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TRANSCRIPT
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Liberalization, Flexibility and Employment Relations Change in Southern European Telecoms since the
1990s
Dr. Andreas Kornelakis Lecturer in HR Management
11 September 2012
IBSSPP/ J.E.Cairnes Business School Seminar NUI Galway
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Plan of Presentation
l Background/Introduction l Research Design
l Liberalisation in IT & GR Telecoms l Flexibility in IT & GR Telecoms
l Wage Bargaining: Divergent Trajectories l Concluding Remarks
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Background and Introduction
l Convergence to Anglo-Saxon model of industrial relations is not borne out (Wallerstein et al, 1997; Ferner & Hyman, 1998; Thelen, 2009)
l Wage Bargaining Centralization remains more or less stable across Europe (EC Industrial Relations in Europe 2010)
l Instead, case evidence of different trajectories of change (Crouch, 2000; Ferner & Hyman, 1998; Traxler, 1995):
l Research Question: How do we explain divergent trajectories
of change in wage bargaining, despite similar pressures ?
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Research Design: ‘Most similar systems’ comparison
l Similar Cases: Italian & Greek Telecoms Sectors – Common Pressures/Challenges – ‘Mediterranean model’ of capitalism
l Divergent Outcomes – Centralisation of Wage Bargaining in Italian
telecoms – Decentralised Bargaining in Greek telecoms
l Why?
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Liberalisation of Italian Telecoms
l Telecom Italia born in 1994 (merger btw SIP, Telespazio, Italcable, SIRM, Iritel) IRI owned since the 1960s
l Privatised in 1997, three hostile takeovers thereafter, now owned by Spanish Telefonica & Italian banks
l Market Opened up in 1998 according to EU requirements
The Erosion of Telecom Italia Market Share (retail revenue)
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New entrants (fixed telephony operators): Albacom (now BT Italia), Infostrada (now Wind), Teletu (now
Vodafone)
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Liberalisation of Greek Telecoms
l OTE (Greek telecoms operator) state-owned since 1950s
l Privatisation (shares issuing) started in 1996 and was completed in 2008 with a takeover by Deutsche Telekom
l Market Opened up in 2001 (EU exception)
The Erosion of Hellenic Telecom(OTE) Market Share (retail revenue)
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New fixed telephony operators: Tellas (now Wind), Hellas Online (now strategic alliance with Vodafone); Forthnet (currently in merger negotiations with Wind)
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The Search for Flexibility in Italian Telecoms
l Revised job descriptions (in response to changes in technology); flatter job classifications
l Downsizing of ex-monopoly operators (early retirement, voluntary exit, part-time work); lower wages for new entrants (work-entry contracts) in Telecom Italia
l Flexibility for core employees: annualised hours, part-time; teleworking; on-call work.
l Flexibility for peripheral employees: immense growth of precarious (freelance) work contracts (co.co.pro)
The Search for Flexibility in Greek Telecoms l Performance-based pay systems for marketing staff
(sales) and technical staff (network speed)
l Downsizing of ex-monopoly operators (early retirement, voluntary exit); abolishing job security (tenure) for new recruits
l Flexibility for peripheral employees: immense growth of spurious self-employment (project-based) contracts (blokaki) Precariousness also for highly skilled engineers
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Centralization of Bargaining in IT Telecoms (I)
l CGIL, CISL, UIL strategy of centralization since mid-1990s; Telecom Italia unions transformed into sectoral federations (SLC, FISTEL, UILCOM); National Strikes for single contract
l 1996: Intersind (IRI employer association) absorbed by Confindustria, and transformed into network services employer association
l 1998: Tripartite Accord, includes commitment on ‘fair competition’ in liberalized network services
l 2000: First Agreement for Telecoms Sector between peak-level unions and Confindustria; low common standards and negotiated flexibility’
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Centralization of Bargaining in IT Telecoms (II) l 1998-2002: Confederal unionists go ‘on the ground’ and
organise workers in new firms; firm-level workers able to speak with a single voice via ‘RSUs’
l 2002: Confindustria establishes ASSTEL, including all telecoms/IT companies; Lucrative compromise: getting the ‘best of both worlds’common standards at sector level and flexibility at firm-level
l 2005-6: Unions forge a ‘labour-state coalition’& put pressure to resisting call-centre firms to abide by agreement; extend coverage of national contract & press for transformation of ‘spurious self employment’into regular open-ended contracts (even if part-time); call centre firms join ASSTEL
l 2005-2009: centralisation of bargaining solidifies
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Wage Bargaining in Italian Telecoms
• Liberalization
• Flexibility
Mid 1990s Late 2010s
CentralizationCoverage
Decentralized Bargaining
Unions ‘Single Voice’
Employer Associability
Labour-State Coalition
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Decentralized Bargaining in Greek Telecoms (I) l Mid-90s: OTE company union strategy to resist
privatization & liberalization; no plan for sectoral contract; Strikes and protest against independent regulator & government because ‘national champion loses market share’ => (implicit union-management alliance)
l 1995: SEPE trade association (OTE & big mobile telecoms); no legal competence to negotiate agreements; 2003: SATPE association created by small telephone operators => small/lg firms divide
l 2003-2008: Company unions established ‘bottom-up’ in WIND, Vodafone, Forthnet despite anti-union management; no assistance from OME-OTE; they negotiate rudimentary firm-level agreements to specify wages; but very suspicious/if not hostile to OME-OTE unionists
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Decentralized Bargaining in Greek Telecoms (II)
l 2005-6: OME-OTE union convinces right-wing government to get compensation for internal restructuring; extremely generous severance package €1.6 billion for 5,000 senior employees who get early retirement (up to 8 years earlier) => some of them become OTE sub-contractors after retiring
l Small union (SMT) requests centralisation from SEPE => request is of course rejected
l 2006-9: OTE Exclusivist strategy: call-centre union wants to be affiliated with OME-OTE, but OTE are excluding call-centre employees on the basis that they do not have‘full-time permanent contracts’
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Wage Bargaining in Greek Telecoms
• Liberalization
• Flexibility
Mid 1990s Late 2010s
CentralizationCoverage
Decentralized Bargaining
Unions ‘Single Voice’
Employer Associability
Labour-State Coalition
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Concluding Remarks
l Despite common pressures from Liberalisation, no simple convergence => path dependence
l Domestic actors’ critical role for shaping wage setting institutions
l Do these insights hold in the context of the current Eurozone crisis?
l Domestic actors (unions, employers) vs. International actors (IMF, EU)? Multi-level games?
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Thank you!