legal and trial logic

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G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST &DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,vs.CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

Tinga, J.:

With another city ordinance of Manila also principally involving the tourist district as subject, the Courtis confronted anew with the incessant clash between government power and individual liberty intandem with the archetypal tension between law and morality.

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,1 the Court affirmed the nullification of a city ordinance barring theoperation of motels and inns, among other establishments, within the Ermita-Malate area. Thepetition at bar assails a similarly-motivated city ordinance that prohibits those same establishmentsfrom offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or "wash up" rates for such abbreviated

stays. Our earlier decision tested the city ordinance against our sacred constitutional rights to liberty,due process and equal protection of law. The same parameters apply to the present petition.

This Petition2 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which seeks the reversal of theDecision3 in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 33316 of the Court of Appeals, challenges the validity of Manila CityOrdinance No. 7774 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time AdmissionRates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, andSimilar Establishments in the City of Manila" (the Ordinance).

I.

The facts are as follows:

On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the Ordinance. 4 TheOrdinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:

SECTION 1.Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the City Government to protectthe best interest, health and welfare, and the morality of its constituents in general and the youth inparticular.

SEC. 2.Title. This ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance" prohibiting short time admission inhotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.

SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or othersimilarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pensionhouses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.

SEC. 4.Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean admittance and charging of room ratefor less than twelve (12) hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms more than twice a day orany other term that may be concocted by owners or managers of said establishments but wouldmean the same or would bear the same meaning.
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SEC. 5.Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision of this ordinanceshall upon conviction thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos oimprisonment for a period of not exceeding one (1) year or both such fine and imprisonment at thediscretion of the court; Provided, That in case of [a] juridical person, the president, the manager, orthe persons in charge of the operation thereof shall be liable: Provided, further, That in case ofsubsequent conviction for the same offense, the business license of the guilty party shalautomatically be cancelled.

SEC. 6.Repealing Clause. Any or all provisions of City ordinances not consistent with or contrary tothis measure or any portion hereof are hereby deemed repealed.

SEC. 7.Effectivity. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon approval.

Enacted by the city Council of Manila at its regular session today, November 10, 1992.

Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on December 3, 1992.

On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaintfor declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (

TRO)5with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as defendant, hereinrespondent City of Manila (the City) represented by Mayor Lim.6 MTDC prayed that the Ordinanceinsofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid andunconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria Court in Malate, Manila itwas authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short time basis aswell as to charge customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours.

On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) andSta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admitattached complaint-in-intervention7 on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their businessinterests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila.8 The three companies are components

of the Anito Group of Companies which owns and operates several hotels and motels in MetroManila.9

On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to intervene. 10 The RTC also notified theSolicitor General of the proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. On thesame date, MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff.11

On December 28, 1992, the RTC granted MTDC's motion to withdraw.12 The RTC issued a TRO onJanuary 14, 1993, directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance. 13 The City filedan Answer dated January 22, 1993 alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of policepower.14

On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to desist fromthe enforcement of the Ordinance.15 A month later, on March 8, 1993, the Solicitor General filed hisComment arguing that the Ordinance is constitutional.

During the pre-trial conference, the WLC, TC and STDC agreed to submit the case for decisionwithout trial as the case involved a purely legal question.16 On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered adecision declaring the Ordinance null and void. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
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WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, [O]rdinance No. 7774 of the City of Manila is herebydeclared null and void.

Accordingly, the preliminary injunction heretofor issued is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.17

The RTC noted that the ordinance "strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and

jealously guarded by the Constitution."18 Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitutionencouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the right tooperate economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinancesought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay, the RTClikened the law to the ordinance annulled in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court,19 where thelegitimate purpose of preventing indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos was sought to be effectedthrough an inter-province ban on the transport of carabaos and carabeef.

The City later filed a petition for review on certiorariwith the Supreme Court.20 The petition wasdocketed as G.R. No. 112471. However in a resolution dated January 26, 1994, the Court treated thepetition as a petition forcertiorariand referred the petition to the Court of Appeals.21

Before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police powerpursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities, among otherlocal government units, the power:

[To] regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, includingtourist guides and transports.22

The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the power of the City under Article III, Section18(kk) of the Revised Manila Charter, thus:

"to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, thefurtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort,convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as be necessary tocarry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Chapter; and to fix penaltiesfor the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six monthsimprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment for a single offense.23

Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacyand the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable andoppressive interference in their business.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of theOrdinance.24 First, it held that the Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom ofmovement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals forshort time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having alawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the Ordinance is satisfiedsince it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments are stillallowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of itsconstituents in general. Finally, as held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor ofManila, liberty is regulated by law.
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TC, WLC and STDC come to this Court via petition for review on certiorari.25 In their petition andMemorandum, petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before the Court of AppealsThey contend that the assailed Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power.

II.

We must address the threshold issue of petitioners standing. Petitioners allege that as owners ofestablishments offering "wash-up" rates, their business is being unlawfully interfered with by the

Ordinance. However, petitioners also allege that the equal protection rights of their clients are alsobeing interfered with. Thus, the crux of the matter is whether or not these establishments have therequisite standing to plead for protection of their patrons' equal protection rights.

Standing orlocus standiis the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection toand harm from the law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case. Moreimportantly, the doctrine of standing is built on the principle of separation of powers, 26sparing as idoes unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government.

The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly from the

Constitution.27The constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts whichconcededly are not susceptible of precise definition.28 In this jurisdiction, the extancy of "a direct andpersonal interest" presents the most obvious cause, as well as the standard test for a petitioner'sstanding.29 In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court reviewed and elaborated on themeaning of the three constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation, and redressabilityinAllen v. Wright.30

Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadthdoctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine oftranscendental importance.31

For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an exception and the overbreadthdoctrine are appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio,32 the United States Supreme Court wrote that: "We haverecognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided three importantcriteria are satisfied: the litigant must have suffered an injury-in-fact, thus giving him or her a"sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute; the litigant must have a closerelation to the third party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect hisor her own interests."33 Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are likewiseinjured by the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their customers for their continued viabilitywhich appears to be threatened by the enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative silence inconstitutional litigation of such special interest groups in our nation such as the American CivilLiberties Union in the United States may also be construed as a hindrance for customers to bring

suit.34

American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-interest were allowed standing toadvocate or invoke the fundamental due process or equal protection claims of other persons orclasses of persons injured by state action. In Griswold v. Connecticut,35 the United States SupremeCourt held that physicians had standing to challenge a reproductive health statute that would penalizethem as accessories as well as to plead the constitutional protections available to their patients. TheCourt held that:
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"The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected unlessthose rights are considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation tothem."36

An even more analogous example may be found in Craig v. Boren,37 wherein the United StatesSupreme Court held that a licensed beverage vendor has standing to raise the equal protection claimof a male customer challenging a statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of beer to males under theage of 21 and to females under the age of 18. The United States High Court explained that the

vendors had standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties who seek access to theirmarket or function."38

Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the former toassert the rights of the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into play. In overbreadth analysis,challengers to government actionare in effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties. Generallyapplied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies when astatute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights.39In this case, the petitionersclaim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. We cansee that based on the allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from overbreadth.

We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients topatronize their establishments for a "wash-rate" time frame.

III.

To students of jurisprudence, the facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City ofManila ruling, but our 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v.Hon. City Mayor of Manila.40Ermita-Malate concerned the City ordinance requiring patrons to fill up aprescribed form stating personal information such as name, gender, nationality, age, address andoccupation before they could be admitted to a motel, hotel or lodging house. This earlier ordinancewas precisely enacted to minimize certain practices deemed harmful to public morals. A purpose

similar to the annulled ordinance in City of Manila which sought a blanket ban on motels, inns andsimilar establishments in the Ermita-Malate area. However, the constitutionality of the ordinancein Ermita-Malate was sustained by the Court.

The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond thesingularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances wereenacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodgingestablishments. This could be described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban onmotels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. Atits core, this is another case about the extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the livesof its citizens.

The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila hasheld that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the localgovernment unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must alsoconform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or anystatute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must notprohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) mustnot be unreasonable.41
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The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissionsand renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the policepower as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through suchimplements as the general welfare clause.

A.

Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to

underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficientand flexible response as the conditions warrant.42 Police power is based upon the concept ofnecessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. 43 Police power hasbeen used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. These range from theregulation of dance halls,44 movie theaters,45 gas stations46 and cockpits.47 The awesome scope ofpolice power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in ournations legal system, its use has rarely been denied.

The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the coveredestablishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, areunimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability

of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align withthe Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people. The Bill ofRights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Macchiavelli, and, sometimes even, the politicalmajorities animated by his cynicism.

Even as we design the precedents that establish the framework for analysis of due process or equalprotection questions, the courts are naturally inhibited by a due deference to the co-equal branches ofgovernment as they exercise their political functions. But when we are compelled to nullify executiveor legislative actions, yet another form of caution emerges. If the Court were animated by the samepassing fancies or turbulent emotions that motivate many political decisions, judicial integrity iscompromised by any perception that the judiciary is merely the third political branch of government

We derive our respect and good standing in the annals of history by acting as judicious and neutralarbiters of the rule of law, and there is no surer way to that end than through the development ofrigorous and sophisticated legal standards through which the courts analyze the most fundamentaland far-reaching constitutional questions of the day.

B.

The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed underSection 1, Article III of the Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition. 48 The purpose of theguaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property ofindividuals. The due process guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure

Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty insofar as their property isconcerned.

The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but distinctrestrictions on government, "procedural due process" and "substantive due process." Procedural dueprocess refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of lifeliberty, or property.49 Procedural due process concerns itself with government action adhering to theestablished process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere. Examples range from theform of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing.


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If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd situation ofarbitrary government action, provided the proper formalities are followed. Substantive due processcompletes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether the governmenthas sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.50

The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law, has reflecteddynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of fundamental freedoms.Police power, traditionally awesome as it may be, is now confronted with a more rigorous level of

analysis before it can be upheld. The vitality though of constitutional due process has not beenpredicated on the frequency with which it has been utilized to achieve a liberal result for, after all, thelibertarian ends should sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the State. Instead, the due processclause has acquired potency because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged todetermine the proper metes and bounds for its application.

C.

The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is best testedwhen assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v.Carolene Products.51 Footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case acknowledged that the judiciary

would defer to the legislature unless there is a discrimination against a "discrete and insular" minorityor infringement of a "fundamental right."52Consequently, two standards of judicial review wereestablished: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the politicalprocess, and the rational basis standard of review for economic legislation.

A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted by the U.SSupreme Court for evaluating classifications based on gender53 and legitimacy.54 Immediate scrutinywas adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Craig, 55 after the Court declined to do so in Reed v.Reed.56 While the test may have first been articulated in equal protection analysis, it has in the UnitedStates since been applied in all substantive due process cases as well.

We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protectionchallenges.57 Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationallyfurther a legitimate governmental interest.58 Under intermediate review, governmental interest isextensively examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered. 59 Applying stricscrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interestand on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.

In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard fordetermining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation offundamental freedoms.60 Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with theregulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier

applications to equal protection.61 The United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strictscrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage,62 judicial access63 and interstate travel.64

If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect onlyon the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law which we arecapacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners, an injury that wouldwarrant the application of the most deferential standard the rational basis test. Yet as earlier stated,we recognize the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons

those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodgingestablishments in question.
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Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of these customers were are trivial since theyseem shorn of political consequence. Concededly, these are not the sort of cherished rights that,when proscribed, would impel the people to tear up their cedulas. Still, the Bill of Rights does notshelter gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those "trivial" yet fundamental freedoms which the peoplereflexively exercise any day without the impairing awareness of their constitutional consequence that accurately reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed by the people. Liberty, as integrally incorporatedas a fundamental right in the Constitution, is not a Ten Commandments-style enumeration of whatmay or what may not be done; but rather an atmosphere of freedom where the people do not feel

labored under a Big Brother presence as they interact with each other, their society and nature, in amanner innately understood by them as inherent, without doing harm or injury to others.

D.

The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty which we upheld in City ofManila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that most primordial of rights, thus:

Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to existand the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into merefreedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of

man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to suchrestraint as are necessary for the common welfare."[65] In accordance with this case, the rights of thecitizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn hislivelihood by any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the conceptof liberty.[66]

The U.S. Supreme Court in the case ofRoth v. Board of Regents, sought to clarify the meaning of"liberty." It said:

While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . . . guaranteed [by the Fifthand Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the

right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquireuseful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to thedictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . asessential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there canbe no doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed.67[Citations omitted]

It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexualbehavior. The City asserts before this Court that the subject establishments "have gained notoriety asvenue of prostitution, adultery and fornications in Manila since they provide the necessaryatmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus became the ideal haven for prostitutesand thrill-seekers."68 Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be

denied that legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consenting single adults which isconstitutionally protected69 will be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of Manila case. Our holdingtherein retains significance for our purposes:

The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interferencedemands respect. As the case ofMorfe v. Mutuc, borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly stated:

Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation, areindefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligationsare built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his
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experience is private, and the will built out of that experience personal to himself. If he surrenders hiswill to others, he surrenders himself. If his will is set by the will of others, he ceases to be a master ofhimself. I cannot believe that a man no longer a master of himself is in any real sense free.

Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of whichshould be justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacyindependently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. 70

We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair. Thereare very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day. Entirefamilies are known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out intheir homes. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimatepurpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any person or groups of persons in need ofcomfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having sex or usingillegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.

E.

That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and thepetitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of theOrdinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, asdistinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and themeans must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not undulyoppressive of private rights.71 It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishmentof the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation mustexist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, foreven under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to privateproperty will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.72

Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitraryintrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to

judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected.73However, this is not in any way meant to takeit away from the vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity. 74

Similar to the Comelec resolution requiring newspapers to donate advertising space to candidates,this Ordinance is a blunt and heavy instrument.75The Ordinance makes no distinction between placesfrequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus itprevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare or even unheard of. A plain reading ofsection 3 of the Ordinance shows it makes no classification of places of lodging, thus deems them allsusceptible to illicit patronage and subject them without exception to the unjustified prohibition.

The Court has professed its deep sentiment and tenderness of the Ermita-Malate area, its longtimehome,76 and it is skeptical of those who wish to depict our capital city the Pearl of the Orient as amodern-day Sodom or Gomorrah for the Third World set. Those still steeped in Nick Joaquin-dreamsof the grandeur of Old Manila will have to accept that Manila like all evolving big cities, will have itsproblems. Urban decay is a fact of mega cities such as Manila, and vice is a common problemconfronted by the modern metropolis wherever in the world. The solution to such perceived decay isnot to prevent legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product. Rather, cities revivethemselves by offering incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus attracting the dynamism ofindividuals that would bring a new grandeur to Manila.


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The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact bediminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferationof prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing thesituation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution anddrug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners andother legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented bymerely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activitiesMoreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele by charging

their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.

IV.

We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly berequired by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan thatmust be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned theOrdinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of theestablishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of thebusinesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient

justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day

with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.

The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the fulendorsement of the judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn toprotect.77 The notion that the promotion of public morality is a function of the State is as old as

Aristotle.78 The advancement of moral relativism as a school of philosophy does not de-legitimize therole of morality in law, even if it may foster wider debate on which particular behavior to penalize. It isconceivable that a society with relatively little shared morality among its citizens could be functionalso long as the pursuit of sharply variant moral perspectives yields an adequate accommodation ofdifferent interests.79

To be candid about it, the oft-quoted American maxim that "you cannot legislate morality" is ultimatelyillegitimate as a matter of law, since as explained by Calabresi, that phrase is more accuratelyinterpreted as meaning that efforts to legislate morality will fail if they are widely at variance withpublic attitudes about right and wrong.80 Our penal laws, for one, are founded on age-old moraltraditions, and as long as there are widely accepted distinctions between right and wrong, they willremain so oriented.

Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the acceptance of the right-wrong distinction, but also the advent of fundamental liberties as the key to the enjoyment of life tothe fullest. Our democracy is distinguished from non-free societies not with any more extensiveelaboration on our part of what is moral and immoral, but from our recognition that the individual

liberty to make the choices in our lives is innate, and protected by the State. Independent and fair-minded judges themselves are under a moral duty to uphold the Constitution as the embodiment ofthe rule of law, by reason of their expression of consent to do so when they take the oath of office,and because they are entrusted by the people to uphold the law. 81

Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable complement to governance,that prerogative is hardly absolute, especially in the face of the norms of due process of liberty. Andwhile the tension may often be left to the courts to relieve, it is possible for the government to avoidthe constitutional conflict by employing more judicious, less drastic means to promote morality.
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WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, andthe Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 ishereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGAAssociate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNOChief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBINGAssociate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGOAssociate Justice

(On Official Leave)

ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONAAssociate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALESAssociate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNAAssociate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURAssociate Justice

TERESITA LEONARDO DE CASTROAssociate Justice

(On Sick Leave)ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

(On Official Leave)DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in theabove Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of theopinion of the Court.


ESTRADAv.ESCRITORAMNo.P021651,August4,2003,June20,2006


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Mark Jorel O. Calida | 1C 2007 | Introduction to Law

FACTS:Escritor,amemberoftheJehovahsWitness,waschargedforimmoralconductforco

habitingwithaman withoutthebenefitofamarriage,theirrelationshipbearingachild.She

securedaDeclarationofPledging Faithfulness,indicatingtheirchurchsapprovaloftheir

unioninaccordancewiththebeliefsoftheJehovahsWitness.

ISSUES:WhetherornotEscritormaybesanctionedinlightoftheFreeExerciseclause.

RULING:No.Thestatehastheburdenofsatisfyingthecompellingstateinteresttesttojustify

anypossiblesanctionto beimposeduponEscritor.Thistestinvolvesthreesteps:

1) Thecourtsshouldlookintothesincerityofthereligiousbeliefwithoutinquiringintothetruthof

thebelief. 2) Thestatehastoestablishthatitspurposesarelegitimateandcompelling. 3) The

stateusedtheleastintrusivemeanspossible.

ThecasewasremandedtotheOfficeoftheCourtAdministratorsothatthegovernmentwould

havetheopportunityto demonstratethecompellingstateinterestitseekstoupholdinopposing

Escritorspositionthatherconjugal arrangementisnotimmoralandpunishableasitcomes

withinthescopeoffreeexerciseprotection.

SinceneitherEstrada,Escritornorthegovernmenthasfiledamotionforreconsideration

assailingtheAugust4,2003 ruling,the2003decisionhasattainedfinalityandconstitutesthelaw

ofthecase.Anyattempttoreopenthisruling constitutesacontraventionofelementaryrulesof

procedure.Worse,insofarasitwouldoverturnthepartiesrightto relyupontheSupremeCourts

interpretationwhichhaslongattainedfinality,italsorunscountertosubstantivedue process.

InitsJune20,2006ruling,theSupremeCourtheldthat,Escritorssincerityisbeyondserious

doubt.Sheprocuredthe certificate10yearsaftertheirunionbeganandnotmerelyafterbeing

implicated.Thefreeexerciseofreligionisa fundamentalrightthatenjoysapreferredpositionin

thehierarchyofrights.Thestatesbroadinterestinprotectingthe institutionsofmarriageand

thefamilyisnotacompellinginterestenforcingtheconcubinagechargesagainstEscritor. The

Constitutionadherestothebenevolentneutralityapproachthatgivesroomforaccommodation

ofreligious exercisesasrequiredbytheFreeExerciseClause.Evenassumingthattherewasa

compellingstateinterest,thestate failedtoshowevidencethatthemeansthestateadoptedin

pursuingthiscompellinginterestistheleastrestrictiveto Escritorsreligiousfreedom.

Hence,Escritorsconjugalarrangementcannotbepenalizedasshehasmadeoutacasefor

exemptionfromthelaw basedonherrighttofreedomofreligion.

EBRALINAG v. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBUG.R. No.95770 March 1, 1993

AMOLO et al vs. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU and ANTONIOA.SANGUTANG.R. No. 95887 March 1, 1993 ; GRIO-AQUINO,

J.:

Facts:The petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by thepublic school

authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem andrecite the patrioticpledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265


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(An Act making flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions)of July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order No. 8(Rules and Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions)dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)making the flagceremony compulsory in all educational institutions. Jehovah's Witnesses admitted that they taughtheir children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for theybelieve that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously giveto anyone or anything except God". They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the

State. They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledgetranscends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect andspirit which the Constitution protect against official control..

Issue:Whether or not school children who are members or a religious sect may be expelledfrom school fordisobedience of R.A. No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8Held:No.Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highestpriorityand the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves therelationship

of man to his CreatorThe sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religiousfreedom is the existence

of a grave and present danger of a character both grave andimminent, of a serious evil to public safety, publicmorals, public health or any otherlegitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty)to prevent." Absent such athreat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools isnot justified.(Teehankee) The petitioners further contend that while they do not take part in thecompulsoryflag ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offendtheircountrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the observance of theflagceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show theirrespect for the rightof those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Sincethey do not engage in disruptivebehavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.

The Court is not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from salutingthe flag, singingthe national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious groupwhich admittedly comprises a"small portion of the school population" will shake up our partof the globe and suddenly producea nation "untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love ofcountry and admiration for national heroes" .What the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flagceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where they may study the Constitution, thedemocratic way of life and form of government, and learn not only the arts, sciences, Philippinehistory and culture but also receive training for a vocation of profession and be taught the virtues of"patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and dutiesof citizenship, and moral and spiritual values (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part ofthe curricula. Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very

situation that this Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through their on handof the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive tolove of country or respect for dully constituted authorities. Also, the expulsion of members ofJehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled violates their right as Philippinecitizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to" protect and promote the right of all citizens to qualityeducation . . . and to make such education accessible to all (Sec. 1, Art. XIV)


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G.R. No. 190529 April 29, 2010

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI), represented by its Secretary-GeneralGEORGE "FGBF GEORGE" DULDULAO, Petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

BRION, J.:

The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) seeks in this petition for certiorari1and in themotion for reconsideration it subsequently filed to nullify Commission on Elections (COMELEC)Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI, and the Resolution datedDecember 9, 2009 denying PGBIs motion for reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004 (MP). Via theseresolutions, the COMELEC delisted PGBI from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoraparties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.

BACKGROUND

Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List System Act,provides:

Section 6.Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may motu proprio or uponverified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, theregistration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the followinggrounds:

x xxx

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for theconstituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.]

The COMELEC replicated this provision in COMELEC Resolution No. 2847 the Rules andRegulations Governing the Election of the Party-List Representatives through the Party-List System which it promulgated on June 25, 1996.

For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2009Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registerednational, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list organizations

affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did notparticipate in the 2007 elections. Nevertheless, the COMELEC stated in this Resolution that anynational, regional sectoral party or organizations or coalitions adversely affected can personally orthrough its authorized representative file a verified opposition on October 26, 2009.

PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise sought, through its pleading, theadmission ad cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a party-list organization under the Party-ListSystem Act. Among other arguments, PGBI asserted that:
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(1) The assailed resolution negates the right of movant and those similarly situated to invoke Section4 of R.A. No. 7941, which allows any party, organization and coalition already registered with theCommission to no longer register anew; the party though is required to file with the Commission, notlater than ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-list system; since PGBI filed a Request/Manifestation seeking a deferment of its participation in the2007 elections within the required period prior to the 2007 elections, it has the option to choosewhether or not to participate in the next succeeding election under the same conditions as to rightsconferred and responsibilities imposed;

(2) The Supreme Courts ruling in G.R. No. 177548 Philippine Mines Safety EnvironmentAssociation, also known as "MINERO" v. Commission on Elections cannot apply in the instantcontroversy for two reasons: (a) the factual milieu of the cited case is removed from PGBIs; (b)MINERO, prior to delisting, was afforded the opportunity to be heard, while PGBI and the 25 otherssimilarly affected by Resolution No. 8679 were not. Additionally, the requirement of Section 6(8) hasbeen relaxed by the Courts ruling in G.R. No. 179271 (Banat v. COMELEC) and the exclusion ofPGBI and the 25 other party-list is a denial of the equal protection of the laws;

(3) The implementation of the challenged resolution should be suspended and/or aborted to prevent amiscarriage of justice in view of the failure to notify the parties in accordance with the same Section

6(8) or R.A. No. 7941.2

The COMELEC denied PGBIs motion/opposition for lack of merit.

First, the COMELEC observed that PGBI clearly misunderstood the import of Section 4 of R.A.7941.3 The provision simply means that without the required manifestation or if a party or organizationdoes not participate, the exemption from registration does not arise and the party, organization orcoalition must go through the process again and apply for requalification; a request for defermentwould not exempt PGBI from registering anew.

Second, the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as MINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in

2001 and did not participate at all in the 2004 elections.

Third, PGBI was given an opportunity to be heard or to seek the reconsideration of the action or rulingcomplained of the essence of due process; this is clear from Resolution No. 8679 which expresslygave the adversely affected parties the opportunity to file their opposition.

As regards the alternative relief of application for accreditation, the COMELEC found the motion tohave been filed out of time, as August 17, 2009 was the deadline for accreditation provided inResolution 8646. The motion was obviously filed months after the deadline.

PGBI came to us in its petition for certiorari, arguing the same positions it raised with the COMELEC

when it moved to reconsider its delisting.

We initially dismissed the petition in light of our ruling in Philippine Mines Safety EnvironmentAssociation, also known as "MINERO" v. Commission on Elections (Minero);4 we said that no graveabuse of discretion exists in a ruling that correctly applies the prevailing law and jurisprudence.

Applying Section 6(8) of RA 7941, the Court disqualified MINERO under the following reasoning:

Since petitioner by its own admission failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not participate atall in the 2004 elections, it necessarily failed to get at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast inthe two preceding elections. COMELEC, therefore, is not duty bound to certify it.
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PGBI subsequently moved to reconsider the dismissal of its petition. Among other arguments, PGBIclaimed that the dismissal of the petition was contrary to law, the evidence and existing jurisprudence.Essentially, PGBI asserts that Section 6(8) of RA 7941 does not apply if one is to follow the tenor andimport of the deliberations inclusive of the interpellations in Senate Bill No. 1913 on October 19, 1994.It cited the following excerpts from the Records of the Senate:

Senator Gonzales: On the other hand, Mr. President, under ground no. (7), Section 5 there areactually two grounds it states: " Failure to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or its

failure to obtain at least ten percent (10%) of the votes case under the party-list system in either ofthe last two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered"

In short, the first ground is that, it failed to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections. Thesecond is, failure to obtain at least 10 percent of the votes cast under the party-list system in either ofthe last two preceding elections, Mr. President,

Senator Tolentino: Actually, these are two separate grounds.

Senator Gonzales: There are actually two grounds, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino: Yes, Mr. President.5 [Underscoring supplied.]

PGBI thus asserts that Section 6(8) does not apply to its situation, as it is obvious that it failed toparticipate in one (1) but not in the two (2) preceding elections. Implied in this is that it also failed tosecure the required percentage in one (1) but not in the two (2) preceding elections.

Considering PGBIs arguments, we granted the motion and reinstated the petition in the courtsdocket.

THE ISSUES

We are called upon to resolve: (a) whether there is legal basis for delisting PGBI; and (b) whetherPGBIs right to due process was violated.

OUR RULING

We find the petition partly impressed with merit.

a. The Minero Ruling

Our Minero ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustainPGBIs delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or

coalitions under the party-list system.

First, the law is clear the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interestedparty, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional orsectoral party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2) precedingelections; or (b) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-listsystem in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. 6 The word"or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the otherthings enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a
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disjunctive word.7 Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2)separate reasons for delisting.

Second, Minero is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, asPGBIs cited congressional deliberations clearly show.

Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-participation of a party-list organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold

party-list vote. What Minero effectively holds is that a party list organization that does not participatein an election necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list votes. To be sure, this is aconfused interpretation of the law, given the laws clear and categorical language and the legislativeintent to treat the two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a mixture or fusion of these twodifferent and separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained application of the law in

jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation not within the contemplation of the framers of the law andhence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law.8

What we say here should of course take into account our ruling in Barangay Association forAdvancement and National Transparency v. COMELEC9 (Banat) where we partly invalidated the 2%party-list vote requirement provided in RA 7941 as follows:

We rule that, in computing the allocation ofadditional seats, the continued operation of the twopercent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes itmathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when thenumber of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent thresholdin the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% ofthe members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.

The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2) preceding elections shouldtherefore be understood in light of the Banat ruling that party-list groups or organizations garnering

less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat in the allocation of additional seats.

We need not extensively discuss Banats significance, except to state that a party-list group ororganization which qualified in the second round of seat allocation cannot now validly be delisted forthe reason alone that it garnered less than 2% in the last two elections. In other words, the applicationof this disqualification should henceforth be contingent on the percentage of party-list votes garneredby the last party-list organization that qualified for a seat in the House of Representatives, apercentage that is less than the 2% threshold invalidated in Banat. The disqualification should nownecessarily be read to apply to party-list groups or organizations that did not qualify for a seat in thetwo preceding elections for the constituency in which it registered.

To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; thesegrounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for failure togarner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections should now be understood, in light of the Banatruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the constituency inwhich it has registered. This, we declare, is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood andapplied. We do so under our authority to state what the law is, 10 and as an exception to theapplication of the principle of stare decisis.
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The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle thingswhich are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides,thus:

ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of thelegal system of the Philippines.

The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the

rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent tobe followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based onthe principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemedsettled and closed to further argument.11The doctrine is grounded on the necessity for securingcertainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus:

Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judiciapractice thatwhen a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, itwill adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially thesame. Stare decisiset non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled.Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case

should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same , even though theparties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerfucountervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike . Thus, where the samequestions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in aprevious case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to anyattempt to relitigate the same issue.12

The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances attendant in aparticular case override the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of staredecisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside.13

As our discussion above shows, the most compelling reason to abandon Minero exists; it was clearlyan erroneous application of the law an application that the principle of stability or predictability ofdecisions alone cannot sustain. Minero did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, theintent of the legislature, and to the rule of law in general. Clearly, we cannot allow PGBI to beprejudiced by the continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, we now abandon Minero and strikeit out from our ruling case law.

We are aware that PGBIs situation a party list group or organization that failed to garner 2% in aprior election and immediately thereafter did not participate in the preceding election is somethingthat is not covered by Section 6(8) of RA 7941. From this perspective, it may be an unintended gap inthe law and as such is a matter for Congress to address. We cannot and do not address matters over

which full discretionary authority is given by the Constitution to the legislature; to do so will offend theprinciple of separation of powers. If a gap indeed exists, then the present case should bring thisconcern to the legislatures notice.

b. The Issue of Due Process

On the due process issue, we agree with the COMELEC that PGBIs right to due process was notviolated for PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of Resolution No.8679. The essence of due process, we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard;as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain ones side or the
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opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-typehearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the partiesare afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What isfrowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x. 14 We find it obvious under the attendantcircumstances that PGBI was not denied due process. In any case, given the result of this Resolution,PGBI has no longer any cause for complaint on due process grounds.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly ANNUL COMELEC

Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as the petitioner PGBI is concerned, and theResolution dated December 9, 2009 which denied PGBIs motion for reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004 (MP). PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as a party-list group or organization in the coming May2010 elections.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRIONAssociate Justice

WE CONCUR:


ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate Justice

RENATO C. CORONAAssociate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALESAssociate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURAAssociate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTROAssociate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMINAssociate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLOAssociate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABADAssociate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZAssociate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZAAssociate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in theabove Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of theopinion of the Court.
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