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Liberalism and Denominational SchoolsGer Snik a & Johan de Jong aa University of Nijmegen , The NetherlandsPublished online: 03 Aug 2006.

To cite this article: Ger Snik & Johan de Jong (1995) Liberalism and Denominational Schools, Journal of Moral Education, 24:4,395-407, DOI: 10.1080/0305724950240403

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Journal of Moral Education, Vol. 24, No. 4, 1995 395

Liberalism and DenominationalSchoolsGER SNIK & JOHAN DE JONGUniversity of Nijmegen, The Netherlands

ABSTRACT This paper discusses the problematic relation between liberalism and freedom ofeducation, i.e. the right of (groups of) parents to found schools in which they can educate theirchildren in accordance with their particular conception of the good life. First, the educationaland philosophical backgrounds of the conflict between liberalism and freedom of education areexplicated. Secondly, it is suggested that freedom of education can be considered a liberal value.The right to freedom of education is interpreted as a group right, and it is argued that it is bothpossible and desirable to defend, on certain conditions, group rights within liberalism. Finally,some consequences of this position for a liberal theory are spelled out.

In the Netherlands, communities with a particular view of life have the consti-tutional right, on condition that the quality of education is guaranteed, to establishstate-financed schools where they can educate and teach their children in accord-ance with their own conception of life. In order to be allowed to found a school,some conditions must be satisfied. First, it must be demonstrated that the school hasa certain number of pupils (mid-1993: for a primary school in smaller municipalitiesa minimum of 200, in bigger municipalities 333). Secondly, the new school must besufficiently distinct from already existing schools in respect of its view of life.

The right to freedom of education was laid down in the constitution in 1917,when many years of debate and political struggle ("the school struggle") resulted inthe full financial equality of public and denominational education (Glenn, 1988,p. 248). Since that time the number of denominational schools has increasedconsiderably. Whereas in 1917 30% of the children went to denominational and70% to public schools, now it is the other way around. Many groups have producedan educational system of their own: Catholic, Protestant-Christian, Orthodox Prot-estant (in various kinds), anthroposophical, liberal-Jewish, evangelical.

The background of this diversity of educational systems is the typically Dutchphenomenon of verzuiling (segmentation or "pillarisation") (Iijphart, 1976) [1].The Netherlands is a zuilenmaatschappij ("pillar society") that consists of differentgroups, each holding a particular view of life. They all have their own trade unions,

0305-7240/95/040395-13 © 1995 The Norham Foundation

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unions for employers, health care institutions, institutions for care for the aged,newspapers, political parties, broadcast, clubs for sports, culture and relaxation (e.g."the goat breeders association").

Since the 1960's ontzuiling ("depillarisation") has been taking place. Institu-tions lose their particular identity, particularly through secularisation. In many fieldsinstitutions have broadened and merged (e.g. trade unions and political parties).Until recently education has been an exception to this trend, but now schools toohave lost their particular identity. This is particularly the case in secondary andhigher education, where schools not only alter or abandon their particular foun-dation but also merge. The result is the loss of the specific identity of the school.

However, this does not mean that verzuiling has come to its end. On thecontrary, there are small-scale efforts to revitalise traditional confessional education.In addition, new minority groups also demand the right to establish schools of theirown (e.g. orthodox Jews, Hindus, Muslims [orthodox and liberal] and those practis-ing transcendental meditation).

Unsurprisingly then, from time to time, as recently in the "debate aboutminorities", the right to freedom of education is debated. Is it still desirable that ina democratic, pluralist society minorities should educate their children in denomina-tional schools according to their own identity? Advocates suppose that freedom ofeducation is a liberal value. They subscribe to the right of communities to perpetu-ate their identity and transmit it to future generations (McLaughlin, 1992). Oppo-nents point to two objections to denominational schools. First, such schools do notstimulate the integration of minorities in the open, pluralist, democratic society butadvance segregation (which, of course, in most cases is exactly the purpose of suchschools). Secondly, education, the keynote of which in such schools is actually bydefinition the transmission of a particular view of life or ideology, is "pedagogicallysuspect". They suppose that, in a liberal democratic society, the school is not thereto trap children in a indoctrinatory way in the culture of a particular community, butthat education should acquaint children as objectively as possible with the optionsof the pluralist society and should respect and stimulate the autonomy of the child.

From the description of these two positions it appears that both advocates andopponents appeal to values that are commonly connected with the appellation"liberal". This points to the fact that the ideal of freedom of education constitutesa problem for liberalism. In liberalism, the central notion is that each individual,including the child, has the individual right to determine his/her own conception oflife. However, the idea of freedom of education presupposes that communities havethe group right to transmit their conceptions of life to children. These two points ofview are in sharp contrast.

In this paper this conflict is discussed. From two different perspectives weillustrate the backgrounds of the tension between freedom of education and liberal-ism. In Section 2 and 3 we treat the philosophical-pedagogic backgrounds of thecontradiction between freedom of education and autonomy. In Section 4 we attendto the political-philosophical backgrounds of the conflict between group rights andindividual rights. Then, with the help of arguments that are derived from the workof Kymlicka and Crittenden, we will indicate briefly how there can be room for

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Denominational Schools 397

group rights (Section 5) and freedom of education (Section 6) within the frameworkof liberalism. We start, however, with a brief exposition of what we, and manyothers, mean by "liberalism".

1. Liberalism

What does liberalism hold? Because there are different versions of liberalism, thisquestion is not easy to answer. Yet there is a standard conception that, in fact, canbe summarised in one contention: everyone has the right to determine for him/her-self what kind of life he/she wants to lead.

Three principles constitute the background of this fundamental norm: first, theidea that it is impossible in a rationally compelling way to decide which conceptionof life should be accepted by everyone. This insight is called by some authors the"agnosticism-argument". This term is rather misleading; only a few people are of theopinion that choosing a conception of life is like throwing a dice and that critical,argumentative judgement is completely impossible. Secondly, each individual hasthe right to choose and execute his/her own conception of life (principle of individ-uality). The individual is understood as an autonomous subject who should not lethim/herself be determined by traditions and custom, but who should judge withhis/her own rational capacities and on his/her own responsibility; for instance, bycritically evaluating existing options, and subsequently accepting or rejecting them.Third is the principle of neutrality, which holds that the state does not have the rightto prescribe a particular conception of life.

Liberalism should be understood as a second-order morality. It is not derivedfrom a substantial conception of life but transcends all conceptions of life. We mustconceive of liberalism as a specific attitude to conceptions of life. Thus it does notprescribe a particular substantial conception of life, but is formal. It enables citizensto determine their own conceptions of life in a critical and autonomous way. Theseconceptions of life can be understood as (part of) substantial first order moralities.

Incidentally, this does not mean that liberalism is neutral in all respects.Liberalism is a public morality in which a fundamental norm applies to everyone:each individual has the right to choose autonomously his/her own plan of life. Nosubstantial plan of life is prescribed, although it is assumed that autonomy is betterthan heteronomy (the condition in which authorities, traditions or custom determinethe individual's conceptions of life) [2]. The ideal of autonomy then is in contrastwith many fundamentalist traditions.

The historic background of the origin of liberalism is the pluralisation of society,i.e. the development in which the cultural homogeneity of traditional society madeway for the plurality of conceptions of life that is characteristic of modern societies(Galenkamp, 1993, p. 69; Van Asperen, 1993, pp. 55ff.). In a traditional society thenotion of choice is absent because of the existence of cultural homogeneity; theexisting and generally accepted conception of life was conceived of as a "fact".Modern society is characterised by the absence of a common conception of life.There are many perspectives on what we should value in life; how we should live isno longer self-evident but the object of individual choice. Given this, there is a need

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to differentiate between (substantial) conceptions of life and a formal, liberalframework of rights that enables the individual to determine his/her own plan of life.Liberalism, then, is in some respects an answer to the question of how a pluralistsociety is possible (Van Asperen, 1993).

2. Freedom of Education Versus Autonomy of the Child

In this section we spell out the philosophical-pedagogic backgrounds of the conflictbetween "freedom of education" and "autonomy of the child". We clarify why theidea of freedom of education forms a problem within the philosophy of liberaleducation. Incidentally, we indicate how, on certain conditions, there can be roomfor freedom of education within the liberal theory of education.

Many see freedom of education as an illuminating elaboration of the liberalfundamental norm that the state does not have the right to impose upon its citizensa particular conception of life (cf. Van Asperen, 1993, p. 96). For them freedom ofeducation is the consequence of liberalism and a right, which is a continuation of theright to the freedom of religion. The starting point is the liberal idea that a view oflife is not a public, but a private matter. Liberalism forbids the state from prescribinga particular conception of life for its citizens. As a consequence, the state does nothave the right to educate children into a particular conception of life nor to obligeparents to do so. So liberalism prohibits not only state religion but also statepedagogy. It therefore follows that parents and communities have the right toeducate their children in accordance with their own conceptions of life. Because thechoice of a conception of life is a private matter, the state has nothing to say aboutthe aims and content of education. Education is a private matter for parents andcommunities. The state must, if parents and communities so wish, allow andencourage (subsidise) children to be educated in schools with a particular view of lifein accordance with that specific view. Evidently, in such denominational schools thetransmission of community-specific values will take place mainly through moral andreligious education. In short, it is liberal to respect the diversity of perspectives onthe nature and aims of education. A pluralist, liberal society is characterised by theexistence of different educational practices, in which different community-specificconceptions of life determine the aims and content of education.

Allowing freedom of education, then, seems very liberal. Even so, in philosoph-ical pedagogy (in particular the Anglo-Saxon "philosophy of liberal education")doubts are put forward concerning the idea of freedom of education. It is doubtedwhether freedom of education is compatible with liberal education. Freedom ofeducation means that parents and communities are allowed to derive the aims andcontent of education from their view of life; they want to educate their children as,for example, good Christians, and they attempt to transmit the traditional Christianfaith to their children. Liberal education, however, is directed to the aim of enablingchildren through education to choose (in the future) their own conception of life.One cannot fill in the aim of liberal education at will. The starting point is thepublic, liberal norm that each individual has the right to determine his/her ownconception of life (see Section 1). This fundamental norm defines the object of

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education and makes demands on the nature and the content of education. Ofcourse, the child is not mature enough to determine his/her own conception of life.Through education he/she should be enabled to do so. The object of education isnot that the child is adapted to the plan of life of his/her educators, but that the childlearns to choose his/her own plan of life in a critical and informed way (e.g. O'Hear,1981, pp. 48ff., 54). Liberal education is directed at the achievement of liberaldemocratic values by the child, the transmission of knowledge of the possibilities ofchoice that the pluralist society offers, and the development of principles, capacitiesand virtues of critical thinking in different domains of rationality (Crittenden, 1988).

Almost all liberal educators suppose that a traditional education aimed atassimilating the child to the conception of life of the educators is contrary to Qiberal)education. Adults cannot, at the same time, educate the child as an autonomousperson and, for example, as a good Muslim (White, 1982, pp. 166-167). Thismeans that educators are not free to educate their children in accordance with theirown denominational points of view. They do not have the right to determine theconception of life of their children (Tamir, 1990).

It is argued that because the choice of a conception of life is a private matter,the object of education is not a private matter for parents and communities but is infact a public matter. Education has a formal object that transcends all privateconceptions of parents and communities; that is, the autonomy of the child, andcontent that holds for everyone; that is, information about conceptions of life andthe development of critical capacities of judgement. Concerning education, the statehas a particular task: the state must enable parents and communities to educate theirchildren towards autonomy, and has the task to see to it that parents do notrenounce their duty to educate their children towards autonomy (O'Hear, 1981,p. 12; Lomasky, 1987; Crittenden, 1988). This does not imply a return to statecontrol of education (state pedagogy); the state does not have the right to impose aparticular conception of life on children. But because parents do not have this righteither, the state has to defend the right of the child to autonomy.

Liberal educators are broadly in agreement on these premises, yet it is possibleto differentiate between authors who categorically prohibit the transmission ofsubstantial conceptions of life (e.g. White, 1983) and more moderate authors, whoon certain conditions permit the transmission of substantial conceptions of life(McLaughlin, 1984; 1987, 1992; Crittenden, 1988; cf. Snik, 1993).

The first group of authors supposes that schools may not transmit a particularconception of life in a partial manner. Because such a transmission hinders thedevelopment of autonomy, it is their opinion that the school should restrict itself tothe neutral and objective transmission of information about existing perspectives onlife. For this reason, supporters of this point of view are inclined categorically todeny freedom of education (e.g. White, 1983).

The latter group of authors thinks that partial transmission is not only inevitablebut also desirable. Referring to a set of important arguments (see Peters, 1981), theyunderstand the transmission of a specific conception of life as a condition for thedevelopment of autonomy and thus as the first stage of liberal education; that meansthat within liberal education there is room for freedom of education, albeit under

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certain conditions (McLaughlin, 1984; 1987; Crittenden, 1988). The (ultimate)goal of the practice of freedom of education in connection with liberal education is,after all, not the conception of life of the parents, but the development of thepersonal autonomy of the child. On closer inspection, the position that is taken doesnot read: freedom of education is admissible as long as education in accordance withthe conception of life of parents and communities is not contrary to the developmentof the autonomy of the child. It does read: freedom of education is admissiblebecause the implicated transmission of tradition contributes to the development ofautonomy; transmission of tradition is not—as in traditional education—directed atadapting the child to the conception of life of parents. Because traditional educationand liberal education do have these incompatible goals, it is not right to understandtraditional education as a precondition of, or as a first stage of, liberal education.There are considerable differences between transmission of tradition in traditionaleducational practices and transmission of tradition in connection with liberal edu-cation (McLaughlin, 1984; 1987; Snik, 1993).

3. Two Different Perspectives on the Relation Between Views of Life andEducation

Both positions expounded in the previous section are defended by an appeal toliberalism. In each case it is argued that determining and practising a conception oflife is not a public, but a private matter. Nevertheless, the conclusions are verydifferent, even contrasting. In this section we illustrate how two essentially differentperspectives on the relation between views of life and education underlie bothpositions. At the same time we will strengthen the impression, already given in theprevious section that the second position corresponds best to the liberal fundamentalnorm, that each individual has the right to determine his/her own conception of life.

In the first position ("parents and communities have the right to educatechildren to their conception of life") the starting point is that the aim of educationis dependent on a conception of the meaning of life. This conception has beenincluded in the determination of the object of education and in the definition ofeducation. This perspective on the relation between education and a view of life iscommonly designated by the term beginselpedagogiek (principled pedagogy) [3].Because pedagogy derives its aim from educators' conceptions of the purpose of life,pedagogy is dependent on particular principles. Educators who take this point ofview have no problem with terms such as "Christian pedagogy" and "Islamiceducation" (Hirst, 1974). For them the expression "denominational pedagogy" isreally a pleonasm. The insight that pedagogy is subservient to particular premises is,according to these educators, itself not derived from a view of life but is ameta-theoretical, formal principle that is prior to all pedagogy and is presupposed byall pedagogies (Brezinka, 1992). It is a "common ground" that all (denominational)pedagogies share with each other and on which educators, while having verydifferent convictions, are in agreement with each other. Of course, everyone withhis/her own specific principles fleshes out this formal common starting point differ-ently.

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Denominational Schools 401

In the second position ("autonomy of the child") the idea of "autonomouspedagogy" is presupposed. Education is not dependent on particular conceptions ofthe meaning of life, but has its own internal aim, i.e. the autonomy of the child andthe principles of critical rationality (Hirst, 1974). This aim can be found in thephenomenon of education itself, or is implied in the concept "education". Theintrapedagogic norm "autonomy" is the common ground which applies to allconceptions. It should not be ruled out that within this common pedagogic normsometimes, for instance in selecting the content, value-dependent decisions can andmust be made. Nevertheless, the aim of education is not the view of life of theeducator, but the autonomy (i.e. majority or self-responsible self-determination) ofthe child. For educators who take this position terms such as "denominationaleducation", "Christian pedagogy" and "Islamic education" are in fact self-contra-dictory expressions (Hirst, 1974).

Autonomy, the object of liberal education, is of a different order from theconceptions of life that are the object of traditional educational practices. Autonomyis neither an answer to the question of the meaning of life nor derived from such aconception. Because of this, there is a major difference between the way in which inthe liberal approach the goal of autonomy is justified and the way in which in adenominational pedagogy a conception of life is justified as the object of education.In the latter case, the wish to educate the child into a particular conception of lifeis justified by an appeal to the formal starting point that all education is dependenton a conception of life, plus a reference to this particular conception of life. In thefirst case, essentially different arguments are used (Tamir, 1990, p. 162), forinstance the transcendental argument that the denial of the value of autonomyaffirms the value of autonomy (Snik, 1990] Snik & Van Haaften, 1991).

4. The Tension Between Group Rights and Individual Rights

The conflict between "freedom of education" and "autonomy of the child" is not apurely philosophical-pedagogic problem, but is also connected with the political-philosophical distinction between group rights and individual rights.

In a pluralist society, group rights enable religious, cultural, national or ethniccommunities and minorities to practice, continue and transmit their own traditionor "group identity" (Galenkamp, 1993) [4]. In group rights, the autonomy ofcommunities is central. The state does not have the right to deny communities theirtraditions: the diversity of communities and cultures must be respected and toler-ated. Concerning education, the right of communities to give their children aneducation that is in accordance with a particular conception of life can be under-stood as a group right. After all, education and schooling are pre-eminently meansto preserve the group identity of communities.

Individual rights enable the individual to choose, revise and practice his/herown conception of life. Individual rights assume the autonomy of the individual. Noone has the right to impose a particular conception of life on another person.Concerning education, this means that the child must be educated towards auton-omy.

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It is obvious that there exists a tension between group rights and individualrights. Because in liberalism individual rights are premised many contemporaryliberals, as Kymlicka shows (1989, pp. 137ff, 140, 206ff), have difficulty with theidea of group rights [5]. In modern liberal theory the individual is conceptualised assomeone who must be free to determine his/her plan of life. The primacy ofindividual rights is related to the liberal-individualistic view that only "individualsare viewed as the ultimate unit of moral worth" (Kymlicka, 1989, p. 140). Onlyindividuals count as "self-originating sources of valid claims" (Rawls, 1980, p. 543).This starting point forms the basis for the attribution of individual rights and leaveslittle room for the idea of group rights: the community cannot, as the individual can,be the source of valid moral claims. For liberals, the community is important onlyas far as it contributes to the (good) life of individuals. In liberal theory, individualand group rights cannot compete for the same moral space because the value of thecollective is derived from its contribution to the value of individual lives (Kymlicka,1989, p. 140).

Theoretically, contemporary liberal individualism leaves little room for therecognition of group rights. At the same time, the liberal fear of group rights is fedby practical-political considerations. For instance, liberals fear that group rightssignify the first step towards segregation, "apartheid" or "balkanisation". In ad-dition, liberals shudder at the thought that the practice of group rights may result inthe violation of individual rights. After all, group rights enable communities torestrict the freedom of their members and commit them to a specific conception oflife. In short, a combination of philosophical and political considerations makeliberals inclined to reject group rights.

Galenkamp (1993, pp. 152-155) goes one step further than Kymlicka bystating that individual rights and group rights are in fact incompatible. Both rightshave completely different features. In individual rights racial, ethnic and culturalcharacteristics are considered contingent and irrelevant, whereas in group rightsthose characteristics are central: in contrast to individual rights, group rights are notcolour blind. Individual rights are the property of each individual, because theindividual is a human being and shares a universal core with all other human beings("human dignity"). Group rights are the property of groups of people who have aspecific racial, ethnic or cultural characteristic in common ("group identity"). Bothrights refer to completely different frameworks. Individual rights are individualistic,universal and egalitarian; they belong to the modern liberal tradition. Group rightsare collectivistic, particularistic, group/community-bound and differential; they be-long to the premodern, traditional framework. Each type of right is part of a differentform of life, in which essentially different conceptions of the person and of societyare used. Individual rights assume that the person determines his/her own identityand presuppose the concept of Gesettschaft. Collective rights assume that the com-munity constitutes the identity of the individual and presuppose the concept ofGemeinschafi [6]. Here, according to Galenkamp, we are confronted with twodifferent, legitimate language games that are theoretically incompatible.

There is then a fundamental difference between group rights and individualrights. With reference to education we see a tension between the two types of rights

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Denominational Schools 403

because, on close inspection, the group right of freedom of education is contrary tothe individual right of the child to autonomy. The group right to freedom ofeducation holds that communities have the right to preserve group identity and totransmit to their children group-determined conceptions of life. The individual rightof the child to autonomy holds that the child has the right eventually to determinehis/her own identity and conception of life. This tension is especially relevant in thecase of denominational schools because the (possibly indoctrinatory) moral andreligious education in such schools may threaten the development of the autonomyof the child.

5. The Rehabilitation of Group Rights in Liberalism

In response to the modern liberal overemphasis of individual rights, a rehabilitationof the idea of group rights has occurred in recent years. The communitariancriticism of the asocial character of the liberal-individualistic conception of theperson plays an important part in it (Snik, 1992; 1993). Communitarians point tothe fact that communities play an important role in the development of personalidentity, a role that is connected closely with the intermediate position of communi-ties between the individual and the state. Therefore, communitarians say, communi-ties deserve special moral recognition, for instance by accepting, along with theprinciple that individuals are right-and-duty-bearing units, a comparable principlefor the benefit of ethnic communities (Van Dyke, 1977, p. 363; cf. Kymlicka, 1989,p. 153).

The question now is whether it is possible to incorporate group rights in liberaltheory. In other words: is the tension between the two types of rights such that areconciliation is impossible in advance? In reply to that question Kymlicka rejectsthe one-sided emphasis that modern liberals put on individual rights. Instead, hetries to defend group rights within liberal theory [7]. In accordance with the viewsof "old" liberals such as Mill and Dewey, Kymlicka holds that the community ofcultural membership is not in contrast with individual freedom, but rather aprecondition of it (Kymlicka, 1989, p. 206). Cultural membership is an importantprimary good, because a rich and secure cultural structure makes the individualaware of the available options. In addition, individual freedom of choice demands acertain cultural context from which individuals can make meaningful choices. Aculture is a "context of choice", i.e. not only a precondition but also a subject ofautonomy. That is why cultural membership must be protected (Kymlicka, 1989,p. 238). In some respects, then, group rights do have a place in liberalism.

Galenkamp remarks that Kymlicka has not succeeded in reconciling grouprights with the liberal model (Galenkamp, 1993, pp. 150-151). In view of theincommensurable backgrounds of group rights and individual rights such a rec-onciliation is, according to her, theoretically impossible. In particular, she findsproblematic the "liberal" demands Kymlicka makes on minorities for the attributionof group rights. These demands result in the loss of traditional identity. Asking aculture to behave in a liberal manner is tantamount to taking away its identity(Galenkamp, p. 151). Galenkamp concludes that Kymlicka's effort "to liberalize

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traditions without destroying them" is noble but unrealistic. It is either one or theother: either one includes minority rights in liberal theory—but then the result is thatcultures will be forced to give up their specific and traditional identity; or one pleadsfor the preservation of traditional cultures—but then one must not be startled by theanti-liberal views that are generally characteristic of traditional cultures. In short,according to Galenkamp it is fundamentally impossible to reconcile liberalism withthe group right to preserve a particular cultural identity, without doing injustice toone of the two.

In our view the substance of this criticism is right, but that is no reason to rejectKymlicka's position. Kymlicka does not aim at reconciling liberal individualism withthe collectivistic conception of group rights, without being detrimental to one of thetwo. His effort to incorporate group rights into liberal theory must be seen as acorrection of its individualism, in which the primacy of individual rights will bepreserved. On closer inspection, this means that in Kymlicka's case the meaning ofthe notion of "group rights" shifts; he in fact rejects the collectivistic conception ofgroup rights.

In Kymlicka's liberal view of group rights two thoughts are central. First, thecommunity is important for the development of identity and autonomy, becausewithout a cultural heritage that development will be blocked (Kymlicka, 1989,pp. 175-177). Secondly, the primacy of individual rights makes demands on, andsets conditions for, the practice of group rights. Communities are not allowed tocontinue their identity without conditions. The exercise of a group right must notmake it impossible for the individual to leave the community, if he/she wishes; thepractice of a group right may not result in forcing either the members or thenon-members of a tradition.

In view of this, group rights can be positively included in liberal theory. Inaddition, it is consonant with liberalism to allow communities not only to experiencebut also to maintain their group identity. liberals should value a plurality ofcommunities. After all, there must be different cultural contexts available for theindividual to be able to make meaningful decisions. And if we value the plurality ofchoice-possibilities, then that implies not only its acceptance but also its activemaintenance (Crittenden, 1988). In that case, it is liberal to allow communities tocontinue their traditions and transmit them to future generations, provided that theliberal achievement of individual autonomy will not be sacrificed. In short, thejustification of group rights within a liberal framework is not only possible but alsodesirable.

6. Freedom of Education and the Autonomy of the Child

We conclude that it is both possible and desirable to include group rights forcultural, religious, national and ethnic communities in liberalism together withindividual rights. The starting point remains the primacy of individual rights. Thisprimacy puts limits to, and makes demands on, the permission of group rights. Theimportance of the experience, continuation and transmission of traditions in com-munities is acknowledged. The exercise of a group right may not result in constraints

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7Denominational Schools 405

on either members or non-members of a particular tradition. The individual rightshould make it possible that the individual steps out of a tradition and/or joins a newtradition.

Concerning education, this position corresponds to the philosophical-peda-gogic conception that initiation into traditions and communities is a necessarycondition for the development of personal identity (see Section 1; Snik, 1990). Ourposition is related to that of Crittenden (1988). On one hand, parents and com-munities have the right to educate their children in accordance with (and thereforeto initiate them into) their own way of life. This means a recognition of the right tofreedom of education. Parents and communities have the right to found schools thatare in accordance with the conception of life that is in force in family andcommunity. The condition is indeed that those schools are sufficiently distinct fromalready existing schools in respect of its view of life. On the other hand, this groupright is limited by the individual right of the child to choose his/her own conceptionof life. Support should be withheld from schools which wish to transmit values thatconflict with the values of the liberal-democratic society (Crittenden, 1988, p. 270).It is permissible to demand from the school that the child be increasingly encour-aged to think and act independently (p. 115-116). Consequently, moral and re-ligious education in denominational schools must not be indoctrinatory. It shouldnot block but, rather, encourage the development of the child's autonomy.

In the course of secondary education in particular the child must be stimulatedto reflect critically on his/her own and alternative values (pp. 153-154; cf. Snik,1991). In other words, "engagement" gradually makes way for "discursus", i.e.standing back from and reflecting on the norms and values one traditionally holds(Van Haaften, 1990). That means that by the end of secondary education the reasonfor giving support to denominational schools has disappeared.

Acknowledgements

This paper was first published in Dutch, entitled "Iiberale moraal en vrijheid vanonderwijs". It appeared in the Nederlands tijdschrift voor opvoeding, vorming enonderwijs, 9, December 1993, pp. 340-351. For the English version some revisionshave been made.

We would like to thank Ruth Jonathan, The Editor and referee for their helpfulcomments.

Correspondence: Dr Ger Snik and Drs Johan de Jong, Vakgroep Algemene Peda-gogiek, University of Nijmegen, Postbus 9104, 6500 HE Nijmegen, The Nether-lands.

NOTES

[1] Lijphart uses the terms segmentation (verzuiling) and segments (zuileri). Others (e.g. Glenn) use theterms polarisation and pillars.

[2] There are dissidents who reject this view (e.g. Kukathas, 1992a; 1992b). They suppose that it is notliberal to present liberalism as a "better" way of life, which should be generally accepted. We

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406 G. Snik &J. dejong

think that at this moment this proposition does not form part (yet) of the standard picture of liberalindividualism, surely not of the standard picture that is present in "the philosophy of liberaleducation".

[3] Here we focus on the "pluralist" version of principled pedagogy, in which the pluriformity andequality of conceptions of life is acknowledged. There is, of course, also a "fundamentalist" version.In this version it is assumed that there is only one "true" conception of life, which actually oughtto be generally accepted. Supporters of this version incline to state pedagogy and to a rejection ofthe idea of freedom of education.

[4] In the literature different terms are used: "cultural rights", "minority rights" (Kymlicka), "grouprights", "collective rights" (Galenkamp). We choose the term "group rights".

[5] Kymlicka notes that the present liberal hostility to group rights constitutes a contingent andhistorical fact. According to him this hostility has developed itself in the years after the SecondWorld War. Kymlicka demonstrates that the history of the liberal attitude to group rights shows adiffuse picture. The attitude of 19th century liberals is predominantly negative; liberals at thebeginning of the 20th century have a more optimistic view on group rights.

[6] Galenkamp derives the concepts of GeseUschaft and Gemeinschafi from: Tonnies, F. (1979) Gemeinsc-hafi und GeseUschaft: grundbegriffe der reinen Soziobgie (Darmstadt, Wissenschaftlichebuchgesellschaft). For her these concepts are theoretical constructs. Gemeinschafi denotes "atraditional and constitutive community in which the individual's identity is mainly determined by hisor her belonging to this community"; Gesettschaft refers to "a rather loose community, that is, a'societas' ( . . . ) in which the individual obtains an identity of his or her own, simply by being ahuman being" (Galenkamp, 1993, p. 147).

[7] According to Galenkamp, not only cultural but also ethnic, national and religious groups are eligiblefor the attribution of group rights. Kymlicka is less clear on this issue. He alternately speaks of rightsof "minority cultures", "cultural communities" and "minority cultural communities". That thisresults in confusion becomes clear in a discussion between Kymlicka (1992) and Kukathas (1992a,1992b). On one hand, Kymlicka restricts his examples to ethnic communities (Indians and blacks);on the other hand, Kukathas also cites examples of religious (Amish) and other (gipsy) groups,without it being pointed out by Kymlicka that these fall outside his defence. We assume that ifKymlicka's argument regarding ethnic communities holds good, in the same way group rights ofreligious, national and ethnic communities too can be defended within liberalism.

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