khairaj

11
Within the railway industry, the need for computer sy stems to perform safety-critical tasks is constantly increasing. A typical application is the rai the signals and switches on railway lines and are therefore responsible for safe train operation. An incorrect output from such a system may in t domain are axle counters along railway lines, computer systems on board trains, and field element controllers that operate under rough environm Figure 1: Electronic interlocking for mainline rail. All these systems have an important common Due to the variety of applications with these common requirements, THALES Rail Signalling Solutions has developed a generic faul t-tol erant computer platfor m that fulfils them, and thus enabl es the applicati on progra mmers to full y concentrate on developing the correct application. Due to the increasing c omplexity of applications, it is also necessary that the platform be able to keep up with ever increasing demands for processing power, memory consumption and connectivity. This trend can only be addressed by the use of off-the-shelf hardware and operating systems. In order to be able to keep up with the advances in hardware and operating systems, these components should be as interchangeable as possible, such that exchanging them does not compromise the system's safety integrity. For this reason, the middleware that implements the safety functions is strictly separated from the rest of the system. This layered structure can be seen in Figure 2. Figure 2: TAS control platform layer structure.

Upload: dhirendra-inkhiya

Post on 10-Apr-2018

217 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: khairaj

8/8/2019 khairaj

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/khairaj 1/11

Within the railway industry, the need for computer systems to perform safety-critical tasks is constantly increasing. A typical application

the signals and switches on railway lines and are therefore responsible for safe train operation. An incorrect output from such a system

domain are axle counters along railway lines, computer systems on board trains, and field element controllers that operate under rough

Figure 1: Electronic interlocking for mainline rail.

All these systems have an important common

Due to the variety of applications with these common requirements, THALES Rail Signalling Solutions has developed a generic

fault-tolerant computer platform that fulfils them, and thus enables the application programmers to fully concentrate on

developing the correct application. Due to the increasing complexity of applications, it is also necessary that the platform be able

to keep up with ever increasing demands for processing power, memory consumption and connectivity.

This trend can only be addressed by the use of off-the-shelf hardware and operating systems. In order to be able to keep up withthe advances in hardware and operating systems, these components should be as interchangeable as possible, such that

exchanging them does not compromise the system's safety integrity. For this reason, the middleware that implements the safety

functions is strictly separated from the rest of the system. This layered structure can be seen in Figure 2.

Figure 2: TAS control platform layer structure.

Page 2: khairaj

8/8/2019 khairaj

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/khairaj 2/11

The core hardware containing the CPU board and the interfaces represents the lowest level, and is cleanly separated from the

rest of the system. This means that the hardware best suited for each purpose is utilized (eg for rail signalling systems powerful

processors and a large amount of memory is needed, whereas for on-board systems low-end hardware with increased

environmental resistance is preferred), and that CPU upgrades can be easily performed for new platform generations without

major impact on the rest of the system.

The operating system is compliant with POSIX (Portable Operating System Interface), and is currently based on a microkernel.

The next platform generation will be based on a more powerful operating system with a Linux kernel, which will bring benefits

regarding hardware support and real-time performance.

The main innovation of the platform is its safety middleware, which is the decisive element that makes it suitable for safety-

critical applications. The safety middleware ensures the clean separation of the lower levels (hardware and operating system)

from the application, and provides all services to ensure safety. The safety middleware also provides the ability to run the

platform in redundant configurations.

The applications on top of the layered architecture provide the actual services. The platform can be operated in three

architecture variants (Figure 3). The 2oo3 ('2-out-of-3') configuration provides both the required level of safety and fault-tolerance

mechanisms to enhance availability. In this configuration, all safety-critical decisions are subject to a majority voting procedure,

such that a failure of one element is detected and tolerated. A 2oo2 configuration provides the same level of safety but a lower 

level of availability, since in the case of a conflict of output values between two elements, a failure of one element is detected but

not tolerated, since it cannot be decided which one is correct. Finally, a 1oo1 configuration allows an application to be safely

operated on a single hardware element, but requires the generation of a diverse application according to specified diversification

rules. Software diversity ensures that the same level of safety is achieved.

Figure 3: Architecture variants.

The safety middleware layer (Figure 2) provides the communication services to globalize data amongst replicated hardware and

thus ensures a consistent view even in the case that one replica is faulty and sends erroneous and inconsistent data messages.

Page 3: khairaj

8/8/2019 khairaj

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/khairaj 3/11

The API to access these services is implemented as voted message queues. An application transparent voting service enables

the reliable detection of faults and the isolation of the faulty replica. This runtime environment for safety-critical applications also

ensures replica determinism which is a prerequisite for software execution and voting on redundant hardware. In addition, the

platform allows safety-critical applications to access only a limited part of the operating system API, so that replica determinism

and safe execution within the runtime environment is guaranteed.

To ensure that no latent faults are aggregated in the hardware, the platform also performs continuous online testing of thehardware. This online testing, which is performed by a background task, covers the CPU, memory, buses, clocks and disks.

Finally, the platform allows safety-critical applications to access only a limited part of the operating system, so that the safe

execution environment of the application is guaranteed.

The platform, launched in 2001, is a well-established product and in operation in more than twenty countries on four continents.

It has demonstrated that its safety and reliability approach fits for all vital railway applications within THALES Rail Signalling

Solutions. To cope with rapid technology changes in hardware and software, functional enhancements and new concepts for 

fault detection and tolerance are currently being developed. The next generation of the platform will provide enhanced support

for software and hardware diversity, to ensure that the same level of safety can be maintained in the long term with future

hardware and software.

Links:

http://www.thalesgroup.com/markets/Activities/Ground-Transportation.html

Page 4: khairaj

8/8/2019 khairaj

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/khairaj 4/11

 

Description

Railway Signalling is a complex and fascinating research and development area in railways. The puand efficient movement of trains on the railway. Two major worldwide markets in railways are M

Systems (Metro, LRT (Light Rail Transit), Tramway). This project investigates all aspects of raSystems to design and develop national signalling solutions. The initial target of the project is to

(signalling literature and information infrastructure, railway signalling lab, development team, teamfirst road map, some technical blue prints, requirements analysis and system architecture des

programs.

Fixed Block Systems

Looking back over the past few decades, railway signaling technology has been based mainly on th(ref1, ref2) principle. Traditional signalling systems are based on fixed blocks: the railway is dividsignals. A train is not allowed to enter a given track section (=block) before the preceding train hadisadvantages, one being its lack of flexibility: the block size is the same for all trains regardless obig safety distances required by fast trains are imposed on slower trains as well. Obviously this red

The fixed block technology inherently imposed a service limitation because of the need to reserv

Page 5: khairaj

8/8/2019 khairaj

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/khairaj 5/11

increasing patronage, demand grew to achieve higher line capacities on existing rail infrastruwithout major upgrades to the rolling stock and rail infrastructure, intelligent signaling and traitechnology for the new age of rail systems and services. The distance-to-go principle has therefwhich provides flexible control of the buffer block(s) for train separation.

Further to that, the “Moving Block System”, which also operates on the distance-to-go principle,wayside equipment than fixed block systems. They provide considerable cost reductions for personway-side equipment.

Moving Block Systems (CBTC = Communications Based Train Control)

A moving block system (often called CBTC = Communications Based Train Control) does not requirdetermining train position. Instead, it relies on continuous two-way digital communication betweencentre. On a moving block equipped railway, the line is usually divided into areas or regions, each with its own radio transmission system. Each train transmits its identity, location, direction and spenecessary calculations for safe train separation and transmits this to the following train. The radio continuous so the computer knows the location of all the trains in its area all the time. It transmitsgives it a braking curve to enable it to stop before it reaches that train. In effect, it is a dynamic ditravelling at the same speed as the one in front and they all have the same braking capabilities, thmetres (e.g. about 50 metres at 50 km/h). This, of course, would contradict the railways safety posignalling is usually retained - the requirement for a full speed braking distance between trains. Thdata retained on board the following train will cause it to stop before it reaches the preceding trainis that it makes the block locations and lengths consistent with train location and speed, i.e. makin

Future Systems

The future signaling and train control system will very likely be a radio-based moving block syscommunication network to continuously track train location, speed and running direction. The scommunication technologies to ensure data security and allow for interoperability with other sysperformance under an adverse environment of high radio traffic and electromagnetic noioffers a low lifecycle cost and is able to overlay on any existing systems to facilitate syste

Automatic Train Control (ATC): The system for automatically controlling train movement, enforcing trainsafety, and directing train operations. ATC must include ATP, and may include ATO and/or ATS.

Automatic Train Operation (ATO): The subsystem within the automatic train control system that performsany or all of the functions of speed regulation, programmed stopping, door control, performance levelregulation, or other functions otherwise assigned to the train operator.

Automatic Train Protection (ATP): The subsystem within the automatic train control system thatmaintains fail-safe protectionagainst collisions, excessive speed, and other hazardous conditions through acombination of train detection, train separation, and interlocking.

Automatic Train Supervision (ATS): The subsystem within the automatic train control system that monitorstrains, adjusts the performance of individual trains to maintain schedules, and provides data to

adjust service to minimize inconveniences otherwise caused by irregularities. The ATS subsystem also typicallyincludes manual and automatic routing functions.

Communications-Based Train Control (CBTC): A continuous automatic train control system utilizing high-resolution train location determination, independent of track circuits; continuous, high capacity,bidirectional train-to-wayside data communications; and trainborne and wayside processors capable of implementing vital functions.

Page 6: khairaj

8/8/2019 khairaj

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/khairaj 6/11

Page 7: khairaj

8/8/2019 khairaj

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/khairaj 7/11

Page 8: khairaj

8/8/2019 khairaj

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/khairaj 8/11

Train driving based on scale speed (mph or km/h).

Speedometer, odometer and brake control.

Minimum starting voltage and max speed can be selected separately for forward and backward movement.

Selectable acceleration and deceleration momentum.

Realistic simulation of momentum based on train tonnage.

Monitoring of maintenance intervals.

Free configurable engine functions (for built-in decoder functions, sound files, or more complex macro

functions).

Import of images of your favourite locomotive and trains from arbitrary sources and all common formats(among others BMP, JPG, GIF, screen savers, etc) with the complimentary extra softwareTrainAnimator™.

Multiple unit operation with automatic speed compensation

Page 9: khairaj

8/8/2019 khairaj

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/khairaj 9/11

Route Setting FunctionTrain route is ensured by automatic signal and point control according to train diagram.

Sequence Assessment

In case of diagram disrupted, optimal route setting is realized by grasping information on train traffic anddeciding which train has priority to take route.

Train Diagram

Train No. Up/Down Arr. Time Dep. Time Plat. No.

Page 10: khairaj

8/8/2019 khairaj

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/khairaj 10/11

21B Down - 14:15 Plat. 9

18B Up 14:18 - Plat. 11

CASE1: Sequence assessment for train operations running on schedule

Route Setting sequence:

(1)Set the route for 21B to depart from platform 9.• (2)Set the route for 18B to enter platform 11.

CASE2: Sequence assessment for disrupted diagram

Route Setting sequence:

• (1)Set the route for 18B to enter platform 11.

• (2)Set the route for 21B to depart platform 9.

Tracking Function

Train tracking is realized by relating train identification number and change in track circuit status.

Page 11: khairaj

8/8/2019 khairaj

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/khairaj 11/11