liberal citizenship and civic friendship

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Liberal Citizenship and Civic FriendshipAuthor(s): Jason A. ScorzaSource: Political Theory, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Feb., 2004), pp. 85-108Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.

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LIBERAL CITIZENSHIP AND

CIVIC FRIENDSHIP

JASONA. SCORZA

FairleighDickinsonUniversity

Aristotle amouslyarguesthatfriendship an serve as a normativemodelfor thepracticeof citi-

zenship,and this view has been widelyaccepted by neo-Aristotelians.Liberals,however,are

quick o rejectbothAristotle'sviewoffriendshipandhis viewof citizenship.Does this meanthat

theconceptoffriendship spolitically irrelevantfor iberalism?Thisessaysuggests,on the con-

trary, hattheconceptoffriendship sfarfromobsolete,evenfor liberals.Specifically,communi-

cative constraintsderivedfrom he normsoffriendship,as interpreted y RalphWaldoEmerson,

could serve topromotethe modest nstrumental urposes of liberalcitizenship-personalfree-

dom,socialjustice, and civilpeace-while simultaneouslyallowing thepractice of liberal citi-

zenshipto developin noninstrumental irections,enrichedrather hanstrainedbythemulticul-

tural realitiesof most modernsocieties.

Keywords: friendship; citizenship;Emerson; iberalism

When RalphWaldoEmersonsuggests,inhis 1844essay "Politics,"hat

citizensmight someday"exercise owardseach otherthe grandestand sim-

plestsentiments,as well asa knot of friends,or apairof lovers,"heappears o

be talkingpurenonsense.'If citizenship s conceivedin largely nstrumental

terms,as liberal ndividualists ommonlydo,there s no obvious ustificationforcitizensas such to model theirconducttowardone anotheron thenorms

of friendship.Fellow citizensmayreasonablydemand rom each otherbasic

respectandtoleration,as well as some assuranceof socialwelfare commen-

suratewith therequirements f humandignity.Butthey maynot demand hat

others love them,treat hem as friends,or abandonself-determinedprojectsfor their sake. In fact, such demandswould be completelyexternalto the

AUTHOR'SNOTE:I am deeply gratefulto JonathanAllen, KatharineLawrieBalfour Patrick

Deneen,AmyGutmann,GeorgeKateb,W.CareyMcWilliams,BethPosner,KathyPurnell,and

the editorandanonymousrefereesof PoliticalTheoryfor theirthoughtful ommentson earlier

versionsof this essay.

POLITICALTHEORY,Vol. 32 No. 1, February 004 85-108

DOI:10.1 77/0090591703252378

? 2004 Sage Publications

85







86 POLITICALTHEORY February2004

usual instrumentalpurposesof liberalcitizenship,which include the com-

mon defense of personalfreedom,the establishmentof basic conditionsof

socialjustice, and the maintenanceof civil peace.It is notsurprising,herefore, hat iberal ndividualists endtorelegate he

practiceof friendship and ts norms)to theprivatesphere,wherecitizens as

private persons are free to establish amicablerelationswith whomevertheychoose (regardlessof whether heir riendsarefellow citizens).2Theydonot,as a rule,proposethatfriendshipserve as a normativemodelfor thepracticeof citizenship,asAristotleand some of his contemporary dmirersdo and as

Emersonappears o do in thispassage.But Emerson s not anordinaryndi-

vidualist,andcertainlynot anordinaryiberal.Significantly,hisconceptionsof friendshipandcitizenshipare both informedby a commitment o "demo-

craticconnectedness," noninstrumentalalueenjoyedthroughresponsive-ness orreceptivity oothers,andexpressed hroughmembershipna commu-

nity of equals based on openness and empathy,ratherthan merely on

contractualobligations.As such, Emerson'sconceptionsof friendshipand

citizenshiparesympathetico,andmay verywell enrich,rights-basedorlib-

eral)conceptionsof citizenship,butshould not be mistakenforthem.

The term"democratic onnectedness"was first used by GeorgeKateb,who illuminatesandrefines Emerson'soriginalidea.3Accordingto Kateb,Emersondoes notembraceanextremeorunmodified ndividualism.Rather,he attempts o reconcile a strongcommitment o individualismwith a strongcommitment o a distinctivelydemocratic orm of association.Self-reliance,definedby Katebasthinkingone's ownthoughtsandthinking hemthrough,is the centralpracticeof Emersonian ndividualism,while democraticcon-

nectednessis the centralpracticeof the democratic-rather thanreligious,

racial,tribal,or national-form of associationtheorizedby Emerson.Self-relianceanddemocraticconnectednessdo notthemselvesconstitute

a positive vision of a good life. Rather,they are practicesthat, in theory,enableindividuals o choose for themselves a good way of life frommyriad

possible ways of life, or to engage in a succession of experimentsn living.Thepracticeof democraticconnectedness ntroducesndividuals o thevari-

ousness andpossibilityof human ife throughmmediaterelationswithother

persons,while the practiceof self-relianceenables individualsto navigate

deliberatelythroughthe gardens-and minefields-of humanvariousnessandpossibility.Herewebeginto see the intrinsicvalue of thepracticeof civic

friendship,whichcontributesbothto the developmentof the individualand

to the shareddemocraticculture.

Althoughdemocraticconnectednesscanmitigatesome of theworstego-istic, selfish,competitive,andacquisitive endenciesof unmodifiedndividu-

alism,this is not the mainreasonwhywe shouldvalueit. Almostanyform of







Scorza/ LIBERALCITIZENSHIPAND CIVICFRIENDSHIP 87

connectedness-including many ormsof religious,racial, ribal,andnational

unity-can tame individualismas well orbetter handemocraticconnected-

ness. However,these othertypes of connectedness end also to foster chau-

vinism and ntolerance, ather hanpromoting ivic friendshipwithinaheter-

ogeneouscommunity.Theyappealmoreto the authoritarianersonality hat

seeks to evade fears of freedom andresponsibilityby submitting he con-

science to some externalauthority. ndeed,these othertypes of connected-

nessoftenwork ostigmatize ndsuppress-rather hanenrich-individualism.

As such,religious,racial, tribal,andeven most kinds of nationalunity playnopart nEmerson'sconceptionof civic friendship,which standsas much n

oppositionto these forms of unityas it does to merelycontractual orms.

By theorizingaboutcitizenship n terms of friendship,Emersoncontrib-

utes to anunderstanding f civic life that s thicker hanconventional iberal

conceptions, but more individualistic than typical communitarianviews.

However,Emersondoes notaimatamiddlepositionbetween iberal ndivid-

ualism and more collectivist visions of citizenship,suchas those articulated

recentlyby the so-called civic liberals.4Rather,Emersoncalls us to a radical

democraticvision in which the nation-state ades into the background,and

primaryrelationshipsbetween citizens as suchemergeas the focus of civic

identityandactivity,andof personalstrivingand transcendence.

Thesignificanceof Emerson'svision shouldbeobvious.Politicsin liberal

democracieshasgraduallydegeneratedntothe worstconceivableversionof

Madisonianpluralism,with citizens dividedandconqueredby specialinter-

ests, andpublicopinionmanufactured y powerfulmedia forces. Tiesunit-

ingcitizens as such arepracticallynonexistent,exceptat the concrete evel of

the state,where individualsenjoythe statusof taxpayersandclients,and at

the abstract evel of thenation,where citizens often love theircountrybutnottheircountrymen.And so Emersonwonders,"Couldnot a nationof friends

even devise betterways?"In thisessay,I exploreEmerson'sconceptionof friendshipand consider

how its two crucial communicativenorms(whichhe calls "truth" nd "ten-

derness")couldhelpto enrich hecontemporary racticeof citizenship.6The

norm of truth,briefly, is a posture of candor and directness in political

speech,andawillingnesstolisten to suchspeechfromothers,while thenorm

of tenderness s anattitudeof gentle respecttowardothers andaresponsive-ness or opennessto others(particularly,hose who are differentfrom one-

self). Constrainedby thenormof tenderness,relationsof friendshiparepro-vided with an element of civility (a quality that is no less important or

citizenship han t is forfriendship).Constrained ythenormof truth, riend-

ship is providedwith a crucialelement of incivility.7Working n tandem,

these two normscanhelptopromote he limited nstrumental urposesof lib-








eralcitizenship,while simultaneously ranscendinghis instrumentalism y

elevating hepracticeof citizenship oan encounterwith theradicalpossibili-

ties of democraticconnectedness.In addition oprovidingaconceptionof friendship hat s compelling nits

ownright,Emersonmakesat least threedistinctiveandworthwhilecontribu-

tions to ourunderstandingf therelationshipbetween thepracticeof citizen-

shipandthe normsof friendship.First,unlikemostcontemporaryheoristsof

civic friendship,he emphasizes communicativenorms, rather than more

demandingcivic obligationssuchasthe communalethicof care endorsedby

SibylA. Schwarzenbach,hegeneralresponsibility or the welfareof compa-

triotsproposedby AndrewMason,or theobligation o fellow citizenstopar-

ticipatefully in publiclife supportedby numerouscommunitarian nd civic

republican heorists.8Contrastedwith these theories,Emerson'smoremod-

est communicativenormscanenrichthepracticeof liberalcitizenshipwith-

outattemptingo erase,replace,ortransform t into a watered-downversion

of republican,communitarian, r Aristoteliancitizenship.These communicativenormsare also more relevant hanmanyothercon-

ceptionsof civic obligationto some of our mosturgentcontemporary oliti-

cal problems.Theresurgenceof chauvinisticnationalismaround heworld,thedumbingdownof democraticdiscourse,andthepoliticalinfantilization

of the democraticcitizenall seem to demandcommunicativenormscapableof defusingtensions andfosteringappreciative onnectionsbetweengroups,

elevatingpoliticalconversation,andactivating he deliberativecapabilitiesof citizens,whomust earn ogive fellow citizens(andexpectto receive from

them) reasonable accounts of theirpolitical preferences.The Emersonian

normsof truthandtendernesswould be transferable oanyof thedeliberative

settingsthatAmyGutmann ndDennisThompsoncall"middledemocracy,"including governmentalnstitutions,such as legislativesessions, courtpro-

ceedings,andadministrative earings,as well as nongovernmental ssocia-

tions, such as grassrootsgroups,laborunions,citizenscommittees,profes-sionalorganizations,and,of course, schools anduniversities.9t is here, in

middledemocracy,hatcitizenscanget a feel foroneanother,as actual-not

abstract-persons, and wherecommunicativenormsderived romaconceptof friendshipmightbe practiced, nitially,for purelyinstrumental easons

but,ultimately,perhaps, or normativeones.It should also be notedthatEmerson'scommunicativenormsrelyfarless

on formalcivic education or indoctrinationhando other theoriesof civic

friendship, ncluding hoseof both civic liberalsandthe criticsof liberalism.

Whereascitizens could notreasonablybe expectedto engage in communal

care, generalresponsibilityfor the welfare of compatriots,or fully active

politicalparticipationwithoutfirstbeing taughtthe intrinsicvalue of these







Scorza / LIBERALCITIZENSHIPAND CIVICFRIENDSHIP 89

practices,theycould begin to practicethe communicativenorms ntegral o

Emerson'sconceptionof friendshipnpublic ife forpurely nstrumental ea-

sons (i.e., becausethey help address he aforementionedpolitical problemsandbecausethey promote he basicpurposesof liberalcitizenship).Citizens

mightthendiscover the intrinsicvalueof citizenship-namely, the value of

democraticconnectedness-by actuallypracticingthese norms. Bonds of

civic friendshipwould emerge as individualsbegan to feel valued and

respectedby theircompatriots,by virtueof howtheyarespokenand istened

to in thepublic sphere,notmerelybecausetheyareurgedby teachers, ead-

ers,orimploredbypoliticaltheorists otreat heir ellow citizens like friends.

THEPOLITICALRELEVANCEOF FRIENDSHIP

Systematicattempts o establishthe politicalrelevanceof friendshipcan

be tracedbackto Aristotle,who identifiesthreedifferent ypesof friendship,

based,respectively,on utility,pleasure,and virtue.As he argues amously n

TheNicomacheanEthics,friendshipbased on virtue s the mostperfecttype,

insofar as it aims at the pursuitof goodness or moral excellence for its ownsake rather hanmerelythe interestsorpleasuresof individuals.1oHowever,each kind of friendship s, in a sense, altruistic, ince we are concernedwith

thewelfareof ourfriends ortheirsake,notmerelyforourown.'1Thegeneralbonds of civic friendship politikephilia), which are almostcertainlya vari-

ety of utility friendshiprather han of virtuefriendship,12help maintainus-tice and law in thestate,thuspreservingspacefor the cultivationof personal

friendshipsbased on virtue.Meanwhile, heproliferation f personal riend-

ships based on virtue serves as an independentcheck on the possible civiccorruptionof the state as a whole.'3Citizenswho view one anotheras civic

friendswould come together n a broadconsensus on mattersof public pol-

icy, a consensus made easierin Aristotle'sschemeby the exclusion fromthe

political communityof manymarginalized roupswithpotentiallydiffering

interests,such as women, slaves, andpersonsof foreigndescent.14

Therehave been numerousattemptsn recentyearsto restore heAristote-

lianconceptionof friendship o preeminent tatus.'"Theseefforts, however,

haveconsistentlygenerated artoo demandinga notionof civic friendship.'6Nevertheless, t may not be necessaryto abandon riendshipas a normative

modelforcitizenship ustbecauseAristotelianand neo-Aristotelian oncep-tions are unsuited o modemliberalsocieties.Likewise,it maynotbe neces-

saryto condemnliberalism ortheinstrumental oals of liberalcitizenship)

simply because they are incompatiblewith civic friendship,as it was con-

ceivedbyAristotle.Thereare, nparticular,wostrikingbutoften overlooked








structural imilaritiesbetweenfriendshipandcitizenshipthat ustify further

inquiry ntothe usefulness of the normsof the former orimproving heprac-

tice of the latter.

First,relationshipsbetween citizens as such, like relationshipsbetween

friends,may-but, obviously,do notnecessarily--evolveanddevelop hroughthe investmentof time andeffort.Likefriendships, elationshipsbetweencit-

izens seldom begin at the highest level of intimacy,mutuality,and trust.

Hence,just as one maychafe when a new acquaintancepresumesa level of

intimacythat has not been earned,claims madeuponus by fellow citizens

who arepracticallyor completelystrangers o us can feel excessive. How-

ever,whenpeopleinvest ntheiracquaintanceships,heydo sometimesblos-som intodeeper,moretrusting,and moremutuallysatisfyingrelationships.

Likewise, if people invest in the practiceof citizenship,it could gradually

develop beyond its original,modest instrumentalpurposes,into a practicethatis, potentially,both noble andennobling.

Secondly,membersof modem liberalsocieties often disagreeandfightwith eachother,muchas friendsdo.Animportant ifference,however, s that

friendstry to governtheirdisagreements n such a way as to preserveand

develop,rather hanterminate, he bond between them.Theydo not exces-sively stifle or suppressdisagreements,creating deadly silences that could

cause the bonds of friendship ogradually rode. Nor do they engageinunre-

strained ree-for-alls,riskingthe eruptionof violence that could cause the

bonds of friendship o suddenlysnap.Instead, heyemploy relativelysimple(but subtle) communicative norms to achieve a balance, somewhere in

between. One might say that friendstryto disagree todayin a manner hat

will allowthem to disagreeagaintomorrow.Liberalcitizenscould,perhaps,

also learnto governtheirdisagreements n muchthe same mannerand forsome of the same reasons.

On the otherhand,ChristopherHeath Wellmanarguesthatrelationships

amongfellow citizens aredisanalogousto those amongfriends,for at least

threecogentreasons.First,friendshipsare based to somedegreeon consent,whereasconsent is missing fromcitizenship.Second, the strongemotional

bonds found ingenuinefriendshipareabsentfromrelationshipsbetween cit-

izens as such(especiallyinlargecommunitiesorstates).And, third,whereas

friendships commonly udgedto be intrinsically, ather haninstrumentally,valuable,the same cannotbe said for citizenship.'7

Theseobjectionswouldappear o damnthe ethics of friendship o irrele-

vance wherethe practiceof citizenshipis concerned. None of us, initially,consentstomembershipnour stateornation,although t is possibleforus-withconsiderabledifficulty-to withdraw rom suchmembershipswhen we

find themunpalatable.Wellman'spoint,though, s thatwe incurspecialobli-







Scorza / LIBERALCITIZENSHIPAND CIVICFRIENDSHIP 91

gationsto friendspreciselybecause theserelationshipsareconsensual.Inthe

absence of consent, there can be no such specialobligationsto fellow citi-

zens.WhileIaminclinedto agreewith thisanalysis,Iwould note one caveat.

Although herelationship f citizenshipmayormaynot entailspecial obliga-

tions, such as givingpreference o the welfareof fellow citizens over "simi-

larlysituatedforeigners,"'"t does conveya dutyto be mindful of how one

speaksto fellow citizens andhowonelistensto them.Ourfellow citizens are

our civic equals,as well as free and autonomouspersons.As such,we maynot conversewith them as if theyarechildren,subjects,or slaves.As long as

our account of obligationsto fellow citizens does not extendprimafacie

beyond certain obligations on democraticdiscourse, but are discoveredinstead throughdemocraticdiscourse, Wellman's first objection against

modeling citizenshipon friendshipcan be refuted.

Wellman's assertionthat the emotional ties between fellow citizens are

nothinglike those between friends, althoughunsubstantiated mpirically,

ringstrueenoughto be takenseriously.As he explains,

Not only does the enormoussize andbureaucratic atureof contemporary tates entail

that citizens will never meet (let alone becomeintimatelyattached o) more than a tinyfractionof theircompatriots,he multiculturalismf most statesoften results nxenopho-bic citizens'harboringantipathy ather hansympathy owardeach other.19

This seems somewhatmuddled,however.As we will see, the practiceof

friendship s dynamic.Individualsdo not as a generalrulebegintheir rela-

tionshipat the mostintense level of mutualregard. nstead, riendshipsgrowand evolve overtime,propelledby aninnermomentumof which we arenot

always fully aware.Friendshipshave a way of sneakingup on us. ConsiderThomas Jeffersonand JohnAdams who-once bitterpolitical enemies-

became friendsin the end.20

Wellmanalsoargues hat herelationship f friendshiphas intrinsicvalue,

and is properlyvaluedfor its own sake, whereascitizenshipcan only ever

haveinstrumentalalue.21Wellman'sposition s usefullycontrastedwiththat

of Mason who arguesthatspecialobligations o fellow citizensemergefrom

the intrinsicmoralvalue of therelationshipof citizenship.This,he suggests,

is basedon being "a memberof a collectivebodyin which

theyenjoy equalstatuswith its other membersand aretherebyprovidedwithrecognition."22

AlthoughI am inclinedto agreewithMason thatfreeandequaldemocratic

citizenshiphas an intrinsicmoralvalue,vestedinthetreatment f eachmem-

ber as worthyof equal recognitionandrespect,I am less confidentthat one

can, or should,attempt o derivemore thana verylimited set of obligationsfromthispremise.Suchobligations, t seemsto me, do not includea dutyof








politicalparticipation r giving preference o the welfare of fellow citizens,as Masonargues,but,rather, nlya dutyto speakand isten to fellowcitizens

withrespectandregard ortheirequality.23 hat s, these dutiespertainonlyto the enactmentor realizationof the intrinsicvalueof citizenship, namely,thefeelingof mutualrespect,recognition,andresponsiveness hat following

Kateb)I have been calling democraticconnectedness.I would add that the

dynamiccharacter f friendship,whichWellmanneglectsin his analysisbut

whichEmersonemphasizes,againmakesfriendshipanexcellentanalogyfor

therelationshipof citizenship,whichmaybegin primarilyas aninstrumental

arrangement ut,with time andpractice, may evolve into somethingmore

meaningful.Turningfrom the theoreticalto the practical,there are some important

ways in which the dynamicsof actualpoliticallife in the late twentiethand

early twenty-first enturiesdefy anyattempt oestablishnormsof friendshipas norms of citizenship.In particular,nequalitiesof power;hierarchiesof

class, race,andgender;andthe relativepowerlessnessof ordinarypeople in

manycontemporary ocieties seem to makethe idea of genuine friendshipbetween all citizens laughable.Additionally,Wellman s rightto point out

thatusingfriendshipas a modeloranalogyforcitizenship s potentiallymis-guided because it "lendscredence to the dangerousidea that others have

standingonly if theystand n somerelation ous."24 hisidea,he thinks,sus-

tains(orat leastfails to deter)ethnicconflict,violation of humanrights,and

(presumably)ndifference o suchviolations.

However,it is not my contention,nor was it ever Emerson's,that true

friendship epresents,ngeneral,agoodbasis forpolitics.Rather,mypoint s

thatcertaincommunicativenormsbasedon thenormsof friendshipmayalso

serve,effectively,asconstraints ndisagreementsbetweenmembersof mod-ernsocieties who oftenhavedifferentvalues,competinginterests,and con-

flictingunderstandingsf thegood.Attheveryleast,theymay providea crit-

ical vantagepointwith broadcultural andintercultural) ppealfromwhich

to assail manipulativeand/orcoercive communicativestrategies,a benefit

not to be takenlightly.In some respects,the premiseI am presentingfollows the aims of dis-

courseethics.Thecommunicative onstraints ypicallysetby discourseeth-

ics, includingmutualrecognitionof the equalityof all participantsand anumberof constraints f rationality e.g., absence of forceorstructural res-sure,the admissibilityonly of rationalarguments, he privilegingof no un-sharedassumptions,etc.), workto promote usticeby constrainingdialogueand providecriticalleverage againstmanipulativeand coercive discourse.

Unfortunately,heseidealconditionsarrive romnowhere,relateto no com-mon practice,and are connected to no cultural(much less transcultural)








norms.Moreover, hey takeno account of religious,cultural,racial,territo-

rial,andsocioeconomicdividesamongparticipants.

Thenormsof friendship,onthe otherhand,derivefrom analmostuniver-sal practicethatcuts acrossreligious,cultural,racial,territorial, ndsocio-

economicdivides.25Wehave all experienced riendshipandknow its norms

intimately, ven if we practice hemimperfectly.Althoughmuch moremod-

est, perhaps,thanthe ideal conditionsof full-blown discourseethics, thenormsof friendshipare atleastavailableandfamiliar o anyonewho has,orhasbeen, a friend.This is not to say thatbeyondsome basicnormstherearenotalsosignificantdifferencesbetweentheattitudesoward riendshipndif-

ferenttraditions.26 owever, n spiteof these differences,thereareenoughunderlyingsimilaritiesbetweenconceptionsof friendship o providea basisfor interculturaldiscussion and cross-culturalunderstanding.Many tradi-

tions,forinstance,suggestthat riendshipmust nvolve asignificantmeasureof franknessor truth-telling,n addition o the expectedkindnessor gentle-ness.27 f common norms,such as these,can be transferredo thepracticeofliberalcitizenship,then its practicemay be enhanced,withoutresortingto

conceptionsof citizenship nconsistentwiththecontractualiberalapproach.

EMERSONAND THENORMSOF

DEMOCRATICRIENDSHIP

Likemostimportant onceptsin Emerson'sunsystematic heoretical ys-tem,friendship, o him,is closely related otheconceptof self-reliance.Per-sonspracticing elf-relianceheed theirownmoral udgmentas much aspos-

sible,anddependas little aspossibleon theopinionsof others,oron societalconventions.However,the relationshipbetween self-reliance-the core of

Emerson's ndividualistic reed-and thepracticeof friendships aparadox-icalone, forfriendships arelationshiphatpromotesself-relianceby threat-

ening always to undermine and destroy it. It is, for Emerson,a crucible

throughwhich self-reliancemustpass in orderto realizeitself fully.

Ideally, riendship erves as an aid to self-reliance.Throughacquaintancewith friends,one's acquaintancewith oneself can be renewed.So Emerson

writes,inhis poem"Astraea,""'Whatam I?companion,say.'/And he friendnothesitates/Toassignjust placeandmates;/Answersnot in word or letter;/Yetis understood hebetter;/Eacho each alooking-glass,/Reflectshisfigurethatdothpass."28 mersonmeansthatonlyanother elf, to whomone is openand responsive,can reveal one to oneself.29 n a gesture,pause, word, or

glance, individualscan, in a flash, see themselves throughthe eyes of a

friend. Friendscan also renew one another'sacquaintancewith the world in








which theylive. Forinstance,a friend can introduceus to new perspectivesand viewpoints, share with us a new experienceor way of life, or even

increase our awareness of the variousness and possibility of human lifeitself by shakingus from ourdoldrums,depressions, anddogmas. And it

is through this process of developing or awakening friendship that the

value of democraticconnectedness-understood as receptivityor respon-siveness to others-is realized.

Inspiteof theseapparent enefits, however,Emersonrealizes thatfriend-

shipalso can undermine elf-reliancebecauseone's integrity s almostcon-

stantlyundersiege by the influenceof one's friends.Whilewe mightdeliber-

ately,orplayfully,choose to tryout a way of life that our friendhas already

exploredor embraced,we also may sometimes feel compelledto accept a

friend'sway of life as ourown,either for fear of losing thatfriend or due to

self-doubt. As Emersonexplainsin his essay "Friendship"1841), the ideal

friend is "a sort of beautifulenemy,untamable,devoutlyrevered."30To con-

ceive of a friend as an enemy, even as a beautifulone, is shocking. And,

clearly,Emersonwants to shock,as does Nietzsche when he transforms he

Aristotelianepitaph"friends, here are no friends" o "enemies,thereis no

enemy "3' Itis his wayof disrupting onceptionsof friendship hatpicture tas a perfectharmonyor unity,or which reduce it to casual companionship(e.g., friendsas golf partners rdrinkingbuddies).Of course,Emersondoes

notmeanthat riendsareenemies intheconventional ense.Theydonot,nor-

mally, tryto kill or ruinus, although hey may,periodically,misunderstand,

mislead,ordisappointus. Rather,by appealingmagnetically o oursensibili-

ties,bybeingattractive ous, friendstemptus to becomemore likethem and

less like ourown ideas of ourselves.

Although drawnby thoughts of ideal friendships,Emerson also fre-quentlyemphasizestheirfrustrating eality.Amonghis chief concerns s the

vulnerabilityof friendshipto degenerationand disintegration.Emerson

explains,"Our riendshipshurry o shortandpoorconclusions,because we

havemadethematextureof wineanddreams, nsteadof thetoughfibreof the

humanheart."32y his own analysis,friendshipcannotbeginin the clouds.

He writes,"Iwish thatfriendshipshouldhavefeet, as well as eyes andelo-

quence.It mustplant tself on theground,beforeit vaults overthe moon."33

Consequently,muchof Emerson's heorizing bout riendships concerned-quite properly-with the normsby which its bonds may, slowly and over

time,bedeveloped.Incontrast,whileAristotlealsodiscusses thefrustrationsof "inferior"ypesof friendship i.e., thosebased on utilityorpleasure),heoffers little insightinto how thesecoulddevelopintohighersorts of friend-

ship. This representsa significant differencebetween his conception of







Scorza/ LIBERALCITIZENSHIPAND CIVIC FRIENDSHIP 95

friendshipandEmerson's,especiallyif thepracticeof friendships tobe seri-

ously consideredas a normativemodel for liberalcitizenship.

Importantly,orEmerson, riendshipdoes notentail aperfectharmonyor

unanimitybetweenpersons.Rather,he views friendshipas a turbulent nion,characterized lmost as muchby incivilityas by civility,and almost as much

by separatenessas by unityor harmony.Onceagain,therefore,his concep-tion of friendships uniquelysuitedas a model forthepracticeof citizenshipin modem liberalsocieties, sincetheyareoften characterized y deep asym-metries of power and resources,by enduringethnic, racial, and religious

antagonisms,and,most importantly,by moral and culturalpluralism.As a

model for liberal citizenship,Emerson'sconception of friendshipdistin-

guishes itself fromAristotle's,whichpresupposesa broadmoral consensus

as well as virtualunanimityconcerningquestionsof public importance.34

Truth

Foremostamongthe norms of friendship dentifiedby Emersonare two

communicativeconstraints,which he calls truthand tenderness.35 ruth, n

thecontext of friendship, s apracticeof franknessconjoinedwithopennessto the frankspeechof one's friends.Thedevelopmentof thebonds of friend-

ship requiresa kind of mutualunderstanding,rat least awillingnessto work

towardmutualunderstanding, othby speaking franklyandby listeningto

frankspeech. As Emerson writes in "Behavior" 1860), there "is a French

definitionof friendship,rienques'entendre,good understanding.Thehigh-estcompactwe can makewith ourfellow, is,-'Let therebe truthbetweenus

two forevermore.' 36Therefore,amongfriends, hereshouldbe nopredeter-

mined limits to whatmaybe said and heard.So Emersonwritesin "Friend-

ship,""A friend is a personwith whom I maybe sincere. Beforehim I maythinkaloud.""37

Accordingto Emerson,the bonds of friendship, ike the muscles of the

humanbody,must be exercisedregularly f theyare to grow stronger,over

time, ratherthandegenerate.Truth-sayingand truth-hearing re practicesthat test and develop the muscularityof a friendship.Of course, speaking

franklyis difficult. One may,reasonably,worrythatone will be misunder-

stood,or evenscorned.Openness o frank alk is also problematic,or in dis-

putes and disagreementswith friends the desire to win can be extremely

strong,andwinningcanrequireomission,as well as deception.However,as

Emersonexplains,







96 POLITICALTHEORY February 004

Thegreatgainis, notto shine,not to conqueryour companion,-then you learnnothingbutconceit,-but to find acompanionwho knows whatyoudonot;to tilt with him andbe

overthrown,horse and

foot,with utterdestruction

of all yourlogic and learning.38

Appliedto politics,the norm of truthcannot nvolve thetellingof the lit-

eral truth n all instances because the practicalitiesof politics would never

permitsuch a thing. Deception, misinformation,and misdirectionare, for

betterorworse,partof theeverydayarsenalof thepolitician,andalwayswill

be.39 The normof truth, n the contextof politics, is much more concerned

withthe frankrepresentation f perspectives,purposes,andvalues,and with

the abilityof citizens to listen seriouslyto suchrepresentations,ven if theyappear o be threats o theirownwayof life. Through hepracticeof truth, o

conceived, membersof modernliberal societies may come to know and

better understandone another,although not necessarily agree with one

another,or even like one another,as personalfriendshopefullywould.

Examplesof how disarming rank alk can be areeasily observed.I expe-rienced his while sitting n an interfaith atheringof somesixtystudentsand

colleagues,in theaftermath f theSeptember11,2001 terrorist ttacks.Sev-

eralMuslims nthegroupwere atgreatpainstoexpresssympathy,anger,andregretregardingthe tragedy,overturesand acknowledgementsthat were

heartfeltand,obviously,welcomed by non-Muslimmembers of the group.Buttheyseemed to follow aformula,saying thingsthatneededtobe said and

thateveryoneexpectedtohear.Similarly,a numberof non-Muslimmembers

of the groupacknowledged hatAmericanforeignpolicy was not, perhaps,

alwaysbeneficial o theworldandthatmanyMuslims nthe MiddleEastmayhave legitimategrievanceswith the U.S. This, too, needed to be said, and

there was acertainexpectation hatit wouldbe.

Nonetheless, a great divide of understanding emained and the groupseemedhauntedbythingsunsaid.Apparently,herewere non-Muslimmem-

bers in the group(includingmyself) who expecteda lesson on the natureof

Islam. Itwas not untila numberof Muslimscandidlyexplained hattheyhad

no intentionof explainingor apologizingfor Islam,andthatthey were not

inclined tojustify theirreligionto anyone,thatthe airbeganto clear,even asthe tensionmomentarilyheightened.And it was not untilthe non-Muslims

beganto

grasp why the Muslims were so unwilling-they felt they werebeingaskedtoexplainwhytheyweren'tterrorists,oo-that thegroupbeganto pull togetheracross thedivide.The ritual ormulasof rapprochement is-solved andwhatensued was arealdiscussion of whatcould bedonetogether,as a group, n responseto the tragedy.

Tosaythatpoliticalconversation s constrainedby truth s sometimes ustanotherwayof sayingthat t is unconstrained y silence. A modelof "uncon-








strained"publicdiscourse,whichrequiresmembersof a societyto articulate

theirtruecommitments,desires,needs,projects,and so on, would,in theory,

promoteacommunity n whichthegenuineneedsandpurposesof individu-als are takeninto account.40Althougha mutualunderstanding f commit-

ments,desires,needs,and so forthalonecannot settlecontroversialpoliticalissues such as abortion,school prayer,affirmativeaction,orcapitalpunish-ment,when citizens find themselves in conflict with one anotherover such

issues, theyarewell-servedby an understanding f the values andcommit-

ments of their fellows. There is no guarantee hat any particularview or

vision of socialjustice wouldemergefrom a condition of improvedmutual

understanding etweencitizens.However,one would expectrival views orvisions ofjusticeto receiveproperhearings.And,anyconsensusconcerning

principlesof justice thatemergedfromsuchhearingswould be theresult of

the process andpracticeof politics, rather hanthe result of a prepolitical

attempt o squelchor silence genuinedisagreementswithina community.Even so, some theoristsdo not believe thatmembers of modem liberal

societies should be expectedto expose to one anothertheirmost intimate

beliefs, desires, fears,andcommitments.Accordingto J. DonaldMoon,for

instance,there s a coerciveaspectto thisexpectation,violatingthevalue of

privacy orindividualsandgroups.Moreover,Moonargues, hisexpectationrunsafoul of normalpsychologicaldefensesagainstvulnerability.41This is a

seriousobjectionto unconstrained iscourse,ortruth,conceivedof as a con-

straintonpublicdiscourse.Certainly,Moon'sassessmentof thepsychologi-cal barriers o such a practice s painfullyaccurate.If one's principlesand

commitmentsarebased on deeply personalreligiousbeliefs, as was thecase

forMuslimparticipantsn thecampusteach-in, t could be agonizingto talk

to nonbelieversaboutthem.Nonetheless,when fellow citizens seek to bindone anotherby law-as, forexample, prolifeandprochoiceadvocatesdo-

we canreasonably xpectthemtopresent hetruereasonswhy theyaredoingso. Itmaybe intrusive,but it is notunreasonable,o ask one's fellow citizens

to explain why they areattempting o use the coercivepowerof the state to

thwartone another'sgoals, hinder he satisfactionof one another'sneeds,or

block theenjoymentof one another'sconceptionof thegood life. However,the requirementof truthwould pertain only to political disagreements n

which citizens intend to subjectone another o a common law orpolicy.Noone should expect fellow citizens to bare their souls or expose theirmost

cherishedbeliefs to public scrutinyunderanyother circumstances.

Anotherobjectionto the idea of truthas a constrainton publicdiscourse

concernsthepotential mpactof truth-telling n mutualrespect.JohnRawls,forone,urgescitizens to invokeonly publicreasonsderived rom anoverlap-

ping consensus concerning constitutional essentials. Nonpublic reasons,








derived from the many comprehensivemoral,philosophical,and religiousdoctrines that constitute the backgroundculture of a society, are to be

excluded frompublicdiscourse anddebate.42Accordingto Rawls,one doesnotdemonstrateespect orone's fellow citizensby offeringreasons hat heycannotreasonablybe expectedto comprehendor recognize as legitimate.

Therefore,citizens have a dutyof civility

to explainto one anotheron thosefundamental uestionshow theprinciplesandpolicies

theyadvocateandvote for can be supported y thepoliticalvalues of publicreason.This

dutyalso involves awillingnessto listen to othersanda fairmindednessndecidingwhen

accommodations o their views shouldreasonably

be made.43

This argument s quite compelling. It is, certainly,reasonable o expectfellow citizens to speakthe samepolitical language,in the name of mutual

respect,whenever hey tryto bind one anotherby law. It is also reasonable o

ask citizens to listen to one another,andtryto makecompromisesbetween

stronglyheld opinions.However,we do notdemonstratemutualrespectfor

ourfellow citizensby depriving hem of therightto expresstheirdeepestand

mostpassionate

commitmentsin thepolitical sphere. Indeed,

this denial

makes a mockeryof our duty to listen to them. The normsof citizenshipshould aimatbroadening, ather hanrestricting,dialoguebetweencitizens

withdifferent tronglyheld values andbeliefs.Hence,while arequiremento

offermutuallycoherentreasons n public disagreementss sound,aprohibi-tion on nonpublicreasons is not.

Tenderness

The basic meaningof tenderness s somethinglike "kindness" r "affec-

tion."However,a richermeaning s intendedbyEmerson. nhisdiscussionof

the norms of friendship,he understandsenderness o be both a postureof

giving and a postureof receiving,one of speakingandlistening.In "Man-

ners,"Emersondescribesa debatebetween BurkeandFoxintheEnglishPar-

liament,duringwhichFox "urgedon his old friend theclaims of old friend-

ship with such tenderness,that the house was moved to tears.""44n this

instance,Emerson seems to meanby tendernesssomethingthat is given orproffered. t is agentlebutrespectfulmannerof handlingotherswhoare,pre-

sumably,one'sequalsanddeserveto be treatedas such.However, n "Friend-

ship,"Emersonconfesses to "anextreme endernessof nature" ponmeetinga newpersonwho maybe apotential riend.Inthisinstance,Emersonseems

to mean by tenderness a kind of permeabilityor responsiveness.Through

responsiveness,we adoptapostureof opennessto ourinterlocutor, xposing








ourselves to his or herwords andthoughts,while throughgentle respectful-

ness, we tryto be sensitive to thatperson's potentialpermeabilityorrespon-

sivenessto our words andthoughts.Therefore,no unfairadvantages taken.

Instead,we attempt o care for our nterlocutorhroughour words(evenif we

feel no genuineaffection for thatperson).

Tenderness,whenproperlyunderstood s amannerof speaking,demands

recognitionandrespectfor thedignityandautonomyof others.Yet,tender-

ness alsoconnotessomethingof firmness.Neither riendsnorcitizens should

deal with one anotheras if theyweremade of glass or withgratuitous ough-ness orcruelty.Similarly,one maycareforotherswithouttreating hem as if

they are incapableof makingchoices for themselves.Hence, one sense oftenderness s "to tender."This is not a term of love oraffection,but one that

describesa relationshipnvolving somethingof closeness andsomethingof

distance.Importantly,enderness, n this first sense, means respectingthe

potentialof other individualsfor self-reliance.Throughouthis essays and

lectures,Emersonargues hateveryhuman ife is properlyviewed as anave-

nue throughwhich great thoughtsandgreatactionsnot only may flow but

also deserve to flow. He insists,therefore, hateverypersonhas a right(and,

perhaps,even a duty)to think and act self-reliantly,dependingas much as

possibleon one's own thoughtsand sense of justice forguidance,andlivingas much as possibleas one likes (provided hatone's way of life andexperi-mentsin livingdo nottransgressuponthedignityorrightsof others).Emer-

son writes,"Fornonconformity he worldwhipsyou withits displeasure."45

Tenderness,n thisfirstsense,means neverholdingthewhip, if one canpos-

sibly avoidit.

On the otherhand,tendernessunderstoodas a mannerof listeningcon-

notes a permeabilityorresponsiveness o impressionsreceivedfrom othersand aboutothers.Thisresponsivenesscanenrichour lives by introducingus

to differentways of life, as well as the variousnessof human life itself.

Describingthis responsiveness,Emersonwrites, "HighthanksI owe you,excellentlovers,whocarryout theworldforme to newandnobledepths,and

enlarge hemeaningof allmy thoughts. .. Iconfesstoanextreme enderness

of natureon this point."46Emersonhimself is understandably autiousabout the possibilities for

tendernessas a constrainton personalfriendship.Certainly,he is morecau-tious,say,thanWaltWhitman,whopictureshuman ife asajourneydownan

open road, a quest for individualityundertaken,perhapsparadoxically,

throughsomething ikeresponsiveness o others,andmanifested,variously,as camaraderie,riendship,eroticlove, anddemocraticcitizenship.47How-

ever,like Whitman,Emersonbelieves thatthe practiceof tendernesshelps








introducendividuals o thevariousnessof human ife andhelpsthemachieve

a distinctlydemocraticconnectednesswith others.Emersonwrites,

Analogous to the laws of society are those of conversation,which is the firstoffice of

friendship. In able conversation we have glimpses of the universe, perceptions of

immensepowernative o thesoul,fardartingightsandshadowsof a mountainandscape,such as we cannot at all attainunto in oursolitarystudies.48

Ofcourse,thisresponsivenesswouldhave to be strictlybalancedbytheprac-tice of self-reliance, which enables individuals to navigate intelligently

throughhe

depths-andshoals-of humanvariousnessand

possibility.Transferrednto thepoliticalrealm,the normof tendernesss notwithout

certain limitations and liabilities. For instance, one might complain that

effective political talk could neverbe characterizedby tenderness(in the

sense of gentle respectfulness)but must be characterizedby eloquence.Indeed,mosteffectivepoliticalspeakersattemptobecomemastersof words,while takingcarethemselvesto avoidbeingvictims of words;to remainun-

moved,while moving others.However,practicing enderness-understoodas

gentlerespectfulness-doesnotnecessitateunilateraldisarmamentn the

politicalarena.Treatingone's fellow citizens with gentle respectcan be as

sound,strategically, s attemptingo trickthem. Thisis especiallytrue nthe

many smallersettingsof middledemocracy,where citizens encounteroneanother face to face, and where participantsn a discussion can responddirectlyto attacks.If we takethe possibility of social justice seriously,wemustacknowledgethe importanceof tenderness.Otherwise,unconstrained

by tenderness,or some comparablenorm,politicalconversation s likely to

be just anothermode of dominationorcynical manipulation,

deaf to theclaims of justice.

Anotherpossibleobjectionto tendernessas a communicative normfor

democraticdeliberation s that it goes farbeyondthepracticeof toleration

normally requiredby liberalism. While toleration merely requires citi-zens to put up with difference, tenderness in the sense of responsiveness)

attempts o entertain hepossibilitiesthatdifferencesuggests.This is one ofthe moreinvitingnoninstrumental ossibilitiesof citizenshipunderstoodn

conjunctionwiththecommunicativenorms offriendship.

However,tender-nessmaybe, inotherrespects,amoremodest,and ess taxing,constrainthantoleration.Whereastolerationappearsto requirecitizens to exercise self-

censorshipwhen they encounterways of life inconsistentwith theirvaluesandprinciples,therebyprojectingthe appearanceof at least tacitapproval,the normof tenderness equiresonlythatcitizenshave ago attrying ounder-stand one another.








Again, the gap in interculturalunderstanding evealedby the Septem-ber 11terrorist ttackson theUnitedStatescan illustrate hisproblem.Some

haveargued hatattempts o understand he motivationsof terrorists, rtheir

admirers, s somehowequivalent ojustifyingtheiractions,or thatattempt-

ingto imaginehow an AmericanMuslim feels in the aftermath f theattacks

somehow diminishes the memoryof those who perished.However,assum-

ing a postureof responsiveness owardone's fellow citizens (ortowardciti-

zens of othernations)does not necessarilyinvolve abandoningone's own

values andprinciples,orgivingupthefight(if onehappens o be in one).Itis

not moralbankruptcy rpoliticaltreason. nstead, t is anattemptatempathic

identificationwith others.If genuine sympathyor affection does notemergefrom thispractice,so be it. If membersof modemliberalsocieties musthave

enemies,theycan,at theveryleast,takethe timetogetto know these enemies

better.This practice s exemplifiedby the UnitedNations,where ambassa-

dors and staffersof rival nations maintaincordialrelations n spite of their

differences,and whererepresentativesf formerenemies(andpotentialene-

mies) may be observedchattingaffablyin the corridorsanddiningrooms.

The UN maybe anunexpectedplaceto discoverthepracticeof Emersonian

civic friendship.However, f it can bepracticed here tcan,perhaps,beprac-ticed elsewhere.

CONCLUSION

Theuse of Emerson'sconceptionof friendshipas a model forliberalciti-

zenship is neither obvious nor unproblematic. ndeed,some scholars,like

Wilson Carey McWilliams,have found this conception unsatisfyingandemotionallycold.Indeed,McWilliamsobserves hatEmersondistrustedper-sonalfriendshipsbecausetheyare "basedonqualitiesof personality which]

hampermen in theirefforts to 'merge'with the all."49 notherwords,Emer-

son is too willingto sacrifice riends or thesakeof an idealizedtranscenden-

tal connectedness. McWilliams also notes that Emerson's conception of

friendship s premisedupon a radical ndividualism hat,in spite of Emer-

son'sownintentions,couldserveto "moralizedisloyaltyandself-seeking."50

RejectingEmerson,McWilliamswritesapprovinglyof ancientGreekcon-

ceptionsthatview fraternity s aneedestablishedby the natureof man,with-

out which society wouldbe sick, alienated, ndividualistic,andwithoutanytractiononthetrulyhumanexcellencesthat urnmere ife into thegoodlife.

Nonetheless,Emerson'sconceptionof friendship,with its twinpracticesof truthandtenderness,representsa compellingchallengeto the traditional

Aristotelianview that tendsto dominatediscussionsof friendshipand citi-








zenship.One majoradvantageof Emerson'sconceptionoverAristotle'sis

that the formeraccepts as given the moraland culturalpluralismof most

modem societies, anddoes not insist that a strongor comprehensivemoralconsensusexist betweencitizenspriorto politics.51UnlikeAristotle,Emer-son had the opportunity o immerse himself in Islamic, Buddhist,Hindu,

Confucian,and othernon-Westernwritings,and can acknowledge signifi-cantintellectualdebtsoutside of theWestern radition.52orinstance, n his

essay "PersianPoetry,"Emersonassertsthat certainEasternpoets, amongthem IbnJemin, Hafiz, andJami,makecontributions o the philosophyof

friendshipequalto thatof Montaigne.He admiringlyquotesJami,who (like

Emersonhimself)portrays riendshipas growing stronger hroughconstanttesting,writing,"Afriendis he, who, huntedas a foe,/So muchthekindliershows him thanbefore;/Throwstones at him, or ruder avelins throw,/Hebuildswithstoneandsteela firmer loor."53Similarly,oneof Emerson'smorefamousobservations oncerning riendship,"He will havelearned helessonof life who is skilful in theethics of friendship,"s based on aquotation rom

Hafiz, "Thou earnestno secret until thou knowestfriendship,since to theunsoundno heavenlyknowledgeenters."54

The mainstrengthof Emerson'sconceptionof friendshipas a model forliberalcitizenship,when comparedwith Aristotle's,is a dynamicelementthatcouldgive bothdefendersandcritics of liberalismreasonto believe thatthepracticeof citizenship n liberalsocieties can evolve in noninstrumentaldirectionswithoutjeopardizing iberalcitizenship'susualinstrumental ur-poses. Friendshipsdo not springforth,fully grown, like Athena from thehead of Zeus. Rather, f friendshipsare to grow and flourish,they requireinvestmentandgradualdevelopment."Letusbuyourentrance o thisguild,"

Emersonadvises,"byalongprobation."55henormsof friendshipdentifiedby Emersonworkto promoterelationships hatgrow,andgrowmoresolid,overtime,rather hanweakeninganddyingby degrees.By practicing ruthandtenderness, hetwocrucialnormsof friendship, elationsbetweenfellow

citizensalso canslowly develop,and cangraduallycometo be characterized

bya moreopenformof deliberation, morestableformof disagreement, nda moretrulydemocraticconnectedness.

The communicativenorms of friendship heorizedby Emersonpromote

solid relationshipswhere disagreementsare possible but not explosive.Friends,afterall, disagreeall thetimebutmakereservingandstrengtheningthe bondsof friendshipa priorityandwinninga particular rgumenta sec-

ondaryconsideration.Strategiessuch as pulling one's punches or leavingthingsunsaidmaybe employedto maintainfriendships,butsuch strategiescould also indirectlyserve to weaken hebonds of friendship n the longrun.








Friends who cannot be frankwith one another,or are afraidthatfrankness

will jeopardizetheirrelationship,cannot be friendsin the richestpossible

sense.They maybe close acquaintances nd know one anotherverywell, orthinkthey do. But such relationshipsare fragile and unsure. To endure,a

friendshipmustdevelop, and to developa friendshipoccasionallymustbe

testedby anelement of incivility.Therefore,Emersonwrites,"Ido notwish

to treatfriendshipdaintily,but with roughest courage.When they arereal,

they are not glass threadsor frostwork,but the solidestthingwe know.""56

Truthand tendernesscould,conceivably,be viewedas competingorcon-

tradictorynorms, since the former is primarilyconcerned with testing the

bonds of friendship,while the latter s primarilyconcernedwithpreservingthem.AlthoughEmersondoes not say so explicitly,it seems to me that the

normsof truthandtendernessarenotnecessarilyopposedtoone another at-

egorically,where the practicesof friendshipandcitizenshipareconcerned,

but, instead,maybe dialecticallyopposed.Thatis to say,the norms of truth

and tendernessmay turnoutto be dialectical correlatesin a processof per-sonaland socialdevelopmenthatoperates,at leastinpart, hrough he mech-

anismof disagreementand deliberation.

Workingtogether through the norms of friendship, truthand tender-

ness, as theorized by Emerson, can help produce a social union that is

characterizednot by fearor decorum,which may leave too much unsaid,or by street fighting, which leaves too much unheard.Instead, t would be

characterizedby a synthesisthatBernardCrickonce called "aroughcivil-

ity."57 he elementof incivility-namely, truth-pushes a society to recog-nize the divisions and tensions within it, while the element of civility-

namely, tenderness-helps thatsociety reachan endless series of delibera-

tive compromises. Working together against silence and violence, bothnormspromotea more durablesocial union and, ultimately,a greaterand

moremeaningfulharmony.If the norms cultivatedwithin friendshipsare transferable o political

communities, henpeoplewho understandwhat it meansto be a goodfriendalsowill knowsomething,althoughnoteverything,aboutwhat t meansto be

a good citizen.Peoplewill notnecessarilypracticegood citizenshipbecause

theyactuallyare united with their fellow citizensby reciprocalgoodwill, as

Aristotlehadhoped. Friendshipwill not become the concretebasis for thestate.Rather,peoplewill practicegood citizenship,at leastinitially,because

they recognizethat he samenormsthatworkforfriendshipalso will workto

preserveandstrengthenmodern iberalsocieties,even in theface of inevita-

ble disagreementbetween memberswithdifferentvalues and interests.The

practiceof citizenship hatemergeswill resemblecontractualiberalcitizen-








shipin manyrespects,particularlyn its affirmation f expansive ndividual

rights.But it alsowill be enrichedby ademocratic onnectedness hat s both

radical n characterand,it mustbe said, indefinitein its possibilities.

NOTES

1. RalphWaldoEmerson,"Politics,"Emerson:Essays and Lectures,ed. Joel Porte(New

York:Libraryof America, 1983), 570-71.

2. ChristopherHeath Wellman is typical of this view. See ChristopherHeathWellman,

"Friends,Compatriots,and

SpecialPolitical

Obligations,"Political

Theory29

(April 2001):217-36.

3. Katebexplorestheideaof democratic onnectednesswith reference o WaltWhitman n

"WaltWhitmanand he Cultureof Democracy,"n TheInnerOcean(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniver-

sity Press, 1992),240-66. He investigates his conceptionfurtherwithreference o Emerson n

Emersonand Self-Reliance ThousandOaks,CA: Sage, 1995), esp. chap.4.

4. Articulationsof civic liberalism include William Galston,LiberalPurposes: Goods,

Virtues, ndDiversityin theLiberalState(Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1991);

Stephen Macedo, Democracy and Distrust: Civic Education in a MulticulturalDemocracy

(Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress,2000); StephenMacedo,Liberal Virtues:Citizen-

ship, Virtue, nd Communityn LiberalConstitutionalismNew York:OxfordUniversityPress,1990);PeterBerkowitz,Virtue ndtheMakingofModernLiberalism Princeton,NJ: Princeton

UniversityPress,1999);ThomasSpragensJr.,CivicLiberalism:Reflectionson OurDemocratic

Ideals (New York:Rowman & Littlefield, 1999);EamonnCallan,CreatingCitizens:Political

Educationand LiberalDemocracy(Oxford,UK: Clarendon,1997).5. Emerson,"Politics," 70.

6. JamesR. Martel also identifies these two centralfeaturesof Emerson'sconceptionof

friendship,but defines them rather lumsily as "repulsionandattraction." ee JamesR. Martel,

LoveIs a Sweet Chain:Desire,Autonomy ndFriendshipn LiberalPoliticalTheory NewYork:

Routledge,2001), 127.

7. The word"incivility"has come to enjoy an almostpurelynegativeconnotationdue, in

part,to the efforts of critics like StephenL. Carter.See StephenL. Carter,Civility:Manners,

Morals,and heEtiquetteofDemocracy New York:Basic Books, 1998), 134.Compare his with

MarkKingwellwho, in anexcellent studyof thepracticeof civility,acknowledges hatcivility

maynot be sufficient.Conceding hatcivilitycould "bea meansof oppressionoranexpressionof

power,not a restrainedandopen orientation o understanding," ingwell arguesthat we must

rebukeoneanother, rankly,when we suspectthat"civilityhides an instrumental nd"other han

maintaining ivil peaceandsocial order.See MarkKingwell,A CivilTongue: ustice,Dialogue,andthe PoliticsofPluralism(UniversityPark:PennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress, 1995),238-

39.

8. See SibylA. Schwarzenbach, OnCivicFriendship," thics 107(October1996):97-128;AndrewMason,"SpecialObligations o Compatriots," thics 107 (April 1997):427-47; David

Selbourne,ThePrincipleof Duty(London:Sinclair-Stevenson,1994), 156, 230-31.

9. AmyGutmann ndDennisThompson,DemocracyandDisagreement Cambridge,MA:

HarvardUniversityPress, 1996), 12.

10. Fordiscussion,see PaulSchollmeier,OtherSelves: Aristotle on PersonalandPolitical

Friendship Albany:StateUniversityof New YorkPress, 1994).







Scorza LIBERALCITIZENSHIPAND CIVICFRIENDSHIP 105

11. See Aristotle,NicomacheanEthics, 1155al-1158a36.

12. JohnM. Cooperargues hatAristotle'sconceptionof civic friendship s properlyunder-

stood to be avarietyof utility friendship,andthatutility friendship, ike true riendship,nvolvesmutualanddisinterestedwell-wishing.See JohnM.Cooper,"Aristotle nFriendship,"nEssays

on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Amelie OksenbergRorty(Berkeley: Universityof CaliforniaPress,

1980);andJohnM. Cooper,"PoliticalAnimalsandCivicFriendship,"nAristotle'sPolitik:Pro-

ceedings of the XIth Symposium Aristotelium, ed. Gunther Patzig (Friedrichshafen:

Vandenhoeck& Ruprecht,1990), 220-41. In contrast,AlasdairMacIntyreviews Aristotelian

civic friendshipas a kind of virtue riendship.See AlasdairMacIntyre,AfterVirtue, ded. (Notre

Dame, IN: Notre Dame UniversityPress, 1984), 156.

13. See PaulJ.Waddell,Friendship nd theMoralLife(NotreDame,IN:Universityof Notre

Dame Press, 1989), 49, 61-68.

14.Fordiscussion,see SuzanneStern-Gillet,Aristotle'sPhilosophyof Friendship Albany:StateUniversityof New YorkPress, 1995).

15.Forinstance,Schwarzenbach ttempts o shedthe Aristotelian onceptionof some of its

infamousmasculinist,elitist,andxenophobicconnotations,arguing hatcitizens of modern oci-

eties can maintaina close approximation f Aristoteliancivic friendshipbased on a relatively

thin consensusregarding oleration,mutualrecognitionof rights,and a universalvalueof care.

See Schwarzenbach,"OnCivic Friendship," 05-14.

16.Indeed,according o MacIntyre,membersof modern iberalsocieties are unable o prac-tice civic friendshipas Aristotleunderstoodt. For iberal ndividualists,MacIntyre xplains,"a

communitys

simplyanarena nwhich ndividuals achpursue heirown self-chosenconception

of thegood life, andpoliticalinstitutions xist toprovide hatdegreeof orderwhichmakessuch

self-determinedactivitypossible."See Maclntyre,After Virtue,195.

17. Wellman,"Friends," 21-23.

18. Ibid.,220.

19. Ibid.,222.

20. See MerrillD. Peterson,AdamsandJefferson:A RevolutionaryDialogue (Oxford,UK:

OxfordUniversityPress, 1995);JeanM. Yarbrough, PoliticsandFriendshipn the Adams-Jef-

fersonCorrespondence,"n FriendsandCitizens:Essaysin Honorof WilsonCareyMcWilliams,

ed. PeterDennisBathoryandNancyL. Schwartz Lanham,MD:Rowman& Littlefield,2000);

Jean M. Yarbrough,The Adams-JeffersonLetters: The Complete CorrespondencebetweenThomasJeffersonandAbigailand JohnAdams,ed. LesterJ.Cappon ChapelHill:Universityof

North CarolinaPress, 1988).

21. Whilefriendships "aconstituentof well-being," hepowersandrightsof citizenshipare

no morethan a means to well-being. See Wellman,"Friends," 23.

22. See Mason,"SpecialObligations," 42. Masonbuildsuponthe workof JosephRaz,who

has argued hatthe obligationsof friendshipare constitutiveof the intrinsicgood of friendship,

rather hanmerelybeingburdens hatbenefitothers.See Raz,"LiberatingDuties,"Law and Phi-

losophy8 (1989): 3-21. Forrefinementsof Raz'sbasic argument, ee SamuelScheffler,"Rela-

tionships and Responsibilities,"Philosophy & Public Affairs 26 (summer 1997): 189-209;

Michael O. Hardimon,"Role Obligations,"Journal of Philosophy 91 (July 1994): 333-63.Schefflerargues hatspecialobligationsadhere orelationships hatone happens o value,while

Hardimonsuggests that role identification provides the moral reasons to assume special

obligations.

23.According o Mason,thisobligationcannotbe derived romnational dentitybut,rather,

onlyfromcivic identity,although he reasonsforthis arenotentirelyclear.See Mason,"Special

Obligations,"442. Wellmanarguesthat no such distinctioncan be made between civic and








national dentity,since both provide mainly instrumental oods thatpromotewell-being. See

Wellman,"Friends," 23.

24.Wellman,"Friends,"

30.

25. Some culturescautionagainstcross-cultural riendships.See for instanceQu'ran,3:26,

3:116, 4:137, and5:51.However, reatingothersaccording o some of the normsof friendship or

instrumental easonsis not the same as forming genuinefriendshipswiththem.

26. For an account of the historicaldevelopmentof the concept of friendship n Islamic

thought, see Lenn E. Goodman, "Friendship n Aristotle, Miskawayh, and al-Ghazali," n

FriendshipEast and West:Philosophical Perspectives,ed. Oliver Leaman(Richmond,UK:

Curzon,1996), 164-91; for discussion of Confucian hinkingon friendship, ee David L. Hall

andRogerT.Ames, "ConfucianFriendship:The Roadto Religiousness," n TheChangingFace

of Friendship,ed. LeroyS. Rouner NotreDame,IN: NotreDameUniversityPress, 1994), 77-

94; fordiscussionof traditional ndianviews of friendship, ee BhikhuParekh,"An ndianViewof Friendship,"n The ChangingFace of Friendship,ed. Leroy S. Rouner(Notre Dame, IN:

Notre Dame UniversityPress, 1994), 95-113.

27. We readin al-Ghazali, or instance,thatfriendship"entails ove as well as candor and

onlybenevolencecanguidethe choicebetweenspeakingoutandkeepingsilent."See Goodman,

"FriendshipnAristotle,"184.Similarly, t wasrecognized nthe Indianepics that riendship"is

one of thefew relationshipsnwhich honestandfearlesscriticism sbothpermitted ndrequired.Friendsmust'speak ruth' satyamvada) o eachother;otherwise heir riendship ests onuntruth

and is 'false.'" See Parekh,"AnIndianView,"102.

28. RalphWaldoEmerson,"Astrea,"n TheCompleteWorks fRalph WaldoEmerson,cen-

tenaryed., ed. EdwardW.Emerson,12 vols. (Boston:HoughtonMifflin, 1903-04), vol. 9, 80.

29. In an early lecture,"Society,"Emersonwrites of friendship,"This is anotherself. He

occupiesanotherpointof view,and sees thesameobjectonanother ide.His confirmation f our

report ejoices,his contradictionmakes us pause."RalphWaldoEmerson,"Society,"TheEarlyLecturesof RalphWaldoEmerson,3 vols. (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress, 1972),vol. 2, 102. This notion of a friendas "another elf' recalls Aristotle'sunderstanding f a truefriend as a "second self."See Aristotle,NicomacheanEthics, 1166a30-35.However,Emersondoes notmean,as Aristotledoes, thatmy friend s anotherme, possessing the same moralper-spectiveandconcern orvirtue,so thatself-loveembracesbothpersonsequally.There s a crucial

separatenessinvolved in Emersonian

riendship,which does not

appearo exist in

Aristotle'sconceptionof virtuefriendship.Fordiscussion,see Stern-Gillet,Aristotle'sPhilosophy,37-40.

Also see Kateb,Emersonand Self-Reliance,106-7.

30. RalphWaldoEmerson,"Friendship,"n Emerson:Essays and Lectures,ed. Joel Porte

(New York:Libraryof America, 1983), 351.

31. See FriedrichNietzsche,Human,All TooHuman,ed.MarionFaber Lincoln:Universityof NebraskaPress, 1984), section 376. Fordiscussion,see JacquesDerrida,Politics of Friend-

ship (London:Verso,1997), throughout.32. Emerson,"Friendship,"45.

33. Ibid.,348.

34. Aristotle,NicomacheanEthics, 1167a22-1167b15.35. Kateb dentifiesandelaborates hese two aspectsof Emerson'sconceptionof friendship.

AlthoughEmerson laims,initially, ogive theseaspectsequalweightinconstituting riendship,Kateb s probably orrect n his view thattruth eceives a largerplacein Emerson'ssystem,per-hapsdue its moreintimateconnection to self-reliance,which is the centralconceptof this sys-tem. See Kateb,Emersonand Self-Reliance,esp. 102-9.

36. RalphWaldoEmerson,"Behavior,"n Emerson:Essays and Lectures,ed. Joel Porte








Scorza LIBERALCITIZENSHIPAND CIVICFRIENDSHIP 107

37. Emerson,"Friendship,"47.

38. RalphWaldoEmerson,"SocialAims,"CompleteWorks f RalphWaldoEmerson,cente-

naryed.,ed. EdwardW.Emerson,12vols. (Boston:HoughtonMifflin, 1903-04),vol.8,95-96.39. Fordiscussion,see Sissela Bok,Lying(New York:Vintage,1989),esp. 90-106. Also see

GutmannandThompson,Democracyand Disagreement,esp. chap.3.

40. Fordiscussion,see Seyla Benhabib,"LiberalDialogue versus a CriticalTheoryof Dis-

cursive Legitimation,"n Liberalismand the Moral Life, ed. Nancy Rosenblum(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1989),esp. 146-54.Comparewith Bruce Ackerman'sdefense of

conversational estraint n "WhyDialogue?"Journalof Philosophy86 (January1989):5-22.

41. See J. DonaldMoon, ConstructingCommunity:Moral Pluralism and Tragic Conflicts

(Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1993), 92. For a contrastingview, see Stephen

Holmes,"GagRules or thePolitics of Omission," n Constitutionalism ndDemocracy,ed. Jon

Elster andRuneSlagstad (Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1988).42. JohnRawls,PoliticalLiberalism NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1993),fn.220.

43. Ibid.,217.

44. RalphWaldoEmerson,in "Manners,"Emerson:Essays and Lectures,ed. Joel Porte


45. RalphWaldoEmerson,"Self-Reliance,"n Emerson:EssaysandLectures,ed. Joel Porte


46. Emerson,"Friendship,"43.

47. Whitman's"Songof theOpenRoad"concludeswith,"Camerado, give you my hand /I

give you mylove moreprecious hanmoney,/Igive you myselfbeforepreaching rlaw;/Willyou

give me yourself?Will you come travel with me?/Shallwe stick by each other as long as we

live?" See WaltWhitman,Leaves of Grass (New York:New AmericanLibrary,1980), 144.

Derridaappears o echo this sentiment nPoliticsofFriendship,where he writes,"Whenwill we

be readyfor anexperienceof freedomandequalitythat s capableof respectfullyexperiencingthatfriendship,which would at last be just, just beyondthe law, and measuredup againstits

measurelessness?O my democratic riends" p. 306).48. RalphWaldoEmerson,"TheHeart,"n EarlyLecturesof RalphWaldoEmerson,3 vols.

(Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress, 1972), vol. 2, 292.

49. Wilson CareyMcWilliams,The Ideaof Fraternity n America(Berkeley:Universityof

CaliforniaPress, 1973), 285.50. Ibid.,285.

51. BernardCrickarguesagainst he need for such aconsensus,writing,"Themoralconsen-

sus of a free state is not somethingmysteriouslyprior o or abovepolitics: it is theactivity(the

civilizing activity)of politics itself." See BernardCrick,In Defense of Politics, rev. ed. (Balti-more:Penguin,1964), 24.

52. Among Emerson'ssourceswere theBhagavadGita,the Hindu VishnuSarma,the four

classic booksof Confucianism namely, heAnalects,the BookofMencius,theChungYung, nd

the TaHeo), various collections of sayings of Buddha,several volumes of Persian and Arabic

poetry includingFirdusi'sepicShahNameh),andseveralvolumesof Islamichistoryandphilos-

ophy (includingtheAkhlak-I-Jalaly,which introducedEmersonto Sufism).FordiscussionofEmerson'sexposureto non-Western hilosophies,see RobertD. RichardsonJr.,Emerson:The

MindonFire(Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress,1995),218-23,376-80, 391-94,404-9.

53. RalphWaldoEmerson, n "PersianPoetry,"CompleteWorks f RalphWaldoEmerson,

centenaryd.,ed.EdwardW.Emerson, 2 vols.(Boston:HoughtonMifflin,1903-04),vol.8,259.

54. CompareRalphWaldoEmerson,"DomesticLife," n CompleteWorks f RalphWaldo

Emerson,centenary d.,ed. EdwardW.Emerson,12 vols. (Boston:HoughtonMifflin, 1903-04),vol. 7, 129, with Emerson,"PersianPoetry," 58.








55. Emerson,"Friendship" 51.

56. Ibid.,346.

57. Crick,In Defense of Politics, 161.

JasonA. Scorzais an assistantprofessor ofphilosophyandpolitical science at FairleighDickinsonUniversity n Teaneck,NewJersey.He is presently completinga book on the

theoryandpractice of liberalcitizenship.

liberal citizenship and civic friendship

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