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Leigh K. Jenco How meaning moves: Tan Sitong on borrowing across cultures Article (Published version) (Refereed) Original citation: Jenco, Leigh K. (2012) How meaning moves: Tan Sitong on borrowing across cultures. Philosophy East and West, 62 (1). pp. 92-113. DOI: 10.1353/pew.2012.0007 © 2012 University of Hawai‘i Press This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/45297/ Available in LSE Research Online: September 2012 LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website.

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92 PhilosophyEast&WestVolume62,Number1January201292–113 ©2012byUniversityofHawai‘iPress

HOW MEANING MOVES:TAN SITONG ON BORROWINGACROSS CULTURES

Leigh K. JencoNationalUniversityofSingapore

Thisessayoffersanattemptatacross-culturalinquiryintocross-culturalinquirybyexamininghowoneinfluentialChinesereformer,TanSitong(1865–1898),thoughtcreativelyaboutthepossibilitiesoflearningfromdifferentlysituatedsocieties.Thatistosay,ratherthanfocusingondevelopingeitherTan’ssubstantiveideasorelaborat-ingamethodologyforhowsuchanapproachmightproceed,Iminehisworkforthemethodologicallessonsitoffers.Ihopetoofferbothargumentandexampleforthepossibilitynotonlythatculturallydistinctwaysoflifecaninformeachother,butthatsuchinfluencecanincludelearningtheoreticalandpracticalmeansbywhichsuchengagementmaybecarriedout.Thisexplorationseemsespeciallynecessarynowthatpoliticaltheoryandphilosophyincreasinglyrecognizethevalueofhistoricallymarginalizedthoughttraditions,butneverthelesscontinuetoengagethosetraditionsusingmethodologiesrootedintheirownconcerns,suchastorectifyinequalitiesofpowerortoaddress(mis-)representationofhistoricallymarginalizedgroups.1Oneresultisthatrecenttheoriesofcross-culturalunderstandinginAnglophonepoliticaltheoryandphilosophy—fromthe“politicsofrecognition”tocomparativepoliticaltheory, liberal multiculturalism, cultural cosmopolitanism, and universal humanrights—examineculturethroughthelensofculturallyembeddedindividualsortexts,rather thanas a social phenomenonconstitutedby learnedpractices.The taskofcross-culturalengagementbecomesdefinedashowtonegotiatewhatareassumedtobefairlyintractable(becauselocalized)culturaldifferences,oftenthroughsympa-theticunderstandingoftheother’sconceptualgrammarormoralvalues,orthereg-istrationofsingular,non-WesternvoiceswithinexistingEurocentricconversations.2

Onereasonforthisincreasinglycircumscribedpracticemaybethedifficultyofsharingmeaningasopposedtomerelyforgingmutualcommensurability,inwhichthe terms of the other are rendered intelligible by translating them into familiarvocabulary.Here,“meaning”pointsto“thewaysinwhichpeopleattempttomakeapparent,observable senseof theirworlds—to themselvesand toeachother—inemotionalandcognitiveterms.”3Asasociallyproducedphenomenonsustainedbycommunity-widepractices,meaningsresistidenticalexportationelsewherepreciselybecauseoftheirdiffuseandsocialcharacter(acharacteristicthatCharlesTaylorandothershavelabeled“intersubjectivity”4).Recognizingthefurtherdifficultyoftrans-plantingmeaningsinaworldinwhichEurocentricdiscoursesgovernthearticulationofculturalidentities,thegoalformuchrecentcross-culturalresearchistoenhanceself-reflexivityaboutone’sownvalues rather than toaskhowor ifone’s founda-tionalassumptionsanddisciplinaryconversationscanbedecisivelychallenged,andpossiblyreplaced,byforeignones.

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Wemayfindanimportantanddisruptivecontrasttotheserecentmethodologicalclaimsindebatesassociatedwith“WesternLearning”(Xixue),areformmovementthatbeganinmid-nineteenth-centuryChinathaturgedtheadoptionofWesterninstitutionstoachieve“wealthandpower”(fuqiang).Isay“disruptive”becausetheseclaimsofferbothaninstructivecritiqueofmanycurrenttheoriesofcross-culturalborrowingandafairlyambitiousalternativevisionofhowcross-culturalinquirycanproceed.Usingthevocabularyofdao(substance,Way)andqi(vessel,tool),aswellastheparallelandmorewell-knowndichotomyofti(substanceorstructuring)andyong(function,use),thesereformersappliedlong-standingChinesestrandsofmetaphysicstoexam-inetheconditionsunderwhichmeaningsandsocialpractices—ratherthandiscreteknowledgeorindividualinsight—canmoveacrosscommunities.Byattemptingtheproductionofmeaningalongforeignlines,theseWesternLearningreformersques-tionedwhetherthelocalizationofmeaningentailsintractableculturaldifference.

Icentermydiscussiononatheoryabouttherelationshipbetweendaoandqithat the radical reformerTanSitong formulatedaround1895, in supportof “totalWesternization”(quanpan Xihua).Followingbutultimatelycontestingthedominantti/yong paradigm of the more conservative ForeignAffairs School,Tan parses theproblemoutinthisway:how,ifatall,aretheparticularconcretemanifestationsoftheWesternworldthatseemsobrilliantlyuseful—steamengines,guns,tallbuildings—relatedtothevaluesorprinciplesthatWesternpeopleseemtouphold?HowcantheycomenotonlytobeimitatedbyChinesebutalsotohavemeaningforthem?Tanrecognizedthatthesemeaningswererelatedbutirreducibletotheideasindividualsheldseparatelyintheirminds,orthevaluesenforcedbystateinstitutions.Inresponse,he produces an original and unusually metaphysical account of how values andmeaningareproducedandconsumedacrosssociety,aswellashowtheyworktosupportmoreobservableexternalphenomenasuchasparliamentarygovernment,technologicaldevelopment,andsocialpracticesofequality.

Tan’sinterventionintheWesternLearningdebate,inmyview,makesatleasttwoimportantcontributions to thinkingaboutcross-culturalborrowing.First,he looksbeyond the individualizedunderstandingandpartial,episodic translation thatarethegoalsofmuchcontemporarycross-culturaltheory.Hedrawsattentioninsteadtohowdaos(whichIwillprovisionallytranslateas“meanings”)aresociallyembeddedandproducedbutalsoaremanifest inexternallyobservablepracticesandinstitu-tions(qi)thatareintheoryreplicableinothercommunities.Second,bystressingtheexternalaspectsofmeaning-production,heprovidesamethodforre-creatingcul-tural forms inothercontexts,drawingattention to thepossibilityandnecessityofauthenticimitationofforeignwaysoflife.Hisambitionstoauthenticity,however,donotaffirmaculturalessencesomuchastheyrecognizetheprocessofmeaningpro-ductionasdrivenbyanecessarytensionbetweencontinuityorreplicationontheonehandandinnovationandinterpretationontheother.Tanthereforeprovidesanimportantcorrectivetocontemporaryaccounts,which,inemphasizingcultureasaconstructthatinformsthevaluesorchoicesofembeddedindividuals,tendstoignorethewaysinwhichforeignmeaningcanbeasiteofintellectualdisciplineaswellasatargetofpoliticalinclusion.

94 PhilosophyEast&West

Western Learning: Moving Meaning across Space?

WesternLearningwasnotacoherentmovementsomuchasadiffuseandcontestedreaction toconservatives in theQingcourt,whobelieved that adoptionof selectEuropeaninstitutionsinpiecemealfashioncouldstrengthentheQingstateandChi-nesesocietywhilemaintainingputativelytraditionalChinesesocialvalues.Thislatterargumentwasfirstputforwardundertherubricoftheti/yongor“essence/function”dichotomy,aNeo-Confucianmetaphysicalbinarywithnumerousanalogues(root/branch,way/vessel)thatcametostructuretheoriesofcross-culturallearningonbothsides.5

Themostfamousandcertainlymostinfluentialapplicationoftheti/yongbinarywasadvancedbyZhangZhidong(1837–1909)inhisfamous1898essayExhortation to Learning(Quanxue pian). Inthisessay,Zhanginsiststhattheutilitarian,functionalaspects(yong)ofEuropeanandAmericanmilitaryandtechnicalknowledgecouldbecombinedwiththeessentialfeaturesorsubstance(ti)ofChina’smoralandculturalheritagewhileleavingthemfullyintact.Zhanghelpfullyencapsulatesthesefeaturesas the“threebondsandfiverelationships”—normsofsocialhierarchythatZhanginsists “have been transmitted for several thousand years without changing theirmeaning.6Themeansbywhichsagesaresages,thewaybywhichChina(Zhongguo)isChina,actuallyliesinthese.”7ZhangZhidong’sassessmentofChineseculturewasattimesbothessentialistandanachronistic,butitassuredmanythatChina’scurrentpoliticalproblemscouldbesolvedwithoutradicaltransformationsofitsvaluesys-temandwayoflife.Itofferedadoubleemotionalpayoff,firstbyidentifyinga“true”essencetoChineseculturethatwouldsurvivetime,andsecondbyreducingforeigncapacitiesto“techniques.”AlthoughforZhangthese“techniques”includedhuman-isticlearning,suchashistoryandpolitics,anddidnotmerelysignifyWesterntech-nology,8theyneverthelesswereseentocomplementratherthantransformthemoresublimeendinformedbypriorunderstandingofChineseculturalvalues.

Beginningasearlyasthe1860s,however,reformerswhohopedtostrengthenChinamilitarilyandfinanciallybyborrowingWesterntechnology,suchasFengGui-fen (1809–1874), began to point out that simple know-how was not sufficient toproduce the desired outcome: they realized (some before Zhang introduced hisdichotomy)thatWestern“use”cannotbedetachedfromitsmetaphysicalbasisinaveryWesternti.TheproblemforFeng,andcertainlyforlaterradicalreformersaroundtheturnofthecentury,wasnotoneofknowledgebutofpracticalcapacitiesembodiedinbothpeopleandinstitutions.Thesethinkersaskednot“howcanweunderstandthose who speak and act within a different frame of cultural reference?” or even“howcanweusewhattheyknow?”but“howcanwe‘goon’todoastheydo?”ThatitwasthelatterquestionthatpreoccupiedthesethinkerscanbeseenintheirwidelysharedbeliefthatChinacouldgoontoexceedtheWestintermsofingenuity,pro-duction,andpoliticalprosperityandstability—notbyreplicatingWesterntechnol-ogybutbyinnovatingastheWesternersdid.9Althoughsomeresolvedthiscrisisofcontrast by presuming a Chinese origin forWestern ingenuity and science, mostothersrealizedthatborrowingfromtheWestrequiredafarmoredramaticandwhat

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wemaycallanexplicitlyculturalleap—thatis,fromonewayofbeingintheworldandorganizingsocietytoanotherwithajarringlydifferentsetofmeaningsandfunc-tions.

Thisinsightincreasedinsophisticationaslaterandmoreradicalcriticsofself-strengtheningsuchasWangTao(1828–1897)insistedthat“managingalltheaffairsunderheaven”requirednolessthan“totalchange”(yi bian)inChineseinstitutionsandwaysoflife.10ZhengGuanying(1842–1922),theeditorofthevolumeShengshi weiyan(Warningstoaprosperousage),articulatedthistotalizingconceptascaptur-ingtheWesterners’tiaswellastheiryong.Inhisprefacetothiswork,Zhengimpliesthat ti andyongwerenotdichotomizedalongChinese/Western linesasearly re-formerswouldhaveit,butwereinfacttwoaspectsofthesamereality,andbothwerethusnecessarytargetsofborrowing.ThetirequiredtoembodytheWesterntechno-logicalyonglieincultivatingparticularkindsoftalent,practicingparticularkindsofpoliticalprocedure(specifically,parliamentarydebate),anduniting“rulerandpeo-ple.”Anythingless,inZheng’sview,is“emptytalk”thatwouldrenderChineseca-pacitiesvis-à-vistheWestessentiallyunchanged.11

Modernhistoricalassessmentsoftheseti/yongdebatesfocususuallyontherela-tionshipbetween“function”and“essence,”interpretingthebinaryeitherasalogicalunit12orasafunctionallyseparatealthoughcomplementarysetofdesirablequali-ties.13Amoreinterestingquestionmightbewhycross-culturalborrowingwas—and,inmuchcontemporaryChinesescholarship,continuestobe—articulatedusingsuchterms.14Whatgoalsdosuchtermssuggest,anddotheyenableaparticularwayofparsingorpursuingcross-culturalinquiry?

Onemainpossibilitystandsout,whichIwillraisehereandusetheremainderofthisessaytoelaborate.WesternLearningthinkers—atleastthoseopposedtowhatinChinesescholarshipisidentifiedasthe“ForeignAffairsSchool”ofZhangZhidongandhiscolleagues—ingeneralallviewedtheissueofcross-culturalborrowingasabroadsocialorpoliticaltransformationalongnewlinesofthoughtandaction.ThosesuchasYanFu(1854–1921),whorejectedthedichotomizationofti/yong,continuedto use it in differentways to construct an ambitious foundation for cross-culturallearning.AsYanpointedout,itwaspreciselybecausetiwassocloselyconnectedtoyongthatneithercouldbeconfinedtoonecultureoranother.15Thatis,ratherthanseekingmerelytogaincommensurabilityacrossdifferenceorknowledgeaboutfor-eignwaysoflife,theyaimedtoreproducewholesystemsofmeaning-making,socialorganization,andpoliticalorder.

TanSitongofferswhatisprobablythemostsystematicandthoroughtheorizationofsuchacts,invokingthetermsdaoandqi.Thebinaryofdaoandqimapsmuchthesamerelationshipbetweensubstance/formasdoesthatoftiandyong,apointthatTannotes,16butthealternativephrasingallowshimtoconnecttherelationshiptoacomplex interpretationof theBook of Changes advancedbyWang Fuzhi (1619–1692),theMing/Qingtransitionliteratus(andTan’sfellowHunanese).17Thedao/qivocabularyhelpsTantotheorizeaformofcross-culturalborrowingthatseeksfirsttoreplicate,andthengoesontobuildcreativelyfrom,alternativefoundations—thosesocial,political,andintellectualconstructspossessingthecapacitytogroundpresent


intelligibilityandfutureinnovation.Inalatersection,Idiscusshowandwhysuchan“alternativefoundations”approachisrarelyseenasapossibilitywithincontempo-rarytheory,butIfirstexploreTan’sdefenseofhismoreradicalposition.

Tan Sitong’s Argument for Western Learning and “Total Westernization”

Asoneof themost dynamic andpassionate thinkers ofChina’s late-Qing reformgeneration,TanSitongmakesforadifficultcasestudy.Beginningasastaunchde-fenderofChineseethnocentrism,Taneventuallybecameoneof themore radicaldefenders ofWestern Learning and then eventually a theorist of universal, proto-cosmopolitanvaluesinhismagnumopusRenxue.18Butindefendinghistransitionfromconservativetoradical,Tanprovidesconsiderableinsightintothetheoreticalandnotmerelylogisticalinsightsthatunderlayhisnewconvictions.19Inalongessaywritten forhis friendOuyangZhonggu, titled“OnPromotingMathematics” (Xing suanxue yi),andinaletterofpersuasionsenttoBeiYuanzheng,bothwrittenaround1896,TanexplainshisradicalpositiononWesternLearning.Heinvokesthevocabu-laryofdaoandqitoofferasomewhatambiguousbuttheoreticallyrichframeworktosupporthisreasonsforsuchanambitiousculturaltransformation.

Tanbeginsboth lettersby trying toconvincehis interlocutorsnotonlyof theworthofborrowingmorethoroughlyfromtheWestthanearlierreformershadeverconceded,butalsoofthepropermethodforsuchborrowing.AtseveralpointsheaffirmstheworthofChinesetraditionalvaluesbutarguesthatinthepresenttimesthesevaluescanonlybeunderstoodwithrespecttothebinaryofdaoor“way”andqior“vessel.”CitingWangFuzhi’sOuter Commentary on the Book of Changes,Tansuggests that contemporary discourse has muddled the true relationship betweenthesetwoentitiesandassuchhasdeprivedWesternLearningand“foreignaffairs”(yangwu)ofanysubstantivecapacitytobenefitChinesesociety(Quanji,pp.196–197).

TanfollowsWangbydepartingfromtypicalNeo-Confucianreadingsthathelddao道tobethefoundationofqi 器,whichderivedfromthedistinctionbetweenli 理,generalmetaphysicalprincipleorpattern,andqi2氣,thematerialembodimentsorformsofprinciple.20MuchNeo-Confucianphilosophy,beginningwiththeChengbrothersintheearlySong,heldthatnotonlywasthisqi2inferiortolibutthatitalsoobscuredthetruthitcontained.Incontrast,Wangreversedtherelationship,holdingthatitwasinfact“vessels”thatheldthe“way,”or,inotherwords,theparticularandconcretethatpredicatedthegeneralandabstract.21Thisdeparturefromorthodoxyimbues thedaowithaconsiderablemeasureofcreativeambiguity;daobasicallymarksthepluralanddynamicoutcomesofchangingqi,resistingconsistenttransla-tionintoconcreteterms.

TanbuildsonWang’sheterodoxreadingtoarguethat“whatpeopletodaycalldao, without relying on qi, simply flails about in emptiness.” Citing Wang,Tanexplains:

“Thereisnodaowithoutqi.Withoutabowandarrowthereisnodaoofarchery;withouthorsesandvehiclesthereisnodaoofdriving....TheHanandTangdynastiesdidnot

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havethedaooftoday,andtherearemanyexamplesofthepresenttimenothavingthedaoofpasttimes.”He[Wang]alsosays,“Therearemanytimeswhenthedaocanbehadbutitdoesnotexist.Thereforethereisnodaowithoutqi.”Ah,thesearetruewords.Ifwebelievethesewords,thendaomustrelyonqibeforeyoucanhavepracticaluse;itisnotthecasethatdaoexistsinsomeemptyobjectlessspace.(Quanji,pp.160–161)

Tan’sdaoandqiterminologyissometimesseenbycommentatorsasforwardingaconservativeargument,whichfollowsearlierti/yongbinariesrathercloselytourgetheinstrumentaladoptionofWesterntechnology (qi) toassurethepreservationofChinesevalues(dao).22Yetthetheoreticalframeworkofdaoandqi —aswellasTan’sownargument—suggestsamoreradicalinterpretationinwhichChinesevaluesandwaysoflifearefundamentallydisplacedbyaWesterndaoratherthanpreservedbyWesternqi.AsTanremarks,“Onceqihaschanged,candaoaloneremainunchanged?Changeispreciselydoingqi,andqicannotleavedao.Peoplecannotabandonqi;how,then,cantheyabandondao?”(Quanji,p.197).23

Accordingtothislogic,adoptingWesterntechnology(qi)willbringalongwithitaparticularkindofdao,anditisnotalwaysclearthatthisdaowillbethatofChina’sancientsages.TandoessuggestthatWesternersandChinesesharethesamekindofdao —meaningthattheirqiaresomehowcompatiblewith,ifnotoutrightidenticalto,alreadyexistingpracticesandmoraloutlooksofcontemporaryChinese(Quanji,pp.197,200).YethefollowsupthisobservationwithalongcelebrationofWesternsocial practices, from education to marriage arrangements, female liberation andparliamentaryassemblies (Quanji,pp.209–216).Theseqi imply staggeringlypro-foundsocialandpoliticaltransformations,belyinghisinsistencethatanypastChi-nesedaowillbepreserved.Headmitsthattheancientlaw(gu fa)waswellordered,butitisgone,becausetherearenosupportinginstitutionsremainingtoinvokeit:

All these statutes, institutions, and the renownedobjects [of past times, including thewell-fieldsystem]were,tragically,nottransmitted;thustheyarenotthingsthatlatergen-erationscanjustmodeloutofthinair.TheDukeofZhourecordedthesedevicesinordertoestablishthefirmfoundationofthelaw.Butthedevicescannotberevived,andtheirremainders[inthepresent]havenothingtoleanon,andtheirdistance[fromourtime]makesthemhardtoimplement.Therefore,Isay,withoutitsqiyoucannothaveitsdao.(Quanji,p.201)

Inthisiterationofdao/qi,Tanmakesclearhisviewofdaoasaholisticwebofrela-tionshipsbetweenmutuallydependentqi,inwhicheven“remainders”cannotservetoconjureuptheintegrityofpastinstitutions:eachtimehasitsowndaoandhenceadifferentsetofqitoinhabit.Only“changinglaws”(or“changingways,”bian fa)toreflectWesternmodesofdoingthingswillsupplytheqithatcanallowChinesesoci-ety to flourish again (Quanji, p. 227)—but given the protean working of qi, it isunclearonwhatgroundssuchre-establishmentwouldproceed.InaboldreversalofanxietiesheldbyearlierconservativessuchasWoren(1804–1871),whocondemnedWesternLearning in thebelief thatWestern ideasandobjects couldcontaminateChinese values,Tan complains in his treatise “Mathematics” that “we stagnantlyadoptonlythebranchesoftheWesterners,”thatis,theirgunsandships,but“leave


behind their greatest essence” (Quanji,p.161).Theproblem forTan isnotbeingcontaminatedenough,notradically transformingto thedegreenecessarytomakeWesternqi(anddao)work.

Here and throughout the two essays he implicitly differentiates between twodistinctthoughrelatedkindsofqi:thefirstkindpointstotheactualmaterialobjectssuppliedbytheWesterners—militaryhardwareandtechnology,ships,Westernim-portedmerchandise.Thesecond,lessclear-cutkindofqipointstothefacultiesorcapacities—intellectual, social, institutional, economic—that produce these ob-jects.24TheselatterkindsofqiarewhatTanseemstomeanwhenhespeaksoftheWesterners’“greatestessence,”andseemtobeencapsulatedintheconceptof“law”(fa).ThroughoutTaninsiststhat,contrarytopopularopinion,WesternersandChinesedeepdownpossessthesame“nature”(xing).Theonlyproblemishoweachorga-nizessociety.“IsitthatWesterners’naturesaregoodwhileoursarebad?[No,itisthat]theirlawsaregoodandtheirintentionsimpeccable,whilewehavenolaws.Ifthelawisgoodtheneveryoneofmiddlingqualityandbelowcanpullthemselvesout[oftheirpredicaments];ifthereisnolawtheneventhoseabovemiddlingqualitywillhaveahardtimestandingupontheirown.”LikeFengGuifenbeforehim,Tanrecog-nizesthatlearninghowto(re-)produceWesternprosperityismoreimportantthansimplyattainingthematerialproductsthatcouldhelpdefendChinaagainstforeignincursion.ForFeng,however,thereasonswerestrategic:onlybyadaptingtothetimesand learning theWestern tricks—suchasphysics,moderndiplomacy,and institu-tionalorganization—couldWesternersbedrivenoutofChineseterritoryforgood.25

ButforTanthereasonsaremoremetaphysical.Tan’sreadingofdaoandqitakesthelogicofWangFuzhiastepfurthertointerrogatetherelationshipsbetweentheusesofitems(qi)andthelargersocialpatternstheydemanded.Continuingtohold,asWangFuzhidid,thatconcrete“tools”(ju)or“vessels”werethekeytosupportingdao,Tanconcludesfromthispremisethatsuchqicanactuallyproduceaparticulardao,inthiscaseoneclosertothespiritofthemodernWestthantotheancientChi-nesepast.Hedoesnot,afterall,suggestthattheWestlooktoChinaforitsdao,evenas China appropriatesWestern qi; if the two daos were actually the same, as hesometimessays,thisbilateralmovementwouldbeapossibility.26

AsIreadhim,TanissuggestingthattheinternalcomplexityofWesternpoliticalandsocialinstitutions,waysoflife,andintellectualorganizationcanbemademan-ageablebymeansofaparticularformofinquiry,onethatbeginswiththeparticular(qi)butculminatesinthegeneral(dao).Toavoid“flailingaboutinemptiness,”onecannotgoaroundhopingtoreviveadao —anydao —directly,becausethishaslittlemeaningwithoutbeingembeddedinparticularcontexts,performances,andmate-rialobjects.Tanspecifiesthatlearningforeignlanguages,readingforeignnewspa-pers, and studying abroad are the first steps in this practice- and object-basedborrowing,tobefollowedbythereformofeducation,thebuildingofmines,andthedevelopingofcommerce(Quanji,pp.162–163).InanannotationtoTan’stext,Ou-yangZhongguexplainsfurtherthatthismeansthe“practicingoftheir[i.e.,Western]affairs”willenableoneto“complete theqi”appropriate toWesterndao (Quanji,p.171n.16).

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Byusingqi tomeannotonlymaterialobjectsbut thoseparticular systemsofknowledgeandpracticedeeplyimplicatedintheproductionofmeaning,Tan’suseofthetermbleedsintomuchofwhatwasusuallytakentobedaoorti(substance).Towhat,then,doesdaopoint?AlthoughoutsideEastAsiadaoisbestknownforthemysticalauraassociatedwithDaoistpractices, theconceptpoints towardamuchlargerandmoregeneralsetofconcepts thatarenotspecific toanyphilosophicalschool.Oftenthesiteofcontestationamongschoolsastowhosethoughtbestex-pressestheonetruepath,daowas“thewordmostoftenusedtotalkaboutthemanywaysofknowing,andsometimesusedtotalkaboutahigherlevelofknowingthatsubsumedallothers.”27

Similarly,Tan’sdaoisprobablybestunderstoodasanessentiallycontested,in-terpretativelyopenconceptimplicatedinmeaning-productionratherthanthesiteofsomesharedself-identity.Hispairingofthetermwithqiisonesuchinstanceofusingdaoasacapaciousanalyticcategory,ratherthanamarkerofaparticularphilosoph-icalallegiance.TanfollowsWangFuzhicloselyinthattheproliferationofobviouslydifferentkindsofqiresultsnotinaconvergencebutapluralityofdaos:thedaoofyesterday,beingsupportedbydifferentqithatarenolongerinexistence,impliesadifferentdaooftoday.Thisiswhylawchangeswiththetimes(Quanji,p.200).Daoseemstobethearchitectonicvaluethatinhabitsphysicalobjects,socialarrangements,persons,andgroups,makingthemaliveandmeaningful.Withouttherightkindofdao,Tanargues,imitatingritualsoractswillhavenopurpose.TothosewhowishtorevivetheancientlawsinsteadofborrowingWesternones,Tanwarns,“imitatethemdiligently,butintheenditwillsimplybeputtingonashow....[T]hecowisnotacow,thehorseisnotahorse;youwilljustbegoingthroughthemotionstonorealeffect”(Quanji,p.201).Thereisacausal(yin)effecthere:“Havingheightiscausedby(yin)atallhill;beinglowiscausedby(yin)amarshorriver.Theancientlawsarecompletelygone,and there isnothing to serveas their ‘cause’” (Quanji,p.201).Lackingayin —acauseoramotivation—theancientlawlacksadao.

Dao,then,isakinto“culture”inthatitnotonlyconditionsbutconstitutestherelationshipsamongandbetweentheseentities;itenablesandrendersmeaningfulthe faculties that qi implies.This mutually constitutive process is not adequatelydescribedasarelationshipbetweenformandsubstance,betweenayongandati.Ratheritgesturestowardthemutualco-appearanceofeachandthereforeimpliesarelationshipofdynamicadjustmentandchange.ToWangFuzhi,Tan’sinspiration,this relationshipbetweenwhatwecanperhapsbetter translateasappearance (qi)and way (dao) documents the cyclical and ever-changing processes of all-under-Heaven.TheChangesscholarHellmutWilhelmsummarizestheseprocessesasundi-recteddynamism,mappedbutnotexhaustedby“images”(xiang —words,objects,forms).28Suchimages—Tan’sqi —arelikeorientingcoordinatesforeventsandac-tions;theyareform,butalsoakindofdynamic“forming.”29

InthecaseofthemoreradicalreformersofWesternLearning,replicatingorbor-rowingqiacknowledgesthedeeplyinterconnectedsystemsofmeaningsandprac-tice that enable qi to exist at particular times and places, but without implyingbeforehandwhat“Western”dao(s)willlooklike;itallowsforlearninganddevelop-


menttooccuralongWesternlines,withoutclaiming comprehensive knowledge of any given dao.Daoandqithusenableaformofborrowingthatpointsbeyondthelimitsofpersonalcomprehensionorcross-culturalintelligibilitytoimitativeprojectsmeanttocapture—andfurtherdevelopinperhapsunanticipatedways—thesociallydistributedknowledgeandpracticesofaculturalother.

Tan’s work suggests a more complex application of the ti/yong and dao/qidichotomies, but he sharesmuch in commonwithhis earlier progenitors. ZhangZhidong’sclassic ti/yongdichotomy(“Chineselearningfor ti [substance],Westernlearningforyong[use]”)waslaterrejectedbythinkerssuchasYanFuonthebasisofitsobviousontologicalimpossibility,30butitneverthelessfurnishesamodelforsitu-atingculturesinrelationtoeachotherthatestablishesanimportantframeworkforhowfutureWesternLearninginChinawouldbeconceptualized.Believing,asZhangdid,thatWesternyong(technology,medicine,methodsofwarfare)couldbeinjectedwholesaleintoChineseti(thewebofsocialandmoralvaluesunderwrittenbyChi-nesepoliticalorganization)recognizesthateven“practical”culturalformssuchasappliedtechnologyarenotsimplylodgedinindividual,representativepersonsbutareembodiedininstitutions—whethertheseinstitutionshavematerialpresenceintheformofbuildingsandpersonnel,orsocialpresenceintheformofrules,laws,or“logics.”TheproblemZhangseekstoaddressbydichotomizingtiandyongispre-ciselytheproblemTanaddressesbyinsistingthatthetwoconceptsaremutuallyre-lated:theyreflecttheenormityofborrowingasaninstitutional,society-wideprocess.IfChinesesubstancecanstand inplaceofWesternsubstance to supportWesternutility,asZhangbelieves,thentheanalytic(nottomentionlogistic)obstaclestothisformofcross-culturalborrowingaredrasticallyabated.Ifthisisnotpossible,asTanbelieves, then more thoroughgoing, society-wide transformations must take placeanddaowillbetransformed.BybuildingontheviewthatChinacouldborrowfromtheWest,Tanaffirmsboth“Chinese”and“Western”daosasdistinctsitesofthoughtandexperience.

Contemporary Counterarguments

Suchatheorizationofexchangewiththisimitativegoalinmindmayseembothuse-lessandunfeasible.Todayfewindividuals,muchlesswholesocieties,arewillingtodisplace completely their indigenous ways of thinking and practice with foreignones.Gadamer’sinsightintotheprejudicialprocessofallknowledge-formationsug-gestsfurtherthatsuchwholesaleimitationmaynotevenbepossible.31Ifweneces-sarilyunderstandnewideasonlybyreferencetowhatwealreadyknow,howcanweever completely replace our own categories with foreign ones? In contemporarypoliticaltheoryandphilosophy,thisGadamerianlogicinformsatleasttwodistinctargumentsagainstwholesaleborrowingofthekindTanadvocated.Bothseethefun-damentaldilemmaofcross-culturallearningasnegotiating(ratherthanovercoming)thesedeepGadamerianprejudices,orbackgroundassumptions, thatmakecross-culturalborrowingimpossibleordistorting,andeachoffersanalternativepictureofhowtheprocesscanproceedgiventheserestraints.

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Thefirstargumentspeaksfromthepoliticaldifficultiesofpluralculturalidentity,oftenarticulatedashybridityorvernacularcosmopolitanism,negotiatedpoliticallybywayofthe“politicsofdifference.”Thismodeofnegotiatingdifferenceseekstheinclusionofethnicallyinflectedlifeexperiencesintopoliticaldecision-makingasameansofabatingdomination,enrichingdebate,andsecuringvoicetotypicallymar-ginalizedindividualsandgroups.32Inaworld“remadebycolonization”andbereftoffoundationalist,Archimedeanvantagepointsthatpresumetoadjudicateuniversalvalue,thesecontextualizednegotiations—whetherwithinliberal-democraticdomi-cilesorwithintheglobalarenawritlarge—havebecomeincreasinglyattractivetopoliticaltheoristsandcomparativephilosophershopingtoeffacelegaciesofWesterndomination.33To avoid the imposition of essentialism, and to capture the hybridcharacterofmuchcontemporaryculturalidentity,manytheoristsinpoliticaltheoryand philosophy attend carefully to the particular, power-saturated circumstanceswithinandforwhichculturalexchangetakesplace.Modelingtheireffortsonegali-tariandialogue,thesetheoristsanalogizecross-culturalexchangetotheinteractionbetweenembeddedpersonswhoofferupcategoriesofanalysisforexamination.34

The result isaprocessofcontestation inwhichnewvisionsof selfandotheremerge,adialogicinterplay“animatedbybothsympathyandresistance,awilling-nesstobalanceunderstandingandself-transgression,”whichleavesdifferencesin-tactratherthanattemptingfulltransparency.35Understoodinthisway,comparativephilosophyisanopen-ended,mutuallytransformativeprocessratherthanasystemofabsoluteadjudicationbetween twoormorepurportedlydiscretephilosophicalsystems.Comparativephilosophytakesplaceina“dialogic”mannerwithinandbe-tweenparticular,alreadysituatedphilosophicalsystems(whatthecomparativephi-losopherRaimundoPanikkargeneralizesas“topoi”)thatinevitablybeginsfromsomeparticularphilosophybutneverthelesssubjectseverythingtocriticalscrutiny.36

Thesecondargumenttakesthedifficultiesoflearningacrossculturesevenmoreseriously,callingintoquestionevenminimaldialogictransformation.Inacritiqueofcurrentworkincosmopolitanism,specificallytheworkofJeremyWaldron,PratapMehtaarguesthatattemptstoappropriateforeignculturalformsaremuchmoredif-ficultthancosmopolitans—and,wemayadd,comparativepoliticaltheorists—oftensuppose,preciselyforthereasonthatsuchformsrelyonpotentiallyincommensurableanddeeplylodgedbackgroundassumptionsthatgivethemmeaning.Waldronclaimsthat“weneedculture,butwedonotneedcultural integrity,”simplybecause thesignificanceofculturalmaterialsturnsforeachpersononwhatareoftenmisinterpre-tationsoftheiroriginalcontext.Thesematerialsaresimplyavailableforthetaking,“asmoreorlessmeaningfulfragments,images,snatchesofstories.”37Mehtainsists,however,thatthisabusestheveryideaofwhatcultureissupposedtodo.Theexistingculturalcontextinwhichforeignformsareappropriated“altersthembeyondrecog-nitionandoften,ratherthancomplicatingtheculturethatappropriatesthem,ismadequitecompatiblewithitsgoverningpremises.”38Heechoestheoristsofincommen-surabilitysuchasAlasdairMacIntyre,whoconnects thevaluesofparticular tradi-tions to their specificembodiments insharedpractices,histories,and institutions.AccordingtoMacIntyre,thesevaluescannotbedivorcedfromtheparticularsocial


orderorculturalphenomenafromwhichtheyemergeandstillretaintheirintelligi-bility.39

Fromthisperspective,thosesuchasJeremyWaldronwhobelievethatindividualscanfreelyappropriateforeignideasandwaysoflifeareleftdefendingaratherunten-ableviewofcultureasindependentofinstitutions,includingsharedsocialnorms.Ifwedefinecultureas“intelligentandintelligiblestructuresofmeaning,”asWaldrondoes,40thenculturedemandsaparticularinstitutionalembodiment.FortheliberalpoliticalphilosopherWillKymlicka,thisrecognitionofembodimentjustifiesextend-ingspecialrightstominorities,toprotecttheirsharedwaysoflifefromencroach-ment by the larger culture in which they are territorially embedded.41 By seeingculturallifeassodeeplyembeddedinacollectivelifestylethatitscommunitymustenjoy political rights to assure its future existence, he—along with Mehta andMacIntyre—suggeststheimpossibilityofaborrowedcultureorculturalformversusmerelyaborrowedideathatexistsindependentlyofthesociopoliticalconstructsthatproducedit.

Basedonthesetwoargumentsabouttheembeddednatureofculturalconstructs,TanSitong’sintuitionaboutthenecessityforframingculturebywayofinstitutionsor“qi”seemstoworkagainsthim:Mehta,Kymlicka,andthoseinfluencedbyGadamerallargueindifferentwaysthatitispreciselybecauseculturalformshavesomeformofinstitutionalembodimentthattheirappropriation,assimilation,orcomprehensionbyothersissoproblematicastobeunlikely.DallmayrandPanikkar,inparticular,arguethatafusionofhorizonsoraffiliativeassociationsmediatedbydialogicinter-actionisthemostradicaloutcomethatiscognitivelypossibleforsuchirreduciblysituatedhumanbeings.

ButTan’sworkandtheintuitionsofhisfellowWesternLearningthinkershelptosteerapathbetweentheviewthatcultural formsareeitherindependentofsocialorganizationandinstitutions,ontheonehand,oraresodependentonsuchinstitu-tions that they cannot be meaningfully borrowed, on the other. Where Waldronrejectsorfailstoconsideradefinitionofcultureasinstitutionallyreliant,andcom-parativepoliticaltheoristsreadcultureasaccessibleonlypartiallythroughdialogicinteraction with embedded individuals, Tan insists that culture—constituted bycomplexanddynamicdaoswhosetruescopeisessentiallyunknowabletoanyonehuman—necessarilyisgraspedandembodiedonlyinqi (materialobjects,institu-tions,texts,andsoon).ButhedoesnotfollowKymlickaorMehtatoconcludethatthisinstitutionalembodimentimpliesaviewofcultureconfinedtothosewhoarebornintoit,orGadamertoconcludethatatbesta“fusionofhorizons”willbeforgedtocreateakindofthirdculturalspaceorunderstandingirreducibletotheoriginaltwo. Rather, the very replicability of qi enables the portability of culture—not inWaldron’scosmopolitansense,which“ignoresthedependenceofthesepracticesonincommensurable background presuppositions” and assumes we can hybridizeeasilyandquicklybyadoptingsuperficialmarkersofculturaldistinction,42butinamuchdeeper,morepracticalsense,whichwrestleswiththedifficultiesofsocialandnotjustindividualtransformation.

IncontrasttoincommensurabilitytheoristssuchasMacIntyre,whosesolutiontotheproblemof incommensurability involves familiarizingerstwhileoutsiderswith

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thecanonicallanguagesofparticulartraditions,43Tanbroachestheneedforinstitu-tional re-creation of foreign traditions on native soil, and not just an individual’sinitiationintoexistingdiscourses.Althoughthesetransformationswilllikelybebesetbyissuesoftranslationandcommensurabilitybesthandledina“conversational”ordialogicway,toleavetheissueofborrowingtherewouldbetoignoretheveryrealneedtoframe(andborrow)culturalformsinasetofinstitutionsthatcansupportabroadrangeofpersonalinterests,needs,talents,andcertainlyinterpretations.

Specifically,Tan’sdao/qianalysissuggeststhatmeanings,ordaos,haveimportantinstitutionalcomponentsthatareproducedby,yetatthesametimeenable,particularkindsofknowledgeandunderstanding.Meaning-(ordao-)makingiskeyednottoethnicbackgroundoridiosyncrasysomuchasspecific,butreplicable,learningpro-cessesthattakeshapeinparticularareasandatparticulartimes.Assuch,itcannotbecapturedinadialogicencounterandrequiresafarmoreambitiousaccountofauthenticity,namelyofhowparticularcultural formscanbefaithfullyreproducedwithinforeigncommunities.

Authenticity

AuthenticitymaynotbethemostfelicitousEnglishtermforTan’sattempt,butitcap-turestherangeofmeaning(andtheurgency)indicatedbyTan’s(andhiscolleagues’)useofwordslike“imitate”(xiaofa)and“takeasmodel”(fa, mofang).IncontrasttomoreconservativedefendersofChineseculturalidentitysuchasZhangZhidong,Tanand other reformers wanted China to adopt institutions, such as parliamentarygovernment, that were not creative interpretations of those institutions but werethemselvesthoseinstitutions—thatis,theyhadtomeantoChinesewhattheymeanttoWesterners.Thisauthorizedabroadly transformativeprocess that inTan’sviewcouldandshoulddisplacenativeChinesevalues,whateverthoseweresupposedtobe,withonesthateitherproducedorconstitutedWesterndaos.

Forthemostpart,suchquestionsof“authentic”replicationhavebeenbracketedasirrelevanttothepowerrelationsthatarereallymediatingcross-culturalexchange,44ordiscreditedasfundamentallymisguidedeffortsthatreducethecomplexitiesofanentire culture to a singular essentialized identity.45 However, authenticity is itselfambiguous,anditspersistentassociationwithnotionsofculturalpurityorabsolu-tizedidentitydoesnotexhaustitspotentialimplicationsforcross-culturalexchange.Inhisstudyofauthenticityandculture,CharlesLinholmpointsoutthat“therearetwooverlappingmodesforcharacterizinganyentityasauthentic:genealogicalandhistorical(origin)andidentityorcorrespondence(content). . ..[T]hesetwoformsofauthenticityarenotalwayscompatible.”46Althoughcultural-identitypoliticsoftenturnonrubricsthatemphasizeoneortheother,wecaninsteaddiscernthetensionanimatingboth.Inemphasizingconformitytosomeexternalstandardorlogic,bothdefinitionsofauthenticityturnanalysisawayfromsubjectivelyexperiencedorinter-preted experience toward the ways in which communities of individuals govern,produce,andcontestmeaning.

Authenticitybecomessucha recurringelementofTan’sanalysispreciselybe-causeheandhis reformistcolleaguesbelieve that “learning from theWest”must


extend beyond the individuals participating in it to produce non-subjectivist,community-generatedsystemsofmeaning.Theyrecognizethatmeaningsbydefini-tionarenotcreatedexnovobyindividuals,noraretheycontaineddefinitivelywithinanyparticularexchanges.Rather,theyareproducedandconsumedovertimeandbylargenumbersofpeople,makingfaithfulnessorcorrelationwithsomestandardofinterpretationordeploymentaconstituentpartofthelearningorborrowingprocess.Tan’sanalysisthussuggestshowauthenticitycanhelpusarticulateasetofnewand,Ibelieve,productivedilemmasforculturalexchangethatextendbeyondsimplyes-sentialistidentity:namely,whichcriteriaandstandardsholdforculturalproduction,whereandbywhomaretheymediated,andhowmustwholecommunitieschangetoapply them?Thesedilemmasdemandnot somuchadefinitive responseasanaccountofhowmeanings—semioticsystemsgeneratedfrombutirreducibletothepluralityofdiscreteindividualexchangesthatcomprisethem—canbetransportedacrosscommunities.

Notethewaythesetwodefinitionsof“authentic”fromtheOxford English Dic-tionaryinsomewayscontradicteachother:

4.Original,first-hand,prototypical;asopposedtocopied.Obs.

5.Real,actual,‘genuine.’(Opposedtoimaginary,pretended.)arch.47

Thefirstdefinitionclaimsthatinorderforsomethingtobeauthenticorgenuine,itmustbechosenorfeltspontaneouslyandthusbe“first-hand,”nothavinganypriororiginormotive(agenuinefeelingofregret,anauthenticreligiousexperience).Thisishowthetermisusedinmuchcontemporarydiscourse,atendencysomeattributetothepowerandinfluenceofProtestantChristianityanditsemphasisonsincerein-dividualchoiceinsecuringreligiousbelief.48Theseconddefinition,however,deemssomethingauthenticinthesenseof“genuine”ifitaccordswithsomeexternalstan-dardorquality,likeanauthenticdiamond,“thegenuinearticle,”or“therealthing.”Infact,thelattertwophraseshavebeenappropriated—correctly,itisworthnoting—byarangeofcompaniessellingmass-producedgoods(bluejeans,carbonatedbever-ages)thatareidenticaltoeachotherbutpresumablymeaningfullydistinctinsomewayfromotherwiseverysimilarproducts.Itisonlybybeingpartofagrouporseriesofitemsrecognizableasthatthingthatsomethingcanbeconsideredtobe“really”thatthing.Howelsewouldweknowtocallit—andevenmoretothepoint,uponinspectionconfirmit—assuch?Authenticityandgenuinenessimplyanaccountoforigins,buttheydonotrequirethatsomethingbeanorigininitself;itneedsimplybesomethingthathassprungfromoriscloselyconnectedtosomevaluedorigin.

Consider these definitions of “genuine” from the Oxford English Dictionary(whichexplicitlyidentifythewordwith“authenticity”):

3.Reallyproceedingfromitsreputedsourceorauthor;notspurious;=AUTHENTIC.49

4.a.Having thecharacterororigin represented; real, true,notcounterfeit,unfeigned,unadulterated.(the) genuine article.50

By thesedefinitions, it isonly through faithful reproductionand transmission thatsomething can come to be called authentic. Firsthand creation or individualized

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flourisheswould implyheterodoxy,abastard lineage—inotherwords, somethingspurious and profoundly inauthentic. CharlesTaylor indicates some of this sensewhenhepointsoutthat“authentic”commitmentsneednot,andinfactcannot,berootedonlyinsubjective,personalvalue;rather,theirsignificancemustbeindepen-dentofusandourdesiresasapreconditionof theirmaking sense.51These sameconcernsdrovethescholarsoftheHanLearningmovementofthelateQingdynasty,whichsoughttoestablishauthenticlineagesforConfuciantextsthattheybelievedhadbeencorruptedbyforgeries.Ironically,intheirquestforagenuineortruesourceof Confucianism unclouded by generations of (particular) textual mediation, theymimicked the very people whose influence they sought to eradicate: the daoxueNeo-Confucianists, who believed that internal self-ordering and reflection ratherthanexcessiverelianceontextswouldrevealthetrueprinciple(li)obscuredbeneathlayersofmaterialexistence(qi2).Bothwererejecting(different)formsoftextualcon-vention to revealamoreauthenticConfucian learning, inwhichauthenticitywasconstitutednotbyanactofspontaneousandoriginalcreativitybutbythefaithfulreplicationofwhattheancientsreallymeant.ForthescholarsofHanLearning,thismeant establishing an authentic lineage of transmission from the ancients to thepresent;fortheNeo-Confuciandaoxueadvocates,thisdemandedconformitytoanexternallyverifiableprinciple(li).

Onthisbasis,wecanrecognizethatauthenticityneednotmeanashamelessoremptyrip-offofsomeputativelydiscretepractice,norneeditpresumeexhaustiveknowledgeofthesubjectofimitation.FormanythinkersofHanLearning,suchasTan’sassociateKangYouwei,authenticatingtextswasameansofadvancingquiteradicalinterpretationstoreclaimaheritagetheybelievedhadbeenlostamidstthesubjectivistemphasisofNeo-Confucianlixue.52Forothers,suchasGuYanwu,thesearchforauthenticityencouragedacriticalengagementwiththepastsoradicalthatitthreatenedtodemolishtheveryclassicallearningitwasmarshaledtosupport.53Regardlessoftowhatextentsuchauthenticationaimedtochangewidelyacceptedstandardsofwhatconstitutedthe“real”Confuciandao, itneverthelessdemandedintelligiblestandardsexternaltotheactofappropriationitself:whatconstitutesau-thenticity,andwhowillaccepttheevidencesupportingsuchaclaim?Whatkindsofcommunitiescanbeconfiguredorbuilttosustainthisnewfamilyofstandards,andhowcanthesestandardscometobemeaningfulforthem?

Oneofthecounterintuitiveresultsofthisanalysisisthatauthenticity,farfromtyingtheselfineradicablytoitsownculturalorigins,actuallyoffersawayforcom-munities toreplicateforeignwaysof lifebypointingtotheexternalpracticesandstandards, rather than the inscrutable interpretations of individuals, that sustainmeaningandintelligibility.This iswhy, forTan,authenticity is linked toqi,whichgeneratesbutdoesnotdefinitivelydeterminethestandardsofintelligibilitythatwouldmakeparticularWesternformsbothworkandmakesensewithinaforeigncommu-nity.Theprocessbeginswiththe(re-)creationofexternallyobservablepracticesandinstitutions,andfromtherecallsintobeingacollectiveratherthanmerelyanindi-vidual senseofhowagiven institution functionsas the thing itactually, really, issupposedbyitsdiverseparticipantstobe.Authenticqiandinnovativedaobothmarkandgivelifetothetensionbetweenoriginalcreationandfaithfulreplicationatthe


heartofalllearning,cross-culturallearninginparticular.Readinthisway,theimita-tionofWestern“qi”canbeseennotasmindlesscopyingbutasaprofoundinsightintothecollectivelysustainednatureofpoliticalinstitutions,values,andpractices.LiketheantiquityoflateImperialkaozhengscholars,theculturalsubjectsofsuchimitationsdonot present themselves toborrowers as “finishedproducts.”Rather,theyhavetobe“rediscoveredandreconstructed.”54

Iwouldliketosuggestthataspiringtosuch(chastened)authenticityisaneces-sarypartofanyattempttoextendfoundationalprinciplestomeetnewchallenges,tolearnorbeconvertedtoanewwayofthinkingthatimpliesaseriesofinterconnectedandembeddednetworksofmeaning,ratherthandiscreteconceptssomehowheldtobeintelligibleinisolationfromeachotherandfromthelogical,social,andintellec-tualmatrices that embody theirmeaning.Whateverone’sviewson the futilityornecessityofauthenticityincross-culturalexchange,itisclearthatsuchissuespersis-tentlyreturn—itseemsthatthe(self-conscious,atleast)pointoftheexerciseisnottoreinforcewhatisknownoreventosyncretizefragmentedandhalf-understoodcul-turalformsbuttolearnsomethingnewandcompletethatisradicallytransformative.

Anotionofauthenticityisnecessary,moreover,ifwearetoavoidconfoundingthecomparisonofindividualexpressionsorworldviewswiththecomparisonof“cul-tures.”Inanattempttoavoidessentialism,theoristsofthemutual-intelligibilityap-proachleaveopenthequestionofwhetherthedifferencebeingcrossedortheformsbeingborrowedare“cultural”ormerelyidiosyncratic.Byreducingcomparativephi-losophyandtheorytoanexchangebetweensituatedinterlocutors,whetheractual(as indifferencepolitics)orreconstructed(fromcanonical textsandothermedia),theseapproachesallmodelcross-culturalinfluenceorexchangeasaperformancebyindividuals.Thenegotiationofculturaldifferenceactseithertointerrogateself-identity(thegoalsofhybridityorcosmopolitandiscourse)ortogainintelligibilityofforeignwaysoflifeasameanstogreatermutualunderstanding.Forthosehopingtocraftaviablepoliticaltheoryfromcross-culturalexchange,theissueiscommensura-bility and its goal or resolution is mutual understanding, often in the form of ahermeneutical intervention from a self-conscious vantage point.55 Individuals areprimarytargetsandparticipantsinthisformofinteraction:it isthroughindividualactsofcomprehension,psychologicaladjustment,commitment,andexpressionthatmutual intelligibility ismadepossible.Thepossibilityof groundinganalysis inanalternative set of theoretically self-sufficient categories,whichpotentially offer aninternal diversity of interpretations and resources, is never broached because theanalysisremainscenteredonthetropeoractualperformanceofinterpersonalcom-munication(inthecaseofdialogicandtranslationmodels)orself-awarenessofone’spositionorculturalconstitution(aswithhybridityandcosmopolitanism).Howevermuch each individual may share his knowledge with others, the performance ofcross-cultural thinking remains irreducibly individual; it is not a matter of socialtransformation,sharedpractices,orinstitution-building.

ManyWesternLearningthinkers,incontrast,hopedtosetintomotionculturallydistinctinstitutionsandwaysoflifethatare,bydefinition,sociallydistributedandperformedratherthanpersonallyaccessible.Thisdifferenceingoalproducesadif-

LeighK.Jenco 107

ferenceinmethod,revealingtowhatextentthemutual-intelligibilityapproachfailstoaddressboththeinstitutionalizedandinterconnectedmultiplicityofsociallifeandculturalmeaningaswellastheneedtoaddressandengagecommunitiesratherthanindividualsinthesearchforcross-culturalknowledge.Applyingsuchaviewoflearn-ing to cross-cultural borrowing, asTan does, dynamizes across space rather thansimplyacrosstimeananthropologicalorsocial-scienceviewofculturalpractices.Borrowinga“culture”oroneof its forms, then,mustsomehowpreservethisplaybetweensharedsymbols,ontheonehand,andcreativedeploymentoforcriticalresistancetothem,ontheother.

Tan’s elaboration of the mutually constitutive qi/dao relationship offers onemeansthroughwhichwecanbegintomoveculturalpracticesacrossspaces(andnotmerelythroughtime).Byshowingthattheyarelearned—thatis,learnable —practicesthatbothproduceandinformalooselycoherentsemioticsystem,Tanmaintainsthetension between tradition and innovation that marks all cultural production.Theproblemthisintroduces,ofcourse,isthatbyadoptingasemioticsystemthatendowsactionsandinstitutionswithmeaning,suchlearningpointstosocietyratherthantheindividualasthesiteoftransformation.Themereunderstandingofhowgivensys-temsworkbyoneindividualisofnodirectuse.

The Path Forward

Tanhasbynomeansresolvedallthedilemmasofcross-culturalborrowing,buthehassetthemonaproductivenewtrack.Specifically,herefutespresumptionsoftheintractability(ifnottheintelligibility)ofculturaldifferenceamidstaworldbereftofobjectivepointsofadjudication.Whilemanycurrentcomparativetheoristsandphi-losophersseektocounterfalseuniversalismbytyingclaimstoparticular,negotiatedcontexts,theunfortunateresultisthatculturaldifferences—whetherornotseentobederivedfromandreducibletoethnicdifferences—arerenderedifnotunintelli-giblethenunusableto“outsiders.”Accordingtothisview,onlymutualintelligibilityorahybrid,emerginguniversaldiscourse(notconversionorthedevelopmentofthe“other’s”categoriesfromtheinside)ispossible.RoxanneEuben,forexample,explic-itlyjustifiesthetaskofcomparativepoliticaltheoryonthebasisofsharedconcernsthatinformbutdonotsupplantWesterndiscourses:“non-Westernperspectivesmayprovidenew(newtotheWest,thatis)answerstoouroldquestions”56—apparentlyleavingthecapacityforposingquestionsfirmlywithinalready-developedWesternmodesofinquiry.57

“Authenticity”begins to refute these assumptionsbypointing to the external,replicablepractices,objects,andinstruments,orqi,thatdrawuponand/orconstituteaconstellationofshiftingandhermeneuticallyopensociety-widevalues,commit-ments,andcharacteristics(dao),suggestinginturndilemmasthataremorecomplexthanthosethatattendtranslation,cross-culturaldialogue,oridiosyncraticperceptionsofselfandother.Forone,readingcross-culturalexchangeastheacquisitionofdaosbytheimplementationofqisuggeststhatourgoalcanbetogainfacilityinwhollynewmodesof inquiryrather thansimplytoacquiresubstantiveideas.Scholarsof


particulardaosaffirmthetheoreticalintegrityofthosedaosbyactuallyfosteringtheirinternaldevelopment—“goingon”astheydo—ratherthansimplydocumentingthetraditionsorphilosophiesexistingwithinagivencontextorterritory.Althoughthismodelsetsnolimitonwhocanmeaningfullypursuesuchdevelopments,itdoesre-quireaggressivereproductionofwhatareperceivedtobefoundationalpremises,aswellastheinstitutionsthatgroundparticularcommunitiesofinquiry.Themodelthusaccountsforthepossibilitythatculturalfoundations—asconceptionsthatbothinter-pretandareinterpreted—mayexceedtheirexpressioninanyparticulartextorsetoftexts,mayfurnishalternativecounter-discoursesandinternalcritique,andmaydrawfromhithertounseenculturallyembeddedbutnotessentializedlogicsthatcanbefurtherdevelopedtoformanewresearchprograminavarietyofculturalcontexts.

InsomewaysTan’smodelresemblesAlasdairMacIntyre’sargumentabouthowwegainaccesstoerstwhileforeignwaysofthought.ForMacIntyre,learningaforeigndaowouldinvolvelearninga“secondfirst language”that involvesdeepacquain-tancewithnotonlybodiesoftheorybutalso“theculturalandhistoricalcontextsinandthroughwhichtheyoriginallyderivedtheirintelligibilityaspartofasequenceconstitutingthatkindoftraditionofinquirywhichisthebearerofadevelopingthe-ory.”58ButwhereMacIntyrepresumesatightandnearlyinsurmountableconnectionbetweendistinctlifeforms(orcultures)anddistinctbodiesoftheory,59Tanunder-scoresthesometimesunevenascriptionof“cultural”differencetovariouslifeexperi-ences that may or may not have direct relationships to the intellectual concernsunder scrutiny,oreven toculturally situatedwaysof thinkingat all.Withcarefulcultivationofcertainqi,Tanclaims,largeparcelsofWestern“thinking”canbefaith-fullyreproducedanddevelopedinfuturewaysbyChinesescholars,buthedoesnotprescribeinadvance,orever,thedaothatsuchqiultimatelybringsforth.

ThegreatstrengthofTan’sideaisthathegivesusentrypointsintowhatisulti-matelyacomplexentitysubjecttointerpretationandonlylimitedhumancompre-hension.Daointhisviewisnotacircumscribed,graspableobject,liketheideaof“culture”onemaygleanfromatouristguidebook,butthisdoesnotmeanitistrac-tableonlythroughinteractionswith,orthearticulatedself-identityof,situatedindi-viduals.Asaninterlockedseriesofinteractionsandknowledgeproducedbycountlessindividuals,thesedaosaremultilayeredandrich.Reproducingtheirpremisesdoesproducesomethingmeaningful,evenifnecessarilypartial.Tan’snotionofaradicallyopen-endeddao enables a formofborrowing focused lesson identifyingdistinctideasthatcanbecontributionstoalreadyexistingdiscoursesthanitisoninaugurat-ingnewfieldsofinquiry,aswellasnewwaysoflifeinacommunityoflike-mindedothers.

Notes

IwouldliketothankGuyAlitto,SteveAngle,MarkBevir,PerryCaldwell,JackDon-nelly,BenjaminElman,LiWanquan,TalLewis,LoyHui-Chieh,JenLondon,EmilyNacol,TanSorHoon,LisaWedeen,TimWeston,andthetwoanonymousreviewers

LeighK.Jenco 109

ofthisessayfortheirhelpinsharpeningtheideasIexplorehere.IpresentedsomeoftheideasinthisessayattheDepartmentofEastAsianStudies,PrincetonUniversity;theDepartmentofChineseStudies,NationalUniversityofSingapore;andtheInsti-tuteofModernHistory,AcademiaSinica.Ithankalloftheseaudiencesfortheirhelpandquestions.

1–Idiscussthisargumentinmoredetailbelow,butseeLeighJenco,“‘WhatDoesHeaven Ever Say?’A Methods-CenteredApproach to Cross-Cultural Engage-ment,”American Political Science Review 101(4)(November2007):741–755,forfurtherelaborationofhowconcernsaboutequalityinformthemethodologyofmuchcontemporarycross-culturaltheory.

2–Thereare,ofcourse,notableexceptions,suchasStephenC.Angle,Sagehood: The Contemporary Significance of Neo-Confucian Philosophy(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009).Ileavemoredetailedargumentforlaterintheessay.

3–Lisa Wedeen, “Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science,”American Political Science Review96(4)(2002):717.

4–CharlesTaylor,“InterpretationandtheSciencesofMan,”inPhilosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers,2 (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1985),p.36.

5–WangXianming,infact,pointsoutthatdao/qiandrelatedformulations(suchasben/zhi[root/branch])precededtherelativelylate(ca.1895)developmentofti/yong as constitutive of Western Learning discourse. See Wang Xianming,“Zhongtixiyong:Jindaixinxuedewenhuamoshi,”inJindai xinxue: Zhongguo chuantong xueshu wenhua de shanbian yu chonggou (Beijing:ShangwuYin-shuguan,2000),p.252.

6–Tze-kiHonhasrecentlyarguedthatZhang’sstancewasnotstarklyconservativesomuchasiturgedcooperationbetweenextremistsonbothsidestopromote“a critical evaluation of [China’s] traditional institutions as well as a globalvision.”SeeHon,“ZhangZhidong’sProposalforReform:ANewReadingoftheQuanxuepian,”inPeterZarrowandRebeccaKarl,eds.,Rethinking the 1898 Reform Period(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityAsiaCenter,2002),p.88.Itremainsthecase,however,thatZhanginterpretsthestudyofWesternLearn-ingasproperlysubsequentto,andinformedby,foundationalChineselearning(p.90).

7–ZhangZhidong, “QuanxuePian,” inZhang Zhidong quanxue pian, ed. LuoBingliang(Beijing:HuaXiaChubanshe,2002),p.34.

8–Hon,“ZhangZhidong’sProposalforReform,”p.82.

9–FengGuifen,“CaiXixueyi,”inJiao bin lu kang yi(Taibei:WenhaiChubanshe,1971),p.152.

10–WangTao,Tao Yuan wen lu wai bian,ed.ZhangDainian,Zhongguoqimengsixiangwenku(Shenyang:LiaoningRenminChubanshe,1994),pp.22–23.


11–ZhengGuanying,Shengshi weiyan,2vols.,Zhongguoshixuecongshu(Taibei:TaianXueshengShuju,1965),pp.26–27.

12–JohnKingFairbankandMerleGoldman,China: A New History (Cambridge,MA:BelknapPress,1998),p.217;JosephR.Levenson,Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: A Trilogy(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1958).

13–LukeS.K.Kwong,“TheT’i-YungDichotomyandtheSearchforTalentinLateCh’ingChina,”Modern Asian Studies27(2)(1993).

14–Todaytheterm“WesternLearning”inscribesabroadrangeofdebatescenteredon themeaninganddesirabilityofWesternization inChineseacademicandsocial life, articulated largely by reference to this earlier discussion and itscategoriesofti/yong.See,forexample,FangChaohui,“Zhongxue” yu “Xixue”: Chong xin jie du xian dai Zhongguo xueshu shi(Baoding:HebeiDaxueChu-banshe,2002).

15–YanFu,“Yu‘Waijiaobao’zhurenlunjiaoyushu,”inYan Fu xuanji,ed.ZhouZhenfu(Beijing:RenminWenxueChubanshe,2004),p.146.

16–TanSitong,Tan Sitong quanji,ed.CaiShangsiandFangXing,1sted.,2vols.(Beijing:ZhonghuaShuju,1981),p.197.Hereafter,allreferencestothisworkwillbecitedasQuanjifollowedbythepagenumber.

17–AccordingtoStevenPlatt,TanbelievedthatthetrueteachingsofConfuciusandMencius were preserved in the work of Wang Fuzhi and fellow Hunanesescholarsalone.Tansawitashisresponsibilitytoperpetuatethe“blood”ofhisancestorWangbyemphasizingpracticallearningthat“servedrealconditions”(Platt,Provincial Patriots: The Hunanese and Modern China[Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2007],p.72).

18–ImakenoclaimshereabouthowandtowhatextenttheessaysunderscrutinyherefitinwithTan’smorewell-knownRenxue,writtenlaterandafterTanbe-cameconvincedofthesupremacyofBuddhismasasourceofreligiousguid-ance.Therearesignificantcontinuities,however,specificallytheemphasisonmaterialforcesorobjects(inRenxue,“ether”oryitai)asconstituentembodi-ments of moral and social values, and the affirmation of “names” (ming) aspower-saturated,sociallyconstructedlabelsratherthanindicatorsofaninde-pendentlyexistingreality;seeRenxue,1sted.(Beijing:ZhonghuaShuju,1958),pt.1,chaps.1,5,8.(FormoreonTan’sstatusasamaterialist,seeLiZehou,“LunTanSitongdezhexuesixiangheshehuizhengzhiguandian,”inKang You-wei Tan Sitong sixiang yanjiu [Shanghai:RenminChubanshe,1958],sec.2.)One explanation for Tan’s return to Chinese rather than explicitly Westernframeworksmaybehisdiscovery,alludedtoinhisearlierworkssuchasSi pian(On thinking) (Quanji, pp. 122–152), thatChina alreadypossessedmuchofwhatheformerlytooktobenovelWesterninventions(qi).Inthiscase,hedoesnotcontradicthisdao/qitheorysomuchaschangehisevaluationofhowmuchWesternqiChinaneededtoborrowinordertoproduceWesterndao.

LeighK.Jenco 111

19–InalettertohisfriendTangFuchen,Tannotedthataroundthetimeofhisthir-tiethbirthday,his thoughtunderwent“anenormous transformation” (Quanji,pp.259–260).

20–Notethattheqiofdao/qiandtheqiofli/qiaredifferentcharactersandmean-ings,despitetheiridenticalromanization.Iwillindicatethelatterasqi2.

21–Zhang Dainian, Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy, trans. Edmund Ryden(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,2002),pp.224–225;ChenDianyun,“WangFuzhilun‘dao’he‘qi’,”inWang Fuzhi bianzheng fa sixiang yinlun,ed.XiaoShafu(Wuhan:HubeiRenminChubanshe,1984),pp.162–163.

22–LukeK.S.Kwong,T’an Ssu-T’ung, 1865–1898: Life and Thought of a Reformer(Leiden:E.J.Brill,1996),p.110;Tu-kiMin,National Polity and Local Power: The Transformation of Late Imperial China(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1989),pp.80–85.

23–IntheSi pian,section2,Quanji,p.123,Tanconnectsqiastheuniquekeytoboth“fundamentals”(ben)anddao.

24–ComparethistoWangFuzhi’sclaimthat“knowledge”(zhi)and“faculty”(neng)are the two“uses” (yong) thatcomplete ti (WangFuzhi,Zhou yi wai zhuan(Beijing:ZhonghuaShuju,1977[1655]),p.157).

25–Feng,“CaiXixueyi.”

26–This philosophical implication was identified and more fully questioned byothers,includingBiFucheng,asWangXianmingnotes,inWang,“Zhongtixiyong:Jindaixinxuedewenhuamoshi,”pp.253–254.

27–MarkCsikszentmihalyi,Readings in Han Chinese Thought(Indianapolis:Hack-ett,2006),p.65.

28–HellmutWilhelm,Heaven, Earth, and Man in the Book of Changes (Seattle:UniversityofWashingtonPress,1977),pp.32–33.IntheRenxue, TanaffirmsthatthechangesasinterpretedbyWangFuzhispeakonlyofvisibility,notofabsolutenotionsofexistence(whichTanpresumesareinscrutableand/ornon-existentintheBuddhistsense).SeeTan,Renxue,pt.1,sec.12.

29–Wilhelm,Heaven, Earth, and Man in the Book of Changes,p.34.

30–Yan,“Yu‘Waijiaobao’zhurenlunjiaoyushu.”

31–Hans-GeorgGadamer,Truth and Method,trans.JoelWeinsheimerandDonaldG.Marshall,2ndrev.ed.(NewYork:Continuum,1989).

32–CharlesTaylor,“ThePoliticsofRecognition,”inMulticulturalism and “The Poli-tics of Recognition” (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1992);FredDall-mayr,“BeyondMonologue:ForaComparativePoliticalTheory,”Perspectives on Politics4(2)(2004).

33–RoxanneEuben,Enemy in theMirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism: A Work of Comparative Political Theory (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1999),p.13.


34–Forexample,Euben,Enemy in the Mirror;FredR.Dallmayr,Beyond Oriental-ism: Essays on Cross-Cultural Encounter (Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,1996);StephenC.Angle,Human Rights and Chinese Thought: A Cross-Cultural Inquiry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Daniel A.Bell,East Meets West: Human Rights and Democracy in East Asia(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2000).

35–FredDallmayr,Alternative Visions: Paths in the Global Village (Lanham,MD:RowmanandLittlefield,1998),p.7.

36–RaimundoPanikkar,“What IsComparativePhilosophyComparing?” in Inter-preting across Boundaries, ed. Gerald Larson and Eliot Deutsch (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1988),pp.127–129.Foramorethoroughcritiqueofthedialogicmodel,specificallytheEurocentrismofitsowncategories,seeLeighJenco,“‘WhatDoesHeavenEverSay?’”

37–JeremyWaldron,“MinorityCulturesandtheCosmopolitanAlternative,”Uni-versity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform25,no.751(1992):785.

38–PratapBhanuMehta, “Cosmopolitanismand theCircleofReason,”Political Theory28(5)(2000):630.

39–AlasdairC.MacIntyre,“Incommensurability,Truth,and theConversationbe-tweenConfuciansandAristoteliansabouttheVirtues,”inCulture and M odernity: East-West Philosophic Perspectives,ed.EliotDeutsch(Honolulu:UniversityofHawai‘iPress,1991),pp.114–115;MacIntyre,Whose Justice? Which Rational-ity?(NotreDame:UniversityofNotreDamePress,1988),p.327.

40–JeremyWaldron,“WhatIsCosmopolitan?”Journal of Political Philosophy8(2)(2000):242.

41–WillKymlicka,Liberalism, Community and Culture(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1989).

42–Mehta,“CosmopolitanismandtheCircleofReason,”p.620.

43–MacIntyre,Whose Justice? Which Rationality? pp. 374–375, 382–383, 394–395.

44–Forexample,LydiaH.Liu,Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity —China, 1900–1937 (Stanford: StanfordUniversityPress,1995).

45–For example, Uma Narayan, Dislocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions, and Third-World Feminism: Thinking Gender(NewYork:Routledge,1997),chap.4.

46–CharlesLindholm,Culture and Authenticity (Malden,MA:Blackwell,2008),p.2.

47–Oxford English Dictionaryonlineedition,q.v.“authentic.”

48–AdamB.Seligmanetal.,Ritual and Its Consequences: An Essay on the Limits of Sincerity(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2008),p.9.

LeighK.Jenco 113

49–The relevant definition provided by the OED for “authentic” reads: “Reallyproceeding from its reputed sourceor author;ofundisputedorigin, genuine(Opposedtocounterfeit, forged, apocryphal ).”

50–Oxford English Dictionaryonlineedition,q.v.“genuine.”

51–CharlesTaylor,The Ethics of Authenticity(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1992),pp.82etpassim.

52–KangYouwei,Kongzi gai zhi kao(Taibei:TaiwanShangwuYinshuguan,1968).

53–BenjaminA.Elman,From Philosophy to Philology: Intellectual and Social As-pects of Change in Late Imperial China,2ndrev.ed.(LosAngeles:UCLAAsianPacificMonographSeries,2001),pp.32–34.

54–Ibid.,p.35.

55–Suchinterventionsdonotalwaystaketheexplicitformofdialogue,thoughtheyofteneffectivelyimitateitinsuchmattersastheselectionandexegesisoftextsforstudy.SeeGadamer,whopointsoutthesimilaritybetweenreadingatextandreachinganunderstandinginaconversation:“Justaseachinterlocutoristryingtoreachagreementonsomesubjectwithhispartner,soalsotheinter-preter is trying to understand what the text is saying” (Gadamer, Truth and Method,p.370).

56–Euben,Enemy in the Mirror,p.11.

57–EubennotesfurtherthatinaworlddominatedbyWesternhegemonyandcolo-nialism, “questionswe take tobeourshaveceased tobe soexclusively ...becausetheyhavecometoframethesensibilitiesofnon-Westernersaswell”(ibid.,p.10).

58–MacIntyre,“Incommensurability,Truth,andtheConversationbetweenConfu-ciansandAristoteliansabouttheVirtues,”pp.114–115.

59–Forexample,inWhose Justice? Which Rationality? MacIntyreoftenconstruestraditionsasconstitutedbyasharedcoreofessentialbeliefsgroundedinall-encompassingwaysoflife(pp.355–356),whichhelaterspecifiesasdistinctlyunchosen(“Incommensurability,”p.116).

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