levinas and ethics of care

ABSTRACT. In this paper, we suggest the likely effects of the application ofEmmanuel Levinas’s philosophy to the care ethic, particularly as it is represent-ed by the author Joan Tronto, one of the most cogent exponents of care ethics.Thus, we ask: does Levinas’s philosophy have enough in common with the careethic to be able to overlap it and fruitfully address shared issues of pressingimportance? And, is Levinas’s philosophy different enough to challenge the careethic and help it grow in the ways that it must to become a more philosophical-ly recognized and viable perspective? Our answer is affirmative in both regards.This paper does not intend to criticize the philosophy of Levinas on the basis ofcare ethics (as it is our conviction that care ethics has precious little on which tocriticize Levinas, apart from his view of women) but instead lends the care ethica perspective with the philosophical legitimacy that it has been hitherto lacking.In terms of alterations to the care ethics, we believe first and foremost that, froma Levinasian point of departure, it would be necessary for the care ethic to adopta greater awareness of asymmetry in the ethical relation, as well as become morefuture-oriented towards the consequences of the individual agent’s (intentionalor non-intentional) actions.

KEYWORDS. Levinas, Tronto, care ethics, other, particularity, asymmetry

INTRODUCTION

It is our goal in this paper to explore whether or not a philosophicalfoundation, in the vein of the ideas of Emmanuel Levinas, can be

Towards A Levinasian Care Ethic:A Dialogue between the Thoughts of Joan Tronto and Emmanuel Levinas

W. Wolf DiedrichDoctoral student, K.U.Leuven

Roger BurggraeveFaculty of Theology, K.U.Leuven

Chris GastmansInterfaculty Centre for Biomedial Ethics and Law,

K.U.Leuven

ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ETHICS NETWORK 13, no. 1 (2003): 33-61.© 2006 by European Centre for Ethics, K.U.Leuven. All rights reserved. doi:10.2143/EP.13.1.2011786

forged and grafted onto the care ethic perspective. To accomplish this, we will narrow the discussion to two voices — that of Levinas and thatof the contemporary care ethicist, Joan Tronto. In what follows, we willevaluate the compatibility of these two authors’ relevant writings andattempt to identify any potential stumbling blocks to a successful dialoguebetween the two different, yet not overly divergent world views represent-ed by each author. First, we will present some of the core concepts ofTronto, then some basic ideas from Levinas, so that we may ultimatelycompare two in the conclusion of this essay.

This paper is rooted in the conviction that Levinas can help lend thekind of philosophical credence that many care ethics authors have beenrequesting for some years now. In its reaction to an ethic of justice — anethic that categorizes responses to situations based on universal principles— the care ethic, or care perspective, can also be viewed as a reaction tothe whole history of Greek metaphysical reduction in Western philoso-phy. With its stress on the necessity of positively valuing particularity, thecare perspective emphasizes the viewpoint of the alien other, falling out-side the scope of the Western canon of thinking. Insofar as this is thecase, it is our thesis that the tenets of an ethics of care stand close to theideas of certain other postmodern thinkers — specifically, those thinkerswho have radically called into question the method of thinking aboutreality that philosophy has for so long embraced. At stake in this compar-ison the determination of whether or not the writings of Levinas wouldbe suitable for providing a philosophical grounding to the care perspec-tive that is appropriate and other to the classical philosophical groundingthat lends shape to the autonomy-centred ethics of justice.

TRONTO’S STANCE WITH REGARD TO THE ETHICS OF CARE DEBATE

In her 1993 book, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care,Tronto offers the following definition of care, devised in collaborationwith Berenice Fisher:

ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES – MARCH 2006

— 34 —Ethical Perspectives 13 (2006) 1

On the most general level, we suggest that caring be viewed as a speciesactivity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, andrepair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible. Thatworld includes our bodies, our selves, and our environment, all ofwhich we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web.1

This definition has been disparaged as being too broad, vague, and amor-phous.2 However, it is precisely this definition’s inchoate character thatmakes it appropriate for typifying the care ethic. With so many differentauthors positioning themselves in such different ways to qualify the careethic at the present time, the broadest definitions will be best for includingthe widest range possible of care ethicists.3 That being said, we are in noway suggesting that Tronto is, or should be taken as, the representative ofcare ethics. Nevertheless, since Tronto develops a coherent and easily trace-able line of thought in her work, she is a very fitting candidate for initiatinga dialogue with philosophy, on behalf of the care perspective. Moreover,unlike some care ethics authors, Tronto intimately concerns herself withthe question of how to bestow upon the care perspective greater currencyand respect in the social and political spheres. Tronto’s brand of care ethics,if you will, maintains an exigent need for an apposite philosophical anthro-pology capable of legitimating the care ethic for a sceptical intellectual audi-ence — many of whom perceive the care movement as merely speaking ofan ethics of friendship that is incompetent to treat serious moral dilemmas.

During a lecture presented at the Catholic University of Leuven,“Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care: Care, Ethics and Politics,”Tronto poses the following two questions with regard to the care ethic:

I. If care is promising as a concept, why has it not been concretelyimplemented yet?

II. Is there a way to re-envision the care ethic taking the previousquestion into account?

To answer the first question, Tronto proposes several hypotheses. Thesehypotheses all revolve around the insight that even a moral concept as


DIEDRICH – BURGGRAEVE – GASTMANS

seemingly incorruptible as ‘care’ can be misappropriated and abused. If careis viewed as a practise in which one reaches out to those in need, then theconquests of various missionaries of the Americas can be seen as a functionof care. After all, colonists also understood their mission in part as bringingculture and religion (salvation) to the helplessly ignorant. Perhaps most detri-mental to the serious consideration of the care ethic is a phenomenonTronto identifies as “privileged irresponsibility.” This entrenched prejudicefunctions in Western societies by holding a predilection for thinking thatimportant people are not required to do less important tasks. That is, onewho occupies a position of relative authority or responsibility for a businessor organisation is not inclined to feel responsible for making sure that heputs his rubbish in the correct container — ‘someone is hired to separate therecyclables from the other trash,’ is the presupposition. Normal duties ofcare are viewed as menial tasks for people with nothing better to do, or withno possibility to make something better of themselves. People who areinvolved in the abstract over-seeing of society are viewed as important, whilenurses who change bedpans are viewed as unimportant by comparison.Obviously, this leads people to think that care is not a worthwhile value.4

As to the second question, Tronto’s principal petition is that care ethi-cists begin to think about how an ethic of care might work within the con-text of existing political and social models, given the depiction of care thatshe offers. In order to do this, she claims that care ethicists must begin totake seriously the legal, social, political and ethical boundaries that havebeen erected by society in order to prevent the positive valuation of caringtasks, as well as care in general. Tronto holds that once we become mindfulof the boundaries, we can begin to deconstruct them, as they are human cre-ations, and not the product of ingrained biological or natural programming.

TRONTO’S POLITICS OF CARE

According to Tronto, care is a perspective, and likewise a litmus test,through which the ethical quality of various forms of behaviour can be



evaluated according to both their efficacy and honesty in an ethical sense.This caveat is critically placed, since, as Tronto reiterates in variously inMoral Boundaries, “by focusing on care, we focus on the process by whichlife is sustained, we focus on human actors acting.”5 An ethic of care canonly be of aid to the society that implements it if, and only if, it is viewedas a supplemental guide to otherwise functioning systems of justice.Tronto makes the case that the universalists worry needlessly, since thereis no need to abolish the justice paradigm for care ethics to receive atten-tion (even most reactionary care ethicists agree that we as a society wouldbe worse off without any notion of justice). Rather, there is only a needto show where the justice paradigm is incomplete and re-draw theboundaries of the understanding of political power, such that care canbecome part of the paradigm instead of constantly dwelling pointlesslyoutside the walls of the state’s legitimacy.6 What is needed is a shift inemphasis, the creation of a more caring form of justice, rather than thefull pendulum swing that is sometimes alluded to by other authors whocan’t seem to conceive of how care and justice can share a stage at thesame time.

Attempting to challenge the boundary that prevents care from beingtaken seriously in the public sphere, Tronto takes Aristotle as a chiefinspiration in formulating an ethic of care that contains a political dimen-sion. In Aristotle’s ethics, a person cannot become good unless they liveand work in a good polis — that is, politically structured society. As such,Tronto considers Aristotle a moral maximalist, as he requires much ofindividuals and their respective community in order for moral life to existat all.7 For Aristotle, fostering and developing virtues is necessarily a socialevent, not an isolated, individual project one performs ensconced in thecorner of a dimly lit room while contemplating theological and philosoph-ical treatises. However, rather than seeing these two as inextricably inter-woven and dependant upon one another, most moralists and politicianssince Aristotle wish either to make political life an instrument for realiz-ing moral principles, or to make morality an instrument for political,



power-motivated ends.8 Tronto instead agrees with Aristotle that morali-ty and politics can and should dynamically interact with one another, andthat neither politics nor morality should have a sanctioned ascendancyover the other. Because politicians and moralists are at loggerheads onthis issue, though, politics and morality have come to be two separatedrealms of life. It is precisely this preternatural separation that concernsTronto. Tronto argues that the separation between politics and moralitycan be stated differently as the separation between the public and theprivate.9 Tronto sees this boundary as social and not natural, and thus,susceptible to deconstruction. The distinction between public and privatehas led Western cultures to develop two distinct forms of morality thathave not been allowed to intermingle. On the one hand, there is themorality of politics, a Machiavellian-type doctrine that is only concernedwith morality insofar as it can help the politician gain more power andcontrol over the public domain. On the other hand, there is the moralityof the home, the traditional sphere of women and the family.10 It is in thisenvironment that relationships and concerns for particular individualscome to the fore. Tronto regards the home as the original foundation forthe care ethic, and more or less praises the values that emanate from thismilieu. However, chief to Tronto’s argument is that the ethic of care isuseless in terms of its possibility to transform society for the better unlessthe boundary (although not the distinction!) between the morality of theprivate and the morality of the public is abrogated. Tronto urges her read-ers that unless moral boundaries are taken seriously and seen for whatthey are — walls that accord legitimacy on one side and illegitimacy onthe other — there can never be a culturally viable equality between menand women. Women, as yet, seek equal footing with men in a contextwhere the boundary between public and private persists — meaning equalfooting is defined only from the perspective of the public side of theboundary. The implication of this view is far reaching: rather than talk, asCarol Gilligan does, about care and justice as being two sides of a coin, acoin whose two sides cannot be emphasized simultaneously, Tronto will



argue that care and justice are concepts that are distinguishable from eachother, but cannot ever be separated from each other in practise. That is tosay, a well-developed notion of justice is impossible without a well-devel-oped notion of care, and vice versa. Tronto thus defines justice as “thecontinued care for the common good.”11

Tronto is in line with the conviction that an ethic of care should befundamentally a non-violent ethic.12 However, constructing an overarch-ing theory of care in her view will necessarily call for an end to thecelebrations of an ethic of care as a product of gender difference thatpoints to women’s superiority, perhaps much to the chagrin of some fem-inist care ethics authors.13 This is not to say Tronto is not a feminist in herown right, but merely that she sees the care ethic as having a more glob-al import than what it was originally conceived to have. It is also worthmentioning along these lines that Tronto admonishes people to be sensi-tive to the fact that human beings comport themselves to their respectiverealities neither according to a way posited by advocates of isolated auton-omy, nor in way theorized by supporters of a caring paradigm thatexcludes (or at least de-values) the value of principles. Care requiresautonomy and justice in order to fulfil its goals, since care strives, in mostcircumstances, toward making others autonomous in their own right.14

Should care lose sight of this, a care ethic will be a tool for imprisoningothers rather than helping or teaching others. In this way, Tronto pleadsfor what other care ethicists have dubbed an understanding of “relation-al autonomy.”15 In this view, our autonomy is always heteronomous insome sense, dependant upon another’s gift, as well as being contextuallydependant.

Thus, Levinas seems to appear in some of Tronto’s statements:“Caring seems to involve taking the concerns and needs of the other asthe basis for action…what is definitive about care…seems to be a per-spective of taking the other’s needs as the starting point for what must bedone.”16 In much of his writings, Levinas is concerned, if not almostobsessed, with an ethics that is built not on autonomy, but rather,



heteronomy (more precisely, an ethics that understands heteronomy andautonomy as connected existential realities). For Levinas, it is the other,and not I, who is the genesis of any ethical relation. Because Tronto andLevinas have the same basic point of departure when it comes to ethics,we are warranted in asking the larger question of whether or not they allo-cate a similar concept of political and ethical responsibility. To the extentto which they do, we may begin to speak of a ‘Levinasian care ethic.’ Inwhat follows, we will explore, to the extent possible in a short essay, theideas of Levinas in order to pursue this question.

THE OTHER IN THE WRITINGS OF LEVINAS

In nearly all of his writings, and especially in his magnum opus of 1961,Totality and Infinity, Levinas tries to describe how it is possible, in philo-sophical terms, to have a relationship with the other that is non-allergic.In contradistinction to the Greek method of philosophising, Levinaswants to reject the notion that the other has quiddity (that-ness, or what-ness), and as such, amend some of what may be called the racist tenden-cies of Western thought.17 Traditionally, people in the West have made ahabit, an institution even, of dividing their world into two parts: therealm of truth and the realm of falsehood, or the spheres of the sacredand profane, or spirit and matter — the list of examples can be enumer-ated ad infinitum. Whatever words one may use as paradigmatic terms toillustrate this phenomenon, the underlying idea is that in life only goodand evil exist, and only the good is praiseworthy. By dividing the worldsuch, and emphasizing the need to choose only one path to the detrimentof the other, people in the West have striven to make universality domi-nate particularity. The favoured pastime of empire building (whether itbe the Greek, Roman, French, Spanish, English, German, or American)is a concrete example and consequence of this way of thinking about theworld.



Western society has long maintained an allergic relationship to thesealien others, in its thought and its treatment of them. Thales, at the birthof Western philosophy, inaugurates the canon of Greek thinking by look-ing for the substrate, the principle of unity for all reality. Once the substrateis identified, all things are viewed as a mere function of the principle.Likewise, all people are reduced to a function of thought. Instead of allow-ing their voice to be heard, their particularity must be overcome so thatthey are nothing more than an echo of the pre-selected arche. It is at thispoint that the switch is surreptitiously and almost seamlessly made fromdialoguing with the other to codifying, categorizing, and instrumentalizingthe other. The other, instead of being considered in terms of his “who-ness” is now considered in terms of his “what-ness.” More specifically, byassuming a static, comprehensible nature to the human person “… thequestion ‘who’ amounts to a ‘what’.”18 Instead of making an allowance forthe person in and of himself, secondary characteristics and specific quali-ties are considered first — sex, colour of skin, race, religious beliefs, etc.The other which stands in defiance to my way of compressing and squeez-ing the world into an intelligible totality must be bested, and never listenedto on his or her own terms. This is, according to a certain view, the under-side of the legacy of Western philosophy and Western society.

Levinas wants to aver that exteriority, or the group that falls outsidethe empire, does not connote a failed unity. Levinas believes that Westernthought has always viewed exteriority negatively because it only thinks ofseparation in terms of lack or need, instead of recognizing a Good that isbeyond the totality.19 One of the principle goals of Totality and Infinity is toshow that it is precisely separation that makes truth possible.20 InLevinas’s view, separation and distinctions lie at the base of intelligibility,not unity or singularity. Because of this conviction, he stands in directopposition to the Greek understanding of plurality as chaos. God createsin order to have multiplicity, and this multiplicity destroys the chaos ofthe Hebrew “tohu wa bohu,” the formlessness of unified reality bereft ofindividuality.



Levinas thinks that individuals may have, at least in certain circum-stances, a non-allergic relationship to otherness; however, the philosoph-ical tradition has not been able to recognize this fact previously in an ade-quate way, due to the very way philosophy functions. For Levinas,Western philosophy would seem to function primarily by identifying theknower with the known, with the identification making the two separateentities one in thought.21 Thus, Levinas tries to provide an account of arelationship between the self and the other that exists, at least for a cer-tain duration, apart from the structures of thought. The place and modefor this special type of relationship is in and through the dialogueencounter.

In a non-technical manner of speaking, the problem can be stated inthe following way: as soon as I finish a conversation with another person,as soon as I pause to reflect, I have the opportunity to think. Once I think,I will try to understand what my discussion partner is saying in categoriesalready familiar to me. I have the chance to dissect the discussion, tounderstand it by way of any number of philosophical, psychological orscientific mediations. Essentially, I will translate the vocabulary of theother into my own vocabulary, imposing upon the other my ideas of whatthe other has said. In this way, I have reduced the otherness of the other(his alterity) to the sameness of my thought. I do not allow the other toappear in her light, but the light that I lend to her.

It is because of this truism of human experience that Levinas encour-ages his readers to take a step back before drawing conclusions about theinter-subjective relationship. Levinas pays critical attention to the momentof dialogue before the pause, that is, before the presence of reflective andcategorical ‘thought.’ Before the mediation of my thought, the thought ofthe same, there is a moment of immediacy. It is in this moment that theother is, or can be, before me in and of herself. Levinas describes thismoment as coming into contact with the face of the other. When I recognizethe face of the other, I do not recognize any specific quality or amalgam ofqualities pertaining to the other person. To the contrary, I recognize the



other outside of any role he may hold in regular or public life. The face isa living, naked presence22. A non-Levinasian example might make the pic-ture clearer: I see a businessman walking down the street, no-nonsensebriefcase in hand, dressed in a fashionable Armani suit, Ray Ban sunglass-es, chatting away on his cellular phone, oblivious to the world around him.I see a businessman. Then, as I see that man attempt to cross the street, heis mugged and stabbed by a robber. I run up to the man to see if he is okay.I see the same man before me lying on the ground, humiliated, pleading forhelp…but what I see is no longer a businessman — I see a man strippedof his role, I see his face. It is signification without specification, a “…sig-nification that cannot be assembled.”23

For Levinas however, generally speaking, I witness the face of theother in and through dialogue, and not as in the above example, since lan-guage constitutes the relation to the other (there can be no relation toanother person without language, in other words).24 As such, this immedi-ate moment of coming into contact with the face is a moment of transcen-dence, a kind of deliverance, if you will, from the ordinary structures ofbeing.25 According to the Darwinian dictates of being, or the conatus essen-di as Levinas calls it (referring quite explicitly to Spinoza), I should and willnormally seek self-preservation at any cost without regard for the other,just as it is in the animal kingdom. The order of being, or the conatus,instructs us that natural selection brutally and consistently selects only theself-insistent, clever, and powerful for continuation in the species.However, when I meet the face, I realize that I am confronted with auniquely human choice, a possibility to disobey the rules of being. The faceexhibits a strange authority over me. I realize before the face that insteadof being condemned to drown in my egoistic arrangement of the universe,I have the possibility to be brought out of myself, to learn and be taughtby the other in such a way that I am not merely reducing all exterior thingsto my pre-determined categories of understanding. True language consistsin being taught to give by the face, in the inversion of my objectifying gaze,or cognition.26 The content of the other’s instruction is ethical; it is a call



to learn through action, through response. This is what Levinas means byresponsibility in and through the other. The other calls out to me, asks ofme. I cannot ignore this call once heard; I can only choose either torespond to the other or not to respond to the other.

To put it alternately, the other teaches me in and through the priori-ty of the ‘saying’ over the ‘said.’ By this terminology, Levinas means toimply that the imminent and dynamic vehicle of ‘saying’ in the presenttense (dialogue) is the appropriate forum to discover the non-thought ori-ented teaching of the other. The medium of the ‘said,’ that which is writ-ten or recorded in some fashion, is inevitably the product of reflectivethought, and as such, represents a formal masking of the face, or thenakedness of the other. The said always proceeds from the role we playin ordinary life and retains more of a static and fixed quality. Furthermore,when we in the West invert the ethical relation and give precedence to thesaid through our scientific modes of understanding, we give pride of placeto ontology at the same time. As we discovered earlier through the reduc-tion of ‘who-ness’ to ‘what-ness,’ reducing human nature to an intelligibleand unchangeable substrate leads inevitably toward categorizing the otheramong the realm of things. The core insight that Western thinking neg-lects, and that Levinas in turn emphasizes, is that being and ontology arenot fundamental — before I can think of the other’s being I am alreadyspeaking to him, already in relation to him:

I have spoken to him, that is to say, I have neglected the universal beingthat he incarnates in order to remain with the particular being he is. Herethe formula “before being in relation with a being, I must first havecomprehended it as being” loses its strict application, for in compre-hending being I simultaneously tell this comprehension to this being.27

It is in this context that we can understand the meaning of Levinas’s state-ment, “In language qua said everything is conveyed before us, be it at theprice of a betrayal.”28 The betrayal Levinas speaks of is none other than thebetrayal of our own categories. Through ontology we mean to make a 1:1



correlation between our ideas of others, and in fact the entire cosmos thatwe inhabit, and the actual realities of these persons and things in and ofthemselves. While there is no detriment per se when we confuse our ideaof things with what they are in and of themselves, there is an enormousprice to pay in the moral sphere for confusing our ideas of others with whoothers are in and of themselves. In a simplistic sense, this is Levinas’s pri-mary complaint and critique of the traditional concept of knowledge.

RESPONSIBILITY IN THE THIRD PERSON

To properly understand the way Levinas sees ethics as operative within apolitical sphere, it is necessary to un-say, at least partially, what we havesaid thus far with regard to Levinas’s philosophical outlook. The reasonfor this back stepping is obvious when we consider that we cannot con-ceive of a political theory that does not generalize to some degree usingabstraction. Here it becomes evident that the thrust of Levinasian philos-ophy is not as anti-intellectualist as our expose of responsibility in the sec-ond person might have made it seem.29 As soon as we move away fromthe isolated ethical situation in which I am considering merely the otherin the immediacy of the moment, we cannot help but acknowledge in andthrough our impartial intellect the complex web of relations to others thatpersists before, during and after the person-to-person ethical encounter.To live in society means to live with others whom I do not know or donot immediately come into contact with, but whom nevertheless myactions indirectly affect. There is always an other who is not present at themoment, to whom I have an ethical obligation. When I am confrontedwith the arresting face of the other, I am also confronted with that per-son’s other, or ‘the third party’ for whom I am an other as well:30

Certainly, my responsibility for everyone can also manifest itself by limiting itself: the ego may be called in the name of this unlimited



responsibility to concern itself about itself as well. The fact that everyother, my neighbour, is also a “third party” in relation to another neigh-bour, invites me to justice, to weighting matters, and to thought…[this]unlimited responsibility…justifies this concern for justice and for selfand for philosophy.31

Two vital aspects must be noted in the preceding quotation. Let us con-sider them both separately. Chronologically, the first point of significancehas to do with the idea of serving the ends of responsibility by limitingresponsibility. If I allow the other to partake of my resources and myselfinfinitely, concomitant with the infinite nature of her call to me, I neglectmy responsibility to other others, who have the potential to call to me justas urgently. Building on this premise, since I am an other to another other,I need to conserve my energies. I should not expend all that I have to givein one relation, since another other calls me to responsibility for myself(responsibility in the first person) in a way that the other does not. This isthe case due to the asymmetrical priority of the other intrinsic to respon-sibility in the second person. However, the character of this responsibili-ty in the third person is not of the same order as the intentional ethicsinvolved with responsibility in the second person. An ethics that concernsitself with other others is examining the way that my actions affect otherswith whom I live in community, irrespective of whether or not I intendthese actions. Thus, we are now dwelling in the legal or political realm.Ethics of this kind can be particularly difficult, especially since there areso many effects, so many consequences that issue from my behaviour thatI do not in the least intend:

The comedy begins with the simplest of our movements, each of whichcarries with it an inevitable awkwardness. In putting out my hand toapproach a chair, I have creased the sleeve of my jacket. I havescratched the floor, I have dropped the ash from my cigarette. In doingthat which I wanted to do, I have done so many things I did not want.That act has not been pure, for I have left some traces. In wiping outthese traces, I have left others…we are thus responsible beyond ourintentions.32



If I can never expect any particular intentional act to have a determinatenumber of effects that I have power over as the person who wills this act,I must begin to seriously accept the notion I am responsible in ways thatI myself cannot understand all at once (or at least, prior to acting). I actin a sense that escapes me. The objective meaning of my actions sudden-ly prevail over my intentions.33 My interiority, or the fact that no one canstand in my place to make my decisions for me, loses its importance onceaccused by a third party.34 To live as conscious of these facts demandsvigilance from the subject — an ever watch-full eye that surveys its sur-roundings in spite of how it thinks it is relating to its surroundings. Byspending an hour of my time talking with one person about an issue ofmutual concern, I neglect fifteen minutes of time that might have beencritical for helping another friend later in the same day. Alternatively, evenmore minimally, by simply taking the first available chair to sit in a full andbustling café, I deprive another person of the possibility to enjoy the envi-ronment of that café as well. Some of the unintended consequences ofour actions are relatively benign (such as the example with the chair at thecafé), while others entail decidedly more gravity.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF APPLYING THE PHILOSOPHY OF LEVINAS TO THE

CARE ETHIC

Asymmetry as Opposed to Symmetry

The starkest contrast between the philosophy of Levinas and that of thecare ethicists centres on the notion of the asymmetry of the ethical rela-tionship. For those unfamiliar with Levinas’s work, this notion is oftenone of the most challenging to comprehend, and difficult to accept, dueto its radical conclusions. Acquiescing to the idea that the other alwaysstands in a position of height in relation to me can be confounding forthose raised in a milieu that prizes equality and egalitarianism as the



paragons of moral virtue. The complicatedness of the issue is in fact two-fold: first, the idea that the other is my master or teacher can causeone to fear that I, the subject, am nothing more than doormat for theother, a passive listener to her ethical appeals and then a slave to her arbi-trary bidding. As soon as I assert myself in the dialogue, if I question orevaluate the moral value of her teaching for me, I tamper with the ethicalnature of the encounter and it ceases to be ethical, strictly speaking. Thesecond complication arises from the contradiction that, when I meet theother, what I see is the naked, shivering, vulnerable face, without form orthe role that I customarily attribute to the person in question. How canthis vulnerability, this utter lack of authority or grandeur, be interpretedas a teacher who is lofty, who descends from a position of height to meetme? In addressing these two contentions, we can move further towardbridging the gap between Tronto and Levinas.

As to the first complication, the general disagreement from a care ethi-cist such as Tronto would stem not so much from the proscription toanalyse the value of what the other says before listening or responding tothe other, but from the inequality inherent in the asymmetrical ethical rela-tion. The issue of becoming a doormat for the other is something of a spu-rious concern for one who is acquainted with the way that Levinas’s phi-losophy is designed, however. As soon as one realises that my responsibil-ity for third parties calls me to be responsible for myself as well, the door-mat concern is alleviated. For Levinas, there’s a twist: personal responsi-bility is only derived from my responsibility to others (I take care of myselfso that I can be able to take care of other others as well), and not derivedfrom a duty towards myself. I am not important in the ethical pictureexcept in relation to others. As to the question of not evaluating the con-tent of the other’s ethical charge to me, the pseudo-scholastic method ofmeticulously prognosticating the possible moral advantages and disadvan-tages before deciding to commit to one action or another is a practice careethicists have shunned from the beginning, in favour of immersing oneselfinto a situation and becoming well versed with the narratives of all relevant



parties involved in a moral dilemma. Mentally assessing before-handwhat impact an action might have on those involved takes a secondaryposition (it is not neglected altogether!) to first getting involved in a sit-uation, accepting the otherness of the other points of view, and familiar-izing oneself with the stories of each individual person, rather thanimposing one’s own grand narrative upon the situation at hand.However, throughout this whole experience, the care ethicist assumesthat she has as much to teach to others, in the eventuality of the ensuingconversation, as she has to learn. The field of dialogue is manifestly level.Granted, the care ethicist will speak of the other’s needs as coming first,of even sacrificing oneself for the needs of the other, but never at theexpense of totally neglecting oneself. The care of oneself is still part ofthe ethical representation; it does not belong to any other domain. WhileLevinas would not necessarily disagree that such an approach can befruitful in terms of doing good, he would add that the only aspect of thecare ethicist’s approach that is ethical, properly speaking, is the aspect ofthe ethicist’s ability to be open to learn from the other, and not the aspectof the ethicist teaching the other. As soon as I wish to teach the other, Iam once again conversing in concert with my own egoistic drives. In acertain sense, Levinas just wants to make clear the distinction that it isthe egoistic or selfish quality of the interaction that cannot be acceptedfrom an ethical point of view. The actual product of egoistic involvementmay very well lead to a subsequent good for all involved, but such is acci-dental to the consideration of being immersed in the ethical sphere.Ethics is something very special and specific for Levinas; it is not anumbrella term for various practises. Ethics takes place outside the con-fines of being, it un-fetters us from egoism. Many things which otherethicists would be quick to call morally or ethically good, Levinas hesi-tates to praise in the same way. It is not that he disputes the good of cer-tain caring actions; it is only that certain caring actions (namely, thosethat proceed from egoistic concerns) are not ethical because they do nottake one out of oneself to a level of transcendence. One could say that



the difference here arises from Levinas thinking on a primarily meta-ethical level (the level of responsibility in the second person), whereasTronto is thinking only on a concrete ethical level (the level of responsi-bility in the third person, for Levinas).

The reason Levinas is intent to make the aforementioned distinctionwill become evident as we address the second contention to his doctrineof asymmetry — how it is that the other can maintain an elevated posi-tion over me, especially when it is the case that whenever I come into con-tact with the face of the other, I see nothing but helplessness. The answerto this question has much to do with the theological component toLevinas’s thought. The other stands in a position over me because theother is that person who pulls me out of myself, which effects transcen-dence.35 The other stands above me as the only one who offers an alter-native to dwelling within the labyrinthine circuits of my own interiority.By not destroying this helpless face, I realise my possibility to be some-thing other than an ego ruling a world of my own creation. The dimen-sion of height comes into play when I realise the possibility to be other tomyself, and thus to transcend, to ascend. It is here that we see more clear-ly why Levinas talks of ethics in terms of metaphysics. If being ethical hasto do with self-transcendence, doing the good has more of a meaningthan just doing the good for the others, caring for others, making theworld a better place. Ethics has to do with escaping the endless cycle ofthe ‘there-is’,36 it has to do with true liberation and freedom — a libera-tion that takes place not apart from the human community, as in the mys-tical ecstasies of cloistered saints, but one that takes place throughouthuman interactions, within our responsibility to others. It is a liberationthat entails a doing, or exercise concept, and not a liberation that is a free-dom-from anything that might hinder a subject that would prefer to be un-encumbered.37 Thus, when Levinas philosophises about ethics, hemeans to speak of something more than just how to bring the mostamount of good into a given situation, but he also wishes to comment on what is the meaning of being ethical. Stress on meaning, in terms of



self-transcendence, is absent in the ethical writings of Tronto. It is theconcept of the meaning-full-ness of ethics by which we think they mightvery well profit.

A Denunciation of Self Actualisation

Exactly how to balance conflicting responsibilities, rather than the com-peting rights of the justice paradigm, against the backdrop of the multi-plicity of relationships that we always find ourselves engaged in is a ques-tion that Tronto tackles in her work. Tronto’s response is that we musthave a politically sound version of the care ethic that is not the enemy ofjustice, but its collaborator; for, it is through the practise of justice that weuse our mental capabilities to prioritise, organise, and structure the minu-tiae of daily life. It is only with such a structure in place that care can bemaximized and made effectual. Levinas is in accord with Tronto on theissue of using justice, or philosophical thinking, as a vehicle to promoteand make the most of care, or responsibility, in the second person in histerms. However, what remains unresolved is the exact character of thisjustice or philosophical thinking that is to order and augment the originalethical impulse.

We argue that an unavoidable implication of the logical premises ofan ethic of care is that it is unable to uphold or support a liberal politicalview. If we examine some of the core presuppositions of the care ethic,this quickly becomes evident. To begin with, the care ethic honestlyaccepts the reality of human finitude, in all of its senses. Debunking themyth of the fully autonomous self-made man is a key fixation for Tronto.The fact that I cannot do anything I want, that I am limited by my respon-sibilities to those around me, and that those responsible for my ownupbringing and socialisation condition my identity in large part before I ever come to a self-conscious reflection and mastery of that identity, areall components of finitude in a broad sense. Finitude, in the specific senseof death, is something not to live in spite of, but in awareness of for the



care ethicist. If I am to be defined then by my care for others and theircare for me, it scarcely seems to follow that such a world-view could beaccurately expressed through the means of liberalism, where the ultimateend is to be as isolated and free from the hindering concerns of others aspossible. Liberalism, the political embodiment of the Romantic-Enlightenment ethic of self-actualisation, becoming the authentic ‘me’regardless of what that means for others, is nearly the complete antithesisof an ethic that strives to put the other’s concerns first. We have nochoice but to unfasten the care ethic from some of its feminist leanings ifwe are to be rationally consistent about what it means to espouse a careethic. Those who still wish to argue for abortion within care ethics mustdo so via a completely different approach than the one that has been useduntil now (presuming logical consistency is something they care for in theleast). How that might be done is not a pressing anxiety for the currentproject.

The character of a Levinasian care ethic must be such that it isevident that all forms of autonomy are rooted in a formally precedingexperience of heteronomy. The freedom of ethics, as opposed to the free-dom of being (or egoism), is always dependant and conditioned upon theinitiative of the other. The confusion over notions of freedom is some-thing that the care ethic can only be promoted by clarifying. Egoistic free-dom, the freedom that attempts to make me feel more at home in theworld, is liberal freedom, whereas ethical freedom would be faithfullyincarnated in a republican ethic that sees civic duty and the active cultiva-tion of responsibility as the constituents of liberty. While there is no needto make more of this distinction than necessary for fear of overdrawingthe antinomy, suffice it to say that a distinction exists and is helpful.Because there is a distinction, it does not mean that one pole must be cho-sen and the other excluded. As Levinas reiterates repeatedly in his writ-ings, egoistic freedom makes ethical freedom possible, since separationand difference are the grounds for truth and the means for avoiding total-ity. The two can intermingle without great distress as long as they do not



become one in the mind. What is important is that we place proper accenton which element is the ethical element so that we are left with a conclu-sive notion of what our ethics is all about.

The inherent oversight that we detect in the works of Tronto (as wellas many other care ethics authors) is that they assume care to be a self-evident practice that should obviously be carried out due to the way theworld in their view is regimented, and yet they are shocked to find thatcaring practises are being continuously marginalized and not taken seri-ously at the upper strata of power. While we believe Tronto’s explanationof why care has had difficulty being accepted (through perversions of careand the boundaries set up at the political and public level) to be persua-sive, we think it is incomplete at the same time. Most ethical systemsencourage people that by doing certain actions they will attain happiness.That happiness might be hedonistic pleasure, it might be spiritual or inte-rior, or it may be communal. However, the care ethic is not built on sucha foundation. The reason to care has to do with exigencies in the emo-tional realm. No payoff of happiness is (or can be) promised. In fact, care,especially in the literature that uses mothering as the embodiment of carepar excellence, is often filled with disappointment and tribulation, and lit-tle security. Therefore, we suggest that Levinas’s notion of responsibilitycould fill in the care ethic, since at its base is a very solid motivation forcare: namely, transcendence leading to liberation of excessive and oppres-sive in-dwelling. However, we must immediately qualify the previousstatement by adding that responsibility for Levinas is not something thatis consciously enacted by individuals, but something we are confrontedwith in spite of ourselves (i.e., I do not create the face to face encounterthat awakens my sense of responsibility in the form of questioning; itcomes to me from outside). Thus, if the occasions in which we realise thatwe are called to responsibility are not of our own choosing, it follows thata Levinasian care ethic would be much less prescriptive than what manymight prefer. All we can add is that if we are mindful of responsibility ina Levinasian sense, and are careful to make it part of our philosophical



reflection, we are much more likely to be aware of the moments when weare confronted with the face of the other and called to responsibility, andwe are much more likely to answer that call favourably rather than turnaway back into ourselves.

There are indeed those in the ethical community who will say that ifan ethical theory cannot offer systematic and tangible advice no matterwhat the circumstance — if it cannot tell you what to do with certainty —it is useless. The presumption of people who might articulate such a state-ment is no doubt something like the following: the reason there are ethi-cists in the world is because people fundamentally do not know what todo when it comes to making moral decisions, and are in need of the guid-ance of enlightened authorities (whether they want it or not, we mightadd). As abrasive and parochial as such a position may come across tosome readers, there is definitely something, from a philosophical outlook,to say for such a position. It is completely justifiable, even necessary andhelpful, to question the value of an ethic that has difficulty suggesting verydeterminate behaviour, since such an ethic is so easily given to misinter-pretation and misappropriation. In the ethical realm, a misunderstandingcan lead to the perpetration of a moral evil, which is exactly what moral-ity is aimed at avoiding. Under the influence of a pretence to knowledgeof the dictates of care that is malformed, a person can focus all of theirenergies on one particular person while excluding the concerns of manyothers, and thus generate more harm to others than what they might havehad they acted otherwise. While part of an ethic of care or a Levinasianethic is accepting the fact that sometimes the needs of the one outweighthe needs of the many, neither would espouse the idea of habitually ignor-ing or not paying due attention to the many.

If a Levinasian care ethic is susceptible to these criticisms, the ques-tion must be asked, what is the contribution of an ethical theory with verylittle normative pertinence? An acceptable answer to this query dependsupon how much one is willing to accent the value of a perspective.Because there is such a great amount of concentration on objects and



circumstances in present moral education, the idea of a general life-orien-tation, or perspective, as being important for shaping not only our ethicalcharacter but also our ethical decisions as well is occasionally marginal-ized. A Levinasian care ethic, if there could indeed be such a thing, wouldwant to emphasize that some of the most important elements of themoral equation are not external factors that can easily be references, butrather are motivations (not necessarily in the strict psychological sense)rooted in particular relational experiences that call our comfortable com-portment to reality under scrutiny. Unless we allow ourselves to learn andbe taught by another through such experiences, the kind of ethical personone may become, the kind of care one will give, will necessarily be exca-vated of a deeper quality that makes sense of why a human being acts inan ethical way at all. To put it another way, unless we learn to let ourresponsibility in the second person inform both our responsibility in thefirst and third person, the type of responsibility that is manifested will bedevoid of the essential characteristics that make responsibility what it is: aresponse.

Besides the benefit of emphasizing the importance of perspective, anethical theory that refrains from normative application also has the flexi-bility to avoid making its moral conclusions oppressively burdensome.One of the potentially dangerous propensities of law-based moral systemsis expectation of adherence in every situation, without exception. There isa healthy (even moral!) sense in which we need to be exempted occasion-ally from the dictates of our own morality, lest we are crushed by theweight of its grave and serious commands. As Burggraeve comments, wemust be heedful so as to assure that even our morality, which shouldbreak up totalities, does not become a totality unto itself.38 Any system,no matter how conceptually perfect, can become a totality if it is not con-fronted at times with another voice. Undoubtedly, such a suggestion willthrow many conservative ethicists into disquiet. They might ask, ‘will thisnot lead to ethical anarchy if people can freely choose when and when notmorality should be binding?’ However, even in systems that do claim to



offer a method for discerning the correct action in any moral circum-stance, when we pay attention to the people that promote such systems,we inevitably notice that they cannot stand the test that they propose toothers. In many ways, such a question is a pertinent note to end on, sinceit draws us to the core of this entire project. In opting for a Levinasiancare ethic, we opt at the same time to forsake any notion of an overarch-ing solution, of a grand unifying theory, if you will. If we were to makeLevinas or care ethicists into normative ethical thinkers, we would run therisk of turning them into ‘moralisers.’ We can never define as such whatmust be done, and thus, the normative level that has been so eagerlysought after is nothing other than the level of human creativity. It is notup to the ethicist in the picture that we have been portraying to decidedefinitively what people should do and when. It is instead the job of theethicist to help people become more aware of the responsibility that isperiodically manifesting itself before our eyes, and to encourage people toaccept that responsibility as a means to caring, understanding the ways weare inter-related as humans, and ultimately finding meaning in this life byway of what is ‘otherwise’ to it.

CONCLUSION

Moving toward a Levinasian care ethic then implies some concrete revi-sions to care theories as they currently exist, at least in the writings ofTronto. In order to speak of a care perspective in a Levinasian sense, itmust be accentuated that every caring relation is one in which the one forwhom I am caring stands in a position over me, as my teacher. In thisrevision (or addition) is contained the insight that any ethical action hasintimately to do with a resignation of the egoistic illusion of mastery ofthe world around me, as well as mastery over the consequences and out-come of my actions. Nevertheless, I am at the same time called to respon-sibility beyond the intentions of my actions, for the exact reason that



I cannot control the consequences of my own ethical behaviour. In thecaring relation I am called to take part in a continuous process of respon-sibility that extends into the future indefinitely. Because another caringrelation always exists apart from the caring relation that I preoccupymyself with at any given moment, I must remain vigilant in my awarenessthat there are always other others who call me to responsibility as well.Therefore, the tools of organisational thought (or justice) are indispensa-ble for the care ethic, in terms of allowing me not to over-care or under-care in any particular relationship. In organisational thought, I secure aspace for myself that assures I will not be over-claimed by my own ethi-cal impulse. The character of this organisation is most properly viewed inthe political perspective of exercise concepts, and not in liberal conceptsof opportunity that fail to evince the interconnectedness of humanity, aswell as the imperative to care for others in our society. Finally, aLevinasian care ethic encourages us to understand the ethical good not asa project of the ego’s creation, but rather, as an interruption to the proj-ect of the ego. In this light, caring is not something I necessarily want todo, but is something that I (according to my sensibilities) find abnormaland difficult. The willingness to care always comes from outside of me,and therefore, I deserve no glory in the accomplishments of my caringactions. Care is a love that I cultivate only with labour.

An ethic of care has a future in ethical discourse at large if its criticsdiscontinue their unsympathetic belief that it is nothing more than anapplied ethic of altruistic friendship built on emotional sentiment, inca-pable of addressing the high demands of other normative conceptions ofhow ethics must function. We present this paper as a step in the directiontoward convincing such critics otherwise. Ultimately, however, one canonly make so many arguments on paper for what is intended to be anethic of action. In a very real sense, responsible caring is not truly intelli-gible in the abstract thought of one who apprehends its meaning andplace in the world. Despite any commentator’s best intentions and hardacademic work, care and responsibility exist only in doing and practicing



them, and no amount of argument or reasoning can sway the recalcitrantother toward seeing the validity of a caring perspective if that other doesnot have the opportunity to see responsibility already being practised inthe world around her. That which can be contributed in papers such asthis one is a greater awareness of what responsibility and caring entail, sothat when the recalcitrant other surveys her world, she will know how toidentify these ethical practices for what they are, and hopefully, add totheir momentum.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Burggraeve, Roger. The Wisdom of Love in the Service of Love: Emmanuel Levinas On Justice,Peace and Human Rights. (unpublished manuscript) Faculty of Theology, K.U.Leuven: Leuven, 2002.

Gastmans, Chris. “Toward an Integrated Clinical Ethics Approach: Caring, Clinical andOrganizational.” Healthy Thoughts: European Perspectives on Health Care Ethics. eds. R.K.Lie, P.T. Schotsmans, B. Hansen & T. Meulenbergs. Leuven: Peeters Publishers,2002.

Gilligan, Carol. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development. Cambridge,Massachusets, and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1982.

Koehn, Daryl. Rethinking Feminist Ethics: Care, Trust and Empathy. London and New York:Routledge, 1998.

Levinas, Emmanuel. Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other. European Perspectives: A Series in Social Thought and Cultural Criticism. New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1998.

Levinas, Emmanuel. “Is Ontology Fundamental?.” Emmanuel Levinas: Basic PhilosophicalWritings. eds. A. Peperzak, S. Critchley, and R. Bernasconi. Indiana University Press:Bloomington, 1990.

Levinas, Emmanuel. Nine Talmudic Readings. Trans. Annette Aronowicz. Bloomington &Indianopolis: Indiana University Press, 1990.

Levinas, Emmanuel. Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. Martinus Nijhoff PhilosophicalTexts 3. Nijhoff The Hague, 1981.

Levinas, Emmanuel. Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. Duquesne Studies:Philosophical Series 24. Pittsburg, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1969.

Levinas, Emmanuel. “Trace of the Other” in Tijdschrift voor Philosophie (Sept. 1963, v605n23) transl. A. Lingis. Kluwer Publishing: Leuven.

Sevenhuijsen, Selma. Citizenship and the Ethics of Care: Feminist Considerations on Justice,Moraliy and Politics. London and New York: Routledge, 1998.



Tronto, Joan. “Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care.” Signs: Journal of Womenin Culture and Society. Volume 12. Issue 4. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987.

Tronto, Joan. “Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care: Care, Ethics andPolitics.” Lecture, 14 March, 2003. Leuven: Katholieke Universiteit Leuven,Belgium.

Tronto, Joan. Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care, Gender Studies.London and New York: Routledge, 1994.

Verkerk, Marian A. “The Care Perspective and Autonomy.” Medicine, Health Care andPhilosophy. Volume 4. Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001.

NOTES

1. Joan Tronto. Moral Boundaries, 103.2. Joan Tronto, Lecture, 14 March 2003.3. Marian Verkerk offers a short and very cogent overview of the confusion concerning

what care ethics is all about. In her article “The care perspective and autonomy,” she reveals thatmost misconceptions of the care ethic stem from two false assumptions: (a) that care ethics ismerely a form of applied ethics, and (b) that care ethics can be reduced to an ethics of friendshipor an ethics of personal relationships. Verkerk argues instead that care ethics can be best present-ed as “a moral perspective or orientation [rather] than as a full-blown ethical theory” (103) — anargument for which this essay will have much support.

4. These examples are taken from Tronto’s lecture.5. Tronto, Moral Boundaries, 154.6. Ibid., 157.7. Ibid., 30.8. Ibid., 8-9.9. Ibid., 10.10. Ibid.11. Tronto, Lecture, 14 March 2003.12. Tronto, Lecture, 14 March 2003. Tronto mentioned in her lecture that Gilligan’s studies

on dissociation are useful for understanding how it is possible in the first place for (mainly) mencontinually to engage in and sow the seeds of war. As a basis for her talk, she quoted Simone Weil,who wrote: “But nothing the peoples of Europe have produced is worth the first known poem thatappeared among them. Perhaps they will yet rediscover the epic genius, when they learn that thereis no refuge from fate, learn not to admire force, not to hate the enemy, nor to scorn the unfortu-nate. How soon this will happen is another question.” In “The Iliad: Poem of Force” (1939).

13. Joan Tronto, “Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care,” 662.14. Tronto, Lecture, 14 March 2003.15. See C. MacKenzie & N. Stoljar (eds) Relational Autonomy. Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy,

Agency and the Social Self (Oxford University Press, New York-Oxford, 2000).



16. Tronto, Moral, 105.17. Levinas, Totality, 69.18. Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, 27.19. Levinas, Totality, 102.20. Ibid., 60.21. Ibid., 48.22. Ibid., 66.23. Levinas, Otherwise, 27.24. Levinas, Totality, 39.25. Ibid., 52.26. Ibid., 67 & 75.27. Ibid., 7.28. Levinas, Otherwise, 6.29. Levinas, Totality, 109.30. Ibid., 213.31. Levinas, Nine Talmudic Readings, 50.32. Levinas, “Is Ontology Fundamental,” 4.33. Levinas, Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other, 20.34. Ibid., 23.35. “‘Thought’ and ‘Interiority’ are the very break-up of being and the production (not the

reflection) of transcendence. We know this relation only in the measure that we effect it; this iswhat is distinctive about it. Alterity is possible only starting from me,” Levinas, Totality, 40. This isan unusual quotation because of its seemingly instrumental overtones. In French, the word ‘pro-duction’ means a wide variety of things that are not necessarily connoted in its English cognate(e.g. the activity of provoking a phenomenon, the way by which something comes into being, acollection of works, etc.) There is some danger for misunderstanding in phrasing the problematicin the way that Levinas has here, since it can make it seem as though the other is merely a meansto my own transcendence of myself, which implies that ultimately, ethics is still about a kind ofegoistic enterprise (even if that enterprise has to do with the destruction of the ego!). However,this point just underscores the difficulty of thinking at the edge of the human capacity for concep-tualization, not as a refutation of the self-less-ness of Levinas’s philosophy. Levinas’s point in thisquotation is to say that egoism is indispensable to the project of ethics, even if it is not formally apart of what we would call the ethical. Without an ego to bring the other into relief, one wouldbecome lost in the other and simply form another totality. Without an ‘I’ there can be no other,which is to say that transcendence must have something to transcend. The use of ‘thought’ and‘interiority’ in the quotation, terms which we have thus far taken to be synonymous with egoism,are employed to point out that egoism is the condition of possibility for something other than ego-ism to occur in one’s experience. It is the other that is nevertheless our deliverance from our ego-ism, not ourselves—which is why I have made mention of this quotation as being possibly mis-leading.

36. Due to certain limitations of length in this essay, we have not explained Levinas’s ratherimportant concept of the ‘il-y-a,’ or roughly translated into English, ‘there-is.’ While a footnote at



this juncture surely will not compensate for this omission, suffice it to say that the ‘there-is’ is astate of anxiety endemic to the very base of being human, concerning the disappearance of the selfor singularity into a monolithic, undifferentiated totality.

37. We have made mention at several points in this essay of a kind of freedom that is notclassical, liberal, negative freedom. The positive freedom of which Levinas speaks shares propin-quity with Hannah Arendt’s as well as Charles Taylor’s notions of freedom. Both of these thinkerscan be of great interest if one wishes to seek out other authors talking about the same ideas, justfrom a much more political perspective.

38. Roger Burggraeve, The Wisdom of Love in the Service of Love: Emmanuel Levinas On Justice,Peace and Human Rights.



levinas and ethics of care

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