leasingflyer 250 airport circle, unit 104€¦ · 69,039 sf industrial space for lease prologis...

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WHO LOBBIES WHOM? Electoral Systems and Organized Interests’ Choice of Bureaucrats vs. Politicians in Japan Megumi Naoi Ellis Krauss Department of Political Science Graduate School of International University of California, San Diego Relations and Pacific Studies Email: [email protected] University of California, San Diego Email: [email protected] 9500 Gilman Drive La Jolla, CA USA 92093 Abstract How do interest groups choose across different venues of lobbying to influence policy? Why do some interest groups lobby politicians and others lobby bureaucrats? We theorize lobbying as an organized interests’ effort to form and enforce a contract with policy-makers, politicians or bureaucrats. We argue that organizational structures of interest groups substantially affect their choice of lobbying strategies because they are associated with different ability to monitor and enforce contracts with policy-makers and punish them when they fail. We demonstrate that whether structures are centralized or decentralized accounts for a good part of the variations in their venue choices. Different types of electoral systems, we further argue, affect the effectiveness of various instruments of monitoring and punishment (votes, political funds, and candidate endorsement) and hence interest groups’ choice to lobby politicians or bureaucrats. We test these arguments with the case of a major democracy which recently went through an electoral reform without major partisan change, Japan. We use a unique longitudinal survey data on lobbying which spans two decades (1980, 1994, 2003), covers around 250 organized interest groups in various sectors and issue areas. The results lend strong support to our organizational structure argument and the effect of electoral reform on interest groups’ choice of lobbying tactics. 9534 Words (Excluding Appendix)

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Page 1: LeasingFlyer 250 Airport Circle, Unit 104€¦ · 69,039 SF Industrial Space For Lease Prologis Corona Distribution Center #3 250 Airport Circle, Unit 104 Corona, CA 92880 USA LOCATION

www.prologis.com

69,039 SFIndustrial Space For Lease

Prologis Corona Distribution Center #3

250 Airport Circle, Unit 104Corona, CA 92880 USA

LOCATION• West Corona Location• High Image Corporate Business Park Environment• Prologis Owned and Operated• Excellent Access to the 91 and 15 Freeways

FACILITY• Part of a Larger 152,242 SF Building• Approximately 5,072 SF Offi ce - 2 Story• 24’ Minimum Warehouse Clearance• Eight (8) Dock High Double Capacity Doors• Three (3) Ground Level Doors• 400 Amps, 277/480 Volts, 3-Phase• .60/3,000 GPM Sprinkler System• Large Secured Yard Area• 85 Parking Spaces

Page 2: LeasingFlyer 250 Airport Circle, Unit 104€¦ · 69,039 SF Industrial Space For Lease Prologis Corona Distribution Center #3 250 Airport Circle, Unit 104 Corona, CA 92880 USA LOCATION

www.prologis.com

69,039 SFIndustrial Space For Lease

No warranty or representation, expressed or implied, is made as to the accuracy of the information contained herein, and same is submitted subject to error and omissions.

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