lillian roberts etc v health hasps corp

7/28/2019 Lillian Roberts Etc v Health Hasps Corp

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87 A.D.3d 311, *; 928 N. Y.S.2d 236, **;2011 N. Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5733, ***; 2011 NY Slip Op 5882Lillian Roberts, as Executive Director of District Council 37, American Federation of State, Countyand Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, et al., Respondents, v Health and Hospitals Corporation etal., Appellant. Daniel Dromm, Member of New York City Council, District 25, et al., Respondents,v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, Appellant. In the Matter of Sean Fitzpatrick,as Business Representative and on Beha lf of Local Union No. 3, I.8.E.W., AFL-CIO, et al. ,

Respondents, v. Health and Hospitals Corporation et al., Appellants.4974, 112247/10, 112249/10, 112294/10

SU PREME CO URT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT87 A.D.3d 311; 928 N.Y.S.2d 236; 2011 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5733; 2011 NY Slip Op 5882

July 7, 2011, DecidedJuly 7, 2011, EnteredSUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Leave to appeal denied by Lillian Roberts, etc. v. Health & Hasps.Corp, 17 NY3d 717, 958 NE2d 1202, 2011 N.Y. LEXIS 3260, 935 NYS2d 287 (N.Y., Nov. 21 ,2011)Motion granted by Ullian Roberts, etc. v. Health & Hosps. Corp., 17 NY3d 935, 95 9 NE2d 514,2011 N.Y. LEXIS 3269, 935 NYS2d 576 (N.Y., Nov. 21, 2011)PRIOR HISTORY: Consolidated appeals from three orders and judgments (each one paper) ofthe Supreme Court, New York County (Alice Schlesinger, J.), entered December 13, 2010 inproceedings pursua nt to CPLR article 78 . The orders and j udgments granted petitions to annulthe determination of respondent New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation to lay offcarpenters, electricians, and laborers, respectively, at respondents' facilities.Roberts v Health &f-losps. Corp., 2010 NY Slip Op 333 19(U), reversed.Roberts v. Health & Hosps. Corp., 2010 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6670 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nov. 24, 2010)Roberts v. Health & Hosps. Corp., 2010 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5852 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nov. 24, 2010)CASE SUMMARYPROCEDURAL POSTURE: In consolidated appeals from three CPLR art. 78 proceedings,respondent public benefit corporation appealed from orders of the Supreme Court, New YorkCounty (New York), grant ing petitions to annu l the public benefit corporation's decision tolayoff carpente rs, electricians, and laborers. Petitioners consist of elected officials, labor unionrepresentatives and union members (collectively, the unions).

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OVERVIEW : The public benefit corporation sought to restructure it s organization to make itmore cost efficient . As part of this effort, it made the layoffs in dispute. The unions arguedthat the layoffs could have potential ly created conditions that would have violated unspecifiedhealth laws and regulations. The trial court should have dismissed the petitions because theunions lacked standing and failed to state a claim fo r injunctive relief under Public Health Law 2801-c where they relied upon threatened, not actual, violations of the public health laws.Section 2801-c authorized injunctive relief only for violations of specified provisions of thePublic Health Law or regulations adopted thereunder, not for claimed violations of N.Y.Unconsolidated Laws or fo r unspecified violations. Further, the question of whether thescheduled layoffs wou ld have left t he public benefit corporation with a sufficient staff to satisfyits statutory obligations presented a nonjusticiable controversy. Finally, even assuming theunions had standing to challenge the layoffs, the layoff decision was not arbitrary andcapricious and was founded on a rational basis pursuant to CPLR 7803(3).OUTCOME: The court reversed the orders which granted the petitions to annul layoffdetermination, vacated the injunctions, denied the petitions, and dismissed the CPLR art. 78proceedings.

CORE TERMS: layoff, staff, steer ing committee, patient, electrician, justiciability, scheduled,health laws, safe, branch of government, carpenter, HHC Act, laborer, recommendation,methodology, staffing, mission, health facilities, judicial review, executive branch, repair,zone, petitioners cla im, med ica l services, separation of powers, speculative, public hospital,elected officials, statutory provisions, inter alia

LEXISNEXIS HEADNOTESC1v1I Procedure > Justiciability > Political Quest ions > Separation of Powerc; +.-..HN1. .,While in appropriate circumstances, the courts may intervene to review decisions

within the purview of the executive branch, this power must be exercisedsparingly. More Like This HeadnotePublic Health & Welfare Law > Healthcare > General Overview +.-..HN2.:t.,See Public Health Law 2800.Civil Procedure > Remedies > lnJunct1ons > General Overview 4: .Public Health & Welfare Law > Healthcare > General Overview +. .HN3,;t.See Public Health Law 2801-c.Public Health & Welfare Law > Healthcare > General Overview +. .

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HN4,;t.The N.Y. Health De partment's Public Health Council adopts regulations, subject to theState Commissioner of Health's approval, to effectuate the provisions and purposes ofPublic Heal th Law art. 28. Public Health Law 2803(2)(a). More Like This HeadnoteCivil Procedure > Justiciab1 l1ty > Standing > General Overview +. .HNS.:t., Whether a person seeking relief from a court is a proper party to request anadjudication is an aspect of justiciability which must be considered at the outset ofany litigation. Standing is thus a threshold determination that allows a litigant accessto the courts to adjudicate the merits of a particular dispute that otherwise satisfies

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the other justiciability criteria. More Like This Headnote I Shepardize: Restrict By HeadnoteAdministrative Law > Judicial Review > Revlewability > Standing 4; .HN6;t.The first prong of the two-part test for determining standing to challenge

governmental action requires that a petitioner must demonstrate injury in fact,meaning that he or she will actually be harmed by the challenged administrativeaction. The claimed injury, of course, must be more than conjectural. Moreover, aparty must show that the injury suffered is personal to the party, i.e., distinct fromthat of the general public. The second prong of the test requires that the injury mustfall within the zone of interests or concerns sought to be promoted or protected bythe statutory provision under which the agency has acted. This zone of interest testpermits the court to ascertain the petitioner's status without reaching the merits ofthe litigation. I t also ensures that a group or individual whose interests are onlymarginally related to, or even inconsistent with, the purposes of the statute cannotuse the courts to further their own purposes at the expense of the statutorypurposes. More Like This Headnote I Shepardlze: Restrict By Headnote

Civil Procedure > Just1ciabillty > Standing > Injury m Fact 4; .HN7 t.Tenuous and ephemeral harm is insufficient to trigger judicialintervention. More Like This HeadnoteCivil Procedure > Just1ciabil1ty > Standing > Third Party Standing +." .HNB;t,.Legislator petitioners specifically have no standing because they may no t raise legalgrievances on behalf of others. More Like This HeadnoteCivil Procedure > Remedies > Injunctions > General Overview 4; .Public Health & Welfare Law > Healthcare > General Overview +; .HN9;t.Public Health Law 2801-c authorizes injunctive relief only for violations of any

provisions of the Public Health Law or the regulations of the department adoptedthereunder, not for claimed violations of the UnconsolidatedLaws. More Like This HeadnoteConstitutional Law > Separation of Powers +.-..HNlD;t.One of the fundamental principles of government underlying the U.S. Constitution is

the distribution of governmental power into three branches - the executive,legislative and judicial - to prevent too strong a concentration of authority 1n oneperson or body. The principle of separation of powers is included by implication inthe pattern of government adopted by the State of New York. While the doctrine ofseparation of powers does not require the maintenance of three airtightdepartments of government, it does require that no one branch be allowed toarrogate unto itself powers residing entirely in anotherbranch. More Like This Headnote

Civil Procedure > Just1c1ab1lity > General Overview +.-..Constitutional Law > Separation of Powers +; .HNl l ; t .The doctrine of usticiabil ity is an untidy concept that embraces the constitutionaldoctrine of separation of powers and refers, in the broad sense, to mattersresolvable by the judicial branch of government as opposed to the executive or

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legislative branches or their extensions. Although much has been written on thissubject, i t remains a concept of uncertain meaning and scope, one that is more thanan intuition bu t less than a rigorous and explicit theory. Cases that presentnonjusticiable controversies involve political questions, advisory opinions, mootissues and those where there is no standing to maintain an action. Part of theuncertainty in the doctrine of justiciability ar ises from the fact that the doctrine is ablend of constitutional requirements and policy considerations. Moreover, policylimitations are not always clearly distinguished from the constitutional limitation.The courts have the responsibility of determining whether a matter falls within thepurview of another branch of government, or whether the action of that branchexceeds its constitutional authority. However, as part of the tripartite constitutionalstructure, courts must use this power prudentially so as to not encroach on thepower of a coequal branch. More Like This Headnote

Civil Procedure > Justiciability > Pollt1cal Questions > Separation of Powers +:uHN12.t, Courts at all levels are enjoined not to substitute their judgment for that of thecoordinate branch of government to whom such judgment has been, in the scheme

of a divided government, primarily entrusted. More Like This HeadnoteCivil Procedure > Justrciab1l1ty > Political Questions > Separation of Powers +;uHN13.t, While the doctrine of usticiability evolves with the passage of time there Is onerecurrent theme: the court as a policy matter, even apart from principles of subjectmatter jurisdiction, will abstain from venturing into areas if i t is ill-equipped toundertake the responsibility and other branches are fa r more suited to the task. Thisis particularly true in those cases that involve political questions, which involve thosecontroversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinationsconstitutionally committed for resolution to the legislative and executive branches.The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation ofpowers, which requires a case-by-case analysis. More Like This HeadnoteCivil Procedure > Just1c1ab1lity > Political Questions > Separation of Powers +; .HN14.t,It is axiomatic that each branch of government should be free from interference, in

the lawful discharge of duties expressly conferred, by either of the other branches.The lawful acts of executive branch officials, performed in satisfaction ofresponsibilities conferred by law, involve questions of judgment, allocation ofresources and ordering of priorities, which are generally not subject to judicialreview. This general rule is, however, subject to the exception that a court mayprevent a member of the executive branch from acting ultra vlres, in bad faith, orarbitrarily. More Like This Headnote

Civil Procedure > Justic1ab1l1ty > Political Questions > Separation of Powers +."uHNlS.t,The need fo r deference on the part of the judiciary fo r the other two branches of

government, where appropriate, is an important concept, particularly since thecourts are the ultimate arbiters of the New York Constitution. The doctrine ofseparation of powers generally will preclude a court from intruding upon the policymaking and discretionary decisions that are reserved to the legislative and executivebranches. At the same time, however, it is the province of the Judicial branch todefine, and safeguard, rights provided by the New York State Constitution, andorder redress for violation of them. The competing obligations between thejudiciary's responsibility to safeguard rights and the necessary deference to be paidto the pol icies of the other two branches of government creates a tension that mustremain in balance. While it is within the power of the judiciary to declare the vestedrights of a specifically protected class of individuals, in a fashion recognized by

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statute, the manner by which the State addresses complex societal andgovernmental issues is a subject left to the discretion of the political branches ofgovernment. Simply put, when the courts review the acts of the Legislature and theExecutive, tl1ey do so to protect r ights, not to make policy. More Like This Headnote

Administrative Law > Judicial Review > Reviewabill ty > General Overview tuPublic Healt l1 & Welfare Law > Hea lthcare > General Overview +.:uHN16.,Inasmuch as the New York Legislature saw fit to give the New York City Health andHospitals Corporation (HHC) the discretion to determine the number ofnonmanagerial employees necessary to carry ou t its mission, CLS Uncons. Laws of

NY ch. 214-A, 1 et seq., HHC's decisions regarding staffing levels are beyondJudicial review. Statutory requirements that public agencies maintain their facilitiesin a safe and sanitary condition do no t give rise to judicially enforceable rights toemployment of maintenance staff at any given level. The statutory right to a safeworkplace may not be enforced by means of a remedy at law which would requirethe judiciary to preempt the exercise of discretion by the executive branch ofgovernment. Neither the petitioners nor the courts should be permitted to substitutetheir judgment for the discretionary management of public business by publicofficials, as neither have been lawfully charged with that responsibility. Petitioners,however sincerely motivated, may not interpose themselves and the courts into themanagement and operation of public enterprises. More Like Th is Headnote IShepardize: Restrict By Headnote

Administrative Law > Judicial Review > Standards of Review > General Overv iew


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Get a Document - by Citation - 87 A.D.3d 31 1 Page 6 of 16distinct from that of the public at large. Nor were petitioners within the "zone of interest" soughtto be promoted or protected by the statutory provisions under which the corporation acted: theregulations cited by petitioners that the corporation allegedly violated mostly provided for thebenefit and protect ion of patients, with any benefits derived by hospital staff being incidental.Moreover, to the extent that certain regulations do mention staff and personnel, any cla imedviolations thereof remained wholly theoretical and unsubstantiated. Further, neither section 7382nor section 7385 (7) of the Unconsolidated Laws of NY (HHC Act 2, 5 [7]) imposes enforceablelegal duties upon the corporation.Courts - - Justiciable Questions -- Challenge to Decision by Public Hospital Corporationto Lay Off Certain Workers2. The question of whether respondent New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation'sscheduled layoffs of certain maintenance staff positions would leave the corporation withoutsufficient staff to satisfy its statutory obligations to operate, manage, superintend, control,repair, maintain and otherwise keep up its health facilities, and to maintain it s health facilities ina manner so as to assure a safe and suita ble environment fo r patients presented a nonjusticiablecontroversy. Inasmuch as the Legislature saw fi t to give the corporation the discretion todetermine the number of nonmanagerial employees necessary to carry out its mission{McKinney's Uncons Laws of NY 7385 [12]; 7382 [New York City Health and HospitalsCorporation Act (L 1969, ch 1016, 1, as amended) 5 (12); 2]), its decisions regardingstaffing levels were beyond judicial review. Petitioners failed to identify any law or regulationsrequiring the corporation to emp loy maintenance staff at a specific level or to determinemaintenance staff levels in accordance with a particular standard or formula. Statutoryrequirements that public agencies maintain their facilities in a safe and sanitary condition do notgive rise to j udicially enforceable rights to employment of maintenance staff at any given level.Moreover, the statuto ry right to a safe workplace may not be enforced by means of a remedy atlaw which would require the judiciary to preempt the exercise of discretion by the executivebranch of government.Health -- New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation - - Judicial Review of Decisionto Lay Off Certain Workers3. The decision of a public hospital corporation to lay of f certain maintenance staff in response tocity budget cuts and other f inancial issues affecting its operations was not arbitrary andcapricious, and was founded on a rational basis. There was no reason to apply the "substantialevidence" test to the corporation's determination since there was no administrative hearing heldor required prior to the determination. The record showed that t he layoff decision was rational inlight of the imperative to reduce costs in conjunction with the corporation's statutory mandate toprovide medical services to all. The undisputed facts showed that the corporation took itsmassive restructuring effort seriously, as evidenced by the creat ion of a high level steeringcommittee and retention of the se rv ices of an outside consultant to assist in a review of all of itscurrent operations. After a nine-month review, the consultant provided the steering committeewith a voluminous re por t detailing 100 cost-cutt ing options as we ll as present ing the risks andmission impact of each. The committee thoughtfully reviewed those recommendations andselected 39. There was nothing that mandated the corporation to utilize any particularmethodology in making its staffing determination. Moreover, there was nothing in the record toshow that the layoff decision was arrived at in bad faith or without adequate facts or deliberation.

COUNSEL: [ * **1] Michael A. Cardozo .,.../ , Corporation Counsel, New York City (Scott Shorr ...Francis F. Caputo ... and Eamonn Foley of counsel), for appellants.Mary J. O'Connell ..., New York City (Steven E. Sykes and Aaron S. Amaral of counsel), fo r LillianRoberts and others, respondents.Broach & Stu/berg, LLP ..., Ne w York City (Robert B. Stu/berg ..,./ and Michael H. Isaac ... ofcounsel), for Daniel Dromm and others, respondents.

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Greenberg Burzichelli Greenberg P.C., Lake Success (Robert J. Burzichelli ,,, Linda N. Keifer andGenevieve E. Peeples of counsel), for Sean Fitzpatrick and others, respondents.JUDGES: Richard T. Andrias ,,, J.P., John W. Sweeny, Jr . James M. Catterson . ,Dianne T. Renwick ...., JJ. Opinion by Sweeny ..,., J. All concur.OPINION BY: John W. Sweeny, Jr .OPINION

[*313] [**238] Sweeny ..,., J.These consolidated appeals from three CPLR article 78 proceedings once [***2] again raise theissue of the proper role of the [*314] Judiciary in our coordinate branch system [**239] ofgovernment. Petitioners in each action seek to involve the courts in a decision-making processthat lies squarely within the purview of the executive branch. HN1+While in appropriatecircumstances, the courts may intervene to review such decisions, this power must be exercisedsparingly (Jones v Beame, 45 NY2d 402, 406, 380 NE2d 277, 408 NYS2d 449 [1978]). In theseproceedings, for the reasons to be discussed, we decline to do so.The PartiesRespondent New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (HHC) is a public benefit corporationformed by virtue of the provisions of McKinney's Unconsolidated Laws of NY 7384 York CityHealth and Hospitals Corporation Act [L 1969, ch 1016, 1, as amended (HHC Act)] 4). TheLegislature created HHC to address the need to provide "[a] system permitting legal, financialand managerial flexibility ... for the provision and delivery of high quality, dignified andcomprehensive care and treatment for the ill and infirm, particularly to those who can least affordsuch services" (McKinney's Uncons Laws of NY 7382 [HHC Act 2]).HHC provides medical and treatment services to approximately 1.3 million New Yorkers annually[***3] through the operation of its 11 acute care hospitals, four skilled nursing facilities, sixlarge diagnostic and treatment centers and more than 80 community-based clinics. I t isadministered by a board of directors appointed by the Mayor and City Council. I t has a chiefexecutive officer selected by the board "from persons other than themselves" who serves at thepleasure of the board (McKinney's Uncons Laws of NY 7384 [1 ] [HHC Act 4 (1)]).

Petitioners consist of elected officials, labor union representatives and union members. Thesepetitions are brought to revisit certain layoff decisions made by HHC which will be discussed morefully herein.In Dromm v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., petitioners are: (1) Daniel Dromm, Karen E.Koslowitz and Julissa Ferreras, three members of the New York City Council representing districtsin Queens; and (2 ) Frank Spencer, the supervisor of the New York City District Council ofCarpenters (the Carpenters Union) representing, inter alia, carpenters and supervisor carpentersemployed by HHC.In Matter of Fitzpatrick v Health & Hosps. Corp ., petitioners are: (1 ) Sean Fitzpatrick, thebusiness representative of Local [*315] Union No. 3, I.B.E.W. (the Electricians Union); (2 ) theElectricians Union [***4] in its own right, which represents HHC's supervisor electricians,electricians, and electrician's helpers; (3 ) Rodney Downes, an HHC electrician scheduled to belaid off; and (4) William LaRosa and Bill Lecomples, HHC electricians who were to retain theirpositions a ~ e r the scheduled layoffs.In Roberts v Health & Hosps. Corp., petitioners are: ( 1) Lillian Roberts, the Executive Director of

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Get a Document - by Citation - 87 A.D.3d 311 Page 8of16District Council 37 (DC37), a confederation of 55 local labor unions; (2) Kyle Simmons, thepresident of Local 924, the DC37 affiliate representing HHC laborers; (3) Trevor Moonsammy, anHHC laborer scheduled to be laid off; and (4) Victor Maduro, an HHC laborer scheduled to be laidoff from his present position and reassigned to his previous title of "Service Aide."FactsThe underlying facts are essentially not in dispute.In early 2009, in response to city budget cuts and other financial issues affecting Its operations,HHC undertook to restructure its organization with a goal of making it more cost efficient. As partof this effort, HHC formed a "Restructuring Steering [**240] Committee" consisting ofexecutives and network leaders from within HHC. I t also retained Deloitte Consulting (Deloitte) toconduct a study of HHC [***S] at every level and propose various options to be considered bythe steering committee in deciding how best to restructure the corporation. Deloitte was given atwofold mission: provide the steering committee with options to save approximately $ 1 billionwhile preserving HHC's main function of providing "patient care to all, regardless of ability topay" and build upon HHC's "patient safety culture."Deloitte spent nine months, including 2,000 pro bono hours, examining HHC's operations at alllevels. I t presented 100 options to the steering committee in a massive 1,000-page reportdescribing the risks, mission impact and expected financial results of each option presented. Therecommendation which underlies these proceedings called for the creation of "shared servicesoperations and contracting out the management and/or provision of anci llary services" such asthose provided by carpenters, electricians, laborers and plumbers. Included in thlsrecommendation was the elimination of certain titles and the layoffs of some ancillary, i.e. ,nonmedical employees. I t was estimated that this recommendation, i f fully implemented, wouldsave HHC approximate ly $ 141 million.[*316] In April 2010, the [***6] steering committee discussed all of Deloitte'srecommendations, rejected a number of the proposed options and decided which ones toimplement. The steering committee determined that HHC could eliminate certain tradespositions, including carpenters, electricians and laborers, while safely maintaining its facilities.This decision was made after consultation with the facility managers affected. In May 2010, HHCreleased a report announcing the steering committee's final cost-reduction decisions. Rather thanreduce services or shutter facilities, HHC ultimately decided, inter alia, to eliminate, effectiveSeptember 17, 2010, 45 of 136 carpenter positions, 45 of 156 electrician positions and 54 of 104laborer positions, among others. The number of emp loyees subject to these layoffs was lowerthan those recommended by Deloitte.On September 15 and 16, 2010, in response to the proposed layoffs, the three instant petitionswere filed.The PetitionsThe Dromm petitioners seek an order pursuant to CPLR 6301, 7803 and 7805, and Public HealthLaw 2801-c, preliminarily and permanently enjoining HHC from abolishing one third of itscarpentry staff. Petitioners argue that the decision to [***7] abolish these positions violatesMcKinney's Unconsolidated Laws of NY 7382 and 7385 (7 ) (HHC Act 2, 5 [7]), whichrequire HHC to operate, manage, superintend, control, repair, maintain and otherwise keep up itshealth facilities. They also claim violations of Public Health Law 2800 and 2803, as well asspecified Department of Health Regulations promulgated thereunder (10 NYCRR 405.24, 702.1,702.2, 702.3, 711.2 711.4. These regulations require HHC to maintain its health facilities in amanner so as to assure a safe and suitable environment for patients. Petitioners argue thatHHC's decision to reduce its maintenance staff will create an unsafe condition for patients andstaff members who remain emp loyed at the affected facilities. I t is claimed that HHC's decisiondemonstrates a failure to perform a duty enjoined upon lt by law--namely, the maintenance of itsfacilities in a safe condition--and thus brings the petition within the ambit of CPLR 7803 (1) and

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Get a Document - by Citation - 87 A.D.3d 311 Page 9 of 16(3).[**241] The Fitzpatrick petitioners claim that HHC's scheduled layoffs would threaten thesafety of electricians who retained their jobs. They seek declaratory and injunctive relief onsubstantially the same grounds as alleged [***8] in Dromm. Additionally, they claim that thescheduled layoffs would violate the [*317] Merit and Fitness Clause of New York Constitution,article V, 6, because HHC allegedly planned to hire private contractors to perform the work oflaid-off HHC electricians. They also claim that HHC's layoff procedures violated Personnel Rules

and Regulations of the City of New York (SS RCNY Appendix A) 7.6.3.The Roberts petitioners assert claims and request relief that are substantially simila r to those inDromm.The trial court issued temporary restraining orders (TROs) in the three proceedings onSeptember 15 and 17, 2010, prohibiting the layoffs from going into effect. To date, no layoffshave occurred.On October 8, 2010, the court issued an interim order holding that all petitioners had standing topursue their claims against HHC. I t then scheduled a consolidated hearing on the merits ofpetitioners' claims and to determine whether it should vacate the TROs or convert them intopreliminary and permanent injunctions.At the conclusion of the hearings, the court granted the petitions in their entirety. The courtfound, inter alia, that HHC's layoff decision was arbitrary and capricious; that HHC failed toemploy a sound methodology designed [***9] to gather and evaluate all the relevant facts andassess the potentia l impact of the proposed layoffs on the health and safety of the patients, staff,and remaining tradespeople; that Deloitte used a flawed analysis in arriving at Its layoffrecommendations; that HHC did not conduct appropriate planning to minimize the impact of theproposed staff reductions; that "[t]he flaws in HHC's decision-making process ... are numerousand profound" (2010 NY Slip Op 33319[U], *21); and that HHC did not develop an adequatehealth and safety plan.The court remanded the matter for further evaluation by HHC consistent with the terms of itsdecision.We now reverse.StandingWe begin with a rev1ew of the applicable Public Health Law provisions.Public Health Law 2800, entitled "Declaration of policy and statement of purpose," states inpertinent part:

HN2+11 Hosp1tal and related services including health-related service of the highestquality, efficiently [*318] provided and properly utilized at a reasonable cost, areof vital concern to the public health ... (A] ll public and private institutions, whetherstate, county, municipal, incorporated or not Incorporated, se1v1ng principal ly asfacilities fo r the ... rendering of health-related service shall be [***10] subject tothe provisions of this article."

Public Health Law 2801-c, entitled "Injunctions," states: HN3+"The supreme court may enjoinviolations or threatened violations of any provisions of this article; and i t may enjoin violations ofthe regulations of the department adopted thereunder."

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HN4+The Health Department's Public Health and Health Planning Council adopts regulations,subject to the Commissioner's approval, to effectuate the provisions and purposes of article 28(Public Health Law 2803 [2 ] [a]). The petitioners claim that these regulations, specifically foundat 10 NYCRR 405.l et seq and 10 NYCRR 702.1 et seq., were violated.HN5+whether a person seeking relief from a court is a proper party to request an adjudication "isan aspect of justiciability [**242] which must be considered at the outset of anylitigation" (Matter of Dairylea Coop. Inc. v Walkley, 38 NY2d 6, 9, 339 NE2d 865, 377 NYS2d 451[1975]). Standing is thus a threshold determination that allows a litigant access to the courts toadjudicate the merits of a particular dispute that otherwise satisfies the other JUSticiability criteria(see Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d 761, 769, 573 NE2d 1034, 570NYS2d 778 [1991]).[1 ] In New York State Assn. of Nurse Anesthetists v Novello (2 NY3d 207, 211, 810 NE2d 405,778 NYS2d 123 [2004]), the Court of Appeals [ ***11) restated the well-established, two-parttest for determining standing to challenge governmental action. HN6+The first prong of this testrequires that a petitioner must demonstrate "injury in fact," meaning that he or she "will actuallybe harmed by the challenged administrative action." (Id.) The claimed injury, of course, "must bemore than conjectural." (Id.) Moreover, a party must show that the inJUry suffered is personal tothe party, i.e., "distinct from that of the general public" (Matter of Transactive Corp. v New YorkState Dept. of Social Servs., 92 NY2d 579, 587, 706 NE2d 1180, 684 NYS2d 156 [1998); MatterofMcAllan v New York State Dept. ofHealth, 60 AD3d 464, 464, 875 NYS2d 24 (2009)). Thesecond prong of the test requires that the injury "must fall within the zone of interests orconcerns sought to be promoted or protected by the statutory provision under which the agencyhas acted" (Novello, 2 NY3d at 211). This "zone of interests" test permits the court to ascertainthe petitioner's status without reaching the merits of the litigation. I t also [*319] ensures thata group or individual "whose interests are only marginally related to , or even inconsistent with,the purposes of the statute cannot use the courts to further their own purposes [***12] at theexpense of the statutory purposes" (Society of Plastics Indus., 77 NY2d at 774). Here, petitionersfail to satisfy both the "injury In fact" and "zone of interests" prongs of the test to establishstanding.Viewed in its best light, petitioners' claim that the scheduled layoffs would leave HHC so shortstaffed that HHC facilities wou ld inevitably violate Public Health Law ar ticle 28, thus exposingthem to "imminent" risk from "smoke, fire, bacterial, toxic and structural hazards," is speculative.Each construction trade (carpenters, electricians and laborers) maintained that the variousfacilities operated by HHC were already understaffed, as evidenced by the overtime worked andopen repair tickets. HHC countered that, in many cases, the work performed by these trades wasdone after hours so as to minimize patient inconvenience, thus necessitating overtime. It alsonoted that many of the open repair tickets submitted at the hearing had in fact been closed. Inaddition, the construction trades alleged that work performed by outside contractors was inferior,although there was no evidence submi tted to support this claim. Taken as a whole, however,petitioners' claims assert only [***13] threatened, not actual, violations of the Public HealthLaw. They point to no specific violation of any building code provision which will, as a result ofthese layoffs, actually occur and which will cause actual injury to them. Rather, petitionersapproached the proposed layoffs globally, i.e., they essentially claim that the proposed layoffswould create the conditions for violations to occur at some unspecified future time. This is far toospeculative and hypothetical to even approach the "injury in fact" requirement (see Novello, 2NY3d at 214-215; see also Rudder v [**243) Pataki, 93 NY2d 273, 279, 711 NE2d 978, 689NYS2d 701 (1999] [ H N ~ " t e n u o u s and "ephemeral" harm is "insufficient to trigger judicialIntervention"]). Additionally, this asserted "injury" is neither separate nor distinct from that ofthe public at large, including the numerous New York City residents who utilize HHC facilities andwould presumably be affected by the purported deficiencies in these allegedly unsafe andunderstaffed facilities (see Matter of McAllan, 60 AD3d at 464).Nor do petitioners find themselves within the zone of interests or concerns sought to bepromoted or protected by the statutory provisions under which HHC acted. Indeed, [***14] the

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regulations [*320] cited by petitioners that HHC al legedly violated mostly provide for thebenefit and protect ion of the patients at hospitals and other medical facilities (see 10 NYCRR405.24 ["The hospital shall be operated and maintained to ensure the safety of patients"]; 702.1[d] [1] [hospitals must operate ventilation, heating and others systems to "provide for patient orresident health and comfort"); 702.1 [e ] [3 ] [buildings shall be maintained free of nuisances thatmay adversely affect patient health]; 711 .2 [All medical facilities shall provide for proper, safeand efficient patient and resident care]). Any benefits HHC staff derives from those regu lationsare incidental. While petitioners also reference safety and maintenance regulations that mentionneither patients nor staff (10 NYCRR 405.24 [c ] [2] [a written preventive maintenance programshall be established and implemented to insure all buildings and equipment are operated andmaintained in a safe and sanitary condition]; 702.2 [a] [the entire facility shall be maintained ingood repair]; 702.3 [a] [buildings shal l be maintained so as to prevent fire and other hazards topersonal safety]; 711.4 [b) [general construction [***15] standards)), this merelydemonstrates that HHC staff benefits incidentally from those regulations, not that the regulationswere promulgated for their benefit. Such incidental benefit is insufficient to confer standing uponpetitioners.Moreover, to the extent that certain regulations cited by petitioners relating to hospitalemergency policies, practices, plans and procedures do mention staff and personnel (see 10NYCRR 405.3 [b] [9], [10); 405.8 [b ] [2]; 405.24 [b]; 702.3 [e]), the claimed violation of theseregulations remains wholly theoretical and unsubstantiated. As noted above, what petitionersessential ly argue is that these layoffs would create the conditions that would lead to some future,unspecified violations of health laws and regulations. Their injuries are potentia l, not actual.Petitioners fail to demonstrate how their vague and nebulous claims of possible injury from thealleged potential violations of these regulations relate to Public Health Law article 28's goals of"cost containment and the promotion of efficiency in health care planning" (Arnot-Ogden Mem.Hosp. v Guthrie Clinic, 122 AD2d 413, 414, 505 NYS2d 232 [1986], Iv denied 68 NY2d 612, 503NE2d 124, 510 NYS2d 1027 [1986]). As a result, pe titioners have fai led to state [***16] aclaim for entitlement to injunctive relief under Public Health Law 2801-c, as petitioners can onlyclaim threatened, no t actual violations of the statute.Even if we assume arguendo, that the claims of the City Council petitioners in Dromm were notspeculative or common [*321] with the publ ic at large, those petitioners still lack standing tobring this petition. The trial court's reliance on Matter of Powis v Giuliani (216 AD2d 107, 628NYS2d 634 [1995]) and Matter of Graziano v County of Albany (3 NY3d 475, 821 NE2d 114, 787NYS2d 689 [2004]) is misplaced. Powis did not directly address the issue of whether an electedofficial had [**244] standing to challenge a fire department's decision to eliminate street firealarm boxes. In fact, it was silent on this issue. Graziano involved an appointed, not electedofficial and does not specifically stand for the proposition that elected officials have standing toassert claims on behalf of their constituents. Of note is the fact that the Court of Appeals statedthat an election commissioner "performs two distinct statutory functions--he assists hiscocommissioner in the administration of the Board and he safeguards the equal representationrights of his party" (3 NY3d at 480). The Court denied standing [***17] to the petitionerelection commissioner on his claims on behalf of the county board of elections, i.e., in hisgovernmental capacity. I t found however, that he had standing "in the language of theConstitution and the Election Law ... in [his] unique role as guardian of the rights of his party and... from the constitutional and statutory requirement of equal representation" (id.). This is a fardifferent situation than that presented here. We have previously held that HN8+1egislatorpetitioners specifica lly have no standing because they "may no t raise legal grievances on behalfof others" (Urban Justice Ctr. v Pataki, 38 AD3d 20, 27, 828 NYS2d 12 [2006], appeal dismissedand Iv denied 8 NY3d 958, 868 NE2d 218, 836 NYS2d 537 [2007], citing Society of PlasticsIndus., 77 NY2d at 773).Finally, contrary to t he Fitzpatrick and Roberts petitioners' argument that HHC's layoffdetermination violated McKinney's Unconsolidated Laws of NY 7382 and 7385 (7) (HHC Act 2, 5 [7]), we note that neither provision Imposes enforceable legal duties upon HHC (see Matterof Hamburg v McBamette, 83 NY2d 726, 733, 635 NE2d 1225, 613 NYS2d 355 [1994]; McAllan vMarcos, 262 AD2d 192, 192-193, 693 NYS2d 528 [1999], appeal dismissed 94 NY2d 791, 722

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NE2d 502, 700 NYS2d 422 [1999], Iv dismissed in part, denied in part 95 NY2d 789, 732 NE2d950, 710 NYS2d 842 (2000]). In any [***18] event, HN9+Health Public Health Law 2801-cauthorizes injunctive relief only for violations of "any provisions" of article 28 of the Public HealthLaw or "the regulations of the department adopted thereunder," not for claimed violations of theUnconsolidated Laws.Thus, the trial court should have dismissed the petitions in toto, as petitioners lacked standingand failed to state a claim for injunctive relief under the Public Health Law.[*322] Justiciability[2 ] The question of whether the scheduled layoffs would leave HHC with a sufficient staff tosat isfy its statutory obl igations presents a nonj usticiable controversy.HN1.o+"one of the fundamental principles of government underlying our Federal Constitution isthe distribution of governmental power into three branches--the executive, legislative andjudicial--to prevent too strong a concentration of authority in one person or body" (Under 21,Catholic Home Bur. fo r Dependent Children v City of New York, 65 NY2d 344, 355, 482 NE2d 1,492 NYS2d 522 [1985]). The principle of separation of powers has long been recognized as"included by implication in the pattern of government adopted by the State of New York" (id. at355-356) . "Whi le the doctrine of separation of powers does not require the maintenance of th ree[***19] airtight departments of government, It does require that no one branch be allowed toarrogate unto itself powers residing entirely in another branch" (id. at 356 [internal quotation

marks and citations omitted]; see [**245] also Clark v Cuomo, 66 NY2d 185, 189, 486 NE2d794, 495 NYS2d 936 (1985]).HN11+-The doctrine of justiciability is an "untidy" concept that "embraces the constitutionaldoctrine of separation of powers and refers, in the broad sense, to matters resolvable by thejudicial branch of government as opposed to th e executive or legislative branches or theirextensions" (Jiggetts v Grinker, 75 NY2d 411, 415, 553 NE2d 570, 554 NYS2d 92 (1990][internal quotation marks omitted]). Although much has been written on this subject, i t remains"a concept of uncertain meaning and scope" (Flast v Cohen, 392 US 83, 95, 88 S Ct 1942, 20 LEd 2d 947 (1968]), one that is "more than an intuition bu t less than a rigorous and explicittheory" (Allen v Wright, 468 US 737, 750, 104 S Ct 3315, 82 L Ed 2d 556 (1984]). Cases thathave presented nonjusticiable controversies involve political questions, advisory opinions, mootissues and those where there is no standing to maintain an action (Flast, 392 US at 95).Part of the uncertainty in t he doctrine of justiciability arises from the fact that the doctrine "hasbecome [***20] a blend of constitutional requirements and policy considerations" (392 US at97). Moreover, policy limitations are "not always clearly distinguished from the constitutionallimitation" (see Barrows v Jackson, 346 US 249, 255, 73 S Ct 1031, 97 L Ed 1586 [1953)). Theco urts have the responsibili ty of determining whether a matter fal ls w ithin t he purview of anotherbranch of government, or whether t he action of that branch exceeds its constitutional authority(Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 211, 82 S Ct 691, 7 L Ed 2d 663 [1962]; see also Cohen v State ofNew York, 94 NY2d 1, 11, 720 NE2d 850, 698 NYS2d 574 [1999)) . However, as part of thetripartite const itutiona l [*323] st ructure, courts must use this power prudentially so as to notencroach on the power of a coequal branch. Put another way, HNl 2 +'"[c]ourts at all levels areenjoined not to substitute their judgment for that of the coordinate branch of government towhom such judgment has been, in t he scheme of a dividend [sic] government, primarilyentrusted" (16A Arn Jur 2d, Const itut ional Law 267, 268). 1FOOTNOTES

1 This has been a basic restriction on judicial power since the earliest days of the Republic.(See Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 78.)

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Critics of the doctrine have argued that justiciabilit y undermines the [***21] separation ofpowers doctrine because it restricts or even bars the exercise of judicial review, the main barrierwhich prevents unconstitutional action by the political branches. (See fo r example ErwinChemerinsky, Interpreting the Constitution, at 1-24, 86-97 [1987]; Martin H. Redish, The FederalCourts in the Political Order: Judicial Jurisdiction and American Political Theory, at 4-6, 75-100[1991).) I ts defenders, on the other hand, argue that justiciability preserves the Judiciary'scircumscribed role in our system of tripartite government (see fo r example Antonin Scalia, TheDoctrine ofStanding as an Essential Element of the Separation ofPowers, 17 Suffolk U L Rev881, 890-899 [1983)).HN13+'While the doctrine of justiciability has evolved with the passage of t ime, 2 " [t]here [**246] is one recurrent theme: the court as a policy matter, even apart from principlesof subject matter jurisdiction, will abstain from venturing into areas if 1t is ill-equipped toundertake the responsibility and other branches are far more suited to the task" (Jones, 45 NY2dat 408-409). This 1s particularly true in those cases that involve political questions, which involve"those controversies which revolve around pol icy choices and value determinationsconstitutionally [***22] committed for resolution to the legislative and executivebranches" (16A Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law 268). "The nonjusticiability of a political questionis primarily a function of the separation of powers," which requires a case-by-case analysis(Baker, 369 US at 210).FOOTNOTES2 For an excellent review of the origins, evolution and suggestions for the future of thedoctrine of justiciability, see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation ofPowers: ANeo-Federalist Approach 81 Cornell L Rev 393 [1996] . Professor Pushaw argues that thetwentieth century saw an erosion of the traditiona l principles of the doctrine of justiciabilitylaid down by the Founders, particularly the Federalists. This in turn has created theuncertainty in "meaning and scope" of the doctrine as the Court in Flast noted (392 us at95). He argues that a return to Federalist principles, adapted to modern jurisprudence, willbring more clarity to the doctrine of justiciability.

[*324] HN14+It is axiomatic that each branch of government "should be free frominterference, in the lawful discharge of duties expressly conferred, by either of the otherbranches" (Matter of New York State Inspection, Sec. & Law Enforcement Empts., Dist. Council82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 233, 239, 475 NE2d 90, 485 NYS2d 719 [1984 ).[***23] "The lawful acts of executive branch officials, performed in satisfaction ofresponsibilities conferred by law, involve questions of judgment, allocation of resources andordering of priorities, which are generally not subject to judicial review" (id.; see Matter ofAbrams v New York City Tr. Auth., 39 NY2d 990, 992, 355 NE2d 289, 387 NYS2d 235 [1976];see also Matter of Civil Serv. Empts. Assn., Inc., Local 1000, AFSME, AFL-CJO v County of Erie,43 AD3d 1341, 1342, 843 NYS2d 203 [2007]). This general rule is, however, subject to theexception that a court may "prevent a member of the executive branch from acting ultra vires, inbad faith, or arbitrarily" (16A Arn Jur 2d, Constitutional Law 272).HN1.S+-fhe need for deference on the part of the Judiciary for the other two branches ofgovernment, where appropriate, is an important concept that has long been recognized,particularly since the courts are the ultimate arbiters of the State Constitution (see e.g. Cohen vState of New York, 94 NY2d 1, 11, 720 NE2d 850, 698 NYS2d 574 [1999)). The doctrine ofseparation of powers generally wlll preclude a cour t from intruding upon " 'the pol icy-making anddiscretionary decisions that are reserved to the legislative and executive branches' " (Campaignfo r Fiscal Equity, Inc. v State ofNew York, 8 NY3d 14, 28, 861 NE2d SO, 828 NYS2d 235 (2006),[***24] quoting Klostermann v Cuomo, 61 NY2d 525, 541, 463 NE2d 588, 475 NYS2d 247[1984]; see also Matter of Montano v County Legislature of County ofSuffolk, 70 AD3d 203, 210,891 NYS2d 82 (2009]) .

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At the same time, however, "it is the province of the Judicial branch to define, and safeguard,rights provided by the New York State Constitution, and order redress fo r violation ofthem" (Campaign fo r Fiscal Equity, Inc. v State ofNew York, 100 NY2d 893, 925, 801 NE2d 326,769 NYS2d 106 [2003]). The competing obligations between the Judiciary's responsibility tosafeguard rights and the necessary deference to be paid to the policies of the other two branchesof government create a tension that must remain in balance.

"While i t is within the power of the judiciary to declare the vested rights of aspecifically protected class of individuals, in a fashion recognized by statute, themanner by which the State addresses complex societal and governmental issues is asubject left to the discretion of the political branches of government" (Matter of New[**247] York State Inspection, [*325] Sec. & Law Enforcement Employees vCuomo, 64 NY2d at 239-240 [citation omitted]).

Simply put, "[w]hen [the courts] review the acts of the Legislature and the Executive, we do soto protect [***25] rights, not to make policy" (Campaign for Fiscal Eqwty, 8 NY3d at 28; seealso Matter of Maron v Silver, 14 NY3d 230, 261, 925 NE2d 899, 899 NYS2d 97 (2010]).HN16+'Inasmuch as the Legislature saw fit to give HHC the discretion to determine the number ofnonmanagerial employees necessary to carry out its mission (McKinney's Uncons Laws of NY7385 (12]; 7382) [HHC Act 5 (12); 2]), HHC's decisions regarding staffing levels arebeyond judicial review. Petitioners here have failed to identify any provision of the Public HealthLaw, Unconsolidated Laws, or any regulations requiring HHC to employ maintenance staff at aspecific level or to determine maintenance staff levels in accordance with a particular standard orformula. Statutory requirements that public agencies maintain their facilities in a safe andsanitary condition do not give rise to judicially enforceable rights to employment of maintenancestaff at any given level (see Delgado v New York City Haus. Auth., 66 AD3d 607, 608, 888 NYS2d19 [2009]).Financial and budgetary considerations presented HHC with a Hobson's choice: either reduce itsexpenses by various means, including layoffs of some staff, or violate its statutory mandate toprovide cost-efficient medical services by reducing [***26] or shuttering medical services andfacilities. The Legislature, by statutory provision, saw fit to put these types of decisions squarelywithin HHC's executive function (McKinney's Uncons. Laws of NY 7382 [HHC Act 2]). Byannulling HHC's layoff determination and mandating that it continue to employ workers identifiedfor layoffs until it came up with a plan which passed judicial scrutiny, the court improperlyinserted itself into executive branch decision making by interfering with HHC's exercise of itsstatutory authority.Petitioners' claims that HHC's decision to reduce maintenance staff would result in the creation ofan unsafe workplace do not salvage their petitions. In addition to being far too speculative to riseto the level of an injury in fact, those claims clearly present a nonjusticiable controversy. "Thestatutory right to a safe workplace may not be enforced by means of a remedy at law whichwould require the judiciary to preempt the exercise of discretion by the executive branch ofgovernment" (Matter of New York State Inspection, Sec. & Law Enforcement Empls., 64 NY2d at237; McKechnie v New York City Tr. Police Dept. of N. Y. City Tr. Auth., 130 AD2d 466, 468, 515NYS2d 48 (1987]).[*326] Neither [***27] the petitioners nor the courts should be permitted to substitute their

judgment for the discretionary management of public business by public officials, as neither havebeen lawfully charged with that responsibility (see Matter ofRiverkeeper, Inc. v Planning Bd. ofTown ofSoutheast, 9 NY3d 219, 232, 881NE2d172, 851 NYS2d 76 [2007]; Matter ofAbrams,39 NY2d at 992). Petitioners, "however sincerely motivated, may not interpose themselves andthe courts into the management and operation of public enterprises" (Jones, 45 NY2d at 407[internal quotation marks omitted)).

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Get a Document - by Citation - 87 A.D.3d 31 l Page 15of16HHC's Decision was Not Arbitrary and Capricious(3] We also note that, even assuming, arguendo, that petitioners had standing, [**248] HHC'slayoff decision was not arbitrary and capricious and was founded on a rational basis (see CPLR7803 [3]).Initially, the court improperly utilized a "substantial evidence" test in determining that HHC'smethodology in determining its layoff policy was unsound. There was no administrative hearingheld or required prior to HHC's determination, and thus, application of the "substantial evidence"test was misplaced (see CPLR 7803 [4]; cf. Matter of Council of Trade Waste Assns. v City ofNewYork, 179 AD2d 413, 579 NYS2d 330 (1992], Iv [***28] denied 79 NY2d 755, 590 NE2d 250,581 NYS2d 665 (1992]). Indeed, the record before us clearly shows that HHC's layoff decisionwas rational in light of the imperative to reduce costs in conjunction with its mandate to providemedical services to all. The undisputed facts show that HHC took its massive restructuring effortseriously, as evidenced by the creation of a high level steering committee, and retention ofDeloitte's services as an outside consultant to assist in a review of all of its current operations.Its instructions to Deloitte were to prepare cost-cutting/revenue-enhancing options consistentwith HHC's mission of providing medical services to all, regardless of ability to pay. A ~ e r a ninemonth review of HHC's operations, Deloitte provided the steering committee with a voluminousreport detailing 100 cost-cutting options as well as presenting the risks and mission impact ofeach. The committee reviewed those recommendations and selected 39, including the option oflaying off trades workers rather than medical staff or closing clinics or other facilities. I t rejectedDeloitte's option of eliminating 14 outpatient clinics and four long-term-care facilities, as well asthe option of closing or repurposing [***29] hospitals. Indeed, the steering committeedemonstrated its thoughtful review of those options by, inter alia, reducing the targeted[*327] maintenance savings to 30% of the potential $ 160 million Deloitte had recommended.The steering committee decided to lay off 293 of HHC's trades staf f, rather than the 421recommended by Deloitte. The network leaders presented that proposal to HHC's medical facilttymanagers who provided feedback to the steering committee based upon their expert knowledgeof facility conditions. In arriving at its layoff decision, the steering committee specifically took

into account the fac t that any HHC facility may obtain additional trades workers, should the needarise, by borrowing them from other HHC facilities, utilizing an HHC requirements contract, or, asa last resort, invoking emergency contracting procedures.

The court, in rejecting HHC's layoff decision, relied heavily on petitioners' expert, Dr. JohnShershow, who was critical of the methodology used by Deloitte in determining staffing levels. Heopined that a different methodology, utilizing data from past inspections, should have beenutilized in determining proper staffing levels at each HHC facility. [***30] When the expert wasasked on cross-examination by HHC's counsel as to his opinion of HHC's decision-makingmethodology, the court improperly sustained petitioners' objection, ruling that the effect of HHC'sdecision, not how it came to those decisions, was at issue.The court improperly rejected HHC's layoff decision as methodological ly unsound. In doing so,the court ignored the fact that there was no evidence, statutory, regulatory or otherwise, thatmandated HHC to utilize any particular methodology in making its staffing determination. Simplyput, the court disagreed with the manner ln which HHC arrived at its decision and thereforerejected the result. However, HNl7+while judicial review must be meaningful, the courts may notsubstitute their judgment for that of the agency, "for it is [**249] not their role to weigh thedesirability of any action or [to] choose among alternatives" (Akpan v Koch, 75 NY2d 561, 570,554 NE2d 53, 555 NYS2d 16 [1990] [internal quotation marks omitted]).There is nothing in this record which remotely demonstrates that HHC arrived at its decisions inbad faith or without adequate facts or deliberation. In fact, the record demonstrates exactly theopposite. Since HHC's staffing determination [***31] had a rational basis, we find no reason todisturb it (Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns ofScarsdale& Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222, 313 NE2d 321, 356 NYS2d 833 (1974);Matter ofRiverkeeper, Inc., 9 NY3d at 232).

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We have considered the petitioners' remaining arguments and find them to be unpersuasive.[*328] Accordingly, the orders and judgments (each one paper) of the Supreme Court, NewYork County (Alice Schlesinger, J.), entered December 13, 2010, which granted the petitions toannul the determination of respondent HHC to lay of f carpenters, electricians and laborers,respectively, at its facilit ies, should be reversed, on the law, without costs, the injunctionsvacated, the petitions denied and the proceedings brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 dismissed.

Andrias ..,,., J.P., Catterson ..,,. and Renwick ...., JJ., concur.Orders and judgments (each one paper), Supreme Court, New York County (Alice Schlesinger,J.), entered December 13, 2010, reversed, on the law, without costs, the injunctions vacated, thepetitions denied and the proceedings brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 dismissed.

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