Demetrio vs Alba

Facts:Petitioners are the members of the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa.They are assailing the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. The section states that, The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.

Issue: Whether or not the first paragraph of Section 44 of PD No. 1177 is constitutional.

Held:YES. The Constitution provides that, Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical under the 1973 Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different branches of the government and those of the constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources, the constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body concerned. The leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and conditions for which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and such transfer may be made only if there are savings from another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body.

Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.

Garcia vs. Executive Secretary

Facts:Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, assails the validity of Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478. He argues that Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 are violative of Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides Sec. 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.

Executive Order No. 475 reduced the rate of additional duty on all imported articles from nine percent (9%) to five percent (5%)ad valorem, except in the cases of crude oil and other oil products which continued to be subject to the additional duty of nine percent (9%)ad valorem.

Executive Order No. 478 levied (in addition to the aforementioned additional duty of nine percent (9%)ad valoremand all other existingad valoremduties) aspecial dutyof P0.95 per liter or P151.05 per barrel of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products.

Issue:Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.

Held:YES. under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:

(2)The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fixwithin specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose,tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, andother duties or impostswithin the framework of the national development program of the Government.

There is thus explicit constitutional permissionto Congress to authorize the President subject to such limitations and restrictions is [Congress] may impose to fix within specific limits tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . .

ABAKADA vs Ermita

Facts:Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitionersABAKADA GUROParty List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition onMay 27, 2005. They question the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties. These questioned provisions contain a uniformprovisoauthorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effectiveJanuary 1, 2006.Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

Issue:Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power which violates Article 6 Section 28(2) of the Constitution.

Held:NO. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law. The intent and will to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from Congress and the task of the President is to simply execute the legislative policy. That Congress chose to do so in such a manner is not within the province of the Court to inquire into, its task being to interpret the law.

Pimentel vs. Congress

Fact:Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and void the continued existence of the Joint Committee of to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the May 10, 2004 elections following the adjournment of Congresssine dieon June 11, 2004. The petition corollarily prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Joint Committee to cease and desist from conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing.Petitioner posits that with "the adjournmentsine dieon June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth Congress of its last regular session, [its] term ... terminated and expired on the said day and the said Twelfth Congress serving the term 2001 to 2004 passed out of legal existence." Henceforth, petitioner goes on, "all pending matters and proceedings terminate upon the expiration of ... Congress." To advance this view, he relies on legislative procedure, precedent or practice [as] borne [out] by the rules of both Houses of Congress.Petitioners claim that his arguments are buttressed by legislative procedure, precedent or practice [as] borne [out] by the rules of both Houses of Congress is directly contradicted by Section 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules adopted by the Senate, of which he is an incumbent member. This section clearly provides that the Senateshallconvene in joint sessionduring any voluntary orcompulsory recessto canvass the votes for President and Vice-Presidentnot later than thirty days after the day of the elections in accordance with Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.

Issue:Whether or not the Joint Committee canvassing even Congress session has been terminated is constitutional.

Held:NO. Sec. 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.Contrary to petitioner's argument, the term of the present Twelfth Congress did not terminate and expire upon the adjournmentsine dieof the regular session of both Houses on June 11, 2004.Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution cited by petitioner does not pertain to the term of Congress, but to its regular annuallegislative sessionsand the mandatory 30-day recess before the opening of its next regular session (subject to the power of the President to call a special session at any time).Section 4 of Article VIII also of the Constitution clearly provides that "[t]hetermof office of the Senatorsshall be six yearsand shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election." Similarly, Section 7 of the same Article provides that "the Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for atermofthree yearswhich shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election." Consequently, there being no law to the contrary, until June 30, 2004, the present Twelfth Congress to which the present legislators belong cannot be said to have "passed out of legal existence."Thelegislativefunctions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon the final adjournment of its regular sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not affect its non-legislativefunctions, such as that of being the National Board of Canvassers. In fact, the joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by express directive of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly elected President and Vice-President has not, and cannot, adjournsine dieuntil it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it renderedfunctus officio. Its membership may change, but it retains its authority as a board until it has accomplished its purposes. Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its non-legislative duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the duly elected President and Vice-President, its existence as the National Board of Canvassers, as well as that of the Joint Committee to which it referred the preliminary tasks of authenticating and canvassing the certificates of canvass, has not becomefunctus officio.