kevin staley-al-kindi on creation aristotle's challenge to islam

Al-Kindi on Creation: Aristotle's Challenge to IslamAuthor(s): Kevin StaleySource: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1989), pp. 355-370Published by: University of Pennsylvania PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2709566 .Accessed: 30/10/2014 11:26

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AL-KINDI ON CREATION: ARISTOTLE'S CHALLENGE TO ISLAM

BY KEVIN STALEY

Ya'qub ibn Ishaq al-Kindi (c. 800-870) was the first philosopher of Islam. It is difficult to overstate the incredible intellectual vitality of the period of Islamic culture to which his thought belonged. The translation movement had grown from its early beginnings in the eighth century into what has been called a full-fledged scramble for Greek scientific and philosophical texts on the part of the caliphate and wealthy citizens alike.1 This period also witnessed the political ascendancy of the dialectical theologians known as the Mu'tazilites, who began to adapt philosophical methods to theological matters.2 It would be a mistake, however, to construe this period merely as an Hellenization of Islam. Early in the Abbasid period the separation of theology (kaldm) and the study of the law (shari'ah) into two distinct disciplines took place, and each profited from its new independence. The four major schools of jurisprudence were already established by al-Kindi's time, and the canonization of the Tra-

'See M. Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy (New York, 1970), 21ff. Although some early historians identified al-Kindi as a translator himself, this is probably not the case. See G. N. Atiyeh, Al-Kindi: The Philosopher of the Arabs (Rawalpindi, 1966), 14, and M. Moosa, "Al-Kindi's Role in the transmission of Greek Knowledge to the Arabs," Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society, 15 (1967), 1-18. However, al-Kindi played a key role in forming the conceptual apparatus and technical vocabulary that were necessary for meaningfully appropriating Greek thought. In his "On the Definitions of Things and Their Descriptions" (R. fiHudud al-Ash ya wa Rusumiha, ed. M. CA. H. abu Ridah in Rasa' il al-Kindi al-Falsafiyah [Cairo, 1950-53], I, 165-80), al-Kindi gives a number of definitions for each of ninety-six philosophical terms in an effort to recast the abstract conceptual data of Greek thought into the predominantly poetic language of the Arabs. See Atiyeh, 12.

2 Al-Kindi's precise relationship to the Mu'tazilite theologians is a matter of debate. Richard Walzer has argued for a very close relationship on the basis of overwhelming doctrinal and methodological similarities. See R. Walzer, "New Studies on al-Kindi," Greek into Arabic: Essays on Islamic Philosophy (Oxford, 1962), 175-205. Alfred Ivry argues that this evidence is insufficient for showing any intimate or unique relationship between al-Kindi and the Mu'tazilites. He argues that these similarities might be shared by anyone who is more or less rationally oriented to one's faith. Ivry prefers to see al- Kindi as a solitary man, happy with his science and philosophy with "apparently little inclination for insisting upon the particulars of religious or political creeds." See A. Ivry, Al-Kindi's Metaphysics (Albany, 1970), 32. Walzer has made too strong a claim by identifying al-Kindi as a "Mu'tazilite theologian" (Ibid., 187), while Ivry's position that al-Kindi stood aloof from the concerns of the theologians seems equally excessive. The distance between al-Kindi and the Mu'tazilites-as regards their methodology, principles, and origins-appears to be that between philosophy and theology. This relationship is carefully defined by al-Kindi, as I hope to show.

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Copyright 1989 by JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS, INC.


356 KEVIN STALEY

ditions of the Prophet led to the consolidation of Sunnism as well as to the development of Islam's own historical consciousness.3 In the midst of all this intellectual vitality, al-Kindi's thought stands as a highly creative and unique appropriation of the wealth of scientific and philosophical texts which had become available.4

In spite of this pervasive Hellenic influence, al-Kindi remained sen- sitive and committed to his Moslem creed, but it would be mistaken to construe al-Kindi's introduction of philosophy to Islam merely as an introduction of philosophical methodology into traditional theological speculations. The first part of perhaps his greatest treatise, On First Philosophy, did something more than that. It was nothing less than an invitation to Islam to philosophize. Thus, al-Kindi exhibited a deep respect for the ideals of philosophy and the Philosopher himself. Never- theless, unlike later Moslem philosophers such as Ibn-Sina and al-Farabi, he was compelled to overturn a tenet central to the Aristotelian Physics and Metaphysics and directly contrary to the Moslem creed, namely, the eternity of matter, motion, and time.

In this essay, I hope to do justice to the unique position which al- Kindi holds within the intellectual history of Islam by examining his philosophy of creation. Because part of his uniqueness lies precisely in the fact that he handled this doctrine philosophically, I begin by looking at al-Kindi's definition of philosophy and its relation to revelation and theology. In the second part of the essay I provide a detailed analysis of al-Kindi's argument for the non-eternity of the world. The final sections of the essay are devoted to a criticism and assessment of al-Kindi's position from an Aristotelian perspective.

I. Al-Kindi defines philosophy as "knowledge of the true nature of things, insofar as it is possible for man."5 As a human art or science, philosophy must attain truth through research (talab) and effort (tak- alluf). Unlike prophetic knowledge, which is granted to particular in- dividuals immediately through inspiration (ilham) and purification

3 For a concise discussion of this period in Islamic history, see W. M. Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology (Edinburgh, 1962), 72-81.

4 One can trace the intellectual inheritance evidenced within al-Kindi's writings to Aristotle, Plato, Porphyry, the Stoics, John Philoponus, and Nicomachus, among others. See A. Ivry, "Al-Kindi's On First Philosophy and Aristotle's Metaphysics," Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science, ed. G. F. Hourani (Albany, 1975); H. Davidson, "John Philoponus as a Source of Medieval Islamic and Jewish Proofs of Creation," Journal of the American Oriental Society, 89 (1969), 357-91; and M. E. Marmura and J. M. Rist, "Al-Kindi's Discussion of the Divine Existence and Oneness," Medieval Studies, 25 (1963), 338-54.

5 On First Philosophy (fi al-Falsafah al-Ula), 97, 9 (henceforth identified as FP), from A. Ivry's translation in his Al-Kindi's Metaphysics (Albany, 1974); reference is to the abu Ridah pagination of the Arabic edition (97-162) given in the columns of Ivry's text.


AL-KINDI ON CREATION 357

(tathir), the path of philosophy is long and arduous.6 Therefore, although the findings of philosophy are in agreement with revealed truth, it is to be strictly distinguished from prophetic knowledge "which human beings are unable by their very nature to attain through nature alone."7

Al-Kindi also distinguishes philosophy and theology proper. Philo- sophical investigation does not take its start from revealed truths. Rather, it begins with those concepts which "are verified in the soul, validated and rendered certain through the veracity of intellectual principles which are known necessarily...." It is characteristic of these concepts that they are free from all imagery of sense and imagination: "This is a perception of the soul which is not sensory, is necessary, and does not require an intermediary."8 The richly concrete and poetic language of the Koran alone rules it out as a candidate for providing the first principles of philosophical discourse.

Al-Kindi does not, therefore, intend to replace revelation and theology with philosophy, but he does grant philosophy its own charter and its independence from revelation. This was bound to raise suspicion. Al- Kindi no doubt encountered opposition on this score. Unfortunately, the specific historical details of this situation are sparse. Suffice it to say that al-Kindi anticipated such opposition and attempted to convince his fellow Moslems of the benefits of the new science he was introducing. In the text with which I am principally concerned, On First Philosophy, he not only presents an account of the nature and aim of philosophy; he also gives an apologia for its utility and harmony with Islam's own quest for truth:9

The knowledge of the true nature of things includes the knowledge of Divinity, unity, and virtue, and complete knowledge of everything useful, and of the way to it; and a distance from anything harmful, with precautions against it. It is the acquisition of all of this which the true messengers brought from God, great be his praise.

6 For an English translation of al-Kindi's discussion of the distinction between human science and prophetic knowledge taken from his treatise "On the Number of Aristotle's Books," see R. Walzer, "New Studies on al-Kindi," Greek into Arabic, 178.

7 Walzer, 178, and Atiyeh, 28-32. 8FP, 107, 13-108, 3 (page, line number). Failure to follow this methodological cri-

terion is largely responsible for the error and confusion which attend investigations of matters divine: "For this reason many of the inquirers into things which are beyond nature have been confused, since they, as children [do], have used in their investigation of them their [sensible] representation in the soul . ." (FP, 110, 15ff). Clearly the Koran, which is largely poetic narrative, falls into this class.

9 FP, 104, 8-10. Ivry suggests that this formulation of revelation may have increased opposition to al-Kindi's philosophical endeavor, for in this summary there is apparently no room "for such Islamic principles as fasting, pilgrimage, or prayer." In effect, al- Kindi is attempting to minimize doctrinal particularities ("Al-kindi's On First Philosophy and Aristotle's Metaphysics," 23).


358 KEVIN STALEY

Al-Kindi here refers, of course, to the prophets, but he does so in order to emphasize the like-mindedness of the philosopher and prophet. Each is bound by the same constraint and in pursuit of the same good, truth. Therefore, "we ought not," al-Kindi urges, "be ashamed of the truth and of acquiring it wherever it comes from, even if it comes from races distant and nations different from us. For the seeker of truth nothing takes precedence over the truth. "'o

In an eloquent paraphrase of a passage from "Alpha ellaton" of the Aristotelian Metaphysics, al-Kindi expresses his deep appreciation of the Greeks: 1

It is proper that our gratitude be great to those who have contributed even a little of the truth, let alone to those who have contributed much truth, since they have shared with us the fruits of their thought and facilitated for us the true (yet) hidden inquiries. ... If they had not lived, these true principles with which we have been educated would not have been assembled for us, even with intense research throughout our time.

The very arduousness of philosophical endeavor calls for the co-operation of all men. Al-Kindi argues that those who fail to appreciate the con- tribution of the Greeks suffer from a narrow understanding, dirty envy, and the lack of true religion.12

In al-Kindi's eyes, First Philosophy is by far the best among the arts and sciences that the Greeks bequeathed to Islam: "The noblest part of philosophy and the highest in rank is First Philosophy, i.e., knowledge of the First Truth, Who is the cause of all truth. "'3 Because First Phi- losophy is knowledge of the First Cause, it is prior to, more noble than, and virtually contains the truths of all other arts and sciences.'4 Moreover, First Philosophy is the most certain of the human sciences. Because the First Cause is independent of matter and motion, man's knowledge of this cause is independent of sensation and imagination. First Philosophy is not, therefore, subject to the error and vicissitudes of sense and fancy. Beginning with truths grasped by the intellect alone, First Philosophy attains to the apodictic certitude proper to demonstrative sciences. Error and confusion arise only when one attempts to utilize imaginative representation and sensation in matters metaphysical.'5

Al-Kindi remained confident that the results of First Philosophy would ultimately be in agreement with revealed truth; but Mecca and Athens were in conflict on at least one serious issue, whether or not the world was created in time. The philosopher whom al-Kindi perhaps had

10 FP, 103, 4-5. 1 FP, 102, 10-14.

12FP, 104, 2-9. 13 FP, 98, 1. 14 FP, 98, 15. 15FP, 112, 15ff.



admired the most, Aristotle, had taken a stance directly opposed to that of revelation. Of course the fallibility of a particular philosopher need not entail the incompatibility of philosophy and theology. However, al- Kindi's confidence in their compatibility remained something of a prom- issory note, and to make good his claim he set out to demonstrate on philosophical grounds what his fellow Moslems accepted on faith.

II. In its most general form, al-Kindi's attempt to demonstrate the non-eternity of the world and its creation in time consists of the following premises. 1) All that is quantitative (which includes body, time, and motion) is finite. 2) But time is the measure of the being of the body of the universe. 3) Therefore, the universe is of finite duration, that is to say, it must have a temporal beginning with regard to its very existence. 4) But the body of the universe cannot have been the cause of its own existence. 5) Therefore, it has been caused to exist by another, in time, and from nothing.

The success of his argument depends, then, on his establishing three crucial premises. First, he must show that time is quantitatively finite. Secondly, he must verify that time is the measure of the total duration of the universe and not only of a part of that duration. Finally, he must show that the universe cannot be the cause of its own existence. I will consider each of these premises in turn.

Premise One: At the heart of al-Kindi's demonstration of the non- eternity of the world is his proof that an actually infinite quantity is impossible. Although he maintains that this is the case precisely inasmuch as something is subject to quantity, his initial argument in On First Philosophy deals only with the impossibility of an infinite bodily magnitude.

He begins his demonstration by supposing that there is an actually infinite body. By showing that this supposition entails false and contradictory results, he proves the impossibility of an infinite body through a reductio ad absurdum. In order to get the proof underway, he makes a second supposition, namely, that a finite magnitude is subtracted from this infinite body. He then specifies the mutually exclusive results of such a subtraction: "If there is an infinite body, then whenever a body of finite magnitude is separated from it, that which remains of it will either be a finite or infinite magnitude. "6 The stage is now set for the decisive moves of his argument.

Suppose that the remainder of the subtraction of a finite magnitude from an infinite magnitude is finite. It is evidently true that the sum of the subtrahend and the remainder must equal the original magnitude. The conjunction of a finite subtrahend and a finite remainder can never yield an infinite quantity. If both the subtrahend and the remainder are

16FP, 115, 1.


360 KEVIN STALEY

finite, it follows that the original magnitude must have been finite. But it was supposed to be infinite. Therefore, the supposition of a finite remainder yields an impossible contradiction.17

Suppose, then, that the remainder is infinite. In this case, the remainder and the subtrahend together must "either be greater than or equal to what it [the remainder] was before the addition [of the subtrahend]." 18 Obviously the whole composed of the remainder and the subtrahend cannot be equal to the remainder; for this entails that the whole is equal to a part of the whole-which is impossible.19 It remains then that the whole composed of the subtrahend and the remainder (the original infinite body) must be greater than the remainder alone. But this is also impossible, as al-Kindi sees it.

By hypothesis, the remainder itself is infinite. Therefore, if the infinite whole is greater than the remainder alone, then one infinity is greater than another. Al-Kindi argues for the impossibility that one infinite quantity be greater than another by observing that the "smaller of the two is equal to a portion of the greater."20 But "two equal things are those whose similarity is that the dimensions between their limits are the same."21 If the lesser infinite, then, is equal to a portion of the greater infinite, it must have limits-given the nature of equality. Thus, "the smaller infinite object is finite, and this is an impossible contradiction. "22

Having argued that the supposition of either a finite or infinite remainder yields impossible contradictions, al-Kindi's reductio is complete. He immediately draws his intended conclusion: "It has now been explained that it is impossible for a body to have infinity and in this manner,"

17FP, 115, 2-6. 8 FP, 115, 8-9.

19 FP, 116, 1-4. See also "On the Explanation of the Finitude of the Universe," Abu Ridah, 188; tr. N. Rescher and H. Khatchadourian in "Al-Kindi's Epistle on the Finitude of the Universe," Isis, 56 (1965), 429.

20FP, 115, 13. 21FP, 115, 14-15. 22FP, 115, 17. See also "On the Unity of God and the Finitude of the Body of the

Universe" (abu Ridah, 202-4; translated in Al-Kindi: Cinq Epitres [Paris, Editions du Centre National La Recherche Scientifique, 1976], 94) and "On What Cannot Be Infinite and Of What Infinity May Be Attributed" (abu Ridah, 194-98; tr. F. A. Shamsi in Islamic Studies, 14 [1975], 137-38). Al-Kindi offers a somewhat different argument in his epistle "On the Explanation of the Finitude of the Universe": since the supposed smaller infinite can be subtracted from the larger, the smaller infinite must be equal to some portion of the greater infinite. An addition to this portion is obviously possible, since it is part of but less than the greater infinite magnitude. But if an addition to the portion is possible, then it is finite "because addition in it is possible." This argument rests on the premise that no addition can be made to an actually infinite magnitude, rather than a premise about the nature of equality (see Rescher and Khatchadourian, 431-32). Although some recent mathematicians agree with al-Kindi on this point, Cantor's set theory allows for the addition but does not allow the initial subtraction of the lesser infinite from the greater in the first place (see Craig, 80-85).



he adds, "it has been explained that any quantitative thing cannot have infinity in actuality."23 This addition is far from casual, for from it al- Kindi draws one of the crucial premises for his argument for the non- eternity of the world, namely, that time itself must be finite. He continues: "Now time is quantitative, and it is impossible that time have infinity in actuality, time having a finite beginning."24

Even if time is finite, al-Kindi does not yet have his intended conclusion, namely, that the universe as a whole has its very beginning in time. Time, for al-Kindi, is the measure of motion. It is at least conceivable that the body of the universe could have existed in some fashion prior to any motion and therefore to the beginning of time. Like the stone which precedes in existence the warmth it receives from the sun, the present universe may only be a temporary agitation of an eternal substratum, destined to resolve itself back into a state of motionlessness. Such a view of the universe is far from fantastic. It had in fact been embraced by several of the ancients with whom al-Kindi was no doubt familiar from his reading of Aristotle.25 In this case creation ex nihilo as well as creation in tempore are effectively ruled out. Al-Kindi must, then, provide support for perhaps the most crucial premise in the overall argument, namely, that time is the measure of the total being of the universe.

Premise Two: Al-Kindi's response to this challenge is fairly straight- forward. Time is the measure of motion. Therefore, motion never exists without time nor time without motion.26 Consequently if body never exists without motion, then body never exists without time. Time will be co-extensive with the total being of the universe. Al-Kindi argues intensively for this conclusion, for with it his entire demonstration stands or falls.

Having shown that motion never exists without body,27 al-Kindi be-

23FP, 116, 5-6. 24FP, 116, 7-8. Five pages later, al-Kindi advances another argument to show that

time must be finite: if past time were infinite, since an infinite cannot be traversed, one could never arrive at some definitely known time-including the present. So past time must be finite. Since past time must be finite, future time must be finite as well; for the forward progression of time will only add finite and determinate periods to a finite past (FP, 121, 5-122, 9). This is not as independent an argument as it first seems; for one can speak of traversing time in this way only if one assumes that time is like a bodily magnitude, the parts of which co-exist and can be traversed in succession. This assumption is most evident in "On What Cannot Be Infinite And Of What Infinity May Be Pred- icated" (see Shamsi, 139-40). Therefore, the demonstration of the impossibility of an actually infinite bodily magnitude remains fundamental in al-Kindi's overall strategy.

25 See Aristotle's Metaphysics, 983b, 6 ff. 26

... time is but the number of motion, i.e., it is the duration counted by motion. If there is motion, there is time; and if there were not motion, there would not be time" (FP, 117, 5-6).

27FP, 117, 7-14.


362 KEVIN STALEY

gins his first argument by assuming the opposite of his intended conclusion. Suppose that body exists and that it is without motion. One of the two alternatives must follow. Either motion is absolutely absent, and it is impossible that it should ever be present; or it is absent, yet its presence remains a possibility. If neither of these alternatives actually obtains, al- Kindi will have shown that his original supposition is false and will have established his intended conclusion.

It is simply not the case, however, that body by its very nature excludes motion as a radical impossibility. Al-Kindi has shown that motion is always the motion of some body. Thus, the fact that we observe motion is sufficient to show that at least some bodies are subject to and do not exclude motion all together. Motion is therefore not an impossibility for body as such.28

Only the second alternative remains. Suppose that the body of the universe is completely without motion, and yet motion remains a possibility. Al-Kindi argues that this supposition is also false; for if there is body and it is possible for that body to be in motion, then some body must (already) be in motion. In short, possibility entails prior actuality, for we say something is possible with respect to a certain substance only if similar substances actually possess it. We affirm the ability to speak of the newborn because other humans have already learned how to speak.29 If motion is a possibility for body, then it must actually exist in some body. Body and motion must ultimately be concomitant. The original assumption that there can be body without motion is false. When there is body, there is motion necessarily.30

In a second argument al-Kindi addresses more directly the opinion that the universe was originally at rest and only subsequently moved. He

28 There are problems with the original manuscript here. The text, as emended by Ivry, reads in translation as follows: "If there is a body and there was no motion, then either there would be no motion at all, or it would not be, though it would be possible for it to be. If there were no motion at all, then motion would be a non-existent. However, since body exists, motion is an existent, and this is an impossible contradiction; and it is not possible for there to be no motion at all if body exists" (FP, 117, 15-118, 1). I take the phrase "no motion at all" to signify the absolute impossibility that body ever be in motion. This is justified to the extent that al-Kindi contrasts "no motion at all" with a situation in which there is no motion, yet motion remains a possibility. Secondly, the premise "since body exists, motion is an existent" is taken to be an appeal to the empirical fact that motion exists (following Ivry, 155, n. 117.17). If taken literally, it asserts as a premise the proposition which al-Kindi wants to prove.

29 FP, 118, 4-6. Al-Kindi has in mind not only logical, but temporal priority as well. If it were not for the necessity of temporal priority, the conclusion that body is at no time without motion would not follow.

30 "Motion, therefore, necessarily exists in some bodies, and exists in the simple body (al-jirm al-mutlaq), existing necessarily in the simple body; accordingly body exists and motion exists" (FP, 118, 5-10). By "simple body," al-Kindi means the outermost of the heavenly sphere in the Aristotelian cosmos.



begins by posing another disjunction: either the universe is created, that is, generated out of nothing, or it is eternal. If it has come into being from nothing, it is impossible that it should ever exist without motion; for creation itself is a kind of motion.31 On the other hand, if it is eternal, it is impossible that it should ever have passed from a state of rest to a state of motion. In this case what is eternal would have moved from actual rest to actual motion, but the eternal is by definition changeless. Therefore, if the universe is eternal or was at one time without motion, even now there would be no motion. On either supposition then, it is impossible that the universe should have ever preceded motion. The universe is in motion; and whenever it is, it must be in motion.32

The force of these argument is to establish that the world has had a beginning in time. Time and motion are, according to al-Kindi, "the number of the duration of that which changes. "33 Because time is necessarily concomitant with motion and motion with body, time is necessarily concomitant with body: "body, motion, and time are therefore not prior to one another, and they occur simultaneously in being. "34 There- fore, if time is of limited duration, a conclusion which al-Kindi takes to have been established in the first set of arguments, then the body universe is also of limited duration, which is to say that it has a beginning in time, or better, that it began when time itself began.

Of course one could always agree that the universe had a beginning in time, but respond that it is its own cause. In order to establish his intended conclusion al-Kindi must, therefore, establish the third and final premise in his main argument, namely, that the universe could not have been the cause of its own being or, as al-Kindi puts it, that the universe "could not have been the cause of its essence."

Premise Three: Al-Kindi begins by posing a fourfold disjunction, which includes all of the permutations of the relationship between a thing and its essence. Either 1) a thing is non-existent, and its essence is non-

31 "If it is a generation from nothing, the coming to be of being from nothing being generation, then its becoming is a motion ..." (FP, 118, 19). It is quite clear that al- Kindi here assumes: 1) that creation is a kind of generation and 2) generation itself is a kind of motion (harakah). Here al-Kindi departs from Aristotle, and he often construes generation/corruption as if it were a change from one contrary to another. (See FP, 113, 11; see also Physics 224b 35-225b 9.) This will prove to be quite an unfortunate classification of creation for al-Kindi; for it implies (correctly in Aristotle's eyes) that any sort of generation or change will presuppose an existent substratum.

32 Al-Kindi offers a third argument for this premise: Body is by nature composite. Composition is itself a kind of motion. Therefore, motion belongs to body by nature. (See FP, 120, 6-121, 3.) This argument simply assumes that that which is composite has at some time been composed. Al-Kindi seems to be aware of the problem (see FP, 121, 2). For a detailed analysis of this argument and its historical precedents, see Davidson, 371-72.

33FP, 120, 15-16. 34FP, 120, 20.


364 KEVIN STALEY

existent, 2) a thing is non-existent, but its essence exists, 3) a thing exists but its essence is non-existent, or 4) a thing exists and its essence exists. If in each of these cases a thing cannot be the cause of its own essence, then, since they cover all the relevant possibilities, the intended conclusion follows by default. In the first case, neither thing nor essence exists, and so one cannot be the cause of the other. Again, in the second case, the thing is non-existent. As a thing and its essence are identical, it is contradictory to suppose that one could exist without the other. The third alternative can be ruled out on the same grounds. This leaves only the fourth alternative, in which the thing and its essence are supposed to exist. However, since a thing and its essence are identical and the same thing cannot be the cause of itself, it is clear that something cannot be the cause of the existence of its own essence. Therefore, the universe cannot be the cause of itself.35

Al-Kindi's demonstration is now complete. The duration of the body of the universe must have had a beginning in time. As such, it requires a cause, but this cause must be distinct from itself. Therefore, it has been caused to exist by another in time. The universe has been created in time.

III. Al-Kindi's argument can be challenged in several ways. These challenges will vary, of course, according to one's point of departure. A mathematician might question al-Kindi's mathematical operations with infinite quantities. Cantorian set theory, for example, argues that an actual infinite does exist, that one infinite can be greater than another, and that it is not contradictory to say that an infinite part of an infinite set is equal to (has a one-to-one correspondence with) the whole infinite set itself. Although al-Kindi's mathematics is central to his position, an analysis of al-Kindi's work in light of contemporary mathematics has already been carried out by William Craig and F. A. Shamsi.36 Therefore, I have selected Aristotle as al-Kindi's critic-as seems especially a propos given that much of al-Kindi's philosophical aspiration reflects an Aris- totelian inheritance.

Aristotle agrees that an actually infinite body is impossible. Unlike al-Kindi, he does not establish his position using mathematics. He appeals instead to "physical" considerations concerning the nature of the basic elements, their natural places, and so forth.37 Nevertheless, it is not this difference in methodology that brings al-Kindi and Aristotle into conflict.

35 FP, 123, 3 - 124, 16. 36 See Craig, 69-110, defending al-Kindi against the objections of Cantorian set theory.

For Shamsi, on the other hand, Cantor wins the day (see 123-33). 37 In the Physics Aristotle sees mathematical and physical analyses as distinct concerns:

"We seem to be inquiring into something general [concerning the infinite as an attribute], namely, whether there is among mathematical entities an [actual] infinite [extension] ... but since our investigation concerns sensible things, we are especially interested in asking whether or not there is among sensible things an infinitely large [actual] body"



An Aristotelian analysis turns one's attention away from the mathematical assumptions implicit in al-Kindi's arguments towards their deeper ontological presuppositions. There are two points of interest here. First, al-Kindi moves from the conclusion that an actually infinite body is impossible to the conclusion that time must also have some beginning. Although Aristotle agrees with the first conclusion, he explicitly argues that it is impossible that time have a beginning. Secondly, al-Kindi argues that creation is a kind of first motion or change. Aristotle argues that it is impossible that there should ever have been some motion absolutely first in time. Each of these issues is indicative of a fundamental problem in al-Kindi's position, as Aristotle would see it, namely, an inadequate understanding of the ontology of motion and change, infinity, and actuality and potentiality.

Let me begin then by reviewing for a moment Aristotle's account of motion. Aristotle defines motion as the actualization of the potential precisely inasmuch as it is potential.38 The actuality of the buildable, precisely inasmuch as it is buildable, is the process of building itself. The completed house has changed or come to be, but it is no longer actually being built. As long as the building materials are in simple potency to becoming a house, the house is not yet being built. Motion, in this case the process of building, falls mid-way between complete actuality and simple potency; and "this," Aristotle notes, "is why it is hard to grasp what motion is: it is a sort of actuality, or actuality of the kind described, hard to grasp, but not incapable of existing."39

Time, motion, and bodily magnitude are all quantitative inasmuch as each is a continuum divisible into parts.40 Furthermore, each can be divided ad infinitum. Thus, Aristotle remarks: "time, [motion], and spatial magnitude are subject to the same divisions. If either is infinite, so is the other. And each is infinite in the same way as the other."41 A bodily magnitude can be said to be infinite inasmuch as it is potentially divisible into an infinite number of parts, as is also the time during which

(Physics III, 5, 240a 32-240b 3; tr. R. Hope in Aristotle's Physics [Lincoln, 1961]). Aristotle then argues against an actually infinite body on the grounds that: a) the basic elements must exist in definite proportion to one another, which would be impossible if any or all of them were infinite and b) everybody must have a natural place, which would be impossible for an infinite body (see also, De Caelo, I, 5-7). Al-Kindi seems to have been well aware that he was departing from Aristotle's approach, as Rescher and Khatcha- dourian point out in their introduction to the epistle "On the Explanation of the Finitude of the Universe" (see 426 and 432).

38 Physics III, 1, 201a 10ff. 39 Physics III, 2, 201b 33-202a 2. 40Physics VI, 1-2, esp. 231b 18-20 and 232a 22ff. 41 Physics VI, 2, 233a 17-18.


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motion over such a magnitude takes place.42 Aristotle calls this sort of infinity potential, as opposed to actual, infinity.43 Given that magnitude, time, and motion are all potentially infinite in this way, one can see why al-Kindi might argue that, since an actually infinite body is impossible, the duration of the universe must also exclude infinity or eternity. How- ever, this overlooks the crucial difference between magnitude, on the one hand, and motion and time on the other-a difference which lies not so much in their quantitative nature as in their ontological status. This may be seen as follows.

We speak of motion from X through Y to Z as having the parts XY and YZ. If we consider motion inasmuch as it is divided according to the division of magnitude, then part of its motion (XY) will have already been completed (and thus no longer motion), while part will not yet be complete (YZ).44 Any given motion therefore, when considered as having parts, is composed of a series of successively completed motions which, unlike the parts of a body, cannot co-exist. If they were actually to coexist, then the same body would both be and not be at the same place at the same time; or better, it would exist at the same place at the same time, and there would be no motion. Therefore, the very being of motion essentially depends upon potentiality. Motion is by definition an incomplete actuality, the being of which depends upon its incompleteness.

When a body is actually divided into parts, it is only potentially whole. When these parts are joined, the body is completely actual and wholly existent. When a given motion or period of time is complete, however, it is finished, used up, over. In short it is no more because incompleteness and potentiality are of its very being.

Clearly then, for Aristotle as much as for al-Kindi, no motion can be actually infinite. It can exist only inasmuch as its parts succeed one another through time, whereas an actually infinite quantity requires that its parts co-exist as a whole. What is more, all motion is from one term to another, from here to there, black to white, from privation to posses-

42 The potential infinity of magnitude is what is primary, according to Aristotle: "Thus, movement is infinite because the magnitude is infinite over which movement or alteration or increase takes place; and time is infinite because movement is so" (Physics III, 7, 23 ff).

43 "There is no actual infinite, but there is an infinite potentially and by division.... Accordingly, that is infinite of which it is always possible, in regard to quantity, to take a part outside what has already been taken" (Physics, III, 7, 206b 12 and 207a, 8-9).

44 Strictly speaking, taken without qualification this premise is false. If motion from X to Y will have been completed, the body in question will have come to rest at Y. In that case motion from X to Y will be numerically distinct from the motion from Y to Z; and the entire motion from X to Z will no longer be a single, continuous motion. It will be composed of two distinct motions. However, inasmuch as we imagine the division of motion according to the division of magnitude, we imagine it to be composed of a series of successively completed motions which do not coexist. We speak of motion as successive when we consider its parts, and as continuous when we consider it as a whole.



sion, etc. Therefore, motion is of its very nature from one limit to another, from beginning to end.45 If, however, there were a motion the end of which coincided with its beginning, then such a motion could be infinite, i.e., of indefinite duration. Such is precisely the case with circular motion.

If one considers any point along a circular path, it is at one and the same time the beginning and end of the motion. Unlike rectilinear motion from X to Y, there is no point on the circular path at which the body in motion must come to rest. It is always in motion from the same point to the same point at the same time, for which reason one who walks in circles get nowhere. Any segment of motion along a circular path will be finite. In this sense, circular motion will be composed of an unlimited number of successive motions. But again, these parts do not co-exist, so there is no question here of there being an actual infinite. The infinity or unlimitedness of circular motion, like the being of motion itself, has its very being in potentiality; for having arrived at any one point along the circular path, a body in circular motion will always be in potency to the next. Nothing prevents circular motion, which is one motion in virtue of its continuity, from extending (into the past and into the future) indefinitely. It is possible, then, that the motion be eternal because a body in circular motion is always in potency to further motion.46

In light of Aristotle's ontology of motion, al-Kindi's demonstration that an actually infinite body is impossible is simply not to the point. Aristotle can fully accept his argument, and still advance unhindered the possibility of eternal motion precisely because the indefinite duration of motion depends on potency rather than actuality. Aristotle sums up this situation as follows in Physics III, 6:47

Hence, we must not take the infinite as actually individual, like a man or a house; rather does the infinite have the kind of being which a day has or which the games have-that is to say, the kind of being which does not belong to a concrete primary being that has come into being, but the kind of being which consists in continual coming into being and passing away, which is finite on each occasion, but which even so is different. But in magnitude it happens that what has been taken [for example, in the division of a line] persists; whereas

45 Physics, VI, 9, 241a 26ff. 46 Physics, VIII, 8-9, 265a 13-266a 10. 47 206a 30-206b. 2. William Craig argues that this distinction is irrelevant, at least

with respect to past events: ". . . since past events, as determinate parts of reality, are definite, distinct and can be numbered, they can be conceptually collected into a totality. Therefore, if the temporal sequence of events is infinite, the set of all events will be an actual infinite" (Craig, 96). He then argues that arguments against actual infinites would apply to past events. But Craig's objection rests on an equivocation. By "actual" he means "having really occurred." But, in this context, by "actual" Aristotle means "existent." Clearly, past events are not "a part of reality," as Craig maintains, if by actual one means "existent." They were, but are no longer. Thus, for Aristotle the impossibility of an actual infinite would not be relevant.


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in time and in the generations of man, the parts taken pass away, but the supply does not fall.

Of course, to have shown the possibility of eternal motion is not to have demonstrated that the universe is actually subject to eternal motion. However, in order to establish this stronger conclusion, Aristotle need only appeal to another premise, the truth of which al-Kindi himself admits, namely, that there can never be a time in which body is without motion. Al-Kindi has argued that the supposition-that the body of the universe was at one time at rest and yet open to the possibility of motion is an impossible supposition; and he did so on the ground that possibility requires prior actuality. And this is to say that any given motion presupposes a motion prior to itself. In a similar fashion Aristotle argues that if the universe had been initially at rest and only subsequently began to move, then one must account for this fact. Either an impediment to this motion must have been removed or the cause of the supposed initial motion must have been brought into contact with the body which began to move. In either case, one supposes another motion prior to any motion supposed to be first.48 In short, if there is every any motion, motion must have always been.

This brings one to the second, and perhaps the weakest moment in al-Kindi's argument, namely, the assumption that creation itself is a kind of motion or change. In order to assess this problem, one must turn once again to Aristotle's definition of motion and change, and again the problem hinges on the element of the potential involved in any change. Motion and change are the acts of the moveable and the changeable as such. But the moveable or changeable is not simply nothing. Absolute non-being is not in potency at all. Even generation presupposes something that undergoes change. Therefore, if creation were an instance of motion or change, it too would presuppose something capable of or in potency to motion or change. Now it is impossible that the creator himself, the true One, should be subject to motion. Only creatures are subject to change. Therefore, if creation were an instance of motion or change, it would presuppose the prior creation of that which is capable of motion and change. And this prior creation would presuppose a creation prior to itself-and so on ad infinitum. Motion will therefore be without beginning, as well as time which is its measure.

Al-Kindi's created world has suddenly become Aristotle's eternal cosmos, and Aristotle would be quick to point it out. The only way to stop such a regress of motion would be either a) to deny that creation is a kind of generation or motion or b) to suppose that there existed an eternal substratum capable of receiving creative activity, but not itself the product of creation. Al-Kindi is not prepared to adopt the first

48 Physics, VIII, 1, 251a 9-25 b 10.



alternative, as it would undermine his argument for the concomitance of time with the total being of the universe.49 If he were to adopt the second, however, creation ex nihilo becomes an impossibility, and no doubt al- Kindi would be quick to recognize this.

Stepping back for a moment, one can assess al-Kindi's situation as follows. Al-Kindi has in effect established the truth of the proposition that if there is ever any motion, there must always be motion. Al-Kindi fails to exclude the possibility of eternal motion (and time) because he fails to take into account the peculiar sort of being which is proper to motion.50 Motion exists as incomplete actuality. Because it is actual, it always presupposes something prior to itself. By reason of its inherent incompleteness, its actuality cannot sufficiently account for itself. On the other hand, because it is essentially incompleteness in process towards completeness and actuality, motion as such always looks beyond itself towards an indefinite succession of partial completions. The most perfect motion, then, according to Aristotle, is that motion whose end is its beginning, or better, that motion which in completing itself always keeps itself open to further completion. This is circular motion, and circularity

49 See note 31 above. Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi has noted that al-Kindi adds ibda' to the traditional categorization of motion and change (harakah); and it differs precisely inasmuch as it presupposes no substratum. For a discussion of this term, together with the Arabic texts, see Walzer, "New Studies on al-Kindi," 187-90. A thoroughgoing analysis of al-Kindi's terminological classification of change (including such terms as tabaddul, istihalah, and harakah) is of utmost importance for a final determination of the validity of al-Kindi's position, as there are inconsistencies in usage throughout On First Philosophy. See Ivry, notes 113.11, 114.3, and 113.9. Such an analysis, however, lies beyond the scope of the present essay.

50 Al-Kindi does give cursory consideration to the notion of potential infinity. He remarks, for example, that "it is possible through the imagination for something to be continually added to the body of the universe, if we imagine something greater than it, then continually something greater than that-there being no limit to the addition as a possibility-the body of the universe being potentially infinite, since potentiality is nothing other than the possibility that the thing said to be in potentiality will occur" (FP, 116, 13-16). He adds that time and motion are also potentially infinite in this fashion. Given a time which is first, it is possible to imagine a time before it. Nevertheless, al-Kindi immediately adds that in actuality it is impossible that they have infinity. It is important to keep in mind that such imaginative representation is of no cognitive significance for the philosopher, according to al-Kindi, especially for the First Philosopher. See note 8 above. The sort of possibility al-Kindi has in mind here should, therefore, be construed along the lines of a barren possibility or fanciful hypothesis. Ivry has grasped the significance of this passage as regards the light it sheds on al-Kindi's position vis a vis Aristotle: "This depreciating of the potential existence as related to infinite entities is fundamental to al-Kindi's position, and goes to the heart of his difference with Aristotle. For the Stagirite viewed time, motion, and magnitude as infinite, each in its own way, but all potentially so, understanding their potentiality as a necessary and not merely possible kind of existence.... Indeed, this acceptance of the ontological legitimacy of the potential enables Aristotle to consider the universe as eternal, though in actuality we perceive only finite time, movement, and magnitude" (see Al-Kindi's Metaphysics, 152).


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is the perfection of motion as motion, that is, of a being whose very being depends on the fact that it ever fail completely to be.

There is, of course, a great price to be paid here, for Aristotle's universe is inevitably a universe which is always in motion but is never going anywhere. It is an eternal universe precisely because it constantly lacks that which it strives to attain. Elsewhere, for example, Aristotle argues that the Prime Mover moves as an object of desire. The secret impulse of motion is, as it were, the desire on the part of everything else to attain that which is first and best. But by the same token, his eternal universe is a universe of constant frustration; for if the Prime Mover ever be attained, desire for what is lacking would yield to joy in a good possessed, and motion would cease.

It is only at this level that I think one can appreciate the challenge that the Aristotelian Physics and Metaphysics put to al-Kindi and other philosophers of the revealed religions. Their universe, whether Muslim, Christian, or Jew, was a universe of promise and fulfillment. Creation- a unique, singular, historical event in time-is, ontologically speaking, every bit as incomplete as Aristotle's motion; but it looks beyond itself in the hope that in the fullness of time when, weary with its own incompleteness, its motion should come to rest, its desire come to term. To argue that the universe has been created in time is thus an affair of great moment, for it is an expression of hope that what begins in time will find its completion at the end of time. It may well be that such hope can never be demonstrated, which is only to say that the medieval philosophers of the revealed religions, including al-Kindi, could never dis- pense with revelation.

Saint Anselm College.


Article Contentsp. 355p. 356p. 357p. 358p. 359p. 360p. 361p. 362p. 363p. 364p. 365p. 366p. 367p. 368p. 369p. 370

Issue Table of ContentsJournal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1989), pp. 355-523Front Matter [pp. 408 - 490]Al-Kindi on Creation: Aristotle's Challenge to Islam [pp. 355 - 370]Francis Bacon's Instauratio: Dominion of and over Humanity [pp. 371 - 390]The Ethics of Animal Experimentation in Seventeenth-Century England [pp. 391 - 407]Music Theory as Scientific Propaganda: The Case of D'Alembert's lmens De Musique [pp. 409 - 427]Kant on Desire and Moral Pleasure [pp. 429 - 442]New Evidence of the Link between Comte and German Philosophy [pp. 443 - 463]The Synthetic Politics of Woodrow Wilson [pp. 465 - 484]NotesMorrow on Coleridge's Church and State [pp. 485 - 489]

ReviewRadical Politics and Ashcraft's Treatise on Locke [pp. 491 - 510]

Notices [pp. 511 - 512]Books Received [pp. 513 - 523]Back Matter

kevin staley-al-kindi on creation aristotle's challenge to islam

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