la turchia contemporanea - i quaderni di paralleli

8/2/2019 La Turchia Contemporanea - I Quaderni Di Paralleli

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politicapoliticaLATURCHIACONTEMPORANEATRAREALT

ERAPPRESENTAZIONE

PARALLELI

LA TURCHIA CONTEMPORANEATRA REALT E RAPPRESENTAZIONE

LA TURCHIA CONTEMPORANEATRA REALT E RAPPRESENTAZIONE

Questo quaderno cerca di esplorare alcuni dei mille volti dellaTurchia, paese complesso e dinamico teatro di cambiamentiimportanti soprattutto negli ultimi ventanni. Una rifl essione sul ruologeo-strategico che la Turchia potr giocare nei prossimi anni e sulletrasformazioni intense della sua stratificata societ.

Le attivit di Parallelisono sostenute dalla

POLITICA

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LA TURCHIA CONTEMPORANEA

TRA REALT E RAPPRESENTAZIONE


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Indice

Note di lettura 2

I Quaderni di Paralleli di Rosita Di Peri 3

Introduzione di Renato Lattes 6

Secularization in Turkey: women and Islam di Fulya Atacan 15

Unpacking European discourses: conditionality,impact and prejudice in EU-Turkey relations di Nathalie occi 25

AKP and secular pillars o Turkish Republic di Kemal Kaya 53

New directions o Turkish oreign policy: a radical shitrom Ankaras Westpolitik? di Matteo Fumagalli 59

Resoconto della Tavola Rotonda Dove va la Turchia?di Steanella Campana 73

Bibliografa 85

Note sugli autori 87Il presente quaderno riporta gli interventi di un convegno.Ovviamente ogni oratore responsabile di quanto aerma.

I quaderni sono un progetto di Paralleli

La urchia contemporanea tra realt e rappresentazione uniniziativa di Rosita Di Peri

Responsabile editoriale: Rosita Di Peri

Curatore: Rosita Di Peri

Revisioni: Laura Odasso, Kamilah Khatib

Realizzazione graca a cura di Sunrise.adv, orino


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Il dibattito su un possibile ingresso della urchia nellUnione Europeaha portato questo paese alla ribalta dello scenario internazionale.Il suo ruolo a cavallo tra Occidente e Medio Oriente, il suo esseremembro della NAO e, al contempo, un paese la cui islamicit

potrebbe minacciare la cristiana Europa lo rendono un ibridoregionale che, ormai da anni, suscita dibattiti pi o meno intensi

presso lopinione pubblica mondiale.Le complesse vicende storiche che hanno attraversato questo paeseda quando allinizio degli anni 20 del secolo scorso, il padre deiturchi (Atatrk) Mustaa Kemal port avanti la gloriosa rivoluzioneconducendo il paese allindipendenza dallImpero Ottomano hannocontribuito a segnarne il destino politico. Il segno delloriginalitturca stato dato dalla volont di staccarsi dal passato ottomano eda quello arabo-islamico proprio attraverso la negazione dellislme del suo preteso signicato politico: dallabolizione del caliato,

prima temporale poi spirituale, alla dichiarazione di laicit delloStato; dallintroduzione dellalabeto turco in sostituzione di quelloarabo ad una secolarizzazione di usi e costumi; dalla riorma deldiritto di amiglia alla chiusura delle scuole coraniche e delle

conraternite mistiche. Il tentativo turco di una nazionalizzazionedellottomanismo, per certi versi naturale continuazione delleriorme conosciute con il nome di tanzimat (1839-1876), ha datovita ad una societ che ha atto proprio della turchizzazione spessoesasperata una delle costanti della vita politica e sociale del paese,

avorita dalla assidua presenza e rilevanza del ruolo dellesercito.Come la costruzione di una identit turca sia passata anche attraversola negazione del ruolo delle minoranze e come lesercito stesso abbiaal contempo utilizzato lislm come collante e come minaccia per lemasse nella costruzione dellidea di nazione, sono due tra i capisaldiche urono posti alla base della nascita della nuova repubblica.

Il presente quaderno prende le mosse da alcune delle questioni appena

sollevate cercando di analizzare gli sviluppi pi recenti della vitapolitica e sociale di questo paese. Si tratta di un quaderno compositoche attinge da tre diverse occasioni di conronto e di dialogo proposte e

promosse dallIstituto Paralleli nellambito delle iniziative urchia-Italia due penisole un mare. Lintroduzione, scritta dal nostrocompianto Presidente Renato Lattes, riporta molto lucidamentealcune delle questioni che sono state sollevate durante una avolaRotonda dal titolo urchia nella UE. Perch no? svoltasi il 7

ebbraio del 2008 a orino. Lanalisi di Lattes tratteggia una realtin chiaroscuro, complessa e interessante, che evidenzia le aspirazionie i problemi di una societ come molte altre nel nostro tempo strettatra le maglie di una globalizzazione accerchiante e una ricchezzaculturale legata al territorio ed alle tradizioni che sono la vera orzadi questo paese. Da ne osservatore e uomo politico Lattes ci indicala strada da seguire per elaborare riessioni originali e non scontate,

rutto della sua pluriennale esperienza nel mondo da protagonistaattivo. E guarda dentro una societ in mutamento che, ancora allalbadel nuovo millennio deve conrontarsi con i antasmi del passato, conle spinte e le tendenze autoritarie, con il ruolo invasivo dellesercito.

I quaderni di Paralleli

Note di lettura

Per acilitare la lettura del quaderno ad un pubblico anchenon specialistico, il curatore ha deciso di introdurre alcunenote (inserite nel testo tra parentesi quadre) la trascrizione deicaratteri arabi stata semplicata per una maggiore leggibilit.Ovviamente, errori e/o omissioni in tali inserti sono sotto direttaresponsabilit del curatore.

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Il terzo saggio, quello di Kemal Kaya, collaboratore dellItalian Centeror urkish Studies, dopo una breve rassegna storica dei principaliatti che hanno caratterizzato lavvio della repubblica turca passa adanalizzare le posizioni e le strategie dellAKP (partito politico turcoal governo di orientamento islamista) soprattutto allindomani dellasua vittoria nelle elezioni del 2002. Il suo insediamento al governo

ha provocato un dibattito molto pressante sul rinnovato ruolo dellareligione nella secolare repubblica turca provocando una divisione trale lite turche ed una crescita della tensione politica nel paese cheha avuto ripercussioni anche sugli assetti macro-economici e, quindi,sulla stessa societ.

In linea con il saggio precedente lultimo intervento di MatteoFumagalli, ricercatore presso lUniversit Centrale di Budapest,aronta la vittoria dellAKP da una diversa prospettiva, cercando ciodi misurare il suo impatto sugli orientamenti di politica estera dellaurchia. Il saggio si concentra in particolare sulle recenti direzionidella politica estera turca ossia sulle nuove relazioni con stati che in

passato non avevano avuto un ruolo strategico per questo paese ossia laSiria, lIran e la Russia. Fumagalli a notare come, pur non perdendoil suo orientamento lo-occidentale, testimoniato dalla sua presenzanella NAO e dal processo di europeizzazione, la urchia dellAKPabbia avviato una nuova era della sua politica estera. Il saggio dunqueanalizza le ragioni di questo apparente mutamento di strategiamettendo in evidenza le nuove prospettive e le loro potenzialit. Ma,come evidenzia Fumagalli nelle sue conclusioni, non si tratta di unmutamento completo di indirizzo in quanto le nuove alleanze sonostrumentali al conseguimento di specici obiettivi politici.

Il quaderno si conclude con un resoconto di Steanella Campana,responsabile dellarea Media dellIstituto Paralleli, che rende la

complessit e la ricchezza della avola Rotonda da lei ideata svoltasia orino il 10 giugno 2008 dal titolo Dove va la urchia. Lapercezione del paese nei media turchi e italiani. Un incontro cheha visto conrontarsi giornalisti italiani e turchi non soltanto sullosviluppo e sul ruolo dei media in urchia ma, anche, su come il paeseviene visto e rappresentato dai media e dai giornalisti italiani. Ilresoconto rende al meglio un dibattito a volte anche molto acceso cheha messo in luce una societ straticata e moderna che convive con latradizione ma che guarda al uturo con occhio attento.

Desidero concludere dedicando il presente quaderno alla memoriadi Renato Lattes, Presidente e amico che ho avuto il privilegio di

conoscere e stimare.

Rosita Di PeriCuratrice della collana

E proprio la societ civile con le sue sde, le sue richieste e le suetrasormazioni al centro del dibattito attuale: il suo essere portatricedi una modernizzazione della tradizione, il suo voler arontare lesde sociali partendo da strategie non scontate e da percorsi non ovvi.E, inatti, proprio sulla straticazione e multi-dimensionalit dellasociet turca si concentra il primo intervento di questo quaderno,

quello della politologa turca Fulya Atacan presentato al Convegno distudi La urchia tra passato e presente svoltosi sempre a orino il 17marzo del 2008. Atacan aronta uno degli aspetti pi controversi eattuali legati allidentit turca ossia al ruolo della donna in seno allasociet. Il saggio parte da un lavoro sul campo che Atacan ha svoltoraccogliendo diverse testimonianze di donne turche provenienti davari strati della popolazione ed analizza i complessi rapporti esistentitra le donne, la societ e lo Stato. Una riessione ancora pi rilevantese si pensa alle recenti discussioni sul tema del velo nelle universitturche e su un presunto revival religioso. Atacan ore una prospettivache mette al centro la dimensione sociale e, soprattutto, quellaeconomica e di classe, due elementi imprescindibili, secondo lautrice,

quando si parla di condizione emminile. Il conronto a distanzatra le vite di due delle donne intervistate (entrambe appartenenti a gruppi islamici), sulle loro aspirazioni, abitudini e sde, mette inrisalto un paese dalla mille saccettature ma, soprattutto, quantosiano ancora rilevanti le questioni legate al censo, allistruzione, allacultura politica. Sebbene, come sottolinea lautrice nel suo saggio ledinamiche di crescita del paese, soprattutto negli ultimi dieci anni,abbiano portato ad un mutamento delle strategie interne dei gruppi

emminili, anche in quelli pi tradizionali, determinando un nuovotipo di relazione tra queste ultime al loro interno e nei conronti delloStato modicando un loro possibile ruolo a livello politico.

Il secondo saggio del quaderno, quello di Nathalie occi, ricercatrice

dellIstituto Aari Internazionali di Roma, aronta una questioneche aonda le sue radici proprio nelle dinamiche di cambiamentodella societ turca a partire dal processo che ha visto il paese arerichiesta di adesione allUnione Europea (nel 1999 alla urchia stato concesso lo status di paese candidato). Ci che occi mettein evidenza attraverso il suo saggio, rutto di un progetto di ricerca

pluriennale, proprio laspetto legato ai pregiudizi, alla percezionedel dibattito pubblico che ha interessato la richiesta di membershipdella urchia alla UE. Al di l dellambito puramente istituzionalein cui molto stato detto, si registra una lacuna proprio sul terrenodel dibattito pubblico, delle percezioni, spesso degli stereotipi e dei

pregiudizi che hanno connotato questo conronto. Il saggio, partendoda queste premesse analizza proprio come si sviluppato il dibattitoin questione e quale stato il suo impatto sullopinione pubblica e suimedia regionali. Il principale aspetto che traspare leggendo il saggiodella occi che mentre non difcile individuare una dimensioneeuropea del dibattito manca unanalisi dettagliata dei dibattiticondotti a livello dei singoli stati (lacuna che stata colmata dalla

prosecuzione del progetto di ricerca).

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Il 2007 ed il 2008 hanno visto Paralleli impegnato in unarticolato programma di iniziative che hanno avuto alcentro la urchia.

Vi hanno partecipato attori del mondo economico, politico,culturale regionale e torinese: il Politecnico, la Camera diCommercio; archeologi e studiosi di architettura comparata;artisti gurativi, scrittori e registi cinematograci. Sono statirealizzati incontri tra amministratori, con il coinvolgimentodei Sindaci di orino e di Bursa.

Molti angoli di osservazione, per costruttori di ponti, dei qualiParalleli vuole avorire la realizzazione; coerentemente con lapropria mission centrale, di costruttore di reti; allincrocio tracultura, ricerca e politica.

Nel 2008 la prima tappa di questo viaggio nella urchiacontemporanea stata lorganizzazione di un colloquiosui nodi politici pi importanti rispetto allentrata dellaurchia nellUnione Europea (UE).

In Italia la discussione pubblica su questo tema non molto diusa: n sui media, n tra o allinterno delle orzepolitiche, n nelle Universit. Nulla di conrontabile,comunque, con quanto avviene, ad esempio, in Francia ein Germania.

In Italia limmigrazione dalla urchia limitata (ben diversala situazione in Germania dove vivono oltre un milione diturchi); ne lItalia stata meta privilegiata (come, invece, avvenuto in Francia) di riugio dei sopravvissuti agli eccidie alla cacciata degli armeni e di altre minoranze dai territoridel Nord-Est della urchia o gi allinterno dei territori

della stessa Armenia alla ne della prima guerra mondiale.

Questa situazione pu essere unopportunit per aprireuna riessione pi libera, meno emotiva e condizionata daattori di politica interna.

Naturalmente, se questa la situazione nellopinionepubblica, va rilevato che alcune orze hanno seguitolevoluzione del dossier urchia con interesse: la FIA presente in urchia da molto tempo e lintero settoredellautomotive piemontese ha con tale paese rapporticommerciali e tecnici consolidati.

Recentemente si tenuta ad Istanbul una mostra sul designitaliano e torinese in particolare.

Anche per queste relazioni la urchia seguita conattenzione crescente da settori universitari: a orino laacolt di Ingegneria, si aggiunta a quella di Architettura(coinvolta in ricerche storico/archeologiche da 50 anni).Il Politecnico ha deciso di dichiarare il 2008 anno dellaurchia.

La domanda di inclusione della urchia nella ComunitEuropea ha per sollevato reazioni e atto emergerecontraddizioni che vanno al di l di questi interessi speciciinvestendo questioni identitarie e storico-culturali di ondo.Pu un paese a cultura islamica essere parte dellEuropa(si dimentica spesso che da secoli c un islm europeo in

INTRODUZIONEdi Renato Lattes

Italia-Turchia:due penisole

un mare

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Bosnia)? La critica vaticana, enatizzata dal Papa, allEuropadimentica delle sue radici cristiane trova orte assonanzacon chi vuole escludere, per ragioni identitarie, la urchiadalla amiglia europea.

Ma, al di l delle questioni identitarie, sono diversi i attoriche rendono particolarmente complessa la discussione. InEuropa come in urchia. Cerchiamo di ordinarle.

Lesercito turco ha una storia orgogliosa di creatore dellaRepubblica turca; stato lo strumento centrale su cui, 90anni a, Atatrk, padre della Patria, alla testa del movimentodei giovani turchi, ormato prevalentemente da ufciali,ha raccolto e radicalmente cambiato leredit dellImperoOttomano, ridotto in cenere dopo la prima guerra mondiale,squassato e insanguinato da conitti inter-etnici, invaso daeserciti stranieri che puntavano a spartirsene le spoglie.

Custode, da quel momento, della laicit e dellunit dellaRepubblica turca, bastione centrale della NAO (con gliUSA che ne curarono la ormazione militare e la ornituradi armi) in unzione prevalentemente antisovietica,lesercito interpret molte volte, a suo modo, la diesa dellademocrazia, diventando attore di colpi di Stato e gestore diregimi autoritari dove erano ridotte al lumicino le garanziedemocratiche, le libert e i diritti civili, politici, sociali(libert di stampa e diritti sindacali sono stati le primevittime per almeno tre occasioni e periodi).

Merito storico indubbio di Kemal Atatrk stata lamodernizzazione a tappe orzate della societ turca. Illimite, ben messo in evidenza dalla situazione odierna, stata lomogeneizzazione obbligata di una societ assaicomplessa e variegata. Felice chi si dice turco u il mottolanciato dal ondatore della repubblica. Ma chi turco?

Allora e oggi. Il libro presentato da Paralleli nel mese diNovembre, La urchia contemporanea di Hamit Bozarslan,ci descrive bene la miriade di gruppi etnici e religiosi chepopolano il grande territorio della penisola. Minoranzereligiose eredi del cristianesimo siriano, ellenico e armeno.

Quindici milioni di curdi. Dieci milioni di musulmanialeviti considerati eretici dallislm sunnita. La urchia un mosaico che il kemalismo ha tentato di ridurre a unit,alimentando, purtroppo, un nazionalismo esasperato dicui si nutrono i ben organizzati gruppi di estrema destrae non solo.

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Di atto nella urchia moderna non tutti i cittadini sonoeguali davanti allo Stato: le minoranze hanno meno diritti,siano esse etniche o religiose.

Ad esempio, agli aleviti, una conraternita non settaria nella

tradizione su, vengono negati gli aiuti dallo Stato che sonoinvece previsti per legge allislm sunnita; chi non sunnitadifcilmente pu accedere a cariche pubbliche; vietatolinsegnamento del curdo, ecc.

Periodicamente questa contraddizione di ondo riemergesotto la spinta di attori interni ed esterni e il paradigmaculturale su cui il kemalismo ha ondato lidentitnazionale entra in tensione. Il sociologo Baskin Oran parladi sindrome di Svres [ndc. a Svres nel 1920 u deciso, daparte delle grandi potenze, lo smembramento dellImperoOttomano]: il complotto imperialista, i nemici interni che

minacciano lunit della nazione, il pericolo ai conni.

Il motto dei ascisti nazionalisti urchia: chi non lamase ne vada ed era scritto sullo striscione del veicolo militareche doveva arrestare il terrorista responsabile dellassassiniodi un giornalista armeno!

I democratici turchi non mancano di denunciare questaparanoia identitaria che gi in passato ha portato a veri epropri pogrom contro le minoranze: nel settembre 1956,in occasione della crisi di Cipro, corse la voce che era stataincendiata la casa di Atatrk e a Istanbul urono saccheggiatie bruciati negozi e case di cristiani, ebrei e aleviti. Oggi i lupigrigi minacciano di morte i curdi sospetti di simpatia per ilPKK [ndc. partito dei lavoratori del Kurdistan di calan].

La urchia un paese di 68 milioni di abitanti. Un possibilegrande mercato in pi per le economie dei paesi UE. Unlargo bacino di manodopera a basso costo: molte grandimultinazionali americane, europee e asiatiche vi hannostabilimenti. Se osse accolto nellUnione Europea, sarebbeil secondo Stato per popolazione, dopo la Germania.

Questo a paura a molti politici e a molti cittadini europei.Paura acilmente manovrabile in Europa dal populismo didestra che a perno sulla paura del diverso, sulla ricerca dicapri espiatori, sullesasperazione di teorie come lo scontrodelle civilt. Far entrare 68 milioni di turchi in Europasuonerebbe come la legittimazione, ad aspiranti cittadini

Il ruolodellesercito...

...e quellodi Atatrk

Il dibattitosullingressonella UE


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europei, dei molti milioni di immigrati extracomunitari dicultura islamica, che, provenienti dallArica e/o dallAsia,sono gi residenti in Europa.

Signicativamente queste paranoie identitarie europee si

sposano con quelle kemaliste prima descritte, dimostrandoche, in ondo, gli stessi motivi che possono spingere unaparte dei cittadini europei a difdare dellentrata dellaurchia nella UE, possono renderlo interessante per altri.

La urchia ha bisogno di are i conti, nel bene e nel malecon il suo passato e con se stessa. LEuropa ci deve aiutare(Orhan Pamuk).

Paralleli impegnato, per sua stessa natura, a tessere legamie a consolidare reti culturali, politiche, economiche, socialitra i vari popoli, nazioni, paesi del Mediterraneo.

Per questo, guarda alle condizioni e alla possibilit che laurchia entri nella UE come a un attore di grande portata.Non pi conronto/scontro tra identit ossilizzate, maincontro tra culture aperte allinuenza dellaltro, chesi contaminano nel riconoscimento di valori comuni.LEuropa della modernit non pu essere quella di CarloMagno e nemmeno quella coloniale delle grandi potenze.La urchia moderna non Solimano il Magnico e lasede del Caliato. Questo il lavoro comune da svolgereandando oltre il concetto di dialogo che tipico dellordinedelle religioni istituzionalizzate e rivelate ove ciascunodialoga partendo dalla sua verit.

La urchia un grande paese che, anche sotto la spintaimpressa alla possibile entrata in Europa, ha compiutosoprattutto negli ultimi anni, un notevole avanzamentonelle condizioni democratiche e laiche del proprio sistemadi governo.

un percorso non compiuto. Grandi problemi sono tuttorairrisolti, come abbiamo visto, sia per quanto riguarda la seradei diritti delle persone e delle libert democratiche per lasociet civile (a partire dalla libert di stampa, di religione e,

pi in generale, di maniestazione delle proprie idee); sia sulterreno della libert di organizzazione delle tante minoranzeetniche, linguistiche, religiose (a partire dal complicato,ma centrale, problema curdo) e della loro rappresentanzapolitica; sia, inne, sul piano della soluzione del conitto cheha diviso lisola di Cipro in due stati, dal 1974.

Cos come lEuropa divisa nella volont di accoglierla alproprio interno, anche in urchia sono presenti spinte indirezioni diverse.

Sono orti le spinte allentrata in Europa, soprattutto tra le

nuove generazioni, tra la parte pi moderna e colta dellapopolazione, tra gli strati che pi hanno tratto stimoli e/ovantaggi dalle esperienze di emigrazione nellultimo mezzosecolo. ra chi spera che lentrata in Europa possa concludereun processo di modernizzazione. ra chi vede oggi i limitidella secolarizzazione imposta dal kemalismo: la soppressionedi conraternite su, la orzata omogeneizzazione culturaledel paese con lumiliazione e la messa al bando di ogniparticolarismo identitario (politico, linguistico, religioso)considerato minaccia allunit dello Stato.

Sono intense le spinte conservatrici e nazionaliste, anche con

orti correnti di stampo ascisteggiante. Hanno una base di massanelle popolazioni rurali dellinterno dellAnatolia, pi legate acultura e identit derivate da uninterpretazione pi chiusa delnazionalismo e della ede religiosa. Alcuni guardano allidentitasiatica, ad antiche, mai cancellate immagini e agli orizzonti diriunicazione della grande nazione turca, dallAsia Centraleno ai Balcani e al Mediterraneo; alla grande attrazione di unprocesso di nuova immersione in contesti di comunit delMediterraneo non europeo, pi segnate dalle culture islamichee anche dalle loro derivate pi ondamentaliste.

In tale quadro di ondo, signicativo e, no ad ora,piuttosto equilibrato il ruolo del partito islamico vincitoredelle ultime due tornate elettorali e a guida dellattualeGoverno [ndc. Partito della Giustizia e dello Sviluppo,

AKP]. Un partito islamico che aerma di credere e di volerdiendere il ruolo laico dello Stato e di volerne traserire ladiesa e la garanzia alla politica, svincolandole dal ruolo ditutoraggio svolto, nel passato, dallesercito.

Anche noi, in passato, abbiamo visto, o vissuto direttamente,esempi simili.

Dal ruolo che, in Italia, ha svolto, nel primo dopoguerra,Alcide De Gasperi, segretario della Democrazia Cristianae Presidente del Consiglio; il quale, pur riaermandola propria ede religiosa, si battuto con impegno pergarantire la laicit della politica e dello Stato, anche in durapolemica con il Vaticano.


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Fino alle molte tragedie innescate, negli ultimi due decenni,dalle scelte di una parte del ondamentalismo islamico nellapolitica e/o nello scontro militare, nelluso globalizzato delterrorismo: dalla storia del FIS in Algeria, alle strategie di

Al Qaeda, che dichiara di battersi per lunit della umma,per lislamizzazione degli stati, perch la loro legge centralesia la sharia.

Lattuale leadership turca appare impegnatanellimplementazione del processo di avvicinamentoallUnione Europea.

Per molti anni una parte consistente dellopinione pubblicae politica liberale e di sinistra in Europa ha valutato cometollerabili gli eccessi nella unzione di tutoraggio compiutidallesercito; pi spaventata del pericolo di un prevaleredellislamismo che attenta ai bisogni di democrazia e libert

espressi da una parte crescente della societ civile.

Anche una parte della sinistra politica interna alla urchiastessa ha sostenuto interpretazioni di questo genere;perdendo il rapporto con importanti settori pi moderni edinamici nella societ.

Oggi la leadership politica della urchia impegnata inunimpresa complessa, come quella della revisione dellaCostituzione.

Molti sostengono che lUnione Europea, anche per le noteriserve da parte di alcuni tra i membri pi importantisullentrata della urchia, sovente alzi lasticella del salto inalto mentre latleta sta gi correndo.

Come Paralleli siamo convinti che:

1. vanno chiarite molto bene le ulteriori condizionilegate ai diritti civili e politici del paese cos come vannosostenuti gli sorzi per una normalizzazione pacicadella situazione di Cipro;

2. importante sostenere questo processo di

avvicinamento, dando, nuovamente, il messaggio di ungrande interesse dellUE allentrata della urchia;3. scommettere sul ruolo geopolitico importante che una

urchia matura, dal punto di vista democratico, pugiocare nel rapporto tra lUE e il Mediterraneo; esempioimportante di un paese a prevalente cultura islamica

con modello di democrazia Occidentale;4. scommettere sulla possibilit di importanti ritmi di

sviluppo, anche economico e sociale, quando la suaeconomia e la sua organizzazione sociale osseromaggiormente integrate con quelle dellUnioneEuropea;

5. lentrata della urchia nellUE potrebbe avere comeeetto anche quello di consolidare le tendenze gipresenti per una maggior autonomia delle comunitmusulmane presenti in Europa, per una cultura islamicaeuropea che sia protagonista di un accordo orte con lamodernit, anche indebolendo i legami ideologicicon le culture delle comunit islamiche nei paesi diorigine.

Siamo convinti che guardare ad un uturo di convivenzapacica, con reciproca inuenza e contaminazione tra

popoli, culture e nazioni diverse una condizione essenzialenel Mediterraneo.

Forse perch siamo gli di culture politiche e storiche,erme nei principi democratici, relativiste e razionalistenel concreto operare, pensiamo siano molto importanti ledirezioni che i processi storici ci rimandano.

Con molti limiti, ma riteniamo che la direzione messa inluce in questi ultimi anni vada valorizzata.

Siamo convinti che la urchia sia un nodo centrale di questaprospettiva e che essa stessa di ronte a diverse possibilitstrategiche per il uturo: diventare un importante ponte tralEuropa e i paesi delle rive aricane e asiatiche del Mediterraneo;oppure guardare a un suo ruolo di leadership, con nuoveorme di alleanza da costruire, nellAsia Centrale e nel MedioOriente; e, come tale, interloquire con lUnione Europea.

Questa seconda scelta potrebbe acilmente spingerela urchia ad accentuare il proprio volto islamista e adiminuire quello europeo/democratico.

Anche la unzione di piattaorma centrale per la diesa/oesa militare nei conronti dellex Unione Sovietica, si molto afevolita dopo la caduta del muro di Berlino.Noi siamo tra coloro che, in passato, hanno ritenutoun errore politico grave non gestire politicamente, nonsostenere i timidi tentativi di superare i conni difcilmente

Il uturo

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accettabili della democrazia nellIran degli Ayatollah,portata avanti, tra mille contraddizioni e grande cautela,anni a, dal Presidente Khatami. Il risultato non statopositivo.

Siamo tra coloro che preerirebbero non ossero atti errorianaloghi (pur in un contesto molto dierente) nel casodella urchia.

In sostanza, crediamo che vada rimessa al centro la politicacon visioni lunghe.

1514

Religious groups/organizations operate in a particularcontext, which is composed o social, political andeconomic conditions, at a certain historical moment.Religion becomes important when it is organized and ithas gained importance as a political actor in the powerstructure o any given society. Te roles played by dierentreligious organizations in the socio-political structureo a given country or the positions held by them in thepower struggles are various. At this point, not only thestructure and the ideas o the religious group, but alsothe social, political and legal structure o the countryand the international conjuncture become important ascomponents o the change in these groups. Te relationsamong dierent religious groups (internal and external)and between these groups and the State must be examined.

SECULARIZATION IN TURKEY:WOMEN AND ISLAMdi Fulya Atacan

Religiousgroups andthe State


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Islam and itstransormation

in Turkey

Islam and

women

Religiousnetworks:

social securitymechanism

1716

Te characteristics o these relations may show dierenceswith respect to dierent religious organizations.

Islam in contrast to Christianity has no church-likeorganization meaning that an individual can be a Muslim

without being a member o any religious organization. Butit does not mean that there are no religious organizations inIslam. Most o the time what is presented as Islam is actuallyone o these religious organizations. Tese organizationsrepresent dierent orms o Islam but not Muslims ingeneral.Tere are dierent interpretations o Islam in dierentgroups; particularly i you consider religion as a livingreligion in the widest sense you will be aced with variousorms o Islam. Actually, talking about one unique Islam isan essentialist approach which implies that Islam has neverchanged and will not be changed. Tis approach is usually

adopted by right-wing politicians and some Islamists inorder to justiy their political actions. Ater World War II, agriculture in urkey has beenmodernized using machinery, irrigation and ertilizers. Teoutcome o this modernization was a process o transitionrom the sel-sufcient agricultural community to cashcropping. Tis gave rise to migration to big cities. Tis, inturn, resulted in large-scale structural change. It is impossibleto expect religion to remain unaected by these structuralchanges. Tus, religion has passed through a process ochange and dierentiation involving its organizationalstructure, its world view, its values and behavioral patterns.

Tis process o change resulted in the disentanglement oreligion and tradition and it ascribed to religion a newstatus

within the dierentiated, diversied and reorganized socialstructure. Religion has assumed a newposition with a newcontentin the changing social structure o urkey1.In this process, on the one hand, privatization o religionhas increased and on the other hand, religion has gainedpublic inuence. When privatization is reerred to as therise o pluralist and voluntary religion among individuals,religious groups have started to be involved in social welare,health care etc. in order to maintain their inuencei2. In

the dierentiated social structure, Islamic groups, based onlower, lower middle and higher middle strata reproduce Islamas a political ideology. Te dierentiation among ideologiesin general creates the need or Islamists to dierentiate andredene themselves rom the others, particularly rom thenationalist ones. Tis situation naturally gives rise to dierent

Islamic ideologies. In urkey today it is impossible to talkabout only one Islamic ideology. Tis dierentiation basedon Islam reects the social stratication o these groups.On the other hand, Islamic ideologies have to compete

with secular ones. With an increasing level o education,the wide spread use o mass media, rapid urbanization,and the changes in lie styles, it is impossible to answerthe needs o some groups by relying on strict, traditionalIslamic ideology. Tereore, Islamic groups become moreexible and their ideology changes allowing bigger portionsrom dierent groups in society to adhere to it.Religion has also undergone a very important change atthe organizational level. Islamic groups have organizedthemselves as a political party, have participated in thecompetitive political system and have organized variousinstitutions, associations, endowments etc. in the society.

A totally new element in these organizations is women.

Islamist women are active in all these organizations. As I mentioned above, a process o transition rom thesel-sufcient agricultural community to cash croppinggave rise to migration to big cities. Migration rom villagesto big cities has started at the end o the 1950s. Whenpeople migrated to the big cites they did not have any workexperiences or education to t into the urban occupationalstructure. Tey were not amiliar with urban lie and theycould not nd the mechanisms or institutions which

would have provided them some services like training or jobs, nding a house or solutions to their problems. So,they had to create their own strategies and mechanisms or

adjustment.Migrants certainly did not change their values or interactionpatterns just because they migrated to big cities. Ex-peasants using the values or interaction patterns in theirbaggage have developed new survival strategies in the ormo clientelistic networks in big cities. In this context, Suorders and Islamic groups have reproduced themselvesas important social security mechanisms mainly or themigrants. Tese religious groups worked in dierent waysto answer the needs o the migrants3.Te members o the Su orders and dierent Islamic groups

have brought their religious belies and organizationsinto the big cities and they have reproduced them in thiscontext and consequently have made the continuation othese organizations possible in the big cities. Te networkbrought by the ex-peasants is not only a religious network,but also a solidarity network unctioning in the cities.


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Economicre-structuring

process

The TurkishIslamicsynthesis

Women:the new status

A point o view:the housewie,Aye -daughtero a Su sheikh

It is a well-known act that migrants utilize dierentnetworks (like kinship and hemerilik, being rom the sameplace with another person) to overcome the difculties intheir basic needs in big cities. In this ramework, the religiousnetworks are an important social security mechanism

which has started in the place where the members wereborn and has continued in the city. I one bears in mindthat most o the rst generation migrants work as unskilledlabour, artisans and small businessmen in the big cities, it

will be clear that it is quite difcult or them to abandonthis network easily.Te economic re-structuring process initiated by the 1980military government and ollowed by the other center-right parties which created new opportunities or some tomove up the social ladder also caused or some, particularlythe old middle-class, to go down. According to this neo-conservative economic policy, the state is so powerul in

the economic lie o urkey and it should be pacied andthe state should abandon the regulatory role. Althoughthey were inefcient in many ways, the social securitymechanisms, which were provided by the state in theramework o the welare state, were weakened using thediscourse o neo-conservatism. When it became acceptedthat state intererence, as a regulatory orce, is not neededin many areas, the situation created many opportunitiesor new aggressive entrepreneurs. As a result o the sameeconomic policies, the gap between the rich and the poorhas widened enormously. In this context, class dierencesonce more become more visible and the relationship

between the poor and the rich became cause o tension.Among the members o Islamic groups, some o them haveused new opportunities and religious networks to climb thesocial ladder. Class dierences among the members havebecome more visible. Class dierences is not a problem,it is rather acceptable or many members as long as thechance o upward mobility is open or is seen a real optionby them. Upward mobility was a sign o progress or realaith until very recently. But it seems that class dierences

will be conceived as a problem by the some Islamic groupsor by the some members o these groups.

It is evident that today there is a socio-economicdierentiation among the members o Islamic groups.Tis dierentiation can also be observed in their lie styles,political preerences and values. In addition to this, peopleexperience a dierentiation between small town and bigcity. Dierent socio-political contexts in these two levels

lead to some changes in the daily lives o the members. Tecomplex web o interaction between these dierent levels,on the one hand creates new cleavages among the members,and on the other hand leads to new ways o coping withthese changes.

While Islamic groups have worked on this social structureand have tried to overcome the tensions and dierentiation

within themselves, changes in the political lie o urkeyover the two-decades have also had a direct eect onthe Islamic groupings. Te most important politicaldevelopments in this sense are the 1980 military coupdtat, which adopted a new ofcial ideology called urkishIslamic synthesis in order to overcome political divisionsin the society and to curb the letist movements in theCold War era; the 28 February 1987 military interventionin which the military abandoned the idea that religion canbe used to consolidate society, whereby urkish Islamic

synthesis lost its prominent role as an ofcial ideology; andAKPs success in the 2002 general elections which has givendierent Islamic groups new opportunities to consolidatetheir positions in the political structure o urkey.In this complex web o interaction among socialdierentiation, diversication, reorganization o societyand religious groupings women are also aected by thesechanges. I will concentrate on the story o two women inorder to explain this complex process.Tere is no doubt that women became more educated andrelatively active in the proessional lie o urkey in thelast 50 years. As a result o structural change women have

let their homes and have gained better education, thusbecoming proessionals. Tis proound change has addednew dimensions to the discussions about the social statusand covering o women which have always been the mostdebated issues in Islam. Many Islamic groups emphasizethe particular verses o the Quran (XXIV, En-nrsura, verse31; XXXIIIAzhap sura, verse 59, 60), which reer to theextent to which a woman has to cover her body. DierentIslamic groups interpreted these verses in dierent waysand argued about this issue both with one another and withsecular Muslims who have a great concern or the issue.

Te rst woman I will talk about is a daughter o a Susheikh who claims to be a descendent o the Prophet. Sheis a middle-aged woman who was born in a small town ineastern Anatolia. She grew up in an atmosphere marked bya one party system and by Kemalism. Her ather was veryond o education and sent her to a secular school. She had


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2322

Uselessnesso secular

education

Lower classposition

Women:mother orghter orIslam

Women,political skillsand patriarchyin Islam

in Islam, she became religious and decided to wear chador.Even though she has no ormal education, she is veryambitious and sel-condent and she is one o the pettyemale leaders in this radical group.Eli thinks that secular education is not necessary or women.Tis is because they are not taught Islam and because co-education is not acceptable rom the Islamic point o view.She claims that according to Islam, women do not haveto work; it is the responsibility o men to support amily.Similarly, women do not have to do housework. Womenhave only one responsibility: to take care o the children andraise them according to Islam. Instead o doing housework

women should work or Islam.When working or Islam is the Muslim womans priority,she has to deliver the massage o Islam to everyone. Tispractically means that she can be out o home or longhours. She actually gives sermons and speeches in private

homes and group meetings, she participates in protestsagainst the ban o head covering at universities, she collectsmoney or aid in kinds or the needy and or people inPalestine, Aghanistan, Iraq etc. She leaves home aboutnine in the morning and comes back at ve or six. Since sheis working or Islam, her absence rom home is acceptableand not a subject o dispute.Eli has earned respect in the group and she wants to keepthis status. Religious activities o the group gave her achance to be out o home and establish hersel as a pettyleader o the women branch. For her this is irreversible.She cannot sit at home any more because she ound Islam

and she had to ght or it. Being part o the group is moreimportant than daily work or secular education. Actually,she has neither education nor proession but by being oneo the leaders o the women branch she has some orm o

job. Although it is not paid in cash, it is paid in respect andauthority.Members o this group have peasant origin and are mainlylower class. Many o them have very poor education andlower income. In other words, they do not have higherstatus or wealth. Eli and none o them believe that they canachieve these in current urkey. For them, the only possible

way to change their lie is to change the current socio-political system. According to this group in an Islamic statethey do not have to suer rom economic difculties and/or lack o status. In the Islamic state they will have respectas well as better lie conditions.In the case o Aye, the maternal role o women are

emphasised and she has no problem with her position insociety. She also has no ear to lose her high status. Butin the case o Eli the situation is dierent and being amember o an Islamic group gave her an opportunity tobecome someone important. Her Islamist activities justiyher absence rom home, give her leadership roles and allowher to be someone who has a say and who could change thesociety. She cannot aord to lose her current position.

Although many Islamic groups, which mobilize women orpolitical aims or group organization, cannot aord to put

women aside, they still deend the division o labour in theamily. Tey claim that men and women are dierent bynature and at the same ime they complement each other.Tere might be some misbehaving which emanates rompeople in the history o Islam. Te basic principle is to have

just division o labour in the amily; each side has weak

and strong eatures and i people adopt this complementaryrole many amilies would not have the problems thatmany are acing now. In this point, womens main role isthe reproduction o humankind. Tey dene women asmothers so their rst responsibility is to stay at home andraise children.Tis approach can be accepted by Aye very easily but Elihas some problems with it. She puts the jihad, ght orIslam, at the centre o her lie. Consequently, she considersher Islamic activities outside her home more importantthan reproduction. Certain sacrices are needed to besuccessul in her cause. Ater achieving her status with her

own eorts, she is not willing to leave this position in thename o being a good mother.

In the last two decades, many emale members o Islamicgroups have learnt how to make politics and have developedthe skills o politics. Some o them are very well aware thatthey are not given important responsibilities to ormulatepolicies and strategies. Like other political parties, they arenot represented in the central hierarchy o Islamic partiesor Islamic organizations. Some o these Islamist womenare asking or more power in dierent organizations. Teirexperiences led them to question patriarchy in Islamictradition and to adopt some o the eminist arguments intheir discussions. Although many o them do not declarethemselves as eminist in public, in private conversationsthey will explain you that eminists are right to criticisetraditional gender roles and patriarchy in urkish society.


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Since urkey was accorded candidacy, EU-urkey relationshave become the ocus o growing academic and policyinterest both in urkey and in several member states. A largebody o research papers has been published and long serieso conerences, seminars and workshops organized, debatingthe intricacies o EU-urkey relations. Surprisingly perhaps,although the political decision to grant urkey candidacy

was taken in 1999, the research interest that ollowed largelyocussed on whether urkey should join the EuropeanUnion rather than on howurkeys accession could take

place. Hence, although the undamental political decisionon the eligibility o urkeys membership was already taken,the research that ollowed concentrated on the adequacy othat decision rather than on the nuts and bolts o urkeysaccession process.

UNPACKING EUROPEANDISCOURSES: CONDITIONALITY,IMPACT AND PREJUDICEIN EU-TURKEY RELATIONSdi Nathalie Tocci

Filling thegap betweenresearch andpublic debateon EU-Turkeyrelations

2524

In conclusion, we can say that the social dynamics behindthe Islamic groupings has changed over the last decade inurkey. oday tensions in dierent levels are inseparableparts o these groupings. On the one hand, the urbanizationprocess reached a level that new opportunities or newmigrants are very limited but or these groups, Islamicgroupings are still an important social security mechanism.On the other hand, some members o these groupings, whohave moved to upper strata, have dierent social, economicand, sometimes, political preerences than the groupsthemselves. Class dierences have become a sensitive topicthat have to be dealt with within Islamic groups.Islamist women who belong to dierent social stratainterpret and practice Islam in dierent orms. In thiscontext it is impossible to talk about one unique, coherentposition taken by Islamist women in respect to the socialand political role o women in society. In other words, i

we ignore the complexity o this act, we will not be ableto analyse these dierent positions and social dynamicsbehind this complexity.

1. Atacan F., Sosyal Deisme ve arikat, Cerrahiler, Hil Yayin, Istanbul, 1990.2. Bayer P.,Religion and Globalization, Sage Publications, London, 1994, p. 71.3. Atacan F., Migration, Change and the arikat, in Les Annales de lAutreIslam, 1999, n. 6, pp. 91-97.


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Moreover, the valuable research results produced in recentyears have by and large ailed to inorm and inuence thepolitical, media and wider public debate on EU-urkeyrelations. On a whole, the quality o the debate on urkeyin the EU has been rather poor. In some member states,there is hardly a debate at all, and a lack o inormationprevails. In other member states, the debate gathered steamater 2002, that is three years ater the launch o urkeysaccession process. Yet there where a debate exists, it hasevolved on a parallel plane detached rom the growingbody o research on EU-urkey relations, and it is otenpoisoned by misperception, misinormation and at timesoutright prejudice. Te main exponents o this debate,

whether in avour or against urkeys accession, oten havelittle or no acquaintance with urkey and rarely groundtheir arguments on existing research. Likewise in urkey,

while the public debate on the EU began much earlier and

has enjoyed ar greater resonance than in member states,those with a deep understanding o the Union and theimplications o urkeys membership are still a minority.

Te underlying rationale or this report ollows romthese observations. Tere is a visible disconnect betweenthe research on EU-urkey relations and the political,media and public debates and opinions in both urkeyand EU member states. Te major contention advancedhere is that the reason or this disconnect lies in the actthat public debates on urkey largely act as proxies ordebates and views on either urkey or the EU, rather than

on the relationship between them. Within urkey, the EUdebate mirrors dierent political views about the desirablepolitical, social and economic development o urkeyitsel. Within member states, the debate on urkey largelyreects dierent ideas about the desirable evolution o theUnion, and, in turn, o the member state in question.

Starting out rom this premise, the aim o this report isnot to present new research on a particular aspect o EU-urkey relations. Rather, it is to unpack the discourses

within several member states on the urkey question,

seeking to understand rom where these discourses deriveand what their political signicance is. In particular, wehave selected two issues that occupy much o the spacein the public debate on EU-urkey relations, namely EUconditionali ty towards urkey and the impact o urkeysEU accession. We analyse conditionality and impact by

Origins andmeanings o

the discourseson Turkeyquestion

revealing how dierent interests, perceptions and at timesprejudices colour and condition these debates, triggeringopinions both in avour and against urkeys accession.

We try to disentangle where possible the content othese debates rom the political views, perceptions andprejudices in which they are embedded. We also seek tounderstand the extent to which these perceptions andprejudices are uninormed or inormed, that is whetherthey stem rom an absolute lack o knowledge and contact,or whether they are ounded on selective inormation andad hoc contact. From a policy perspective, disentanglingthe two is o utmost importance in so ar as inormed anduninormed perceptions and misperceptions oten requireradically dierent remedies.

Te benet o this exercise, we believe, is rst andoremost that o gaining a deeper understanding o

the motivations, assumptions and signicance o thesedebates, including those which may appear as the mostirrational, populist or even nonsensical. We hope thisunderstanding can contribute to narrowing the mistrustand miscommunication which has developed, particularlyin recent years, between urkey and several memberstates. Mistrust uels the tendency - especially in urkey -to presume that any argument has little meaning in and oitsel, but simply reects European prejudices and doublestandards against it. Tis reduces the credibility andtransormative potential o EU conditionality, sties thedebate on both urkeys inclusion and its exclusion rom

the EU, and reinorces misperceptions o Europe withinurkey. o narrow mistrust and miscommunication,

we believe that the media holds a major role andresponsibility. Beyond political elites and ofcial policycircles, journalists in act represent one o the prime targetaudiences o this project. Unlike politicians and ofcials,inevitably entangled in political deadlines and timetables,the media, together with academia and other segmentso civil society, can be critical in bringing greater clarityto the EU-urkey debate, elevating it beyond short-termpolitical horizons and interests.

By unpacking the discourse on conditionality andimpact, we also wish to provide a tool or uture policyresearch on EU-urkey relations; a tool or presentingand disseminating research results in a language thatresonates in dierent domestic contexts and can be more

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3130

terms o actual implementation on the ground. Simplyput, this is because implementation requires a ar deeperprocess o change than a simple elite re-calculation o thecosts and benets induced by EU conditionality. Beyond achange in laws and institutions, implementation requiresa genuine absorption o these new rules by society, alteringits political, economic and social behaviour. It entails aradical transormation o the interests, belies and wayso doing things o all sectors o society, including thoseunderground sectors in urkey (the deep state - derindevlet) that still represent undamental obstacles to deep-rooted progressive change in the country.

Finally, underlining the technical nature o conditionalityafterthe opening o negotiations means loosening the linkbetween the accession process and political reorms inurkey. For all candidate countries, the accession process

requires the ullment o the Copenhagen political criteriabefore the opening o negotiations. During accessionnegotiations instead, conditionality reers principally tothe adoption o the obligations o the acquis. Hence, theopening and provisional closure o the thirty-ve chapterso negotiations, should call or ullment by the candidatecountry o specic and spelled-out acquis-relatedconditions. Yet in practice, compliance with the wide-ranging Copenhagen political criteria is all but completeby the time accession negotiations begin. In the 2004enlargement round, notable cases in point were the rightso the Russian minorities in the Baltics or the reunication

o Cyprus. Te same applies to urkey. Indeed whenproposing the opening o accession negotiations withurkey in 2004, the Commission explicitly stated that

Ankara only sufciently ullled the political criteria andthat much work remained to be done. Yet beyond statingthat the Commission would continue to monitor reormsand engage in a political dialogue with urkey that wouldbe ed into negotiations, little detail was provided as tohow the accession negotiations would be conditioned toongoing political reorms in urkey. Instead, the specicconditions and benchmarks laid down by the Commission

in the screening process reerred to the nuts and bolts othe negotiation chapters.

Having highlighted the technical nature o politicalconditionality up to that time however, when memberstates such as France, Austria, Greece and southern Cyprus

continued criticizing urkeys political shortcomings andwhen EU institutions linked progress in urkeys accessionnegotiations to political conditions (e.g., eight chapters

were suspended in 2006 on the grounds o urkeys reusalto open its air and sea ports to southern Cyprus), this

was harshly criticized in urkey. urks argued that the EUwas now attempting to politicize political conditionality,thereby undermining its legitimacy and credibility. Inother words, EU actors ell into their own rhetorical trapconcerning the technicality o political conditionality.Having emphasized its technicality o conditionalityand the Commissions prime role in the process, whenseveral member states began voicing their conditionalityconcerns, these were read as blatant signs o discriminationin urkey. Hence, while the emphasis on technicalconditionality had been eective in spurring reorms inurkey until 2005, it became powerul ammunition in

the hands o those resisting change in urkey thereater.Te accession process with urkey now risks proceedingslowly and with interruptions, and being progressivelyemptied o its political transormationist potential.

But not only is the articulation o political conditionalityas a technical process problematic in terms o eectiveness,it also ails to capture the realit ies o conditionali ty, therebyuelling misunderstanding and mistrust between the EUand urkey. Conditionality is an inherently politicalprocess when viewed rom the perspective o the candidatecountry. As the precedent o the eastern enlargement

shows, the manner in which conditionality works itselinto domestic dynamics, triggering political, economicand social change, is above all political. Conditionalitychanges the internal power balances within a candidatecountry between political actors with dierent worldviewsand aspirations. It does so both by altering the legal andinstitutional ramework in which domestic actors operateand by empowering one set o actors over another, as theousting o Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar in 1997or the election o urkish Cypriot President Mehmet Alialat in 2005 demonstrate.

When it comes to urkey, it is thus o key importanceor EU actors to understand how conditionality playsinto urkish politics. It is the changing internal balancebetween conservatives and reormists, establishment andperiphery, nationalists and liberals, civilians and military,

Conditionalityas a politicalprocess


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3332

or between secularists and Islamists which determines thenature and pace o urkeys reorm process. Te task or theEU is thus to understand how its conditionality, coupled

with other domestic (e.g., elections), regional (e.g., thewar in Iraq) and wider international developments (e.g.,the war on terror), inuences these internal urkishbalances and ensuing reorm eorts. By emphasizing thetechnical rather than political nature o conditionality,many o these domestic intricacies are lost. Tis leaves EUactors at a loss in trying to understand when and whyconditionality succeeds in producing specic results inurkey and thereore how conditionality can be renedto empower reormist actors in the country and obtainbetter reorm results in the uture.

Conditionality is also a highly political process when viewedrom an EU perspective. Despite the much acclaimed

objective nature o conditionality, conditionality is apolitical means or the EU to pursue its oreign policygoals, particularly those with an alleged normativecontent such as the promotion o peace, democracy andhuman rights. In so ar as oreign policy is a prime areain which the European publics would like to see the EUdevelop, an eective policy o EU conditionality can alsohelp bringing the Union closer to its citizens.

More specically, the EUs interpretation o its normativegoals and accompanying political conditions inevitablychanges in response to the changing goals and interests

o the member states and the changing political,economic and security-related developments in theneighbourhood. Hence or example, in the case o theeastern enlargement, the Commission agged minorityrights conditionality in view o the minority and bordertensions in the Baltics, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia.In the case o the Western Balkans, cooperation with theInternational Criminal ribunal or Yugoslavia becamean explicit condition or progress in the stabilization andassociation process and in the ensuing accession process.More precisely, some member states with particularinterests in certain candidate countries (e.g., Germanyviz Poland, Finland viz Estonia, or Slovenia viz Croatia)inserted and channelled their national requests into theEUs ramework o political conditionality.

Likewise in the case o urkey, the interests and views

o several member states have led to internal EU pushesto condition urkeys accession process to obligationsrelating to Armenia, the Aegean and Cyprus. Othermember states have placed speciic attention onconditionalities regarding questions such as womensrights, the rights o non-Muslim minorities, the abolitiono article 301 o the urkish penal code and civil-militaryrelations, while neglecting others, such as urkeys socio-economic inequalities, the rights o its Muslim minorities,or the transormation o the inormal economy. Te choiceo which conditions to emphasize, how to interpret themand what benchmarks to set is inevitably subjective andpolitical. It results rom specic national interests , debatesand worldviews and the precise regional and internationalcontext in which enlargement unolds. At the EU-widelevel instead, the crisis over the Constitutional reaty, aperceived enlargement atigue and widespread ears o

expanding towards the turbulent East, have all raised theneed to tighten accession conditions towards candidateurkey amongst EU elites and publics alike. In other

words, the politicization o conditionality is inevitable theproduct o changing national debates and interests, andthe manner in which these intersect in the EUs complexdecision-making machinery.

Te point here is not whether EU conditionality onthese and other questions is viewed, legitimately ornot, as misplaced or discriminatory. Rather, it is thatchanging political conditions, interpretations and

weights attributed to the ullment or violation o theseconditions inevitably result rom changing nationalinterests, the evolving EU project and developmentsin the regional and international context in which EUpolicies are ormulated. Failing to appreciate this act byoveremphasizing the objectivity or technicality o aninherently political process such as conditionality risksincreasing miscommunication and mistrust between theEU and urkey. Te task is that o retaining as much aspossible the quality o credibility engendered by technicalconditionality, without concealing the political attributeso this policy; attributes which i eectively channelledand articulated can serve the double purpose o helpingtransorm candidate urkey and bringing the Europeanpublics closer to the Union.

Te discourse on urkeys impact in Brussels and other

Whichconditions

to emphasize?

EUconditionalitymay bemisplaced ordiscriminatory?

The impacto Turkey onthe EuropeanUnion

Conditionalityand UE oreign

policy goals


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3534

European capitals oten takes or granted the answer toa undamental question: the impact o what?. Moreprecisely, European politicians, the media, civil societyand the Commission (in its 2004 Impact Study onurkey) all unmistakeably ocus on the impact o urkeysinclusion in the EU. As detailed below, some actors ocuson urkeys impact on the EUs institutional structureand budget, others discuss the impact on EU publicopinion or migration ows, while others still debate theimpact on European policies. What all these debates havein common is their ocus on the costs and benets ourkeys inclusion in the EU.

Focussing on inclusion is the natural corollary othe enlargement policy, whose declared intent is ullmembership. Te accession process - as opposed tothe neighbourhood policy or alternative proposals or

privileged or unprivileged partnerships with urkey - isexpressly intended to pave the way or urkeys entryinto the EU. Yet given the long-term and uncertainnature o the accession process, the outcome o whichcannot be guaranteed, as spelt out in urkeys AccessionNegotiations Framework, it is nonetheless notable thathardly anyone in the EU raises the question with respectto the opposite scenario: the impact o urkeys exclusionrom the EU. For the EU, the consequences o decidingto exclude urkey rom the EU are equally, i not moreimportant than those o deciding to include urkey.Especially i the decision to exclude urkey occurs outside

the rule-bound and technical ramework o the accessionprocess (e.g., through reerendum results in France or

Austria), the implications or the EUs credibility, itspolitical identity, its economy and its oreign policy

would be as, i not more signicant than the impact ourkeys inclusion. Te implications would relate both tohow Europeans view and understand themselves, and tohow outsiders perceive the nature, mandate and spirit othe Union.

Te implications o urkeys exclusion rom the EUreceive ar greater attention in urkey itsel. Perhaps inview o the urkish publics lack o condence that theaccession process will result in ull membership, ar moreoten than EU member states and institutions urksdebate the consequences o urkeys exclusion. Here,the dierent worldviews within urkey visibly come to

the ore. urkish liberal and progressive orces ear thati the Union ultimately turns Ankara a cold shoulder,urkey could see the re-empowerment o nationalist andconservative orces, moving back on the progress madein political and economic reorms. urkish secularistsand establishment orces warn against an impendingresurgence o political Islam. On the other end othe spectrum, urkish Eurosceptics, nationalists andconservatives highlight Ankaras geostrategic alternativesboth across the Atlantic, in the Middle East and Eurasia,as well as urther aeld towards India or China; theyemphasize the benets o retaining ull sovereignty overurkeys development path, and thus downplay the costso urkeys exclusion rom the EU.

A second EU-urkey question, which receives ar greaterattention in the EU, is that o the impact on what?. Here

the debate is oten conusing and a denite cost-benetbalance sheet has not been convincingly presented. A clear cost-benet calculus regarding urkeys EUaccession can only be speculative, given the impossibilityo making precise impact assessments regarding an entrydate lying sometime ater 2014. It is unreasonable toexpect a denite answer as to what urkeys impact onEU institutions will be, when the EU itsel is in a deepstate o ux, and its constitutional status lies at a critical

juncture with its uture difcult to predict. By the sametoken, it is unreasonable to speculate on the precise levelso uture urkish immigration in other member states,

given the pace o urkeys political, economic and socialdevelopment. Tis makes urkey 2014 impossible topredict. It is even more unreasonable to attempt impactassessments in areas where both urkish and EU variablesare rapidly changing, such as in the realms o the economyand oreign policy.

Moreover, a cost-benet calculation can only be highlysubjective, in so ar as it hinges upon an apriorisubjectivechoice o the specic areas upon which urkeys accession

will impact. In other words, responding to the question:impact on what?, depends upon a subjective view o

which areas are deemed most important. In debating theimpact o urkeys membership, dierent actors withinthe EU and urkey have ocussed on very dierent issues.In the economic sphere, the discussion has ocussed ona set o disparate issues ranging rom the impact on the

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EUs role in the global economy to the impact on the EUsbudget, labour markets and the Common AgriculturalPolicy (CAP). In the political and social spheres, thediscussion has also touched upon a large variety oquestions, including urkeys impact on Europeaninstitutions, public opinion, oreign policy and politicalidentity. What explains how dierent actors go aboutanalysing and speculating about urkeys uture impact?

As elaborated below, a useul key to understandingwhich aspects and spheres dierent actors ocus on whendebating the impact o urkeys accession is to look at thedierent levels at which the debate takes place.

A rst level is that o urkeys impact on the EUs role inthe world. Here the debate ocuses predominantly on theeconomic and oreign policy domains. Tose examiningthis level o analysis, including key constituencies in

member states such as the UK, Finland, Poland, Sloveniaand urkey itsel are rather positive about urkeysexpected impact, highlighting the assets that urkeysmembership would bring to the EUs role in internationalrelations and the global economy. urkeys growth, itsrising productivity, its young and growing labour orce,its rising trade levels and growing FDI inows are broughtto the ore, emphasizing how these would contribute tothe ullment o the EU Lisbon agenda and better equipthe Union to ace rising competition rom emergingeconomic giants such as India or China. Business andpro-EU political circles in urkey, as well as key business

constituencies in the EU with interests in urkish marketsalso emphasize how these economic benets would riskserious dilution i the EU were to insert permanentderogations to the ull liberalization o the our reedomsor uture member urkey. urkeys role as an energyand transport hub, acilitating the EUs much soughtenergy diversication is also underlined, especially byeastern European member states which remain almostentirely dependent on unpredictable Russian supplies,as well as by European energy companies with interestsin transit routes through urkey. Finally, political andcivil society elites in member states like the UK, Greece,Finland, Poland and Slovenia, as well as the Commissionor oreign policy specialists across Europe, highlight theassets that urkeys inclusion could bring to bear uponthe edging European oreign policy, in terms o location,logistics and ties to neighbouring regions such as Russia,

the South Caucasus, Central Asia, the Balkans and theMiddle East. Many also highlight how Middle Easternand Eurasian countries careully watch the evolution oEU-urkey relations, ocussing especially on the expectedgrowth in the EUs actorness in these regions in view ourkeys accession.

A second level o analysis highl ights the impact o urkeysaccession on the EUs internal institutional, political,social, cultural and economic set-up. Here the argumentsemphasize the expected costs o urkeys accession armore than the benets. Beginning with institutions,both France and the Commission have placed muchattention on the impact o urkeys accession on EUinstitutions. Here the most commonly ound arguments- which paradoxically resonate the most in France, whoseno to the Constitutional reaty triggered the Unions

current crisis - is that the EU would unction less witha greater number o member states, particularly largeones that allegedly do not share the Unions ill-denedesprit communautaire. Hence, even in the area o oreignpolicy, where the impact o urkeys membership isnormally associated with key benets or the Union,the greater internal diversity brought about by urkeysaccession would arguably hinder the EUs externalcapabilities and actorness in the current institutionalramework. Moreover, especially i demography is goingto have growing weight in determining member statesdecision-making power, then the newest member state,

urkey, will also be the most important one, a situation which the Unions ounding members, and France inparticular, view with great unease. Hence, the argumentgoes, beore even considering urkeys membership, theUnion has to put its house in order and equip itsel withthe necessary absorption capacity to digest urkey andoperate eectively. Te urkey question coupled with thepost 2004 enlargement situation in the EU has in actreawakened the long-standing widening versus deepeningdebate in Europe. Here, many exponents particularly incontinental Western Europe adamantly espouse the viewthat, while not necessarily competing, enlargement raisesthe stakes in deepening the Union in order to assure itscontinued eectiveness.

Others, and in particular the eastern European memberstates cast this reasoning into question. Enlargement alone

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has not noticeably complicated the EUs institutionalworkings they argue. Intra-EU divisions hindering eectivepolicy-making remain the ones between old member states.Several small member states such as Denmark or Finlandhave argued that it is easier to digest one big member thana number o small or micro states. Tey suggest that the

entry o another large member state would make relativelylittle dierence to the current balance between small andbig. Finally others still, including the Commission, havehighlighted that the EUs institutional and constitutionalreorm is expected to take place well beore urkeys entry,and that urkeys accession process can act as a urtherexternal push actor inducing a successul EU reormprocess.

Yet the worries o many in France and in particular oFrench liberals go well beyond the concern that urkeys

accession would complicate the EUs institutionalunctioning. Te ear - coupled with a strong sense onostalgia or the past - is that urkeys accession andongoing enlargements will ring the death bell o theUnions ederalist aspirations. More generally it wouldseal the end o the political project as conceived by theCommunitys ounding athers, as well as the role thatFrance played in that project. As European ederalists

would argue, it is only those who abhor the prospect o aederal Europe (e.g., British conservatives) or those whohave lost all hope in it (e.g., German Christian Democratsor the Italian centre-let), who may be prepared to accept

urkey in the European old. Indeed according to some, i deepening were to become directly correlated to widening,some anti-ederalists who are now avourable to urkeysaccession would turn against urkeys EU aspirations.Teir Euroscepticism would easily trump their supportor urkeys accession.

France is also at the helm o arguments doubting urkeysmembership on the grounds o contrary public opinion.Here the argument takes dierent tones. Some arguethat the need to rectiy the Unions disconnect romthe demands, desires and expectations o EU publicsis as great as ever. Te French and Dutch nos to theConstitutional reaty are attributed to the rejection byEuropean societies o an increasingly elitist EU project.By the same token, others argue that enlargementatigue, rst and oremost with respect to urkey, is

partly explained by the inability o EU elites to engage thepublics in the debate over the eastern enlargement. TeUnion, it is argued, went through its biggest enlargementever in 2004 and 2007, with the entry o twelve memberstates which almost two decades ago belonged to andconstituted Europes much eared other. A plethora o

Western Balkan states and urkey are now channelled inthe same accession process. Beside them are a number oaspiring applicants, insistently knocking at the Unionsdoor. Yet all this has happened and continues to happen

without the remotest engagement o the public, a lack oengagement which has rendered Brussels ever more alienand distant in the minds o EU citizens. It is with thesearguments in mind, that some in France, or instance,criticize the Commissions inertial and technical progressin enlargement and its alleged stiing o the European-

wide debate on urkeys accession.

Yet others, including Enlargement Commissioner OlliRehn, rebuke many o these points. Rehn, in a speechat the University o Helsinki on 27 November 2006,orceully suggested that the political debate on urkeyruns the risk o undermining the credibility o EU policiestowards urkey. I the Unions right hand lectures urkeyon the Copenhagen criteria arguing that these are the sinequa non or EU entry, while the let hand engages in highlypoliticized and oten populist debates over the desirabilityo urkeys entry, then the Unions credibility in urkeyrisks being seriously undermined. Others argue that the

need to engage with European publics is certainly realand pressing and is, incidentally, a need that has alwaysaccompanied the highly elitist EU project. Yet those veryactors who keep reminding o the importance o takingEuropean public opinion into account are doing little toinsert greater clarity and cool-headedness in the Europeanpublic debate on urkey. Less still do they oster Europeansolidarity towards urkey. Far more oten, raising theissue o contrary public opinion, and calling or nationalreerenda on the urkey question, appears to be more oa shield to hide the absence o strong leadership than agenuine concern or the Unions democratic decit.

urning to a dierent aspect o urkeys expectedimpact on European societies, another common strando arguments links urkeys accession to the EUsmulticulturalism and the question o a European identity.

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As the cases o Denmark and Germany highlight, inpublic debate, urkeys integration in the EU is mirroredto the integration o Muslim migrant communities inEurope, with positive and negative repercussions. Hereviews dier depending on the dierent understandings oa European identity. o those highlighting the essentialist

eatures o a European identity, including culture, religionand history, as many in Austria or the European PeoplesParty do, urkeys accession represents the nemesis o amuch-sought European identity. urkey, it is argued,cannot integrate into the EU, just as non-EuropeanMuslim migrants have ailed to integrate into theirrespective host European countries. Hence, acceptingurkey into the European old would entail abandoningaspirations to orge the Unions identity, dened throughhistory, culture and religion. Others, including keyconstituencies in the UK and more recently in Germany,

reute the claims that a European identity is and canbe premised on monocultural interpretations. Teyemphasize the importance o ostering unity in diversity,encouraging the development o an EU identity basedprecisely on multiculturalism. Following a dierent lineinstead, several commentators in France doubt urkeysmembership not on the basis o its dierent religion orculture per se. Rather, they express concerns on the onehand about urkish secularism which is viewed as contraryto the French understanding o laicit, and on the otherhand about the threat o resurging political Islam in urkey.

A related question which receives rising attention acrossthe EU is the link between identity and borders. othose viewing a European identity through culturalistlenses, geographical borders represent an integral elementseparating and dening us and the other. Hence,urkey should be kept out o the EU on the basis o itsdierent culture, religion and history. Its otherness

would be physically expressed through the delineationand consolidation o the EUs borders well within theboundaries o the European continent. Unsurprisingly,actors within core member states such as Austria orGermany are ar more receptive to this interpretationo borders than members lying on the periphery o theUnion such as Finland, Italy, Spain, Portugal or the UK.

Te French also place much emphasis on the question oborders, yet they have downplayed its cultural dimension.

Te denition o the EUs borders, the argumentgoes, is a critical political step in the ormation o aEuropean identity. Yet the delineation o these borders isconceptualized as an arbitrary and purely political act,rather than as a preordained inevitability. In other words,or reasons o political interest and identity, the European

polity would choose not to extend its borders to Iraq, Iranand Syria by reuting urkeys accession. Te EUs borders

would be determined on the basis o their unctionalpolitical utility in pursuing the Unions interests, dening aEuropean identity and allowing the European polity to livein a comort zone, protected by riendly buer states suchas urkey. Te underlying political outlook permeatingthese views is strongly Eurocentric. Europes world ispredominantly conned to itsel and its neighbouringother, in contrast to the more global outlook espoused byarguments highlighting the EUs role in the world.

A last set o arguments relating to the impact o urkeysaccession on the internal nature and unctioning o theEU relates to the economic realm. As opposed to therather pro-urkey arguments embedded in analysesocussing on the EUs role in the global economy, moreinward-looking economic arguments tend to be ar moresceptical o urkeys accession. A prime issue mentionedmost notably by the Commission relates to the budgetarycosts o urkeys accession, given urkeys size and level oeconomic development. Yet rather than the absolute costto the EU budget, which in terms o individual member

state contributions is unlikely to change radically, it is therelative distribution o Community unds which wouldalter as a result o urkeys accession. Hence, structuralunds would be redirected away rom current recipients ineastern Europe and, much to Frances displeasure, the CAP

would risk being seriously aected by the entry o a largenew member state with a signicant agricultural sector.

Arguments ocussing on budgetary issues are especiallyspeculative and prone to populist ear-mongering. Notonly is it entirely ctional to speculate about the EU budgetor the CAP in 2020, but the rate o change in urkeyseconomy is such that predicting urkeys impact on theEUs budgetary, cohesion or agricultural policies with anyreasonable degree o precision is almost impossible.

A third level o analysis avoured by many nationalcommentators within the EU is the impact o urkeys

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that o the EU, as revealed by positions adopted by urkeyand the EU in multilateral ora such as the UN. In other

words, the accession process is already impacting uponthe urkish domestic political system, economy andoreign policy in a manner that could make the questiono membership and its impact ar less salient over the

accession years.

Tis is not to say that urkeys accession process and theexpected impact o membership is cost-ree. It is strikingthat little attention is paid not only in the EU but also inurkey to the potential losers o membership in urkey.Te impact o the accession process on ordinary citizensis seriously under-researched, yet the waning support ormembership in urkey (as in other candidates beore it)suggests that key sectors o society could seriously lose outrom the accession process. urkish citizens are already

being deeply aected by rising living costs and economicrestructuring. Tese changes, while being generallyassociated to the consequences o modernization andeconomic globalization, are more specically linked to theEU accession process. Unless careully tackled, these costscould seriously undermine the public support necessaryor a monumental transormationist project such as EUmembership.

What explains why some EU and urkish stakeholderspitch their arguments on one level and not another?

Why has the UK ocused on oreign policy, Finland and

the Commission on conditionality, Slovenia on energy,France on institutions and public opinion, and Germany,Austria or Denmark on immigration? Why was negativepublic opinion not raised as a source o concern in Austria

with respect to Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgar iasmembership, but emphasized as a prime problem in thecase o urkey? Why is urkey an issue in public politicaldebate in France, Germany, Austria, Greece or Cyprusand not in Finland, Italy, Poland, Slovenia or the UK?

When unpacking the discourses in Europe on urkey andvice versa, three principal actors condition when and whysome stakeholders ocus on some issues and not on others:interests, perceptions and prejudice. Naturally these threeactors are closely interlinked: the underlying interests odierent constituencies shape the ormation o perceptionsand prejudices on urkey and the EU; those interests in

turn are moulded on the basis o prevailing perceptionsand misperceptions about the EU and urkey.

A rst conditioning actor inuencing the public debatein dierent European countries is the manner in whichthe urkey question intersects with the goals and interests

o dierent constituencies in member states, includingpolitical parties, bureaucracies, the media, civil society,Diaspora and migrant communities, business, industrialor agricultural lobbies, oreign policy specialists anddeence establishments. In order to delve into the EU-urkey discourse, it is o prime importance to understandthe domestic political rationale o the urkey debate indierent member states, and the main constituencies witha stake in that debate, constituencies which may eithergenerate or diuse ideas in avour and against urkeysaccession, at times or reasons which are oten unrelated

to EU-urkey relations.One key actor inuencing the domestic political rationaleo the EU-urkey debate is the extent and manner in

which this debate is linked to national identity politicsin dierent member states. Wherever the urkey questionis part and parcel o the debates on national identity, theEU-urkey question is oten an issue in domestic politics.In France or example, the urkey debate is inextricablytied to the domestic political battle between secularistsand Catholics, whereby the ormer appreciate urkeyssecularism while being wary o the urkish states control

o religion, while the latter highlight urkeys religion asan argument either in avour o urkeys accession in amulti-religion Europe or against urkeys accession onessentialist grounds relating to urkeys dierent religion.In Germany, Austria and Denmark instead, the debateson national identity are related to the dierent viewson the role o existing urkish and Muslim migrantcommunities in the denition o national identities. Inother words, particularly in Germany - the member state

with by ar the largest urkish Diaspora in Europe - thedebate about urkeys EU accession reects the dierentviews about the German identity itsel, ranging romKohls explicit emphasis on Christianity as opposed toFischers or the Greens emphasis on multiculturalism,the latter being linked in no small measure to Germanyschange in its citizenship law in 1999. By contrast, andin view o the small urkish communities in Finland,

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Italy, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden or the UK, debatesabout national identity in these countries have little ornothing to do with urkey, explaining in part the lacko public debate on urkey beyond expert elite levels.

Yet i the urkey question were to become an issue inthe contested denitions o national identities in these

countries, its level o attention in public debate could rise,not necessarily to the benet o EU-urkey relations.

Another issue shaping the extent and nature o the debateon urkey is the level and type o contact with urkeyitsel. Again, depending on the degree and nature ocontact and acquaintance with urkey, views on the EU-urkey question may radically change. In countries suchas the UK and Poland, the urkey question is debatedpredominantly within private elite circles, in whichexpert discussion encourages a relatively detached andne-tuned assessment o the pros and cons o urkeysaccession. In other contexts instead, the contacts andinterests o specic groups shape the nature o the debateon urkey. Te large Armenian Diaspora in France orthe deence establishment in the UK critically eed andgenerate ideas shaping national views on the EU-urkeyquestion. Geographical proximity also plays a role indetermining the degree and type o contact betweendierent EU actors and urkey, shaping the interests ornon-interests regarding EU-urkey relations. For obviousgeographical reasons, urkey plays a ar more prominentrole in the public debate in Greece than it does in Finland.

Despite incomparable dierences in terms o absolute sizeand weight, to Finns the expected impact o Estoniasaccession was ar greater than that o urkey, explainingthe dierences in the levels o public debate in Finlandabout the ormer case compared to the latter. Economicand social contact is also important. Te rising tradelevels between the UK or Germany and urkey, growingBritish and German business and property investment inurkey, and rising levels o British and German tourismin urkish coastal resorts, all contribute in diusing ideasabout the expected

la turchia contemporanea - i quaderni di paralleli

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