w i n g o f r u l e s ; i t i s s o m e t h i n g m o r e . T h e p u r e f o l l o w i n g o f r u l e s i s c a l le d

6~ Ta lent thus does not fo l low an exem plar or an or ig inal idea; ac tu al ly we know th at ta le ntdoes not concern or ig inal ideas or spi r i tual ideals . This does not preve nt ta le nt f ro m conform ingi tse l f to ane m p i r i c a l i d e a l( see w In fac t , a s we saw in w Judgm ent , in t a l en t , r e l a t e s ap roduc t to ag iven (i .e. , not original) idea. See footnote 29.

6a Se hlap p,op . cir. , p . 128. . . . .6~ Here rules are re la ted to a n exem plar. Actu al ly, m some contexts , the dzs tm ctm n between

ideas ( laws) and rules i s not kept , and rules seem to be connected wi th universalsa p r i o r i .This p rob ab ly de rives f rom the fac t tha t som et imes , in th is pe r iod , the judgm ent o f t a s t eis considereda p r io r i .In XV , N. 759 (1772) i t i s sa id th at "die N atu r im genie Stoff und Beysp ie lzu Rege ln g ieb t . " Here example means more p rec ise ly "exem pla r. " In X VI , N . 1821, gen iusi s ca ll ed "U rsprung de r R ege l . "

55 "D as Gen ie wi rd en twicke l t durch Vor legung von p rod uc ten desse lben" : XV , N. 922 ,1775-1778.

~ "A ueh Beysp ie le naehzuahmen fa t de r Le i t f aden vor d as gen ie . Aber n ieh t den B uehs ta -ben und das PersShnl iche, sondern den G eis t derse lb en" XV , N . 778, 1772-1773.

b7 See foo tno te 54.58 Sc hla pp ,op. c i r. ,pp. 125-126.~g This zs c lear ly the spontaneo us but not genia l ta lent , as we saw in w


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m e c h a n i s m ( w h i c h s e e m s t o b e b e t t e r r e l a t e d t o d i l ig e n c e , s~ a s s t a t e d i n X V , N .

9 2 4 , 1 7 7 6 - 1 7 7 8 6 1 a n d i n S c h l a p p 6 2 ) .A s t a l e n t ( w h i c h is o f te n a s p o n t a n e o u s o r p a r t i a l l y o r i g i n a l m e d i u m b e t w e e nd i l i g e n c e a n d g e n i u s ) a s a m e c h a n i s m i s s o m e t i m e sequa t ed t o d i l i g e n c e , a n d a s af r e e t a l e n t t o g e n i u s , i t i s d i ff ic u lt t o s a y t o w h a t k i n d o f t a l e n t X V , N . 9 2 3( 1 7 7 6 - 1 7 7 8 ) r e f e r s , w h i c h s t a t e s t h a t t a l e n t m u s t f o l l o w t h e r u l e s , w i t h e x c e p t i o no f e m p i r i c a l r u l e s , s~ i n w h i c h c a s e t a l e n t g i v e s t o i t s e lf r u l e s t h r o u g h i t s p r o d u c t s .B o t h " s p o n t a n e o u s t a l e n t " a n d t a l e n t - g e n i u s ( a s i n t h e f o l l o w i n g c a se ) c o u ld bem e a n t .

A c t u a l l y i n X V , N . 9 22 , w h e r e m e c h a n i c a l t a l e n t ( e q u a t e d h e r e to d i li g e n ce ) iso p p o s e d t o f re e t a l e n t ( e q u a t e d h e r e t o g e n i u s ), t a l e n t i s s a i d to b e f o u n d e d o nm e c h a n i c a l r u l e s ; b u t r u le s a r e n o t e n o u g h t o p r o d u c e a n o b j e c t , a n d g e n iu s isn e e d e d : t a l e n t ( as g e n iu s ) m u s t a l s o b e f re e f r o m r u l es . G e n i u s m u s t b e a w a r e( i nne we rden )o f r u l e s , b u t n o t l e a r n ( l e rnen) t h e m , a n d i t m u s t b e f r ee t o c o n -f o r m i ts e lf t o t h e m . F r e e d o m o f t a l e n t m u s t n o t b e a l a c k o f ru l e , b u t a s p o n -t a n e o u s a c c o r d w i t h ru l e s w h i c h h a v e n o t b e e n i m p o s e d i n a d v a n c e .

T h e s a m e t h e m e , n o w m o r e c l e a r l y r e l a t e d t o g e n i u s , r e c u r s i n X V, N . 7 7 8( 1 7 7 2 - 1 7 7 3 ) , w h e r e i t i s s a i d t h a t n e w d i s c o v e r i e s n e v e r a r e a b r e a k w i t h t h e

p a s t a n d t h a t g e n i u s m u s t i m i t a t e " t h e g r e a t M a s t e r s " b e f o r e i t c a n b e c o m eo r i g i n a l; t h e l a w o f c o n t i n u i t y is e m p l o y e d i n s u p p o r t o f t h is t h e s is . G e n i u s m a y,s t a te s X V , N . 6 7 2 ( 1 7 7 2 - 1 7 7 3) , d e p a r t f r o m r u le s w h i c h l i m i t s p i r it , b u t n o tf r o m w h a t is c u s t o m a r y a n d c a s u a l ; o t h e r w i s e it m i g h t b e c o m e i r r e g u l a r( R a g e l -los) .

T h e m o r e o r i g i n a l s i d e o f g e n i u s i s e x c l u s i v e l y s t r e s s e d i n o t h e r p l a c e s : g e n i u si s s u p e r i o r t o r u l e s a n d g i v e s l a w s ( X V , N . 8 1 2 , 1 7 7 8 -1 7 7 9 ) 6 4 ; g e n i u s i s t h e o r i g i no f r u l e s ( X V I , N . 1 8 21 , 1 7 6 9 -1 7 7 6 )6 5 ; g e n i u s c r e a t e s w i t h o u t i m i t a t i o n , w i t h o u tt e a c h in g , w i t h o u t r u le , b u t i t m u s t n o t b e p u r e l y i r r e g u l a r ( 1 77 5 - 17 7 6 )~ 6 ; g e n i u si s n o t r e s t r i c t e d b y r u l e s , b u t i t is a n e x e m p l a r f o r t h e m ; e i t h e r i t f o l l o w s s p o n -t a n e o u s l y p r e v i o u s r u l e s , o r i t m u s t i n v e n t s o m e n e w o n es 2 7, 68

w T h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n g e n iu s a n d r u le s i s a s o u r c e f o r a n o t h e r d e v e l o p -m e n t o f o u r q u e s t i o n : t h e p r o b l e m o f] a n a t i c i s m ( S c h w 5 r m e r e i ) .

Ta s t e a n d J u d g m e n t m u s t l i m i t g e n i u s : o t h e r w i s e g e n i u s a p p r o a c h e s m a d n e s s( X V, N . 8 1 2 , 1 7 6 9 - 1 7 7 8 ) . I f a n i d e a i s n o t c l e a r a n d e a s y t o g r a s p( ]ass l i ch) ,i m a g i n a t i o n i s f a n a t i c , a n d i t s p r o d u c t is a p u r e d e l u s i o n ( X V , N . 8 9 9 , 1 7 7 6 -

80 See w and fo otno te 22. Sometimes restricte d tal en t is equate d w ith cop ying. See Schlapp ,op. cir.,p. 128.

6~ In X V, N . 929,Musteror exemplar seems to be re la ted to im ita t ion ( ins tead of example) ,but i t i s to be kept in mind tha t f ree imita t ion is ve ry near to genius and som etimes equatedto i t .

6~ Sc hla pp ,op. cir., p. 129.68 No nem pirical rules seem here to be the same as laws.64 Such laws seem to be the same as original ideas: in X V III , N . 4983, ideas (giving exem -

plars) are opposed to rules (giving examples).66 In this ea rlyRefiexionthere seems to be no dis t inct ion between rules and laws.66 Sc hlap p,op. cir.,p. 62 and pp. 123-124.67 Ib id .,pp. 128-129.68 See foo tno te 54.


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1 7 7 8 ). A g e n i us n o t r e s p e c t f u l f o r c o n t i n u i t y i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f id e a s , a n d

n o t u n d e r g o i n g a s t a g e o f i m i t a t i o n o f t h e M a s t e r s o f t h e p a s t , c r e a t e s o n l y f a n c i e s( X V, N . 7 7 8 , 1 7 7 2 - 1 7 7 3 ) . A n e n t h u s i a s t i c g e n i u s(begeistertes Genie),S~a m o n go t h e r u n p l e a s a n t q u a l i ti e s , is a g a i n s t r i g h t r e a s o n(gesunde Vernun]t),a n d i t sp r e t e n d e d c r e a t i o n s v a n i s h , a s so o n a s t h e v e i l o f m y s t i c a l w o r d s i n w h i c h t h e ya r e e n s h r o u d e d i s t o r n a w a y ( X V, N . 93 6, 1 7 7 2 - 1 7 7 8 ) . F a n a t i c i s m i s b e n t t o w a r d sr e li g io n , a n d i t m e l t s p i e c e m e a l s c r a p s o f r e a s o n a n d l e a r n i n g i n t o a s e c r e t l a n -g u a g e ( X V , N . 8 97 , 1 7 7 6 - 1 7 7 8) . T o b e a f a n a t i c m e a n s t o s u b s t i t u t e m i s c e l -l a n e o u s i n t u i t i o n s f o r a n o r d e r l y re f le c ti o n T ~ a f a n a t i c i s i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e ,l a c k s e v i d e n c e (Deutl ichkeit) ,a n d h e n e i t h e r e n t e r t a i n s c o n c e p t s ( a s a s ci e n ti f icg e n i u s d o e s ) , n o r i m a g e s(Bilder;a s a g e n i a l a r t i s t d o e s ) , b u t p a s s i o n s(Gemiiths-bewegungen); h e m a y h a v e s e n s i b i l i ty a n d s p i r i t , e v e n s o m e t a s t e , b u t n o J u d g -m e n t ; h e l ik e s m y s t i c i s m ( X V, N . 7 71 ,1772-1775).

E l s e w h e r e w e m e e t a m o r e d i f fe r e n t ia t e d t y p o l o g y o f fa n a t i c i s m : a f a n a t i c g e n -i u s e x a g g e r a t e s h i s i d e a s : a s e x a m p l e s , K a n t g i v e s R o u s s e a u , P l a t o , S t . P i e r r e ,L a v a t e r . F a n a t i c i s m p r o c e ed s f r o m t h e s i n g l e -m i n d e d e x a g g e r a t i o n o f a c e n t r a li d e a (Hauptidee),e x t e n d e d b e y o n d t h e f ie ld o f p o s s i b l e e x p er i e nc e . F a n a t i c sm a y b e v e r y i n t e l l i g e n t(gute K6p]e),a n d o n e m a y r e a l l y le a r n f r o m t h e m . T h ee n t h u s i a s t i c g e n i u s (das enthusiastische Gen ie)e x a g g e r a t e s actions c o n f o r m i n gt o a n i d e a i n it s e lf tr u e , o r hi s p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n o f s u c h a n i d e a ( X V , N . 9 2 1 ,1 7 7 5 - 1 7 7 8) . B u t t h e r e s e e m s to b e al s o a n o b l e k i n d o f e n t h u s i a s m , f o l l o w i n g f r o ma n i d e a l . 71

B u t , b e s id e s f a n a t i c i s m a n d e n t h u s i a s m , t h e r e i s a t h i r d k i n d o f u n o r d e r l i n e s s ,c a l l e d whim (Phantasterei) ,w h i c h i s o n l y a m e a n c h e a t i n g . W h i m s i c a l s t y l e i s ak i n d o f s e c r e t o r a l c h e m i s t i c la n g u a g e , a m i x t u r e o f c h e m i s t r y a n d t h e o s o p h y , ac o n t e x t o f e m p t y a n d m e a n i n g le s s w o r d s a i m i n g o n l y a t t h e p u r p o s e f u l d e c e p t i o no f t h e p u b l i c ( X V , N . 9 2 1 a, 1 7 7 5 - 1 7 7 8 ) . K a n t s e e m s t o r e f e r t o P a r a c e l s u s a n dp r o b a b l y B o e h m e , b u t h i s r e a l t a r g e t m u s t h a v e b e e n a m u c h n e a r e r o n e , v iz .,S w e d e n b o r g a n d H a m a n n . 7e

T h u s , t h e f o r m e r l y e x a m i n e d i n d i s c r i m i n a t e i n d i c t m e n t o f f a n a t i c i s m s e e m s toh a v e b e e n a t t e n u a t e d i n r e s p e c t t o s om e p e r s o n a li t ie s w h o m K a n t w i s h e d n o t t oo r d a r e d n o t d i s a v o w, a n d o n l y a c c e n t u a t e d i n r e s p e c t t o s o m e in e x c u s a b l e " b l a c ks h e e p . "

w W e h a v e se e n t h a t in g e n i u s s e v e r a l m e n t a l p o w e r s a r e a t w o r k ( s ee wI n t h e l a s t a rt i c le w e s a w t h a t J u d g m e n t a n d t a s t e a r e e s s e n t i a l to o r d e r l y g e n i u s .

T h e m o s t d i s t in c t i v e p o w e r s c o m p o s i n g g en i u s a r e f o u r : s e n s i b i l i t y(Empf ind-69" Bu t , once a t leas t ,Begeisterungseems to be a posi t ive qual i ty of genius : see XV, N. 812.

In X V, N. 951, we a lso find a d is t inct ion betweenBegeisterungand Schwgrmerei.o ~ ~Reflect ion is for K an t , in th is per iod, a term descr ibing the funct ion of Jud gm ent , as

opposed to "com par i son " o f wi t . Ref lec tion proceeds f rom the whole to the pa r t s , a s sp i r i t does ;only ref lec t ion does notcreatea (new) idea, but i tjudgesabou t the connec t ion be tween anobject and the (given) idea of i t . Judgm entreflects,spir i t vivifies,w it compares.

n Schlapp,op. cir.,p. 142.~ Adickes suggests Herder (XV, N. 921a, note , p . 408) , but there is no evidence in K an t ofsuch an ex t reme con tempt fo r Herder. Kan t r ep r imanded Herder ' s exaggera t ions , bu t had a

cer ta in co nsidera t ion for h im, and he is mo re l ikely to be c lass if ied am ong the "goo d fan at i cs"of XV, N. 921. For a no t ve ry com pl imenta ry remark o f Kan t abou t H erder ' s gen ius , see XV ,N. 912.


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K A N T ' S E A R L Y T H E O R Y O F G E N I U S 1 2 3

u n g ) , J u d g m e n t ( U r t h e i l s k r a ] t ) ,s p i r i t ( G e i s t ) ,73 a n d t a s t e ( G e s c h m a c k ) .A c -

t u a l l y m a n y m o r e p o w e r s c o ~ p i r e i n t h e g e n i a l c r e a t io n ,b u t t h o s e a b o v e a r et h e m o s t c h a r a c t e r is t i c o f g e n iu s ( X V , N . 8 7 4 , 1 7 7 6 - 17 7 8 ) .7 4 A s K a n t d e a ls w i t ht h e p r o b l e m s o f g e n iu s i n s e c t io n s o f h i s n o t e b o o k s a n d o f h is l e c t u re s w h i c h a r es p e c ia l ly d e v o t e d t o th e p s y c h o - e m p i r i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n o f b e a u t y , s o m e t i m e s t h ef o u r e l e m e n t a r y p o w e r s a r e e x c lu s i v e l y re f e r r e d t o t h e g e n e r a l h e a d i n g s " t h e o r yo f t a s t e ," " f in e a r t , " o r " b e a u t y , " 75 w i t h o u t m e n t i o n i n g g e n iu s . B u t , a s th e d i s -c u s s io n ex p a n d s v e r y f r e q u e n t l y b e y o n d t h e b o u n d a r i e s o f a e s t h e ti c s , a n d e m -b r a c e s , in a w i d e r t h e o r y o f o r i g i n a l c r e a t i o n , a l l o f t h e p r o d u c t s o f g e n i u s i n sc i -e n c e a n d t e c h n i c a l a r t , it w i l l b e m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e t o r e l a te t h e m t o g e n i u s , a sK a n t o f t e n d o e s w h e n h e r e f e rs t h e m t o k n o w l e d g e i n g e n e ra l .TM

W e a l r e a d y k n o w h o w s p ir i t w o r k s ( w 1 6 7 A s f o r s e ns ib i li ty , J u d g m e n t , a n dt a st e , a n i n q u i r y a b o u t t h e ir s t r u c t u r e s g o e s f a r b e y o n d t h e l im i t s o f t h is p a p e r .W e w il l t h e r e f o r e o n l y s u m m a r i z e o u r r es u l ts i n t h a t f i eld ( t h e d o c u m e n t a t i o ns h a ll b e g i v e n in a n o t h e r w o r k ) , a n d r e l a t e t h e m t o g e n iu s a n d t o e a c h o t h e r i nt h is p e c u l ia r c o n s t e ll a ti o n . T h e f o u r e l e m e n t s a p p e a r v e r y o f t e n t o g e t h e r i n t h em e n t i o n e d f o r m , w h e t h e r e x p l i c i t l y r e f e r r e d t o g e n i u s , o r n o t . 77 T h e i r c o n s t e l l a -t i o n i s f i rs t m e t i n 1 7 7 1, 7s b u t s o m e t i m e s i t u n d e r g o e s m i n o r v a r i a t i o n s .TM

B e c a u s e o f t h e i r o r ig i n in th e s t u d y o f t h e t h e o r y o f b e a u t y , o u r f o u r e l e m e n t sa r e s o m e t i m e s a b s o r b e d i n th e a e s t h e t i c s i d e o f k n o w l e d g e , s ~ a n d , a s s u c h , t h e ya r e o n c e c a l le d " s u b j e c t iv e f o u n d a t i o n s o f p l e a s u r e " ( X V , N . 8 7 3, 1 7 7 6 - 1 7 7 8 ) ,a n d , a t a n o t h e r t im e , t h e y a r e r e la t e d t o a es t h e t ic k n o w l e d g e ( a i m i n g t o w a r d

" 73 As we a l ready k now , sens ib il ity, .. Ju dg m en t , a nd tas te are e lem en tary p ow ers , bu t sp i r i tis a mo re genera l e leme nt v iv i fy ing a l l pow ers (see w As such i t i s of te n ident i fied wi th geniusi ts e lf , o r w i th th e sum o f the o the r p owers p lus the i r v iv i f i cat ion . I t mu s t , however, be r e -mark ed tha t s ens ib i li t y is a d i f fe ren t k ind o f v iv i f i ca t ion ( see w Ac tua l ly,G e i s tvivifiest h r o u g h concep t s ,no t t h r oug h sensa t ions . Sens ib i l i ty is a k ind o f r ecep t ive , pas s ive v iv i f i ca -t ion , whereas sp i r i t is spon taneous . S ens ib i l it y s eems to be equa ted wi thN a t u r e U , F l e i s s(seeXV , N . 934). Bu t concep t s s eem to be v iv i fy ing on ly a s connec ted w i th sensa t ions o r a s seeni n concre te(see w

~4 XV , N. 960 (1776-1778): " [ ch such e n ich t d ie ph ysisch e U rsach e des genies , i . e . Ein-b i tdungskra f t -Ged i t eh tn i s , denn d i e se s t ehen n i eh t i n unse re r Gewal t , sonde rn d i e l e i t endeKr~f t e , we lche den Na t i i r l i chen r i ch tung geben , a l so b los das fo rma le p r inc ip ium."

See : Sch lapp ,op. c i r. ,p. 59 (1771); XV, N. 779 (1772-1777), N. 916 (1775-1778) and N. 958(1775-1778); X V I, N . 1815 (1771-1775), N . 1825 (1772-1775), and 1857 (1776-1778).

~8 See SchlauD . omcir. , ~).75 (1772) where g en ius is no t m en t ioned , bu t t he fo u r powers seemto be referre d ~t~) 'know!edge in general . Th e,sam e in XV I, N . 1834 (1,7,72-1.778), wh ere "A es th e-t i c " m e a n s n o t o n l y p e r t i n e n t t o b e a u t y b u t , m o r e g e n e r a ll y, p e r t i n e n t t o t h e s e n si b leo r i n tu i t i ve pe r fec t ion o f know ledge , " and . i n X VI , N . 1815 (1771-1775). The fou r pow ers a rerefer red to knowledge in genera l , and, a t the same t ime, to genius , in XV, N. 738 (1769-1775) ,where the p laces of sp i r i t and genius are exch anged , in X V, N . 771 (1772-1775) , N. 812 (1769-1778), N. 817 (1769-1778), and in XVI, N. 1894.

~7 See S chlap p, pp. 59, 75; XV , N . 752, 779, 806 , 812 , 817 , 858, 873, 874, 916, 958 , 977; X V I,N . 1834, 1844, 1845, 1846, 1847.

7s Sch lapp ,op. c i r.p. 59.79 In X V, 738 (1769-1775) , sp i r i t tak es the p lace of genius as a m ore genera l e leme nt , and

comp rehends (1 ) gen ius , (2) t a s t e , (3) r igh t r eason [ an equ iva len t o f Judg me n t ] . Sens ib i l i tyis not ment ioned here , as in XV, N. 812 (1769-1778) . In XV, N. 817 (1769-1778) , genius com-prehend s (1 ) sp i r i t , ( 2) Jud gm en t , (3) s ens ib i l it y, and i s conn ec ted to , bu t on the same foo t ingwi th , t a s te . In XV, N . 815 , an "a rch i t ec ton ic in t e l l igence"( a r c h i t e c h t o n i s c h e k o p f , ,i .e.,gen ius- -see w167 nd 7 for archi tec ton ic re la ted to genius) com preh end s (1) sp i r i t , (2) experm nce[= sens ib i l i ty] , (3) reason [ = Jud gm ent] , (4) tas te . X V I, N. 1902 (1778-1779) con ta ins a st i llmo re i r r egu la r con s t e ll a t ion .

80 Aes the t i c pe r fec t ion o f knowledge i s no t on ly r e fe r r ed to f ine a r t bu t , m ore gene ra l ly,to the sens ib l e d i s t inc tness o r ev idence o f knowledge in g ene ra l . See Tone l l i,op. c i r. ,pp. 167-185, 221 , 304.


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t r u t h ) a n d a r e t e r m e d " s u b j e c t i v e " a s o p p o s e d t o t h e o b j e c t i v i t y o f i n t e l l e c t

a n d i n t u i t i o n (Anschauung;X V I , N . 1 8 34 , 1 7 7 2 - 1 7 7 8 ) . s l R e f e r r i n g t o t h e mp r o b a b l y a s a w h o le , o r in t h e i r p r o p o r t i o n , X V, N . 8 7 4 ( 1 7 7 6 -1 7 7 8 ) s a y s t h a tt h e y c a n n o t b e ta u g h t .

w W e s h a l l n o w p ro c e e d t o e x p o s e t h e r e s u lt s o f o u r re s e a r c h o n t h e f o u re l em e n t s . T h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h r e e o f t h e m ( s e n s ib i l it y, J u d g m e n t , a n d t a s t e ) , c a n -n o t b e d e f i n ed w i t h in t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e o r y o f g e n iu s o n l y. T h e y a r e t h e o b j e c to f v e r y l o n g d is c u ss io n s b y K a n t , w h i c h w e s h a ll n o t r e l a t e , t a k i n g h e r e i n t oc o n s i d e r a t i o n o n l y w h a t t h e i r s t r u c t u r e is w h e n t h e y a r e r e f e r r e d t o a s m e m b e r so f t h e f o u r - p o w e r c o n s t e ll a t i o n .

S e n s i b i l i t y c o n c e r n s t h esens ible content,v i v i f i e s t h e s e n se s , g i v es m u c h t of e e l i n g , e x c i t e s a n d m o v e s(Reiz und Ri~hrung),c o r r e s p o n d s t o t h e peculiarityo f t h e sensiblec o n t e n t ( o f a r e p r e s e n t a t io n , o r o f a p r o d u c t ) , a n d i t is p r o d u c -t i v e ( b r i n g s s o m e t h i n g n e w i n t o t h e s e n s i b l e fi e l d ) .

J u d g m e n t c o n c er n s t h eintellectual ]orm o] the ]oresaid sensations,i . e . , i t un i -f ie s, o r d e r s o r h a r m o n i z e s t h e m , l i m i t i n g t h e i r p l a y w i t h i n t h e m s e l v e s a n d i n c o n -n e c t i o n w i t h t h e i d e a o r c o n c e p t o f t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g o b j e c t , i n s o f a r a s t h euniversalityo f t h i s concepti s c o n c e r n e d ; t h a t i s , i t r e f e r s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t o i t se s s e n t ia l e n d ; b u t i t d o e s n o t p r o d u c e a n y t h i n g , i t o n l y l i m i t s g e n i u s .

S p i r i t c o n c e r n s t h eintellectual content,i . e . , i t v i v i f i e s t h e i n t e l l e c t , g i v e s m u c ht o t h i n k a b o u t , c o n c e r ns ( a s w e k n o w f r o m w 1 6 7 t h e o r i g i n a l i ty o f i d ea s , vi z .,t h e s u b j e c t i v i t y o f i n t e l l e c t u a l l aw s o r t h e p e c u l i a r i t y o f c o n c e p t s , a n d i t i s p r o -d u c t i v e , s2

Ta s t e c o n c e r n s t h esensible/orm o] the ]vresaid ideas,i . e . , i t l i m i t s a n d o r d e r st h e m t h r o u g h s e n s ib i li ty, r e n d e r i n gsensibly universal (--e v i d e n t ) t h o s e s u b -j e c t i v e n o t i o n s (Privatdenken),t h r o u g h t h e p r o p o r ti o n , s y m m e t r y, a n d h a r m o n yo f t h e i r s e n s i b le f o r m ; i t l i m i t s g e n i us , a n d d o e s n o t p r o d u c e a n y t h i n g .

N o w , h o w d o o u r f o u r p o w e r s p r a c t i c a l l y w o r k t o g e t h e r ? O n l y X V , N . 8 1 7a l lo w s u s a g li m p s e in t o th e a c t u a l p r o c e s s ; u n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h ef o u r p o w e r s i s o n t h is o c c a s i o n s o m e w h a t a n o m a l o u s , s~ A n y w a y, t h e p r o c e s sr u n s a s fo l lo w s : " . . . J u d g m e n t d e t e r m i n e s t h e id e a o f w h a t a th i n g o u g h t to b e .T h e f i gu r e, i n w h i c h s u c h a t h i n g a p p e a r s , m u s t n o t c o n t r a s t w i t h t h e i d e a . T h u s ,J u d g m e n t b o u n d s a n d l i m i t s t h e p l a y o f s e n s i b i l i t y, b u t i t g i v e s a t r u e u n i t y t o i ta n d r e i n f o r c e s i n t h is w a y t h e i m p r e s s io n . T h e m i n d i s in t e r e s t e d b y e m o t i o n s ,i t i s p u t i n t o m o t i o n a n d a c t i o n b y s p i r i t, g o e s t h r o u g h t h e m u l t i p l i c i t y, r e a c h e s a ni d e a, c o m e s b a c k a g a in , a n d p r o p o r t i o n s t h a t m u l t i p l i c i ty i n i ts ( t h e m u l t i p l i c -i t y ' s ) c h o i c e a n d r e l a t i o n s h i p s , b o t h i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h a t i d e a a n d w i t h i t s e l f

81 Of course we know that a non fanat ic genius produces not only works of ar t , but valuab leknowledge too , especial ly in respect to the m ethod of obtaining knowledge. Bu t we are notable to say, a t the present t ime, whether such genial e lements in valuable knowledge aregeneral ly considered by K ant assubjective.Although i t i s sure that a t leas t some uses of Judg-me nt , outs ide genius , are considered by K an t object ive, about 1779, even tas te , general lyconsidered as subjective, seems to become, at least in some respect, objective.

In X V, N . 976 (1776-1778), Jud gm ent is identified w ith analysis, spiri t w ith sy nthe sis.s~ See fo otn ote 79.


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( i.e ., r e f e r r i n g to t h e r e l a ti o n s h i p o f t h e e l e m e n t s o f t h e m u l t i p l i c i t y t o e a c h o t h e r ) .

T h e l a s t i s t a s te , w h i c h is n o t h i n g b u t a j u d g m e n t o f th e m e a s u r e o f t h e i m p r e s -s io n s, a s f a r a s t h i s m e a s u r e h a s t h e u s e o f m o v i n g i n a p r o p o r t i o n e d w a y t h ew h o l e r e c e p t i v i t y o f t h e s o u l, i. e. , w i t h o u t i n f r i n g i n g i t w i t h i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s . . . . ,,8 4

B e f o r e w e a t t e m p t a n i n f e r e n t i a l c l a r if i c a ti o n o f t h i s p r o c es s , w e s h a ll i n t r o -d u c e a s u r v e y o f t h e d i f f e r e n t f i e l d s i n w h i c h i t t a k e s p l a c e , i . e . , o f t h e d i f f e r e n tk i n d s o f g e n i a l c r e a t i o n .

w K a n t e s t ab l is h e s a d i s t in c t i o n b e t w e e n p r o d u c t s o fa r t a n d p r o d u c t s o fgen ius .A r t c o n s i s t s i n g i v i n g a c e r t a i n d i s p o s i t i o n t o t h i n g s ( X V, h i . 3 3 1 , 1 7 7 3 -1 7 7 8 ), a n d t h i s r e q u i re s a n e x e m p l a r w h i c h o n e m u s t r e p r o d u c e t h r o u g h d i li g e nc e ,c o n f o r m i n g t o g i v e n ru l e s ; i t i s, p r o p e r l y s p e a k i n g , o a l y a w o r k ( X V , h i . 8 1 2 ,1 7 6 9 - 1 7 7 8 ) ; i t is l ik e a m e t h o d i c a l l y a n d r e g u l a r l y d i s p o s e d g a r d e n ( X V , l~ l. 7 5 4,1 7 7 2 ) . S o m e a r t s a r e o n l y t h is , a s c r a f t s( H a n d w e r k e )w h i c h c a n n o t b e c o n n e c t e dw i t h s p i r i t (ge i s t e s l ee r ) .B u t o t h e r a r t s m a y b e c o n n e c te d w i t h s p i r it(ge i s t e s f i i -h ig ) a l t h o u g h a c t u a l l y t h e y a r e n o t a l w a y s ( X V , hi . 9 5 8 a n d N . 9 7 4 , 1 7 7 6 - 1 7 7 8 ).

G e n i u s , a s o p p o s e d t o n o n g e n i a l a r t , i s i n v e n t i o n( d i c h t e n ,X V , h i . 3 3 1 ) ; i t i st a l e n t a n d s p i r it , f r e e d o m ( X V , N . 8 1 2 ) ; i t is li k e a w o o d p r o d u c e d b y f r e e a n df e r t i l e n a t u r e ( X V , N . 7 5 4 ) .

I n o n e p l a c e t w o k i n d s o f g e n iu s a r e d i s t i n g u i s h e d : o f i d e a s o r i n v e n t i o n , a n do f e x e c u t io n o r m a n n e r( v i r t u o s i ,X V, N . 8 1 2 ) . B u t , i n a n o t h e r , g e n i u s a n d v i r t u -o s i t y s e e m to b e d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s ( X V , N . 9 2 7 ) .

G e n i u s is d i r e c t e d t o w a r d ( 1 ) a r t s o f g en i u s , ( 2 ) s c i e n ce s o f g e n iu s ( X V , h i.8 1 2 ) . 85 G e n i u s i s t e r m e d " a p o w e r f o r p r o d u c i n g o r i g i n a l l y p e r f e c t i o n i nk n o w l e d g e , " a n d t h i s p e r f e c t i o n m a y b e e i t h e r a e s t h e t i c ( c o n s is t in g i n n o v e l t y,f a c i l it y, li v el in e s s, b r e a d t h ) , o r lo g i ca l ( c o n s is t in g i n t r u t h , u n i v e r s a l i t y, p u r i t y - -X V I , N . 1 8 2 1 , 1 7 6 9 - 1 7 7 5 ) . 8 s

A r t o f g e n iu s is a p u r e p l a y o f s e n t i m e n t s a n d i m a g e s, u n i fi e d t h r o u g h a n i d e aa s in p o e t r y o r i n fi c t io n a l l it e r a t u r e ( X V , h i. 9 2 1 a , 1 7 7 5 - 1 7 7 8 ) . A r t s o f g e n i u sm a y b e m u s ic , p a in t i n g , a r c h i t e c t u r e , g ar d e n i n g , b u t e s p e c i a l ly p o e t r y ( X V , h i.8 1 2 ) . R h e t o r i c s e e m s t o b e p e r t i n e n t t o g e n i u s , b u t i t i s m o r e s u b j e c t e d t o r u l e st h a n p o e t r y ( X V, N . 9 22 , 17 7 5 - 1 7 78 ) . A s a n e x a m p l e o f p o e t i c ge n iu s , M i l t o n is

m e n t i o n e d ( X V , N . 7 7 8, 1 7 7 2 - 1 7 7 3 ) .s~ "D ie Urthe i lskraf t best immt die Idee, was e igent l ich e ine Sache se yn sol l . D ie G e-

sta l t , wie s ie erscheint , muss d er Idee nicht wieders t re i ten. Die U rthei lskraf t b indet a lso undschr~inkt das Spiel der Sinntichkeit ein, aber sie giebt ihm wa hre ]~inheit u nd v ers ti irk t dad urc hden Eindruck. Das Germ fi th wird dureh rf ihrungen interess iert , durch Geis t in Bewegung undact ion versetz t , l~uf t das Mannigfal t ige durch, geht bis zur Idee, yon da wieder zur i ik undoropo rt ionier t es in seiner Wahl und Verh~l tnissen na ch derselben und unte r e inander. DasLe tzter e ist Geschm ak, welches nichts ande res ist als das Urtheil f iber das M aas der Ein-drf icke, in so fern es dazu dient , d ie gantze E mpfindsam kei t der Seele proport ion ir t zu r i ihren,d.i . ihr durch keine wiedersprfiche irgendwo abbruch zu thun."

8~ See also Sc hlap p,op.cir., p. 62.86 Ae sthetic ~enius is not exclusively oloerative in fine arts and po etry , an dlogicalgenius

not ex clusively~n science. A s i t appears f rom other contexts , there is a kind of genial bea utywhich refers to an inte l lectual ly def ined idea(wesentliche SchOnheit),a l though b eau ty i s moregeneral ly a s imple play to which the idea gives un i ty, b ut in which i t has no inte l Iectual func-t ion. And genial sc ience is not only phi losophy, which cannot be demonstra tedin concretoor aesthet ical ly, but a lso cosmology (which probably m ay be a t leas t pa r t ia l ly endow ed withsensible evidence) , or a new mathem atical metho d (which cer ta in ly m ay be proved intu i t ively ) .


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126 HIST ORY OF PHI LOS OPH Y

w Genius, as related to science, aims at an augmen tatio n of knowledge, of in-

tellect and reason (XV, N. 921a). In all sciences, especially of reason, it isnecessary, first of all, to invent architecturally the general idea, or the whole;and this is a task for genius. Examples of such leading ideas are "humanity,""republic," "the best world," "justice" (XVI, N. 2835, 1769-1777). This abilityto in vent which one cannot be taught consists in the m e t h o dof a science, s7

In mathematics there are no ideas, except the invention of a new mathematicalmethod (XV, N. 943, 1772-1778, and N. 812); mat hemati cs is the field of con-cepts made intuitive, not of ideas; it does not proceed from whole to parts, butfrom universal to particu lar (XV, N. 943). M athemat ics may be taught , ss

Cosmology seems to be directed by genius, as its inventions seem to be some-thing more than imitation, although imitation is a necessary step to reach them.Kant mentions in this connection Newton and Kepler (XV, N. 778).

As we already know, some minor inventions in the fields of natural science arenot the fruit of genius, but of talent only (XV, N. 969). Philosophy is the scienceof genius p a r e x c e l l e n c e :everything in it is pertinent to an idea (XVI, N.2835). It cannot be taught . 89 It is impossible to teach philosophy, only to philos-ophize2 ~ Nevertheless, philosophical ideas are n ot v ivifying ; only ideas in natureand art are (XV, N. 943). In order to understand this point, we must rememberthat metaphysical and ethical ideas are possible only i n a b s t r a c t o ,i.e., they arespiritual i d e a s but not spiritual i dea l s91 ;therefore, they cannot be connected withsensibility; they lack vivification both as it is found in sensibility (emotion) andas in taste (evidence) ; and, as spirit seems to be vivifyi ng only as a general vivi-fication of all talents, ideas cannot viv ify.

As it appears, philosophy, "the true land of ideas," seems to be emphaticallysponsored as a s c i e n c e o f m e t h o d .

It must be remarked that Kant uses the terms "invention" and "discovery" asequivalents in connection with genial ideas.

w We must, then, try to figure out how the process described in w works in atleast two different realms: genial art (of beau ty) and genial science.

In genial art (of beau ty), apparen tly the process is started by the passive vivi-fication of sensibility, i.e., by excitement (or grace, R e i z ) and emotion ( R i i h r u n g ) ,notions closely related to those of life and vividness, which in turn correspondto the clearness of a representation, or to the multiplicity of its characters, and toa more elementary order in such characters, which makes them easier to grasp( ] a s s l i c h ) ~in a quite subjective or private way. So, a certain representation (ofa real or imaginary object) is endowed with a peculiarly stimulating physiog-nomy, catching the a ttention and putting the mind into motion.

The next step consists in relating the s e n s i b l e c o n

kant's early theory of genius- tonelli

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