language-in-education planning in algeria- historical development and current issues

MOHAMED BENRABAH

LANGUAGE-IN-EDUCATION PLANNING IN ALGERIA:HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND CURRENT ISSUES

(Received 1 March 2006; accepted in revised form 31 December 2006)

ABSTRACT. The paper presents the language policy (arabisation) pursued inAlgeria since independence in 1962. The first section of the paper focuses on therecent changes in government language policy (return to Arabic–French bilingualismin schools) and reactions to them following the recommendations made by theNational Commission for the Reform of the Educational System in March 2001. Thesecond part gives a historical background to post-independent language-in-educationplanning. The third section looks at the unplanned developments resulting from thehegemonic nature of linguistic arabisation. The fourth section explores secondaryschool students’ attitudinal reactions towards Algeria’s linguistic pluralism. Finally,the paper argues that the Algerian leadership’s refusal to recognise linguistic plu-ralism considered beneficial by the majority of the population represents one of themajor obstacles to the nation-building process.

KEY WORDS: Algeria, arabisation, bilingualism, English, French, languageattitudes, language educational policy, language hegemony, language maintenance,Tamazight

ABBREVIATIONS: CNRSE – National Commission for the Reform of the Edu-cational System; FFS – Socialist Forces Front; MCB – Berber Cultural Movement;HCA – High Commission for Berber A!airs

Introduction

Algeria’s development history since its independence consists ofthree main phases each of which has had an impact on languageeducation policies. The first phase is characterised by the coloniallegacies amongst which was a network of schools and an educa-tional system dominated by the French language with Arabic grow-ing steadily in importance. The second phase lasted from the late1960s to the late 1990s and corresponded to the socialist-era centralplanning economy, called the nationalist transition. The Arabic lan-guage was gradually imposed in the educational sector. An extreme

Language Policy (2007) 6:225–252 ! Springer 2007DOI 10.1007/s10993-007-9046-7

version of exclusive nationalism inspired by the 19th centuryEuropean ideal of linguistic convergence marked this era. The thirdphase began in the early 2000s corresponding to the transition tothe free economic market with less assertive arabisation policies.During the third phase, the authorities have encountered hostilityto the reform of the schooling system. In fact, the Algerian govern-ment has come to admit that education has ‘‘failed’’. Two examplesof student achievement will be used here as recent illustrations ofthis failure. In June 2005, ten classes in the city of Mascara tooktheir final examination at the end of the primary cycle (Sixth Formexamination for 11–12 year olds) and not one single pupil suc-ceeded. The second illustration concerns university standards. Inmid-November 2005, the Minister of Higher Education declaredthat 80% of first-year students fail their final exams because of lin-guistic incompetence. The majority of the student population whoenrol in higher education have been schooled through Literary/Classical Arabic only and are hence weak in French, the languageof instruction in scientific disciplines (Allal, 2005: 13; Maız &Rouadjia, 2005: 13). What is more, the imposition of an exclusivelyArabic monolingual schooling system implemented during thenationalist phase is considered to be a major source of its current‘‘failure’’, of the rise of religious fanaticism, and the civil war thathas ravaged Algeria since the early 1990s (Benrabah, 1999a: 154–160, 2004: 71–73; Byrd, 2003: 78; Co!man, 1992: 147 & 185, 1995).

The issue of language education policies in Algeria is a sensitiveissue embroiled in passionate politics and, as correctly assessed byBerger (2002: 8), it is ‘‘the most severe problem of Algeria in itspresent and troubled state’’. This situation sets Algeria apart fromthe rest of the Arab world and Africa and makes it a particularlyinstructive example for the fields of language policy and language-in-education planning.

The present paper aims to examine Algeria’s language educationpolicies since its independence. It will be organised as follows. Thefirst part will present recent reforms and opposition to their imple-mentation. In the second section, a description of post-independentlanguage-in-education planning will be given with a view to set thebackground for a better understanding of the current situation. Inthe third section, it will be argued that the hegemony of linguisticarabisation has led to resistance and to the maintenance oflanguages that were targeted by arabisation. The fourth part ofthe paper will explore Algerian secondary-school students’ attitudes

mohamed benrabah226

towards Algeria’s multilingualism. In the final section, it will beargued that the opposition of the Algerian leadership to linguisticpluralism remains the major obstacle to the process of nation-building.

Educational System in Crisis: Reforms and Reactions

Since the early 2000s, the issue of languages in the educational sys-tem has been the subject of considerable debate in Algeria: shouldschools continue to favour monolingualism in Arabic or shouldthey adopt Arabic–French bilingualism? Arabo-Islamists, who sup-port the policy of arabisation (monolingualism), are opposed to‘‘Modernists’’ (mainly secular and/or francophone members of thepopulation and the elite) who call for the implementation of Ara-bic–French bilingualism. The debate reached its climax in 2002when opponents to bilingual education issued a fatwa against sup-porters of educational reforms (Abdelhai, 2001: 7) and consideredthe defenders of bilingualism as the ‘‘enemies of Islam and theArabic language’’ and the ‘‘supporters of forced Westernisation ofAlgerians’’*1 (Djamel, 2001: 3). Due to be implemented in Septem-ber 2001, the reforms were suspended by the Ministry of the Inte-rior on 3 September 2001.

This strong opposition came as a reaction to the recommenda-tions made in mid-March 2001 by the National Commission forthe Reform of the Educational System (CNRSE in French) set upin May 2000 by the newly elected Head of State, President Abdela-ziz Bouteflika. In March 2001, the CNRSE recommended thatFrench be reintroduced as the first mandatory foreign language inGrade Two (for 6–7 year olds) of the primary cycle instead ofstarting it in Grade Four (for 8–9 year olds) as had been the casesince the late 1970s. The CNRSE also suggested that scientific dis-ciplines be taught in French instead of Arabic in secondary schools(Sebti, 2001). The obvious intended outcomes are bilingualism andbiliteracy as ways of improving student achievement. It requires aclear shift from a ‘‘weak’’ bilingual education – French taught as asubject – to a ‘‘strong’’ form of bilingual education which involvesstudents learning content (scientific disciplines) through Arabic andFrench.

1 Quotes marked by an asterisk were translated from Arabic or French by the presentauthor.

language-in-education planning in algeria 227

The authorities and a large part of the population alike have feltthe need for educational reforms, which should include, amongother things, the reintroduction of French at an early stage. Beforehe was assassinated in June 1992, President Mohamed Boudiafdescribed the educational system as ‘‘doomed and unworthy of theAlgerian people’’* (Messaoudi & Schemla, 1995: 186). Similarly,prior to his election as Head of State in April 1999, candidateAbdelaziz Bouteflika often repeated in public the expression‘‘doomed schooling system’’. In 1999, a survey conducted for thecentral authorities revealed that 75% of Algerians supported theidea of teaching scientific school subjects in French (Djamel, 2001:3). Many parents believe that Algeria’s public schools ‘‘producegenerations of illiterate people who master neither Arabic norFrench’’* (Beauge, 2004: 17).

Indeed, the educational system in Algeria has been detrimentalto quality and open-mindedness (Si Ameur & Sidhoum, 1992: 167).In 1999, President Bouteflika’s first government committed itself toending its interference with pedagogical matters, to revising schoolcycles, curricula and textbooks, and to promoting teacher trainingas means of eradicating Islamist fanaticism fuelled by the Algerianeducational system. The State also set itself the task of legalisingprivate schools that existed in a legal vacuum and which providean Arabic–French bilingual education for pupils who refuse to at-tend Arabic-only public schools (Martın, 2003: 41). And followingthe dramatic events of 11 September 2001, the Algerian authorities,like most other Arab-Muslim governments around the world, cameunder strong pressure from the West to reform educational curric-ula as part of the Global War on Terror (Karmani, 2005: 262). Inaddition to post-9/11 developments, two other factors have workedagainst the maintenance of a monolingual schooling system: first,the demand for economic reforms comes from the pressure exertedby internationalism and the transition to a market economy,second, there are socio-political demands for democratisation andminority linguistic rights (Benrabah, 2005). Hence, educationalreforms that aim at bilingual/multilingual education are not simplyan educational issue: these are expressions of political ideology,tides of political change and political initiatives (Baker, 2003: 101).An understanding of the undergoing changes and the oppositionthey generate require a historical perspective on language-in-educa-tion planning in Algeria.

mohamed benrabah228

Post-independent language-in-education policies

One month before independence, the leadership of the Algerianrevolutionary movement committed the future State to the policyof linguistic arabisation as follows: ‘‘[The role of the Revolution]is above all [...] to restore to Arabic – the very expression of thecultural values of our country – its dignity and its e"cacy as alanguage of civilisation’’ (Gordon, 1978: 149). In fact, the assimila-tionist ideology of colonial France, which undervalued Literary/Classical Arabic, turned this language into the language of libera-tion (Djite, 1992: 16). This language’s symbolic value was furtherincreased by its link with Islamic culture and religion. ‘‘Islam andthe Arabic language were e!ective forces of resistance against theattempt of the colonial regime to depersonalise Algeria’’ (Gordon,1966: 137). However, Algeria’s separatist nationalism was religiousin form but not content: the motivation was not the establishmentof an Islamic theocracy but of democracy even though the motiva-tion for the latter has been obliterated by the military establish-ment which has repeatedly imposed dictatorial forms ofgovernment since the war of liberation (Roberts, 2003: 30). WhenAlgeria gained its independence in July 1962, it was linguistically apluralistic country. This was the result of its heritage includinginfluences from Berber, Phoenician, Roman, Vandal, Byzantine,Jewish, Moor, Arabic, Spanish, Ottoman and French. Its inhabit-ants spoke Algerian Arabic and Berber or Tamazight (in severallocal varieties) and French. The arabisation policy overlookedthe country’s linguistic diversity, denied any status to the languagesspoken in Algeria and promoted Literary/Classical Arabicdeveloped as the lingua franca of the Arab Middle East (Roberts,2003: 11).

Algeria’s first president, Ahmed Ben Bella, initiated the policy oflinguistic arabisation in primary schools and as early as October1962, he declared that Literary Arabic was to be introduced to theeducational system (Grandguillaume, 2004: 27). Arabic teachingbecame obligatory in all programmes and at all levels duringthe period 1963–1964 and the amount of time spent on French-language teaching decreased gradually (Bennoune, 2000: 228).Hence, French turned out to be ‘‘the first target of arabisation’’(Lewis, 2004). The following year, Grade One (for 5–6 year olds)of the primary cycle was fully arabised and the amount of timedevoted to Arabic-language teaching rose to 10 hours in all other


levels. Furthermore, religious instruction and civics were added ontop of this (Grandguillaume, 2004: 27). However, the government’sambitious programme faced real di"culties linked with the socialchanges that accompanied the end of French colonialism. Thegovernment was confronted with a massive increase (from 14% to36.37%) in pupil enrolment in the first cycle and the problem ofteaching personnel and their competency. By July 1962, 25,000 edu-cators had left Algeria as a result of the mass exodus of Europeans(Assous, 1985: 105; Bennoune, 2000: 223). The illiteracy ratestood at around 90% (Bennoune, 2000: 12; Heggoy, 1984: 111;Lacheraf, 1978: 313) and the number of Algerians literate in Liter-ary Arabic only was estimated at around 300,000 out of a popula-tion of 10 million (Gallagher, 1968: 148; Gordon, 1978: 151). As tothe French language, 1 million were able to read it and 6 millionspoke it (Gallagher, 1968: 134). In 1962–1963, the authorities hired10,988 monitors (Assous, 1985: 106) ‘‘whose intellectual hori-zons [were] at times only slightly less limited than their pupils’’’(Gallagher, 1968: 138). A year later, 1,000 Egyptians were recruitedas Arabic-language instructors. Most of these teachers turned outto be unqualified for teaching and totally ignorant of the Algeriansocial reality (Sarter & Sefta, 1992: 111–112). Their spokenEgyptian Arabic was incomprehensible to Algerians in general andTamazight-speaking populations in particular and their traditionalpedagogy (learning by rote and class recitation, physical punish-ment and so on) proved inadequate (Grandguillaume, 2004: 27–28;Wardhaugh, 1987: 189). What is more, the majority of these teach-ers were members of the Muslim Brotherhood and ‘‘interestedmore in the ideological indoctrination of the students than inteaching’’ (Saad, 1992: 60). The Egyptian educators proved to bemajor channels for importing Islamist ideology into Algerian publiclife (Abu-Haidar, 2000: 161; Mostari, 2004: 38; Roberts, 2003: 12;Thomas, 1999: 27).

After the June 1965 military coup led by Colonel Boumediene,arabisation gained momentum under the latter’s presidency (1965–1978). President Boumediene’s arabisation drive is best illustratedby the following declaration made by his first Minister of Educa-tion, Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, during a government session in the1960s: ‘‘This [arabisation] will not work, but we have to do it...’’*(Grandguillaume, 1995: 18). In September 1967, Taleb Ibrahimiinitiated total arabisation of Grade Two in primary schools. Butthe arabisation of the first two primary grades coupled with the

mohamed benrabah230

lower educational quality led many parents to delay the registrationof their children until the third year where French remained domi-nant (Saad, 1992: 61). A survey carried out by the University ofBerkeley under the auspices of the Department of Planning showedthat 80% of the youth were against the arabisation of universitylearning (Calvet, 1996: 118). Meanwhile, Taleb Ibrahimi informallyallowed Mouloud Mammeri, a Kabylian writer/academic andBerberist militant, to restore the chair of Berber studies at AlgiersUniversity banned by Ben Bella’s government in October 1962(Chaker, 1998: 42; Guenoun, 1999: 30). After a cabinet shake-up inJuly 1970, Taleb Ibrahimi became Minister of Culture and Infor-mation and launched the Cultural Revolution in order to accom-pany the government’s radical economic and foreign policies(Roberts, 2003: 11). In September 1976, educational reforms wereintroduced to favour, among other things, linguistic arabisation asa means of increasing the population’s competence in LiteraryArabic (Benachenhou, 1992: 210; Bennoune, 2000: 301). Until the1970s, the educational structure inherited from the colonial periodconsisted of three levels: primary school (lasting 5 years), middleschool (4 years) and secondary school (3 years). Starting from1976, an experimental schooling system called the FundamentalSchool was implemented. It consisted of a fusion of primary andmiddle school grades (nine consecutive years) with all the teachingdone in Arabic (except foreign languages) (Assous, 1985: 132–133;Saad, 1992: 65–66).

In April 1977, the appointment of Mostefa Lacheraf as Ministerof Primary and Secondary Education signalled a pause in theill-prepared and excessively speedy arabising process. This well-known writer and thinker favoured gradual arabisation and bilin-gual education because he believed that French could serve as a‘‘reference point, a stimulant’’ that would force the Arabic lan-guage ‘‘to be on the alert’’* (Berri, 1973: 16). At the end of 1963,he advocated the necessary maintenance of French in the schoolingsystem for as long as it would take to reform Arabic and ‘‘desacra-lise’’ traditional culture (Gordon, 1966: 192–193). Soon after beingappointed Minister, Lacheraf suspended the Fundamental School,dismissed the arabophone personnel in his Ministry, re-instated tea-cher training in French as well as ‘‘strong’’ forms of bilingualism inprimary schools with scientific subjects (math, calculus, biology)taught in French. Lacheraf resigned when President Boumedienedied in December 1978. The pro-bilingual elements within the State


were sidelined by the pro-arabisation lobby (Islamists, conservativesand nationalists). The successor of President Boumediene favouredthe latter group during his presidency (1979–1992).

Hegemony and Resistance

Mohamed Cherif Kharroubi replaced Mostepha Lacheraf as Minis-ter of Primary and Secondary Education in March 1979. The newMinister, a monolingual arabophone and pan-Arabist Kabyliantrained in Syria, was ‘‘detested [by his fellow Kabylians] for hisrefusal to speak his mother tongue’’ (Roberts, 1980: 121). His firstdecisions were to resume the policy of total arabisation, implementthe Fundamental School systematically and impose compulsoryteaching of religious instruction at all levels (Tefiani, 1984:121–122). The Ministry personnel and course designers were givena free hand in designing Islamist syllabuses and teaching. It did nottake them long to turn arabisation into an islamisation process(Benrabah, 1999a: 154–157). French was postponed until GradeFour as the first mandatory foreign language and English as thesecond mandatory foreign language in Grade Eight. In 1986, for-eign languages like German, Italian, Russian and Spanish, knownas ‘‘minority languages’’, were simply dropped in Middle Schools(for students aged 12–15). Hence, between 1984 and 1994, univer-sity departments o!ered ‘‘Bachelor’s degrees’’ for beginners in these‘‘minority languages’’ (Abi Ayad, 1998: 99; Miliani 2000: 18).

In the meantime, Algeria’s elites preferred to enrol their childrenin institutions controlled by the French government. They, thus,indulged in the practice of elite closure (Myers-Scotton, 1993: 149)and promoted arabisation as a strategy to disqualify those less for-tunate and minimise competition for their own children, for whomthey could ensure the appropriate education needed (in French) forgood careers in modern business and technology (Thomas, 1999:26). This practice was most visible in Algiers where a small numberof primary and secondary schools were uno"cially bilingual. Forexample, the former French Lycee Descartes was ‘‘nationalised’’ toprovide a French education to the children of several members ofthe political, military and educational elites (Messaoudi & Schemla,1995: 59). As to the majority of young Algerians, often educated inArabic only and who had an inadequate command of French(which is needed for career advancement), they enrolled in arabised

mohamed benrabah232

university departments (Islamic Law and Arabic Literature inparticular) and became susceptible to Islamist teaching and indoc-trination (Co!man, 1992: 147 & 185, 1995; Roberts, 2003: 12;Stone 1993: 52).

At the beginning of the 1990s, the pro-arabisation lobby putpressure on the Minister of Education to delay yet again Frenchlanguage teaching in the Fundamental School. The Minister didnot satisfy the lobbyists but he put English on the same par asFrench (Laib, 1993: 7). Starting from September 1993, school-chil-dren who accessed Grade Four had to choose between French andEnglish as the first mandatory foreign language (Bennoune, 2000:303). In other words, not only was French no longer the first com-pulsory foreign language, but it could also be chosen as the secondforeign language in Grade Eight. However, this new language com-petition ended up favouring French because the number of pupilswho chose English was negligible (Que!elec et al., 2002: 38). Inuniversities, 95% of post-graduate courses in sciences and 95% ofundergraduate courses in medicine and technical disciplines aretaught in French. And the majority of undergraduates in scientificstreams prefer to follow lectures given in French (Miliani, 2000:20). In the 1990s, many independent establishments were illegallycreated by the associations of parents to o!er Arabic–French bilin-gual education from nursery to secondary levels. In 2003–2004,there were between 380 and 600 such private schools in majortowns and cities (Gillet, 2004: 1342; Martın, 2003: 41). The totalstudent population in the private sector was estimated at 80,000 in2004 (Kourta, 2004: 6).

The maintenance of French in Algeria could be interpreted asresistance to the hegemony of arabisation. It has been argued that‘‘strategies of resistance [are] a typical reaction to overt politicaland linguistic oppression’’ (Mesthrie et al., 2000: 333). The targetsof arabisation were French and the first languages of Algerians(Algerian Arabic and Berber). The survival and spread of both firstlanguages could be described as an illustration of covert and/orovert resistance to the arabisation policy. Opposition to Algeria’slanguage policy first came from the Berber-speaking minority, theKabylians. They began with an armed struggle against the centralauthorities in 1963–1964 under the banner of the newly formedparty the Socialist Forces Front (FFS in French). The ideologicaltrends united by the FFS were all opposed to arabisation (Mahe,2001: 442). The 1963–1964 dramatic turning point announced


future and repetitive unrest in the Kabylian region. The hastypolicy of arabisation and its acceleration with Mostefa Lacheraf’sreplacement by a ‘‘token’’ Kabylian kindled rioting in Kabylia(Tabory & Tabory, 1987: 76). After the authorities cancelledMouloud Mammeri’s lecture on ancient Tamazight poetry whichwas to be held at the University of Tizi Ouzou in March 1980, aseries of riots were sparked and various demonstrations wereorganised in the spring of 1980. These had been preceded by anumber of repressive measures against the Berber language andculture. The Circle of Berber Studies at Algiers University wasabolished and its Berberist leaders arrested in January 1971; thechair of Berber studies at Algiers University was abolished in 1973;possession of the Berber alphabet and dictionaries was made acriminal o!ence (Guenoun, 1999: 32–33; Sadi, 1991: 29–30). Thefrustration of the local population reached its climax with thecensorship of Mammeri’s lecture.

The 1980 convulsions, known as the Berber Spring, turned out tobe the first major destabilisation of the regime and announced the1988 October uprisings which led to the end of the single-party‘‘socialist’’ system and to political liberalisation. Prior to the BerberSpring, Berberophones had adopted a form of passive resistanceexpressed in language use. Tamazight-speaking parents banned theuse of Arabic by their children at home (Kahlouche, 2004: 106) andresistance spilled over into the streets of Algiers whereBerberophones deliberately spoke French or Tamazight in cafes,restaurants, hotels and certain administrative sectors (Harbi, 1980:32). After 1980, under the ideological guidance of the BerberCultural Movement (MCB in French), Berberophones demandedpolitical liberalisation as a way to guarantee their linguistic andcultural rights within a democratic Algeria (Maddy-Weitzman,2001: 38). They also called for the o"cial recognition of AlgerianArabic and Tamazight and refused the arabisation of the educa-tional system because of its ‘‘de-Frenchifying’’ objectives and itsinability to transmit democratic and secular ideals (Mahe, 2001:471). Following the political liberalisation of post-October 1988,two Departments of Berber Language and Culture were created,one at the University of Tizi Ouzou in January 1990 and theother at the University of Bejaia in October 1991 (Chaker, 1998:150; Kahlouche 2000: 158; Tigziri 2002: 61). Between September1994 and April 1995, the MCB organised general strikes andparalysed the entire educational sector in Kabylia. Consequently,

mohamed benrabah234

the government decreed the creation of an administrative structure,the High Commission for Berber A!airs (HCA in French) to beattached to the president’s o"ce (Cherrad-Benchefra & Derradji,2004: 166). The objectives of the HCA were to rehabilitate theBerber culture and introduce the Tamazight language in educationand the media (Maddy-Weitzman, 2001: 39). There was also a prom-ise for a future recognition of Berber. Seven years later (April 2002)following uprisings in spring 2001, President Bouteflika’s govern-ment institutionalised it as a national (though not o"cial) language.

The teaching of Tamazight organised by the HCA was markedby a great deal of haste and improvisation because the Berber lan-guage lacked an o"cial status and proper planning institutions(Kahlouche, 2000: 161–162, Tigziri, 2002: 64). The situation chan-ged after it became a national language. Since September 2003 andthe beginning of the implementation of parts of the recommenda-tions made by the CNRSE, Tamazight has been taught as a subjectin Middle Schools nationally (Benrabah, 2005). A year later,French was finally introduced as the first mandatory foreignlanguage in Grade Two of the primary cycle with 3 hours a weekand English as the second mandatory foreign language in GradeSix. The authorities also recruited 1,500 French teachers to meetthe demand for French language teaching (Cherfaoui, 2004: 2). Butthe reintroduction of French as a medium of instruction forscientific disciplines in secondary education is not on the agendayet because of the pressure exerted from the pro-arabisationquarters. However, the government has made a major move againstthis lobby. Since September 2005, the Ministry of Education hasdiscontinued the Islamic/religious courses in the secondary cycleand their respective exams in the Baccalaureate (Aıt Ouarabi, 2005:1 & 3). In August 2003, Article 6 of Ruling No. 03-09 legalisedprivate schools which provided ‘‘strong’’ forms of bilingual educa-tion and which had so far existed in a legal vacuum (Nassima,2003). It is within this context of change that the present authordecided to measure language attitudes among secondary schoolstudents in Algeria.

Language Attitudes: ‘‘French for Action, Arabic for Prayerand Poetry’’

Arabisation in Algeria had to be implemented with great carebecause of the many obstacles that lay ahead of it. In the 1960s,


two prominent Algerian intellectuals expressed their anxietyconcerning possible negative outcomes. As early as November/December 1963, Mostefa Lacheraf disparaged the first implementa-tion of arabisation that had then been embarked upon. He warnedagainst Arabic school manuals which were so full of abstract wordsthat they might awaken a dislike for Arabic among Algerian stu-dents and encourage them to prefer French (Gordon, 1966: 192–193). A few years later, another Algerian scholar, Abdallah Mazo-uni, published an extensive piece of work on the language issue inAlgeria in which he posited that rapid arabisation might prove,among other things, harmful to the Arabic language itself, mightbe regressive and could alienate students because the language wasdi"cult and the teaching tools were inadequate. In particular, hewarned against the persistence of the myth that maintained Arabicas the language for prayers and poetry and French for action,development and modernity (Mazouni, 1969: 38 & 185).

Young Algerians’ attitudinal reactions towards bilingualismand multilingualism were intended to assess, among other things,Lacheraf’s and Mazouni’s predictions. In April–May 2004, awritten direct questionnaire was filled in by Algerian secondaryschool students. It is important to emphasise here the di"cultiesassociated with the use of direct questionnaires for the study oflanguage attitudes (attention focused on the issue to be probed),and a fortiori of a self-administered written test battery. The aimof the study was not about language but about attitudes towardsvarious languages that are in competition in Algeria. What ismore, a questionnaire remains a practical and economic way forcollecting attitudinal reactions. The questionnaire was designed tosolicit information from students in three cities located in thewest of Algeria. The test-battery consisted of 5 parts. In the first2, respondents had to select one among 10 alternatives, eachcontaining 1 or a combination of 2, 3 or 4 languages. The thirdsection presented a series of 30 statements each expressing aparticular opinion about the 4 languages of Algeria: AlgerianArabic, Literary/Classical Arabic, French and Tamazight (orBerber). The subjects were asked to select the language they feltcorresponded to each statement. In the fourth part (Likertattitude scale), respondents indicated strength of agreement ordisagreement with a series of 25 statements on a 5-point range.The final section of the questionnaire sought to solicit demo-graphic data.

mohamed benrabah236

Respondents were selected on the grounds of age, gender,education (school grade), field of study (sciences or humanities)and residence (size of urban centre). A total of 1,051 informantsfilled out the questionnaire but not all respondents answered allquestions: for example, one statement received the lowest numberof responses (1,006) while another got the highest number ofresponses (1,043). As far as gender is concerned, 42.5% were maleand 57.5% female. They were all aged between 14 and 20 and themajority (55.6%) were 17–18 years old. All attended secondaryschools: 50.6% were senior pupils in the final year, at the end ofwhich they sit for the Baccalaureate exam, and 49.3% in thesecond form 2 years before the Baccalaureate. There were 51.2% inscientific disciplines and 48.8% in the humanities. Three majortowns were chosen on the basis of population size and accessibility,Oran (1 million inhabitants), Saıda (200,000) and Ghazaouet(40,000). The distribution of informants was as follows: 34.3%Oran, 20.8% Saıda and 44.8% Ghazaouet. The rationale behindchoosing secondary school pupils was threefold. First, they werepreferred to university students in university language Departmentswho had already made their choice. Second, the age-group of oursample is representative of the Algerian population in general:within present-day Algeria’s age structure, those under 30 represent62.7% (Riols, 2004: 50–51), and 40% of the population is ofschool-age (Martın, 2003: 53). Hence, this age-group determines thefuture. Finally, the choice of secondary-school students was alsomotivated by the following quote:

secondary schools in post-colonial societies are generally a significant site forexploring how language use and attitudes about language are nuanced by broaderissues of identity as teenagers, in the throes of negotiating their identities, must doso in an environment where language policies in the schools supplant their natallanguage (White, 2002: 17)

Table 1 presents the pupils’ language preferences (1 – ‘‘Languagethat I like most’’, 2 – ‘‘I like to learn/study in’’). The results showthat Lacheraf’s fears were not groundless. For both statements, theFrench language disqualifies Literary Arabic: out of 1,035responses, 44.4% preferred French, 36.0% Literary Arabic, 17.3%Algerian Arabic and 2.2% Tamazight. Most of the results shown inTable 2 tend to support the claims made by Mazouni. Traits relatedto ‘‘sacredness’’, ‘‘beauty’’ and so on, are usually associated withLiterary Arabic. 82% chose Literary Arabic for Statement 1 (‘‘I feelclose to God in’’) and this is confirmed by an equivalent high


percentage (80%) for Statement 2 (‘‘The language of religious andmoral values’’). Moreover, of a total of 1,035 respondents, 75%chose Literary Arabic as ‘‘the richest language’’ (Statement 3). As tothe fourth statement which concerns ‘‘authenticity’’ (‘‘The languagethat allows me to understand the past’’), Literary Arabic has thehighest score (51.6%). However, the distinction was not as clear-cutas for the preceding statements: out of 1,027 respondents, 33.8%preferred Algerian Arabic as the language that allows them to under-stand the past. For the trait ‘‘language of culture’’ (Statement 5),

TABLE 2

Religious values, aesthetics and grammatical di"culty.

AlgerianArabic

LiteraryArabic

French Tamazight Total

Statements Resp. % Resp. % Resp. % Resp. % Resp.(1) I feel close to

God in159 15.3 850 82.0 20 1.9 8 0.8 1,037

(2) The language ofreligious and moralvalues

126 12.4 844 80.0 33 3.2 14 1.4 1,017

(3) The richestlanguage

66 6.4 776 75.0 185 17.9 8 0.8 1,035

(4) The language thatallows meunderstand the past

347 33.8 530 51.6 124 12.1 26 2.5 1,027

(5) The languageof culture

70 6.8 550 53.7 388 37.9 17 1.7 1,025

(6) Most beautifullanguage

125 12.0 471 45.2 432 41.4 15 1.4 1,043

(7) Language with themost di"cult grammar

42 4.1 620 60.4 252 24.5 113 11.0 1,027

TABLE 1

Language preferences.

AlgerianArabic

LiteraryArabic


Statement Resp. % Resp. % Resp. % Resp. % Resp.(1) Language that

I like most179 17.3 373 36.0 460 44.4 23 2.2 1,035

(2) I like to learn/study in 60 5.8 391 37.6 575 55.3 14 1.3 1,040

mohamed benrabah238

Literary Arabic obtains almost the same score (53.7%) as forStatement 4 (51.6%). French comes second with 37.9%. WithStatement 6 (‘‘Most beautiful language’’), the percentages forLiterary Arabic and French are more or less equal: 45.2% and41.4% respectively. The ‘‘most beautiful’’ languages and ‘‘languagesof culture’’ are the two languages of literacy valued by the educa-tional system. This is probably the reason why Literary Arabic andFrench scored the highest for Statement 7 (‘‘The language with themost di"cult grammar’’). With 1,027 respondents, 60.4% choseLiterary Arabic, 24.5% French, 11% Tamazight and 4.1% AlgerianArabic. These results confirm Mazouni’s claim about the di"cultyof learning Literary Arabic. In fact, in April 2000, participants tothe National Conference on the Teaching of Arabic declared: ‘‘after9 years in basic education, pupils still do not master Arabicproperly’’* (Liberte, 2000: 24). This was recently confirmed(January 2006) by the Minister of Education who regretted the factthat pupils did not master the Arabic language (Amir, 2006: 4).

Traits pertaining to the language of action, development, utility,liberation, modernity and so on (Table 3) are associated withFrench. For Statement 1 (‘‘Language which allows openness to theworld’’), French stands out with 91.5% and Literary Arabic comesin second position with only 6.6%. As to ‘‘the language of science

TABLE 3

Language as capital and vehicle of modernity.

AlgerianArabic

LiteraryArabic


Statements Resp. % Resp. % Resp. % Resp. % Resp.(1) Language which

allows openness tothe world

15 1.5 68 6.6 944 91.5 5 0.5 1,032

(2) Language of scienceand technology

19 1.8 121 11.7 887 85.7 8 0.8 1,035

(3) My parents wouldbe ready to investmoney so that I canlearn or ameliorate my

34 3.3 214 20.8 763 74.1 18 1.7 1,029

(4) Most useful languagefor studies

33 3.2 392 38.1 597 58.1 6 0.6 1,028

(5) Most modern language 35 3.4 94 9.1 849 82.1 56 5.4 1,034(6) I say ‘‘I love you’’ to

my lover in250 24.5 153 15 599 58.6 20 2 1,022


and technology’’ (Statement 2), 85.7% of respondents preferredFrench and 11.7% Literary Arabic. Out of 1,029 informants,almost three quarters (74.1%) admitted that ‘‘[their] parents wouldbe ready to invest money so that [they] can learn or ameliorate’’their French (Statement 3). 20.8% chose Literary Arabic. Theresults obtained for Statements 2 and 3 confirm the Algeriangovernment’s poll carried out in 1999 and mentioned above. Thetwo most ‘‘useful’’ languages for studies (Statement 4: ‘‘Most usefullanguage for studies’’) are French with 58.1% and Literary Arabicwith 38.1%. Note again that the languages valued in educationtend to score the highest. These results also highlight an Algerianparadox: French comes well ahead despite language policies target-ing it. It stands out as the ‘‘most modern language’’ (Statement 5)with 82.1% of the responses. As to the results obtained for State-ment 6 (‘‘I say ‘I love you’ to my lover in’’), it seems that courtingfor young Algerians involves the greatest use of French (58.6%)with Algerian Arabic coming second (24.5%), Literary Arabic third(15%) and Tamazight fourth (2%). The results for Statement 6confirm Benmesbah’s claim that French is the language for court-ing in Algeria (2003: 13). In fact, the use of French in contexts ofcourting is considered more ‘‘liberating’’: taboos which cannot becommunicated in the majority’s first language are transgressed byFrench which marks impersonality and socio-psychological distance(Bentahila, 1983: 65; Caubet, 2004: 16). However, it should alsobe pointed out that around one quarter of the sample preferredAlgerian Arabic for transgressing taboos. Hence, it seems thatAlgerian Arabic meets more and more Arabophones’ demands forboth ‘‘authenticity’’ and ‘‘modernity’’ (Benrabah, 2005).

When the results shown in Tables 1–3 are correlated with gen-der, di!erences are statistically significant for both items in Table 1and four items in Tables 2 and 3 (see Table 4). For Statement 1(‘‘Language that I like most’’), gender di!erences are significant for3 languages (p<0.000). For Statement 2 (‘‘I like to learn/studyin’’), di!erences are significant for Literary Arabic and French(p<0.050). In their responses to Statement 3 (‘‘My parents wouldbe ready to invest money so that I can learn or ameliorate my’’)and 4 (‘‘Most beautiful language’’), male informants favour Liter-ary Arabic over French, while females prefer French. The resultsfor the present study suggest a high degree of ‘‘overt prestige’’ inFrench as a marker of status. ‘‘Covert prestige’’ in Arabic (bothLiterary and Algerian) corresponds to markers of national and/or

mohamed benrabah240

local within-group solidarity. In fact, the significant di!erenceshown between male and female informants’ choices for Statement4 (‘‘Most beautiful language’’) can also be linked to perceptions of‘‘masculinity’’: 16.6% of the male respondents chose AlgerianArabic as the most beautiful language while only 8.6% of femalesdid so. With Statement 5 (‘‘Most modern language’’), the infor-mants’ attitude is unambiguous: most of them (79.8% of males and83.7% of females) are certain that the ‘‘most modern language’’ isFrench, with female informants scoring significantly higher thanmale informants. As far as Statement 6 is concerned (‘‘Thelanguage that allows me understand the past’’), it is females whofavour Algerian Arabic or Literary Arabic more than males. Thisseems to reflect a belief in women’s role as ‘‘guardians of tradition’’in pre-industrial societies (Benrabah, 1999b).

The first and fourth parts of the questionnaire were designed tomeasure, among other things, Algerian students’ attitudes towardsbilingualism/multilingualism. The Likert scale attitudinal measure-ments show that most of the respondents value both speakingseveral languages and Algeria’s multilingualism quite highly (seeTable 5). Moreover, these results support the issue discussed

TABLE 4

Language attitudes and gender di!erence.

AlgerianArabic

LiteraryArabic

French Tamazight pStatements

M % F % M % F % M % F % M % F %

(1) Language thatI like most

16.6 8.6 47.3 43.4 34.8 46.5 1.4 1.5 <0.000

(2) I like tolearn/study in

6.4 5.1 41.2 34.9 50.6 59.0 1.8 1.0 <0.050

(3) My parents wouldbe ready to investmoney so that I canlearn or ameliorate my

4.2 2.2 24.5 18.1 69.2 78.2 2.1 1.5 <0.011

(4) Most beautifullanguage

16.6 8.6 47.3 43.4 34.8 46.5 1.4 1.5 <0.000

(5) Most modernlanguage

5.7 1.7 10.3 8.2 79.8 83.7 4.1 6.5 <0.001

(6) The language thatallows me understandthe past

32.5 34.7 49.3 53.4 14.3 10.3 3.9 1.5 <0.019


TABLE

5

Attitudes

towardsbilingu

alism/m

ultilingu

alism.

Statement

1Agree

completely

2Agree

3Neither

agree

nordisag

ree

4Disag

ree

5Disag

ree

completely

(1)Today

,itisan

adva

ntage

tospeakseverallangu

ages.

55.8%

(586

)31

.8%

(334

)4.8%

(50)

4.1%

(43)

1.7%

(18)

(2)Theexistence

ofseverallangu

ages

isawealthforAlgeria.

48.3%

(508

)34

.3%

(361

)7.7%

(81)

5%(53)

3.9%

(41)

(3)Arabic–F

rench

bilingu

alism

isan

adva

ntage

when

livingin

Algeria.

40.2%

(423

)41

.6%

(437

)9.8%

(103

)4.7%

(49)

3%(32)

(4)Iam

forbilingu

alism

inAlgeria.

28.6%

(301

)41

.3%

(434

)10

%(105

)8.3%

(87)

9.2%

(97)

(5)Beingbilingu

alin

Arabic

andFrench

isan

adva

ntage

andallowsone

tolive

andprosper

inAlgeria.

40.5

(423

)41

.9(437

)9.9(103

)4.7(49)

3.1(32)

(6)LiteraryArabic

isnecessary

forfindingajobin

Algeria.

8.5(89)

19.3

(201

)17

.5(182

)32

.8(342

)21

.9(228

)

(7)IthinkTam

azightshould

berecogn

ised

asnational

ando"cial

langu

age

6.2%

(65)

7.3%

(76)

10.6%

(111

)18

.7%

(195

)57

.2%

(597

)

mohamed benrabah242

earlier: monolingualism in Literary Arabic alone does not ensuresocial mobility, which is considered possible mainly through themastery of Arabic–French bilingualism.

However, the data collected with the first part of the test batteryshow that the situation is far more complex and a number of inter-esting observations can be drawn from Table 6. Informants remainresolutely opposed to monolingualism in any one of the competinglanguages in Algeria even though they do not necessarily supportall types of bilingual choices. For example, there are low percent-ages for choices, which involve Tamazight. Three main reasonscould explain the rejection of the Berber language: (1) respondentscome from an exclusively Arabic-speaking region with very limitedcontact with Tamazight (the cities of Oran, Saıda and Ghazaouetare located in the western part of Algeria), (2) the common trendin diglossic communities in general and in the Arab world inparticular that views ‘‘Low’’ varieties negatively, (3) the hostilitygenerated by the authorities’ propaganda that describes the rebel-lious Kabylian community as ‘‘anti-Algerian’’ and ‘‘separatist’’.The results in most tasks of the questionnaire tend to give credenceto the third hypothesis. Indeed, responses presented in Table 7suggest that the young secondary school students held strongly neg-ative attitudes towards the Berber language and had little respectfor it even though all of them lived in non Tamazight-speakingareas with no linguistic competence in this language. Almost three

TABLE 6

Best choice of language(s) for social advancement.

Question: Out of the following 10 possibilities, what is the best choice oflanguage(s) that could allow you to live and prosper in Algeria and elsewhere?

Choices % (out of 1,036)

(1) English only 2.9(2) Arabic only 4.4(3) French only 2.8(4) Tamazight only 0.2(5) Arabic and Tamazight 0.5(6) Arabic and French 15.5(7) French and Tamazight 0.1(8) Arabic and English 3.9(9) Arabic, English and French 58.6(10) Arabic, English, French and Tamazight 11.1


quarters admitted that Tamazight was ‘‘The language [they] like theleast’’ (Statement 1) and considered it ‘‘incapable of progress andevolution’’ (Statement 2). Tamazight was also perceived as ‘‘themost di"cult language’’ (67.9% for Statement 3). Lack of respectfor it is reflected in the responses given to Statement 4 whichconcerned purism: 56.1% considered the Berber language to be‘‘The ‘least pure’ language and most ‘mixed’’’ – note also that36.7% described Algerian Arabic as the most ‘‘impure’’ language.Moreover, the informants’ strong opposition to Berber is clearlyexpressed in tasks, which required them to agree or disagree withthe recognition of Tamazight as an o"cial language (see Statement7 in Table 5). Out of a total of 1,032 responses, 18.7% (195answers) disagreed and 57.2% (597) disagreed completely with thestatement. In other words, 792 informants out of 1,032 rejected theo"cial recognition of Tamazight. No wonder Algeria’s Berberistleadership rejects the government’s choice of a referendum on thequestion.

The other results in Table 6 show that the combination ofArabic and French with one or two other languages emerged as themost interesting pattern (15.5% and 11.1% for choices 6 and 10respectively). The majority preferred the choice, which involvedArabic, English and French (58.6%). It was shown above that theintroduction of English as a competitor to French in the primarycycle failed in the 1990s. This failure is also illustrated here in theresults obtained for choice 8 in Table 6: only 3.9% preferred the

TABLE 7

Attitudes towards Tamazight.

AlgerianArabic

LiteraryArabic

French Tama-zight

TotalFre.

Statements

Fre. % Fre. % Fre. % Fre. %

(1) The language thatI like the least

58 5.7 95 9.4 105 10.4 753 74.5 1,011

(2) Language that isincapable of progressand evolution

153 15.2 84 8.3 38 3.8 731 72.7 1,006

(3) Most di"cult language 46 4.5 198 19.2 86 8.4 699 67.9 1,029(4) The least ‘‘pure’’

language and themost ‘‘mixed’’

378 36.7 49 4.8 25 2.4 577 56.1 1,029

mohamed benrabah244

choice ‘‘Arabic and English’’. In fact, respondents seem to rejectpolicies that seek to displace French in favour of English. Theyoung people surveyed value ‘‘additive’’ rather than ‘‘subtractive’’language policies and favour multilingualism.

One step forward two steps back

Algerians’ experience with language policy in education grossly cor-responds to two major periods. The first one was characterised bywidespread bilingualism in French and Literary/Classical Arabicand produced a socio-linguistic competence frequently expressed byMaghrebins/Algerians who attended these schools back in the1960s and 1970s. Openness towards linguistic plurality is illustratedin lecturers’ and/or students’ use of code-switching as a strategy toget their points across. According to Sultana (1999: 32):

Anybody who has interacted with Maghrebin scholars knows the extent to whichthis code-switching is not only frequent, but almost instinctive, producing aneffortless and seamless flow of language that is comprehensible and acceptablewithin the academic community.

The second period produced monolingualism in Literary Arabicfor the majority of the population, and French–Arabic bilingualismfor the children of those in power. It has led to a worrying situa-tion: every year, cohorts of semi-literate graduates (known as‘‘bilingual illiterates’’) with low language proficiency and educa-tional achievement (Azzouz, 1998: 52; Benaıssa, 1998: 91; Co!man,1992: 146–147; Miliani, 2000: 20) are denied participation in thesociety. Their training has been prejudiced by the obligation oflearning scientific subjects in Literary Arabic. It has produced gen-erations of outcasts unequipped to face the modern economy(Beauge, 2004: 17). In mid-November 2005, the Minister of HigherEducation publicly admitted that Algerian university graduatescould not be integrated into Algeria’s economic market (Allal,2005: 13; Maız & Rouadjia, 2005: 13). These dissatisfied graduatesconstitute an important and potentially turbulent element of thesociety. Moreover, they could become ‘‘a demographic bomb’’(Riols, 2004: 50) if they were to migrate massively to neighbouringEurope and reinforce international Islamist terrorism (Byrd, 2003:78). The recent government’s educational reforms, with the reintro-duction of Arabic–French bilingualism (at least on paper), reflectthe authorities’ (and the international community’s) awareness of


this serious situation. But attempts to reform the system are beingthwarted by strong internal opposition.

In Algeria, elites view linguistic pluralism with suspicion, if notoutright hostility. Their hesitation to abandon the policy of arabi-sation is in stark contrast to neighbouring countries’ practices. In2000, Moroccans produced the Charter for Educational Reformwhich, among other things, aimed at encouraging more openness tothe languages that had been targeted by arabisation (French andTamazight). What is more, the term arabisation itself was not men-tioned in the Charter because it has become negatively connoted(Marley, 2004: 31). In Algeria, recent developments show that thegovernment has started back-pedalling on its engagements towardseducational reforms and bilingual education. In the fall of 2005,the Minister of Higher Education admitted that the EuropeanUnion had suspended its aid to Algerian universities because thegovernment was dragging its heels over reforming the educationalsystem (Allal, 2005: 13). Furthermore, in November 2005, legisla-tion was passed by Parliament forbidding the use of languagesother than Arabic as the medium of instruction in private schools,which had provided scientific disciplines in French for 10 years(Moali, 2005). School heads who do not abide by the rule will haveto face imprisonment (Maız & Rouadjia, 2005: 13). And in May2006, the Ministry of Education took the decision to move theteaching of French from Grade Two to Grade Three, starting fromSeptember 2006 (Benrabah, 2006: 70).

There is even greater indecision over how to tackle the Berbero-phones’ linguistic demands. The authorities have made some con-cessions but the major obstacle to granting broad linguistic rightsto Kabylians remains the government’s refusal to accept Berber asan o"cial language. The most recent developments show how thesituation is fraught with tension and di"culty. In September 1999,President Bouteflika declared that ‘‘Tamazight would never be con-secrated in law as an Algerian o"cial language and if it were to bea national language, it is up to the entire Algerian people to decideby referendum’’*. In 2002, he made Berber a national languagewithout resorting to a plebiscite. Yet, in March 2004, he describedTamazight as ‘‘a factor of division in national unity’’ (Lewis, 2004).More recently, the talks between the Aruch (Kabylia’s representa-tives) and President Bouteflika’s government have seemed morepromising. In August 2005, after several rounds of talks, the PrimeMinister and the Aruch agreed on making the Berber language

mohamed benrabah246

o"cial without a referendum (Djilali, 2005: 2). But in September2005, President Bouteflika took everyone by surprise when he pub-licly disagreed with his Prime Minister. He said:

Arabic will remain the only official language of Algeria. No country in the worldhas two official languages and it will never be the case in Algeria where the onlyofficial language, recognised by the Constitution, is Arabic. I cannot accept thingsthat work against Algeria’s interests* (Benchabane, 2005).

In response to the president’s U-turn, the Aruch made public thefollowing statement

[We] consider that the arguments used by the Head of State to deny Tamazightthe right to be an official language are complete nonsense and full of untruths.There are many states with several official languages: South Africa, with its elevenlanguages, is the most enlightening example* (Benchabane, 2005).

The foregoing arguments and counter-arguments readily showthe di"culty for Algerians to move decisively from the ‘‘one lan-guage–one nation’’ ideology of language policy and national iden-tity (arabisation) to a multilingual language policy which promotesethnic and linguistic pluralism (algerianisation) as resources for na-tion-building. Algeria’s promoters of linguistic convergence havefailed in their endeavours for at least four reasons. First, plannersoverlooked both the full complexity of the country’s socio-linguisticprofile as well as the population’s feelings about the di!erent lan-guages in competition within the country. Second, arising out ofthis is the presence of a sort of minority nationalism among theBerber-speaking population, which prevents nation-building as aviable strategy. The language issue has been divisive ever sinceAlgeria obtained its independence. Third, planners systematicallyopposed Literary Arabic to French (or French to English) thuscreating a context of rivalry between them even though the twolanguages are complementary. In fact, four decades of arabisationhave led to a situation where each language in Algeria occupies aset of functions, which are more or less complementary. For themajority of Algerians (1) their first languages, Algerian Arabic and/or Tamazight, allow them to draw their sense of national belonging(identity), (2) Literary/Classical Arabic is associated with Arabo-Islamic values (religion), and (3) French, and English in somespecific domains, represent economic power (Benrabah, 2005).Fourth, arabisation as an exclusionary (monolingual) educationalpolicy does not promote social justice because the majority ofAlgeria’s youth are excluded from the socio-economic activities of


the country. The denial of French-medium instruction contributesto perpetuating the linguistic gulf that separates the bilingual elitefrom the vast majority who are literate or semi-literate in LiteraryArabic only.

Hence, the policy of arabisation was implemented by anauthoritarian regime that was and still is allergic to pluralism (be itpolitical, cultural or linguistic). When the Algerian governmentyields to the pro-arabisation lobby and favours restrictive languagepolicies to forge national consensus and reconciliation, it seeks toimpose the preferences of one subgroup onto everybody. Theirclaims are neither morally legitimate nor rationally convincing.They are simply expressions of a non-democratic system: ‘‘Arabisa-tion has become one more prop of an authoritarian regime that re-fuses to engage in much-needed economic and political reforms.’’(Lewis, 2004) The liberal-democratic tradition favours the set ofvalues, which enhance individual freedom, promote civic equalityand social justice, and/or strengthen democracy (Kymlicka & Pat-ten, 2003: 7). To implement these values in Algeria, the authoritiesneed to move in the direction of reforms, which support linguisticpluralism and abandon the policy of arabisation.

REFERENCES

Abdelhai, B. (2001). L’ecole algerienne version Ennahda. El Watan, 8 April, 7.Abi Ayad, A. (1998). L’Universite et l’enseignement des langues etrangeres. In

D. Guerid (Ed.), L’Universite aujourd’hui (Actes de seminaire) (pp. 99–106).Oran: Edition CRASC.

Abu-Haidar, F. (2000). Arabisation in Algeria. International Journal of FrancophoneStudies, 3(3), 151–163.

Aıt Ouarabi, M. (2005). Reunion hier du conseil des ministres. La suppression desfilieres islamiques confirmee. El Watan, 27 June, 1 & 3.

Allal, M.A. (2005). Que fait-on de l’universite algerienne? El Watan, 2–3 December,13.

Amir, N. (2006). Reformes du systeme educatif. Plus de place pour l’arabe dans lesprogrammes. El Watan, 24 January, 4.

Assous, O. (1985). Arabization and Cultural Conflicts in Algeria. PhD dissertation,Northeastern University, Boston, MA.

Azzouz, L. (1998). Problematique de la baisse de niveau scolaire. In M. Madi (Ed.),Reflexions. L’Ecole en debat en Algerie (pp. 47–57). Algiers: Casbah Editions.

Baker, C. (2003). Education as a site of language contact. Annual Review of appliedLinguistics, 23, 95–112.

Beauge, F. (2004). Algerie, envies de vie. Le Monde, 7 April, 16–17.

mohamed benrabah248

Benachenhou, A. (1992). L’acces au savoir scientifique et technique. In M. Lakehal(Ed.), Algerie, de l’independance a l’etat d’urgence (pp. 210–222). Paris: Larmises-L’Harmattan.

Benaıssa, M. (1998). Di"cultes linguistiques a l’universite et/ou mauvaiseconceptualisation au lycee. In M. Madi (Ed.), Reflexions. L’Ecole en debat enAlgerie (pp. 85–93). Algiers: Casbah Editions.

Benchabane, A. (2005). Apres ses declarations a Constantine sur TamazightBouteflika ebranle la Kabylie. El Watan, 24 September. On www at http://www.elwatan.com.

Benmesbah, A. (2003). Un systeme educatif en movement. Le Francais dans leMonde, 330, November–December, 12–13.

Bennoune, M. (2000). Education, Culture et Developpement en Algerie. Bilan &Perspectives du Systeme Educatif. Algiers: Marinoor-ENAG.

Benrabah, M. (1999a). Langue et Pouvoir en Algerie. Histoire d’un TraumatismeLinguistique. Paris: Editions Seguier.

Benrabah, M. (1999b). Les filles contre les meres. LIDIL. Revue de linguistique et dedidactique des langues, 19, 11–28.

Benrabah, M. (2004). Language and politics in Algeria. Nationalism and EthnicPolitics, 10(1), 59–78.

Benrabah, M. (2005). The language planning situation in Algeria. Current Issues inLanguage Planning, 6(4), 379–502.

Benrabah, M. (2006). Voyage en Algerie, pays des 66 milliards de dollars de reserveet de l’immense desespoir des jeunes. Esprit, 12, December, 61–75.

Bentahila, A. (1983). Language Attitudes among Arabic–French Bilinguals inMorocco. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters Ltd.

Berger, A. E. (2002). Introduction. In A. E. Berger (Ed.), Algeria in Others’Languages (pp. 1–16). Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press.

Berri, Y. (1973). Algerie: la revolution en arabe. Jeune Afrique, 639(7), 7 April,14–18.

Byrd, W. (2003). Contre performances economiques et fragilite institutionnelle.Confluences Mediterranee, 45, 59–79.

Calvet, L. J. (1996). Les Politiques linguistiques. Paris: PUF ‘‘Que Sais-Je?’’.Caubet, D. (2004). Les Mots du Bled. Paris: L’Harmattan.Chaker, S. (1998). Berberes aujourd’hui. Paris/Montreal: Editions L’Harmattan.Cherfaoui, Z. (2004). Reforme de l’ecole et enseignement du francais. Recrutement

de 2000 diplomes. El Watan, 7 June, 1–2.Cherrad-Benchefra, Y. & Derradji, Y. (2004). La politique linguistique en Algerie.

Revue d’amenagement linguistique, 107, 145–170.Co!man, J. M. (1992). Arabization and Islamisation in the Algerian University. PhD

dissertation, Stanford University.Co!man, J. (1995). Does the Arabic Language encourage radical Islam? Middle East

Quarterly, December. On www at http://www.meforum.org/article/276.Djamel, B. (2001). Reforme de l’ecole, les islamo-conservateurs accusent. Le Matin,

19 March, 3.Djilali, B. (2005). Les arouch et Ouyahia s’entendent. Le Quotidien d’Oran,

2 June, 14.Djite, P. G. (1992). The Arabization of Algeria: Linguistic and sociopolitical

motivations. International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 98, 15–28.


Gallagher, C. F. (1968). North African problems and prospects: Language andidentity. In J. A. Fishman, C. A. Ferguson & J. Das Gupta (Eds), LanguageProblems of Developing Nations (pp. 129–150). New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Gillet, N. (2004). Formation professionnelle. L’universite ne repond pas auxexigences de l’entreprise. Marches Tropicaux, 3057(11), June, 1342.

Gordon, D. C. (1966). The Passing of French Algeria. London: Oxford UniversityPress.

Gordon, D. C. (1978). The French Language and National Identity. The Hague:Mouton Publishers.

Grandguillaume, G. (1995). Comment a-t-on pu en arriver la?. Esprit, 208, 12–34.Grandguillaume, G. (2004). L’Arabisation au Maghreb. Revue d’Amenagement

Linguistique, 107, Winter, 15–39.Guenoun, A. (1999). Chronologie du Mouvement Berbere 1945–1990. Algiers:

Casbah Editions.Harbi, M. (1980). Nationalisme algerien et identite berbere. Peuples Mediterraneens

– Mediterranean Peoples, 11, April–June, 31–37.Heggoy, A. A. (1984). Colonial education in Algeria: assimilation and reaction.

In P. G. Altbach & G. Kelly (Eds), Education and the Colonial Experience(pp. 97–116). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.

Kahlouche, R. (2000). L’enseignement d’une langue non amenagee, au statutindefini: le berbere en Algerie. Memoires de la societe de linguistique de Paris, 8,157–168.

Kahlouche, R. (2004). Le berbere dans la politique linguistique algerienne. Revued’Amenagement Linguistique, 107, Winter, 103–132.

Karmani, S. (2005). English, ‘terror’, and Islam. Applied Linguistics, 26(2), June,262–267.

Kourta, D. (2004). Ecoles privees. Plaidoyer pour le bilinguisme. El Watan, 30 June,6.

Kymlicka, W. & Patten, A. (2003). Language rights and political theory. AnnualReview of applied Linguistics, 23, 3–21.

Lacheraf, M. (1978). L’Algerie, Nation et Societe. Algiers: SNED.Laib, M. (1993). L’anglais en 4e annee. La langue alibi. El Watan, 27 May, 7.Lewis, J. E. (2004). Freedom of Speech – in any language. Middle East Quarterly,

Summer. On www at http://www.meforum.org/article/635.Liberte. (2000). Enseignement de la langue arabe. Constat desolant. Liberte, 24

April, 10.Maddy-Weitzman, B. (2001). Contested identities: Berbers, ‘Berberism’ and the State

in North Africa. The Journal of North African Studies, 6(3), Autumn, 23–47.Mahe, A. (2001). Histoire de la Grande Kabylia XIXe-XXe siecles. Anthropologie

Historique du Lien Social dans les Communautes Villageoises. Paris: EditionsBouchene.

Maız, M. & Rouadjia, A. (2005). Quelles langues pour l’enseignement des sciences?Arabe, francais ou anglais? El Watan, 28 December, 13.

Marley, D. (2004). Language attitudes in Morocco following recent changes inlanguage policy. Language Policy, 3, 25–46.

Martın, I. (2003). Algeria’s political economy (1999–2002): an economic solution tothe crisis? The Journal of North African Studies, 8(2), Summer, 34–74.

Mazouni, A. (1969). Culture et Enseignement en Algerie et au Maghreb. Paris:Francois Maspero.

mohamed benrabah250

Messaoudi, K. & Schemla, E. (1995). Une Algerienne debout. Paris: Flammarion.Mesthrie, R., Swann, J., Deumert, A. & Leap, W.L. (2000). Introducing

Sociolinguistics. Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.Miliani, M. (2000). Teaching English in a multilingual context: The Algerian case.

Mediterranean Journal of Educational Studies, 6(1), 13–29.Moali, H. (2005). La langue arabe obligatoire dans les ecoles privees. S’adapter ou

disparaıtre. El Watan, 16 November. On www at http//www.elwatan.com.Mostari, H. A. (2004). A sociolinguistic perspective on Arabisation and language use

in Algeria. Language Problems & Language Planning, 28(1), 25–43.Myers-Scotton, C. (1993). Elite closure as a powerful language strategy: the African

case. International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 103, 149–163.Nassima C. (2003). L’agrement octroye aux ecoles privees. El Watan, 29 November.

On www at http://www.elwatan.com.Que!elec, A., Derradji, Y., Debov, V., Smaali-Dekdouk, D. & Cherrad-Benchefra,

Y. (2002). Le Francais en Algerie. Lexique et dynamique des langues. Brussels:Editions Duculot.

Riols, Y. M. (2004). Le drame d’etre jeune en Algerie. L’Expansion, 690, October,50–52.

Roberts, H. (1980). Towards an understanding of the Kabyle question incontemporary Algeria. Maghreb Review, 5(5–6), 115–124.

Roberts, H. (2003). The Battlefield: Algeria 1988–2002. Studies in a Broken Polity.London: Verso.

Saad, Z. (1992). Language Planning and Policy Attitudes: A Case Study ofArabization in Algeria. PhD dissertation, Columbia University Teachers College.

Sadi, S. (1991). Culture et Democratie. Algiers: Editions Parentheses.Sarter, H. & Sefta, K. (1992). La glottopolitique algerienne. Faits et discours.

Franzosisch Heute, 2, 107–117.Sebti, N. (2001). Rapport de la Commission. Des propositions et des echeances.

Liberte, 20 March. On www at http//www.liberte-algerie.com.Si Ameur, O. & Sidhoum, N. (1992). L’emploi et le chomage, de l’euphorie a la crise.

In M. Lakehal (Ed.), Algerie, de L’independance a l’etat d’urgence (pp. 145–176).Paris: Larmises-L’Harmattan.

Stone, M. (1993). The Tragedy of Algeria. New York: Columbia University Press.Sultana, R. (1999). The Euro-Mediterranean region and its universities: An overview

of trends, challenges and prospects. Mediterranean Journal of Educational Studies,4(2), 7–49.

Tabory, E. & Tabory, M. (1987). Berber unrest in Algeria: lessons for languagepolicy. International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 63, 63–79.

Tefiani, M. (1984). Arabisation et fonctions linguistiques en Algerie. FranzosischHeute, 15(2), 118–128.

Thomas, E. H. (1999). The politics of language in former colonial lands: acomparative look at North Africa and Central Asia. The Journal of North AfricanStudies, 4(1), Spring, 1–44.

Tigziri, N. (2002). Enseignement de la langue amazighe: Etat des lieux. Revued’etudes interculturelles, 24, 61–70.

Wardhaugh, R. (1987). Languages in Competition. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.White, C.M. (2002). Language, authenticity and identity: Indigenous Fijian

students and language use in schools. Language, Culture and Curriculum,15(1), 16–29.


ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Mohamed Benrabah is Professor of English Linguistics and Socio-linguistics at the ‘UFR Etudes Anglophones’, Stendhal-GrenobleIII University (France). His research focuses on applied phonetics/phonology, sociolinguistics, and language policy, language planningand language-in-education planning with a particular interest in theMaghreb and the francophone world. His publications include acontribution to Les Violences en Algerie (Paris: Editions Odile Ja-cob, 1998), and a book Langue et Pouvoir en Algerie. Histoire d’unTraumatisme Linguistique (Paris: Editions Seguier, 1999). He is theauthor of the recent monograph The Language Planning Situationin Algeria (Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 2005). Address for cor-respondence: UFR d’Etudes Anglophones, Universite StendhalGrenoble III, Domaine Universitaire 1180 avenue Centrale, B.P.25, 38040, Grenoble cedex 9, France. E-mail: [email protected]

mohamed benrabah252

language-in-education planning in algeria- historical development and current issues

Documents