legal technique and logic

1 LEGAL TECHNIQUE AND LOGIC

G.R. No. 134625 August 31, 1999

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

MENDOZA, J.:

For review before the Court is the decision of the Court of Appeals1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 42788, dated December 16, 1997, which granted private respondent's application for a writ of mandatory injunction, and its resolution, dated July 13, 1998, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Private respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine is a citizen of India and holder of a Philippine visitor's visa. Sometime in April 1988, she enrolled in the doctoral program in Anthropology of the University of the Philippines College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP) in Diliman, Quezon City.

After completing the units of course work required in her doctoral program, private respondent went on a two-year leave of absence to work as Tamil Programme Producer of the Vatican Radio in the Vatican and as General Office Assistant at the International Right to Life Federation in Rome. She returned to the Philippines in July 1991 to work on her dissertation entitled, "Tamil Influences in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines."

On December 22, 1992, Dr. Realidad S. Rolda, chairperson of the U.P. Department of Anthropology, wrote a letter to Dr. Maria Serena Diokno, CSSP Associate Dean and Graduate Program Director, certifying that private respondent had finished her dissertation and was ready for her oral defense. Dr. Rolda suggested that the oral defense be held on January 6, 1993 but, in a letter, dated February 2, 1993, Dr. Serena Diokno rescheduled it on February 5, 1993. Named as members of the dissertation panel were Drs. E. Arsenio Manuel, Serafin

Quiason, Sri Skandarajah, Noel Teodoro, and Isagani Medina, the last included as the dean's representative.

After going over private respondent's dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Consuelo Joaquin-Paz that there was a portion in private respondent's dissertation that was lifted, without proper acknowledgment, from Balfour's Cyclopaedia of India and Eastern and Southern Asia (1967), volume I, pp. 392-401 (3 v., Edward Balfour 1885 reprint) and from John Edye's article entitled "Description of the Various Classes of Vessels Constructed and Employed by the Natives of the Coasts of Coromandel, Malabar, and the Island of Ceylon for their Coasting Navigation" in the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland Journal, volume I, pp. 1-14 (1833).

Nonetheless, private respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation on February 5, 1993. Four (4) out of the five (5) panelists gave private respondent a passing mark for her oral defense by affixing their signatures on the approval form. These were Drs. Manuel, Quiason, Skandarajah, and Teodoro. Dr. Quiason added the following qualification to his signature:

Ms. Arokiaswamy must incorporate the suggestions I made during the successful defense of her P.D. thesis.

Dr. Medina did not sign the approval form but added the following comment:

Pipirmahan ko ang pagsang-ayon/di pagsang-ayon kapag nakita ko na ang mga revisions ng dissertation.

Dr. Teodoro added the following note to his signature:

Kailangang isagawa ang mga mahahalagang pagbabago at ipakita sa panel and bound copies.5

In a letter, dated March 5, 1993 and addressed to her thesis adviser, Dr. Manuel, private respondent requested a meeting with the panel

members, especially Dr. Medina, to discuss the amendments suggested by the panel members during the oral defense. The meeting was held at the dean's office with Dean Paz, private respondent, and a majority of the defense panel present.6 During the meeting, Dean Paz remarked that a majority vote of the panel members was sufficient for a student to pass, notwithstanding the failure to obtain the consent of the Dean's representative.

On March 24, 1993, the CSSP College Faculty Assembly approved private respondent's graduation pending submission of final copies of her dissertation.

In April 1993, private respondent submitted copies of her supposedly revised dissertation to Drs. Manuel, Skandarajah, and Quiason, who expressed their assent to the dissertation. Petitioners maintain, however, that private respondent did not incorporate the revisions suggested by the panel members in the final copies of her dissertation.

Private respondent left a copy of her dissertation in Dr. Teodoro's office April 15, 1993 and proceeded to submit her dissertation to the CSSP without the approvals of Dr. Medina and Dr. Teodoro, relying on Dean Paz's March 5, 1993 statement.

Dr. Teodoro later indicated his disapproval, while Dr. Medina did not sign the approval form.7

Dean Paz then accepted private respondent's dissertation in partial fulfillment of the course requirements for the doctorate degree in Anthropology.

In a letter to Dean Paz, dated April 17, 1993, private respondent expressed concern over matters related to her dissertation. She sought to explain why the signature of Dr. Medina was not affixed to the revision approval form. Private respondent said that since she already had the approval of a majority of the panel members, she

no longer showed her dissertation to Dr. Medina nor tried to obtain the latter's signature on the revision approval form. She likewise expressed her disappointment over the CSSP administration and charged Drs. Diokno and Medina with maliciously working for the disapproval of her dissertation, and further warned Dean Paz against encouraging perfidious acts against her.

On April 17, 1993, the University Council met to approve the list of candidates for graduation for the second semester of school year 1992-1993. The list, which was endorsed to the Board of Regents for final approval, included private respondent's name.

On April 21, 1993, Dean Paz sent a letter to Dr. Milagros Ibe, Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs, requesting the exclusion of private respondent's name from the list of candidates for graduation, pending clarification of the problems regarding her dissertation. Her letter reads:8

Abril 21, 1993

Dr. Milagros IbeVice Chancellor for Academic AffairsUnibersidad ng PilipinasQuezon Hall, Diliman, Q.C.

Mahal na Dr. Ibe,

Mahigpit ko pong hinihiling na huwag munang isama ang pangalan ni Ms. Arokiaswam[y] William Margaret Celine sa listahan ng mga bibigyan ng degri na Ph.D. (Anthropology) ngayon[g] semester, dahil sa mga malubhang bintang nya sa ilang myembro ng panel para sa oral defense ng disertasyon nya at sa mga akusasyon ng ilan sa mga ito sa kanya.

Naniniwala po kami na dapat mailinaw muna ang ilang bagay bago makonfer ang degri kay Ms. Arokiaswam[y]. Kelangan po ito para mapangalagaan ang istandard ng pinakamataas na degree ng Unibersidad.

(Sgd.)


CONSUELO JOAQUIN-PAZ, Ph.D.Dekano

Apparently, however, Dean Paz's letter did not reach the Board of Regents on time, because the next day, April 22, 1993, the Board approved the University Council's recommendation for the graduation of qualified students, including private respondent. Two days later, April 24, 1993, private respondent graduated with the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology.

On the other hand, Dean Paz also wrote a letter to private respondent, dated April 21, 1993, that she would not be granted an academic clearance unless she substantiated the accusations contained in her letter dated April 17, 1993.

In her letter, dated April 27, 1993, private respondent claimed that Dr. Medina's unfavorable attitude towards her dissertation was a reaction to her failure to include him and Dr. Francisco in the list of panel members; that she made the revisions proposed by Drs. Medina and Teodoro in the revised draft of her dissertation; and that Dr. Diokno was guilty of harassment.

In a letter addressed to Dean Paz, dated May 1, 1993, Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended that the doctorate granted to her be withdrawn.9

On May 13, 1993, Dean Paz formed an ad hoc committee, composed of faculty members from various disciplines and chaired by Eva Duka-Ventura, to investigate the plagiarism charge against private respondent. Meanwhile, she recommended to U.P. Diliman Chancellor, Dr. Emerlinda Roman, that the Ph.D. degree conferred on private respondent be withdrawn.

In a letter, dated June 7, 1993, Dean Paz informed private respondent of the charges against her.

On June 15, 1993, the Ventura Committee submitted a report to Dean Paz, finding at least ninety (90) instances or portions in private

respondent's thesis which were lifted from sources without proper or due acknowledgment.

On July 28, 1993, the CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to withdraw private respondent's doctorate degree and forwarded its recommendation to the University Council. The University Council, in turn, approved and endorsed the same recommendation to the Board of Regents on August 16, 1993.

On September 6, 1993, the Board of Regents deferred action on the recommendation to study the legal implications of its approval.

Meanwhile, in a letter, dated September 23, 1993, U.P. Diliman Chancellor Emerlinda Roman summoned private respondent to a meeting on the same day and asked her to submit her written explanation to the charges against her.

During the meeting, Chancellor Roman informed private respondent of the charges and provided her a copy of the findings of the investigating committee. Private respondent, on the other hand, submitted her written explanation in a letter dated September 25, 1993.

Another meeting was held on October 8, 1993 between Chancellor Roman and private respondent to discuss her answer to the charges. A third meeting was scheduled on October 27, 1993 but private respondent did not attend it, alleging that the Board of Regents had already decided her case before she could be fully heard.

On October 11, 1993, private respondent wrote to Dr. Emil Q. Javier, U.P. President, alleging that some members of the U.P. administration were playing politics in her case.14 She sent another letter, dated December 14, 1993, to Dr. Armand Fabella, Chairman of the Board of Regents, complaining that she had not been afforded due process and claiming that U.P. could no longer withdraw her degree since her

dissertation had already been accepted by the CSSP.

Meanwhile, the U.P. Office of Legal Services justified the position of the University Council in its report to the Board of Regents. The Board of Regents, in its February 1, 1994 and March 24, 1994 meetings, further deferred action thereon.

On July 11, 1994, private respondent sent a letter to the Board of Regents requesting a re-investigation of her case. She stressed that under the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline, it was the student disciplinary tribunal which had jurisdiction to decide cases of dishonesty and that the withdrawal of a degree already conferred was not one of the authorized penalties which the student disciplinary tribunal could impose.

On July 28, 1994, the Board of Regents decided to release private respondent's transcript of grades without annotation although it showed that private respondent passed her dissertation with 12 units of credit.

On August 17, 1994, Chancellor Roger Posadas issued Administrative Order No. 94-94 constituting a special committee composed of senior faculty members from the U.P. units outside Diliman to review the University Council's recommendation to withdraw private respondent's degree. With the approval of the Board of Regents and the U.P. Diliman Executive Committee, Posadas created a five-man committee, chaired by Dr. Paulino B. Zafaralla, with members selected from a list of nominees screened by Dr. Emerenciana Arcellana, then a member of the Board of Regents. On August 13, 1994, the members of the Zafaralla committee and private respondent met at U.P. Los Baños.

Meanwhile, on August 23, 1994, the U.P. Diliman Registrar released to private respondent a copy of her transcript of grades and certificate of graduation.

In a letter to Chancellor Posadas, dated September 1, 1994, private respondent requested that the Zafaralla committee be provided with copies of the U.P. Charter (Act No. 1870), the U.P. Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline, her letter-response to Chancellor Roman, dated September 25, 1993, as well as all her other communications.

On September 19, 1994, Chancellor Posadas obtained the Zafaralla Committee's report, signed by its chairman, recommending the withdrawal of private respondent's doctorate degree. The report stated:

After going through all the pertinent documents of the case and interviewing Ms. Arokiaswamy William, the following facts were established:

1. There is overwhelming evidence of massive lifting from a published source word for word and, at times, paragraph by paragraph without any acknowledgment of the source, even by a mere quotation mark. At least 22 counts of such documented liftings were identified by the Committee. These form part of the approximately ninety (90) instances found by the Committee created by the Dean of the College and subsequently verified as correct by the Special Committee. These instances involved the following forms of intellectual dishonesty: direct lifting/copying without acknowledgment, full/partial lifting with improper documentation and substitution of terms or words (e.g., Tamil in place of Sanskrit, Tamilization in place of Indianization) from an acknowledged source in support of her thesis (attached herewith is a copy of the documents for reference); and

2. Ms. Arokiaswamy William herself admits of being guilty of the allegation of plagiarism. Fact is, she informed the Special Committee that she had been admitting having lifted several portions in her dissertation from various sources since the beginning.

In view of the overwhelming proof of massive lifting and also on the admission of Ms.


Arokiaswamy William that she indeed plagiarized, the Committee strongly supports the recommendation of the U.P. Diliman Council to withdraw the doctoral degree of Ms. Margaret Celine Arokiaswamy William.

On the basis of the report, the University Council, on September 24, 1994, recommended to the Board of Regents that private respondent be barred in the future from admission to the University either as a student or as an employee.

On January 4, 1995, the secretary of the Board of Regents sent private respondent the following letter:17

4 January 1995

Ms. Margaret Celine Arokiaswamy WilliamDepartment of AnthropologyCollege of Social Sciences and PhilosophyU.P. Diliman, Quezon City

Dear Ms. Arokiaswamy William:

This is to officially inform you about the action taken by the Board of Regents at its 1081st and 1082nd meetings held last 17 November and 16 December 1994 regarding your case, the excerpts from the minutes of which are attached herewith.

Please be informed that the members present at the 1081st BOR meeting on 17 November 1994 resolved, by a majority decision, to withdraw your Ph.D. degree as recommended by the U.P. Diliman University Council and as concurred with by the External Review Panel composed of senior faculty from U.P. Los Baños and U.P. Manila. These faculty members were chosen by lot from names submitted by the University Councils of U.P. Los Baños and U.P. Manila.

In reply to your 14 December 1994 letter requesting that you be given a good lawyer by the Board, the Board, at its 1082nd meeting on 16 December 1994, suggested that you direct your request to the Office of Legal Aid, College of Law, U.P. Diliman.

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd.)VIVENCIO R. JOSESecretary of the Universityand of the Board of Regents

On January 18, 1995, private respondent wrote a letter to Commissioner Sedfrey Ordoñez, Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, asking the commission's intervention.18 In a letter, dated February 14, 1995, to Secretary Ricardo Gloria, Chairman of the Board of Regents, she asked for a reinvestigation of her case. She also sought an audience with the Board of Regents and/or the U.P. President, which request was denied by President Javier, in a letter dated June 2, 1995.

On August 10, 1995, private respondent then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and damages, which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-24690 and assigned to Branch 81 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.19 She alleged that petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn her degree without justification and without affording her procedural due process. She prayed that petitioners be ordered to restore her degree and to pay her P500,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages and P1,500,000.00 as compensation for lost of earnings.

On August 6, 1996, the trial court, Branch 227, rendered a decision dismissing the petition for mandamus for lack of merit.20 Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which on December 16, 1997, reversed the lower court. The dispositive portion of the appellate court's decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is hereby reversed and set aside. Respondents are ordered to restore to petitioner her degree of Ph.D. in Anthropology.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend:

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING THE WRIT OFMANDAMUS AND ORDERING PETITIONERS TO RESTORE RESPONDENT'S DOCTORAL DEGREE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTORAL DEGREE GIVEN RESPONDENT BY U.P. CANNOT BE RECALLED WITHOUT VIOLATING HER RIGHT TO ENJOYMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TO JUSTICE AND EQUITY.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN DEPRIVING PETITIONERS OF THEIR RIGHT TO SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS.

Petitioners argue that private respondent failed to show that she had been unlawfully excluded from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which she is entitled so as to justify the issuance of the writ of mandamus. They also contend that she failed to prove that the restoration of her degree is a ministerial duty of U.P. or that the withdrawal of the degree violated her right to the enjoyment of intellectual property.

On the other hand, private respondent, unassisted by counsel, argue that petitioners acted arbitrarily and with grave abuse of discretion in withdrawing her degree even prior to verifying the truth of the plagiarism charge against her; and that as her answer to the charges had not been forwarded to the members of the investigating committees, she was deprived of the opportunity to comment or refute their findings.

In addition, private respondent maintains that petitioners are estopped from, withdrawing her doctorate degree; that petitioners acted contrary to §9 of the U.P. Charter and the U.P. Rules and Regulations of Student Conduct and Discipline of the University, which according to her, does not authorize the withdrawal of a degree as a penalty for erring students; and that only the college committee or the student disciplinary tribunal may decide disciplinary cases, whose report must be signed by a majority of its members.

We find petitioners' contention to be meritorious.

Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan, this Court ruled that the writ was not available to restrain U.P. from the exercise of its academic freedom. In that case, a student who was found guilty of dishonesty and ordered suspended for one year by the Board of Regents, filed a petition for mandamus and obtained from the lower court a temporary restraining order stopping U.P. from carrying out the order of suspension. In setting aside the TRO and ordering the lower court to dismiss the student's petition, this Court said:

[T]he lower court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction of May 29, 1993. The issuance of the said writ was based on the lower court's finding that the implementation of the disciplinary sanction of suspension on Nadal "would work injustice to the petitioner as it would delay him in finishing his course, and consequently, in getting a decent and good paying job." Sadly, such a ruling considers only the situation of Nadal without taking into account the circumstances, clearly of his own


making, which led him into such a predicament. More importantly, it has completely disregarded the overriding issue of academic freedom which provides more than ample justification for the imposition of a disciplinary sanction upon an erring student of an institution of higher learning.

From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the lower court should have restrained itself from assuming jurisdiction over the petition filed by Nadal. Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the petitioner being required. It is of no avail against an official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment.

In this case, the trial court dismissed private respondent's petition precisely on grounds of academic freedom but the Court of Appeals reversed holding that private respondent was denied due process. It said:

It is worthy to note that during the proceedings taken by the College Assembly culminating in its recommendation to the University Council for the withdrawal of petitioner's Ph.D. degree, petitioner was not given the chance to be heard until after the withdrawal of the degree was consummated. Petitioner's subsequent letters to the U.P. President proved unavailing.

As the foregoing narration of facts in this case shows, however, various committees had been formed to investigate the charge that private respondent had committed plagiarism and, in all the investigations held, she was heard in her defense. Indeed, if any criticism may be made of the university proceedings before private respondent was finally stripped of her degree, it is that there were too many committee and individual investigations conducted, although all resulted in a finding that private respondent committed dishonesty in submitting her doctoral dissertation on the basis of which she was conferred the Ph.D. degree.

Indeed, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side of a controversy or a chance seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have been denied due process.

In this case, private respondent was informed in writing of the charges against her and afforded opportunities to refute them. She was asked to submit her written explanation, which she forwarded on September 25, 1993. Private respondent then met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla committee to discuss her case. In addition, she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities explaining her position.

It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an audience before the Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice. It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance of persons whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board of Regents.

Nor indeed was private respondent entitled to be furnished a copy of the report of the Zafaralla committee as part of her right to due process. In Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong, we held:

Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements which became the basis of petitioners' February 14, 1991 order, they were denied procedural due process. Granting that they were denied such opportunity, the same may not be said to detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross examination. An administrative proceeding conducted to investigate students' participation in

a hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. . .

In this case, in granting the writ of mandamus, the Court of Appeals held:

First. Petitioner graduated from the U.P. with a doctorate degree in Anthropology. After graduation, the contact between U.P. and petitioner ceased. Petitioner is no longer within the ambit of the disciplinary powers of the U.P. As a graduate, she is entitled to the right and enjoyment of the degree she has earned. To recall the degree, after conferment, is not only arbitrary, unreasonable, and an act of abuse, but a flagrant violation of petitioner's right of enjoyment to intellectual property.

Second. Respondents aver that petitioner's graduation was a mistake.

Unfortunately this "mistake" was arrived at after almost a year after graduation. Considering that the members of the thesis panel, the College Faculty Assembly, and the U.P. Council are all men and women of the highest intellectual acumen and integrity, as respondents themselves aver, suspicion is aroused that the alleged "mistake" might not be the cause of withdrawal but some other hidden agenda which respondents do not wish to reveal.

At any rate, We cannot countenance the plight the petitioner finds herself enmeshed in as a consequence of the acts complained of. Justice and equity demand that this be rectified by restoring the degree conferred to her after her compliance with the academic and other related requirements.

Art. XIV, §5 (2) of the Constitution provides that "[a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." This is nothing new. The 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitution36 likewise provided for the academic freedom or, more precisely, for the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning. As pointed out by this Court

in Garcia vs. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, it is a freedom granted to "institutions of higher learning" which is thus given "a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of the students." If such institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates.

Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This freedom of a university does not terminate upon the "graduation" of a student, as the Court of Appeals held. For it is precisely the "graduation" of such a student that is in question. It is noteworthy that the investigation of private respondent's case began before her graduation. If she was able to join the graduation ceremonies on April 24, 1993, it was because of too many investigations conducted before the Board of Regents finally decided she should not have been allowed to graduate.

Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of higher learning, for the constitutional grant of academic freedom, to quote again from Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, "is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion."

Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest governing body of the University of the Philippines.38It has the power confer degrees upon the recommendation of the University Council. If follows that if the conferment of a degree is founded on error or fraud, the Board of Regents is also empowered, subject to the observance of due process, to withdraw what it has granted without violating a student's rights. An institution of higher learning cannot be powerless if it discovers that an academic degree it has conferred is not rightfully deserved. Nothing can be more objectionable than


bestowing a university's highest academic degree upon an individual who has obtained the same through fraud or deceit. The pursuit of academic excellence is the university's concern. It should be empowered, as an act of self-defense, to take measures to protect itself from serious threats to its integrity.

While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their educaiton, the USC as an educational institution is also entitled to pursue its academic freedom and in the process has the concomitant right to see to it that this freedom is not jeopardized.

In the case at bar, the Board of Regents determined, after due investigation conducted by a committee composed of faculty members from different U.P. units, that private respondent committed no less than ninety (90) instances of intellectual dishonesty in her dissertation. The Board of Regents' decision to withdraw private respondent's doctorate was based on documents on record including her admission that she committed the offense.

On the other hand, private respondent was afforded the opportunity to be heard and explain her side but failed to refute the charges of plagiarism against her. Her only claim is that her responses to the charges against her were not considered by the Board of Regents before it rendered its decision. However, this claim was not proven. Accordingly, we must presume regularity in the performance of official duties in the absence of proof to the contrary.

Very much the opposite of the position of the Court of Appeals that, since private respondent was no longer a student of the U.P., the latter was no longer within the "ambit of disciplinary powers of the U.P.," is private respondent's contention that it is the Student Disciplinary Tribunal which had jurisdiction over her case because the charge is dishonesty. Private respondent invoke §5 of the U.P. Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline which provides:

Jurisdiction. — All cases involving discipline of students under these rules shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the student disciplinary tribunal, except the following cases which shall fall under the jurisdiction of the appropriate college or unit;

(a) Violation of college or unit rules and regulations by students of the college, or

(b) Misconduct committed by students of the college or unit within its classrooms or premises or in the course of an official activity;

Provided, that regional units of the University shall have original jurisdiction over all cases involving students of such units.

Private respondent argues that under §25 (a) of the said Rules and Regulations, dishonesty in relation to one's studies (i.e., plagiarism) may be punished only with suspension for at least one (1) year.

As the above-quoted provision of §5 of the Rules and Regulations indicates, the jurisdiction of the student disciplinary tribunal extend only to disciplinary actions. In this case, U.P. does not seek to discipline private respondent. Indeed, as the appellate court observed, private respondent is no longer within "the ambit of disciplinary powers of the U.P." Private respondent cannot even be punished since, as she claims, the penalty for acts of dishonesty in administrative disciplinary proceedings is suspension from the University for at least one year. What U.P., through the Board of Regents, seeks to do is to protect its academic integrity by withdrawing from private respondent an academic degree she obtained through fraud.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and the petition for mandamus is hereby DISMISSED.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 187456 June 2, 2014

ALABANG DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. ALABANG HILLS VILLAGE ASSOCIATION

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated March 27, 2009, in CA-G.R. CV No. 88864.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:

The case traces its roots to the Complaint for Injunction and Damages filed [with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City] on October 19, 2006 by [herein petitioner, Alabang Development Corporation] ADC against [herein respondents, Alabang Hills Village Association, Inc.] AHVAI and Rafael Tinio (Tinio), President of AHVAI. The Complaint alleged that [petitioner] is the developer of Alabang Hills Village and still owns certain parcels of land therein that are yet to be sold, as well as those considered open spaces that have not yet been donated to [the] local government of Muntinlupa City or the Homeowner's Association. Sometime in September [2006], ADC learned that AHVAI started the construction of a multi-purpose hall and a swimming pool on one of the parcels of land still owned by ADC without the latter's consent and approval, and that despite demand, AHVAI failed to desist from constructing the said improvements. ADC thus prayed that an injunction be issued enjoining defendants from constructing the multi-purpose hall and the swimming pool at the Alabang Hills Village.

In its Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim, AHVAI denied ADC's asseverations and claimed that the latter has no legal capacity to sue since its existence as a registered corporate entity was revoked by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on May 26, 2003; that ADC

has no cause of action because by law it is no longer the absolute owner but is merely holding the property in question in trust for the benefit of AHVAI as beneficial owner thereof; and that the subject lot is part of the open space required by law to be provided in the subdivision. As counterclaim, it prayed that an order be issued divesting ADC of the title of the property and declaring AHVAI as owner thereof; and that ADC be made liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees.

Tinio filed his separate Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim, practically reiterating the defenses of AHVAI.

On January 4, 2007, the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276, rendered judgment dismissing herein petitioner's complaint on the grounds (1) that the latter has no personality to file the same; (2) that the subject property "is a reserved area for the beneficial use of the homeowners, as mandated by law;" and (3) that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), not the RTC, has exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute between petitioner and respondents.

Aggrieved, herein petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal of the RTC decision. Herein respondent AHVAI, on the other hand, moved that it be allowed to prosecute its compulsory counterclaim praying, for this purpose, that the RTC decision be amended accordingly.

In its Order dated February 20, 2007, the RTC approved petitioner's notice of appeal but dismissed respondent AHVAI’s counterclaim on the ground that it is dependent on petitioner's complaint. Respondent AHVAI then filed an appeal with the CA.

In its assailed Decision dated March 27, 2009, the CA dismissed both appeals of petitioner and respondent, and affirmed the decision of the RTC. With respect to petitioner, the CA ruled that the RTC correctly dismissed petitioner's complaint as the same was filed when petitioner was already defunct and, as such, it no longer


had capacity to file the said complaint. As regards, respondent AHVAI’s counterclaim, the CA held that "where there is no claim against the [respondent], because [petitioner] is already in existent and has no capacity to sue, the counterclaim is improper and it must be dismissed, more so where the complaint is dismissed at the instance of the [respondent]."

Thus, the instant petition based on the following grounds:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ON THE CASE OF "COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS" IN RESOLVING PETITIONER'S LACK OF CAPACITY

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING LACK OF CAPACITY OFTHE PETITIONER IN FILING THE CASE CONTRARY TO THE EARLIER RULINGS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE THAT PETITIONER IS MANDATED TO CEDE PROPERTIES TO RESPONDENT AHVAI

Anent the first assigned error, the Court does not agree that the CA erred in relying on the case of Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. The CA cited the case for the purpose of restating and distinguishing the jurisprudential definition of the terms "lack of capacity to sue" and "lack of personality to sue;" and of applying these definitions to the present case. Thus, the fact that, unlike in the instant case, the corporations involved in the Columbia case were foreign corporations is of no moment. The definition of the term "lack of capacity to sue" enunciated in the said case still applies to the case at bar. Indeed, as held by this Court and as correctly cited by the CA in the case of Columbia: "[l]ack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does not have the character or

representation he claims[;] 'lack of capacity to sue' refers to a plaintiff's general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a party. ..." In the instant case, petitioner lacks capacity to sue because it no longer possesses juridical personality by reason of its dissolution and lapse of the three-year grace period provided under Section 122 of the Corporation Code, as will be discussed below.

With respect to the second assigned error, Section 122 of the Corporation Code provides as follows:

SEC. 122. Corporate liquidation.– Every corporation whose charter expires by its own limitation or is annulled by forfeiture or otherwise, or whose corporate existence for other purposes is terminated in any other manner, shall nevertheless be continued as a body corporate for three (3) years after the time when it would have been so dissolved, for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits by or against it and enabling it to settle and close its affairs, to dispose of and convey its property and to distribute its assets, but not for the purpose of continuing the business for which it was established.

At any time during said three (3) years, said corporation is authorized and empowered to convey all of its property to trustees for the benefit of stockholders, members, creditors, and other persons in interest. From and after any such conveyance by the corporation of its property in trust for the benefit of its stockholders, members, creditors and others in interest, all interest which the corporation had in the property terminates, the legal interest vests in the trustees, and the beneficial interest in the stockholders, members, creditors or other persons in interest.

Upon winding up of the corporate affairs, any asset distributable to any creditor or stockholder or member who is unknown or cannot be found shall be escheated to the city or municipality where such assets are located.

Except by decrease of capital stock and as otherwise allowed by this Code, no corporation shall distribute any of its assets or property except upon lawful dissolution and after payment of all its debts and liabilities.

This Court has held that:

It is to be noted that the time during which the corporation, through its own officers, may conduct the liquidation of its assets and sue and be sued as a corporation is limited to three years from the time the period of dissolution commences; but there is no time limit within which the trustees must complete a liquidation placed in their hands. It is provided only (Corp. Law, Sec. 78 now Sec. 122]) that the conveyance to the trustees must be made within the three-year period. It may be found impossible to complete the work of liquidation within the three-year period or to reduce disputed claims to judgment. The authorities are to the effect that suits by or against a corporation abate when it ceased to be an entity capable of suing or being sued (7 R.C.L., Corps., par. 750); but trustees to whom the corporate assets have been conveyed pursuant to the authority of Sec. 78 [now Sec. 122] may sue and be sued as such in all matters connected with the liquidation...

In the absence of trustees, this Court ruled, thus:

… Still in the absence of a board of directors or trustees, those having any pecuniary interest in the assets, including not only the shareholders but likewise the creditors of the corporation, acting for and in its behalf, might make proper representations with the Securities and Exchange Commission, which has primary and sufficiently broad jurisdiction in matters of this nature, for working out a final settlement of the corporate concerns.

In the instant case, there is no dispute that petitioner's corporate registration was revoked on May 26, 2003.1âwphi1Based on the above-quoted provision of law, it had three years, or until May 26, 2006, to prosecute or defend any

suit by or against it. The subject complaint, however, was filed only on October 19, 2006, more than three years after such revocation. It is likewise not disputed that the subject complaint was filed by petitioner corporation and not by its directors or trustees. In fact, it is even averred, albeit wrongly, in the first paragraph of the Complaint that "[p]laintiff is a duly organized and existing corporation under the laws of the Philippines, with capacity to sue and be sued. x x x"

Petitioner, nonetheless, insists that a corporation may still sue, even after it has been dissolved and the three-year liquidation period provided under Section 122 of the Corporation Code has passed. Petitioner cites the cases of Gelano v. Court of Appeals, Knecht v. United Cigarette Corporation, and Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, as authority to support its position. The Court, however, agrees with the CA that in the abovecited cases, the corporations involved filed their respective complaints while they were still in existence. In other words, they already had pending actions at the time that their corporate existence was terminated.

The import of this Court's ruling in the cases cited by petitioner is that the trustee of a corporation may continue to prosecute a case commenced by the corporation within three years from its dissolution until rendition of the final judgment, even if such judgment is rendered beyond the three-year period allowed by Section 122 of the Corporation Code. However, there is nothing in the said cases which allows an already defunct corporation to initiate a suit after the lapse of the said three-year period. On the contrary, the factual circumstances in the abovecited cases would show that the corporations involved therein did not initiate any complaint after the lapse of the three-year period. In fact, as stated above, the actions were already pending at the time that they lost their corporate existence.


In the present case, petitioner filed its complaint not only after its corporate existence was terminated but also beyond the three-year period allowed by Section 122 of the Corporation Code. Thus, it is clear that at the time of the filing of the subject complaint petitioner lacks the capacity to sue as a corporation. To allow petitioner to initiate the subject complaint and pursue it until final judgment, on the ground that such complaint was filed for the sole purpose of liquidating its assets, would be to circumvent the provisions of Section 122 of the Corporation Code.

As to the last issue raised, the basic and pivotal issue in the instant case is petitioner's capacity to sue as a corporation and it has already been settled that petitioner indeed lacks such capacity. Thus, this Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of the CA finding it unnecessary to delve on the other issues raised by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88864, sustaining the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276, in Civil Case No. 06-138, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 180416 June 2, 2014

ADERITO Z. YUJUICO and BONIFACIO C. SUMBILLA vs. CEZAR T. QUIAMBAO

D E C I S I O N

PEREZ, J.:

This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari from the Orders dated 4 June 2007 and 5 November 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 154, of Pasig City in S.C.A. No. 3047.

The facts:

Background

Strategic Alliance Development Corporation (STRADEC) is a domestic corporation operating as a business development and investment company.

On 1 March 2004, during the annual stockholder's meeting of STRADEC, petitioner Aderito Z. Yujuico (Yujuico) was elected as president and chairman of the company. Yujuico replaced respondent Cezar T. Quiambao (Quiambao), who had been the president and chairman of STRADEC since 1994.

With Yujuico at the helm, STRADEC appointed petitioner Bonifacio C. Sumbilla (Sumbilla) as treasurer and one Joselito John G. Blando (Blando) as corporate secretary. Blando replaced respondent Eric C. Pilapil (Pilapil), the previous corporate secretary of STRADEC.

The Criminal Complaint

On 12 August 2005, petitioners filed a criminal complaint against respondents and one Giovanni T. Casanova (Casanova) before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Pasig City. The complaint was docketed in the OCP as LS. No. PSG 05-08-07465.

The complaint accuses respondents and Casanova of violating Section 74 in relation to Section 144 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 or the Corporation Code. The petitioners premise such accusation on the following factual allegations:

1. During the stockholders' meeting on 1 March 2004, Yujuico-as newly elected president and chairman of STRADEC-demanded Quiambao for the turnover of the corporate records of the company, particularly the accounting files, ledgers, journals and other records of the corporation's business. Quiambao refused.

2. As it turns out, the corporate records of STRADEC were in the possession of Casanova-the accountant of STRADEC. Casanova was keeping custody of the said records on behalf of Quiambao, who allegedly needed the same as part of his defense in a pending case in court.

3. After the 1 March 2004 stockholders' meeting, Quiambao and Casanova caused the removal of the corporate records of STRADEC from the company's offices in Pasig City.

4. Upon his appointment as corporate secretary on 21 June 2004, Blando likewise demanded Pilapil for the turnover of the stock and transfer book of STRADEC. Pilapil refused.

5. Instead, on 25 June 2004, Pilapil proposed to Blando to have the stock and transfer book deposited in a safety deposit box with Equitable PCI Bank, Kamias Road, Quezon City. Blando acceded to the proposal and the stock and transfer book was deposited in a safety deposit box with the bank identified. It was agreed that the safety deposit box may only be opened in the presence of both Quiambao and Blando.

6. On 30 June 2004, however, Quiambao and Pilapil withdrew the stock and transfer book from the safety deposit box and brought it to the offices of the Stradcom Corporation (STRADCOM) in Quezon City. Quiambao thereafter asked Blando to proceed to the STRADCOM offices. Upon arriving thereat, Quiambao pressured Blando to make certain entries in the stock and transfer books. After making such entries, Blando again demanded that he be given possession of the stock and transfer book. Quiambao refused.

7. On 1 July 2004, Blando received an order dated 30 June 2004 issued by the RTC, Branch 71, of Pasig City in Civil Case No. 70027, which directed him to cancel the entries he made in the stock and transfer book. Hence, on even date, Blando wrote letters to Quiambao and Pilapil once again demanding for the turnover of the stock and transfer book. Pilapil replied thru a letter dated 2 July 2004 where he appeared to agree to Blando's demand.

8. However, upon meeting with Pilapil and Quiambao, the latter still refused to turnover the stock and transfer book to Blando. Instead, Blando was once again constrained to agree to a

proposal by Pilapil to have the stock and transfer book deposited with the RTC, Branch 155, of Pasig City. The said court, however, refused to accept such deposit on the ground that it had no place for safekeeping.

9. Since Quiambao and Pilapil still refused to turnover the stock and transfer book, Blando again acceded to have the book deposited in a safety deposit box, this time, with the Export and Industry Bank in San Miguel A venue, Pasig City.

Petitioners theorize that the refusal by the respondents and Casanova to turnover STRADEC's corporate records and stock and transfer book violates their right, as stockholders, directors and officers of the corporation, to inspect such records and book under Section 7 4 of the Corporation Code. For such violation, petitioners conclude, respondents may be held criminally liable pursuant to Section 144 of the Corporation Code.

Preliminary investigation thereafter ensued.

Resolution of the OCP and the Informations

After receiving the counter-affidavits of the respondents and Casanova, as well as the other documentary submissions9 by the parties, the OCP issued a Resolution dated 6 January 2006 in I.S. No. PSG 05-08-07465. In the said resolution, the OCP absolved Casanova but found probable cause to hail respondents to court on two (2) offenses: (1) for removing the stock and transfer book of STRADEC from its principal office, and (2) for refusing access to, and examination of, the corporate records and the stock and transfer book of STRADEC at its principal office.

Pursuant to the resolution, two (2) informations were filed against the respondents before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig City. The informations were docketed as Criminal Case No. 89723 and Criminal Case No. 89724 and were raffled to Branch 69.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/jun2014/gr_180416_2014.html#fnt9


Criminal Case No. 89723 is for the offense of removing the stock and transfer book of STRADEC from its principal office. The information reads:

On and/or about the period between March 1 and June 25, 2004, inclusive, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above accused, being then members of the Board of Directors and/or officers, as the case maybe, of Strategic Alliance Development Corporation (STRADEC, for short), conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, remove the stock and transfer book of the said STRADEC at its principal office at the 24th Floor, One Magnificent Mile-CITRA City Bldg., San Miguel A venue, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, where they should all be kept, in violation of the aforesaid law, and to the prejudice of the said complainants.

Criminal Case No. 89724, on the other hand, covers the offense of refusing access to, and examination of, the corporate records and the stock and transfer book of STRADEC at its principal office. The information reads:

On and/or about the period between March 1 and June 25, 2004, inclusive, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above accused, being then members of the Board of Directors and/or officers, as the case maybe, of Strategic Alliance Development Corporation (STRADEC, for short), conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, refuse to allow complainants Bonifacio C. Sumbilla and Aderito Z. Yujuico, being then stockholders and/or directors of STRADEC, access to, and examination of, the corporate records, including the stock and transfer book, of STRADEC at its principal office at the 24th Floor, One Magnificent Mile-CITRA Bldg., San Miguel Avenue, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, where they should all be kept, in violation of the aforesaid

law, and to the prejudice of the said complainants.

Urgent Omnibus Motion and the Dismissal of Criminal Case No. 89723

On 18 January 2006, respondents filed before the MeTC an Urgent Omnibus Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and To Defer Issuance of Warrants of Arrest (Urgent Omnibus Motion).

On 8 May 2006, the MeTC issued an order partially granting the Urgent Omnibus Motion. The MeTC dismissed Criminal Case No. 89723 but ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest against respondents in Criminal Case No. 89724.

In dismissing Criminal Case No. 89723, the MeTC held that Section 74, in relation to Section 144, of the Corporation Code only penalizes the act of "refus[ing] to allow any director, trustee, stockholder or member of the corporation to examine and copy excerpts from the records or minutes of the corporation" and that act is already the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 89724. Hence, the MeTC opined, Criminal Case No. 89723-which seeks to try respondents for merely removing the stock and transfer book of STRADEC from its principal office-actually charges no offense and, therefore, cannot be sustained.

Anent directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. 89724, the MeTC found probable cause to do so; given the failure of the respondents to present any evidence during the preliminary investigation showing that they do not have possession of the corporate records of STRADEC or that they allowed petitioners to inspect the corporate records and the stock and transfer book of STRADEC.

Unsatisfied, the respondents filed a motion for partial Reconsideration of the 8 May 2006 order of the MeTC insofar as the disposition in Criminal Case No. 89724 is concerned. The

MeTC, however, denied such motion on 16 August 2006.

Certiorari Petition and the Dismissal of Criminal Case No. 89724 After their motion for partial reconsideration was denied, respondents filed a certiorari petition, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO), before the RTC of Pasig City on 27 September 2006. The petition was docketed as S.C.A. No. 3047.

On 16 November 2006, the RTC issued a TRO enjoining the MeTC from conducting further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 89724 for twenty (20) days.

On 4 June 2007, the R TC issued an Order granting respondents' certiorari petition and directing the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 89724. According to the RTC, the MeTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a warrant of arrest against respondents in Criminal Case No. 89724.

The RTC found that the finding of probable cause against the respondents in Criminal Case No. 89724 was not supported by the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation but was, in fact, contradicted by them:

1. The R TC noted that, aside from the complaint itself, no evidence was ever submitted by petitioners to prove that they demanded and was refused access to the corporate records of STRADEC between 1 March to 25 June 2004. What petitioners merely submitted is their letter dated 6 September 2004 demanding from respondents access to the corporate records of STRADEC.

2. The allegations of petitioners in their complaint, as well as 6 September 2004 letter above-mentioned, however, are contradicted by the sworn statement dated 1 July 2004 of Blando wherein he attested that as early as 25 June 2004, Pilapil already turned over to him "two binders containing the minutes, board resolutions, articles of incorporation, copies of

contracts, correspondences and other papers of the corporation, except the stock certificate book and the stock and transfer book."

3. The RTC also took exception to the reason provided by the MeTC in supporting its finding of probable cause against the respondents. The R TC held that it was not incumbent upon the respondents to provide evidence proving their innocence. Hence, the failure of the respondents to submit evidence showing that they do not have possession of the corporate records of STRADEC or that they have allowed inspection of the same cannot be taken against them much less support a finding of probable cause against them.

The RTC further pointed out that, at most, the evidence on record only supports probable cause that the respondents were withholding the stock and transfer book of STRADEC. The RTC, however, opined that refusing to allow inspection of the stock and transfer book, as opposed to refusing examination of other corporate records, is not punishable as an offense under the Corporation Code. Hence, the directive of the RTC dismissing Criminal Case No. 89724.

The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the R TC remained steadfast.

Hence, this petition by petitioners.

The Instant Petition

In their petition, petitioners claim that Criminal Case No. 89724 may still be sustained against the respondents insofar as the charge of refusing to allow access to the stock and transfer book of STRADEC is concerned. They argue that the R TC made a legal blunder when it held that the refusal to allow inspection of the stock and transfer book of a corporation is not a punishable offense under the Corporation Code. Petitioners contend that such a refusal still amounts to a violation of Section 74 of the Corporation Code, for which Section 144 of the same code prescribes a penalty.


OUR RULING

The RTC indeed made an inaccurate pronouncement when it held that the act of refusing to allow inspection of the stock and transfer book of a corporation is not a punishable offense under the Corporation Code. Such refusal, when done in violation of Section 74(4) of the Corporation Code, properly falls within the purview of Section 144 of the same code and thus may be penalized as an offense.

The foregoing gaffe nonetheless, We still sustain the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 89724 as against the respondents.

A criminal action based on the violation of a stockholder's right to examine or inspect the corporate records and the stock and transfer book of a corporation under the second and fourth paragraphs of Section 74 of the Corporation Code-such as Criminal Case No. 89724--can only be maintained against corporate officers or any other persons acting on behalf of such corporation. The submissions of the petitioners during the preliminary investigation, however, clearly suggest that respondents are neither in relation to STRADEC.

Hence, we deny the petition.

The act of ref using to allow inspection of thestock and transfer book of a corporation,when done in violation of Section 74(4) ofthe Corporation Code, is punishable as anoffense under Section 144 of the same code.

We first address the inaccurate pronouncement of the RTC.

Section 74 is the provision of the Corporation Code that deals with the books a corporation is required to keep. It reads:

Section 74. Books to be kept; stock transfer agent. - Every corporation shall keep and carefully preserve at its principal office a record of all business transactions and minutes of all meetings of stockholders or members, or of the

board of directors or trustees, in which shall be set forth in detail the time and place of holding the meeting, how authorized, the notice given, whether the meeting was regular or special, if special its object, those present and absent, and every act done or ordered done at the meeting. Upon the demand of any director, trustee, stockholder or member, the time when any director, trustee, stockholder or member entered or left the meeting must be noted in the minutes; and on a similar demand, the yeas and nays must be taken on any motion or proposition, and a record thereof carefully made. The protest of any director, trustee, stockholder or member on any action or proposed action must be recorded in full on his demand.

The records of all business transactions of the corporation and the minutes of any meetings shall be open to inspection by any director, trustee, stockholder or member of the corporation at reasonable hours on business days and he may demand, in writing, for a copy of excerpts from said records or minutes, at his expense.

Any officer or agent of the corporation who shall refuse to allow any director, trustees, stockholder or member of the corporation to examine and copy excerpts from its records or minutes, in accordance with the provisions of this Code, shall be liable to such director, trustee, stockholder or member for damages, and in addition, shall be guilty of an offense which shall be punishable under Section 144 of this Code: Provided, That if such refusal is made pursuant to a resolution or order of the board of directors or trustees, the liability under this section for such action shall be imposed upon the directors or trustees who voted for such refusal: and Provided, further, That it shall be a defense to any action under this section that the person demanding to examine and copy excerpts from the corporation's records and minutes has improperly used any information secured through any prior examination of the records or minutes of such corporation or of any other corporation, or was not acting in good faith or for a legitimate purpose in making his demand.

Stock corporations must also keep a book to be known as the "stock and transfer book'', in which must be kept a record of all stocks in the names of the stockholders alphabetically arranged; the installments paid and unpaid on all stock for which subscription has been made, and the date of payment of any installment; a statement of every alienation, sale or transfer of stock made, the date thereof, and by and to whom made; and such other entries as the by-laws may prescribe. The stock and transfer book shall be kept in the principal office of the corporation or in the office of its stock transfer agent and shall be open for inspection by any director or stockholder of the corporation at reasonable hours on business days.

No stock transfer agent or one engaged principally in the business of registering transfers of stocks in behalf of a stock corporation shall be allowed to operate in the Philippines unless he secures a license from the Securities and Exchange Commission and pays a fee as may be fixed by the Commission, which shall be renewable annually: Provided, That a stock corporation is not precluded from performing or making transfer of its own stocks, in which case all the rules and regulations imposed on stock transfer agents, except the payment of a license fee herein provided, shall be applicable. (5 la and 32a; P.B. No. 268.) (Emphasis supplied)

Section 144 of the Corporation Code, on the other hand, is the general penal provision of the Corporation Code. It reads:

Section 144. Violations of the Code. - Violations of any of the provisions of this Code or its amendments not otherwise specifically penalized therein shall be punished by a fine of not less than one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos but not more than ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos or by imprisonment for not less than thirty (30) days but not more than five (5) years, or both, in the discretion of the court. If the violation is committed by a corporation, the same may, after notice and hearing, be dissolved in appropriate proceedings before the Securities and Exchange Commission: Provided, That such dissolution

shall not preclude the institution of appropriate action against the director, trustee or officer of the corporation responsible for said violation: Provided, further, That nothing in this section shall be construed to repeal the other causes for dissolution of a corporation provided in this Code. (190 112 a) (Emphasis supplied)

In the assailed Orders, the RTC expressed its opinion that the act of refusing to allow inspection of the stock and transfer book, even though it may be a violation of Section 74(4), is not punishable as an offense under the Corporation Code. In justifying this conclusion, the RTC seemingly relied on the fact that, under Section 7 4 of the Corporation Code, the application of Section 144 is expressly mentioned only in relation to the act of "refus[ing] to allow any director, trustees, stockholder or member of the corporation to examine and copy excerpts from [the corporation's] records or minutes" that excludes its stock and transfer book.

We do not agree.

While Section 74 of the Corporation Code expressly mentions the application of Section 144 only in relation to the act of "refus[ing] to allow any director, trustees, stockholder or member of the corporation to examine and copy excerpts from [the corporation's] records or minutes," the same does not mean that the latter section no longer applies to any other possible violations of the former section.

It must be emphasized that Section 144 already purports to penalize "[v]iolations" of "any provision" of the Corporation Code "not otherwise specifically penalized therein." Hence, we find inconsequential the fact that that Section 74 expressly mentions the application of Section 144 only to a specific act, but not with respect to the other possible violations of the former section.

Indeed, we find no cogent reason why Section 144 of the Corporation Code cannot be made to


apply to violations of the right of a stockholder to inspect the stock and transfer book of a corporation under Section 74(4) given the already unequivocal intent of the legislature to penalize violations of a parallel right, i.e., the right of a stockholder or member to examine the other records and minutes of a corporation under Section 74(2). Certainly, all the rights guaranteed to corporators under Section 7 4 of the Corporation Code are mandatory for the corporation to respect. All such rights are just the same underpinned by the same policy consideration of keeping public confidence in the corporate vehicle thru an assurance of transparency in the corporation's operations.

Verily, we find inaccurate the pronouncement of the RTC that the act of refusing to allow inspection of the stock and transfer book is not a punishable offense under the Corporation Code. Such refusal, when done in violation of Section 74(4) of the Corporation Code, properly falls within the purview of Section 144 of the same code and thus may be penalized as an offense.

A criminal action based on the violation of astockholder's right to examine or inspect thecorporate records and the stock and transferbook of a corporation under the second andfourth paragraphs of Section 74 of theCorporation Code can only be maintainedagainst corporate officers or any other personsacting on behalf of such corporation.

The foregoing notwithstanding, and independently of the reasons provided therefor by the RTC, we sustain the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 89724.

Criminal Case No. 89724 accuses respondents of denying petitioners' right to examine or inspect the corporate records and the stock and transfer book of STRADEC. It is thus a criminal action that is based on the violation of the second and fourth paragraphs of Section 7 4 of the Corporation Code.

A perusal of the second and fourth paragraphs of Section 74, as well as the first paragraph of the same section, reveal that they are provisions that obligates a corporation: they prescribe what books or records a corporation is required to keep; where the corporation shall keep them;

and what are the other obligations of the corporation to its stockholders or members in relation to such books and records.1âwphi1 Hence, by parity of reasoning, the second and fourth paragraphs of Section 74, including the first paragraph of the same section, can only be violated by a corporation.

It is clear then that a criminal action based on the violation of the second or fourth paragraphs of Section 74 can only be maintained against corporate officers or such other persons that are acting on behalf of the corporation. Violations of the second and fourth paragraphs of Section 74 contemplates a situation wherein a corporation, acting thru one of its officers or agents, denies the right of any of its stockholders to inspect the records, minutes and the stock and transfer book of such corporation.

The problem with the petitioners' complaint and the evidence that they submitted during preliminary investigation is that they do not establish that respondents were acting on behalf of STRADEC. Quite the contrary, the scenario painted by the complaint is that the respondents are merely outgoing officers of STRADEC who, for some reason, withheld and refused to turn-over the company records of STRADEC; that it is the petitioners who are actually acting on behalf of STRADEC; and that STRADEC is actually merely trying to recover custody of the withheld records.

In other words, petitioners are not actually invoking their right to inspect the records and the stock and transfer book of STRADEC under the second and fourth paragraphs of Section 74. What they seek to enforce is the proprietary right of STRADEC to be in possession of such records and book. Such right, though certainly legally

enforceable by other means, cannot be enforced by a criminal prosecution based on a violation of the second and fourth paragraphs of Section 74. That is simply not the situation contemplated by the second and fourth paragraphs of Section 74 of the Corporation Code.

For this reason, we affirm the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 89724 for lack of probable cause.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petlt10n is hereby DENIED. The Orders dated 4 June 2007 and 5 November 2007 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 154, of Pasig City in S.C.A. No. 3047, insofar as said orders effectively dismissed Criminal Case No. 89724 pending before Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 69, of Pasig City, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. NO. 142509 March 24, 2006

JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR. vs THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ATTY. JOSE J. PIERAZ

D E C I S I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Jose Alemania Buatis, Jr. (petitioner) seeking to set aside the Decision dated January 18, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 20988 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 167 of Pasig City, convicting him of the crime of libel. Also assailed is the appellate court’s Resolution dated March 13, 2000 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

The facts of the case, as summarized by the appellate court, are as follows:

On August 18, 1995, the wife of private-complainant Atty. Jose J. Pieraz (Atty. Pieraz),

retrieved a letter from their mailbox addressed to her husband. The letter was open, not contained in an envelope, and Atty. Pieraz’ wife put it on her husband’s desk. On that same day, Atty. Pieraz came upon the letter and made out its content. It reads:

DON HERMOGENES RODRIGUEZ Y REYES ESTATEOffice of the Asst. Court Administrator No. 1063 Kamias St., Bgy. Manggahan, Pasig City,Metro Manila

August 18, 1995

ATTY. JOSE J. PIERAZCounsel for Benjamin A. Monroy#8 Quirino St., Life Homes SubdivisionRosario , Pasig City, Metro Manila

Subject: Anent your letter dated August 18, 1995 addressed to one Mrs. Teresita Quingco

Atty. Pieraz:

This has reference to your lousy but inutile threatening letter dated August 18, 1995, addressed to our client; using carabao English.

May we remind you that any attempt on your part to continue harassing the person of Mrs. Teresita Quingco of No. 1582 Mngo St., Bgy. Manggahan, Pasig City, Metro Manila---undersigned much to his regrets shall be constrained/compelled to file the necessary complaint for disbarment against you.

You may proceed then with your stupidity and suffer the full consequence of the law. Needless for you to cite specific provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as the same is irrelevant to the present case. As a matter of fact, the same shall be used by no other than the person of Mrs. Quingco in filing administrative charge against you and all persons behind these nefarious activities.


Finally, it is a welcome opportunity for the undersigned to face you squarely in any courts of justice, so as we can prove "who is who" once and for all.

Trusting that you are properly inform (sic) regarding these matters, I remain.

Yours in Satan name;

(Signed)

JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR.Atty-in- Fact of the presentCourt Administrator of the entireIntestate Estate of Don Hermogenes

Rodriguez Y. Reyes.

Copy furnished:All concerned.

Not personally knowing who the sender was, Atty. Pieraz, nevertheless, responded and sent a communication by registered mail to said Buatis, Jr., accused-appellant. In reply, Buatis, Jr. dispatched a second letter dated August 24, 1995 to Atty. Pieraz.

Reacting to the insulting words used by Buatis, Jr., particularly: "Satan, senile, stupid, [E]nglish carabao," Atty. Pieraz filed a complaint for libel against accused-appellant. Subject letter and its contents came to the knowledge not only of his wife but of his children as well and they all chided him telling him: "Ginagawa ka lang gago dito."

Aside from the monetary expenses he incurred as a result of the filing of the instant case, Atty Pieraz’ frail health was likewise affected and aggravated by the letter of accused-appellant.

The defense forwarded by accused-appellant Buatis, Jr. was denial. According to him, it was at the behest of the president of the organization "Nagkakaisang Samahan Ng Mga Taga Manggahan" or NASATAMA, and of a member, Teresita Quingco, that he had dictated to one of

his secretaries, a comment to the letter of private-complainant in the second week of August 1995.

Initially during his testimony, Buatis, Jr. could not recall whether he had signed that letter-comment or if it was even addressed to Atty. Pieraz. Neither could he remember if he had made and sent another letter, this time dated August 24, 1995, to Atty. Pieraz. Confronted in court with the counter-affidavit which he filed before the Pasig City Prosecutor’s Office, however, Buatis, Jr. could not deny its contents, among which was his admission that indeed, he had sent subject letter of August 18 and the letter dated August 24, 1995 to Atty. Pieraz.

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision dated April 30, 1997 finding petitioner guilty of the crime of libel, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Jose Alemania Buatis, Jr. GUILTY of the crime of LIBEL defined in Art. 353 and penalized under Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day, as minimum, to Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Ten (10) Days, as maximum; to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P20,000.00, by way of compensatory damages; the amount of P10,000.00, as and for moral damages, and another amount ofP10,000.00, for exemplary damages; to suffer all accessory penalties provided for by law; and, to pay the costs. 5

The trial court ruled that: calling a lawyer "inutil", stupid and capable of using only carabao English, is intended not only for the consumption of respondent but similarly for others as a copy of the libelous letter was furnished all concerned; the letter was prejudicial to the good name of respondent and an affront to his standing as a lawyer, who, at the time the letter was addressed to him, was representing a client in whose favor he sent a demand letter to the person represented by petitioner; the letter is libelous per se since a

defect or vice imputed is plainly understood as set against the entire message sought to be conveyed; petitioner failed to reverse the presumption of malice from the defamatory imputation contained in the letter; the letter could have been couched in a civil and respectful manner, as the intention of petitioner was only to advice respondent that demand was not proper and legal but instead petitioner was seething with hate and contempt and even influenced by satanic intention.

The RTC also found that since the letter was made known or brought to the attention and notice of other persons other than the offended party, there was publication; and that the element of identity was also established since the letter was intended for respondent. It rejected petitioner’s stance that the libelous letter resulted from mistake or negligence since petitioner boldly admitted that he had to reply to respondent’s letter to Mrs. Quingco, it being his duty to do as the latter is a member of petitioner’s association.

The RTC found respondent entitled to recover compensatory damages as the immediate tendency of the defamatory imputation was to impair respondent’s reputation although no actual pecuniary loss has in fact resulted. It also awarded moral damages as well as exemplary damages since the publication of the libelous letter was made with special ill will, bad faith or in a reckless disregard for the rights of respondent.

Subsequently, petitioner appealed the RTC’s decision to the CA which, in a Decision dated January 18, 2000, affirmed in its entirety the decision of the trial court.

The CA found that the words used in the letter are uncalled for and defamatory in character as they impeached the good reputation of respondent as a lawyer and that it is malicious. It rejected petitioner’s claim that the letter is a privileged communication which would exculpate him from liability since he failed to

come up with a valid explanation as to why he had to resort to name calling and downgrading a lawyer to the extent of ridiculing him when he could have discharged his so called "duty" in a more toned down fashion. It found also that there was publication of the letter, thus, it cannot be classified as privileged.

The CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated March 13, 2000.

Hence the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner, raising the following issues:

A. CAN THERE BE MALICE IN FACT, AS ONE OF THE ELEMENTS OF LIBEL, ATTRIBUTED TO A RESPONDING URBAN POOR LEADER ACTING AS COUNSEL, DEFENDING A MEMBER OF AN ASSOCIATION UNDER THREAT OF EJECTMENT FROM HER DWELLING PLACE?

B. WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE ALLEGED LIBELOUS LETTER AS ONE OF THOSE FALLING UNDER THE PURVIEW OF PRIVILEGE (sic) COMMUNICATION?

C. WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT: THE PETITIONER CAN NOT BE MADE TO ACCEPT FULL RESPONSIBILITY THAT WHAT HE DID IS A CRIME?

The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment in behalf of the People and respondent filed his own Comment praying for the affirmance of the CA decision. As required by us, the parties submitted their respective memoranda.

The principal issue for resolution is whether or not petitioner is guilty of the crime of libel.

In his Memorandum, petitioner claims that: the CA failed to apply the ruling in People v. Velasco that "if the act/matter charged as libelous

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is only an incident in [an] act which has another objective, the crime is not libel;" when he made his reply to respondent’s letter to Mrs. Quingco making a demand for her to vacate the premises, his objective was to inform respondent that Mrs. Quingco is one of the recognized tenants of the Rodriguez estate which is claiming ownership over the area of Brgy. Manggahan, Pasig City, and petitioner is the attorney-in-fact of the administrator of the Rodriquez estate; communication in whatever language, either verbal or written of a lawyer under obligation to defend a client’s cause is but a privileged communication; the instant case is a qualified privileged communication which is lost only by proof of malice, however, respondent failed to present actual proof of malice; the existence of malice in fact may be shown by extrinsic evidence that petitioner bore a grudge against the offended party, or there was ill will or ill feeling between them which existed at the time of the publication of the defamatory imputation which were not at all indicated by respondent in his complaint; contrary to the findings of the CA, there was justifiable motive in sending such a letter which was to defend the vested interest of the estate and to abate any move of respondent to eject Mrs. Quingco.

Petitioner further argues that if the words used in the libelous letter-reply would be fully scrutinized, there is justification for the use of those words, to wit: "lousy but inutile threatening letter…using carabao English" was due to the fact that the demand letter was indeed a threatening letter as it does not serve its purpose as respondent’s client has no legal right over the property and respondent did not file the ejectment suit; that respondent is just making a mockery out of Mrs. Quingco, thus he is stupid; that the words "Yours in Satan name" is only a complementary greeting used in an ordinary communication letter, which is reflected to the sender but not to the person being communicated and which is just the reverse of saying "Yours in Christ".

We deny the petition.

Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.

For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable.

The last two elements have been duly established by the prosecution. There is publication in this case. In libel, publication means making the defamatory matter, after it is written, known to someone other than the person against whom it has been written.9 Petitioner’s subject letter-reply itself states that the same was copy furnished to all concerned. Also, petitioner had dictated the letter to his secretary. It is enough that the author of the libel complained of has communicated it to a third person. Furthermore, the letter, when found in the mailbox, was open, not contained in an envelope thus, open to public.

The victim of the libelous letter was identifiable as the subject letter-reply was addressed to respondent himself.

We shall then resolve the issues raised by petitioner as to whether the imputation is defamatory and malicious.

In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense.

For the purpose of determining the meaning of any publication alleged to be libelous, we laid down the rule inJimenez v. Reyes, to wit:

In Tawney vs. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co. (109 Minn., 341), the court had the following to say on this point: "In determining whether the specified matter is libelous per se, two rules of construction are conspicuously applicable: (1) That construction must be adopted which will give to the matter such a meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in which the public would naturally understand what was uttered. (2) The published matter alleged to be libelous must be construed as a whole."

In applying these rules to the language of an alleged libel, the court will disregard any subtle or ingenious explanation offered by the publisher on being called to account. The whole question being the effect the publication had upon the minds of the readers, and they not having been assisted by the offered explanation in reading the article, it comes too late to have the effect of removing the sting, if any there be, from the words used in the publication.

Gauging from the above–mentioned tests, the words used in the letter dated August 18, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent is defamatory. In using words such as "lousy", "inutile", "carabao English", "stupidity", and "satan", the letter, as it was written, casts aspersion on the character, integrity and reputation of respondent as a lawyer which exposed him to ridicule. No evidence aliunde need be adduced to prove it. As the CA said, these very words of petitioner have caused respondent to public ridicule as even his own family have told him: "Ginagawa ka lang gago dito."

Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 is defamatory; and, under the general rule laid down in Article 354, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. Thus, when the imputation is defamatory, the prosecution need not prove malice on the part of petitioner (malice in fact), for the law already presumes that petitioner’s imputation is malicious (malice in

law). A reading of petitioner’s subject letter-reply showed that he malevolently castigated respondent for writing such a demand letter to Mrs. Quingco. There was nothing in the said letter which showed petitioner’s good intention and justifiable motive for writing the same in order to overcome the legal inference of malice.

Petitioner, however, insists that his letter was a private communication made in the performance of his moral and social duty as the attorney-in-fact of the administrator of the Rodriguez estate where Mrs. Quingco is a recognized tenant and to whom respondent had written the demand letter to vacate, thus in the nature of a privileged communication and not libelous.

We are not persuaded.

Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 354. Requirement for publicity.─ Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

Clearly, the presumption of malice is done away with when the defamatory imputation is a qualified privileged communication.

In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified privileged communication under Article 354, No. 1, as claimed by petitioner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the

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communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice.

While it would appear that the letter was written by petitioner out of his social duty to a member of the association which he heads, and was written to respondent as a reply to the latter’s demand letter sent to a member, however, a reading of the subject letter-reply addressed to respondent does not show any explanation concerning the status of Mrs. Quingco and why she is entitled to the premises as against the claim of respondent’s client. The letter merely contained insulting words, i.e, "lousy" and "inutile letter using carabao English", "stupidity", and "satan", which are totally irrelevant to his defense of Mrs. Quingco’s right over the premises. The words as written had only the effect of maligning respondent’s integrity as a lawyer, a lawyer who had served as legal officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for so many years until his retirement and afterwards as consultant of the same agency and also a notary public. The letter was crafted in an injurious way than what is necessary in answering a demand letter which exposed respondent to public ridicule thus negating good faith and showing malicious intent on petitioner’s part.

Moreover, the law requires that for a defamatory imputation made out of a legal, moral or social duty to be privileged, such statement must be communicated only to the person or persons who have some interest or duty in the matter alleged, and who have the power to furnish the protection sought by the author of the statement. A written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged when it is published and circulated among the public. In this case, petitioner admitted that he dictated the letter to

one of her secretaries who typed the same and made a print out of the computer. While petitioner addressed the reply-letter to respondent, the same letter showed that it was copy furnished to all concerned. His lack of selectivity is indicative of malice and is anathema to his claim of privileged communication. Such publication had already created upon the minds of the readers a circumstance which brought discredit and shame to respondent’s reputation.

Since the letter is not a privileged communication, malice is presumed under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code. The presumption was not successfully rebutted by petitioner as discussed above.

Thus, we find that the CA did not commit any error in affirming the findings of the trial court that petitioner is guilty of the crime of libel.

An appeal in a criminal case throws the entire case for review and it becomes our duty to correct any error, as may be found in the appealed judgment, whether assigned as an error or not. We find that the award of P20,000.00 as compensatory damages should be deleted for lack of factual basis. To be entitled to actual and compensatory damages, there must be competent proof constituting evidence of the actual amount thereof. Respondent had not presented evidence in support thereof.

Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes libel by means of writings or similar means with prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party.

The courts are given the discretion to choose whether to impose a single penalty or conjunctive penalties; that is, whether to impose a penalty of fine, or a penalty of imprisonment only, or a penalty of both fine and imprisonment.

In Vaca v. Court of Appeals, where petitioners therein were convicted of B.P. 22 which provides for alternative penalties of fine or imprisonment or both fine and imprisonment, we deleted the prison sentence imposed upon petitioners and instead ordered them only to pay a fine equivalent to double the amount of the check. We held:

Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are Filipino entrepreneurs who presumably contribute to the national economy. Apparently, they brought this appeal, believing in all good faith, although mistakenly, that they had not committed a violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise, they could simply have accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade prison term. It would best serve the ends of criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within the range of discretion allowed by §1, par. 1, the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, namely, that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order.

In the subsequent case of Lim v. People, we did the same and deleted the penalty of imprisonment and merely imposed a fine for violation of B.P. 22, concluding that such would best serve the ends of criminal justice.

Adopting these cases, we issued Administrative Circular No. 12-2000. On February 14, 2001, we issued Administrative Circular 13-2001 which modified Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 by stressing that the clear tenor of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. 22.

While Vaca case is for violation of B.P. 22, we find the reasons behind the imposition of fine instead of imprisonment applicable to petitioner’s case of libel. We note that this is petitioner’s first offense of this nature. He never

knew respondent prior to the demand letter sent by the latter to Mrs. Quingco who then sought his assistance thereto. He appealed from the decision of the RTC and the CA in his belief that he was merely exercising a civil or moral duty in writing the letter to private complainant. In fact, petitioner could have applied for probation to evade prison term but he did not do so believing that he did not commit a crime thus, he appealed his case. We believe that the State is concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the social organization against the criminal acts of destructive individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and other social ends. Consequently, we delete the prison sentence imposed on petitioner and instead impose a fine of six thousand pesos.

This is not the first time that we removed the penalty of imprisonment and imposed a fine instead in the crime of libel. In Sazon v. Court of Appeals, petitioner was convicted of libel and was meted a penalty of imprisonment and fine; and upon a petition filed with us, we affirmed the findings of libel but changed the penalty imposed to a mere fine.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that, in lieu of imprisonment, the penalty to be imposed upon the petitioner shall be a fine of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The award of compensatory damages is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. P-13-3132 June 4, 2014(Formerly A.M. No. 12-3-54-RTC)

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs SARAH P. AMPONG

R E S O L U T I O N

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:


This administrative case arose from the letter dated March 15, 2011 of Executive Judge Jaime L. Infante (Judge Infante) of the Regional Trial Court of Alabel, Sarangani Province, "Branch 38. (RTC), addressed to complainant the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), inquiring about the employment status of respondent Sarah P. Ampong (Ampong), a Court Interpreter III of the said RTC since August 3, 1993. In the aforementioned letter, Judge Infante informed the OCA that despite Ampong's dismissal from service by the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which dismissal was affirmed by the Court, the RTC never received any official information or directive from the OCA on the matter. As such, Ampong remains employed in the RTC and has been continuously receiving all her monthly salary, benefits, allowances, and the like.

The Facts

Sometime in August 1994, the CSC instituted an administrative case against Ampong for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for having impersonated or taken the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers on behalf of one Evelyn B. Junio-Decir (Decir). On March 21, 1996, after Ampong herself admitted to having committed the charges against her, the CSC rendered a resolution dismissing her from service, imposing all accessory penalties attendant to such dismissal, and revoking her Professional Board Examination for Teachers (PBET) rating. Ampong moved for reconsideration on the ground that when the said administrative case was filed, she was already appointed to the judiciary; as such, she posited that the CSC no longer had any jurisdiction over her. Ampong’s motion was later denied, thus, prompting her to file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals (CA).

On November 30, 2004, the CA denied Ampong’s petition and affirmed her dismissal from service on the ground that she never raised

the issue of jurisdiction until after the CSC ruled against her and, thus, she is estopped from assailing the same. Similarly, on August 26, 2008, the Court En Banc denied her petition for review on certiorari and, thus, affirmed her dismissal from service in G.R. No. 167916, entitled "Sarah P. Ampong v. Civil Service Commission, CSC-Regional Office No. 11" (August 26, 2008 Decision).

Notwithstanding said Decision, the Financial Management Office (FMO) of the OCA, which did not receive any official directive regarding Ampong’s dismissal, continued to release her salaries and allowances. However, in view of Judge Infante’s letter notifying the OCA of such situation, the FMO issued a Memorandum7 dated September 7, 2011 informing the OCA that starting June 2011, it had started to withhold Ampong’s salaries and allowances.

In her Comment dated September 25, 2012, Ampong prayed that the Court revisit its ruling in G.R. No. 167916 despite its finality because it might lead to unwarranted complications in its enforcement. Moreover, Ampong reiterated her argument that the CSC did not have any jurisdiction over the case against her.

The Action and Recommendation of the OCA

In a Memorandum dated March 27, 2013,the OCA recommended that Ampong be found guilty of Dishonesty for impersonating and taking the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers in behalf of Decir and, thus, be dismissed from the service on the ground that she no longer possesses the appropriate eligibility required for her position, with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits except accrued leave credits and with perpetual disqualification from re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporation or government financial institution.

The OCA found that Ampong’s act of impersonating and taking the November 1991

Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers for and on behalf of another person indeed constitutes dishonesty, a grave offense which carries the corresponding penalty of dismissal from service. It added that the fact that the offense was not connected with her office or was committed prior to her appointment in the judiciary does not in any way exonerate her from administrative liability as an employee of the court.

Further, the OCA found that Ampong’s appointment as Court Interpreter III did not divest the CSC of its inherent power to discipline employees from all branches and agencies of the government in order to protect the integrity of the civil service. Consequently, the CSC could validly impose the administrative penalty of dismissal against her, which carries with it that of cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government service, unless otherwise provided. In this relation, the OCA emphasized that the CSC ruling effectively stripped Ampong of her civil service eligibility and, hence, could no longer hold the position of Court Interpreter III.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue raised for the Court’s resolution is whether or not Ampong had been dismissed from her employment as Court Interpreter III of the RTC.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court resolves the issue in the affirmative.

As the records show, in the August 26, 2008 Decision, the Court had already held Ampong administratively liable for dishonesty in impersonating and taking the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers on behalf of Decir, viz.:

The CSC found [Ampong] guilty of dishonesty. It is categorized as "an act which includes the procurement and/or use of fake/spurious civil

service eligibility, the giving of assistance to ensure the commission or procurement of the same, cheating, collusion, impersonation, or any other anomalous act which amounts to any violation of the Civil Service examination." [Ampong] impersonated Decir in the PBET exam, to ensure that the latter would obtain a passing mark. By intentionally practicing a deception to secure a passing mark, their acts undeniably involve dishonesty.

This Court has defined dishonesty as the "(d)isposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray." [Ampong’s] dishonest act as a civil servant renders her unfit to be a judicial employee. Indeed, We take note that [Ampong] should not have been appointed as a judicial employee had this Court been made aware of the cheating that she committed in the civil service examinations. Be that as it may, [Ampong’s] present status as a judicial employee is not a hindrance to her getting the penalty she deserves. (Emphases and underscoring supplied).

Notably, the Court also addressed Ampong’s misgivings on the issue of jurisdiction in the same case, viz.:

It is true that the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the civil service. As defined under the Constitution and the Administrative Code, the civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, and government-owned or controlled corporations. Pursuant to its administrative authority, the CSC is granted the power to "control, supervise, and coordinate the Civil Service examinations." This authority grants to the CSC the right to take cognizance of any irregularity or anomaly connected with the examinations.

However, the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is given exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and judicial

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personnel. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. It may take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. Thus, this Court ruled that the Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of a judge on the powers granted to it by the Constitution. It violates the specific mandate of the Constitution granting to the Supreme Court supervisory powers over all courts and their personnel; it undermines the independence of the judiciary.

In Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana, this Court held that impersonating an examinee of a civil service examination is an act of dishonesty. But because the offender involved a judicial employee under the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court, the CSC filed the necessary charges before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), a procedure which this Court validated.

A similar fate befell judicial personnel in Bartolata v. Julaton, involving judicial employees who also impersonated civil service examinees.1âwphi1 As in Sta. Ana, the CSC likewise filed the necessary charges before the OCA because respondents were judicial employees. Finding respondents guilty of dishonesty and meting the penalty of dismissal, this Court held that "respondents’ machinations reflect their dishonesty and lack of integrity, rendering them unfit to maintain their positions as public servants and employees of the judiciary."

Compared to Sta. Anaand Bartolata, the present case involves a similar violation of the Civil Service Law by a judicial employee. But this case is slightly different in that petitioner committed the offense before her appointment to the judicial branch. At the time of commission, petitioner was a public school teacher under the administrative supervision of the DECS and, in

taking the civil service examinations, under the CSC. Petitioner surreptitiously took the CSC-supervised PBET exam in place of another person. When she did that, she became a party to cheating or dishonesty in a civil service-supervised examination.

That she committed the dishonest act before she joined the RTC does not take her case out of the administrative reach of the Supreme Court.

The bottom line is administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the Supreme Court, regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after employment in the judiciary. (Emphases in the original; citations omitted)

Pursuant to the doctrine of immutability of judgment, which states that "a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law," Ampong could no longer seek the August 26, 2008 Decision’s modification and reversal. Consequently, the penalty of dismissal from service on account of Ampong’s Dishonesty should be enforced in its full course. In line with Section 58(a) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS), the penalty of dismissal carries with it the following administrative disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of retirement benefits; and (c) perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporation or government financial institution. Ampong should be made to similarly suffer the same.

To clarify, however, despite Ampong’s dismissal on the ground of dishonesty, she should nevertheless been titled to receive her accrued leave credits, if any, pursuant to the aforementioned provision of the URACCS, which does not include the forfeiture of the same.

It is a standing rule that despite their dismissal from the service, government employees are entitled to the leave credits that they have earned during the period of their employment. As a matter of fairness and law, they may not be deprived of such remuneration, which they have earned prior to their dismissal.

It must be stressed that every employee of the Judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness, and honesty. Like any public servant, she must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of her official duties but also in her personal and private dealings with other people, to preserve the court’s good name and standing. The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court personnel have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice. Here, Ampong failed to meet these stringent standards set for a judicial employee and does not, therefore, deserve to remain with the Judiciary.

WHEREFORE, the Court SUSTAINS the dismissal of respondent Sarah P. Ampong, Court Interpreter III of the Regional Trial Court of Alabel, Sarangani Province, Branch 38, on the ground of Dishonesty. Accordingly, her retirement and other benefits are forfeited except accrued leave credits, and she is perpetually disqualified from re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporation or government financial institution, effective immediately.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9317 June 4, 2014(Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3615)

ADELIA V. QUIACHON vs. ATTY. JOSEPH ADORA. RAMOS

R E S O L U T I O N

SERENO, CJ:

This is a disbarment case filed by Adelia V. Quiachon (complainant), against her lawyer, Atty. Joseph Ador A. Ramos (respondent). The latter represented complainant, who was then the plaintiff in a labor case filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and in a special proceeding case filed before the Regional Trial Court (R TC). Complainant charges respondent with gross negligence and deceit in violation of Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Labor Arbiter (LA) granted complainant a favorable decision on 26 November 2007. Upon appeal, it was reversed and set aside by the NLRC in its Decision dated 25 July 2008. On 24 October 2008, the NLRC also denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent on complainant's behalf. A Petition for Certiorari was filed before the Court of Appeals (CA), but it affirmed the NLRC's reversal of the LA's Decision. The Notice of the CA Decision was received by respondent on 23 November 2010.

After the Petition was filed before the CA, complainant would always ask respondent about the status of her case. The latter always told her that there was no decision yet.

Sometime in August 2011, while complainant was in respondent’s office waiting for him to arrive, she noticed a mailman delivering an envelope with the title of her labor case printed thereon.

Complainant asked the secretary of respondent to open the envelope and was surprised to discover that it contained the Entry of Judgment of the CA’s Decision. Thereafter, complainant tried repeatedly to contact respondent, but to no avail. When she finally got to talk to him, respondent assured her that "it was alright" as they still had six months to appeal the case to the Supreme Court. After that final meeting, no updates on the


labor case were ever communicated to complainant.

With respect to the special proceeding case, the RTC of Roxas City dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed, but it was also denied. Once again, respondent did nothing to reverse the RTC Decision. Consequently, the Entry of Judgment was received on 28 October 2008.

On 28 November 2011, complainant filed the instant disbarment Complaint against respondent.

In his Comment, respondent averred that complainant was informed of the status of the case. He claimed that he had told complainant that he "cannot cite any error of law or abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals’ decision that necessitates a Petition for Review with the Supreme Court;" thus, he supposedly advised her to "respect the decision of the Court of Appeals." Respondent prayed that a Decision be rendered dismissing the instant disbarment Complaint for lack of merit.

In a Resolution dated 13 June 2012, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.

During the pendency of the proceedings, specifically on 5 February 2013, complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint.

In his Report and Recommendation dated 23 April 2013, IBP Commissioner Hector B. Almeyda (Almeyda) declared:

True enough, it seems clear that respondent had been remiss in failing to update complainant in what had happened to the cases being handled by respondent in behalf of complainant. There was a failure to inform complainant (the client) of the status of the cases that thereafter prevented the client from exercising her options. There was neglect in that regard.

However, in spite of finding neglect on respondent’s part, he recommended the dismissal of the case against him, stating that "with the decision to withdraw the complaint, there does not appear basis to go ahead with the proceedings since without the complaint, there will be no basis to make any finding of liability."

On 11 May 2013, a Resolution was passed by the Board of Governors of the IBP resolving to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of investigation commissioner Almeyda. The case against respondent was dismissed with a warning that a repetition of the same act shall be dealt with more severely.

This Court finds this to be an opportune time to remind the investigating commissioners and the members of the Board of Governors of the IBP that the withdrawal of a disbarment case against a lawyer does not terminate or abate the jurisdiction of the IBP and of this Court to continue an administrative proceeding against a lawyer-respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar.

In the present case, Almeyda recommended the dismissal of the case against respondent, even after finding that the latter had been negligent. On the basis of this finding, the latter was declared to have "been remiss in failing to update complainant in what had happened to the cases being handled by him in behalf of complainant." Still, Almeyda recommended the dismissal of the case, because "without the complaint, there will be no basis to make any finding of liability."

The Board of Governors of the IBP affirmed the recommendation.

The IBP Board of Governors should not have supported Almeyda’s stance.

The complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the case, but a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court. There is neither a plaintiff nor a

prosecutor in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers. The real question for determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges of a member of the bar. Public interest is the primary objective. We explained why in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos, viz.:

The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven x x x. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges x x x.

In this case, the IBP found that respondent violated Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.1âwphi1 Thus, it should have imposed the appropriate penalty despite the desistance of complainant or the withdrawal of the charges.

The failure of respondent to file an appeal from the CA Decision without any justifiable reason deserves sanction. Lawyers who disagree with the pursuit of an appeal should properly withdraw their appearance and allow their client to retain another counsel.

In Abay v. Montesino, the respondent-lawyer and his client disagreed on the legal course to be taken regarding the appealed case. The lawyer therein strongly advised the client to abandon the appeal and to consider the other available remedies. The client, on the other hand, wanted

to pursue it. Without obtaining the assent of his client, the respondent-lawyer deemed it wise to abandon the appeal without informing the former. In finding the respondent-lawyer guilty of negligence, the Court explained:

Not filing an appellant's brief is prejudicial because, as happened in this case, such failure could result in the dismissal of the appeal. The conduct of respondent shows that he failed to exercise due diligence, and that he had a cavalier attitude towards the cause of his client. The abandonment by the former of the latter's cause made him unworthy of the trust that his client reposed in him. Even if respondent was "honestly and sincerely" protecting the interests of complainant, the former still had no right to waive the appeal without the latter's knowledge and consent. If indeed respondent felt unable or unwilling to continue his retainership, he should have properly withdrawn his appearance and allowed the client to appoint another lawyer.

In the present case, respondent failed not only to keep the client informed of the status of the case, but also to avail of the proper legal remedy that would promote the client's cause. It is clear that respondent neglected the case entrusted to him.

All lawyers owe fidelity to their client's cause. Regardless of their personal views, they must present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law in support of that cause.

Whenever lawyers take on their clients' cause/s, they covenant that they will exercise due diligence in protecting the client's rights; their failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes them unworthy of the trust reposed in them by their client/s and make them answerable to the client, the courts and society.

In Pilapil v. Carillo, this Court upheld the recommendation of the IBP to suspend a lawyer from the practice of law for six months after finding that he had failed to file a petition for certiorari of the adverse decision rendered in the


case of his client despite the latter's repeated follow-ups.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Joseph Ador A. Ramos is found GUILTY of negligence and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months, effective upon receipt of this Decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be served on the IBP as well as on the court administrator, who is directed to circulate these copies to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9881 June 4, 2014(Formerly CBD 10-2607)

ATTY. ALAN F. PAGUIA vs. ATTY. MANUEL T. MOLINA

R E S O L U T I O N

SERENO, CJ:

For resolution by this Court is the dismissal by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors of the administrative Complaint for DISHONESTY against respondent, Atty. Manuel Molina. Atty. Molina allegedly advised his clients to enforce a contract on the complainant's client who had never been a party to the agreement.

The facts are as follows:

The case involves a conflict between neighbors in a four-unit compound named "Times Square" at Times Street, Quezon City. The neighbors are the following: 1) Mr. And Mrs. Gregorio M. Abreu, clients of Atty. Paguia; 2) Mr. And Mrs. Wilson Lim, clients of respondent Molina; 3) Dr.

and Mrs. Eduardo Yap; and Dr. Belinda San Juan.

The clients of Atty. Molina entered into a contract with the other unit owners save for Mr. Abreu. The agreement, covered by a document titled "Times Square Preamble," establishes a set of internal rules for the neighbors on matters such as the use of the common right of way to the exit gate, assignment of parking areas, and security. Mr. Abreu, the client of complainant, Atty. Paguia, was not a party to the contract since the former did not agree with the terms concerning the parking arrangements.

On 4 February 2010, Atty. Paguia filed a Complaint for Dishonesty1 with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline against Atty. Molina for allegedly giving legal advice to the latter’s clients to the effect that the Times Square Preamble was binding on Mr. Abreu, who was never a party to the contract.

In his Answer, Atty. Molina downplayed the case as a petty quarrel among neighbors. He maintained that the Times Square Preamble was entered into for purposes of maintaining order in the residential compound. All homeowners, except Mr. Abreu, signed the document.

Respondent further stated in his Answer that Mr. and Mrs. Gregorio Abreu filed two cases against his clients, Mr. And Mrs. William Lim, on the belief that Mr. Abreu was not bound by the Times Square Preamble. The first case, was filed with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), which was an action to declare the Times Square Preamble invalid. The second suit was an action for declaratory relief. Both cases, according to respondent, were dismissed.

Respondent further claimed that another case had been filed in court, this time by his client, the Lims. They were prompted to file a suit since Mr. Abreu had allegedly taken matters into his own hands by placing two vehicles directly in front of the gate of the Lims, thus blocking the latter’s egress to Times Street. The Lims filed

with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, a Complaint for Injunction and Damages, coupled with a prayer for the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-08-63579. According to respondent, the RTC granted the relief prayed for in an Order dated 12 December 2008.

Atty. Molina concluded that the above facts sufficiently served as his answer to the Complaint.

On 3 August 2010, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez rendered a Report and Recommendation. He recommended dismissal for lack of merit, based on the following grounds: 1) the complaint consisted only of bare allegations; and 2) even assuming that respondent Molina gave an erroneous legal advice, he could not be held accountable in the absence of proof of malice or bad faith.

On 14 May 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XIX-2011-210, adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Atty. Paguia filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 2 August 2011, but was denied by the IBP Board of Governors on 29 December 2012. Notices of the denial were received by the parties on 21 March 2013.

No petition for review has been filed with this Court.

It is worth noting that a case is deemed terminated if the complainant does not file a petition with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board’s resolution. This rule is derived from Section 12(c) of Rule 139-B, which states:

(c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a

decision exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the complainant or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board’s resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise. (Underscoring supplied)

In this case, Atty. Paguia received notice of the Board’s resolution on 21 March 2013, as evidenced by a registry return receipt. To this date, this Court has yet to receive a petition for review from Atty. Paguia. Thus, for his failure to file a petition for review with the Court within 15 days, this case is deemed terminated pursuant to the above mentioned Section 12(c).

Nevertheless, we have gone over the records but we have no reason to deviate from the findings of the IBP Board of Governors.

When it comes to administrative cases against lawyers, two things are to be considered: quantum of proof, which requires clearly preponderant evidence; and burden of proof, which is on the complainant.

In the present case, we find that the Complaint is without factual basis. Complainant Atty. Paguia charges Atty. Molina with providing legal advice to the latter’s clients to the effect that the Times Square Preamble is binding on complainant’s client, Mr. Abreu, who was not a signatory to the agreement. The allegation of giving legal advice, however, was not substantiated in this case, either in the complaint or in the corresponding hearings. Nowhere do the records state that Atty. Paguia saw respondent giving the legal advice to the clients of the latter. Bare allegations are not proof.

Even if we assume that Atty. Molina did provide his clients legal advice, he still cannot be held administratively liable without any showing that his act was attended with bad faith or malice. The rule on mistakes committed by lawyers in the exercise of their profession is as follows:

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/jun2014/ac_9881_2014.html#fnt1


An attorney-at-law is not expected to know all the law. For an honest mistake or error, an attorney is not liable. Chief Justice Abbott said that, no attorney is bound to know all the law; God forbid that it should be imagined that an attorney or a counsel, or even a judge, is bound to know all the law. x x x.

The default rule is presumption of good faith. On the other hand, bad faith is never presumed.1âwphi1 It is a conclusion to be drawn from facts. Its determination is thus a question of fact and is evidentiary. There is no evidence, though, to show that the legal advice, assuming it was indeed given, was coupled with bad faith, malice, or ill-will. The presumption of good faith, therefore, stands in this case.

The foregoing considered, complainant failed to prove his case by clear preponderance of evidence.

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors adopting and approving the Decision of the Investigating Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) vs. ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO

CRUZ, J.:

The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again.

The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that-

h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.

The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.

But first the facts.

The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times. When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test.

In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection.

After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the challenged order invalid and granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.

We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be reversed.

In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano declared for a unanimous Court:

Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the

NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the pratice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements-i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school-for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current state of our social and economic development, are widely known.

We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality

of medical education in the country." Given the widespread use today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably, in other countries with far more developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.

However, the respondent judge agreed with the petitioner that the said case was not applicable. Her reason was that it upheld only the requirement for the admission test and said nothing about the so-called "three-flunk rule."

We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the case at bar. The issue raised in both cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged at least initially by the admission test and, indeed with more reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the former in the regulation of the medical profession.

There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.


The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.

The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.

While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.

A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one who wants to be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised and adviced. Of course, he may not be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand he may not force his entry into the bar. By the same token, a student who has demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to take a course in nursing, however appropriate this career may be for others.

The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.

The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared. Where even those who have qualified may still not be accommodated in our already crowded medical schools, there is all the more reason to bar those who, like him, have been tested and found wanting.

The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-taken. A law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.

There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between medical students and other students who are not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly affects the very lives of the people, unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation. The accountant, for example, while belonging to an equally respectable profession, does not hold the same delicate responsibility as that of the physician and so need not be similarly treated.

There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal protection requires is equality among equals.

The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The private respondent has failed the NMAT five times. While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love.

No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed that a person who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The only inference is that he is a probably better, not for the medical profession,

but for another calling that has not excited his interest.

In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is more likely to succeed and may even be outstanding. It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education for the full harnessing of his potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be a brilliant future.

We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never have left the farm and engineers who should have studied banking and teachers who could be better as merchants.

It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated January 13, 1989, is REVERSED, with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.

A.M. No. P-13-3123 June 10, 2014

ALBERTO VALDEZ, Complainant, vs.DESIDERIO W. MACUSI, JR., Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Tabuk, Kalinga, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM:

This administrative matter refers to the failure of respondent Desiderio W. Macusi, Jr., Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25, to act on a writ of execution issued by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Tabuk, Kalinga on 3 December 2003 in Criminal

Case No. 4050, entitled "People v. Jorge Macusi y Wayet," for reckless imprudence and negligence resulting in homicide. Sheriff Macusi was charged with misfeasance, nonfeasance or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

In a letter-complaint dated 12 May 2009 sent to Judge Victor Dalanao (Judge Dalanao), presiding judge of the MTCC of Tabuk, Kalinga, complainant Alberto Valdez (Valdez) alleged that Sheriff Macusi failed to act on the writ of execution issued by the MTCC in violation of Section 14, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

In his Comment dated 14 July 2009, Sheriff Macusi stated that he was appointed as Sheriff IV in the Province of Kalinga on 24 May 2004. Sheriff Macusi explained that in a Report dated 6 January 2004, his predecessor, Francisco C. Mabazza, served on accused Jorge Macusi the writ of execution issued by the MTCC on 5 December 2003. However, the accused replied that he had no money to pay for the execution. Thus, the notation in the writ of execution was "unsatisfactory (sic) served. "Thereafter, Sheriff Macusi stated that he tried to serve the order again by entering the residence of defendant looking for personal properties that could be confiscated on account of the writ but to no avail. Sheriff Macusi then asked accused to voluntarily comply with his legal obligation but found out that accused had suffered a stroke and could no longer fend for himself and his family and resorted to accepting charity from his sister.

In a Partial Report dated 3 May 2006, Sheriff Macusi filed a return of the writ of execution stating that it was still unserved. The relevant portions of the Report state:

1. That the accused because of the incident suffered a stroke and therefrom could no longer find a livelihood for himself and his children and as stated in the order of the Honorable Court is now living on the charity of his sister. His sister is also tending to the needs of their mother who


also suffered the same fate because of illness that befell her son;

x x x x

3. That the court battle begun armed with the hope that the accused was never given his day in court (in fact an ocular inspection was done to determine the seriousness of the illness of the accused and at that time he could hardly speak and walk yet the court continued hearing his case; thus, his right to be present in all the stages of the court proceedings of his case was denied) will be imprisoned should the decision of the Hon. Court will (sic) be against him;

x x x x

Sheriff Macusi averred that he could not be held liable for misfeasance, nonfeasance or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service since he carried out all the possible legal remedies on execution and satisfaction of judgment under the rules.

On 19 June 2006, Judge Dalanao issued an Order stating that the Partial Report dated 3 May 2006 of Sheriff Macusi was an improper and inadequate report as required under the Rules. The relevant portions of the Order state:

It appears therefrom that the said report is not the report contemplated by law, which should be submitted monthly to the Court (Section 14, Rule 39, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).

Instead, the Sheriff appears to be lawyering for accused, even going to the extent of accusing the Court of having denied the accused his day in Court. Certainly, this comment, from a responsible officer of the Court is unwarranted or without any justification at all. Not only that, it will certainly diminish the good image of the Court, and worst, tarnish the faith and confidence of the litigants in our judicial processes.

The Court just came to know that the accused in this case is the brother of Sheriff Desiderio

Macusi. The least that he should have done was to inhibit himself from handling this case.

Furnish a copy of this Order to the Executive Judge for his information and/or appropriate action without prejudice for this Court to take measures appropriate under the premises, where warranted.

SO ORDERED.

Valdez, in the letter-complaint, added that Sheriff Macusi did not submit another report to the court since the time the MTCC issued the Order dated 19 June 2006. Acting on the letter-complaint, Judge Dalanao issued an Order dated 13 May 2009 endorsing the letter-complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action.

In a Report dated 1 June 2010,the OCA recommended that the administrative complaint be referred to the Executive Judge of the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk City, Kalinga, Branch 25, for investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days from receipt of notice. In a Resolution dated 28 July 2010, this Court adopted the recommendation of the OCA and referred the matter to Executive Judge Marcelino K. Wacas (Judge Wacas).

In an Investigation Report dated 20 April 2012, Judge Wacas found no substantial evidence to hold Sheriff Macusi for the offense charged and recommended the dismissal of the complaint. In a Resolution dated 4 July 2012, this Court referred the Investigation Report to the OCA.

In its Report dated 23 April 2013, the OCA disagreed with the recommendation of Judge Wacas and found Sheriff Macusi liable for (1) simple neglect of duty for his failure to submit the proper returns, and (2) violation of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel for his failure to disclose that the accused in "People v. Jorge Macusi y Wayet"is his brother. The OCA recommended that Sheriff Macusi be suspended

from office for two months without pay. The recommendation of the OCA states:

1. The instant administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;

2. Desiderio W. Macusi, Jr., Sheriff IV, Branch 25, Regional Trial Court, Tabuk, Kalinga, be held LIABLE for Simple Neglect of Duty and Violation of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel; and

3. Sheriff Macusi be SUSPENDED from office for two (2) months without pay, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

We adopt the findings of the OCA but modify its recommendation on the penalty.

Section 14, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

Section 14. Return of writ of execution. — The writ of execution shall be returnable to the court issuing it immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall report to the court and state the reason therefor. Such writ shall continue in effect during the period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to the court every thirty (30) days on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires. The returns or periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the proceedings taken, and shall be filed with the court and copies thereof promptly furnished the parties.

The 30-day period imposed for the execution of the writ after the judgment has been received by the sheriff, as well as the periodic report every 30 days, is mandatory under the rule. In Aquino v. Martin, we held that it is mandatory for the sheriff to execute the judgment and make a return on the writ of execution within the period provided by the Rules of Court. Also, the sheriff

must make periodic reports on partially satisfied or unsatisfied writs in accordance with the rule in order that the court and the litigants are apprised of the proceedings undertaken. Such periodic reporting on the status of the writs must be done by the sheriff regularly and consistently every 30 days until they are returned fully satisfied.

In the present case, the records show that Sheriff Macusi submitted only one return of writ of execution in his Partial Report dated 3 May 2006 and did not file any other report to the court. Sheriff Macusi failed to implement the court order and failed to submit periodic reports of the actions he had taken on the writ "every 30 days until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires," as required by the Rules. In Dilan v. Dulfo, we held that sheriffs play an important part in the administration of justice because they are tasked to execute the final judgment of courts. If not enforced, such decisions are empty victories on the part of the prevailing parties. Clearly, Sheriff Macusi was remiss in his duties and is thus liable for simple neglect of duty.

Simple neglect of duty is the failure to give attention to a task, or the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or indifference. Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense punishable with suspension of one month and one day to six months for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense.

Further, aside from Sheriff Macusi’s long delay in the enforcement of the writ, it has also been verified by the OCA that Sheriff Macusi is the brother of the accused Jorge Macusi in Criminal Case No. 4050. Section 1(a)(i) of Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel provides:

Section 1. Court personnel shall avoid conflicts of interest in performing official duties.1âwphi1 Every court personnel is required to exercise utmost diligence in being aware of conflicts of interest, disclosing conflicts of


interest to the designated authority, and terminating them as they arise.

(a) A conflict of interest exists when:

(i) The court personnel’s objective ability or independence of judgment in performing official duties is impaired or may reasonably appear to be impaired; x x x

As an officer of the court, Sheriff Macusi should have informed the court and inhibited himself from enforcing the writ knowing fully well that there is a conflict of interest since the accused is his brother. It is incumbent upon him, as an agent of the law, to adhere to high ethical standards in order to preserve the good name and standing of the court. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Sheriff IV Cabe, we emphasized the heavy burden and responsibility which court personnel bear in view of their exalted positions as keepers of public faith. They must be constantly reminded that any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must be avoided. We agree with the OCA that Sheriff Macusi violated the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel for his failure to disclose that the accused in "People v. Jorge Macusi y Wayet"is his brother. The Rules classify this violation of existing Civil Service Law and rules a serious offense punishable with suspension of one month and one day to six months for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense.

We disagree with the penalty of suspension for two months without pay as recommended by the OCA. This is the second time that Sheriff Macusi was found guilty of simple neglect of duty. In the 2013 case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Macusi, Jr., this Court found Sheriff Macusi liable for simple neglect of duty for his "failure to file periodic reports on the Writ of Execution dated 10 September 2008 in Civil Case No. 429-06, as well as on the writs of execution in the other cases in Judge Dalanao’s inventory." However, instead of imposing on him the penalty of suspension from service in accordance with

the Rules, the Court imposed on him the penalty of fine ofP4,000 since he was deemed resigned from government service after filing his certificate of candidacy for the 2010 local elections.

Here, respondent is found guilty of committing two offenses: (1) simple neglect of duty (second offense), and (2) violation of civil service law and rules of a serious nature (first offense). Thus, the penalty for the more serious offense must be imposed. This is expressly laid down under Section 55, Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service which states:

Section 55. Penalty for the Most Serious Offense. If the respondent is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge or count and the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances.

In view of the circumstances, the penalty that should be imposed is dismissal from the government service. However, considering that Sheriff Macusi was deemed resigned after filing his certificate of candidacy making the penalty of dismissal no longer feasible, we impose on him the penalty of forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government owned and controlled corporations, since he had been previously warned that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Desiderio W. Macusi, Jr., Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court of Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25, GUILTY of SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY and VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR COURT PERSONNEL and impose on him the penalty of forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-14-1841 June 2, 2014(Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-2388-MTJ)

GERSHON N. DULANG vs. JUDGE MARY JOCYLEN G. REGENCIA

R E S O L U T I O N

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is an administrative case for gross inefficiency, gross ignorance of the. law, gross incompetence, serious misconduct, and serious dereliction of duty against respondent Judge Mary Jocylen G. Regencia (Judge Regencia) of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Asturias-Balamban, Cebu (MCTC), commenced thru a Verified Complaint dated May 28, 2011 filed by complainant Gershon N. Dulang (Dulang) before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).

The Facts

The instant case stemmed from an ejectment complaint with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 212-B, entitled "Spouses Gershon Dulang and Luzviminda Dulang, represented by Reynaldo Moldez v. Emmanuel Flores," which was filed before the MCTC on Februrary 2, 2000 (ejectment case).

In the Verified Complaint, Dulang alleged that on May 4, 2009, he moved for the resolution of the above-mentioned ejectment case, given that the same had been filed as early as year 2000 and had already been submitted for resolution. Notwithstanding the summary nature of the ejectment proceedings, Judge Regencia rendered a Judgment dismissing the ejectment case only on February 18, 2011(February 18, 2011 Judgment), or more than 11 years since its filing. Consequently, the Notice of Judgment was issued only on March 7, 2011 and mailed on March 15, 2011.

Dulang likewise noted that Judge Regencia was previously found administratively liable for gross inefficiency in Tam v. Judge Regencia and was thereby ordered to pay a fine of 5,000.00 and warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

On September 1, 2011, Dulang filed a Verified Supplemental Complaint to the Verified Complaint dated May 28, 2011 (supplemental complaint) before the OCA, alleging that despite the filing of a notice of appeal from Judge Regencia’s February 18, 2011 Judgment, the latter nevertheless issued an Order dated August 1, 2011 (August 1, 2011 Order) directing the postmaster and postal carrier of the Cebu Central Post Office, Cebu City to certify Dulang’s receipt of a copy of the said Judgment. In this regard, Dulang accused Judge Regencia ofgross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence, serious misconduct, and serious dereliction of duty, contending that by filing his appeal, the latter was already stripped of her (Judge Regencia) jurisdiction over the case and should not have issued the said order. Dulang claimed that this effectively stalled the administration of justice, much to his prejudice.

In her Comments (to the Verified Complaint) dated August 7, 2011, Judge Regencia maintained that no trial was held in Civil Case No. 212-B as the parties merely filed their respective position papers and that she could have easily resolved the said case if not for another case pending before the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Branch 59 (Toledo City RTC), i.e., Civil Case No. T-862, entitled "Spouses Emmanuel Flores and Daisy Flores v. Spouses Jose G. Paulin and Eleodora Ganhinhin, et al.," which was closely intertwined with the former.

As such, she found it prudent to defer the resolution of Civil Case No. 212-B until Civil Case No. T-862 was decided. She also averred that she should not be faulted for the long delay in resolving the ejectment case as she assumed her post as MCTC judge only in November 2002


and, thereafter, began presiding over the same starting on November 15, 2007.

In opposition to the accusations contained in the supplemental complaint, Judge Regencia commented that she issued the August 1, 2011 Order because the defendant in the ejectment case, Emmanuel Flores (Flores), opposed Dulang’s notice of appeal. She explained that this order was merely intended to determine whether or not Dulang filed his appeal within the reglementary period.

Pursuant to the Court’s Resolution dated July 30, 2012, the administrative case was referred to the Executive Judge of the Toledo City RTC for investigation, report, and recommendation. Consequently, in his Report and Recommendation dated December 20, 2012, Executive Judge Hermes B. Montero (Judge Montero) found Judge Regencia administratively liable for gross inefficiency, gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence, serious misconduct, and serious dereliction of duty in handling the ejectment case, and thereby recommended that she be dismissed from service. Judge Montero opined that Judge Regencia failed to observe the Rules on Summary Procedure as she did not resolve said case with dispatch; despite the case having been submitted for resolution on October 17, 2008, she only rendered judgment on February18, 2011, or after more than 11 years since the case was filed. Judge Montero also pointed out that contrary to Judge Regencia’s contentions, there was no suspension of the proceedings that was agreed upon by the parties and that no prejudicial question ever existed to warrant a discontinuance of the same.

Meanwhile, Judge Regencia filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Resolution dated July 30, 2012 referring her administrative case to Judge Montero for investigation, report, and recommendation. She argued that Judge Montero cannot be expected to make an impartial investigation of her case as he is the "compadre" of Dulang’s lawyer and that he had constantly shown a hostile attitude towards her. Judge

Regencia also sent two (2) letters, both dated April 10, 2013, informing the Court that Dulang was reportedly killed and that she had verified this information with Flores. In view of Dulang’s death, Judge Regencia prayed that the administrative case against her be dismissed.

The Action and Recommendation of the OCA

In a Memorandum dated November 22, 2013, the OCA recommended that Judge Regencia be held administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision, and thereby fined her in the amount of 20,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. It agreed with the findings of Judge Montero that there is no justifiable excuse for Judge Regencia not to render judgment in the ejectment case within the 30-day reglementary period mandated by the Rules on Summary Procedure. In this relation, the OCA brushed aside Judge Regencia’s charge of partiality against Judge Montero for lack of factual support and equally disregarded the fact of Dulang’s death, holding that such circumstance does not automatically result in the dismissal of his administrative complaint.24

However, the OCA no longer determined Judge Regencia’s administrative liability with respect to the charges of gross inefficiency, gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence, serious misconduct, and serious dereliction of duty. Hence, in due deference to her right to be afforded due process, said charges shall no longer be tackled herein.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue raised for the Court’s resolution is whether or not Judge Regencia may be held administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court agrees with the findings and conclusions of the OCA, with the modification,

however, as to the penalty imposed on Judge Regencia.

Prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of judges. If judges do not possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable to the prejudice of the litigants. Accordingly, judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of their obligation to administer justice promptly. This is embodied in Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which states that "[a] judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods" and echoed in Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which provides that "[j]udges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness."

Here, it is undisputed that Civil Case No. 212-B was already submitted for resolution on October 17, 2008. Being an ejectment case, it is governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure which clearly sets a period of thirty (30) days from the submission of the last affidavit or position paper within which a decision thereon must be issued. Despite this, Judge Regencia rendered judgment only about two (2) years and four (4) months later, or on February 18,2011. While rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases and, thus, should be regarded as mandatory, the Court has nevertheless been mindful of the plight of judges and has been understanding of circumstances that may hinder them from promptly disposing of their businesses and, as such, has allowed extensions of time due to justifiable reasons.

However, Judge Regencia failed to proffer any acceptable reason in delaying the disposition of the ejectment case, thus, making her administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision.

Further, as adverted to earlier, Judge Regencia tried to justify the delay in resolving Civil Case No. 212-B by claiming, inter alia, that there exists a prejudicial question brought about by the existence of a pending case in the Toledo RTC and that the parties agreed on the suspension of the proceedings. However, Judge Montero found that there was neither a prejudicial question nor an agreement between the litigants that would warrant substantial delays in the proceedings – a finding which is subscribed to by the OCA. Verily, Judge Regencia’s clear and blatant attempt to mislead the Court is deplorable and should never be countenanced.1âwphi1

Undue delay in rendering a decision is classified as a less serious charge, punishable either by: (a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months; or ( b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. In imposing the proper sanction on Judge Regencia, the Court notes that aside from her aforementioned misrepresentation, she was also previously found administratively liable for gross inefficiency where she was ordered to pay a fine of PS,000.00 and warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. Moreover, as correctly observed by Justice Arturo D. Brion during the deliberations of this case, her length of service of more .than 17 years should be taken against her instead of being considered a mitigating factor as she should have already known that Civil Case No. 212-B, being an ejectment case, is a summary proceeding and, thus, ought to be expeditiously resolved. Hence, a fine of P40,000.00, instead of suspension, should be the appropriate penalty for Judge Regencia' s misconduct.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Mary Jocylen G. Regencia of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Asturias-Balamban, Cebu, GUILTY of undue delay in rendering a decision. Accordingly, she is ordered to pay a fine of P40,000.00 and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/jun2014/am_mtj-14-1841_2014.html#fnt24


SO ORDERED.

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