ldts: a lightweight and dependable trust system for clustered wireless sensor networks
DESCRIPTION
LDTS: A Lightweight and Dependable Trust System for Clustered Wireless Sensor Networks. Author s: Xiaoyong Li, Feng Zhou, and Junping Du. Presented by: Ting Hua. Outline. Motivation C lustered WSN M odel Lightweight Scheme for Trust Decision-Making Theoretical analysis and evaluation - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
LDTS: A Lightweight and Dependable Trust Systemfor Clustered Wireless Sensor Networks
1
Presented by: Ting Hua
Authors: Xiaoyong Li, Feng Zhou, and Junping Du
Outline
2
• Motivation• Clustered WSN Model• Lightweight Scheme for Trust Decision-Making• Theoretical analysis and evaluation• Simulation-based analysis and evaluation• Conclusion
Motivation
3
• Limited work focus on– Resource efficiency of clustered WSNs
• fail to consider the problem of resource constraints of nodes• used complex algorithms to calculate nodes’ trustworthiness
– Dependability of the trust system itself• Current: collect remote feedback and then aggregate s such
feedback to yield the global reputation for the nodes• Problem: How about open or hostile WSN environment
contains a large number of undependable (or malicious) nodes?
Outline
4
• Motivation• Clustered WSN Model• Lightweight Scheme for Trust Decision-Making• Theoretical analysis and evaluation• Simulation-based analysis and evaluation• Conclusion
Clustered WSN Model
5
• Nodes– CH: cluster head – CM: cluster member– BS: base station
• Communications– Inter-cluster: A CM can communicate
with their CH directly.– Intra-cluster: A CH can forward the
aggregated data to the central BS through other CHs.
Outline
6
• Motivation• Clustered WSN Model• Lightweight Scheme for Trust Decision-Making• Theoretical analysis and evaluation• Simulation-based analysis and evaluation• Conclusion
Trust Decision-Making at CM Level
7
• Decision making: past interaction records?– Yes: CM-to-CM Direct trust degree (DTD)
• # of successful and unsuccessful interactions• Interaction: cooperation of two CMs, e.g., node x sends a
message to CH i via node y– Successful: node y forwarded such message to CH – Unsuccessful:
» No retransmission of the packet within a threshold time» Overheard packet is illegally fabricated
– No: CH-to-CM Indirect trust degree (ITD)• send a feedback request to CH
CM-to-CM Direct Trust Calculation
8
a window of time # of successful interactions of node x with y
# of unsuccessful interactions of node x with y strict punishment for
unsuccessful interactions
CH-to-CM Feedback Trust Calculation
9
# of positive feedback
# of negativefeedback
Assumption: CH is trustworthy within its cluster!
Trust Decision-Making at CH Level
10
• Decision making: calculate for direct trust and feedback trust simultaneously
• CH-to-CH direct trust– # of successful and unsuccessful interactions
• BS-to-CH feedback trust– BS periodically asks all CHs for their trust ratings on their neighbors.– CH send a feedback request to BS
CH-to-CH Direct Trust Calculation
11
# of unsuccessful interactions of CH i with CH j strict punishment for
unsuccessful interactions
a window of time # of successful interactions of CH i with CH j
BS-to-CH Feedback Trust Calculation
12
feedback of CH k toward CH j
# of positive feedback
# of negativefeedback
quality of feedback
Self-Adaptive Global Trust Aggregation at CHs
13
# of successful interactions
BS-to-CH feedback trust
CH-to-CH Direct Trust
# of positive feedbacks
increasing α, Φ(x) quickly approaches 1
Outline
14
• Motivation• Clustered WSN Model• Lightweight Scheme for Trust Decision-Making• Theoretical analysis and evaluation• Simulation-based analysis and evaluation• Conclusion
Dependability Analysis Against Malicious Attacks
Dependability Analysis Against Malicious Attacks
Dependability Analysis Against Malicious Attacks
Dependability Analysis Against Malicious Attacks
Dependability Analysis Against Malicious Attacks
Dependability Analysis Against Malicious Attacks
Dependability Analysis Against Malicious Attacks
Dependability Analysis Against Malicious Attacks
Dependability Analysis Against Malicious Attacks
Dependability Analysis Against Malicious Attacks
Communication Overhead Analysis and Comparison
Assume: Network consists of m clusters (including the BS)average size of clusters is n (including the CH of the cluster)
# of CM send n requests and receiven responses
communication overhead of one node
Storage Overhead Analysis and Comparison
Outline
27
• Motivation• Clustered WSN Model• Lightweight Scheme for Trust Decision-Making• Theoretical analysis and evaluation• Simulation-based analysis and evaluation• Conclusion
LDTS Simulator and Environment
Overhead Evaluation and Comparison
Overhead Evaluation and Comparison
Dependability Evaluation and Comparison
Dependability Evaluation and Comparison
Outline
33
• Motivation• Clustered WSN Model• Lightweight Scheme for Trust Decision-Making• Theoretical analysis and evaluation• Simulation-based analysis and evaluation• Conclusion
Conclusion
• Lightweight trust evaluating scheme – cooperations between CMs – cooperations between CHs
• Dependability-enhanced trust evaluating approach – cooperations between CHs
• Self-adaptive weighting method – CH’s trust aggregation