koffi annan freedon from fear ch3

7/29/2019 Koffi Annan Freedon From Fear Ch3

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from

FEAR


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The world is now in the fifty-fifth year without war among the major pow-

ersthe longest such period in the entire history of the modern systemof states. In the area of Europe that now comprises the EuropeanUnionwhere most modern wars starteda security community hasemerged:an association of states characterized by dependable expecta-tions that disputes will be resolved by peaceful means.

Moreover,nearly five decades of cold warsustained by a nuclear bal-ance of terror that could have annihilated us all instantlyhave passed.Some observers have lamented that fact, claiming that bipolarity wasstable,predictable and helped keep the peace.But that was hardly truein the developing world: there the cold war was a period of frequentarmed conflict fuelled by both sides in the bipolar world.Once the cold

war ended,that source of external political and material support ceasedto exist.

Freeing the United N ationsfrom the shackles of the cold war also enabled it to playa more significant role. T he 1990s saw an upsurge both in our peacekeeping and inour peacemaking activities: three timesmore peace agreementswere negotiated andsigned during that decade than in the previous three combined.

T he frequency of inter-state warfare hasbeen declining for some time. (For the cor-responding decline in refugee numbers, see figure 6.) Economic globalization haslargely eliminated the benefits of territorial acquisition, while the destructiveness of

modern warfare hasincreased its costs.T he near-doubling in the number of democ-racies since 1990 hasbeen equally important, because established democratic states,for a variety of reasons, rarely fight each other militarily ( see figure 7) .

W ars since the 1990s have been mainly internal.T hey have been brutal, claimingmore than 5 million lives. T hey have violated, not so much borders, as people.H umanitarian conventionshave been routinely flouted, civiliansand aid workershavebecome strategic targets, and children have been forced to become killers. O ftendriven by political ambition or greed, these wars have preyed on ethnic and religiousdifferences, they are often sustained by external economic interests, and they are fedby a hyperactive and in large part illicit global arms market.

In the wake of these conflicts, a new understanding of the concept of security isevolving. O nce synonymous with the defence of territory from external attack, therequirementsof security today have come to embrace the protection of communi-tiesand individualsfrom internal violence.

T he need for a more human-centred approach to security isreinforced by the con-tinuing dangers that weaponsof massdestruction, most notably nuclear weapons, poseto humanity: their very name reveals their scope and their intended objective, if theywere ever used.

T he need f or a mor e human- cent r ed appr oach to secur it y i s r ein for ced by the cont inuin g danger s that weapons of mass destr ucti on pose to humanity


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A s we look ahead, we can see real risks that resource depletion, especially fresh-

water scarcities, aswell assevere forms of environmental degradation, may increasesocial and political tensions in unpredictable but potentially dangerousways.

In short, these new security challengesrequire us to think creatively, and to adaptour traditional approaches to better meet the needsof our new era. But one time-honoured precept holdsmore firmly today than ever: it all begins with prevention.

Preventing deadly conflicts

T here isnear-universal agreement that prevention ispreferable to cure, and that strate-gies of prevention must address the root causes of conflicts, not simply their violent

1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995

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Democracies

Autocracies

Transitionalpolities

Figure 7Democratic,

autocratic andtransitional polities,

1946 1998

Source: M arshall, derived from datafrom the Polity III dataset, C enter for

International D evelopment andC onflict M anagement, U niversity of

M aryland, 1999.

Figure 6Global refugee

population,1965 1998

(Millions)

Source: UN HC R, 2000.

1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995

4

8

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Secur it y begins wi th pr event ion


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symptoms.C onsensusisnot alwaysmatched by practical actions,however.Political lead-

ers find it hard to sell prevention policies abroad to their public at home, because thecosts are palpable and immediate, while the benefits an undesirable or tragic futureevent that doesnot occur are more difficult for the leaders to convey and the pub-lic to grasp.T husprevention is, first and foremost, a challenge of political leadership.

If we are to be successful at preventing deadly conflicts, we must have a clear under-standing of their causes. N ot all wars are alike; therefore no single strategy will be uni-versally effective.W hat isdifferent about the wars that people have suffered since thebeginning of the 1990s?

Several major conflicts in the past decade were wars of post-communist succes-sion, in which callousleadersexploited the most primitive formsof ethnic nationalismand religious differences to retain or acquire power. Some of those conflicts have

already receded into the history books along with those leaders and it is to behoped that the remainder soon will.T he majority of wars today are wars among thepoor.W hy is this the case?

Poor countrieshave fewer economic and political resourceswith which to manageconflicts.T hey lack the capacity to make extensive financial transfersto minority groupsor regions, for example, and they may fear that their state apparatusis too fragile tocountenance devolution. Both are routine instrumentsin richer countries.

W hat thismeansis that every single measure I described in the previoussectionevery step taken towards reducing poverty and achieving broad-based economicgrowth is a step towards conflict prevention. A ll who are engaged in conflict pre-vention and development, therefore the United N ations, the Bretton Woods insti-

tutions, governments and civil society organizations must address these challengesin a more integrated fashion.

We can do more. In many poor countriesat war, the condition of poverty is cou-pled with sharp ethnic or religiouscleavages. A lmost invariably, the rights of subordi-nate groupsare insufficiently respected, the institutionsof government are insufficientlyinclusive and the allocation of societysresourcesfavours the dominant faction overothers.

T he solution isclear,even if difficult to achieve in practice:to promote human rights,to protect minority rights and to institute political arrangements in which all groupsare represented.Wounds that have festered for a long time will not heal overnight.N or can confidence be built or dialogues develop while fresh wounds are beinginflicted.T here are no quick fixes, no short cuts. Every group needsto become con-vinced that the state belongsto all people.

Some armed conflicts today are driven by greed, not grievance. W hereas war iscostly for society asa whole, it neverthelessmay be profitable for some. In such cases,often the control over natural resourcesisat stake, drugsare often involved, the con-flicts are abetted by opportunistic neighbours, and private sector actors arecomplicit buying ill-gotten gains, helping to launder fundsand feeding a steady flowof weaponsinto the conflict zone.

Ever y step tak en t owar ds reducing pover ty and achieving br oad-based economic gr owth is a step towards conflict pr event ion


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T he best preventive strategy in thiscontext is transparency:naming and shaming.

C ivil society actors have an enormousrole to play in this regard, but governmentsandthe Security Council must exercise their responsibility. G reater social responsibility onthe part of global companies, including banks, is also essential.

Finally, successful strategiesfor prevention require usto ensure that old conflictsdo notstart up again, and that the necessary support isprovided for post-conflict peace-build-ing. I regret to say that we do not fully enjoy that level of support in most of our missions.

W hile prevention is the core feature of our effortsto promote human security, wemust recognize that even the best preventive and deterrence strategiescan fail. O thermeasures, therefore, may be called for. O ne is to strengthen our commitment to pro-tecting vulnerable people.

Protecting the vulnerable

D espite the existence of numerousinternational conventionsintended to protect thevulnerable, the brutalization of civilians, particularly women and children, continuesinarmed conflicts. Women have become especially vulnerable to violence and sexualexploitation, while children are easy prey for forced labour and are often coerced intobecoming fighters. C ivilian populationsand infrastructure have become covers for theoperationsof rebel movements, targetsfor reprisal and victimsof the chaotic brutali-ties that too often follow breakdowns in state authority. In the most extreme cases,the innocent become the principal targetsof ethnic cleansers and genocidaires .

International conventionshave traditionally looked to statesto protect civilians, but

today this expectation is threatened in several ways. First, statesare sometimes theprincipal perpetrators of violence against the very citizens that humanitarian lawrequires them to protect. Second, non-state combatants, particularly in collapsedstates, are often either ignorant or contemptuousof humanitarian law.T hird, interna-tional conventionsdo not adequately addressthe specific needsof vulnerable groups,such asinternally displaced persons, or women and children in complex emergencies.

To strengthen protection,we must reassert the centrality of interna-tional humanitarian and human rights law.We must strive to end the cul-ture of impunity which is why the creation of the International CriminalCourt is so important. We must also devise new strategies to meetchanging needs.

N ew approaches in this area could include establishing a mechanism to monitorcompliance by all parties with existing provisions of international humanitarian law.Stronger legal standards are needed to provide for the protection of humanitarianworkers. C onsideration should also be given to an international convention regulatingthe actionsof private and corporate security firms, which we see involved in internalwars in growing numbers.

G reater use of information technology can also help to reduce the pain and bur-densof complex emergencies for the people involved; one example is a programme

To st r engthen protection,

we must r easser t th e

centr ali ty of international

humanitarian and human

r ights law


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called Child C onnect , which helpsreunite children and parentswho have been sep-

arated in wars and natural disaster ( see box 7) .O f one thing we may be certain: without protecting the vulnerable, our peace ini-

tiativeswill be both fragile and illusory.

Addressing the dilemma of intervention

In my addressto the G eneral Assembly last September, I called on M ember Statestounite in the pursuit of more effective policiesto stop organized massmurder and egre-giousviolationsof human rights.A lthough I emphasized that intervention embraced awide continuum of responses, from diplomacy to armed action, it wasthe latter optionthat generated most controversy in the debate that followed.

Some criticswere concerned that the concept of humanitarian intervention couldbecome a cover for gratuitousinterference in the internal affairs of sovereign states.

In wars and natural disasters children often get separated from their parentsand reuniting them

can pose an immense challenge for aid agencies. T he International Rescue Committees C hild

C onnect project wasdesigned to solve thisproblem. T he project usesa shared database open

to all the agencies in the field seeking to reunite lost children with their parents. T hese agencies

can submit data and photographsof unaccompanied children aswell assearch requestsfrom par-

ents. Search proceduresthat once took months can now be completed in minutes, saving both

children and parentsmuch heartache.

For C hild C onnect to realize itspotential, all the tracing agencies in a region need to be ableto submit and review the lost-and-found data on a regular basis. The easiest way to do this, of

course, isvia the Internet, but armed conflictsrarely occur in placeswith robust Internet or com-

munications infrastructures.

In K osovo, the International Rescue C ommittee created a shared satellite/wireless Internet

network in Pristina (www.ipko.org). Every United N ationsagency, the O rganization for Security

and Cooperation in Europe, several national missions, and the majority of non-governmental

organizationsare connected to the Internet 24 hours per day via the network.

Because the marginal cost of this technology is so low, the project is also able to provide free

Internet access to the university, hospital, libraries, schools, local media and local non-govern-

mental organizations. So not only are international organizations getting robust communications

links and saving money, they are helping to support Kosovar civil society and build a long-term

Internet infrastructure for K osovo. T he project hasnow been turned over to an independent local

non-governmental organization that is already completely self-sustaining.

T his project can serve asa model for future humanitarian emergencies. By building a shared

Internet infrastructure, international organizationswill benefit from more reliable communications

at a much lower cost and they will be able to take advantage of shared access to databasesand

other Internet-based applications to improve their effectiveness.

W hen the crisisends, the infrastructure can be left in place and local people trained to maintain it.

Box 7Child Connect:Using theInformationRevolution to findlost children

Without pr otecti ng the vulnerable,our peace ini ti ati ves wi ll be both fr agil e and illusory


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O thers felt that it might encourage secessionist movements deliberately to provoke

governmentsinto committing grossviolationsof human rightsin order to trigger exter-nal interventionsthat would aid their cause. Still others noted that there is little con-sistency in the practice of intervention, owing to its inherent difficulties and costs aswell asperceived national interests except that weak statesare far more likely to besubjected to it than strong ones.

I recognize both the force and the impor tance of these arguments. I also acceptthat the principlesof sovereignty and non-interference offer vital protection to smalland weak states. But to the critics I would pose this question: if humanitarian inter-vention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond toa Rwanda, to a Srebrenica to gross and systematic violations of human rights thatoffend every precept of our common humanity?

We confront a real dilemma.Few would disagree that both the defence of human-ity and the defence of sovereignty are principles that must be supported. A las, thatdoesnot tell uswhich principle should prevail when they are in conflict.

H umanitarian intervention isa sensitive issue, fraught with political difficulty and notsusceptible to easy answers. But surely no legal principle not even sovereignty canever shield crimes against humanity.W here such crimes occur and peaceful attemptsto halt them have been exhausted, the Security Council has a moral duty to act onbehalf of the international community.T he fact that we cannot protect people every-where is no reason for doing nothing when we can.A rmed intervention must alwaysremain the option of last resort, but in the face of mass murder it is an option thatcannot be relinquished.

Strengthening peace operations

W ith the end of the cold war confrontation and the paralysis it had induced in theSecurity Council, the decade of the 1990sbecame one of great activism for the UnitedN ations. M ore peace operations were mounted in that decade than in the previousfour combined,and we developed new approachesto post-conflict peace-building andplaced new emphasis on conflict prevention.

W hile traditional peacekeeping had focused mainly on monitoring ceasefires, todayscomplex peace operationsare very different.T heir objective, in essence, is to assist theparties engaged in conflict to pursue their interests through political channelsinstead.To that end, the United N ations helps to create and strengthen political institutionsand to broaden their base.W e work alongside governments, non-governmental organ-izationsand local citizens groupsto provide emergency relief, demobilize former fight-ersand reintegrate them into society, clear mines, organize and conduct elections, andpromote sustainable development practices.

International assistance to rebuild the economy isan essential complement to thiswork. People will quickly become disillusioned with fledgling institutions, and even thepeace processitself, if they see no prospect for any material improvement in their con-

T he fact that we cannot

pr otect people ever ywher e is no r eason for doing nothing

wh en w e can


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dition. Post-conflict peace-building hashelped to prevent the breakdown of numer-

ous peace agreements, and to build the foundations for sustainable peace.We can claim significant successesamong our peace operationsin the last decade or

so, beginning with N amibia in the late 1980s, and including Mozambique, El Salvador, theCentral A frican Republic, Eastern Slavonia, the former Yugoslav Republic of M acedoniaand,at least partially, Cambodia.W e also encountered tragic failures, none more so thanRwanda and the fall of Srebrenica and the other safe areasin Bosnia.T he many reasonsfor those failures, including those attributable to the United N ationsSecretariat, are dis-cussed frankly and in considerable detail in two reports I issued late last year.

T he structural weaknesses of United N ations peace operations, however, onlyM ember Statescan fix.O ur system for launching operationshassometimesbeen com-pared to a volunteer fire department, but that description is too generous. Every time

there is a fire, we must first find fire enginesand the fundsto run them before we canstart dousing any flames.T he present system reliesalmost entirely on last minute, adhoc arrangements that guarantee delay, with respect to the provision of civilian per-sonnel even more so than military.

A lthough we have understandingsfor military standby arrangementswith M emberStates, the availability of the designated forcesis unpredictable and very few are in astate of high readiness. Resource constraints preclude us even from being able todeploy a mission headquartersrapidly.

O n the civilian side, we have been starkly reminded in Kosovo and East T imor howdifficult it is to recruit qualified personnel for missions.W here do we find police offi-cersquickly, or judges, or people to run correctional institutions to focusonly on law

enforcement needs?A more systematic approach is necessary here aswell.To bring greater clarity to where we stand and how we can hope to progresswith

regard to U nited N ationspeace operations, I have established a high-level panel,whichwill review all aspects of peace operations, from the doctrinal to the logistical. It willsuggest waysforward that are acceptable politically and make sense operationally.

I expect that the panelsreport will be completed in time to enable the M illenniumA ssembly to consider itsrecommendations.

Targeting sanctions

D uring the 1990s, the U nited N ationsestablished more sanctionsregimes than everbefore. Sanctions, an integral element of the collective security provisions of theC harter, offer the Security C ouncil an impor tant instrument to enforce itsdecisions,situated on a continuum between mere verbal condemnation and recourse to armedforce.T hey include armsembargoes, the imposition of trade and financial restrictions,interruptionsof relationsby air and sea, and diplomatic isolation.

Sanctions have had an uneven track record in inducing compliance with SecurityC ouncil resolutions. In some cases, little if any effort has gone into monitoring andenforcing them. In many cases, neighbouring countriesthat bear much of the lossfrom

Post-conflict peace-building has helped t o pr event t he breakdown of numer ous peace agr eements,and to buil d the foundat ions for susta inable peace


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ensuring compliance have not been helped by the rest of the international community

and, asa result, have allowed sanctions to become porous.W hen robust and comprehensive economic sanctionsare directed against author-

itarian regimes, a different problem is encountered.T hen it is usually the people whosuffer, not the political eliteswhose behaviour triggered the sanctionsin the first place.Indeed, those in power, perversely, often benefit from such sanctionsby their ability tocontrol and profit from black market activity, and by exploiting them asa pretext foreliminating domestic sourcesof political opposition.

Because economic sanctionshave proved to be such a blunt and even counter-pro-ductive instrument, a number of governments, and numerous civil society organiza-tionsand think tanksaround the world, have explored waysto make them smarter bybetter targeting them. Switzerland hasled an effort to design instrumentsof targeted

financial sanctions, including drafting model national legislation required to implementthem, and G ermany is supporting work on how to make arms embargoesand otherforms of targeted boycottsmore effective.T he U nited Kingdom of G reat Britain andN or thern Ireland and C anada have also contributed to the debate on how to targetsanctions more effectively.

These efforts are now sufficiently well advanced to merit serious con-sideration by Member States.I invite the Security Council, in particular,to bear them in mind when designing and applying sanctions regimes.

Pursuing arms reductions

T he post-cold-war era hasseen both gainsand setbacksin the realm of disarmament.O n the positive side, the O ttawa Convention banning landmines and the ChemicalWeaponsC onvention have both entered into force.The C omprehensive N uclear-Test-Ban Treaty has been concluded, nuclear safeguards have been strengthened andnuclear-weapon-free zones now embrace all of the southern hemisphere. N uclearweapons numbers have almost halved since 1982, and world military expendituresdeclined by some 30 per cent between 1990 and 1998 (see figures8 and 9).

T he rest of the picture ismuch lessencouraging.Little meaningful progresshasbeenachieved in limiting the proliferation of small arms.T he nuclear non-proliferation regimehassuffered major blowsasa result of clandestine nuclear weapon programmes, thenuclear tests in South A sia and the unwillingness of key states to ratify theC omprehensive N uclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

A dvances in biotechnology are increasing the potential threat posed by biologicalweapons, while negotiations on a verification regime for the Biological WeaponsC onvention are being unnecessarily prolonged. For three years in a row now, theC onference on D isarmament in G eneva hasnot engaged in any negotiationsbecauseitsmembershave been unable to agree on disarmament priorities.

I cannot here review the entire armscontrol spectrum. Instead, I focuson two cat-egoriesof weapon that are of special concern: small arms and light weapons, because

When r obust and

compr ehensive economic

sancti ons ar e di r ected against

authori tar ian r egimes i t

is usual ly the people who

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they currently kill most people in most wars; and nuclear weapons, because of their

continuing terrifying potential for massdestruction.

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

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1,200

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Worldtotal

UnitedStates

FormerSovietUnion

Figure 8Nuclear stockpiles,estimated,1950 2000(Thousands of weapons)

Source: N atural ResourcesD efenseC ouncil, 2000.

Figure 9World militaryexpenditures,1989 1998(Billions of United Statesdollarsconstant1995 dollars)

Note: 1991 estimated.Source: Stockholm Peace ResearchInstitute, SIPRI Yearbook 1999.


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Small arms

T he death toll from small armsdwarfsthat of all other weaponssystems and in mostyears greatly exceeds the toll of the atomic bombs that devastated Hiroshima andN agasaki. In terms of the carnage they cause, small arms, indeed, could well bedescribed as weapons of massdestruction .Yet there is still no global non-prolifera-tion regime to limit their spread, as there is for chemical, biological and nuclearweapons.

Small arms proliferation is not merely a security issue; it is also an issue of humanrights and of development.T he proliferation of small arms sustains and exacerbatesarmed conflicts. It endangers peacekeepers and humanitarian workers. It underminesrespect for international humanitarian law. It threatens legitimate but weak govern-mentsand it benefits terrorists aswell asthe perpetratorsof organized crime.

M uch of the cold wars small armssurplusfinished up in the worlds most danger-ousconflict zonesand, asthe number of weapons in circulation increased, their pricedeclined, making accessto them ever easier even in the poorest countries. In parts of A frica in the mid-1990s, for example, deadly assault riflescould be bought for the priceof a chicken or a bag of maize. Reducing the toll caused by these weaponswill be dif-ficult, not least because of the extraordinary number in circulation, which some esti-matesput ashigh as500 million.

A n estimated 50 to 60 per cent of the worlds trade in small arms is legal butlegally exported weaponsoften find their way into the illicit market.T he task of effec-tive proliferation control is made far harder than it needsto be because of irrespon-sible behaviour on the part of some states and lack of capacity by others, together

with the shroud of secrecy that veilsmuch of the arms trade.M ember Statesmust actto increase transparency in arms transfers if we are to make any progress. I would alsourge that they support regional disarmament measures, like the moratorium on theimporting, exporting or manufacturing of light weaponsin West A frica.

Even if all arms transfers could be eliminated, however, the problem posed by themany millionsof illicitly held small armsalready in circulation in the worldswar zoneswould remain.

Because most conflict-prone poor countries lack the capacity to detect and seizeillicit weapons, a more promising path may be the use of market incentives. O utrightbuy-back programmes may simply stimulate arms imports from neighbouring coun-tries, but non-monetary reimbursement schemeshave worked in A lbania, El Salvador,M ozambique and Panama.In return for weapons, individualsmay receive tools, such assewing machines, bicycles, hoes and construction materials, and entire communitieshave been provided with new schools, health-care servicesand road repairs.

N ot only governments but also the private sector can and should help fund suchprogrammes.T his would be both a helpful and an appropriate contribution by majorinternational corporationsthat have a presence in conflict-prone regions.

C ontrolling the proliferation of illicit weaponsis a necessary first step towards thenon-proliferation of small arms.T hese weaponsmust be brought under the control of

Small ar ms pr olif er ation is

not mer ely a secur i ty i ssue;

it is also an issue of human

r ights and of development


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states, and states must be held accountable for their transfer.T he U nited N ations is

convening a conference on the illicit trade in small armsand light weaponsin 2001, inwhich I hope civil society organizationswill be invited to participate fully.

I urge Member States to take advantage of this conference to starttaking serious actions that will curtail the illicit traffic in small arms.

T he many recent expressionsof concern about small armsproliferation are a wel-come sign that the importance of the issue is being recognized, but words alone donothing to prevent the ongoing slaughter of innocent people. D ialogue is critical, butwe must match the rhetoric of concern with the substance of practical action.

Nuclear weaponsLet me now turn to nuclear weapons. W hen the bipolar balance of nuclear terror

passed into history, the concern with nuclear weaponsalso seemed to drift from pub-lic consciousness. But some 35,000 nuclear weapons remain in the arsenals of thenuclear powers, with thousands still deployed on hair-trigger alert.W hatever ration-ale these weapons may once have had haslong since dwindled. Political, moral andlegal constraints on actually using them further undermine their strategic utility with-out, however, reducing the risks of inadvertent war or proliferation.

T he objective of nuclear non-proliferation isnot helped by the fact that the nuclearweapon states continue to insist that those weaponsin their handsenhance security,while in the handsof others they are a threat to world peace.

If we were making steady progress towards disarmament, this situation would beless alarming. U nfortunately the reverse is true. N ot only are the Strategic Arms

Reduction Talks stalled, but there are no negotiations at all covering the many thou-sandsof so-called tactical nuclear weaponsin existence,or the weaponsof any nuclearpower other than those of the Russian Federation and the United Statesof America.

M oreover, unlessplansto deploy missile defencesare devised with the agreementof all concerned parties, the progress achieved thus far in reducing the number of nuclear weapons may be jeopardized. C onfidence-building is required to reassurestates that their nuclear deterrent capabilities will not be negated.

A bove all else, we need a reaffirmation of political commitment at the highest lev-elsto reduce the dangersthat arise both from existing nuclear weaponsand from fur-ther proliferation.

To help focus attention on the risks we confront and on the opportu-nities we have to reduce them,I propose that consideration be given toconvening a major international conference that would help to identifyways of eliminating nuclear dangers.

We need a reaffirmation of p oli ti cal commit ment to r educe the danger s fr om exi st ing nuclear weapons and fr om fur ther proliferation

koffi annan freedon from fear ch3

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