living without why · connolly, john m. living without why : meister eckhart’s critique of the...

Living without Why

Living without WhyMeister Eckhartrsquos Critique of the

Medieval Concept of Will

J O H N M C O N N O L LY

1

1Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford

It furthers the Universityrsquos objective of excellence in research scholarship and education by publishing worldwide

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copy Oxford University Press 2014

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You must not circulate this work in any other formand you must impose this same condition on any acquirer

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataConnolly John M

Living without why Meister Eckhartrsquos critique of the medieval concept of will John M Connollyp cm

Includes bibliographical references and indexISBN 978ndash0ndash19ndash935978ndash3 (hardback alk paper) 1 Eckhart Meister ndash1327

2 WillmdashHistorymdashTo 1500 I TitleB765E34C67 2014

233rsquo7mdashdc232013043048

1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper

Dedicatedto

four great teachers of history and philosophywho opened the minds of many

to the beautythe excitement

and the lasting importanceof medieval thought

W Norris Clarke SJRobert J OrsquoConnell SJJeremiah F OrsquoSullivanErnst Konrad Specht

Haeligte der mensche niht mȇ ze tuonne mit gote dan daz er dankbaeligre ist ez waeligre genuoc

mdashMeister Eckhart Pr34

vii

C O N T E N T S

Preface ix

Abbreviations xiii

Introduction 1

1 The Will as ldquoRational Appetiterdquo 5

2 Aristotlersquos Teleological Eudaimonism 17

3 Augustinersquos Christian Conception of Will 42

4 Aquinas on Happiness and the Will 86

5 Meister Eckhart Living on Two Levels 129

6 Meister Eckhart Living without Will 168

7 Living without Why Conclusion 206

Bibliography 219

Index 225

ix

P R E F A C E

These are heady days for scholars and lay readers interested in the thought of Meister Eckhart Since the 700th anniversary of his birth in 1960 there has been an upswell of interest in his writings and these have become ever more available through the efforts of (mainly German) scholars and able translators But during my years of university study in the 1960s Eckhart was still a decidedly marginal and esoteric figure even (perhaps especially) in Catholic circles Ewert Cousins who taught me theology at Fordham University mentioned him with some ad-miration but we were never introduced to his writings

For me that introduction had to wait until around 1980 when I was living in Germany with my family My wife herself German and an interfaith minister gave me a copy of Josef Quintrsquos very useful one-volume edition of Eckhartrsquos German sermons and treatises But my initial attempts to befriend these writings hit a road block on the very first page where the early Talks of Instruction begin with high praise of obedience ldquoOh nordquo I thought ldquoanother Catholic disciplinar-ianrdquo A colossal misunderstanding on my part no doubt but the book went promptly onto the shelf

Fortunately it did not stay there too long By the later 1980s I was reading the German sermons with great interest Ironically the most fascinating idea for memdashEckhartrsquos advice to ldquolive without why (or will)rdquomdashis itself intimately con-nected to his decidedly original notion of obedience Indeed the second para-graph of the Talks links the two in these words ldquoWhenever a man in obedience goes out of his own and gives up what is his in the same moment God must go in there for when a man wants nothing for himself God must want it equally as if for himselfrdquo (The translation is Walshersquos emphasis addedmdashsee Abbreviations section for details) Eckhartrsquos use of this notion from his earliest writings onward struck a deep chord within me It resonated with a favorite theme of another of my Fordham professors the philosopher and Augustine scholar Robert J OrsquoConnell SJ who pointed out to us a tension between Greek eudaimonist

x p r e f a c e

conceptions of the good life and certain Christian ideals of selflessness and ser-vice Was this clash what Eckhart was talking about

Other themes in Eckhartrsquos work fascinated me too One of course was de-tachment (abegescheidenheit) which in the Eckhart lexicon is a synonym for obe-dience I had become interested in Buddhism in the 1980s and was intrigued to learn that Japanese Buddhist philosophers such as Keiji Nishitani found deep affinities to Buddhism in Eckhartrsquos thought On a practical level as well Eckhar-tian detachment became important to me as spiritual sustenance during the chal-lenging decade I spent during the 1990s in the administration at Smith College My personal admiration for the fourteenth-century philosopher theologian and administrator of his Dominican order grew during this period as did my interest in his striking hermeneutical methods in his sermons This led to a first publication on Eckhart as a biblical interpreter

When I returned to the Smith philosophy faculty in 2002 I was determined to devote my research efforts to the Meisterrsquos work and at the top of the agenda would be an investigation of his admonition to live without why But I was by then advanced in my career very late for an entrant into the complex and dy-namic field of medieval philosophy and theology My earlier work had been de-voted to contemporary issues the philosophy of human action philosophical hermeneutics and the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein Nonetheless I was greatly aided by two fortunate circumstances first that my targeted aspect of Eckhartrsquos thoughtmdashhis ideas on how we should livemdashdovetailed nicely with my previous philosophical research and second that I found a number of colleagues in the profession who greatly aided my fledgling attempts to build on what I had learned earlier of medieval thought Tobias Hoffmann of the Catholic Univer-sity was an enormous aid along these lines and through him I became acquainted with a number of other helpful colleagues including Theo Kobusch at the Uni-versity of Bonn and other German members of the crucially important Meister-Eckhart-Gesellschaft (the British Meister Eckhart Society has also been a bless-ing) But I owe a still greater debt to the dean of American Eckhart scholars Bernard McGinn of the University of Chicago His advice friendship and en-couragement have played a major role in my ability to produce this book

Closer to home many of my Smith and Five College colleagues have also as-sisted my efforts Chief among these have been my polymath Smith colleague Jay Garfield Jonathan Westphal of Hampshire College Lynne Rudder Baker and the late Gareth Matthews of the University of Massachusetts in Amherst my colleagues in the Five College Propositional Attitudes Task Force (especially its co-founder Murray Kiteley and its current convener Ernie Alleva) and Lara Denis of Agnes Scott College Closest to home my wife Marianna Kaul Con-nolly not only provided my first copy of Eckhartrsquos writings she has also been my constant and indispensable companion in exploring many of the themes treated

p r e f a c e xi

in this book In addition she has helped me revise the manuscript To her I owe the greatest debt

Smith College a truly nurturing institution of learning was extraordi-narily generous in providing research support for this project Many former students helped me at various points to clarify my thinking and proof my texts These include Claire Serafin Lilith Dornhuber deBellesiles Rosemary Gerstner Maria-Faacutetima Santos Caitlin Liss Erin Caitlin Desetti and espe-cially Sofia Walker Finally I am in debt to the anonymous reviewers for Oxford University Press and for the journal Faith and Philosophy for helpful criticisms of my work on the topics dealt with here

If this book can in any way contribute to the recent renaissance of interest in Eckhartrsquos thought my efforts will have been richly rewarded But then again as Eckhart taught work properly undertakenmdashie without whymdashis its own reward

John M ConnollySeptember 27 2013

xiii

A B B R E V I AT I O N S

Eckhartrsquos works were long scattered surviving piecemeal in various archives and some in one collection from the early fourteenth century the Paradisus anime in-telligentis (which also contained works by other contemporaries) Eckhartrsquos sur-viving writings are available in a variety of forms today For scholarly purposes such as in this book the standard (ldquocriticalrdquo) edition is that produced since 1936 under the aegis of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft

Meister Eckhart Die deutschen und lateinischen Werke (StuttgartBerlin Kohlhammer Verlag 1936ndash)

Ten (of the eleven foreseen) volumes have been published five each for the Latin (LW) and the Middle High German (DW) writings Texts are cited here by volume section number (where applicable) page number and line number so for instance In Ioh n226 LW 3189 8ndash12 refers to the Commentary on John section 226 in volume 3 of the Latin writings page 189 lines 8 to 12 Eckhartrsquos various treatises and sermons have also been numbered by the edi-tors and also have numbered paragraphs Following this convention the Latin sermons (Sermones all in LW 4) will be given as eg lsquoS XXVrsquo and the para-graphs or sections will be indicated by lsquonrsquo or lsquonnrsquo thus ldquoS XXV n264 LW 4230 3ndash4rdquo for Sermo XXV section number 264 in volume 4 of the Latin works page 230 lines 3 and 4 The Middle High German sermons (Predigten) are ren-dered thus Pr 6 (DW 1102 4ndash5) stands for German sermon 6 in volume 1 of the German works page 102 lines 4 and 5 Similar conventions are used for Eckhartrsquos Latin and German treatises which are cited according to the follow-ing abbreviations

xiv a b b r e v i a t i o n s

Latin Works

In Eccli Sermones et Lectiones super Ecclesiastici ch 2423ndash31 (LW 2229ndash300) Sermons and Lectures on Ecclesiasticus ch 24 23ndash31

In Ex Expositio Libri Exodi (LW 21ndash227) Commentary on the Book of Exodus

In GenI Expositio Libri Genesis (LW 1185ndash444) Commentary on the Book of Genesis

In GenII Liber Parabolarum Genesis (LW 1447ndash702) Book of the Para-bles of Genesis

In Ioh Expositio sancti Evangelii secundum Iohannem (LW 3) Commen-tary on John

In Sap Expositio Libri Sapientiae (LW 2303ndash643) Commentary on the Book of Wisdom

Prolgen Prologus generalis in Opus tripartitum (LW 1129ndash65) General Prologue to the Tripartite Work

Prolopexpos Prologus in Opus expositionum (LW 1183ndash84) Prologue to the Work of Commentaries

Prol op prop Prologus in Opus propositionum (LW 1166ndash82) Prologue to the Work of Propositions

Qu Par Quaetiones Parisienses (LW 1237ndash83) Parisian Questions

Sermo die Sermo die beati Augustini Parisius habitus (LW 589ndash99) Pari-sian Sermon on the Feast of St Augustine

German Works

BgT Daz buoch der goetlichen troestunge (DW 51ndash105) Book of Divine Consolation

RdU Die rede der underscheidunge (DW 5137ndash376) Talks of Instruction

Vab Von abegescheidenheit (DW 5400ndash434) On DetachmentVeM Von dem edeln menschen (DW 5106ndash36) On the Noble Person

a b b r e v i a t i o n s xv

Translations

Many of the Latin translations in this volume are mine However where a pub-lished English version is available I have generally used it Most of Eckhartrsquos Middle High German works have been translated into English by M OrsquoC Walshe on the basis of the critical edition and I have generally used the Walshe translations Originally in three volumes these are now happily collected into a single version which is the one cited in this book But those with access only to the three-volume version can find the sermons I have cited (using their numbers from the official German critical edition which Walshe calls ldquoQuintrdquo or ldquoQrdquo) by consulting the concordance in his third volume

Essential Meister Eckhart The Essential Sermons Commentaries Treatises and Defense tr and introd by Edmund Colledge OSA and Ber-nard McGinn (New York Paulist Press 1981)

Teacher Meister Eckhart Teacher and Preacher ed Bernard McGinn with the collaboration of Frank Tobin and Elvira Borgstadt (New York Paulist Press 1986)

Largier Meister Eckhart Werke 2 vols ed and comm Niklaus Largier (Frankfurt Deutscher Klassiker Verlag 1993)

Lectura LECTURA ECKHARDI Predigten Meister Eckharts von Fachgeleh-rten gelesen und gedeutet ed Georg Steer and Loris Sturlese 3 vols (BerlinStuttgart Kohlhammer Verlag 1998 2003 2009)

Parisian Parisian Questions and Prologues ed and trans Armand Maurer CSB (Toronto Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies 1974

Walshe The Complete Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart tr and ed Mau-rice OrsquoC Walshe rev Bernard McGinn (New York Crossroad Publ Co 2009)

Other Works citedAristotle

The Greek texts of Aristotle used in this book are from the online Perseus Digital Library

The English versions are all taken from The Complete Works of Aristotle ed Jonathan Barnes two vols (Princeton Princeton University Press 1984 1994)

CAT CategoriesDA De Anima On the SoulEE Eudemian Ethics

xvi a b b r e v i a t i o n s

Met MetaphysicsNE Nicomachean Ethics

Augustine

The Latin texts of Augustine used in this volume are unless otherwise noted from the online S Aurelii Augustini opera omnia A number of the translations as noted below are from Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers First Series Vol 4 ed Philip Schaff (Buffalo NY Christian Literature Publ Co 1887) hereafter Nicene Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight httpwwwnewadventorgfathers1401htm

Ad Simp De diversis questionibus ad Simplicianum To SimplicianmdashOn Vari-ous Questions Translation John H S Burleigh Augustine Earlier Writings Volume VI of the Library of Christian Classics (Phila-delphia The Westminster Press 1953)

Contra duas Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum Against Two Letters of the Pela-gians Translation Peter Holmes and Robert Ernest Wallis re-vised by Benjamin B Warfield In Nicene

Conf Confessiones Confessions Translation Maria Boulding OSB Saint Augustine The Confessions (Hyde Park NY New City Press 1997)

DCD De civitate Dei City of God Translation Marcus Dods (New York Modern Library 1950)

DDC De doctrina christiana On Christian Doctrine Translation James Shaw Dover Philosophical Classics (Mineola NY Dover Publish-ing 2009)

DLA De libero arbitrio On Free Choice of the Will Translation Thomas Williams Augustine On Free Choice of the Will (Indianapolis IN Hackett Publ Co 1993)

De mor De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus manichaeorum On the Life-Style of the Catholic Church Translation Richard Stothert In Nicene

De Spir De spiritu et litera On the Spirit and the Letter Translation Peter Holmes and Robert Ernest Wallis In Nicene

De Trin De Trinitate On the Holy Trinity Translation Arthur West Haddan In Nicene

Gen litt De Genesi ad litteram Literal Meaning of Genesis Translation John Hammond Taylor (New York Newman Press 1982)

QQ 83 De diversis quaestionibus 83 Eighty-Three Different Questions

a b b r e v i a t i o n s xvii

Translation D L Mosher (Washington DC Catholic Univer-sity of America Press 19822002)

Retr Retractationes Reconsiderations

Church Fathers

PG Patrologiae cursus completus Series Graeca ed J-P Migne 161 vols (Paris J-P Migne 1857ndash66)

Thomas Aquinas

The Latin texts of St Thomas used in this volume are from the online Corpus Thomisticum Some of the translations are my own

DVir Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus On the VirtuesDVer Quaestiones disputatae de veritate On TruthDReg De Regimine Principorum On the Government of Rulers Transla-

tion James M Blythe (Philadelphia University of Pennsylvania Press 1997)

QDA Quaestiones disputatae de anima Disputed Questions on the SoulSCG Summa contra gentiles Contra Gentiles Translation Vernon

Bourke (New York Hanover House 1955ndash57 online edition httpdhsprioryorgthomasContraGentileshtm)

SENT Scriptum super Sententiis Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard

SLE Sententia libri ethicorum Commentary on Aristotlersquos Nicomachean Ethics Translation CJ Litzinger OP (Notre Dame IN Dumb Ox Books 1993)

STh Summa theologiae in 4 parts called ldquoprimardquo (Ia) ldquoprima secundaerdquo (IaIIae) ldquosecunda secundaerdquo (IIaIIae) and ldquotertiardquo (III) Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province online edition Copyright copy 2008 by Kevin Knight

1

Introduction

In the spring of 1329 Pope John XXII the second (and longest reigning 1316ndash1334) of the Avignon popes issued a bull condemning twenty-eight propositions attributed to the German Dominican philosopher and theologian Meister Eckhart von Hochheim Among the censured propositions were a sub-stantial number expressing Eckhartrsquos views on how we should live including this one based on one of his German sermons

The eighth article [of the bull] Those who seek nothing neither honor nor profit nor inwardness nor holiness nor reward nor heaven but who have renounced all including what is their ownmdashin such persons is God honored1

The popersquos point of view might well seem justified did Eckhart really want to imply in this passage that God is not honored by those who seek ldquoholinessrdquo ldquorewardrdquo or ldquoheavenrdquo Was he in a back-handed way condemning those who failed to renounce ldquoall including what is their ownrdquo a point of special sensitiv-ity at the splendid papal court2 What we certainly have in this eighth article is the Popersquos emphatic rejection of a teaching found in many of Eckhartrsquos works

1 Octavus articulus Qui non intendunt res nec honores nec utilitarem nec devotionem internam nec sanctitatem nec premium nec regnum celorum sed omnibus hiis renuntiaverunt etiam quod suum est in illis hominibus honoratur Deus (Emphasis in the translation added In agro dominico LW V596ndash600 here 598) The Latin text of In agro dominico is also available at this web address httpwwweck-hartde (under Texte) An English version is in Edmund Colledge OSA and Bernard McGinn Meister Eckhart The Essential Sermons Commentaries Treatises and Defense (Mahwah NJ Paulist Press 1981)

2 This particular condemned phrase perhaps suggested the highly charged position on ldquoApostolic povertyrdquo of the ldquospiritual Franciscansrdquomdasha position supported by William of Ockham and one that Pope John XXII himself had condemned But Eckhart had in fact nothing directly to say about this dispute

2 l i v i n g w i t h o u t w h y

ie that we should ldquolive without whyrdquo (or ldquowithout willrdquo)3 The suggestion of goallessness as an ideal seems at first glance bewildering the more so in that Eck-hart was himself a highly motivated and successful academic and administrator Furthermore he was working in a tradition of Christian ethics and spirituality that as we will see was premised on a pervasive teleology the very opposite of goallessness In the context of late medieval ethics ldquowhyrdquo implies a specific kind of teleological or goal-oriented approach4 inherited from classical moral philos-ophy and brilliantly weldedmdashby Thomas Aquinas and others in the thirteenth centurymdashinto a monumental edifice that located ethics within a structure of the-ology metaphysics psychology and political theory

What may have made Eckhart seem the more dangerous was that he was not some wild-eyed outsider nor was he basing his views on unheard-of teachings from alien or long-rejected traditions Instead he was himself a learned scholar deeply acquainted with Aristotle the most teleological of thinkers and a close reader of Augustine and Aquinas he was commenting on the same Chris-tian scriptures as they all the while citing them as authorities The perceived danger may have been that these central sources of Christian doctrinemdashthe scriptures Augustine Thomas and among the philosophers Aristotle and the Neoplatonistsmdashcould be interpreted to yield conclusions so uncongenial to the worried church authorities Indeed the fact that Eckhart came to what are at first glance such radical and unusual conclusions should spark the curiosity not only of those interested in the history of Western moral philosophy but also of anyone who thinks that an ethic that has detachment as its central concept cannot have been conceived in Christian medieval Europe

The papal bull was meant to put an end not only to the influence of Eckhart but in particular to a trial against him begun in Cologne in 1326 by the local and powerful archbishop that had dragged on for three years The bullrsquos focus was primarily theological (though questions of ecclesiastical and political power were certainly also involved) but it is interesting to find among the indicted teachings several propositions attributed to Eckhart that continue to be debated in ethics and the philosophy of human action today

The sixteenth article God does not properly command an exte-rior act

The seventeenth article The exterior act is not properly good or divine and God does not produce it or give birth to it in the proper sense

3 Eg ldquoNow whoever dwells in the goodness of his nature dwells in Godrsquos love but love is with-out whyrdquo [Wer nu wonet in der guumlete sicircner nature der wonet in gotes minne und diu minne enhȃt kein warumbe] (Pr 28 DW 259 6ndash7 Walshe 129)

4 In particular a teleological eudaimonism an ethic whose point is so to live as to secure onersquos eudaimonia (happiness well-being in Greek)

Int roduc t i on 3

The eighteenth article Let us bring forth the fruit not of exterior acts which do not make us good but of interior acts which the Father who abides in us makes and produces

The nineteenth article God loves souls not the exterior work5

Eckhart was not denying the goodness of external acts altogether but he stressed instead the importance of the attitude or motivation of the agent Here he was following Aristotle (and anticipating Kant) and his teachingmdashwhich obviously aroused the Inquisitorsrsquo iremdashis as we will see closely connected to his coun-sel to ldquolive without why (or will)rdquo It represents a particular position in the age-old controversy over the role of ldquoworksrdquo in our quest to live the good life (or find salvation) which came to be one of the principal points of contention in the Reformation and which echoes still in the disputes between Kantians and consequentialists

As central as these lastmdashand similarmdashcondemned articles are for this study Eckhartrsquos continuing notoriety (and in some quarters popularity) rests more on the immediately succeeding one

The twentieth article That the good man is the Only-Begotten Son of God6

This seemingly audacious claim like most others made by Eckhart (including those concerning the will) is not really understandable outside the context of what one modern philosopher has called his ldquoextraordinary metaphysicrdquo7 Given its peculiarity and difficulty it is not surprising that Eckhart has been either

5 Sextusdecimus articulus Deus proprie non precipit actum exteriorem Decimusseptimus articulus Actus exterior non est proprie bonus nec divinus nec operatur ipsum Deus proprie nec parit Decimusocta-vus articulus Afferamus fructum actuum non exteriorum qui nos bonos non faciunt sed actuum interio-rum quos pater in nobis manens facit et operatur Decimusnonus articulus Deus animas amat non opus extra (LW 5598ndash99)

6 Vicesimus articulus Quod bonus homo est unigenitus filius Dei (LW 5 599) In what is most likely the source of this article Eckhart actually wrote ldquoThus in very truth for the son of God a good man insofar as he is Godrsquos son suffering for Godrsquos sake working for God is his being his life his work his felicityrdquo [Alsȏ waeligrliche dem gotes sune einem guoten menschen sȏ vil er gotes sun ist durch got lȋden durch got wuumlrken ist sȋn wesen sȋn leben sȋn wuumlrken sȋn saeliglicheit] (In BgT DW 544 16ndash19 Walshe 543) It is noteworthy that the bull omits the crucial phrase ldquoinsofar as he is Godrsquos sonrdquo a sign that the inquisitors did not understand or chose to ignore the complexity of Eckhartrsquos teaching

7 Jan Aertsen ldquoMeister Eckhart Eine ausserordentliche Metaphysikrdquo Recherches de Theacuteologie et Philosophie Meacutedieacutevales 66 1 (1999) 1ndash20 See also the detailed discussion of Eckhartrsquos overall philo-sophical approach in Kurt Flasch Meister Eckhart Philosoph des Christentums (Munich C H Beck Verlag 2010)


misunderstood or else ignored by friends as well as enemies But it is only from the standpoint of that metaphysic that one can grasp what Eckhart was trying to say with claims such as this last one or for that matter see how it is related to his teaching on the will

In this book I try to decipher the meaning of Eckhartrsquos ldquolive without whyrdquo by placing the claim in its historical and metaphysical context Given that context what does it mean andmdashequally important perhapsmdashnot mean How did it arise in a very ldquowhyrdquo-oriented tradition of Western philosophy and theology In particular how could it flow from the pen of a Dominican confregravere of Thomas Aquinas whose own teachings were initially controversial (for their reliance on Aristotle) but whose reputation had subsequently been so successfully re-stored by the efforts of the Dominican order that the same Pope John XXII who condemned Eckhart in 1329 had canonized Thomas in 1323 And what are the consequences of Eckhartrsquos teaching for other notions involving the concept of will such as motivation or intention Perhaps most importantly how does one actually live a ldquolife without willrdquo Is it possible outside a hermitrsquos cell This last question brings us face to face with the question of happiness or human fulfill-ment in which the role of will hasmdashfrom its vague beginnings in Aristotlemdashbeen prominent This classical place of origin is where our own investigation has its roots

But we begin much closer to Eckhartrsquos own time noting a few of the main points of Aquinasrsquos influential teaching on the will (chapter 1) That will lead us back to the principal sources of that teaching the competing teleological eudai-monisms of Aristotle (chapter 2) and St Augustine (chapter 3) We will then be in a position to explore the rolemdasha problematic one I will suggestmdashthat the will plays according to Thomas in the Christianrsquos path to happiness (chapter 4) Eckhartrsquos dramatically different approach is presented against its metaphysical backdrop in chapters 5 and 6 There we will find I contend that ldquoliving without whyrdquo is not an outlandish doctrine True it is anchored in a metaphysical world-view that has grown unfamiliar to modern readers nonetheless it still deserves our attention

5

1

The Will as ldquoRational Appetiterdquo

Composed at the summit of his career in the years around 1270 Thomas Aqui-nasrsquos Summa Theologiae epic in scope and epoch-making in its effects begins with a discussion of its central topic ldquosacred doctrinerdquo Although Thomas de-fends the view that this field of study ldquois speculative rather than practical because it is more concerned with divine things than with human actsrdquo he immediately adds that ldquoit does treat even of these latter inasmuch as man is ordained by them to the perfect knowledge of God in which consists eternal blissrdquo1 In other words inquiry into the nature of God leads one to seek ldquothe perfect knowledge of Godrdquo but this can only be attained in the afterlife (ldquoeternal blissrdquo) the path to which consists in the performance of the right sort of ldquohuman actsrdquo In the introduction to the second main part of the work Thomas wrote

Since as Damascene states ( John of Damascus De Fide Orthod ii 12) man is said to be made to Godrsquos image in so far as the image implies an intelligent being endowed with free-choice and self-movement now that we have treated [in part one of the Summa] of the exemplar ie God and of those things which came forth from the power of God in accordance with His will it remains for us to treat of His image ie man inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions as having free choice and control of his actions2

(STh IaIIae Prologue emphasis added)

1 Sacra autem doctrina est principaliter de Deo cuius magis homines sunt opera Non ergo est scientia practica sed magis speculativa de quibus agit secundum quod per eos ordinatur homo ad perfectam Dei cognitionem in qua aeterna beatitudo consistit The Summa Theologiae (STh) will be cited hereafter in the text in the standard fashion ie by part question article and section of article Here Ia14sc I gener-ally use the translation of the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (2nd and rev ed 1920) which is available in several online formats eg at httpwwwccelorgccelaquinassummahtml

2 Quia sicut Damascenus dicit homo factus ad imaginem Dei dicitur secundum quod per imaginem significatur intellectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se potestativum postquam praedictum est de exemplari scilicet de Deo et de his quae processerunt ex divina potestate secundum eius voluntatem restat ut consider-emus de eius imagine idest de homine secundum quod et ipse est suorum operum principium quasi liberum


Thomas signals here the general framework within which he will go on to con-sider questions of the greatest concern to human beings ldquothe ultimate end of human life and the means by which human beings can reach this end or devi-ate from itrdquo3 (STh IaIIae 1 preface) The trope of humans as the ldquoimage of Godrdquo or ldquomade to the image of Godrdquo (Genesis 126) was a commonplace among Christian thinkers and it will occupy an important place in this study (even in Aristotle there is something similar) As we will see the notion of ldquoimagerdquo can be understood in several ways For Thomas in this contextmdashwhere the focus is on how we humans must live if we are to reach happiness ie the ultimate fulfillment possible to usmdashthe crucial elements of the comparison between the divine and the human are intellect power and will Just as God created the entire world the macrocosm through the divine intellect and will so we humans must fashion our lives the microcosm through the use of our human intellect and will The path to the happiness (beatitudo) appropriate to beings ldquomade to Godrsquos imagerdquo is principally through right action the key to which is having the right will

A bit further along in the Summa at the start of the Treatise on Human Acts (IaIIae 6ndash21) Thomas claims

Since therefore Happiness is to be gained by means of certain acts we must in due sequence consider human acts in order to know by what acts we may obtain happiness and by what acts we are prevented from obtaining it And since those acts are properly called human which are voluntary because the will is the rational appetite which is proper to man we must consider acts in so far as they are voluntary4

(IaIIae 6 Prologue emphases added)

By taking this approach Thomas is not only focusing on a concept much at-tended to by Christian thinkers since the time of Augustine but he takes him-self to be also emulating Aristotle ldquothe Philosopherrdquo whose major works had become newly available in Latin translation by the mid-thirteenth century

3 Ubi primo considerandum occurrit de ultimo fine humanae vitae et deinde de his per quae homo ad hunc finem pervenire potest vel ab eo deviare

4 Quia igitur ad beatitudinem per actus aliquos necesse est pervenire oportet consequenter de humanis actibus considerare ut sciamus quibus actibus perveniatur ad beatitudinem vel impediatur beatitudinis via Cum autem actus humani proprie dicantur qui sunt voluntarii eo quod voluntas est rationalis ap-petitus qui est proprius hominis oportet considerare de actibus inquantum sunt voluntarii

arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem I deviate from a common translation of ldquoliberum arbi-triumrdquo as ldquofree willrdquo for reasons that I will explain below in chapter 3 By ldquoprinciplerdquo Thomas means ldquosourcerdquo Further references to this work will generally be given in parentheses in the text

Th e Wil l a s ldquoR at i onal A p pe t i te rdquo 7

Their arrival on the university scene was a sensation and they provoked some-thing of a crisis in the intellectual circles of Western Christendom Traditional-ists generally Augustinian in orientation were skeptical about their use the most extreme wanted them banned altogether Their hand was strengthened by the strong and heterodox enthusiasm shown for Aristotle by some thirteenth-century philosophers largely in the arts faculty at the University of Paris But a different party of philosophically oriented theologiansmdashto which Thomas and his teacher Albert the Great belongedmdashsoberly embraced Aristotlersquos works and wanted to show their compatibility with the Christian faith One place where this challenge was considerable was the attempt to harmonize Aristo-tlersquos this-worldly pagan ethic with a decidedly other-worldly Christian Welt-anschauung5 The form in which Thomas carried out this effort confirmed the central position of the willmdashunderstood in a certain waymdashin Christian moral thought a position it had earlier attained in the work of St Augustine as I will attempt to show

The central question in this book concerns why Meister Eckhart himself a student of Aristotle and a successor to Thomas on the Dominican chair of theology in Paris claimed we should ldquolive without whyrdquo (or ldquowillrdquo in a certain sense of the term) What could such a claim mean How could it arise in the broadly ChristianAristotelian will-centered tradition in which Eckhart was schooled And what would it mean for Christian ethics to be based not on the will but on detachment from it Our path to addressing these questions will begin at a principal source Aristotlersquos main treatise of moral philosophy the Nicomachean Ethics by asking what role the notion of will played in Aristotlersquos construction of the good life Then we will look at how a fuller Christianized conception of will arose in the life and writings of St Augustine (354ndash430) before returning to Aquinas for a more detailed examination of his teachings on the role of the will in the Christian path to salvation Only then will we have the materials needed for understanding Eckhartrsquos distinctly different approach to the trope of the likeness between God and humans as in this citation from his Commentary on Exodus (where ldquowhyrdquo is closely connected to will in the traditional sense)

It is proper to God that he has no ldquowhyrdquo outside or beyond himself Therefore every work that has a ldquowhyrdquo as such is not a divine work or done for God ldquoHe works all things for his own sakerdquo (Prov 164) There will be no divine work if a person does something that is not for

5 This task was the more difficult because of St Augustinersquos harsh critique of pagan ethics Cf chapter 3 below eg p 78


Godrsquos sake because it will have a ldquowhyrdquo something that is foreign to God and far from God It is not God or godly6

(In Ex n247 LW 22017ndash11 emphasis added)

This is a radical claim ldquoDivinerdquo or ldquogodlyrdquo ie truly virtuous works play a central role in the human quest for happiness or beatitude for Augustine and Aquinas of course but alsomdashmutatis mutandismdashfor Aristotle Although there are major differences among the ethical theories of these three thinkers each assigns a cen-tral place to the virtues7 and as we will see central to the virtues is the will and hence a ldquowhyrdquo This is the natural and appealing idea that only through the regular practice of voluntary actions aimed at what we most naturally and deeply want can we reach our fulfillment Thus to say as Eckhart did that ldquoevery work that has a lsquowhyrsquo as such is not a divine workrdquo seems to imply either that will plays no part in the virtues or else that virtue is not central to the attainment of beati-tude One can understand the Popersquos shock

The virtue ethics of Aristotle and Thomas are of course related Aquinas having incorporated into his moral theology substantial elements of Aristotlersquos Nicomachean Ethics Their roles in our lively contemporary discussion show that both of these related ethical systems continue to inspire philosophers and to exercise in Thomasrsquos case truly substantial influence beyond the academy since much Christian (especially Catholic) moral teaching and preaching is based on his writings (and hence if indirectly on Aristotlersquos)8 Aquinas was also deeply influenced by Augustine who in turn was also an important inspiration for some of the Protestant Reformers Obviously many todaymdashCatholics Protestants and othersmdashcontinue to feel the attraction of the idea that at the heart of ethics is a deep connection between the quality of the life we lead as measured by our virtues and vices and the fulfillment or happiness that each of us can attain

7 Indeed recent interest among both philosophers and the wider public in the tradition of virtue ethics often takes its inspiration from one or more of these thinkers Virtue ethics has been a very active field in moral philosophy in recent decades while William Bennettrsquos Book of the Virtues (New York Simon and Schuster 1996) was a top bestseller in the United States during the 1990s Cf Ro-salind Hursthouse Virtue Ethics (Oxford Clarendon Press 1999) But see also the caution in Martha Nussbaum ldquoVirtue Ethics A Misleading Categoryrdquo Journal of Ethics 3 3 (1999) 163ndash201

8 Recent Catholic reliance on Thomas is sketched in Anthony Kennyrsquos ldquoThe Thomism of John Paul IIrdquo (1999) reprinted in his Essays on the Aristotelian Tradition (Oxford Oxford University Press 2000) The lasting influence of Augustinersquos thought in both Catholic and Protestant circles is also beyond question

6 [p]roprium est deo ut non habeat quare extra se aut praeter se Igitur omne opus habent quare ipsum ut sic non est divinum nec fit deo Ipse enim lsquouniversa propter semet ipsum operaturrsquo Prov 16 Qui ergo operatur quippiam non propter deum non erit opus divinum utpote habens quare quod alienum est deo et a deo non deus nec divinum


Even Kant apparently the most antiteleological of moral philosophers felt that the moral life would be crippled without the belief in a link between virtue and divine reward

But nowhere do Aristotle Augustine Thomas and Eckhart differ more strik-ingly than over the nature of this fulfillment Aristotlersquos eudaimonism is the view that our happiness or perfection that is the objectively most desirable form of life consists in the active practice of the virtues especially the intellectual vir-tues9 While large stretches of Thomasrsquos writings on ethics (eg his analysis of human action) are plainly Aristotelian other and non-Aristotelian elementsmdashmany derived from St Augustine (and even Plato10)mdashdominate at times Au-gustinersquos influence is seen among other places where core Christian notions (grace salvation charity etc but also the will) replace Aristotlersquos pagan this-worldliness The result is a hybrid that on crucial points concerning the nature of both the virtues and happiness is thoroughly un-Aristotelian That two thinkers from such different religious milieus should diverge on the content of happiness is not surprising One consequence of that difference I will contend is Aquinasrsquos tendency toward a moral instrumentalismmdashthe view that moral behavior is pri-marily a means to a more highly valued endmdashthat is alien in spirit to Aristotlersquos ethics Furthermore I will suggest that this tendency may be rooted in a deeper incoherence in Augustinersquos and Thomasrsquos respective attempts to construct a moral theology within the teleological framework inherited from classical ethics that is also faithful to the Christian gospel that particular marriage may in fact not work

In the generation following St Thomas some thinkers including John Duns Scotus took issue with eudaimonism altogether arguing that our deepest ethi-cal impulse the inclination to justice calls on us to do what is right for its own sake regardless of its impact on our happiness At first glance Eckhart who was Scotusrsquos contemporary seems to be echoing this view when he advises his audi-ence to ldquolive without whyrdquo ie without a will or goal But I will argue that Eck-hart is actually a kind of eudaimonist While no less rooted in Christian thought than his fellow Dominican Thomas his ethical views owe much more to Neopla-tonism than do Thomasrsquos but paradoxically they are in a way more faithful than Aquinasrsquos to the spirit of Aristotle

It will be helpful to have at the start a characterization of will and I will use that of Aquinas widely recognized for its comprehensive and definitive char-acter As we saw Thomas says in the Summa Theologiae that will is the ldquorational

9 More fully the active practice of those virtues in a life not unduly beset with maladies catastro-phes hunger and the like In insisting on a modicum of amenities and good fortune Aristotle was less radical than other ancient champions of the virtues such as Socrates and the Stoics

10 As I will suggest in chapter 4 p 90ndash91


appetite which is proper to manrdquo (IaIIae 6 Prologue) and that ldquothe object of the will is the end and the goodrdquo (IaIae 1 1 c)11 He adds in the Prologue

First then we must consider the voluntary and involuntary in general secondly those acts which are voluntary as being elicited by the will and as issuing from the will immediately thirdly those acts which are voluntary as being commanded by the will which issue from the will through the medium of the other powers12

Still later when discussing the notion of the voluntary he says

The fact that man is master [dominus] of his actions is due to his being able to deliberate about them for since the deliberating reason is indif-ferently disposed to opposite things the will can be inclined to either13

(IaIIae 6 2 ad 2)

Finally he tells us that ldquothe act of will is simply a kind of inclination proceeding from the interior knowing principlerdquo14 (IaIIae 6 4 c) As vague as these state-ments may seem they bring out a number of essential features of the will in Thomasrsquos understanding of it

bull First as ldquorational appetiterdquo (rationalis appetitus) the will always aims at what the intellect discerns as good and thus will combines both cognitive and co-native elements It is not merely one or the other not simply a kind of desire nor an opinion of any ordinary sort Aquinas takes himself to be following

12 Primo ergo considerandum est de voluntario et involuntario in communi secundo de actibus qui sunt voluntarii quasi ab ipsa voluntate eliciti ut immediate ipsius voluntatis existentes tertio de actibus qui sunt voluntarii quasi a voluntate imperati qui sunt ipsius voluntatis mediantibus aliis potentiis Thomas assumes that actions are called ldquovoluntaryrdquo (voluntarius) because of the presence in them of will (vol-untas) As we will see this is a prime example of an accidental etymology having a substantive philo-sophical consequence Cf STh IaIae 6 2 1 and ad 1

13 Ex hoc contingit quod homo est dominus sui actus quod habet deliberationem de suis actibus ex hoc enim quod ratio deliberans se habet ad opposita voluntas in utrumque potest

14 Actus voluntatis nihil est aliud quam inclinatio quaedam procedens ab interiori principio cognoscente

11 Obiectum autem voluntatis est finis et bonum David Gallagher gives a useful anatomy of Thom-asrsquos various ways of marking the will off from other forms of appetite particularly sense appetite in ldquoThomas Aquinas on Will as Rational Appetiterdquo Journal of the History of Philosophy 294 (October 1991) 559ndash84 These include the distinctions between sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge as well as in terms of the object desired the agentrsquos control over the deed and his or her capacity for reflection Summarizing Gallagher notes that ldquoalmost invariably the distinction between the two levels of appetite turns on the notion of controlrdquo Such control is rooted in the human capacity for deliberation ldquoThomasrsquos understanding of the will never strays from Aristotlersquos fundamental concep-tion of choice as lsquodeliberative desirersquordquo (583ndash84)


Aristotle on this for whom will (or wish boulecircsis) was in J O Urmsonrsquos words the ldquodesire for what on the basis of rational calculation is seen to serve onersquos best interest in the long runrdquo15 In this way will is a kind of compass that keeps one on the path that by onersquos own lights leads to what one wants most of all ie happiness Further when Thomas calls the will ldquorational appetiterdquo he meansmdashin at least one central usagemdashmore than a desire the agent judges to be sensible or in line with her long-term goals he also means it is what the agent resolves to pursue16 He says ldquoIt is from willing the end that man is moved to take counsel in regard to the meansrdquo17 (IaIae 14 1 ad 1)

bull Second Thomas connects the will (voluntas) to actions that are voluntary (voluntarie) an association that seems obvious since it is manifest in the very Latin terms (though not in Aristotlersquos Greek where the parallel terms were etymologically unrelated to each other18) Further by speaking in the plural of ldquoacts which are voluntary as being elicited by the will and as issuing from the will immediatelyrdquomdashhe is referring here to intention choice consent etc each of which he goes on to discuss separatelymdashThomas alludes to the fact that the concept of will covers a variety of what one could call ldquoaction- oriented psychological (or propositional) attitudesrdquo Like ldquomindrdquo it is a con-cept standing for a genus and indeed a genus much wider than what Aristotle had in mind

bull Third Thomas ties will closely to the capacity to deliberatemdashan act of practical reasonmdashabout what we should do in a given situation In whatever ways our desires may be disposed the will of a free agentmdashie of one who is neither coerced nor addictedmdashis by definition ldquoindifferently disposed to opposite thingsrdquo it exercises a kind of judicial function Terence Irwin calls it ldquorational choicerdquo Davidson identifies it with the agentrsquos ldquobetter judgmentrdquo19

15 J O Urmson Aristotlersquos Ethics (Oxford Basil Blackwell 1988) 4016 ldquoResolvesrdquo is not quite right since in many ldquowilledrdquo actions the agent simply acts with no sepa-

rate step of forming a resolution Her behavior one might say expresses the categorical or uncon-ditional judgment ldquoThis action is desirablerdquo tout court as Donald Davidson put it Interestingly Davidson was initially a skeptic about the will thinking that human action could be analyzed solely in terms of ordinary desires beliefs and (event-) causation His change of mind is described in the In-troduction and Essays 2 and 5 of Essays on Actions amp Events (Oxford Oxford University Press 1980) He credits Aquinas on pp 33 and 36 The quoted phrase is on p 98

17 [H]omo vult finem movetur ad consiliandum de his quae sunt ad finem18 Thomas says ldquoA thing is called lsquovoluntaryrsquo from lsquovoluntasrsquo (will)rdquo [Voluntarium enim a voluntate

dicitur] (IaIIae 6 2 obj 1 cf also ibid ad 1) Since for Aristotle the acts of animals and children who lack will or wish (boulecircsis) can be voluntary (hekousion) not every voluntary action involves will It is an etymological accident that Latin writers came to render hekousion with voluntarius thus laying the basis for the opposed view ie that every voluntary action is willed

19 Cf Terence Irwin ldquoWho Discovered the Willrdquo in Philosophical Perspectives 6 Ethics ed James Tomberlin (Atascadero CA Ridgeview 1992) 467 Donald Davidson ldquoHow is Weakness of the Will Possiblerdquo in Actions 21ndash42 at 36


bull Fourth Thomas associates will with an ldquointerior knowing principlerdquo Here he plainly seems to have in mind Aristotlersquos placement of boulecircsis ldquoin the ratio-nal partrdquo of the soul (DA III 9 432b 3) as proceeding frommdashor perhaps constitutingmdashthe mindrsquos assessment about how best to live20 But Thomas may also well have in mind here the role of will in practical knowledge ie the knowledge that brings about a certain particular result it is ldquothe cause of things thought ofrdquo21 (IaIIae 3 5 obj 1) He does not think of the willmdashwhether in its boulecircsis-function of identifying the right way to live or in its specific manifestation as choice the selection among alternatives of the right action to perform here and nowmdashas entirely autonomous (as did say Scotus and other ldquovoluntaristsrdquo) but as dependent on practical reason ldquoThe will tends to its object according to the order of reason since the apprehensive power presents the object to the appetiterdquo22 (IaIIae 13 1 c) In adopting an intention or making a choice of some means to an end we have selected we come to know through practical reason what we will do (or makemdashthe builder knows the house in her mind before her designs and deeds bring it about in fact)23 and

bull Fifth Thomas includes among ldquoacts of willrdquo those ldquoacts which are volun-tary as being commanded by the will which issue from the will through the medium of the other powersrdquo These would include ordinary human actions involving bodily movements such as speaking walking typing cooking etc and more complex activities such as raising children embarking on a career caring for a disabled loved one and the like In other words voluntary actions are themselves ldquoacts of willrdquo

Looking at these principal features of the will as Thomas identified them we can see at once how well they fit the ethical approach of teleological eudai-monism the will (as rational desire or boulecircsis) identifies or determines the goal or telos that state or condition in which our happiness consists Notwithstand-ing their differences Aristotle Augustine and Aquinas agree that happiness can only be attained if we become human agents of a certain kind ie people who live the life of the virtues Virtuous living requires that we deliberate about what

23 Or so argued G E M Anscombe Intention (Oxford Basil Blackwell 1957) Eg ldquo[I]t is the agentrsquos (practical) knowledge of what he is doing that gives the descriptions under which what is going on is the execution of an intentionrdquo 87 Donald Davidson countered that the notion of knowl-edge is not the right one for the analysis of intention (cf ldquoIntendingrdquo Actions 91ndash96) Be that as it may Anscombe seems to have been reporting Aquinasrsquos view accurately

20 ἔν τε τῷ λογιστικῷ γὰρ ἡ βούλησις γίνεται21 causa rerum intellectarum22 [V]oluntas in suum obiectum tendit secundum ordinem rationis eo quod vis apprehensiva appetitivae

suum obiectum repraesentat


actions to perform in the various circumstances of life choosing the ones that will lead to our goal and then performing them voluntarily and indeed inten-tionally Will and eudaimonism at least of the teleological variety seem made for each other

Let me now illustrate the features of will we have seen thus far showing in an example how they are manifested in a relatively simple case of moral conflict

Louise is a successful executive having risen from modest circumstances to the post of vice president of her firm No puritan she has always en-joyed a glass of wine or beer with her meals Recently the stresses of her job and her ever more complicated personal finances have led her to look for ways to keep calm and focused Her older brother a freelance entrepreneur recommended she take a drink of aquavit when she feels the pressure mounting ldquoThatrsquos what I dordquo he told her ldquoYou toss down a delicious ice-cold shot and it works greatrdquo But despite her affection for himmdashand her liking for aquavitmdashher own sense of how she wants to live (ldquoa life of sobriety and integrityrdquo is how she formulates it) and the counsel of her best friend have persuaded her to avoid the alcohol and instead practice yoga-stretching or Daoist breathing So when one Tuesday just before a meeting at which she will have to give a particu-larly gloomy sales report for the preceding quarter she feels the pressure mounting she decides it is time to regain her composure Dismissing the thought of having a drink she turns off her computer and decid-ing against yoga so as to remain seated she closes her eyes and starts to breathe deeply soon she begins to feel a loosening of the tension

As described here Louisersquos behavior illustrates a version of what Aristotle called the virtue of temperance (socircphrosunecirc) the habit of moderation in the fulfillment of bodily needs and desires What makes this a virtue for Aristotle is that it is a character trait guided by reason that governs desires a trait that expresses a meanmdashnot too much not too littlemdashand one that Louise has devel-oped out of her sense (a correct one he would say) of how one should live It is in actions such as these that one attains an important kind of human happiness24

An alternative narrative one in which Louise weakens under temptation and gives in to the desire for a drink of aquavit would illustrate another important

24 As we will see the precise weighting in Aristotle of the roles played by the virtues of the intellect and those of character in the attainment of happiness is complex and disputed But on one reading of his views if Louise were to supplement the breathing practice with a regular and systematic study of metaphysicsmdashand especially of the divine order of the cosmosmdashshe would attain an even higher level of happiness


feature of will the character flaw Aristotle labeled akrasia (incontinence ungov-ernedness often called weakness of will)

Our modern concept of will has many faces which are everywhere in our nar-ratives of Louise Take the action of her beginning Daoist breathing The notion of will is involved in this deed in a number of ways

1 Since her action is self-initiated Louise acted voluntarily she knew what she was doing was not coerced did not mistake Daoist breathing for kundalini yoga etc

2 She did it intentionally ie she acted on the basis of her reason for the deed here she wants to settle her nerves and relax by means of using this breath-ing technique

3 She is exercising choice eg to resort to the breathing exercise (rather than alcohol) and to Daoist breathing (rather than yoga)

4 The root cause (or ldquoprinciplerdquo) of her action is her goal or rational desire to lead a certain kind of life For Louise undertaking this exercise expresses what Aristotle called her boulecircsis (wish will) and Thomas her voluntas (will) ie her ldquorational desire for the goodrdquo or her conception of how best to live avoiding alcohol during work and particularly when under stress is part of her conception of the good life

5 The various manifestations of will here are linked in what has been called a ldquopractical syllogismrdquo ie a form of reasoning that connects some goal (often the agentrsquos boulecircsis) to something she decides or chooses to do voluntarily here and now

6 Louise is here reacting to unpleasant sensations and the need for relaxation but she reacts rationally ie after deliberating about what is the best way to deal with it

7 Louise enjoys the Daoist breathing both in the medieval sense of attaining and resting in the object of her will and in the modern sense of experienc-ing the pleasant effects

8 Louisersquos action some would say shows free will ie is self-determined and thus she is responsible for her deeds (for Aristotle and Aquinas she is ldquomasterrdquo of them)

9 In the first tale Louise exhibits will power she knows what she should do to conform to her own conception of how to live and manages to ignore or overcome any temptation If she experiences no temptation Aristotle would say she is (thus far) temperate ie virtuous if she feels tempted but resists he would call her behavior ldquocontinentrdquo

10 Were she to give in to the temptation Aristotle would say she is akratic According to Augustine Aquinas and other Christian thinkers she would be committing a sin intentionally acting contrary to her insight into how


she should act so her action would be an expression of a perverted (or dis-ordered) will (which as we shall see is claimed by these thinkers to be a universal condition among humankind in the absence of grace)

11 For John Duns Scotus there would be ldquonothing contradictoryrdquo in her akratic behavior She would not thereby commit a logical blunder

12 In Meister Eckhartrsquos view such a misstep would be the result of ldquocreaturelyrdquo worry and thus expresses a sense of possessiveness (eigenschaft) toward her finite material constitution as such it would be a sign of her ignorance of her true nature ie of who and what she really is25

13 The advice of Louisersquos friend is an example of good will or benevolence (one of the earliest senses of the Latin term for will voluntas) its contrary is ill will or malevolence

14 Actions that are performed freely though to some extent reluctantly are sometimes called ldquounwillingrdquo Some have proposed that akratic deeds are of this type

15 But there is an important complexity here in Aristotlersquos conception of ac-tions As we shall see he distinguished between two aspects of action praxis and poiecircsis roughly doing and making or producing The same deed typi-cally has both aspects In our example Louisersquos efforts to calm her nerves are a form of poiecircsis the criterion of success lies beyond the deed itself in its effects Aristotle would regard Louisersquos deed as praxis only if it (a) results from deliberation about what her boulecircsis demands of her and (b) is done ldquofor its own sakerdquo This latter requirement may seem to conflict with the pur-posive means-end character of the act as poiecircsis but what it shows is that there are two separate ldquowhyrdquo questions about the same deed first ldquoWhy ie what result is she aiming atrdquo (ldquoShe wants to calm herself rdquo) and second ldquoWhy ie in what way does she think this act contributes to or constitutes her happinessrdquo (ldquoShe regards this act as temperate and her rational desire is to live a temperatevirtuous liferdquo) In praxis goal and doing are identical performing the breathing technique (rather than taking a drink) constitutes (a part of) living temperately and thus as a case of what Louise regards as living well the doing is for its own sake ie it is itself living well or virtu-ously I will argue that Meister Eckhartrsquos controversial advice to live without why concerns this second (or praxis) sense of why26

25 Eckhartrsquos view relies on something like the Stoic conception of oikeiocircsis a kind of self- possession in which we either instinctively or by choice possess and ldquohold togetherrdquo those characteristics that distinguish us from others make us what we are

26 There are other senses of what has been called ldquowillrdquo not shown in these particular cases for ex-ample will as command (eg ldquoIt is my will that I not be kept on life supportrdquo) or of course the simple future tense (eg ldquoI am sure he will remember to be here by 500 pmrdquo)


16 Aquinas would discern additional ldquoacts of willrdquo in her behavior in addition to the simple act of willing the end (happiness as Louise conceives it) and intending the end through an acceptable means in the circumstances (eg Daoist breathing) as well as to her choice of that means Thomas points out her consent (in principle) to several means (yoga as well as Daoism) and her use of the bodily means to carry out the decision27

I suggest following Aquinas and such modern writers as Kahn Sorabji and Irwin that ldquoourrdquo notion of will includes all these (and perhaps other) elements which are related in intricate and unpredictable ways28 The terms ldquofree willrdquo ldquogood willrdquo and ldquowill powerrdquo for example draw on the notion of will in simi-lar yet distinct ways The first for instance connotes autonomy in acting the second fondness and concern in dealing with someone or something and the third a capacity to stick to onersquos resolve in spite of obstacles There is a palpable relatedness here in the connection of all three to action but these notions could clearly have been expressed by distinct words with no verbal or etymological similarity (as they were in classical Greek) So the family of terms seems to be held together principally by the links of its members to voluntary human action without any systematic ordering One upshot is this in trying to say what Meis-ter Eckhart meant by ldquoliving without lsquowhyrdquo (or will)rdquo we must be very careful to determine just which of the manifold senses of ldquowillrdquo isare in question To live ldquowithout willrdquo may notmdashindeed does notmdashmean one should dispense with good will or intentions and so on With that caveat in mind we turn now to a brief account of Aristotlersquos views on the will and happiness

27 These facets of an intentional action are discussed by Thomas in STh IaIae 8ndash17 They are interwoven in his analysis with parallel acts of (practical) intellect eg deliberation and judgment A discussion and a useful chart of these acts of intellect and will are given by Denis Bradley Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good (Washington DC Catholic University of America Press 1997) 341 A more critical take is offered by Alan Donagan ldquoThomas Aquinas on Human Actionrdquo in The Cam-bridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy eds N Kretzman A Kenny J Pinborg with E Stump (Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1982) 642ndash54

28 Charles Kahn ldquoDiscovering the Will from Aristotle to Augustinerdquo in The Question of lsquoEclecti-cismrsquo Studies in Later Greek Philosophy eds John M Dillon and A A Long (Berkeley University of California Press 1988) 234ndash59 Richard Sorabji ldquoThe Concept of the Will from Plato to Maximus the Confessorrdquo in The Will and Human Action From Antiquity to the Present Day eds Thomas Pink and M W F Stone (London Routledge 2004) 6ndash28 and Irwin ldquoWho Discovered the Willrdquo

17

2

Aristotlersquos Teleological Eudaimonism

Aristotle is a resolutely teleological thinker in physics and biology in meta-physics in ethics and in politics For him the basic physical elements them-selvesmdashair water etcmdashand all substances have built-in goals that are a function of their respective natures Air seeks to rise above earth and water because that is where its natural place is An oak tree strives to grow and produce acorns not apples because that is its nature it is what the oak is for its ldquowhyrdquo in the sense of its ldquofinalrdquo (goal telos) cause The natural is also normative most clearly in the domain of ethics and politics what we humans are by nature determines what our natural fulfillment or endmdashour goodmdashis and hence specifies the sort of life we should lead At the beginning of his epoch-making Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle writes

Every art and every inquiry and similarly every action and choice is thought to aim at some good If then there is some end of the things we do which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this) and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity so that our desire would be empty and vain) clearly this must be the good and the chief good Will not the knowledge of it then have a great in-fluence on life Shall we not like archers who have a mark to aim at be more likely to hit upon what we should1

(NE I1 1094a1ndash2 I2 a18ndash24)

1 πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξίς τε καὶ προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ εἰ δή τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ὃ δι᾽ αὑτὸ βουλόμεθα τἆλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ μὴ πάντα δι᾽ ἕτερον αἱρούμεθα (προέίσί γὰρ οὕτω γ᾽ εἰς ἄπειρον ὥστ᾽ εἶναι κενὴν καὶ ματαίαν τὴν ὄρεξιν) δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον ἆρ᾽ οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡ γνῶσις αὐτοῦ μεγάλην ἔχει ῥοπήν καὶ καθάπερ τοξόται σκοπὸν ἔχοντες μᾶλλον ἂν τυγχάνοίμέν τοῦ δέοντος (Complete Works Vol 2 1729) Further references


Aristotle goes on to spell out in greater detail what is implicit in these lines if there is an ultimate end of the sort described for human undertakings gaining it will be the ldquochief goodrdquo of human beings our eudaimonia (happiness flour-ishing fulfillment) and it will clearly be something to be attained teleologically ie by our own efforts (and not say as a gift of the gods a grace)

Aristotle thinks our efforts to attain eudaimonia will be successful only if they are guided by a correct notion of what it consists in and this must be a function of our nature2 But what is our nature What sort of life does it prescribe for us Aristotle answers these questions with his ldquofunction argumentrdquo in book I chap-ter 7 He suggests that just as craftspeople and bodily organs have functions so too do human beings qua human

What can this (function) be Life seems to be common even to plants but we are seeking what is peculiar to man Let us exclude therefore the life of nutrition and growth Next there would be a life of percep-tion but it also seems to be common even to the horse the ox and every animal There remains then an active life of the element that has a rational principle of this one part has such a principle in the sense of being obedient to one the other in the sense of possessing one and exercising thought And as lsquolife of the rational elementrsquo also has two meanings we must state that life in the sense of activity (as opposed to a mere capacity) is what we mean for this seems to be the more proper sense of the term3

(NE I7 1097b33-1098a7 emphasis added)

2 A word of caution is called for here Since for Aristotle ethics is a practical science ie one that deals with how we should act and thus with particulars (ie situations persons etc) rather than universals it cannot be in his sense deductive So although Aristotle himself alludes to facts about human nature to establish his ethical theories those theories cannot be deduced from such facts That they are at least based on Aristotlersquos conception of human nature and that this approach anticipates those of Augustine and Aquinas cf C J de Vogel ldquoOn the Character of Aristotlersquos Ethicsrdquo in Schriften zur aristotelischen Ethik ed Chr Mueller-Goldingen (Hildesheim Olms Verlag 1988) 273ndash82 Some have urged that the facts Aristotle adduces are part of a ldquodialecticalrdquo argument about the first truths of ethics Cf the overview in Bradley Aquinas on the Twofold 233ndash36

3 τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη ποτέ τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον ἀφοριστέον ἄρα τήν τε θρεπτικὴν καὶ τὴν αὐξητικὴν ζωήν ἑπομένη δὲ αἰσθητική τις ἂν εἴη φαίνεται δὲ καὶ αὐτὴ κοινὴ καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ βοῒ καὶ παντὶ ζῴῳ λείπεται δὴ πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ τὸ δ᾽ ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοούμενον διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης τὴν κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν θετέον κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι

will be given in the text Some have found this argument for a supreme goal in our actions to be fal-lacious eg Anscombe Intention sect 21 Aristotlersquos view at least in the form given it by Thomas Aqui-nas is defended by Scott MacDonald ldquoUltimate Ends in Practical Reasoning Aquinasrsquos Aristotelian Moral Psychology and Anscombersquos Fallacyrdquo Philosophical Review 100 1 (1991) 31ndash66

A r i s tot l e rsquos Tel eol og i cal Eudai m oni sm 19

The distinctively human soul has two parts or aspects one is rooted in our emo-tions and desires but unlike the vegetative and sensate souls is capable of obey-ing reason the other is directly rational its work is to think

Aristotle immediately draws an important conclusion

If the function of man is an activity of soul which follows or implies a rational principle and if we say ldquoa so-and-sordquo and ldquoa good so-and-sordquo have a function which is the same in kind eg a lyre-player and a good lyre-player and so without qualification in all cases eminence in respect of excellence being added to the name of the function (for the function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well) if this is the case and we state the function of man to be a cer-tain kind of life and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle and the function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of these and if any action is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence if this is the case human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with excellence and if there are more than one excellence in accordance with the best and most complete4

(NE I7 1098a7ndash17)

The human function is to live rationally a person who does so actively and well ie in accordance with excellence or virtue fulfills that function and thereby ac-cording to Aristotle deserves to be called ldquohappyrdquo

The very end of the last quoted passage says that if there are several kinds of excellences of thinking the human good will be ldquoin accordance with the best and most completerdquo That seems to mean on a natural reading that there is just one kind of thinking activity that constitutes human happiness call this view ldquoexclusivismrdquo (or ldquomonismrdquo) But it seems at odds with a passage immediately preceding the function argument in book I7

[A]nd further we think (happiness) most desirable of all things with-out being counted as one good thing among othersmdashif it were so

4 εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου τὸ δ᾽ αὐτό φαμεν ἔργον εἶναι τῷ γένει τοῦδε καὶ τοῦδε σπουδαίου ὥσπερ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ σπουδαίου κιθαριστοῦ καὶ ἁπλῶς δὴ τοῦτ᾽ ἐπὶ πάντων προστιθεμένης τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἔργον κιθαριστοῦ μὲν γὰρ κιθαρίζειν σπουδαίου δὲ τὸ εὖ εἰ δ᾽ οὕτως ἀνθρώπου δὲ τίθεμεν ἔργον ζωήν τινα ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου σπουδαίου δ᾽ ἀνδρὸς εὖ ταῦτα καὶ καλῶς ἕκαστον δ᾽ εὖ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται εἰ δ᾽ οὕτω τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ᾽ ἀρετήν εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην


counted it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods for that which is added becomes an excess of goods and of goods the greater is always more desirable Happiness then is something final and self-sufficient and is the end of action5

(NE I7 1097b16ndash20)

Here Aristotle seems to be saying that if there are several kinds of rational ac-tivities that constitute the human function then even if one is better than the other(s) happiness will be a combination of excellent activity in the several forms not just the one call this ldquoinclusivismrdquo A great deal of critical ink has been spilled in defense of one or the other of these doctrines or even of some third hybrid as we will see below

But before we look at this dispute let us first say more about Aristotlersquos notion of the two kinds of rational lives in question asking also what role if any there is for the concept of will in each To begin with the part of the soul that has a rational principle ldquoin the sense of being obedient to onerdquo what is at issue is a life of morally virtuous activity acting in accord with justice courage temper-ance generosity truthfulness and the like The best such life will also include friendships built on virtue as well as a healthy version of self-love since virtuous people wish genuine good to themselves as they do to others (cf NE IX4) All of these virtues are concerned with the regulation of our emotions and desires justice is concerned with among other things our acquisitiveness courage with our fear etc The virtues are states Aristotle says habits that we acquire by re-peated practice (NE II1ndash2) Further they not only deal with activities that are pleasurable or painful virtuous behavior itself is a source of pleasure for the vir-tuous person and the absence of pleasure in the performance of virtuous deeds is a sign that the agent is not (yet) a virtuous person ie one who performs such deeds in the way a virtuous person does

The [virtuous] agent must be in a certain condition when he does [virtuous deeds] in the first place he must have knowledge secondly he must choose the acts and choose them for their own sakes and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character6

(NE II4 1105a30ndash33)

5 ἔτι δὲ πάντων αἱρετωτάτην μὴ συναριθμουμένηνmdashσυναριθμουμένην δὲ δῆλον ὡς αἱρετωτέραν μετὰ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὑπεροχὴ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν γίνεται τὸ προστιθέμενον ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὸ μεῖζον αἱρετώτερον ἀεί

6 ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ὁ πράττων πῶς ἔχων πράττῃ πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδώς ἔπειτ᾽ ἐὰν προαιρούμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος δι᾽ αὐτά τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἐὰν καὶ βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττῃ


These are the marks of a morally excellent person who has knowledge (of the meanmdashcf below) makes a deliberated choice (of the act identified by this knowledge and for its own sake) and is guided by a firm virtuous character that determines the choice

As indicated at the end of the previous chapter Aristotle designates actions in their moral dimensions ldquopraxisrdquo distinguishing them from what he calls ldquopoiecircsisrdquo (production or making) As we just saw Aristotle makes it a condition of virtuous action that the agent ldquochoose the acts and choose them for their own sakesrdquo In book VI he tells us ldquoaction [praxis] cannot [have an end other than itself] for good action itself is its endrdquo7 (1140b6ndash7) But in production or making we act precisely for the sake of the result ldquomaking has an end other than itself rdquo8 (1140b6) Although Aristotle gives us no textual guidance here we must assume that these terms must apply in at least some cases to the same deeds as when politicians make decisions about war and peace It seems he means the terms to apply to different aspects of the action Political leaders hoping for a military victory must choose means that effectively bring about the desired outcome but a wise and virtuous one will make sure that in doing so she acts justly where this trait is not measured by the results of the battle but by the demands of justice as well as the character and decision-making process of the leaders themselves As I noted in the previous chapter different why-questions will be relevant to these two aspects of acting in the case of poiecircsis the question will be asking for the agentrsquos intention or hoped-for out-comemdashfor example one might ask ldquoWhy did they order an attack on the ene-myrsquos left flankrdquo and the answer might be ldquoIn order to capitalize on the enemyrsquos overstretched supply linesrdquo But with praxis the focus is on the action itself and its role in the agentsrsquo conception of living well (eupraxia) or eudaimonia for instance the question might be ldquoWhy did they not burn down the enemy city they had capturedrdquo to which one might answer ldquoBecause they felt that would be unjust and disgracefulrdquo

With his typical respect for received opinions especially those of the wise Aristotle finds that eupraxia has to do with determining a mean between excess and deficiency

[M]oral excellence is concerned with passions and actions and in these there is excess defect and the intermediate For instance both fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general plea-sure and pain may be felt both too much and too little and in both cases

7 [τὸ τέλος] τῆς δὲ πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἔστι γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος8 τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἕτερον τὸ τέλος


not well but to feel them at the right times with reference to the right objects towards the right people with the right motive and in the right way is what is both intermediate and best and this is characteristic of excellence Similarly with regard to actions [praxeis] also there is excess defect and the intermediate Now excellence is concerned with pas-sions and actions in which excess is a form of failure and so is defect while the intermediate is praised and is a form of success and being praised and being successful are both characteristics of excellence Therefore excellence is a kind of mean since as we have seen it aims at what is intermediate9

(NE II6 1106b16ndash28)

Summing up then his exploration of moral excellence or virtue Aristotle writes

Excellence then is a state concerned with choice lying in a mean ie the mean relative to us this being determined by a rational principle and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom [ho phroni-mos] would determine it10

(NE II7 1106b36ndash1107a1)

Strikingly enough there seems at first glance to be no reference at all to the will in this characterization of moral virtue But appearances are decep-tive here In this definition Aristotle is concentrating on the role of practical wisdom (or prudence phronecircsis) in determining which action among the avail-able alternatives exemplifies the moral mean Whatever else it might do such wisdom a virtue of the mind produces good choices on the basis of delibera-tion about the options (III2) Good choices repeated often enough give rise to a virtuous character hence Aristotlersquos focus But correct choice and practi-cal wisdom presuppose a correct ldquowishrdquo (boulecircsis) which Aristotle says is ldquofor the endrdquo while ldquochoice relates to what contributes to the endrdquo (loosely the

9 λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικήν αὕτη γάρ ἐστι περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον οἷον καὶ φοβηθῆναι καὶ θαρρῆσαι καὶ ἐπιθυμῆσαι καὶ ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἐλεῆσαι καὶ ὅλως ἡσθῆναι καὶ λυπηθῆναι ἔστι καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον καὶ ἀμφότερα οὐκ εὖ τὸ δ᾽ ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφ᾽ οἷς καὶ πρὸς οὓς καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὡς δεῖ μέσον τε καὶ ἄριστον ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον ἡ δ᾽ ἀρετὴ περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις ἐστίν ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἁμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις ψέγεται τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται καὶ κατορθοῦται ταῦτα δ᾽ ἄμφω τῆς ἀρετῆς μεσότης τις ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή στοχαστική γε οὖσα τοῦ μέσου

10 ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν


means)11 (III4 1113a15 and III2 1111b26) Hence without the right wish or will there cannot be right choice or virtue So this notion to the examination of which he devotes a scant thirty or so lines nonetheless carries an important burden for Aristotlersquos ethics12

With respect to what exactly it is that we should want for our lives Aristotle relies on the crucial notion of the spoudaios the excellent person who serves as the standard of right conduct

That which is in truth an object of wish is an object of wish to the good man (spoudaiocirc) while any chance thing may be so to the bad man as in the case of bodies also the things that are in truth wholesome are wholesome for bodies which are in good condition while for those that are diseased other things are wholesomemdashor bitter or sweet or hot or heavy and so on since the good man judges each class of things rightly and in each the truth appears to him For each state of character has its own ideas of the noble and the pleasant and perhaps the good man differs from others most by seeing the truth in each class of things being as it were the norm and measure of them13

(NE III4 1113a24ndash33 translation slightly amended)

11 ἡ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶν ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος Ross Complete Works of Aristotle and Terence Irwin Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 2nd ed (Indianapolis Hackett Publ Co 1999) translate boulecircsis and its cognates (eg the verb form boulometha) as ldquowishrdquo In other Greek authors ldquowillrdquo is the preferred English equivalent (the online Liddell amp Scott lexicon gives among other meanings ldquowilling will or testament purposerdquo for the term) The wider notion of wish is appropriate for Aristotle because he expressly wants boulecircsis also to cover the desire for things recognized as impossible (III2) But this does not negate the fact that in the context of praxis he also employs boulecircsis in a sense similar to the English ldquowillrdquo or ldquorationally willrdquo instead of ldquowishrdquo In spite of his own occasional usage where boulecircsis does have the sense of ldquowishrdquo Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics often has in mind a special sense for these terms ie the rational desire for an object as an end in itself and this is quite different from the normal meaning of the English ldquowishrdquo As we saw J O Urmson says of boulecircsis in Aristotle it ldquomeans something like desire for what on the basis of rational calculation is seen to serve onersquos best interest in the long runrdquo (Urmson Aristotlersquos Ethics 40) With these caveats I will follow the tradition in using ldquowishrdquo

12 We shall consider below whether the Aristotelian version of a ldquorational desirerdquo captures enough of the Aquinas version (which we provisionally adopted in the previous chapter) to be called in any sense ldquowillrdquo

13 κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν βουλητὸν εἶναι τἀγαθόν ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ τὸ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν εἶναι τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ τὸ τυχόν ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων τοῖς μὲν εὖ διακειμένοις ὑγιεινά ἐστι τὰ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν τοιαῦτα ὄντα τοῖς δ᾽ ἐπινόσοις ἕτερα ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πικρὰ καὶ γλυκέα καὶ θερμὰ καὶ βαρέα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστα ὁ σπουδαῖος γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνει ὀρθῶς καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τἀληθὲς αὐτῷ φαίνεται καθ᾽ ἑκάστην γὰρ ἕξιν ἴδιά ἐστι καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ διαφέρει πλεῖστον ἴσως ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ τἀληθὲς ἐν ἑκάστοις ὁρᾶν ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὤν


The virtuous person the spoudaios has the right wish or correct orientation in life uses practical wisdom (phronecircsis) to deliberate well and on this basis makes correct choices

Note that this way of putting things itself suggests that in matters of moral action (praxis) the thinking involved follows a distinctive course of reasoning which Aristotle himself calls ldquosyllogismrdquo In book VI Aristotle makes the point explicit speaking of phronecircsis

And this eye of the soul acquires its formed state not without the aid of excellence [virtue] as has been said and is plain for inferences [syllogis-moi] which deal with acts to be done are things which involve a starting-point viz ldquosince the end ie what is best is of such and such a naturerdquo whatever it may be (let it for the sake of argument be what we please) and this is not evident except to the good man14

(NE VI12 1144a30ndash34)

Presumably the spoudaios might reason the way Louise did in the example given in chapter 1 where her wish (boulecircsis) is expressed in the first premise ldquoI want to live a sober upright life (or Let me live a sober upright life) if I imbibe strong alcoholic drink on the job I will not lead such a life so let me not do so in these circumstancesrdquo

What makes the conviction of the spoudaios about the proper goal of life correct This too is a question that has elicited strikingly different answers from the commentators including Aquinas Buttressed by apparently clear asser-tions from Aristotle himself some have argued that correctness about the goal of life is a matter of the right habits and that these are anchored in our desires

14 ὄμματι τούτῳ γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς ὡς εἴρηταί τε καὶ ἔστι δῆλον οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσιν ἐπειδὴ τοιόνδε τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ ἄριστον ὁτιδήποτε ὄν (ἔστω γὰρ λόγου χάριν τὸ τυχόν) τοῦτο δ᾽ εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ οὐ φαίνεται Compare the formulation in VII3 1147a25ndash31 ldquoThe one opinion (ie premise) is universal the other is concerned with the particular facts and here we come to something within the sphere of perception when a single opinion results from the two the soul must in one type of case affirm the conclusion while in the case of opinions concerned with production it must immediately act (eg if lsquoeverything sweet ought to be tastedrsquo and lsquothis is sweetrsquo in the sense of being one of the particular sweet things the man who can act and is not pre-vented must at the same time actually act accordingly)rdquo [ἣ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου δόξα ἡ δ᾽ ἑτέρα περὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστά ἐστιν ὧν αἴσθησις ἤδη κυρία ὅταν δὲ μία γένηται ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀνάγκη τὸ συμπερανθὲν ἔνθα μὲν φάναι τὴν ψυχήν ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς πράττειν εὐθύς οἷον εἰ παντὸς γλυκέος γεύεσθαι δεῖ τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ ὡς ἕν τι τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἀνάγκη τὸν δυνάμενον καὶ μὴ κωλυόμενον ἅμα τοῦτο καὶ πράττειν] Aristotle also uses this notion of the practical syllogism elsewhere in his writings eg in On the Move-ment of Animals VII


(principally boulecircsis)15 Aristotle plainly thinks that habituation in the per-formance of virtuous acts is a necessary precursor to becoming virtuous and indeed more important than our natural inclinations and the instruction we receive16

[W]e become just by doing just acts temperate by doing temperate acts brave by doing brave acts states of character arise out of like ac-tivities This is why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind it is because the states of character correspond to the differences between these It makes no small difference then whether we form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth it makes a very great dif-ference or rather all the difference17

(NE 1103b1ndash2 b21ndash25)

ldquoAll the differencerdquo in texts such as these particularly in book II Aristotlersquos view seems very like that of Hume according to whom the sole role of reason is to serve our desires18

However Aristotle explicitly places boulecircsis in the rational part of the soul ldquo[F]or wish is found in the calculative part (en te tocirc logistikocirc) and desire and passion in the irrationalrdquo19 And surely for Aristotle it is an objective rationally decidable matter what the human end is Admittedly ldquothe end ie what is best is not evident except to the good manrdquo20 (NE VI12

15 So for instance Aristotle says that ldquowish (boulecircsis) relates rather to the end choice [and thus phronecircsis practical wisdom] to what contributes to the end for instance we wish to be healthy but we choose the acts which will make us healthyrdquo [ἔτι δ᾽ ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ μᾶλλον ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος οἷον ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα προαιρούμεθα δὲ δι᾽ ὧν ὑγιανοῦμεν] (III2 1111b26ndash28) Among those who argue for the ldquonarrow viewrdquo ie that Aristotle restricts the role of (practical) reason in the moral life to determining ldquowhat contributes to the end (pre-selected by ha-bituated desire)rdquo is William Fortenbaugh ldquoAristotle Emotion and Moral Virtuerdquo Arethusa 2 (1969) 163ndash85 See the discussion in Richard Sorabji ldquoAristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtuerdquo in Essays on Aristotlersquos Ethics ed Amelie O Rorty (Berkeley University of California Press 1980) 201ndash19 at 210 ff

16 All three are mentioned at the start of book II Habituation is strongly emphasized over the other two

17 δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονες τὰ δ᾽ ἀνδρεῖα ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ ἑνὶ δὴ λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται διὸ δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιὰς ἀποδιδόναι κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἕξεις οὐ μικρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων ἐθίζεσθαι ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν

18 David Hume Treatise of Human Nature ed L A Selby-Bigge rev P H Nidditch (Oxford Clarendon Press 1978) IIiii3

19 ἔν τε τῷ λογιστικῷ γὰρ ἡ βούλησις γίνεται καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ θυμός (DA III9 432b4ndash5) For a brief anatomy of Aristotlersquos varieties of desire cf Irwin Aristotle 323ndash24

20 τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ ἄριστον τοῦτο δ᾽ εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ οὐ φαίνεται


1144a33ndash35) but habituation by itself cannot account for the unmistak-ably cognitive aspects of the definition Aristotle winds up giving for virtue of character

Excellence then is a state concerned with choice lying in a mean rela-tive to us this being determined by reason and in the way in which the man of practical wisdom would determine it21

(NE II6 1106b36ndash1107a1 emphases added)

Discernment of the mean eg that this act of donation to victims of a recent local disaster is neither prodigal nor stingy and therefore ldquofinerdquo (kalos) or praiseworthy is determined by phronecircsis and not by mere habituation which by itself could never prepare one for the enormous variability of practical cases Further as Terence Irwin has stressed the process of such discernment about ldquowhat contributes to the endrdquo inevitably helps specify the end ldquoAs a result of deliberating about what promotes happiness we discover its constituents and so we have a more precise conception of happinessrdquo22 One could thus think of deliberation as a continuation of the processes of instruction and induction from casesmdashboth involving the intellectmdashwhich enable us to acquire and apply practical wisdom (and hence virtue) in the first place But for Aristotle it is equally true that such wisdommdashsince it is a true conception of the mean be-tween virtue and vicemdashis impossible without the correct boulecircsis ie without the moral agentrsquos desire to live the virtuous life Without that desire habituated through training and guided by phronecircsis we would become a differentmdashand worsemdashsort of person

Hence although it can appear that Aristotle makes virtuous charactermdashor indeed any charactermdashthe determiner of the end while practical wisdom is lim-ited to determining the proper means to the end there is much to recommend the ldquoexpanded viewrdquo on this issue the spoudaios is in principle capable of the kind of dialectical reasoningmdashin gist if not in scopemdashthat Aristotle himself un-dertakes in his ethical treatises in order to answer precisely this question What is the proper end of human life How ought we to live As Aristotle says his own goal is practical

The present inquiry does not aim at theoretical knowledge like the others (for we are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is but


22 Irwin Aristotle 249


in order to become good since otherwise our inquiry would have been of no use) 23

(NE II2 1103b26ndash28 emphasis added)

But although the goal of the book is right action the approach is rational Unlike the works of Homer or the playwrights the Nicomachean Ethics is not designed to appeal to the emotions but rather to the intellect It aims to give us as Richard Sorabji says ldquoa fuller and clearer conception of the good life and this conception will be grounded in a discussion of human naturerdquo24 In other words it aims to convince us to live virtuously ldquoto become (or remain) goodrdquo and is thus both cog-nitive and practical for Aristotle there is no clash between the two

It must then be possible for the Nicomachean Ethics to persuade its readers to continue their lives devoted to virtue and thus would be especially useful for a young person of good upbringing But can it also persuade a morally corrupt person an akolastos to abandon a life devoted to the pursuit of pleasure and reset his priorities Here Aristotle is very pessimistic Such a person he says ldquois bound to have no regrets and so is incurable since someone without regrets is incur-ablerdquo25 (NE VII7 1150a21ndash22)

To modern readers familiar with conversion narratives this may be puzzling But we can agree this far with Aristotle that if such conversion can take place the cause of such change will be neither habituation nor practical reason alone but a combination of the two and perhaps other factors26 We would say today that persons who make such a change have chosen a new path of life perhaps even that they have undergone a ldquoradicalrdquo change or a ldquoconversionrdquo27 But Aristo-tle does not say this at least not of the kind of choice that is front and center in the Nicomachean Ethics ie prohairesis It is very largely his apparent refusal to extend the notion of prohairesis to choice of the end that gives the narrow view of reason in his ethics the appeal that it has

23 ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ παροῦσα πραγματεία οὐ θεωρίας ἕνεκά ἐστιν ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι (οὐ γὰρ ἵνα εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτόμεθα ἀλλ᾽ ἵν᾽ ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν ὄφελος αὐτῆς

24 Sorabji ldquoAristotle on the Role of Intellectrdquo 217 Similarly Bradley though willing to concede that the ldquonarrow viewrdquo of phronecircsis captures the situation of the ldquoordinary moral agentrdquo thinks a ra-tional grounding of ethics is possible (and necessary) in Aristotlersquos view ldquothe demonstration (of the truth or goodness of the agentrsquos ends) could be and needs to be supplied by the moral philosopher who seeks scientific knowledge of the universalrdquo (Aquinas on the Twofold 198) This is of course a practical science one not involving strict necessity and logical deductions (hence not demonstrative unlike metaphysics or mathematics)

25 ἀνάγκη γὰρ τοῦτον μὴ εἶναι μεταμελητικόν ὥστ᾽ ἀνίατος ὁ γὰρ ἀμεταμέλητος ἀνίατος26 St Augustine famously gave all the credit to divine grace for his change of heart so also did John

Newton the former slave-ship sailor later clergyman and author of the stirring ldquoAmazing Gracerdquo27 I will have more to say on this topic when discussing St Augustine Cf chapter 3 67


How are we to understand Aristotlersquos reluctance here One possibility lies in the fact that he has defined prohairesis choice in a peculiar way to do a very special task and this renders it unable to participate in such radical change When he comes in book III to discuss the principal concepts of his moral psy-chology he first deals with voluntariness (to hekousion) and then turns imme-diately to choice which he proceeds over several pages to characterize largely by contrast first with the voluntary (choice is voluntary but not everything vol-untary is chosen) with appetite with temper (thumos) and belief andmdashmore pertinentlymdashwith deliberation and with wish (boulecircsis) The latter expresses the agentrsquos goal in life say to have as much pleasure as possible But such a goal is of course still too general and needs to be tailored to the specific circumstances that agents find themselves in This is the job of deliberation

We deliberate about things that are in our power and can be done (and) we deliberate not about ends but about what contributes to ends Having set the end (we) consider how and by what means it is to be attained28

(NE III3 1112a30ndash31 1112b11ndash12 1112b15)

So wish being ldquofor the endrdquo (III4 1113a15) deliberation enables us to deter-mine what we should do to attain it The result of this process is choice which is

deliberate desire of things in our own power for when we have de-cided as a result of deliberation we desire in accordance with our deliberation29

(NE III3 1113a10ndash12)

In the case of the spoudaios his practical reason guides his deliberation to the correct choice of ldquowhat contributes to the endrdquo

So defined choice presupposes a fixed end as well as deliberation about achiev-ing it Hence when Aristotle remarks that ldquowish relates rather to the end choice to what contributes to the endrdquo (III2 1111b26) he is saying something that is true by his own definition an agent cannot ldquochooserdquo (in Aristotlersquos technical sense of prohairesis) his or her goal in life hence she cannot choose a new goal But if this consideration really means that Aristotle has a narrow view of choice and practical reason what is then the point of the Nicomachean Ethics itself It

28 βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ πρακτῶν βουλευόμεθα δ᾽ οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη ἀλλὰ θέμενοι τὸ τέλος τὸ πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται σκοποῦσι

29 ἡ προαίρεσις ἂν εἴη βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐκ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι γὰρ κρίναντες ὀρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν


seems that for Aristotle we are all held captive by the early training and habitu-ation we receive in our upbringing and no amount of rational persuasion could change that Perhaps however the situation is not so one-sided In book I in answer to the question What is the supreme good Aristotle had declared

Verbally there is very general agreement for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that [the highest of all goods achievable by action] is happiness and identify living well and doing well with being happy but with regard to what happiness is they differ30


The fact that I want above all to be happy does not tell me what to do in any situation whatsoever because eudaimonia is thus far perfectly general31 it must be made more specific before it can guide one on any life path Normally such specification is the product of education and habituation But in a broad sense of choice it could be said to be the product of a (virtual) choice one that is in prin-ciple correctible analogously to the way that onersquos prohairesis is correctible when one sees one has made an error in deliberation Aristotle himself makes use of such a broad sense at I5 1095b19ndash20 using the very verb form connected with prohairesis ldquoNow the mass of mankind are evidently quite slavish in their tastes preferring (proairoumenoi) a life suitable to beastsrdquo32 This kind of preference or choice clearly applies to ends and not to means only In other words the wish say to lead a life of pleasure is in this broad sense chosen in the mistaken belief that such a life constitutes happiness and it is this latter completely general goal that we all really want The tacit premise of the Nicomachean Ethics then could be said to be that we ought to recognize what happiness truly consists in and organize our lives accordingly But it is hard to find a truly convincing argument within this text for the pessimistic view that the morally corrupt are literally incurable33

30 ὀνόματι μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων ὁμολογεῖται τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες λέγουσιν τὸ δ᾽ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν ταὐτὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τί ἐστιν ἀμφισβητοῦσι

31 Happiness is a more general goal than say the goal of living a life of pleasure The latter already rules out certain sorts of acts eg preferring self-sacrifice to onersquos pleasures of the moment whereas the goal of happiness does not (or not yet) Whether or not self-sacrifice can be part of a happy life depends on how happiness is specified

32 οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ παντελῶς ἀνδραποδώδεις φαίνονται βοσκημάτων βίον προαιρούμενοι33 Though as we just saw Aristotle (at 1150a22) does call the intemperate person [akolastos]

ldquoincurablerdquo (aniatos) since she has ldquono regretsrdquo about her behavior But this is more a matter of defini-tion and not an explanation Experience indicates that sinners do repent but Aristotle is for some reason unpersuaded


As already mentioned Aristotle has little to say explicitly about what he calls wish boulecircsis However a careful reader of books IndashV as well as VIIndashIX and part of X would have ample reason to think that willing plays a key though implicit role in Aristotlersquos ethical thought For it is involved through its role in the practical syllogism in every morally virtuous act34 and the great bulk of the Nicomachean Ethics appears implicitly to identify the life of mor-ally virtuous activity as happiness But before we can turn to what Aristotle actually concludes about what happiness is we must look at the virtue(s) of the other distinctive part of the human soul the one that is rational ldquoin the sense of possessing (a rational principle) and exercising thoughtrdquo35 (NE I7 1098a4ndash5)

Excellence in this realm ldquoin the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time)rdquo36 (II1 1103a15ndash16) Excellence of character by contrast ldquocomes about as a result of habit whence also its name [ecircthikecirc] is one that is formed by a slight varia-tion from the word ethos [habit]rdquo37 (Ibid 16ndash18) The idea is presumably this mere teaching about justice is in the absence of habituation in the per-formance of just deeds of no use conversely habituation plays little or no role in the case of the intellectual excellencesmdashprincipally phronecircsis and sophiamdashwhile teaching by learned elders is crucial

After these preliminary remarks Aristotle devotes himself to the moral vir-tues in Books IIndashV returning in Book VI to the promised discussion of the vir-tues of thought

We said before that there are two parts of the soulmdashthat which grasps a rule or rational principle and the irrational let us now draw a similar distinction within the part which grasps a rational principle And let it be assumed that there are two parts which grasp a rational principlemdashone by which we contemplate the kind of things whose origina-tive causes are invariable and one by which we contemplate variable things for where objects differ in kind the part of the soul answering to each of the two is different in kind since it is in virtue of a certain likeness and kinship with their objects that they have the knowledge

34 This is of course not to claim that agents actually go through a process of practical reasoning each time they act only that we could reconstruct some such rationale implicit in all voluntary behav-ior enabling us to understand what the agent is doing and why

35 τὸ δ᾽ ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοούμενον36 ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν διόπερ ἐμπειρίας

δεῖται καὶ χρόνου37 ἡδ᾽ ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρεκκλῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους


they have Let one of these parts be called the scientific and the other the calculative38


Prudence or practical wisdom is of course included among these latter calcula-tive virtues and so are the various arts or crafts which aim at a product distinct from the activity itself The ldquoscientificrdquo excellences those concerned with ldquoinvari-able thingsrdquo (the objects of mathematics metaphysics and theology) include demonstrative science understanding and wisdom The first of these proceeds from confidently held principles via deduction or demonstration (VI3) But the principles presupposed by every such science cannot themselves be dem-onstrated So the state of mind by which they are grasped must be different and Aristotle designates this cognitive grasp as nous (understanding or comprehen-sion) (VI6) Wisdom (sophia) finally is a combination of the nous and deduc-tive knowledge

Therefore wisdom must plainly be the most finished of the forms of knowledge It follows that the wise man must not only know what fol-lows from the first principles but must also possess truth about the first principles Thus wisdom must be intuitive reason combined with sci-entific knowledgemdashscientific knowledge of the highest objects which has received as it were its proper completion39


Aristotle immediately moves to make clear what was already implicit in his view wisdom (sophia) is simply the highest of the virtues given the lofty nature of its objects

For it would be strange to think that the art of politics or practical wisdom is the best knowledge since man [the object of those disci-plines] is not the best thing in the world40


38 περὶ ψυχῆς πρῶτον εἰπόντες λέγωμεν οὕτως πρότερον μὲν οὖν ἐλέχθη δύ᾽ εἶναι μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς τό τε λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον νῦν δὲ περὶ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον διαιρετέον καὶ ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα ἓν μὲν ᾧ θεωροῦμεν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ μὴ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν ἓν δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα πρὸς γὰρ τὰ τῷ γένει ἕτερα καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων ἕτερον τῷ γένει τὸ πρὸς ἑκάτερον πεφυκός εἴπερ καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητά τινα καὶ οἰκειότητα ἡ γνῶσις ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς λεγέσθω δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικὸν τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν

39 δεῖ ἄρα τὸν σοφὸν μὴ μόνον τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἰδέναι ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀληθεύειν ὥστ᾽ εἴη ἂν ἡ σοφία νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν τιμιωτάτων

40 ἄτοπον γὰρ εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν ἢ τὴν φρόνησιν σπουδαιοτάτην οἴεται εἶναι εἰ μὴ τὸ ἄριστον τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν


Curiously Aristotle does not go on to provide any information at all about how one acquires this the arguably most valuable of the virtues The contrast with Platorsquos lengthy discussion of education in the Republic could hardly be stronger41 But he does tell us that the aspirant to this (theoretical) wisdom must have knowledge of the sciences (including metaphysics and theology) and this in turn requires substantial leisure Furthermdashalthough it would be easy in reading the Nicomachean Ethics to miss the pointmdashwe must assume that since the active practice of sophia in theoretical work is itself a form of praxis in the broad sense42 ie activity valued for its own sake the undertak-ing of it but not the principles involved in its actual practice is guided by phronecircsis

But again it (phronecircsis) is not supreme (kuria) over philosophic wisdom ie over the superior part of us any more than the art of medicine is over health for it does not use it but provides for its coming into being it issues orders then for its sake but not to it43


But if phronecircsis is necessary for the ldquocoming into beingrdquo of sophia so too is wish boulecircsis Aspiring as well as practicing philosophers must recognize the value ofmdashand therefore wantmdashsophia and its corresponding activity theocircrein for themselves and then deliberate about how to make them achievable The acqui-sition of sophia is hard work So is the activity in which it is realized the practice of philosophy Presumably what motivates that work in Aristotlersquos view is the realization that it is the highest most valuable activity of which at least some of us are capable But whether he thinks that it alone can make one happy has been hotly debated

Though Aristotle heaps high praise on sophia already in book VI many readers have been (understandably) surprised (and some disappointed) by Aristotlersquos intellectualist conclusions about happiness in book X There he

41 Sarah Broadie comments that book VI is ldquomainly about (practical) wisdom (phronecircsis)rdquo and that Aristotle explains its nature by ldquoshowing what it is notrdquo If so his neglect of sophia here may be more understandable but the stress he lays in book X upon contemplation or studymdashthe central activity of sophiamdashmakes the overall ignoring of the topic mysterious Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics trans Christopher Rowe introd and commentary by Sarah Broadie (Oxford Oxford University Press 2002) 357

42 In the Politics (VII3 1325b14ndash21) contemplation (theocircria) is expressly counted as part of the active life (bios praktikos) which is the best life

43 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κυρία γ᾽ ἐστὶ τῆς σοφίας οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτίονος μορίου ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῆς ὑγιείας ἡ ἰατρική οὐ γὰρ χρῆται αὐτῇ ἀλλ᾽ ὁρᾷ ὅπως γένηται ἐκείνης οὖν ἕνεκα ἐπιτάττει ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐκείνῃ


claims that it is the activity of contemplation and not morally virtuous activ-ity that constitutes teleia eudaimonia (either ldquocompleterdquo or ldquoperfectrdquo happi-ness) The appropriate rendering of teleia at 1177a16 is one of the bones of contention in a debate that has had a long run among commentators does Aristotle identify happiness exclusively with a life of contemplation or does he think it consists in a life of all the virtues both theoretical and practical In response to John Ackrillrsquos skillful presentation of grounds for the latter ldquoinclusivistrdquo view in his 1974 British Academy lecture a chorus of eminent Aristotle scholars rose up to defend the ldquoexclusivistrdquo or ldquomonisticrdquo concep-tion44 They pointed among other things to the natural exclusive sense of Aristotlersquos phrase in book I ldquothe best and most complete virtuerdquo and to the support offered to their reading by what Aristotle says about the ldquofinalityrdquo of the highest good that it alone is always sought for its own sake and never for the sake of something else In both cases he seems to be talking of a single best virtue45

In favor of the exclusivistintellectualist reading there is this striking claim in X7

But such a life (of contemplation) would be too high for man for it is not in so far as he is man that he will live so but in so far as something divine is present in him and by so much as this is superior to our com-posite nature is its activity superior to that which is the exercise of the other kind of virtue If reason is divine then in comparison with man the life according to it is divine in comparison with human life But we must not follow those who advise us being men to think of human things and being mortal of mortal things but must so far as we can make ourselves immortal and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us for even if it be small in bulk much more does it in power and worth surpass everything This would seem too to be each man himself since it is the authoritative and better part of him It would be strange then if he were to choose not the life of his self but that of something else And what we said before will apply now that which is proper to each thing is by nature best and most pleasant for each thing for man therefore the life according to intellect (nous)

44 The Ackrill lecture is reprinted in Rorty Essays 15ndash3445 One round of the dispute between the exclusivist and the inclusivist views (from roughly the

1960s into the mid-1980s) is extensively summarized by Bradley Aquinas on the Twofold ch VIII 3ndash6 A more recent phase beginning with Ackrill is outlined by Stephen Bush ldquoDivine and Human Happiness in Nicomachean Ethicsrdquo Philosophical Review 117 no 1 (2008) 49ndash75


is best and pleasantest since intellect more than anything else is man This life therefore is also the happiest46

(NE 1177b26ndash1178a8)

But in spite of this strong textual and philological evidence in its favor the recent exclusivist tide did not long remain unchallenged For one thing when Aristotle says at the end of the claim just quoted that ldquointellect more than any-thing else is manrdquo the phrase ldquomore than anything elserdquo (malista) would seem to imply ldquobut not exclusivelyrdquo as a number of commentators have pointed out47 Indeed Aristotle immediately follows this claim by adding at the start of X8

But in a secondary degree the life in accordance with the other kind of excellence [ie moral] is happy for the activities in accordance with this befit our human estate48

(NE 1178a5ndash6)

Stephen Bush takes this statement as one basis for a ldquodualistrdquo reading of Aristo-tle human happiness consists in the practice of the moral virtues divine happi-ness in contemplation To the extent that humans can participate in this latter activity they are divine and can share in the happiness of the gods This approach also makes straightforward sense of some of Aristotlersquos most striking claims in X7 such as ldquoIf intellect is divine then in comparison with man the life accord-ing to it is divine in comparison with human liferdquo49 (NE 1177b30ndash31)

46 ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατ᾽ ἄνθρωπον οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν οὕτω βιώσεται ἀλλ᾽ ᾗ θεῖόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει ὅσον δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συνθέτου τοσοῦτον καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν ἀλλ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν ἐστι δυνάμει καὶ τιμιότητι πολὺ μᾶλλον πάντων ὑπερέχει δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον ἄτοπον οὖν γίνοιτ᾽ ἄν εἰ μὴ τὸν αὑτοῦ βίον αἱροῖτο ἀλλά τινος ἄλλου τὸ λεχθέν τε πρότερον ἁρμόσει καὶ νῦν τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἑκάστῳ τῇ φύσει κράτιστον καὶ ἥδιστόν ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος εἴπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος οὗτος ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος It is particularly the claim that ldquointellect more than anything else is manrdquo that led John Cooper to argue that Aristotlersquos intellectualism in book X rules out a morally virtuous life for the philosopher Hence exclusivism in the Nicomachean Ethics has disastrous moral conse-quences Cf Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge Harvard University Press 1975) 163ndash65

47 Bush ldquoDivine and Human Happinessrdquo 61 and also Dominic Scott ldquoPrimary and Secondary Eudaimoniardquo Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society suppl 73 (1999) 225ndash42 at 232ndash33

48 δευτέρως δ᾽ ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν αἱ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτην ἐνέργειαι ἀνθρωπικαί49 εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον


As Bush formulates the challenge can exclusivists consistently allow that for Aristotle there are two kinds of happy life even if one is superior to the other He thinks not ldquoWhat [exclusivists] have still not accomplished is an explana-tion of how Aristotle can regard the life of morally virtuous activity as happyrdquo as he clearly does in X8 Bush continues ldquoIf only the activity of contempla-tion is happiness how could a life devoid of contemplation be considered happy even in a secondary deficient senserdquo (ldquoDivinerdquo 53) In addition to these points one can indeed ask if exclusivism is right and human happinessmdashthe focus after all of the Nicomachean Ethicsmdash is contemplation alone why does Aristotle spend the great majority of the book discussing the bios politikos In addition his altogether cursory attention to sophia not to mention his silence on how it is gained is hard to fathom if its acquisition alone constitutes hap-piness By contrast if (a) sophia constitutes ldquoonlyrdquo perfect and not complete happiness while (b) happiness ldquoin a secondary senserdquo can be attained through morally virtuous activity and (c) the latter is a form of life de facto available to vastly more people than the life of philosophy then the lopsided focus of the Nicomachean Ethics on the moral virtues would make better sense50 By read-ing teleia eudaimonia in X7 as perfect (and not as complete) happiness the inclusivist can take Aristotle as claiming that contemplation qua divine is the best but not the only component of a happy life the life of practical virtue is a necessary component of happiness and for many it must suffice though for a small number an even happier existence is possible namely the life of study (or contemplation)51

Further as we saw Aristotle in several places suggests that practical wisdom (prudence) functions for the sake of theoretical wisdom In this vein he writes at the very end of Eudemian Ethics

But since man is by nature composed of a ruling and a subject part each of us should live according to the governing element within him-selfmdashbut this is ambiguous for medical science governs in one sense health in another the former existing for the latter And so it is with

50 Also if the bulk of Aristotlersquos pupils in the Lyceum were destined for a political life would Aristotle have been likely to teach them that such a life could not be happy in any way Or that the philosophical life the flourishing of which clearly presupposes at least the tolerance of the rulers is inconsistent with the values of the political life Cf Bradley Aquinas and the Twofold 224ndash25

51 While I think Bushmdashas well as Dominic Scott ldquoPrimaryrdquo and David Keyt ldquoIntellectualism in Aristotlerdquo in Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy ed John Anton and Anthony Preus Vol 2 (Albany State University of New York Press 1983) 364ndash87mdashmakes a convincing case against exclusivism with respect to eudaimonia I do not take any position in the further dispute between inclusivism and Bushrsquos dualism


the theoretic faculty for god is not an imperative ruler but is the end with a view to which (practical) wisdom (phronecircsis) issues its commands52

(EE VII15 1249b9ndash15)

Thus theoretical wisdom ldquorulesrdquo us as the telos the goal-toward-which we should strive the final cause of our effortsmdashAristotlersquos god does not command our con-templative attention but rather attracts it while practical wisdom rules as an ef-ficient cause in the sense of prescribing the path

It is of considerable interest for this study that in the Nicomachean Ethics at least Aristotle sees a divine calling for human beings that is rooted in our intel-lectual capacity and says of this capacity that it ldquowould seem too to be each man himself since it is the authoritative and better part of himrdquo53 (X7 1178a1ndash2 em-phasis added) We have a divine calling in virtue of the intellect (nous) the active part of which he described in De Anima as ldquoseparable impassable unmixedrdquo and therefore ldquoimmortal and eternalrdquo54 (DA III5 430a16 20ndash21) This divine or quasidivine portion of the soul is what abstracts the immaterial forms from the data of perception and its exercise is most sublime in thought or contemplation about the highest indeed immaterial substances It is in that exercise that it and thus the human being most resembles the divinities

The act of contemplation is what is most pleasant and best If then God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are this com-pels our wonder55

(Met XII7 1072b24ndash25)

Though Aristotle does not posit a personal immortality he says we ldquomust so far as we can make ourselves immortal and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in usrdquo56 (NE 1177b32ndash33)

But this achievement remains private curiously so for such a political thinker as Aristotle For him unlike Plato theory is theory while the realm of practice remains independent The perfect practice of the moral virtues is not as Plato thought the result of attaining the highest form of theoretical insight Instead the causation runs in the opposite direction the moral virtues seem to play for

52 ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωπος φύσει συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου καὶ ἕκαστον ἂν δέοι πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀρχὴν ζῆν (αὕτη δὲ διττή ἄλλως γὰρ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἀρχὴ καὶ ἄλλως ἡ ὑγίεια ταύτης δὲ ἕνεκα ἐκείνη οὕτω δ᾽ ἔχει κατὰ τὸ θεωρητικόν οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτακτικῶς ἄρχων ὁ θεός ἀλλ᾽ οὗ ἕνεκα ἡ φρόνησις ἐπιτάττει

53 δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον54 χωριστὸς καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀμιγής ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον55 καὶ ἡ θεωρία τὸ ἥδιστον καὶ ἄριστον εἰ οὖν οὕτως εὖ ἔχει ὡς ἡμεῖς ποτέ ὁ θεὸς ἀεί θαυμαστόν56 ἀλλ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ


Aristotle the role of making possible for at least a select few the attainment of this highest of human achievements contemplation phronecircsis ldquoprovides for (the) coming into being (of sophia) it issues orders then for its sake but not to itrdquo57 (NE VI13 1145a8ndash9) Like Aristotlersquos God the Philosopher does not ldquocom-mandrdquo the polis though if the polis is fulfilling its calling it is making possible the existence of philosophy in the state a crowning (if detached) achievement58

That only a few are de facto able to follow the potential of human intellect to its summit seems not to have worried Aristotle This is odd If the capacity for thismdashthe greatest happiness possible to humansmdashis rooted in our common human nature is it not then something that everyone ideally is capable of and indeed ought to have some share in But of course no society could consist solely of philosophers How then should those who get to practice this profes-sion be chosen It seems likely that having access to the wealth needed for the required leisure would be one de facto qualification and anothermdashdecisive in most casesmdashwould be the intellectual ability to learn the highly abstract and challenging sciences of mathematics metaphysics and theology The inherent unfairness of this is mitigated somewhat by the availability of the ldquootherrdquo sec-ondary kind of happiness which requires less by way of intellectual abilities But in Aristotlersquos construction of the life of moral virtue it too demands both leisure and means the former for involvement in political activities the latter for the practice of the virtue of liberality among other things The eudaimonic aspirations of the remaining populace presumably a vast majority seem not to have been worth much notice in Aristotlersquos view

From this very brief overview of Aristotlersquos ethical views I want to highlight a number of points that will be central to this investigation

First Aristotle is a eudaimonist ie he believes that the human good consists in attaining happiness conceived as the fulfillment of our distinctive natural ca-pacities These are those elements in the human soul that involve reason both in being susceptible to its control (in the case of our irrational impulses) and in thinking itself both practically and theoretically

Second Aristotlersquos eudaimonism is strongly teleological the fulfillment or perfection of our nature involves a future-oriented process consistingmdashto varying extents in various endeavorsmdashof practice habituation experience and learning

57 ἀλλ᾽ ὁρᾷ ὅπως γένηται ἐκείνης οὖν ἕνεκα ἐπιτάττει ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐκείνῃ58 Aristotle presumably had in mind here the ldquosin against philosophyrdquo of the Athenian state in the

condemnation and execution of Socrates One also wonders whether Aristotlersquos views might have in a sense anticipated those of Kant (in his Conflict of the Faculties 1797) where reason as exercised in the philosophical (ie liberal arts) faculty of the university has a kind of duty to subject all views to scrutiny without the fear of state censorship but with no power to issue commands to either church or state


all with an eye to the goal of happiness He suggests that this process may never be entirely complete and it requires in any case a normal lifespan (NE I9ndash11)

Third both forms of happiness that Aristotle discusses in the Nicomachean Ethics are built on intellectual virtues phronecircsis and sophia The latter involves the highest human capacity nous or intellect and accordingly the highest happi-ness possible to humans is that achieved in the practice characteristic of sophia contemplation or theoretical (and theological) study Phronecircsis on the other hand is the excellence of the calculating mind applied to matters of praxis Its exercise encompasses both private and public affairs

Fourth in spite of its denial of an afterlife Aristotlersquos notion of eudaimonia at least in the Nicomachean Ethics has a theological orientation that gave it a basis for acceptance by (some) Christian thinkers59 True apart from a single vague hint he nowhere considers the idea that the perfection we are able to achieve depends in any way on divine grace and thus his system is a prime target for St Augustinersquos charge that classical ethics were so many versions of pride60 But like Augustine and the other Christian authors we will consider in this book he does see a divine element in the human soul and he identifies this with the intellect The best life he insists is the most godlike which consists in the most godlike use of the intellect Though the terminology of ldquoimagerdquo and ldquolikenessrdquo is Pla-tonic rather than Aristotelian it would not be a distortion to say that in book X Aristotle presents the intellect as an image of the divine (or as ldquoakinrdquo to it)

Fifth Aristotlersquos ethical teleology does not imply an instrumental construc-tion of virtuous activity Though he sometimes speaks of acting virtuously in order to be happy (cf eg NE I7 1097b1ndash5) and generally understands human action in means-end terms this is to be understood in the sense that virtuous actions constitute happiness in performing them (over a suitably long period) we achieve eudaimonia and he clearly makes it a requirement of such behavior that it be undertaken for its own sake (cf eg NE II4 1105a30ndash33) As we will

59 In calling the orientation ldquotheologicalrdquo I risk a misunderstanding here For medieval thinkers theology is part of a religious way of living involving the interpretation of scriptures preaching cultic practices communal worship and the like None of these features apply to Aristotlersquos ldquostudy of the divinerdquo Indeed his ldquotheologyrdquo in the Metaphysics is as my colleague Susan Levin pointed out to me (in a personal communication) a matter of astronomy or cosmology rather than religion since Aris-totlersquos God is above all the ldquoPrime Moverrdquo ie the ultimate explanation (as final cause) for the endless motion of the heavenly spheres

60 The ldquovague hintrdquo occurs in book I in a discussion of how happiness is achieved ldquoNow if there is any gift of the gods to men it is reasonable that happiness should be god-given and most surely god-given of all human things inasmuch as it is the best But this question would perhaps be more appropriate to another inquiryrdquo [εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλο τί ἐστι θεῶν δώρημα ἀνθρώποις εὔλογον καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν θεόσδοτον εἶναι καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὅσῳ βέλτιστον ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως ἄλλης ἂν εἴη σκέψεως οἰκειότερον] (I9 1099b11ndash14) We are left guessing what that ldquoother inquiryrdquo might be


see most clearly in Thomas Aquinas some Christian attempts to adopt the te-leologicaleudaimonist framework of Aristotle and other Greek thinkers have difficulty avoiding the quandary of instrumentalizing virtuous activity61

And sixth to anyone familiar with Aquinasrsquos or Augustinersquos treatments of voluntasmdashnot to mention those of Duns Scotus Descartes Kant or Schopen-hauermdashAristotle may well seem to lack a concept of will altogether62 But as we saw he does devote a small section (roughly thirty lines) in book III of the Nicomachean Ethics to boulecircsis rational wish and the term he uses is the ety-mological root of the Latin voluntas More importantly his notion of boulecircsis as rational wish is one (quite central) element in Aquinasrsquos notion of voluntas which undoubtedly means ldquowillrdquo in a strong sense Further we saw that Aristotle has much more to say about prohairesis choice and a great deal more about phronecircsis both of them important aspects of the broader notion of will that is later de-veloped in Christian thought and he links all three of these notions closely to-gether Even in his account of sophia we found reason to posit a role for boulecircsis Whether or not this is enough to say Aristotle ldquodiscovered the willrdquo63 in the sense of the term identified in chapter 1 ie as ldquorational desirerdquo or ldquoonersquos better practi-cal judgmentrdquo in my view he certainly has the beginnings of such a concept and it is central to his ethics For in boulecircsis prohairesis and phronecircsis Aristotle has the ingredients necessary to delineate a conception of rational choice Whether or not he succeeds in putting them together in a satisfactory way is a different question One problem is that unlike Aquinas (and philosophers in general) he restricts by definition the roles of boulecircsis and prohairesis to cases where the agent acts to attain what she regards as the goal of life hence they play no role in casual (goal-less) acts normdashmore consequentiallymdashin akratic behavior where

61 Of course Aristotle does not suppose that people simply set out to perform just or temperate actions they perform them in the course of living their lives For example Louise wants to calm her-self before an important meeting and knows she could do so with Daoist breathing or a stiff drink she chooses the former a purposive bit of self-engineering (poiecircsis in Aristotlersquos terms) her action is temperate in that it expresses her correct settled disposition to be moderate with respect to her bodily appetites (here in a situation where she might inappropriately be drawn to consuming alcohol) Thus her action has both a productive and a moral dimension in the former way its success is judged by the outcome in the latter success is a matter of the character of the action itself and of Louise in performing it Cf NE VI4ndash5

62 This ldquoabsencerdquo view has been propounded by Alasdair MacIntyre Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (Notre Dame IN University of Notre Dame Press 1990) ldquoAristotle like every other ancient pre-Christian author had no concept of the willrdquo (111) The same thesis is central to Albrecht Dihlersquos The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity (Berkeley University of California Press 1982)

63 As Terence Irwin argued in ldquoWho Discovered the Willrdquo An even broader survey of which philosophers contributed to what became in Christian times the mature concept of will is given by Sorabji ldquoConcept of the Willrdquo My thinking about whether Aristotle had a concept of will owes much to the (contrary) views of my colleague Jay Garfield


the agent acts intentionally but contrary to her conception of how best to live The akratic person has and initially makes use of all of what Aristotle regards as the necessary conditions for virtuous action yet fails in the end to carry out the action It was the struggle to understand a problem very similar to this that led St Augustine to the first full-blown notion of will in the Western tradition64

On balance I think it is right to say that in boulecircsis Aristotle has some but not all of what subsequent philosophy in the West has understood by ldquowillrdquo His is not a ldquofaculty psychologyrdquo of will if by the latter we mean ldquoa theory that the mind is divided into separate powers or facultiesrdquo one of which is will65 But for this study in which we are attempting to understand what Meister Eckhart meant by ldquoliving without whywillrdquo it turns out to be precisely Aristotlersquos sense of boulecircsis as expanded and developed in Christian thought that is at stake the rational desire for the goal of life

In the chapters that follow I will be comparing Augustine Aquinas and Eck-hart with Aristotle on these elements the goal of life the structure of human action (with a special focus on will) the virtues and the role of transcendencemdashldquothe divinerdquomdashin the human quest for happiness In this process we should bear in mind correspondingly different senses in which we might speak of teleology of the role that goal orientation might play in ethics

(a) first an ethic might be concerned with moral development in that it con-ceives as the (or a) central task of ethics to lead one from an unsatisfactory initial state of character to a perfected state (the telos or goal eudaimonia maturity etc) in which one is a fully developed moral agent call this a ldquoteleological view of human liferdquo and it is typical of though not exclusive to virtue ethics All the authors examined in this study are teleologists in this first (weak) sense

(b) further an ethic might allot a central role to the means-end aspect of action and thus to the will in moral conduct The end could be intrinsic ie locate the criterion of moral rightness in virtuous goal-directed action itself but could in another version find it in something extrinsic to the action eg the greatest happiness of the greatest number Kantrsquos ethic is famously nonte-leological in this latter sense since its central focus is the agentrsquos motive which Kant distinguishes from both her goal and the consequences of her conduct As we saw Aristotle also distinguishes the moral dimension of action from its productive aspect (poiecircsis) but it is still the point of praxis to contribute to or

64 Aristotle seems not to have even considered the possibility of actions in pursuit of duty that conflict with the pursuit of onersquos own perfection For Kant it is in such actions that the role of will comes to the fore

65 Simon Blackburn ed The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Oxford Oxford University Press 2008) See also Oxford Reference Online It is not that Aristotle did not believe in faculties in this sense he certainly did but he did not regard boulecircsis as one of them but rather as a quite particular kind of desire


constitute eudaimonia something that is to-be-completed by a lifetime of such action While ldquomeans-endrdquo might be a misleading term for the relation of praxis to eudaimonia it is accurate to use Aristotlersquos own phrase praxis is ldquotoward the goalrdquo (pros to telos) of eudaimonia so in this sense Aristotle is a teleologist about action and the will Action is for happiness and the latter depends on getting the former right The same will apply to Augustine and Aquinas but not to Eckhart

(c) with respect to the virtues a teleological ethic might see virtuous action as itself a means to a further end For instance courage might be conceived as a good thing primarily as being in a further way meritorious where earning this further merit from another (or others) is the real goal of life For example it is sometimes said that in the ldquoHomeric ethicrdquo the honor or esteem of onersquos peers is the principal good When the rightness of actions is derived from their serving some such external goal the resulting ethic is a form of consequentialism As noted the danger here is an undermining of the virtues

Aristotlersquos eudaimonistic ethic is teleological in the first way and while he thinks of virtuous action as contributing to happiness the connection of such action (praxis) to happiness is internal and constitutive I shall argue that Au-gustine and Aquinas are stronger teleologists than Aristotle For them the con-nection of virtuous action to what Aquinas calls ldquoperfect happinessrdquo is external and by way of (divine) merit Eckhart though he has a partially teleological ac-count of our lives (in the first sense above) differs importantly from Augustine and Aquinas with respect to each of these senses of ethics and teleology andmdash cruciallymdashis a nonteleologist of a sort about action and the virtues We begin our exploration of these Christian writers with Augustine

42

3

Augustinersquos Christian Conception of Will

Any account of the will in medieval Christian philosophy in Western Europe must reckon with the foundational contributions of Augustine of Hippo (354ndash430) It has even been claimed as we saw that Augustine invented the concept of the will1 More modestly others have seen in his work both a crucial ldquopulling togetherrdquo of elements identified by Aristotle the Stoics Neoplatonists and earlier Christian authors and the contribution of novel ideas of his own to produce something very like the notions of will we find in medieval and modern philosophy2

In this chapter we will explore in outline the main features of Augustinersquos treatment of will and ask how the concept became central to his view of the human drama of salvation For Augustine it is what we will or want more even than what we do or what we think that expresses what we are and determines the moral value of our lives In his view although everyone deep down wants the happy life many have no idea what real happiness is Further and paradoxically (as well as of more interest to Augustine) even those who have come to know what happiness consists in can find themselves unable to want it in the right way or to want it enough Elements of this quandary were of course familiar to the ancients (eg Aristotle on akrasia) But Augustine is writing in a new era tailoring received philosophical reflections to the Christian framework with its notions of an omnipotent and benevolent creator deity a fallen humanity and a Savior-God-made-man In pursuit of this epoch-making project of (re-)con-struction and with considerable subtlety he dissects what we could call the ldquopsy-chological paradox of happinessrdquo our difficult and uncertain struggle to attain what we most ardently desire To this problem he offers a controversial and

1 Not entirely on his own of course Cf Dihle Theory of Will and MacIntyre Three Rival Versions2 Cf Sorabji ldquoConcept of the Willrdquo and Kahn ldquoDiscovering the Willrdquo

A ug u st in e rsquos Chr i s t ian C on c e pt i on o f Wi l l 43

unsettling conclusion that is largely couched in terms of the will Later Chris-tian thinkers in the medieval West build on this foundation for the most part agreeing with its major features Meister Eckhart was one of very few who while preserving many features of the structure denied its central tenet ie that our happiness depends on our having and deploying the right kind of will

Our attention in what follows will be largely (though not exclusively) on two works Confessions and On Free Choice of the Will (De libero arbitrio[DLA]) the latter a book in three parts composed over a seminal roughly seven-year period ending in ca 395 Thus it was begun shortly after Augustinersquos conver-sion to Christianity and finished just before he was consecrated bishop of Hippo Regius Although Augustine continued to talk about will to the very end of his long career he did not deviate in most respects from the conclusions reached by 395 In addition we will look at two further works that bring important elements into the picture the Letter to Simplician (Ad Simplicianum) of 396 in which a genuinely new notion the ldquowill of gracerdquo emerges clearly (section III) andmdashmore brieflymdashthe treatise On the Trinity where Augustine addresses in what sense human beings are the ldquoimage and likenessrdquo of God (section IV) For if the will is to lead us to beatitude and if this consistsmdashas Christians must holdmdashin communion with God then somehow the will must contribute to our becoming ldquolike Godrdquo In section I we begin by looking at Augustinersquos initial approaches to will focusing on his adaptation of classical virtue-eudaimonism In section II we discuss his doctrine of the will itself in more detail

I

The will initially finds its way into Augustinersquos thought as part of his long strug-gle with theodicy In the context of this struggle to work out a satisfying answer to the question about the source of evil in a world created by a supremely good and powerful God Augustine came early in his career to locate evilrsquos origin in the human will and thus was drawn to develop his influential doctrine which he would steadfastly defend even as he developed it in what were (even to him) unexpected directions Not surprisingly given his liberal arts education and the strong and lasting influence on him of both Stoicism and Neoplatonism (and thus indirectly of Aristotle as well as Plato) his teaching on the will is embed-ded in a largely classical eudaimonist framework We first look briefly at his understanding of that framework thenmdashin somewhat more detailmdashat his teaching

There is much that is classical in Augustinersquos moral views Professionally immersed in Latin literature as a teacher of rhetoric and originally inspired by Cicerorsquos praise of the philosophic life he was later drawn to Academic skepticism


and then as he tells in Confessions VII to the ldquobooks of the [Neo-]Platonistsrdquo which played a key role in his conversion to Christianity In particular these writings helped wean him from materialism and convinced him that the Su-preme Reality is entirely spiritual thus laying to rest a major stumbling block in Augustinersquos spiritual development

But in those days after reading the books of the Platonists and follow-ing their advice to seek for truth beyond corporeal forms I turned my gaze toward your [ie Godrsquos] invisible reality trying to understand it through created things I was certain that you exist that you are infinite but not spread out through space either finite or infinite and that you exist in the fullest sense because you have always been the same On these points I was quite certain but I was far too weak to enjoy you3

(Conf VII2026)

Very importantly the ldquoPlatonistsrdquo also gave Augustine a new way to under-stand evil not as some rarified stuff that infects things even less as a monstrous being (or beings) of some sort but as a deficiency the privation of some perfec-tion that should be present in a substance institution or activity Both the mate-rialism and the substantialist view of evil were remnants of Augustinersquos youthful (though lengthy) association with Manichaeism He had turned to this sect in his student days after finding the Bible difficult and unsatisfying its Latin prose in the available translation ldquounworthyrdquo (indignamdashConf III59) to his rhetorical taste in contrast to Cicerorsquos elegance The first of various troubling questions that the Manichees posed to him as Augustine mentions in Confessions concerned ldquothe origin of evil Ignorant in such matters I was disturbed by these ques-tionsrdquo4 (Conf 3712) The sect had an appealing answer the evil in the world derives from a malevolent deity who is engaged in an ongoing cosmic battle with the good deity both of whom are material entities For orthodox Christians this solution was of course unacceptable But then if the One God is the supreme creator how can He escape responsibility for the evil in the world We will come back to this theme in section II

From the time he converted to Christianity in 387 (indeed probably as early as 373) and for the remainder of his life Augustine was a eudaimonist ie he

3 Sed tunc lectis Platonicorum illis libris posteaquam inde admonitus quaerere incorpoream ueritatem invisibilia tua per ea quae facta sunt intellecta certus esse te et infinitum esse nec tamen per locos finitos infinitosve diffundi et vere te esse qui semper idem ipse esses certus quidem in istis eram nimis tamen infirmus ad fruendum te

4 [U]nde malum [Q]uibus rerum ignarus perturbabar


held that the purpose of life and principal human good is to be happy which is what everyone wants The key to attaining happiness and thus living well is first to identify what this consists in and then to find the right path to it5 In the early De beata vita he wrote apparently quoting Cicero ldquoWe want to be happyrdquo And he added

What Is everyone happy who has what he wants If what he seeks wants and has are good things then he is happy if however what he wants is bad then whatever he has he is unhappy6

(2 10)

In the second book of DLA composed some years later he says

The happy life that is the disposition of a soul that clings to the unchangeable good is the proper and principal good of a human being7

(DLAII1952)

That the will is central to this ldquoclingingrdquo is made clear in the following paragraph from the same work

Therefore when the will cleaves to the common and unchangeable good it attains the great and foremost goods for human beings even though the will itself is only an intermediate good But when the will turns away from the unchangeable and common good toward its own private good or toward external or inferior things it sins8

(Ibid II1953)

In his middle period in Confessions this same view is found repeatedly For instance in book X (2029) he asks ldquoWhat is a life of happiness Surely what

6 Beatos esse nos volumus Quid omnis qui quod vult habet beatus est Si bona inquit velit et habeat beatus est si autem mala velit quamvis habeat miser est (My translation)

7 [E]aque ipsa vita beata id est animi affectio inhaerentis incommutabili bono proprium et primum est hominis bonum

8 Voluntas ergo adherens communi atque incommutabili bono impetrat prima et magna hominis bona cum ipsa sit medium quoddam bonum Voluntas autem auersa ab incommutabili et communi bono et conu-ersa ad proprium bonum aut ad exterius aut ad inferius peccat

5 Cf Robert J OrsquoConnell SJ ldquoAction and Contemplationrdquo in Augustine a Collection of Critical Essays ed R A Markus (Garden City NY Anchor Books 1972) 39ndash40 amp passim J M Rist Augus-tine Ancient Thought Baptized (Cambridge Cambridge University Press) 1994 48ndash54 and Oliver OrsquoDonovan The Problem of Self-Love in St Augustine (New Haven and London Yale University Press 1980 ) 168


everyone wants absolutely everyone without exceptionrdquo9 Again in the third of his sermons on Psalm 32 he writes once more connecting happiness to living well ldquoEveryone loves happiness and therefore those people are perverse who want to be wicked without being unhappyrdquo10 (Ennar XXXII3) Confessions itself at least in its narrative parts is largely a story of Augustinersquos own struggle to understand the true nature of happiness and reform his life so as to achieve it And in the great work of his later years City of God one of his principle criti-cisms of paganism is precisely that it was unable to provide a satisfying path to what we all seek Here is the start of book X

It is the decided opinion of all who use their brains that all men desire to be happy But who are happy or how they become so these are ques-tions about which the weakness of human understanding stirs end-less and angry controversies in which philosophers have wasted their strength and expended their leisure11

(X1)

It is equally clear from the texts just cited that Augustinersquos eudaimonism is of the teleological variety ie (a) like Aristotle and many others he is concerned to discover describe and advocate a process of human development toward the goal of life and (b) in that process the will and with it the performance of the right sorts of actions plays a crucialmdasheither causative or constitutivemdashrole in the attainment of happiness The teleological note is omnipresent often taking the familiar metaphorical form of ldquofollowing the path (via iter)rdquo For instance

(I)nsofar as all human beings seek a happy life they are not in error but to the extent that someone strays from the path that leads to happinessmdashall the while insisting that his only goal is to be happymdashto that extent he is in error for ldquoerrorrdquo simply means following something that does not take us where we want to go12

(DLA II926)

9 Nonne ipsa est beata vita quam omnes volunt et omnino qui nolit nemo est10 Amant enim omnes beatitudinem et ideo perversi sunt homines quia mali volunt esse miseri nolunt11 Omnium certa sententia est qui ratione quoquo modo uti possunt beatos esse omnes homines velle

Qui autem sint vel unde fiant dum mortalium quaerit infirmitas multae magnaeque controversiae concitatae sunt in quibus philosophi sua studia et otia contriverunt Tr Marcus Dods (New York Modern Library 1950) Is there in the final phrase a note of envy in the voice of the harried episcopal administrator who once avidly sought the philosophical life but now had precious little otia for such pursuits)

12 In quantum igitur omnes homines appetunt vitam beatam non errant In quantum autem quisque non eam tenet vitae viam quae ducit ad beatitudinem cum se fateatur et profiteatur nolle nisi ad beatitudinem pervenire in tantum errat Error est enim cum sequitur aliquid quod non ad id ducit quo volumus pervenire


Or again later in the same work (and somewhat less optimistically)

While we are striving thus [ie diligently trying to be wise]mdashas long as we do so whole-heartedlymdashwe are on our way We have been allowed to rejoice in these true and certain goods even though for now they are like lightning flashes on this dark road13

(II1641)

The same theme of travel indeed of our yearning to return to the Source is sounded in the famous opening paragraph of Confessions ldquo[Y]ou have made us and drawn us to yourself and our heart is unquiet until it rests in yourdquo14 (Conf I1) This point also turns up in the earlier Morals of the Catholic Church ldquoThe striving after God is therefore the desire of beatitude the attainment of God is beatitude itselfrdquo15 (De Mor I1118)

A teleological approach to eudaimonism more or less implies a teleological view of action but one searches in vain through DLA and other writings for anything like a systematic discussion of human action (such as Aristotle gives in book III 1ndash5 of NE or Aquinas in Questions 6ndash17 of STh IaIIae) Yet in reading books I and II of DLA a modern philosopher of human action feels as much at home with Augustine as with Aristotle or Aquinas Familiar themes about vol-untariness and responsibility dominate the scene and if anything Augustinersquos treatment of will is more ldquomodernrdquo (and far more prominent) than Aristotlersquos As we now follow Augustine through his discussions of virtue vice love and will we will see that his implicit view of human action is very much teleologi-cal actions (as well emotions thoughts etc) are expressions of the agentrsquos basic ldquoloverdquo or will a striving toward one or the other of two fundamental and con-flicting human goals God or self

The virtues seem at first sight to play for Augustine their classical constitutive part in the journey toward the goal of happiness For example in book II of DLA he follows up the passage quoted above from II1952 this way

The happy life that is the disposition of a soul that clings to the unchangeable good is the proper and principal good of a human being It contains all the virtues No one becomes happy by someone elsersquos happiness No one becomes prudent by someone elsersquos prudence or resolute by someone elsersquos fortitude or temperate by someone elsersquos

13 Quod dum agimus donec peragamus in via sumus Et quod istis veris et certis bonis quamvis adhuc in hoc tenebroso itinere coruscantibus gaudere concessum est

14 [F]ecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te15 Secutio igitur Dei beatitatis appetitus est assecutio autem ipsa beatitas


temperance or just by someone elsersquos justice Instead you regulate your soul by those unchangeable rules and lights of the virtues that dwell incorruptibly in the common truth and wisdom 16

Augustine and his dialogue partner Evodius agree throughout book II of DLA that ldquojustice and indeed all the virtues of the soul are counted among the highest goods that are in human beings because they constitute an upright and worthy liferdquo17 (II1850) This kind of thing could easily have been written by a Neoplatonist or an Aristotelian Indeed the idea that the virtues ldquoconsti-tute [constat] an upright and worthy liferdquo is in one sense Aristotlersquos own view Hence we might expect Augustine to focus his investigation as Aristotle (and Aquinas) do on the nature of the various virtues how they are acquired what threats there are to their development etc But this is not the approach Augus-tine takes

For one thing his inspiration is not directly Aristotelian18 He was not very conversant with the work of Aristotle nor was he particularly sympathetic to what he knew of it19 Philosophically his ideas were more directly formed by

16 [E]aque ipsa vita beata id est animi affectio inhaerentis incommutabili bono proprium et primum est hominis bonum In eo sunt etiam virtutes omnes Beatitudine autem alterius hominis non fit alter beatus Neque prudentia cuiusquam fit prudens alius aut fortis fortitudine aut temperans temperantia aut iustus iustitia hominis alterius quisquam efficitur sed coaptando animum illis incommutabilibus regulis luminibusque virtutum quae incorruptibiliter vivunt in ipsa veritate sapientiaque communi

17 Intueris enim iustitiam Haec inter summa bona quae in ipso sunt homine numeratur omnesque virtutes animi quibus ipsa recta vita et honesta constat (emphasis added)

18 In this present study Aristotle serves as the principal representative of classical ethics for a number of reasons as presented in the Nicomachean Ethics his is a well-crafted and systematic moral philosophy further his focus on the role of the virtues largely created one of the main and enduring approaches to ethics andmdashnot leastmdashhis impact both within Western philosophy and in society more generally has been immense and continuing in part mediated (with amendments of course) by the transmission of his approach through Thomas Aquinas and other thinkersmdashChristian Muslim and Jewishmdashin the High Middle Ages Finally his similarities to Augustine are significant enough to make a comparison between the two not misleading Cf Timothy Chappell Aristotle and Augustine on Freedom (Houndmills and London Macmillan 1995) passim

19 Augustine tells us in Confessions IV 1628ndash29 that he read Aristotlersquos Categories in his student days and was not impressed There is no evidence he read any of Aristotlersquos ethical works It is likely that his principal access to Plato and Aristotle was second hand through Cicero and Varro Aristotle was familiar to medieval school children through his logical works (translated into Latin by Boethius in the sixth century) butmdashleaving aside Muslim Spainmdashhis serious philosophical influence in West-ern Europe would for the most part be revived only with the reemergence of his major works in the thirteenth century For our purposes we must not overlook the fact that during the roughly 800-year period when Aristotlersquos works were largely unavailable it was Augustinersquos ethical thought that was dominant in the Latin West When Aristotle did return to the scholarly scene his champions had to figure out how to combine his views with those of Augustine or at least how to avoid (open) conflict between the two


Stoicism and Neoplatonism20 His evaluation of pagan thought in general went from generally favorable to largely unfavorable over his career but certain basics remained constant in his thinking in particular the Platonic emphasis accorded to the role of love (erocircs amor) in our lives Though Plato is (correctly) thought of as a rationalist eros is one of the central concepts in some of his most impor-tant dialogues most notably the Symposium As Stanley Rosen puts it ldquoEros is a striving for wholeness or perfection a combination of poverty and contrivance of need mitigated by a presentiment of completeness This presentiment cannot be fulfilled but its goal is knowledge of the Ideas and thus an adequate vision of the Goodrdquo21 Such vision is supreme both as object of knowledge and goal of action for Plato and the eros that strives for it inspires our metaphysical and our practical longings Thus the notion has similarities to Aristotlersquos boulecircsis the rational desire of the good22

Early and late Augustine highlights the decisive role of love in the life of the Christian perhaps finding a consonance between Platonism and St Paulrsquos letter to Corinthians on the priority of love23 In the climactic passage of The Happy Life (435) he speaks of the ldquoburning loverdquo (caritas flagrans) that motivates the seeker of true happiness In the equally early De moribus he strikingly links love and virtue

As to virtue leading us to a happy life I hold virtue to be nothing else than perfect love of God For the fourfold division of virtue I regard as taken from four forms of love For these four virtues (would that all felt their influence in their minds as they have their names in their mouths) I should have no hesitation in defining them that temper-ance is love giving itself entirely to that which is loved fortitude is love readily bearing all things for the sake of the loved object justice is love serving only the loved object and therefore ruling rightly prudence

21 Stanley Rosen ldquoThe Role of Erocircs in Platorsquos Republicrdquo Review of Metaphysics 183 (March 1965) 452ndash75 at 453

22 The practical good is of course not the object of metaphysics for Aristotle butmdashas we saw in chapter 2mdashthe life of metaphysical study is the supreme (or at least ldquoperfectrdquo teleia) good of human life and hence should be the principal object of boulecircsis

23 Aquinas follows Augustinersquos lead in treating love as first among the passions because of its ori-entation to the good and thus asmdashin its intellectual formmdashequivalent to will Cf STh IaIIae 261 and 271

20 Gerd Van Riel however finds a number of important similarities between Augustinersquos and Aris-totlersquos ethical views and has a theory of how to account for them in ldquoAugustinersquos Will an Aristotelian Notion On the Antecedents of Augustinersquos Doctrine of the Willrdquo Augustinian Studies 38 1 (2007) 255ndash79 And Terence Irwin notes that ldquoAugustinersquos conception of the will is derived from Aristotlersquos conception of boulecircsis taken over by the Stoicsrdquo See Irwin The Development of Ethics Vol 1 From Socrates to the Reformation (Oxford Oxford University Press 2007) 400


is love distinguishing with sagacity between what hinders it and what helps it24

(De Mor I1525 emphasis added)

A bit later in his career in book 2 of DLA (II1437) he talks of those who seek truth and wisdom as its ldquoloversrdquo (amatores) a phrase reminiscent of the Sympo-sium Later still in On Christian Doctrine he writes

Now he is a man of just and holy life who forms an unprejudiced esti-mate of things and also keeps his loves well ordered so that he neither loves what he ought not to love nor fails to love what he ought to love nor loves that more which ought to be loved less nor loves that equally which ought to be loved either less or more nor loves that less or more which ought to be loved equally25

(DDC XV25)

Clearly for Augustine the life of virtue is a life of the proper sort of love the love of God above all else and the love of creaturesmdashincluding other peoplemdashldquoin Godrdquo26 The equation of virtue with ldquothe perfect love of Godrdquo reaches perhaps

24 Quod si virtus ad beatam vitam nos ducit nihil omnino esse virtutem affirmaverim nisi summum amorem Dei Namque illud quod quadripartita dicitur virtus ex ipsius amoris vario quodam affectu quantum intelligo dicitur Itaque illas quattuor virtutes quarum utinam ita in mentibus vis ut nomina in ore sunt omnium sic etiam definire non dubitem ut temperantia sit amor integrum se praebens ei quod amatur fortitudo amor facile tolerans omnia propter quod amatur iustitia amor soli amato servi-ens et propterea recte dominans prudentia amor ea quibus adiuvatur ab eis quibus impeditur sagaciter seligens

25 Ille autem iuste et sancte vivit qui rerum integer aestimator est Ipse est autem qui ordinatam habet dilectionem ne aut diligat quod non est diligendum aut non diligat quod diligendum est aut amplius diligat quod minus diligendum est aut aeque diligat quod vel minus vel amplius diligendum est He uses ldquoaffec-tionsrdquo for dilectionem but ldquolovesrdquo is more common

26 OrsquoDonovan Problem of Self-Love passim and Rist Augustine 162ndash68 have much to say about Augustinersquos notion of love and the difficulties he had in specifying the kind of love that is appropriate for us to have toward creatures especially other human beings OrsquoDonovan (29ndash32) points out the significance the mature Augustine came to find in the idea of well-ordered love repeatedly citing Song of Songs 24 ldquoHe ordered love (caritatem) within merdquo (Vulgate version) Rist stresses that Augustine was trying to avoid the notion that human beings are lsquogoods-in-themselvesrsquo which are the only kinds of goods that should be enjoyedmdashother goods are to be used for the sake of the goods that are to be enjoyed But this sounds as if other humans are to be treated as mere tools on onersquos road to salvation which according to Rist is not Augustinersquos view He simply wishes to avoid the idolatry that would be implicit in treating humans (or any other finite good) as goods in themselves Hence he comes around to speaking of loving onersquos neighbor ldquoin Godrdquo or ldquobecause of Godrdquo On Augustinersquos struggles to interpret the commandment to love onersquos neighbor ldquoas oneselfrdquo see OrsquoDonovan Problem of Self-Love 112ndash17


its most memorable expression in the core metaphor behind City of God ie that ldquotwo cities have been formed by two loves the earthly by the love of self even to the contempt of God the heavenly by the love of God even to the contempt of self rdquo27 (DCD XIV28) Sainthood salvation blessedness happiness these are all names for the same lasting state of such perfect love

Two questions present themselves even granting the influence of Platonism how did Augustine come to equate virtue with love of God And what is the upshot of this identification for the present study One clue to answering the latter question is given in this famous statement near the end of Confessions ldquoMy weight is my love and wherever I am carried it is this weight that carries merdquo28 (Conf XIII910) In the same vein and somewhat later Augustine writes (in the Literal Commentary on Genesis)

[W]eight applies to will and love when it becomes evident how much and what weight is to be given to feelings of desire or dislike or of pref-erence or rejection29

(Gen litt IV37)

ldquoWeightrdquo for Augustine means as it can in English the relative importance we assign to a set of desires and motivations that characterize a way of living Thus these texts suggest that Augustine had come to identify love with a certain sense of will as we shall see a ldquogood will (or weight)rdquo is the right sort of love a ldquobad willrdquo the wrong sort

This connection in turn helps us answer the first question in the previous paragraph how did Augustine come to equate virtue with love of God In clas-sical eg Aristotelian ethics happiness simply is virtuous living and essential to virtue is the right boulecircsis wanting the right goal in life Virtue is in a sense effectively wanting that goal and Augustine identifies the goal with God Since he also equates love with will (in one sense of the term) virtue and love of God are for him the same So it should not be surprising that in Augustinersquos writings talk of the virtues is largely swallowed up by talk of lovewill if one has the right love ie will then the virtues follow automatically For example in book I of DLA Augustine embeds his discussion of the four cardinal virtues (prudence temperance fortitude and justice)mdashto which he initially gives

28 Pondus meum amor meus eo feror quocumque feror29 [E]t est pondus voluntatis et amoris ubi apparet quanti quidque in appetendo fugiendo praepo-

nendo postponendoque pendatur

27 Fecerunt itaque civitates duas amores duo terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei caelestem vero amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui


typically classical definitionsmdashwithin a larger context that focuses on the will A bit later he claims that to have a good will is eo ipso to have these virtues For example

consider whether we can deny temperance [to those who have a good will] which is the virtue which restrains inordinate desires For what is more harmful to a good will than inordinate desire So you may conclude that those who love their own good will resist and oppose inordinate desires in every way they can and so they are rightly called temperate30

(DLA I1327)

In the remainder of DLA and indeed typically in his later writings Augus-tine has more (and more interesting) things to say about the will than about the virtues though he clearly regards the topics as closely related So we might say that he reverses the relative importance that Aristotle assigned to the topics in the NE where boulecircsis (wish broadly but primarily as a crucial aspect of what would become will the rational desire or wish for the goal of life) is briefly introduced in book III only to be overshadowed by Aristotlersquos lengthier discus-sions of choice various virtues akrasia friendship pleasure and other topics By contrast even early Augustine places will on center stage (where neither Aristotle nor any other of the ancients put it) As early as 388 he says as often ldquoWe have found that it is by the will that human beings deserve and therefore receive either a happy or an unhappy liferdquo31 (DLA I1430) An important ques-tion for the present study to which we now turn is how did this reversal of focus from virtue to will within the teleological eudaimonist framework come about And what is its significance

II

Let us now attempt to answer these questions through a direct consideration of Augustinersquos doctrine of will beginning with the query from Augustinersquos interlocutor Evodius ldquoIsnrsquot God the cause of evilrdquo It opens book I of DLA

30 Vide iam nunc utrum ab eo temperantiam alienare possimus cum ea sit virtus quae libidines cohibet Quid autem tam inimicum bonae voluntati est quam libido Ex quo profecto intellegis istum bonae vol-untatis suae amatorem resistere omni modo atque adversari libidinibus et ideo iure temperantem vocari

31 Dixeramus enim atque convenerat inter nos voluntate illam mereri homines voluntate etiam miseram et sic mereri ut accipiant


(I11)32 This treatise is particularly important for the present study since in it Augustine worked out at considerable lengthmdashand over a crucial span of seven years in his midlifemdashthe central core of his doctrine of will It would be at most a modest exaggeration to say that the modern conception of a sub-stantial faculty of will takes its inspiration from this bookmdashie the idea of a mental capacity connected to but separate from the intellect and the emo-tions by use of which we are responsible for the voluntariness of our deeds while also constitutive of our motives other conative states (such as wish intention choice decision etc) and our moral strength and weakness We speak naturally of ldquowillrdquo in all these senses but prior to Augustine no single term covered such a variety of phenomena Hence it is crucial to see just how this conception was at its birth shaped by what was for him as a newly bap-tized Christian a burning theological question ldquoIsnrsquot God the cause of evilrdquo

Taken together this question and the bookrsquos title On Free Choice of the Will suggest the approach Augustine is going to take in dealing with a problem that he says ldquoworried me greatly when I was still young wore me out drove me into the company of heretics [the Manichees] and knocked me flat on my facerdquo33 (DLA I24) Having finally rejected the Manichaean dualism of ultimate prin-ciples Augustine must now make clear that and why he does not regard the One God as the source of the worldrsquos evil He begins by distinguishing the evils one causes by onersquos sins from those one might suffer in just retribution for those sins

Therefore if no one is punished [by God] unjustlymdashand we must believe this since we believe that this universe is governed by divine providencemdashit follows that God is a cause of the second kind of evil [the suffering justly imposed on sinners] but in no way causes the first kind [the sins we commit]34

(I11)

33 Eam quaestionem moves quae me admodum adolescentem vehementer exercuit et fatigatum in hae-reticos impulit atque deiecit

34 Quamobrem si nemo iniuste poenas luit quod necesse est credamus quandoquidem divina provi-dentia hoc universum regi credimus illius primi generis malorum nullo modo huius autem secundi auctor est Deus

32 Dic mihi quaeso te utrum Deus non sit auctor mali Often called On Free Choice of the Will it is called by Rist On Human Responsibility in Augustine xv and passim While Ristrsquos translation does pick out the topic of the work there has been discussion recently on what the literal meaning of the Latin title itself is meant to be particularly the phrase ldquoof the willrdquo is Augustine saying that the will (qua motivation) is chosen by the agent (objective genitive) as I think or does it (as a lsquofacultyrsquo) do the free choosing (subjective genitive) It is I think not crystal clear whether Augustine thinks of the will as a faculty He comes closest to doing so in DLA but the evidence is mixed More on this below footnote 66 p 61 and footnote 69 p 62


Augustinersquos world unlike Aristotlersquos is one in which a providential Creator-Deity rewards and punishes and since He does so justly He must be keeping track of our voluntary conformity to some sort of law(s)

For the ldquofirst kind of evilrdquo the kind we commit ldquothere is no single cause rather everyone who does evil is the cause of his own evildoingrdquo35 (ibid) How can we be sure of this Augustine has a ready reply ldquoEvil deeds are punished by the justice of God They would not be punished justly if they had not been per-formed voluntarily [voluntate]rdquo36 (ibid) The last word in this citation ldquovolun-tarilyrdquo is the crucial one to do something voluntarily is to become responsible for it Augustinersquos strategy is thus clear from the very start the ldquounjustrdquo or avoid-able evil in the world can be traced back in every case to the voluntates the wills or willings of sinners and no further He spends most of the subsequent 100+ pagesmdashas well as parts of many subsequent writingsmdashexplaining this idea For it can seem a mere dodge as he is aware

We believe everything that exists comes from the one God and yet we believe that God is not the cause of sins What is troubling is that if you admit that sins come from the souls that God created and those souls come from God pretty soon yoursquoll be tracing those sins back to God37

(DLA I24)

Prophetic words indeed since Augustine himself never found a completely satisfying answer to the intertwined problems of evil will election predesti-nation etc

It is significant that what is probably the most influential work on the will in the Latin West begins not with speculation about the nature of and search for happiness (as in Aristotle and Aquinas) but with an inquiry into the meta-physical problem of evil Augustine certainly also deals with the willrsquos pivotal role in the human quest to be happy a classical theme with which he was thor-oughly familiar But the speculations that pushed him to explore the idea of will more deeply than did any of the ancient thinkers were largely spurred by his

35 [N]on enim unus aliquis est sed quisque malus sui malefacti auctor est36 [M]alefacta iustitia Dei vindicari Non enim iuste vindicarentur nisi fierent voluntate Note that

Aristotle would have used the Greek term hekousion to express voluntariness a term with no etymo-logical link to boulecircsis The use of voluntate (or sometimes voluntarie) in Augustinersquos Latin thus marks one important kind of extension of Aristotlersquos (modest and proto-) notion of will the concept is now expanded to include voluntariness For Aristotle but not Augustine there are voluntary unwilled actions (eg the akratic ones)

37 Credimus autem ex uno Deo omnia esse quae sunt et tamen non esse peccatorum auctorem Deum Movet autem animum si peccata ex his animabus sunt quas Deus creavit illae autem animae ex Deo quo-modo non parvo intervallo peccata referantur in Deum


own personal struggles to come to grips with the conundrum of evil Where an ancient such as Epicurus could view the existence of evil as proof that God or the gods take no interest in human affairs Christians (and Jews and Muslims) could not In their scriptures God has from the start been intimately involved in human life from the creation of Adam and Eve to the covenant with Abraham to the delivery of the Jews from slavery in Egypt to the Prophets and beyond In Augustinersquos hands the concept of will comes to function as the key to the solu-tion of the dilemma about evil Evil stems not from God its entry into our world is the result of the sin of human beings ie the voluntary falling away from the Perfect Good38

What Augustine means by ldquosinrdquo or ldquowrong-doingrdquo is a matter of disorder ie disorderly desire (libido cupiditas) an affliction of will ldquoFor it is clear now that inordinate desire is what drives every kind of evildoingrdquo39 (I38) In line with his ChristianNeoplatonic insight that all things are good in themselves Augustine sees nothing intrinsically wrong in for example food drink or sex But adultery is not simply sex nor gluttony simply eating or drinking they involve desires and acts that overstep the bounds of order That is they cannot be brought into line with the ldquoeternal law that is stamped upon our minds the law according to which it is just that all things be perfectly orderedrdquo40 (I615) A lengthy (and classically familiar) argument then establishes that ldquowhen reason mind or spirit controls the irrational impulses of the soul a human being is ruled by the very thing that ought to rule according to the law that we have found to be eternalrdquo41 (I818) At this early stage in his career Augustine may still have included the classical thinkers (he would later change his mind) when he added ldquoI reserve the term lsquowisersquo for those whom the truth demands should be called wise those who have achieved peace by placing all inordinate desire under the control of the mindrdquo42 (I919)

One who places ldquoall inordinate desire under the control of the mindrdquo has by definition a good will ie ldquoa will by which we desire to live honorable and upright lives and to attain the highest wisdomrdquo43 (I1225) Furthermore

43 Voluntas qua appetimus recte honesteque vivere et ad summam sapientiam pervenire

40 aeternae legis notionem quae impressa nobis est quantum valeo verbis explicem ea est qua iustum est ut omnia sint ordinatissima This notion of the imprinted eternal law was Stoic in origin but it adapted well to Christianity and the Ten Commandments

41 Ratio ista ergo vel mens vel spiritus cum irrationales animi motus regit id scilicet dominatur in homine cui dominatio lege debetur ea quam aeternam esse comperimus

42 Eos enim sapientes voco quos veritas vocari iubet id est qui regno mentis omni libidinis subiugatione pacati sunt

38 Augustine of course also believed that humans were tempted by Satan into committing the primal sin humans were not the first sinners though they sinned freely

39 Clarum est enim iam nihil aliud quam libidinem in toto malefaciendi genere dominari


Augustine claims ldquoit is up to our will whether we enjoy or lack such a great and true goodrdquo44 (I1226) (This is a major claim and one of several whose wording Augustine would come to regret when they were later hurled back at him by his Pelagian opponents as essentially containing their own view of the willrsquos (active) role in the economy of salvation ie that we have de facto the power to establishmdashor begin to establishmdashin ourselves a good will or as Aristotle might have put it to become virtuous We will go into this matter in greater detail in section III of this chapter below) But what more specifi-cally is the content of a good will what does it want what is the substance of ldquorightly orderedrdquo desire It consists we are told ldquoprecisely in the enjoyment of true and unshakeable goodsrdquo45 (I1329) By contrast those who wind up with unhappy lives have let their wills aim at ldquothings like wealth honors plea-sures physical beauty and everything else that one cannot get or keep simply by willingrdquo46 (I1531 emphasis added) Like the Stoics Augustine here seems to be picking out the rational objects of desire by the criterion of what can and cannot be taken from one by force47 But he comes to suggest two additional criteria for the good willmdashit aims at eternal (not temporal) and common (rather than private) goodsmdashthat have a rather more Christian aspect that will make them features of Augustinersquos teaching from this time forward Both have to do with the distinction of time and eternity ldquo[T]he eternal law de-mands that we purify our love by turning it away from temporal things and toward what is eternalrdquo48 (I1532) Among the temporalia are the body our freedom family and friends the polity itself and property (I1532) All of these are good if incomplete in themselves one uses them badly who ldquoclings to them and becomes entangled with themrdquo while another uses them well who ldquodoes not become attached to them They donrsquot become limbs of his soul as it were (which is what happens when one loves them) so that when these things begin to be amputated he is not disfigured by any pain or decayrdquo49 (I1533) A version of this notion of detachment plays a central role in Meister Eckhartrsquos ethics as we shall see

44 [I]n voluntate nostra esse constitutum ut hoc vel fruamur vel careamus tanto et tam vero bono45 nisi tu putas aliud esse beate vivere quam veris bonis certisque gaudere46 divitias honores voluptates et pulchritudinem corporis caeteraque omnia quae possunt et volentes

non adipisci et amittere invite47 Cf for instance Epictetus Discourses I123ndash24 ldquoYou may fetter my leg but my will not even

Zeus himself can overpowerrdquo (τὸ σκέλος μου δήσεις τὴν προαίρεσιν δὲ οὐδ᾽ ὁ Ζεὺς νι κῆσαι δύναται Greek text and translation by T W Higginson from the online Perseus Project)

48 Iubet igitur aeterna lex avertere amorem a temporalibus et eum mundatum convertere ad aeterna49 is quidem qui male amore his inhaereat atque implicetur et ideo non eis amore agglutinetur neque

velut membra sui animi faciat quod fit amando ne cum resecari coeperint eum cruciatu ac tabe foedent


These criteria imply a certain conception of sin which Evodius expresses thus

[A]ll sins come about when someone turns away from divine things that truly persist and turns toward changeable and uncertain things These things do have their proper place and they have a certain beauty of their own but when a perverse and disordered soul pursues them it becomes enslaved to the very things that divine order and law com-mand it to rule overrdquo50

(I1635)

Sinmdashevilmdashconsists in this very disorder the turning from divine toward the temporal whereby we seek love and attempt to enjoy temporal and private things that we can lose involuntarily hence the source of sin is not in God For it has already been established (in I1226 quoted above) that ldquoit is up to our willrdquo what it seeks and thus the will itself determines whether or not it is good Hence it follows as Evodius puts it ldquothat we do evil by the free choice of the willrdquo51 (I1635)

We should note here how the classical notion of boulecircsis rational desiremdashstandardly rendered by Augustine as voluntas willmdashhas been connected with the notion of ldquofree choicerdquo The things we rationally desire are freely chosen by us ie no one forces us to want them above all else And Augustine depicts our ordinary sinful state as one in which we have turned away from the divine toward the temporal though it will turn out that this is not a historical process in the life of the individual For this would imply that we each were at birth without sin (or sinful inclination) a view Augustine rejects What role then does the ldquoturningrdquo play in the life of the individual We will come back to this question shortly

The third criterion of the rational objects of desiremdashthe notion of the common (as opposed to private) goodmdashreceives special attention in book II of DLA That book is an extended conversation on the question raised at its start by Evodius ldquoWhy God gave human beings free choice of the will since if we had not received it we would not have been able to sinrdquo52 (II11) He contrasts this freedom with the virtues by means of which no one can do evil It is agreed that the virtues by which we live rightly are great goods whereas material and bodily objects

52 [Q]uare dederit Deus homini liberum voluntatis arbitrium quod utique si non accepisset peccare non posset

50 [O]mnia peccata hoc uno genere contineri cum quisque avertitur a divinis vereque manentibus et ad mutabilia atque incerta convertitur Quae quamquam in ordine suo recte locata sint et suam quamdam pulchritudinem peragant perversi tamen animi est et inordinati eis sequendis subici quibus ad nutum suum ducendis potius divino ordine ac iure praelatus est

51 [M]ale facimus ex libero voluntatis arbitrio Note the ambiguity does the will choose Or do we (freely) choose to pursue a good or bad will (desire) The former would suggest a faculty of will the latter not


however good they may be are such that one can live rightly without them and hence they count as goods but of the lowest kind The will is one of those powers of the soul ldquowithout which one cannot live rightlyrdquo but which can also be abused it thus is an example of ldquointermediate goods (media bona)rdquo (II1950)

In the course of his argument about ldquofree choice of the willrdquo Augustine undertakes what may be the first attempt in Christian thought at a philosophi-cal proof of Godrsquos existence It seeks to establish first that in our lives there are standards both of knowledge (ie truth) and of conduct (ie wisdom) which we must acknowledge as superior to and normative for our minds and then that Truth and Wisdom both of which are higher than our minds and available to all are identical with God (ldquoThis is our freedom when we are subject to the truth and the truth is God himself rdquo53 [II1337]) It is characteristic of this truth that commands our assent that anyone might acquire it but it does not thereby become inaccessible to others ldquoNo part of it ever becomes the private property of any one person it is always wholly present to everyonerdquo54 (II1437)

For Augustine the good will is thus one that cleaves to the inalienable immu-table eternal and common good which all can enjoy equally at the same time (while the sinful will prefers alienable mutable temporal and private goods)

Therefore when the will cleaves to the common and unchangeable good it attains the great and foremost goods for human beings even though the will itself is only an intermediate good But when the will turns away from the unchangeable and common toward its own private good or toward external and inferior things it sins It turns toward its own private good when it wants to be under its own control it turns toward external things when it is keen on things that belong to others or have nothing to do with itself it turns toward inferior things when it takes delight in physical pleasure In this way one becomes proud meddlesome and lustful one is caught up in a life that by comparison with the higher life is death 55

(II1953)

53 Haec est libertas nostra cum isti subdimur veritati et ipse est Deus noster Compare Conf X2333 ldquoThe happy life is joy in the truth and that means joy in you who are the Truth O Godrdquo (Hoc est enim gaudium de te qui Veritas es Deus)

54 [N]on enim aliquid eius aliquando fit cuiusquam unius aut quorumdam proprium sed simul omni-bus tota est communis

55 Voluntas ergo adhaerens communi atque incommutabili bono impetrat prima et magna hominis bona cum ipsa sit medium quoddam bonum Voluntas autem aversa ab incommutabili et communi bono et conversa ad proprium bonum aut ad exterius aut ad inferius peccat Ad proprium convertitur cum suae potestatis vult esse ad exterius cum aliorum propria vel quaecumque ad se non pertinent cognoscere studet ad inferius cum voluptatem corporis diligit atque ita homo superbus et curiosus et lascivus effectus excipitur ab alia vita quae in comparatione superioris vitae mors est


That we who are from the start weak and beset with temptations de facto commit sin requires in Augustinersquos view no special explanation But one sin did strike him as inexplicable though undeniable the ldquoprimal sinrdquo of Adam and Eve56 They unlike us were created with the ability to avoid sin they had what Augustine calls ldquofreedom of the willrdquo (libertas voluntatis) a freedom that was lost with the Fall Had they not had that freedom had they been created like usmdashweak and with a proclivity toward greed and egotismmdashthen God not they would be to blame for their sin This meant for Augustine that Adam and Eve were not afflicted by concupiscence their faculties were in proper order with the sensate subordinated to the rational Yet well made as they were they fell how-ever inexplicably Since God punishes no one unjustly they sinned ldquoof their free willrdquo57 Augustine is convinced of this though he admits he cannot explain how primal sin could have happened Still the concept of willmdashnow in the sense of a human capacity to choose and to act voluntarily that is distinct from desire and belief though involving bothmdashmakes the notion of primal sin intelligible (even if only barely)58 For the will is as we have seen more intimately connected with the person in a juridical sense than onersquos desires are59 As was Augustine Donald Davidson was persuaded that the concept of will is indispensable to make sense of voluntary wrong-doing Noting for example the temptation to depict weak-ness of will (he calls it ldquoincontinencerdquo) as a struggle between ldquotwo actorsrdquo reason and passion he pointed out the weakness in this approach

On [this] story not only can we not account for incontinence it is not clear how we can ever blame the agent for what he does his action merely reflects the outcome of a struggle within him What could he do about it And more important the image [of two competing

58 This is the thesis of Robert F Brown ldquoThe First Evil Will Must Be Incomprehensible A Critique of Augustinerdquo Journal of the American Academy of Religion 46 3 (1978) 315ndash29 T D J Chappell takes Augustinersquos side in his ldquoExplaining the Inexplicable Augustine on the Fallrdquo Journal of the American Academy of Religion 623 (1994) 869ndash84

59 Cf chapter 1 pp 10ndash11

56 Here I follow the suggestion of Scott MacDonald and others to label this first of all human sins ldquoprimalrdquo instead of the more familiar ldquooriginalrdquo since the latter shifts the focus to the effects on the descendants of Adam and Eversquos fall Cf MacDonald ldquoPrimal Sinrdquo in The Augustinian Tradition ed Gareth Matthews (Berkeley University of California Press 1999)

57 We by contrast sin ldquovoluntarilyrdquo or by ldquofree choicerdquo but not ldquoby free willrdquo ie nothing outside of us compels us to choose to follow our self-love but nonetheless we are not freemdashin the absence of gracemdashto follow the love of God As Augustine says in City of God (XIV111) ldquoThe (choice of the)will is then truly free when it is not the slave of vices and sins Such was it given us by God and this being lost by its own fault can only be restored by Him who was able at first to give itrdquo [Arbitrium igitur voluntatis tunc est vere liberum cum vitiis peccatisque non servit Tale datum est a Deo quod amis-sum proprio vitio nisi a quo dari potuit reddi non potest]


actors] does not allow us to make sense of a conflict in one personrsquos soul for it leaves no room for the all-important process of weighing considerations60

As seen in chapter 1 Thomas Aquinas stressed as key to the notion of volun-tary action the capacity to ldquoweigh considerationsrdquomdashit makes us ldquomastersrdquo of our actions

The fact that humans are masters of their actions is due to being able to deliberate about them for since the deliberating reason is indifferently disposed to opposite things the will can be inclined to either61

(STh IaIIae 6 2 ad 2)

Davidson explicitly credits Aquinas in amending the ldquotwo actorrdquo imagemdashReason vs Passionmdashand adding a crucial third agent

In the second image the agentrsquos representative The Will can judge the strength of the arguments on both sides can execute the decision and take the rap

(36)

If Davidson was following Aquinas Thomas was surely following Augustine Augustinersquos struggle with the concept of primal sin led him to a conception of the will not only as rational desire but also as a hinge (Latin cardo) by which one inclinesmdashldquoturnsrdquomdasheither to the side of ldquothe common and unchangeable goodrdquo or to that of ldquoprivaterdquo and ldquoinferiorrdquo goods62 (DLA III13) If one chooses the former then onersquos will is indistinguishable from correct rational desire Our capacity to do either howevermdashas illustrated in Augustinersquos version of the Gen-esis storymdashshows that we need to distinguish from either desire ldquoa crucial third agentrdquo the ability to choose between them This ability is the will which repre-sents the self in its autonomy and which thus ldquocan take the raprdquo63

60 ldquoWeaknessrdquo in Essays on Actions 35ndash36 Davidson describes his own change of mind about the will in the Introduction to that volume especially pp xindashxiii

61 [Q]uod homo est dominus sui actus quod habet deliberationem de suis actibus ex hoc enim quod ratio deliberans se habet ad opposita voluntas in utrumque potest

62 Evodius speaks of a person choosing ldquoas if swinging on the hinge of the willrdquo (detorquet quasi quemdam cardinem voluntatis)

63 Though the contrary is often assumed Augustine seems to follow the Stoics and Peripatetics in the eudaimonistic assumption that we always act in pursuit of our judgment about what will lead to our happiness Hence sin represents an errormdasheven more perhaps a lie (mendacium one thinks of the serpent in Eden)mdashabout what true happiness consists in DCD XIV4


For Augustinemdashand here is the payoffmdashthe crucially important ldquoraprdquo is the biggest one of all the responsibility for the presence of evil in the world Since it manifestly belongs to the notion of the will from Aristotlersquos hekousion onward that it cannot be compelled without destroying it and that as a result the agent alone is ldquomasterrdquo (kurios dominus) of her acts it follows that the First Sin was solely Adamrsquos and Eversquos responsibility They were rightly punished God is exon-erated and we their descendants justly bear the penalty for their sin We too sin ldquofreelyrdquo in a sense ie we do so ldquoby free choicerdquo uncoerced doing what we want but we sin not ldquoby free willrdquo ie we are unable without the help of grace to reject our sinful inclination to self-love and choose selflessness We can do what we want but we cannot choose the desires we find ourselves with This however is not Godrsquos fault but an inherited penalty from the sin of Adam and Eve64

The will is thus the key explanatory notion for sin and the presence of evil in the world and it has now becomemdashmuch more so than in Aristotlemdasha com-plex notion From the start Augustine is cognizant of various though related meanings of ldquowillrdquo (voluntas) He initiates his exchange with Evodius about the virtues in book I of DLA with the query ldquoDo we have a willrdquo65 (I1225) Evo-dius says he is not sure so Augustine reminds him of a number of things he wants he wants first an answer to this very question second to thereby attain wisdom third that things go well for his friend Augustine and finally he wants to be happy Thus Augustinersquos initial argument for the existence of will is simply that we want things that is we have various kinds of desires short- and long-term benevolent and self-centered eudaimonic etc66 Augustine as we have

66 Here I take exception to what seems to be T D J Chappellrsquos proposal that ldquoAugustinersquos talk about the voluntas be understood simply as his way of talking about the voluntarymdashwhether that means voluntary action or choice or bothrdquo Cf Chappell Aristotle and Augustine 127 The passage just cited shows that in addition Augustine often uses voluntas to mean desire especially the set of desires that mark onersquos dominant character (onersquos ldquoloverdquo) However I do not deny that Augustine also uses voluntas to mark the voluntary as Chappell suggests and I am also inclined to agree with his thrust when he continues the quoted passage ldquomdashand not as it has often been as talk about a reified faculty of will constituting a substantial presence in the theater of the psycherdquo and able to act independently of the intellect But cf the partially contrary view of Scott MacDonald note 68 Irwin apparently sides with Chappellrsquos rejection of the notion that Augustine is a (the first) voluntarist

64 Cf DLA III18 The topic of Augustine and freedom of will is too complex and too periph-eral to my main concern for me to pursue it further here Cf the discussion in Christopher Kirwan Augustine (London and New York Routledge 1989) chs 5 and 6 When some of his views are taken out of context Augustine is sometimes thought a libertarian but this is mistaken Cf Lynne R Baker ldquoWhy Christians Should Not Be Libertarians An Augustinian Challengerdquo Faith and Philoso-phy 20 (2003) 460ndash78 Eleonore Stump surveys the issue of freedom for Augustine in ldquoAugustine on Free Willrdquo in Cambridge Companion to Augustine eds E Stump and N Kretzman (Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2006)

65 Sitne aliqua nobis voluntas This question and the ensuing discussion is the central focus of Simon Harrison Augustinersquos Way into The Will The Theological and Philosophical Significance of De libero arbitrio (Oxford and New York Oxford University Press 2006)


seen argues that it is ldquoup to our willrdquo whether or not it is good67 And he adds ldquo(F)or what is so much in the power of the will as the will itselfrdquo68 (DLA I1226) This reference to our capacity to choose has suggested to some that he thinks of the will itself as a ldquopowerrdquo or ldquofacultyrdquo of the soul Granted that he does stress this capacity one can still ask if a faculty is what he means here Since we judge people morally on the basis of whether or not they manifest what Au-gustine called a ldquodesire to live an upright and honorable liferdquo it would be strange to claim that one is not responsible for havingmdashor not havingmdashsuch a desire who or what else could be responsible When Augustine asks ldquoWhat is so much in the power of the will as the will itselfrdquo he might mean simply our ability to perform voluntary actions ldquoat willrdquomdashAristotlersquos hekousionmdashie the idea of non-compulsion or he could be alluding to the rather similar Stoic notion of assent (sunkatathesis) or he could mean merely that no one can force us to prefer one thing to another It is in any case not clear that Augustine ismdashat this early point that ismdashembracing the notion of the will as a power or faculty of the soul as some have claimed69 What is clear as we shall see is that Augustine was soon to abandon the apparently commonsensical (and certainly classical) view that nothing ldquois so much in the power of the will as the will itselfrdquo in one straightfor-ward sense of this phrase

Here is a further Augustinian twist to the classical approach to virtue will and love the very Neoplatonic first book of DLA was written not long after Augustinersquos conversion But by the time he finished book II several years later

67 In posing the matter in these terms Augustine breaks from the Stoic and (Neo-)Platonist approach according to which boulecircsis or voluntas as rational desire is always good In this respect his view more resembles that of Aristotle (cf Van Riel ldquoAugustinersquos Willrdquo) though here too he innovates by highlighting a sense of will that seems distinct from any desire the will as ldquohingerdquo as noted above p 60 This I think is the closest he comes to a faculty view

68 Quid enim tam in voluntate quam ipsa voluntas sita est69 Scott MacDonald finds four different senses of voluntas in Augustine ldquo(1) a faculty or power of

the soulmdashthe will (2) a particular act of that power such as a voluntary choice or volition (3) any kind of passing or enduring state or disposition of that power such as an intention attitude want or desire and (4) a personrsquos overarching or dominant bent directedness or volitional commitmentrdquo ldquoPrimal Sinrdquo 117 This multiplicity of related but distinct senses of the one term is an indication of Augus-tinersquos unsystematic approach to the topic He was not a scholastic thinker By contrast to MacDonald Sarah Byers has argued that for Augustine voluntas typically even always denotes the Stoic hormē or impulse (either occurrent or dispositional) toward action ie motivation ldquoThe Meaning of Voluntas in Augustinerdquo Augustinian Studies 37 2 (2006) 171ndash189 Cf also Van Riel who in ldquoAugustinersquos Willrdquo argues for an eclectic use of sources including Aristotle by Augustine for the concept of will How-ever this connection must remain moot based as it on the presumed similarity of Aristotlersquos Protrepti-cus and Cicerorsquos Hortensius The latter which we know Augustine read with ardor in his youth was said to be based on the former but both works are known today only through fragments

ldquo(Augustine) does not claim that the will moves us independently of the greater apparent good He accepts Stoic intellectualism and avoids voluntarismrdquo Development of Ethics 412


he had been ordained and become more deeply immersed in the Christian scrip-tures and theology The change shows itself in a number of ways including the definition of virtue which is now no longer simply ldquoperfect love of Godrdquo Sum-ming up in the thirteenth century Augustinersquos more mature view Thomas Aqui-nas put the matter this way

[T]he definition usually given of virtue [is this] Virtue is a good qual-ity of the mind by which we live righteously of which no one can make bad use which God works in us without us [For this] we have the authority of Augustine from whose words this definition is gathered and principally in de Libero Arbitrio II1970

(STh IaIIae55 41 and sed contra emphasis added)

The striking new note here is the idea that it is God who ldquoworksrdquo virtue in us and does so ldquowithout usrdquo With this Augustine has stepped well away from the Neoplatonists and other classical authors though as is clear from works as late as City of God he does so without abandoning the framework of teleological eudaimonism We will have more to say below about the divine role in creating the will or love that constitutes human virtue

When Augustine refers to the contrast between ldquocommonrdquo goods shared by all (such as truth and wisdom) and ldquoprivaterdquo ones (such as material pos-sessions) he is also expressing his growing hostility toward what he regarded as the elitist character of classical ethics its explicit restriction of the best life to the intelligentsia This development too was part of his deeper immersion in the Christian scriptures and tradition Granted for Plato Aristotle and the Stoics there was nothing intrinsically private about the timeless truths or objects that they prized still these were de facto accessible only to a relative handful the leisured wise By contrast the mission of Jesus was to all and es-pecially to humble and ordinary people such as fishermen tax-collectors women and children slave and free and this very fact was a stumbling block for the Christian message among the learned in the Greek-speaking world71 Later Augustine would say he had gained nothing from studying that ldquoproud

70 [D]efinitio virtutis quae solet assignari scilicet virtus est bona qualitas mentis qua recte vivitur qua nullus male utitur quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur est auctoritas Augustini ex cuius verbis praedicta definitio colligitur et praecipue in II de libero arbitrio Harrison Augustinersquos Way contends that DLA despite its composition over a seven-year period constitutes a substantial unity He may have a point but the three books do show some marked differences eg in frequency of scriptural citation (almost none in book I more in book II frequent in book III)

71 Cf the story of St Paulrsquos reception among the philosophers in Athens Acts of Apostles 17 16ndash34


mouthfulrdquo ie the list of categories given in Aristotlersquos famous logical work of that name72 (Conf IV1628) By contrast ldquowhat disadvantage was it to your little ones that they were much more slow-minded than I They did not forsake you but stayed safely in the nest of your church to grow their plumage and strengthen the wings of their charity on the wholesome nourishment of the faithrdquo73 (Conf IV1631)

If being a ldquoslow-minded little onerdquo is no hindrance to the attainment of ldquowisdom and truthrdquomdashand hence the happy lifemdashclearly Augustinersquos concep-tion of eudaimonism has been greatly broadened from the classical one he still adhered to right after his conversion Now in principle all can walk the path regardless of intellectual capacity or way of life and it is ldquocharityrdquo a good will that makes this possible Indeed from Confessions onward intellectmdashprone to pridemdashis cast as a potential impediment to moral progress Augustine contin-ued to accept the view that our supreme happiness lies in some sort of joining with or ldquocleaving tordquo the immaterial Divine but as he confides in Confessions VII his own attempts at a Neoplatonic mystical union with God were a disap-pointment to him He was bent on finding the needed strength he remarks but he was not yet ldquohumble enough to grasp the humble Jesus as my God nor did I know what his weakness had to teachrdquo74 (Conf VII1824)

The seeming paradox that the sought-for strength lies in humility is delib-erate The dynamic of Augustinersquos conversion story begins with his intellectual insight into the spiritual nature of God but this cognitive step while necessary was not sufficient75 His will also needed to be remade and he feels humiliated that he cannot achieve this on his own In Confessions VII his path of learning led him first to the libri Platonicorum which removed the stumbling blocks of mate-rialism and the nature of evil mentioned above But this path toward salvation could lead no further indeed it threatened to imprison Augustine in a trap of its own the fatal flaw of pride in the seeker

72 buccis typho crepantibus 73 [Q]uid tantum oberat parvulis tuis longe tardius ingenium cum a te longe non recederent ut in nido

ecclesiae tuae tuti plumescerent et alas caritatis alimento sanae fidei nutrirent74 Non enim tenebam Deum meum Iesum humilis humilem nec cuius rei magistra esset eius infirmitas

noveram75 In calling it necessary I am agreeing with Chappell Aristotle and Augustine 153 that Augustine is

not a ldquovoluntaristrdquo if we take that to imply a belief in the willrsquos capacity to act independently of reason The conversion narrative clearly puts intellectual insight first though by itself insight is not enough to bring one safely onto the path of salvation A similar framework is at work in DLA III (see below) Indeed Augustine explicitly says there ldquoIt often happens that right opinion corrects perverted habits and that perverted opinion distorts an upright nature so great is the power of the dominion and rule of reasonrdquo DLA III823 emphasis added [Solet autem et recta opinio pravam corrigere consuetudinem et prava opinio rectam depravare naturam tanta vis est in dominatu et principatu rationis]


I had already begun to covet a reputation for wisdom and though fully punished I shed no tears of compunction rather I was complacently puffed up with knowledge Where was that charity which builds on the foundation of humility that is Christ Jesus And when would those books [of the Platonists] have taught it to me I believe that you [God] willed me to stumble upon them before I gave my mind to your scrip-tures so that the memory of how I had been affected by them might be impressed upon me when later I had been brought to a new gentle-ness through the study of your books and your fingers were tending my wounds thus insight would be mine to recognize the difference between presumption and confession between those who see the goal but not the way to it and the Way to our beatific homeland a Homeland to be not merely descried but lived in76

(Conf VII2026)

The most profound of the classical pagan thinkers the Neoplatonists ldquosee the goal but not the way to itrdquo a Way whose humility could only strike such authors as paradoxical

In his recognition of the limitations of Neoplatonism Augustine turned again to the letters of St Paul and found that his earlier problems with the apostle had ldquomelted awayrdquo

I discovered that every truth I had read in those other books [of the philosophers] was taught here also but now inseparably from your gift of grace so that no one who sees can boast as though what he sees and the very power to see it were not from youmdashfor who has anything that he has not received So totally is it a matter of grace that the searcher is not only invited to see you who are ever the same but healed as well so that he can possess you77

(Conf VII2127 emphasis added)

76 Iam enim coeperam velle videri sapiens plenus poena mea et non flebam insuper et inflabar scientia Ubi enim erat illa aedificans caritas a fundamento humilitatis quod est Christus Iesus Aut quando illi libri me docerent eam In quos me propterea priusquam Scripturas tuas considerarem credo voluisti incurrere ut imprimeretur memoriae meae quomodo ex eis affectus essem et cum postea in libris tuis mansuefactus essem et curantibus digitis tuis contrectarentur vulnera mea discernerem atque distinguerem quid interesset inter praesumptionem et confessionem inter videntes quo eumdum sit nec videntes qua et viam ducentem ad beatificam patriam non tantum cernendam sed et habitandam

77 Et coepi et inveni quidquid illac verum legeram hac cum commendatione gratiae tuae dici ut qui videt non sic glorietur quasi non acceperit non solum id quod videt sed etiam ut videat (quid enim habet quod non accepit) et ut te qui es semper idem non solum admoneatur ut videat sed etiam sanetur ut teneat


In this (almost offhand) manner Augustine announces an epochal shift that on the decisive issue will take him out of the orbit of classical ethics altogether and into that of Pauline Christianity the path to salvation depends not on our efforts but fundamentally perhaps entirely on Godrsquos grace We will have more to say about this shortly but for now we note that Augustine was not alone in his renewed interest in Paul As Peter Brown says ldquoThe last decades of the fourth century in the Latin church could well be called lsquothe generation of S Paulrsquo a common interest in S Paul drew together widely differing thinkers and made them closer to each other than to their predecessorsrdquo78 In Augustinersquos case this interest was destined to have the most profound consequences both for him personally and for the Latin Church At this point in the Confessions narrative the reengagement with Paul is presentedmdashbriefly and simplymdashas the final step in Augustinersquos intellectual acceptance of the Christian religion

But the new level of understandingmdashhowever indispensablemdashdoes not complete Augustinersquos conversion In the dramatic retelling in Confessions VIII of the decisive phase the final step must be taken by the will What held him back he says ldquowas no iron chain imposed by anyone else but the iron of my own willrdquo79 (Conf VIII510) He continues

The enemy had my power of willing in his clutches and from it had formed a chain to bind me The truth is that disordered lust springs from a perverted will when lust is pandered to a habit is formed when habit is not checked it hardens into compulsion A new will had begun to emerge in me the will to worship you disinterestedly and enjoy you O God our only sure felicity but it was not yet capable of surmounting that earlier will strengthened by inveterate custom And so the two wills fought it outmdashthe old and the new the one carnal the other spiritualmdashand in their struggle tore my soul apart80

(Ibid)

78 Peter Brown Augustine of Hippo A Biography (Berkeley University of California Press 19672000) 144

79 Cui rei ego suspirabam ligatus non ferro alieno sed mea ferrea voluntate The metaphor of binding reminds of the saying of Epictetus quoted in note 47

80 Velle meum tenebat inimicus et inde mihi catenam fecerat et constrinxerat me Quippe ex voluntate perversa facta est libido et dum servitur libidini facta est consuetudo et dum consuetudini non resistitur facta est necessitas Quibus quasi ansulis sibimet innexis (unde catenam appellavi) tenebat me obstrictum dura servitus Voluntas autem nova quae mihi esse coeperat ut te gratis colerem fruique te vellem Deus sola certa iucunditas nondum erat idonea ad superandam priorem vetustate roboratam Ita duae voluntates meae una vetus alia nova illa carnalis illa spiritalis confligebant inter se atque discordando dissipabant animam meam


This remarkable passage and the lengthy ones that follow recounting the stormy scene in the garden in Milan are among the most famous in Western literature and have received extensive commentary For our purposes the following points are most salient

First the ldquotwo willsrdquo (voluntates) to which Augustine refers are clearly sets or patterns of habitual desires and not faculties of the soul otherwise he would be endorsing a ldquotwo-soulrdquo theory like that of the Manichees which he explicitly rejects a few pages later ldquoWhen therefore the Manichees observe two conflict-ing impulses [voluntates] within one person let them stop saying that two hostile minds [mentes] are at warrdquo since the same line of reasoning could be extended absurdly to imply three or four (or more) such souls81 (VIII1024)

Second the ldquonew willrdquo has as its object God the summum bonum itself and Augustine is now certain of this but strangely and disconcertingly he does not yet want the Supreme Good sufficiently to turn his back on ldquothat earlier willrdquo his desires for ldquocarnalrdquo enjoyment He regards conversion as the right course for him he ldquocommandsrdquo (imperat) himself to want it (VIII921) ldquoyet it [the mind] does not do what it commandsrdquo ie to will his conversion82 (VIII921) How can this be Augustinersquos own explanation is that he was still conflicted and hence his willing was only partial incomplete ldquoEvidently then it does not want this thing with the whole of itself and therefore the command does not proceed from an undivided mindrdquo83 (ibid) At first glance this explanation seems not to make much sense for as Augustine is well aware we regularly choose even if reluctantly among competing desires and such choices can be praiseworthy But I suggest what he means is that this case is not about selecting among run-of-the-mill wants (ldquochocolate versus vanillardquo so to speak) rather it is about a choice of that fundamental motivational orienta-tion of the self a combination of Aristotlersquos boulecircsis (what we rationally desire the thing we regard as the proper goal of our lives) and an avid and effective desire for that goal (roughly the habituation that Aristotle saw as the founda-tion of character) If so Augustine is here discussing a situation about which Aristotle was largely silent and that he seems to have regarded as psychologi-cally improbable if not impossible ie fundamental conversion of the heart84

81 Iam ergo non dicant cum duas voluntates in homine uno adversari sibi sentiunt duas contrarias mentes de duabus contrariis substantiis et de duobus contrariis principiis contendere

82 [E]t non fit quod imperat83 Sed non ex toto vult non ergo ex toto imperat84 There is disagreement over whether Aristotle believed that a vicious person could reform his

character As we saw he discusses the issue briefly (and ambiguously) in NE III5 1114a 12ndash21 later at NE VII7 in his comparison of incontinence and intemperance he seems to hold out little hope for such radical reform What is clear however is that he devotes very little space to an issue that is central to Confessions Cf Gianluca Di Muzio ldquoAristotle on Improving Onersquos Characterrdquo Phronesis 453 (2000) 205ndash19


Thus pace some commentators85 the situation Augustine describes in Con-fessions VIII is not that of the Aristotelian akratic person who is sure of what the proper goal in life is yet acts contrary to it in a specific case but rather that of a repentant akolastos a vicious person or inveterate sinner who is now trying to reform Here then would be a central case of voluntas as not merely a desire per se but as the cardinal rational desire in onersquos life the pillar notion of eudaimonism enhanced by the requirement that this desire be motivationally effective

Third the new and better will is characterized by ldquodisinterestedrdquo (gratis) desire (or love) This term expands on the theme noted above of what marks the well-ordered soul it wants what it cannot lose against its will it wants the eternal in preference to the temporal and also the common as op-posed to the private With respect to this last contrast Augustine as we saw in book II of DLA chiefly has in mind Truth and Wisdom identified with God If the object of my desire is ldquoabove merdquo and is furthermore such that it plainly can be shared by all equally then Augustine seems to think my desire for it will be disinterested rather than selfish and marked by admiration for the object itself as opposed to what it can do for me86 Early and late this is one of the principal themes of Augustinersquos work the contrast of the two kinds of will the ldquotwo lovesrdquo each of which is the basis of a ldquocityrdquo or metaphorical commonwealth

These are the two loves the first is holy the second foul the first is social the second selfish the first consults the common welfare for the sake of a celestial society the second grasps at a selfish control of social affairs for the sake of arrogant domination the first is submis-sive to God the second tries to rival God the first is quiet the second restless the first desires for its neighbor what it wishes for itself the second desires to subjugate its neighbor the first rules its neighbor for the good of the neighbor the second for its own advantage and [the two loves] also separate the two cities founded among the race of

86 For a skeptical take on Augustinersquos success in accounting for our experience of disinterested love and obligation in these terms see OrsquoConnell ldquoActionrdquo

85 Risto Saarinen for instance says in his ground-breaking Weakness of the Will in Medieval Thought From Augustine to Buridan (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 44 Leiden Brill 1994 35) ldquoThis description [in Conf VIII511] resembles Aristotlersquos presentation of akratic behaviorrdquo mdashresemblance perhaps but Augustine is not discussing akrasia in Aristotlersquos sense though one could describe Augustinersquos becircte noir as ldquoweakness of willrdquo in one sense (cf also Saarinenrsquos more cautious provisos on pp 36ndash37) Rist makes claims similar to those of Saarinen in Ancient Thought 130 137 and 184ndash85


men the first city is that of the just the second is that of the wicked Although they are now during the course of time intermingled they shall be divided at the last judgment 87

(Gen litt II1520)

Fourth Augustine says his ldquoperverted willrdquo is the origin of his final resistance to conversion As we have seen such a will ldquoturns away from the unchangeable and common good toward its own private good or toward external or inferior things It turns toward its own private good when it wants to be under its own controlrdquo (DLA II1953) In this theme there are echoes of both Paul and Ploti-nus In a passage Augustine seems to have known Plotinus asks

What can it be that has brought the souls to forget the Father God and though members of the Divine and entirely of that world to ignore at once themselves and It The evil that has overtaken them has its source in self-will in the entry into the sphere of process and in the primal dif-ferentiation with the desire for self-ownership (Enneads V11 emphases added)88

The Greek term here translated as ldquoself-willrdquo is tolma more often rendered as boldness (Latin audacia) or pride (superbia)89 Augustine has much to say against both audacia and superbia often quoting the words of Jesus Sirach 1015 ldquoThe beginning of all sin is priderdquo90 But recall too that in the passage about St Paulrsquos writings quoted above Augustine had said the truths he encountered there were presented ldquoinseparably from your gift of grace so that no one who sees can boast

87 Hi duo amores quorum alter sanctus est alter immundus alter socialis alter privatus alter com-muni utilitati consulens propter supernam societatem alter etiam rem communem in potestatem propriam redigens propter arrogantem dominationem alter subditus alter aemulus Deo alter tranquillus alter turbulentus alter hoc volens proximo quod sibi alter subicere proximum sibi alter propter proximi utilitatem regens proximum alter propter suam et distinxerunt conditas in genere humano civitates duas sub admirabili et ineffabili providentia Dei cuncta quae creat administrantis et ordinantis alteram iustorum alteram iniquorum Quarum etiam quadam temporali commixtione peragitur saeculum donec ultimo iudicio separentur The Essential Augustine trans V Bourke 2nd ed (Indianapolis IN Hackett Publ Co1974) 201 Cf also City of God XIV 28

88 Enneads V11 Τί ποτε ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ πεποιηκὸς τὰς ψυχὰς πατρὸς θεοῦ ἐπιλαθέσθαι καὶ μοίρας ἐκεῖθεν οὔσας καὶ ὅλως ἐκεί νου ἀγνοῆσαι καὶ ἑαυτὰς καὶ ἐκεῖνον Ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν αὐταῖς τοῦ κακοῦ ἡ τόλμα καὶ ἡ γένεσις καὶ ἡ πρώτη ἑτερότης καὶ τὸ βουληθῆναι δὲ ἑαυτῶν εἶναι Plotinus The Enneads trans Stephan MacKenna (Burdett NY Larson Publications 1992) 423

89 The latter translation is standard in Rist Ancient Thought90 Eg in City of God XIV131


as though what he sees and the very power to see it were not from youmdashfor who has anything that he has not receivedrdquo91 (Conf VII2127 emphasis added)

We have been tracing the reasons why Augustine depicted the good or bad con-dition of the willmdashand not say the intellectmdashas the central determinant of our success or failure in life His need to overcome his early Manichaeism led him to assign the responsibility for the presence of evil in the world to voluntary human wrong-doing God created human beings with a free will but is not to blame for our misuse and subsequent loss of it92 If we did not have this gift we could not perform good deeds either93 In his most optimistic postconversion phase Augus-tine sounds like a classical moralist when for instance in DLA I he writes

(All) who will to live upright and honorable lives if they will this more than they will transitory goods attain such a great good so easily that they have it by the very act of willing to have it94

(I1329)

Contrast the hopeful suggestion here that the ldquoupright and honorablerdquo life is ldquoso easilyrdquo attained with the agony of the divided will depicted in Confessions VIII a decade later95 It seems Augustine had become by then a ldquosadder and a wiser manrdquo Some of the reasons underlying this change of mind are in part laid out in DLA III (and others in the Ad Simplicianum discussed below) In a sustained and brilliant presentation near the end of DLA (III1748 ff) Augustine explains his view that ldquoa perverse will is (itself) the cause of all evilsrdquo I recount here some of his central points

92 To simplify matters I am ignoring the sin of Lucifer and the fallen angels93 This is the so-called ldquoFree Will Defenserdquo for the existence of evil ldquoIf human beings are good

things and they cannot do right unless they so will then they ought to have a free will without which they cannot do rightrdquo DLA II13 [Si enim homo aliquod bonum est et non posset nisi cum vellet recte facere debuit habere liberam voluntatem sine qua recte facere non posset]

94 [Q]uisquis recte honesteque vult vivere si id se velle prae fugacibus bonis velit assequatur tantam rem tanta facilitate ut nihil aliud ei quam ipsum velle sit habere quod voluit

95 Doubly odd is the fact that the events in the garden in Milan in 386 (reported in Confessions) must have been fresh in Augustinersquos memory when he wrote of the tanta facilitate (ldquoso easilyrdquo) a year or so later in DLA I

91 Lloyd Gerson notes that the theme of pride or self-assertion as the source of evil is common to Plato and Aquinas In Laws 731e Plato says that ldquothe cause of each and every crime we commit is pre-cisely this excessive love of ourselvesrdquo while Thomas claims (STh IIaIIae1627c) that pride the act of which is ldquothe contempt of Godrdquo ldquois lsquothe beginning of all sinsrsquordquo [aversio a Deo principium omnium peccatorum] Lloyd P Gerson ldquoPlato Aquinas and the Universal Goodrdquo The New Scholasticism 582 (1984) 131ndash44 But surprisingly Gerson fails to note that this theme is central in Augustine eg at DLA II1953 the will sins ldquowhen it wants to be under its own control and one becomes proud meddlesome and lustfulrdquo [cum suae potestatis vult esse atque ita homo superbuset curiosus et lascivus effectus]


First we seek in vain for any external cause of a perverse will for if there were one (if eg we had been created perverse or were to be perverted against our will by another) there would be no sin

Second our de facto sinfulness stems from our condition of ldquoignorance and difficultyrdquo ie our inability to understand the truth and even when we do understand it the trouble we have to act accordingly but

Third this condition is not our original nature it is itself a ldquopenaltyrdquo the result of sins those that we ourselves commit as well as the sinfulness we inherit as part of our flawed human nature Because of our ignorance ldquowe lack the free choice of the will to choose to act rightlyrdquo Further ldquoeven when we do see what is right and will to do it we cannot because of the resistance of carnal habits which develops almost naturally because of the unruliness of our mortal inheritancerdquo96 (III1852 emphasis added) By ldquoour mortal inheritancerdquo Augustine of course means the effect of original sin

When someone acts wrongly out of ignorance or cannot do what he rightly wills to do his actions are called sins because they have their origin in that first sin [of Adam and Eve] which was committed by free will97

(III1954)

One might naturally wonder how we descendants of Adam and Eve can justly be penalized for their sin Augustine has little patience with this complaint

Let [those who want to blame Adam and Eve instead of themselves] be silent and stop murmuring against God Perhaps their complaint would be justified if there were no Victor over error and inordinate desire You are not blamed for your unwilling ignorance but because you fail to ask about what you do not know You are not blamed because you do not bind up your own wounds but because you spurn the one who wants to heal you These are your own sins98

(III1953)

96 Nec mirandum est quod vel ignorando non habet arbitrium liberum voluntatis ad eligendum quid recte faciat vel resistente carnali consuetudine quae violentia mortalis successionis quodammodo naturali-ter inolevit

97 Nam illud quod ignorans quisque non recte facit et quod recte volens facere non potest ideo dicuntur peccata quia de peccato illo liberae voluntatis originem ducunt

98 [Q]uiescant et adversus Deum murmurare desistant Recte enim fortasse quererentur si erroris et libidinis nullus hominum victor existeret non tibi deputatur ad culpam quod invitus ignoras sed quod negligis quaerere quod ignoras neque illud quod vulnerata membra non colligis sed quod volentem sanare contemnis ista tua propria peccata sunt


ldquoFailing to askrdquo a sin of omission can plausibly be called voluntary and hence culpable on our part So too can ldquospurningrdquo an offer of help and healing True because of original sin we start out in life on the wrong foot but Augustine is here concerned to assure us that though we cannot amend our lives by our own efforts alone divine help is ours for the asking Thus in this extended section we find on one hand a fascinating blend of optimism (ldquoif the will cannot resist it there is no sinrdquo ldquoyou are not blamed rdquo ldquothe soul has the power rdquo) and pessi-mism on the other (ldquowe lack the free choice of the willrdquo ldquowe cannot do itrdquo ldquothese are your own sinsrdquo) In each case the focus is on the will The passage begins with the hopeful affirmation of the classical insight that external compulsion destroys responsibility99 Implicit in what follows is the fact that we are not indeed cannot be forced to our sinful behavior by anyone to be guilty we must (and do) freely choose it Yet ldquobecause of our ignorance we lack the free choice of the will to choose to act rightlyrdquo Does this not contradict the libertarian-sounding idea that compulsion destroys responsibility Despite appearances it does not Our ldquoignorance and difficultyrdquo are not external sources of compulsion They are in us in a sense they are us But then since we did not make ourselves can we be held responsible Here Augustine seems to recognize that he is on the brink of making the Creator responsible for our sinfulness So he hastens to add that

these (sinful traits) do not belong to the nature that human beings were created with they are the penalty of a condemned prisoner But when we speak of the free will to act rightly we mean the will with which human beings were created100

(III1852)

Because of their Fall Adam and Eve lost their birthright including ldquothe free will to act rightlyrdquo and we have all somehow inherited the resultant sorry condi-tion But in spite of their disastrous impact on us it is wrong for us human beings to blame Adam and Eve for our continuing woes For there is a ldquoVictor over error and inordinate desirerdquo namely Christ who has made ldquoGodrsquos helprdquo (ie grace) available to us As a result the soul ldquohas the power to reform itself with Godrsquos help and by pious labors to acquire all of the virtues by which it is freed from the torture of difficulty and the blindness of ignorancerdquo101 (III2056) Such is

100 [N]on est natura instituti hominis sed poena damnati Cum autem de libera voluntate recte faciendi loquimur de illa scilicet in qua homo factus est loquimur

101 [E]tiam quod facultatem habet ut adiuvante Creatore seipsam excolat et pio studio possit omnes acquirere et capere virtutes per quas et a difficultate cruciante et ab ignorantia caecante liberetur

99 Cf for instance Aristotle NE III1 1109b33ndash1110a1 ldquoThose things then are thought involun-tary which take place under compulsion and that is compulsory of which the moving principle is outsiderdquo [δοκεῖ δὴ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ βίᾳ γινόμενα βίαιον δὲ οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν]


the still modestly optimistic conclusion of book 3 of DLA a conclusion thatmdash leaving aside the necessity of asking for divine helpmdashis recognizably a con-tinuation of the classical tradition Augustine has worked hard and apparently successfully to overlay on that tradition the central elements of Christianity the Creator Deity original sin redemption grace etc To become a Christian an Aristotelian would certainly need to amend her view of the moral life but prin-cipally by incorporating the need for divine assistance in acquiring the virtues that lead us to a happiness in principle open to all But if such assistance is made available to us through preaching and teaching the stretch for an Aristotelian would not seem overly great

Before we move on it is important to note again Augustinersquos distinction between free choice (liberum arbitrium) and free will (libera voluntas) The former we have retained in our fallen state (without it we could not sin) Augus-tine often identifies it with consent

[ J]ust as no one sins unwillingly [invitus] by his own thought so no one yields to the evil prompting of another unless his own will consents [consentit]102

(III1029)

True ldquothe free will to act rightlyrdquo has been justly taken from human nature though it can be restored to us by Godrsquos grace Augustine does not tell us much about this sense of will in DLA but he does explain it more fully in later writings as we shall see In any case if we do not avail ourselves of the divine offer of grace then we are properly blamed ldquothese are [our] own sinsrdquo In spite of its gloomier assessment of the human condition than was evident in his earlier writings book III of DLA winds up not far from this hopeful position adopted some years ear-lier in the conclusion of II

What greater security could there be than to have a life in which noth-ing can happen to you that you do not will But since we cannot pick ourselves up voluntarily as we fell voluntarily let us hold with confident faith the right hand of Godmdashthat is our Lord Jesus Christmdashwhich has been held out to us from on high103

(II2054)

102 Nam sicut propria cogitatione non peccat invitus ita dum consentit male suadenti non utique nisi voluntate consentit Note that the translation makes it sound as if it is the will that consents but a more literal rendering would be ldquounless he consents voluntarilyrdquo

103 Quid ergo securius quam esse in ea vita ubi non possit tibi evenire quod non vis Sed quoniam non sicut homo sponte cecidit ita etiam sponte surgere potest porrectam nobis desuper dexteram Dei id est Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum fide firma teneamus


However this relatively optimistic mood did not last long We turn now to a new surprising development in Augustinersquos teaching about the will

III

In 396 roughly one year after finishing book III of DLA Augustine had occa-sion to write a lengthy letter to his former mentor in Milan Simplician who had asked Augustine for help in understanding St Paulrsquos exegesis (in Romans 910ndash29) of the biblical story of Esau and Jacob Before the twin boys were even born God chose to elevate Jacob over his brother who was to be first-born saying according to the prophet Malachi ldquoJacob have I loved but Esau have I hatedrdquo (Malachi 12ndash3) But what could be the reason for this preference since while still in the womb neither could have done anything to merit Godrsquos favor or disfavor Following Paul Augustine feels himself forced to conclude that grace including the grace of faith is a free gift that God for entirely inscrutable reasons gives to His elect and withholds from all others

No one believes who is not called God calls in His mercy and not as rewarding the merits of faith The merits of faith follow his calling rather than precede it So grace comes before all merits104

(Ad Simp I27 emphasis added)

But what of the equally scriptural notion that ldquomany are called though few are chosenrdquo (Matthew 2214) Augustine has a somewhat tortured answer

If God wills to have mercy on men he can call them in a way that is suited to them so that they will be moved to understand and to follow It is true therefore that many are called but few chosen Those are chosen who are effectually called Those who are not effectually called and do not obey their calling are not chosen for although they were called they did not follow [A]lthough He calls many it is on those whom he calls in a way suited to them so that they may follow that he has mercy105

(I213 emphasis added)

104 Nemo enim credit qui non vocatur Misericors autem Deus vocat nullis hoc vel fidei meritis largiens quia merita fidei sequuntur vocationem potius quam praecedunt

105 [S]i vellet etiam ipsorum misereri posset ita vocare quomodo illis aptum esset ut et moverentur et in-tellegerent et sequerentur Verum est ergo Multi vocati pauci electi Illi enim electi qui congruenter vocati illi autem qui non congruebant neque contemperabantur vocationi non electi quia non secuti quamvis vocati etiamsi multos vocet eorum tamen miseretur quos ita vocat quomodo eis vocari aptum est ut sequantur


Presumably he means something like this if I cordially invite some friends to a great feast and do so in a compelling manner surely they will come but if to others I issue the invitation in a language I know they will not understand or in a style they are sure to find repugnant then they will pay no heed The logic of this idea is impeccable But applying it to the Creator one has to wonder about the justice of it

Here with one decisive (some would say horrifying106) stroke Augustine not only signals his complete rejection of the perfectionism of the classical tradition (though the formal framework of teleological eudaimonism awkwardly remains a hollowed-out shell) but he also introduces an apparently arbitrary element into the quest for beatitude to those whom God has for hidden reasons predes-tined for happiness He gives the grace to believe and to develop the virtues by which they will ldquomeritrdquo eternal life Augustine makes no pretense of understand-ing how such an arrangement can be called just He can only plead for Simplician to ldquobelieve that this belongs to a certain hidden equity that cannot be searched out by any human standard of measurementrdquo107 (I216) That he himself saw the significance of his shift in Ad Simplicianum is shown in his remark more than thirty years later in Retractationes the final review of his lifersquos work that ldquoin answering this question [about our role in our own salvation] I tried hard to maintain the free choice of the human will but the grace of God prevailedrdquo108 (Retr II11) This shift to the supremacy of grace over free will in the human search for beatitude is in Peter Brownrsquos phrase ldquoone of the most important symptoms of that profound change that we call lsquoThe End of the Ancient World and the Beginning of the Middle Agesrsquordquo109

For our purposes what is most important is the reflection on the will that is implied in Augustinersquos embrace of the doctrine of predestination and in

106 For example Kurt Flasch in his introduction to Logik des Schreckens Augustinus von Hippo die Gnadenlehre von 397 (Mainz Dieterichrsquosche Verlagsbuchhandlung 1990)

107 credatur esse alicuius occultae atque ab humano modulo investigabilis aequitatis 108 In cuius quaestionis solutione laboratum est quidem pro libero arbitrio voluntatis humanae sed vicit

Dei gratia Augustine apparently means that once he had carefully considered Romans 9 he could no longer maintain the position he had taken in DLA that nothing ldquois so much in the power of the will as the will itselfrdquo The will is not in its own power and can choose the true good only through the aid of grace which it cannot command or even truly request Peculiarly although Augustine himself pointed out this enormous shift in his thinking the significance of the shift that began with ad Simplicianummdashon which he himself insistedmdashis often ignored The letter is for example not mentioned in Scott MacDonaldrsquos comprehensive article on Augustine in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages eds J J C Gracia and T B Noone (Oxford Blackwell 2003) 154ndash71 nor in Irwinrsquos even more extensive treatment of Augustinersquos doctrine of will in Development Christopher Kirwan mentions the letter but not its importance for the will in his Augustine By contrast the text is extensively discussed by James Wetzel Augustine and the Limits of Virtue (Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1992) and its significance is also apparent in Stump ldquoAugustine on Free Willrdquo

109 Brown Hippo 369ndash70


particular an important distinction that Augustine made repeatedly to ward off the claim that his notion of grace abolished human freedom Here is one expres-sion of it

God gives us two different things that we will and what we will That we will He has willed to be both his and ours His because He calls us ours because we follow when called But what we will He alone gives that is to be able to act well and live happily forever110


ldquoThat we willrdquo (or the power to will) must in this context mean what he calls elsewhere ldquofree choice (or consent)rdquo this is still ours in spite of the Fall But ldquowhat we willrdquo is different ldquoHe alone givesrdquo us that And as Augustine makes clear this is what we could call our ldquoprimary motivationrdquo It includes but goes beyond Aristotlersquos boulecircsis our rational desire for the good as we conceive it Augustinersquos ldquowhat we willrdquo is first and foremost shown in what we in fact most want in life and not merely in what we rationally think is most desirable No one has been clearer than Augustine in insisting on the distinction between these two ldquoWhat we most wantrdquo he frequently describes in terms of the agentrsquos ldquoloverdquo her basic structure of desires In our fallen condition marked by both ldquoignorance and difficultyrdquo this love is self-oriented concupiscence But God can give usmdashand did give him Augustine believesmdasha new and selfless love of God in grace (or at least the beginnings of such) Over the ages this love is fashioning the City of God that community of believers across time and space who through grace are able to love God for His own sake and whose performance of good deeds again through grace destines them for eternal happiness111

Whether Augustine was truly forced to this somber indeed shocking view by St Paulrsquos teaching in Romans is a disputed theological point that goes beyond the bounds of this study112 But his implicit view of the will is highly interesting in itself Consider this astute claim in Ad Simplicianum

Who has it in his power to have present to his mind a motive such that his will shall be influenced to believe Who can welcome in his mind

110 Aliter enim Deus praestat ut velimus aliter praestat quod voluerimus Ut velimus enim et suum esse voluit et nostrum suum vocando nostrum sequendo Quod autem voluerimus solus praestat id est posse bene agere et semper beate vivere

111 The fate Augustine foresees for those who constitute the opposed City of Man is terrible indeed

112 For some reflections on Augustinersquos views and their subsequent influence see Galen Johnson ldquoThe Protestant Reformersrsquo Readings of Romans 9ndash11 with Modern Critical Responserdquo Quodlibet Journal 61 (2004)


something which does not give him delight But who has it in his power to ensure that something that will delight him will turn up or that he will take delight in what turns up If those things delight us which serve our advancement towards God that is due not to our own whim or industry or meritorious works but to the inspiration of God and to the grace which he bestows He freely bestows upon us voluntary assent earnest effort and the power to perform works of fervent charity113

(I221)

What Augustine addresses here is what we might call the mystery of human motivation which crucially involves the element of ldquodelightrdquo (delectatio) He regarded delight as an essential moment in the genesis of sin which typically progresses from suggestion to delight to consent114 but the text just quoted shows that the point holds for action more generally The ldquosuggestionsrdquo to act are all around us but they affect people differently Why for instance is one sibling indifferent to the blandishments of say alcohol or sex taking little or no delight in them while the other with the same upbringing responds to them strongly This kind of question puzzled those ancients who asked as in the Meno whether virtue can be taught at all115 Everything depends on the pupil acquiring the proper motivation ie taking delight in the right sorts of things but well-known examples suggest that teaching training and the general influ-ence of a good family can go only so far in bringing about such a desirable state of character Something else something unfathomable and mysterious seems also to be at work For Augustine it is the presence or absence of Godrsquos grace

Augustine thinks the doctrine of divine election formally solves this problem though admittedly at the price of substituting an even deeper mystery ie why God elects some and not others116 From our point of view the solution is espe-cially important since it identifies the human willmdashin the sense of onersquos central

113 Quis habet in potestate tali viso attingi mentem suam quo eius voluntas moveatur ad fidem Quis autem animo amplectitur aliquid quod eum non delectat Aut quis habet in potestate ut vel occurrat quod eum delectare possit vel delectet cum occurrerit Cum ergo nos ea delectant quibus proficiamus ad Deum inspiratur hoc et praebetur gratia Dei non nutu nostro et industria aut operum meritis comparatur quia ut sit nutus voluntatis ut sit industria studii ut sint opera caritate ferventia ille tribuit ille largitur

114 Cf eg De Trinitate 1212 and De sermone Domini in monte 1234ndash35115 Augustine visited similar mysterious issues in his early dialogue De Magistro116 In ldquoAugustine on Free Willrdquo (139ndash41) Eleonore Stump makes an interesting case that Augus-

tine could have avoided this unattractive form of determinism if he had recognized as Aquinas would do eight centuries later a third possibility for the will to accept Godrsquos grace to reject it but also to do neither thus leaving room both for God to be the sole determiner of salvation and for the soul to cooperate with God by not rejecting grace A rather similar dialectic seems to have been at work in Witt-gensteinrsquos ruminations on activity and passivity in the process of working toward his own redemp-tion Cf Ray Monk Wittgenstein The Duty of Genius (New York The Free Press 1990) 408ndash13


motivationmdashas the sine qua non of salvation and simultaneously strips it of power to effect that salvation In speaking of why ldquoharlots and actorsrdquo can sud-denly be converted and saved while sober citizens are apparently passed over Augustine remarks

The only possible conclusion is that it is wills that are elected [by God] But the will itself cannot in any way be moved unless something pres-ents itself to delight and stir the mind That this should happen is not in any manrsquos power117

(I222 emphases added)

The will both in its guise of primary motivational complex118 and also as our capacity to choose is clearly the central player in Augustinersquos drama of salvation As Charles Kahn puts it ldquothe will of man is the stage on which the drama of Godrsquos grace is to be acted outrdquo119 We should note just how this differs from Aristotle For him too the right will boulecircsis is essential to the practice of virtue and thus to the achievement of happiness But Aristotle apparently thinks that a stable boulecircsis of this sort is attainable by habituation the repeated performance of virtuous actions Indeed for Aristotle the virtuous person finds the highest forms of delight prin-cipally (if not exclusively) in the performance of virtuous actions for their own sake an achievement that Augustine seems to regard as (normally) unattainable in this life even with the help of divine grace Perhaps unaided humans can achieve something like Aristotelian virtue but unguided by divine grace such ldquovirtuerdquo con-stitutes only a form of pride or self-glorification ie because of its self-reliance (instead of reliance on God) it is not true virtue at all120 What we have here is a

117 Restat ergo ut voluntates eligantur Sed voluntas ipsa nisi aliquid occurrerit quod delectet atque invitet animum moveri nullo modo potest Hoc autem ut occurrat non est in hominis potestate

118 Here I agree substantially with Nico W den Bok ldquoFreedom of the Will a Systematic and Biographical Sounding of Augustinersquos Thoughts on Human Willrdquo Augustiniana 44 (1994) 237ndash70

119 Cf Kahn ldquoDiscovering the Willrdquo 258 Cf also Gerd Van Riel who when speaking of Augus-tinersquos view of the will from Book III of DLA onward says ldquoThe will becomes the center of a personrsquos morality and many different aspects that played a role in earlier works are now subsumed under the willrdquo (ldquoAugustinersquos Willrdquo 277)

120 Cf City of God XIX 25 Still we would undoubtedly rather have such people as our compan-ions and fellow citizens than the vicious Augustine might agree but these ldquocompanionsrdquo are not the best however valued they might be for earthly peace Be that as it may if virtues are habits that pro-duce virtuous actions Augustine may seem now to have abandoned the point of view so prominent in book II of DLA that ldquono one uses the virtues wronglyrdquo (virtutibus nemo male utitur) (II1950) since sincere pagans apparently perform such actions but with the wrong goal in mind they seek not God through grace but the perfection of self through their own efforts The good or bad use of virtu-ous behavior depends on the willmdashand in particular its direction toward God or selfmdashof the one who uses them Cf Van Riel ldquoAugustinersquos Willrdquo 277 Irwin has a nuanced discussion of Augustine on pagan virtue in Development sectsect226ndash34


new notion of will the ldquowill of gracerdquo and with it a new notion of virtuemdashworked by Godmdashand thus of human perfection one with a more pronounced supernal orientation In this new notion concepts alien to classical ethicsmdasheg human humility unworthiness and powerlessnessmdashplay an important role

From the composition of the first two books of DLA in the 380s right to the dramatic end of his long life in 430 the complex notion of will remains at the focus of the drama that is Augustinersquos soteriology but its dependence on grace has some peculiar consequences as became clearer in his controversy with the Pelagians In denying or restricting the influence of original sin they had made each individual largely if not entirely responsible for her own salvation Pela-gius in his letter to the Roman noblewoman Demetrias in 413 noted that this responsibility is in the first instance our own

Whenever I give moral instruction I first try to demonstrate the inherent power and quality of human nature I try to show the wonderful virtues which all human beings can acquire Most people look at the virtues in others and imagine that such virtues are far beyond their reach Yet God has implanted in every person the capacity to attain the very high-est level of virtue121

(PL 3017B emphasis added)

In Pelagiusrsquos hands this notion led to a strong rigorism and a stress on obedience to every single commandment of God This was not at all to Augustinersquos liking In contrast to such rigorist ideals and drawing on the doctrine of the supremacy of grace he was apt to reply by contrasting with an austere and saintly person the more common kind of Christian Perhaps surprisingly he viewed the latter more leniently

But another who has good works from a right faith which works by love maintains his continence in the honesty of wedlock although he does not like the other well refrain altogether [from sexual intercourse] but pays and repays the debt of carnal connection and has intercourse not only for the sake of offspring but also for the sake of pleasure although only with his wife which the apostle allows to those that are married as pardonablemdashdoes not receive injuries with so much patience but is raised into anger with the desire of vengeance although in order

121 Quoties mihi de institutione morum et sanctae vitae conversatione dicendum est soleo prius humane naturae vim qualitatemque monstrare et quid efficere possit ostendere ac jam inde audientis animum ad species incitare virtutum From The Letters of Pelagius ed Robert Van de Weyer (New York More-house Publishing 1997)


that he may say ldquoAs we also forgive our debtorsrdquo forgives when he is asked [O]n account of the right faith which he has in God by which he lives and according to which in all his wrong-doings he accuses him-self and in all his good works praises God giving to himself the shame to God the glory and receiving from Him both forgiveness of sins and love of right deedsmdash[he] shall be delivered from this life and depart to be received into the company of those who shall reign with Christ Why if not on account of faith122

(Contra duas III514)

The faithful imperfect even sinful Christian conscious of his own weakness is ablemdashby relying on Godrsquos constant helpmdashto ask forgiveness for his sins perform good works (the ldquopious laborsrdquo of DLA III2056) in this life and thus ldquodepart to be received into the company of those who shall reign with Christrdquo By contrast the Pelagian trusting in his own efforts is in mortal peril Such is the will of grace Why it is provided to some and not others is a profound mystery Such mysteries according to Augustine we do well not to question We turn now finally to the ultimate fulfillment of this will

IV

We saw (in chapter 2) that Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics advocates a decid-edly contemplative indeed theological version of happiness as the most desir-able life for human beings In connection with that view I noted (ch 2 p 38) that ldquothough the terminology of lsquoimagersquo and lsquolikenessrsquo is Platonic rather than Aristotelian it would not be a distortion to say that in book X Aristotle presents the intellect as an image of the divine (or as lsquoakinrsquo to it)rdquo Importantly for Augus-tine and other Christian thinkers the notions of image and likeness have not

122 Alius autem habens quidem opera bona ex fide recta quae per dilectionem operatur non tamen ita ut ille bene moratus incontinentiam suam sustentat honestate nuptiarum coniugii carnale debitum et reddit et repetit nec sola propagationis causa verum etiam voluptatis quamvis cum sola uxore concumbit quod coniugatis secundum veniam concedit Apostolus iniurias non tam patienter accipit sed ulciscendi cupiditate fertur iratus quamvis ut possit dicere Sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris rogatus ig-noscat possidet rem familiarem faciens inde quidem eleemosynas non tamen quam ille tam largus non aufert aliena sed quamvis ecclesiastico iudicio non forensi tamen repetit sua nempe iste qui moribus illo videturinferiori propter rectam fidem quae illi est in Deum ex qua vivit et secundum quam in omnibus delictis suis se accusati in omnibus bonis operibus Deum laudat sibi tribuens ignominiam illi gloriam atque ab ipso sumens et indulgentiam peccatorum et dilectionem recte factorum de hac vita liberandus et in con-sortium cum Christo regnaturorum recipiendus emigrat Quare nisi propter fidem Translation of de hac vita corrected


only a Platonic but above all a biblical root in particular Genesis 126 ldquoThen God said Let us make mankind in our image in our likenessrdquo123 This inspired much speculation among early Christian thinkers particularly those with (Neo-)Platonic leanings and especially among Eastern Orthodox writers who took it to imply that divinization is the human destiny either in the sense of be-coming ldquolike to Godrdquo ormdashmore radicallymdashldquobecoming Godrdquo124 In the period of Augustinersquos conversion he heard such ideas presented in the sermons of Bishop Ambrose in Milan125

Condensing a large topic to brief compass this theme was a challenge for Augustine On the one hand the idea has a scriptural basis (in addition to Gen-esis 126 it is found principally in Psalm 826 2 Peter 14 John 112 and various places in Paulrsquos letters eg Romans 829mdashwhere it is explicitly connected to predestinationmdashand 2 Corinthians 318) and was supported by an impressive list of patristic thinkers (the most influential of whom was Origen) On the other hand Augustine had a deep and abiding sense of the tremendous gulf separating the Creator from creatures and especially us fallen ones Part of his approach to the issue for example in the mature work De Trinitate is to give the notion of divinization a particular interpretation in this life the human soul is an image and likeness in the sense of an analog of the Trinity126 however for the chosen divinizationmdashie for Augustine heavenly immortality127mdash becomes a full real-ity in the vision of God after death

And when the last day of life shall have found any one holding fast faith in the Mediator he will be welcomed by the holy angels to be led to God whom he has worshipped and to be made perfect by Him For

123 New International Version 1984124 The locus classicus for the general idea is found in Athanasius of Alexandria (d 373) The

Word was made man so that ldquowe might be made Godrsquorsquo (θεοποιηθῶμενmdashfrom de Incarnatione verbi Dei 543 PG 25 192B) Many others echoed the same theme The prospect of fulfilling ldquothe high-est of all desiresrdquo ie ldquobecoming Godrdquo was held out by Basil of Caesarea a contemporary of both Augustine and Athanasius Cf his On the Holy Spirit IX2023 [τὸ ἀκρότατον τῶν ὀρεκτῶν θεὸν γινέσθαί] and cf the discussion of his views in Thomas Hopko ldquoThe Trinity in the Cappadociansrdquo in Christian Spirituality Origins to the Twelfth Century eds Bernard McGinn John Meyendorff and Jean Leclerq (London Routledge amp Kegan Paul 1986)

125 Cf Gerald McCool SJ ldquoThe Ambrosian Origin of St Augustinersquos Theology of the Image of God in Manrdquo Theological Studies 20 (1959) 62ndash81

126 In this analogy the human will (or love) represents the Holy Spirit Cf Bernard McGinn ldquoThe Human Person as Image of God II Western Christianityrdquo in McGinn Meyendorff and Leclerq Christian Spirituality ldquoAugustine insisted with Paul (1 Cor 117) that the human person can be said not only to be made ad imaginem (ie according to the Word) but also to be in itself a true imago Dei (eg On the Trinity 7612)rdquo 318

127 Cf Bernard McGinn ldquoChrist as Savior in the Westrdquo in McGinn Meyendorff and Leclerq Christian Spirituality 254


the likeness of God will then be perfected in this image when the vision of God shall be perfected128

(On the Holy Trinity 141723)

On several occasions Augustine refers to this process as ldquodeificationrdquo As Gerald Bonner remarks he does so ldquoin language so reminiscent of St Athanasius as to suggest the possibility of direct borrowing lsquoHe who was God was made man to make gods those who were menrsquordquo129 (Serm 192 1 1) Bonner continues

Augustine is however clear that in deification there is no change in the nature of manrsquos being he remains a creature and is deified only by Godrsquos grace Accordingly in expounding the words of the psalmist I said Ye are gods (Ps 816826) Augustine declares ldquoIt is clear that He [ie God] calls men gods through their being deified by His grace and not born of His substance If we are made sons of God we are also made gods but this is done by the grace of adoption and not by generationrdquo130

Genesis 126 is taken in a way that only the Son is properly an image of God humans are likenesses of the Image made in His image and likeness

Nor is that a clumsy distinction between the image and likeness of God which is called Son and that which is made in the image and likeness of God as we understand man to have been made131

(QQ 83 514 emphasis added)

Two points first if it seems strange that even with his restrictive provisos the same Augustine who thunders about the debility and ignorance of the human

128 In quo profectu et accessu tenentem Mediatoris fidem cum dies vitae huius ultimus quemque compererit perducendus ad Deum quem coluit et ab eo perficiendus excipietur ab Angelis sanctis in-corruptibile corpus in fine saeculi non ad poenam sed ad gloriam recepturus In hac quippe imagine tunc perfecta erit Dei similitudo quando Dei perfecta erit visio Cf the even more striking words of Sermon 166 4 ldquoGod wants to make you Godrdquo (Deus enim Deum te vult facere) albeit followed immediately by a more sober ldquonot by nature as in the case of him who gives you birth but through gift and adoptionrdquo

129 Deos facturus qui homines erant homo factus est qui deus erat Cf Gerald Bonner ldquoAugustinersquos Doctrine of Man Image of God and Sinnerrdquo Augustinianum 24 (1984) 495ndash514 at 511

130 Ibid 512 The Augustine text is from Ennar 492 Manifestum est ergo quia homines dixit deos ex gratia sua deificatos non de substantia sua natos Si filii Dei facti sumus et dii facti sumus sed hoc gratiae est adoptantis non natura generantis Cf also OrsquoDonovan Problem of Self-Love 73ndash74 where reference is also made to a somewhat similar teaching in Plotinus

131 Neque inscite distinguitur quod aliud sit imago et similitudo Dei qui etiam Filius dicitur aliud ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei sicut hominem factum accipimus


soul could entertain any sort of ldquodivinizationrdquo one must note that in addition to the repeated scriptural warrant especially in his principal authority Paul the idea of divinization is also supported by classical epistemology the principle that like is known by like132 Only if we can become ldquolike Godrdquo can we come to know God and such knowledge is promised to the just133

Second it is nonetheless puzzling to say that human beings can be deified while at the same time ldquothere is no change in the nature of manrsquos beingrdquo One wonders for instance what then is the relationship between the beings we are in this life and the beings that are deified in the next In what sense can divinization be what we yearn for (as we saw Basil of Caesarea Augustinersquos older contem-porary spoke of ldquothe highest of all desires to become Godrdquo) if it is also beyond our capacity or nature This conceptual challenge reappears in the writings of Thomas Aquinas His approach to it as we shall see in the following chapter is basically in harmony with Augustinersquos and creates the same sense of paradox Eckhartrsquos doctrine of the image proposes a way out of the paradox (and at the same time provides the key to understanding his counsel to ldquolive without whyrdquo)

For this study we should keep especially the following features of Augustinersquos teaching in mind

First at no point even under the influence of the pessimism that grew stron-ger in his later years does Augustine question the central tenet of eudaimonism ie that the meaning and purpose of human existence is the teleological one of attaining its goal or fulfillment ie happiness defined as what everyone desires ldquoWhat is a life of happiness Surely what everyone wants absolutely everyone without exceptionrdquo134 (Conf X2029) Where he parts company with Plotinus and others is in his adherence to the view that ldquoin the holy scriptures which the authority of the Catholic Church guarantees you [God] have laid down the way for human beings to reach that eternal life that awaits us after deathrdquo135 (Conf VII711) The church provides the sole path to happiness the fulfillment of which is in the next life and such fulfillment is possible only through grace

Second as noted above (p 56) in DLA I15 Augustine deplored our ten-dency to cling to ldquothings that can be called ours only for a timerdquo (temporalia) For him to treat things such as the body freedom our family and friends and our property with detachment is an essential step on the path toward salvation in the next life this notion will later be extended and radicalized by Eckhart

132 Cf for instance Aristotle de Anima I2 404b17 (citing Plato γινώσκεσθαι γὰρ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον) and Metaphysics III4 1000b5 ἡ δὲ γνῶσις τοῦ ὁμοίου τῷ ὁμοίῳ

133 Cf McCool ldquoAmbrosian Originrdquo 78ndash79134 Nonne ipsa est beata vita quam omnes volunt et omnino qui nolit nemo est135 [I]n scripturis sanctis quas Ecclesiae tuae catholicae commendaret auctoritas viam te posuisse

salutis humanae ad eam vitam quae post hanc mortem futura est


Third and closely related is the importance Augustine places on the sin of self-centeredness or pride and its contrary virtue humility The former is the beginning of all sin and is to blame for the fall of Adam and Eve136 Pride was the ruination of classical pagan thought Rist has this to say about the special place of humility in Augustinersquos thought and its role in underscoring the abyss that separates the human from the divine

Humility is a peculiarly Christian virtue it marks the proper human recognition that man is not to confuse himself with God Thus like love indeed as a special mode of Christian love humility too comes to suffuse the entire range of Christian virtues If Socratic erocircs is based on a final confidence in the natural immortality of the human soul and thus of a virtual equality with the gods Augustinian erocircs in its realistic (and hence humble though far from groveling) love for God is able to do justice to the gulf between our fallen beauties and Beauty itself137

Rist here applauds what he takes to be Augustinersquos strong rejection of any hint that deification could be somehow inherent in the nature of human beings Yet if deification is nonetheless the final destiny of the blessed one wonders how the gulf can possibly be so great after all

Finally we should note that Augustine thought of humility in terms of bowing before Godrsquos will ie we might say in terms of ldquoThy will be donerdquo

Your best servant is the one who is less intent on hearing from you what accords with his own will and more on embracing with his will what he has heard from you138

(Conf X2637 emphasis added)

To the very end the will is the person for Augustine For him unlike Eckhart ldquoto live without willrdquo is a flatly self-contradictory notion

One last aspect of Augustinersquos treatment of will should be mentioned He sometimes speaks of the phenomenon of acting reluctantly (invitus facere) He

138 Optimus minister tuus est qui non magis intuetur hoc a te audire quod ipse voluerit sed potius hoc velle quod a te audierit

136 Cf City of God XIV13 ldquoOur first parents fell into open disobedience because already they were secretly corrupted for the evil act had never been done had not an evil will preceded it And what is the origin of our evil will but priderdquo (In occulto autem mali esse coeperunt ut in apertam ino-boedientiam laberentur Non enim ad malum opus perveniretur nisi praecessisset voluntas mala Porro malae voluntatis initium quae potuit esse nisi superbia)

137 Rist Baptized 158ndash59


means the sorts of actions Aristotle referred to as ldquomixedrdquo (NE III1) ie where one feels oneself forced by circumstances to do something voluntarily that one would rather not do (eg the ship captain who jettisons the cargo in a storm) Not surprisingly Augustinersquos interest in such acts is theological is there merit in doing the right thing out of fear of divine punishment The answer is a resound-ing ldquoNordquo For instance before the coming of divine grace into human history in the person of Jesus Christ those who followed the Commandments out of fear or other unworthy motives actually offended God

[E]ven those who did as the law commanded without the help of the Spirit of grace did it through fear of punishment and not from love of righteousness Thus in Godrsquos sight there was not in their will that obedi-ence which to the sight of men appeared in their work they were rather held guilty of that which God knew they would have chosen to commit if it could have been without penalty139

(De Spir 813)

This notion of doing the right thing for an unworthy motive will come up again in our discussion of Aquinas and it receives a different and quite novel treat-ment in Meister Eckhartrsquos metaphor of the ldquomerchant mentalityrdquo We see in Au-gustinersquos view here perhaps a reflection of his ruminations in Confessions VIII on his own divided will only a unified will can obey God fully and correctly and because of the penalty of original sin only divine grace can unify the will Augustine openly doubts that this unity is altogether achievable in this life even with the help of grace for concupiscence is inherent in the body140 If unity were attainable then such a will would resemble that of Aristotlersquos virtuous person in that in neither case is there even the temptation to wander from the path Of course if a unified will is impossible in this life (or at least impossible without the most extraordinary grace141) the question for Augustine is idle We turn next to Thomas Aquinasrsquos full development of the various ideas about will that Aristotle and Augustine had formulated

139 [Q]uicumque faciebant quod lex iubebat non adiuvante spiritu gratiae timore poenae faciebant non amore iustitiae Ac per hoc coram Deo non erat in voluntate quod coram hominibus apparebat in opere potiusque ex illo rei tenebantur quod eos noverat Deus malle si fieri posset impune committere

140 Cf for example On Marriage and Concupiscence I30 (XXVII)141 Augustine was very impressed by the fact that even St Paul who not only had been baptized

but was also the recipient of an extraordinary conversion experience as well as mystical visions was nonetheless apparently plagued by temptations ldquoWe know that the law is spiritual but I am unspiri-tual sold as a slave to sinrdquo (Rom 714) It is tempting to see in Augustinersquos decidedly negative view of human concupiscence and its disquieting impulses a Stoic influence (perhaps through Cicero)

86

4

Aquinas on Happiness and the Will

ldquoIf we act on will we form a conception of a universal good and an ultimate end and we are guided by it in acting as we dordquo1

Like all medieval thinkers in the Latin West Thomas Aquinas of course knew and was heavily influenced by the writings of Augustine both directly and indirectly through authorities such as Peter Lombard Particularly in parts of his philo-sophical psychology and ethicsmdashand not least in his doctrine of willmdashThomas is indebted to the church father In the parts of the Summa Theologiae (STh) most pertinent to this study Augustine is cited more than any other Christian author-ity and his influence is decisive in certain key sections Still the authority cited more often by far on matters of the will was Aristotle If Augustine ldquobaptized ancient thoughtrdquo2mdashprincipally Stoicism and (Neo-)platonismmdashthen one can as well say that Aquinas baptized Aristotle That is he (preeminent among many others) showed one important kind of use that could be made of ldquothe Philoso-pherrdquo in Christian thought

Aristotlersquos Nicomachean Ethics was somewhat slow to engage the attention of medieval Christian commentators (and consequently the ire of church authori-ties) By contrast almost as soon as Aristotlersquos metaphysical and physical trea-tises were translated into Latin they were banned at the University of Paris (in 1210 a ban renewed by the papal legate in 1215) But the few books of the Ethics then available were expressly permitted to be read ldquoif one so choosesrdquo on the ldquofeast daysrdquo (of which there were approximately one hundred per year)3 It was

1 Terence Irwin Development of Ethics 456 speaking of Thomasrsquos notion of will2 To borrow from the subtitle of John Ristrsquos study of Augustine cited in chapter 33 Statutes for the University of Paris 1215 text from the Internet Medieval Source Book http

wwwfordhameduhalsallsourcecourcon1html As noted above most of Aristotlersquos nonlogical writings had been lost to the Latin West for hundreds of years Translations of small portions of the Nicomachean Ethics first appeared in western Europe early in the thirteenth century but initially elicited relatively little attention

A quina s on Hap p in e s s and th e Wi l l 87

only in the mid-thirteenth century when the work as a whole was translated that attention to the Ethics increased Thomas Aquinas was instrumental in making it a principal focus of philosophic interest for the remainder of the Middle Ages and beyond first with a careful commentary on the Ethics and then by incorpo-rating significant features of it into his own influential moral theology4

Among the works of Aquinas addressed to moral themes are substantial parts of the Summa Theologiae5 In it starting in the second main part (the prima secundae or IaIIae) Thomas lays out his ethic in a format structured somewhat like that in Aristotlersquos NE (a) in the ldquoTreatise on Happinessrdquo (ar-ticles 1ndash5) he investigates the goal of life that is happiness or beatitude (b) the ldquotreatise of human actsrdquo (articles 6ndash21) is his detailed analysis of human action including moral action (c) the ldquotreatises on the passions virtues and vicesrdquo as well as the Gospel Beatitudes (22ndash89) present his views on the role of these elements in the moral life (d) in the ldquotreatise on lawrdquo (90ndash108) he sets out his influential view of ldquonatural lawrdquo while in the final six questions of the IaIae he deals with grace6 (The next segment of the Summa the secunda se-cundae is a detailed theological investigation of individual virtues wherein his treatment of the theological virtues of faith hope and charity assumes the cen-tral place) Our focus is of course more narrow In this chapter as in those on Aristotle and Augustine we begin with an initial sketch of Aquinasrsquos view of the topic of happiness (blessedness eudaimonia) then turn briefly to a recap of what we discussed in chapter 1 of his philosophy of action and will and follow with an overview of his complex doctrine of the virtues Several unanswered questions raised by Thomasrsquos treatment of the virtues will lead us back to his conceptionmdasha problematic one I will arguemdashof happiness itself the summum bonum At the end of the chapter we look at Thomasrsquos interpretation of Gen-esis 126 human beings as image and likeness of God and Thomasrsquos theory

4 The first fruits of Thomasrsquos study are found in his Commentary on Aristotlersquos Nicomachean Ethics compiled as he was embarking on his Summa Theologiae (Sententia Libri Ethicorum hereafter SLE trans CJ Litzinger OP [Notre Dame IN Dumb Ox Books 1993]) This commentary was made possible by Robert Grossetestersquos first full Latin translation of the NE in the late 1240s (and especially the revised edition of 1260) Thomasrsquos efforts along with two similar works by Albert the Great spurred a veritable explosion of commentarial interestmdashnot all of it favorablemdashin Aristo-tlersquos ethical thought The chronology is described by Istvaacuten Bejczy in the introduction to his edited volume Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages Commentaries on Aristotlersquos Nicomachean Ethics 1200ndash1500 (Leiden-Boston Brill 2008)

5 Among the others are two of the Questiones Disputatae (the De Malo and the De Virtutibus) the Summa contra Gentiles and the Scriptum super Sententiis

6 The formal similarity to the Nicomachean Ethics though not complete is substantial especially if one concedes parallel functions to the treatise on law and Aristotlersquos Politics which Aristotle himself regarded as the continuation of the NE He of course does not have a doctrine of divine grace On the structural similarities of the two works see Irwin Development of Ethics 439ndash40


of analogy that underlies his understanding This will provide a bridge to the metaphysics of Meister Eckhart in chapter 5

Thomas begins his major presentation of ethics with the Treatise on Hap-piness ldquothe centerpiece in the construction of the Summa Theologiaerdquo7 Here he initially hews closely to Aristotlersquos argumentation in the NE in Question 1 he establishes that ldquothe human beingrsquos ultimate end is his complete goodrdquo (16ad 1) and that this is the same for all humans ie happiness or beatitude (I7)8 It follows he argues in Questions 2 and 3 that our happiness cannot con-sist in wealth power sensory pleasure etc as none of these can fully satisfy our desire But pace Aristotle neither can virtue nor contemplation nor any ldquocre-ated goodrdquo none of them singly nor all together can fully satisfy us9 In thus rejecting the notion that a life of the moral andor intellectual virtues could con-stitute our happiness Aquinas steps decisively beyond the framework of Aristo-tle our longing for perfect fulfillment implies that the only thing that can satisfy us is the eternal possession of God in the Beatific Vision of the divine essence the vision that ldquomakes us blessedrdquo or happy10 (28obj 3) The teleological drive built into our nature points inexorably (though I will suggest perhaps paradoxi-cally) to this supernatural completion The happiness we seek can be fully real-ized only in that Vision However such a completion is ldquobeyond the nature not only of humans but of all creaturesrdquo and thus cannot be attained except with the aid of divine grace11 (55c)

Thus although Aquinas is often and appropriately called an ldquoAristotelianrdquo this must not blind us to the significance of his radical departure in 28 from Aristotle on the question of eudaimonia no created or finite good can satisfy

7 Servais Pinckaers OP ldquoBeatitude and the Beatitudes in Aquinasrsquos Summa Theologiaerdquo in The Pinckaers Reader Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology eds John Berkman and Craig Steven Titus (Washington DC Catholic University of America Press 2005) 117

8 His argument which follows Aristotle is the controversial one referred to earlier in chapter 2 note 1 The gist is that properly human action is goal oriented that there must be a final goal for each action but necessarily there can be only one ultimate goal which all agree is happiness We will look at it in more detail later in this chapter when we discuss Thomasrsquos analysis of human action Cf also MacDonald ldquoUltimate Endsrdquo

9 As we saw in chapter 2 Aristotlersquos own conception of happiness seems to vacillate in his two major ethical works between the ldquoperfectrdquo good (the best of all activities that is contemplation) and the ldquocompleterdquo good (that is a set of activities so satisfying that nothing could be added to it that would make it more satisfying) Anthony Kenny claims that Aquinas though ostensibly follow-ing the former line in his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics adopts the latter in the Summa Cf his ldquoAquinas on Aristotelian Happinessrdquo in Aquinasrsquos Moral Theory Essays in Honor of Norman Kretzmann eds Scott MacDonald and Eleonore Stump (Ithaca NY Cornell University Press 1999) 15ndash27 But in fact it seems that Thomasrsquos mature view combines both aspects there is a single perfect Good possession of which is completely satisfying

10 [E]fficitur beatus11 supra naturam non solum hominis sed etiam omnis creaturae


human desire and thus no such good can constitute our happiness12 First of all Aristotle did not think of human happiness in terms of any object whether created or not but rather in terms of excellent and sustained performance of the best activity for human beings (NE I7 1098a3-4) Second and consequently he saw no use in his ethics for any transcendent good Indeed in NE I6 he argues at length against his ldquofriendsrdquo the Platonists that

even if there is some one good which is universally predicable of goods or is capable of separate and independent existence clearly it could not be achieved or attained by man but we are now seeking something attainable13

(1096b32ndash35)

If we understand the ldquouniversal goodrdquo to be God then Aristotle seems here to dismiss (in advance as it were) the Christian belief that the highest goal of life is to see God ldquoface to facerdquo (I Cor 12) which he would scarcely regard as a ldquohuman activityrdquo14 In his commentary on NE Thomas ignores the clash appar-ently taking Aristotle to be referring to what we can make use of ldquoin this liferdquo15 (SLEIlect9n11) Nor does he comment in the Treatise on Happiness on his own departure from ldquothe Philosopherrdquo in what is an otherwise largely Aristo-telian presentation His embrace of the Neoplatonic view is plainly mediated by Augustine who is Thomasrsquos authority at just those crucial non-Aristotelian points in the STh IaIIae First in 27 sc when Aquinas emphasizes the cen-tral importance of the object in which our beatitudo consists it is Augustine who is cited ldquoThat (object) which constitutes a life of happiness is to be loved for itself rdquo16 (DDC I2220) and in 28sc where Thomas rejects the idea that beati-tudo consists in any created good Augustine is again quoted this time from City of God ldquoAs the soul is the life of the body so God is manrsquos life of happinessrdquo17 (DCD XIX26)

12 [I]mpossibile est beatitudinem hominis esse in aliquo bono creato Beatitudo enim est bonum perfec-tum quod totaliter quietat appetitum

13 εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἕν τι τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον ἀγαθὸν ἢ χωριστὸν αὐτό τι καθ᾽ αὑτό δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη πρακτὸν οὐδὲ κτητὸν ἀνθρώπῳ νῦν δὲ τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖται

14 Contemplation of divine objects Aristotlersquos own preferred ldquohighest form of human happinessrdquo is by contrast a form of ldquostudyrdquo (theocircrein) the exercise or activity of our highest human capacity He might perhaps have been able to regard Thomist beatitude as a form of philia friendshipmdashsince friends take delight in one anotherrsquos presence but Aristotlersquos God could have no interest at all in human beings On the other hand Aquinas might insist that the Beatific Vision is indeed an activity though it is one we can only exercise thanks to Godrsquos grace

15 Loquitur enim in hoc libro philosophus de felicitate qualis in hac vita potest haberi16 [I]d in quo constituitur beata vita propter se diligendum est17 [U]t vita carnis anima est ita beata vita hominis Deus est


A key factor in Aquinasrsquos turn toward a ChristianPlatonic notion of human happiness ie the idea that it consists in the vision of a supreme and transcen-dent Good is a claim about the will in 28 that it is in a certain way insatiable (or nearly so) in that it is oriented by its nature to the bonum universale taken now as meaning not simply ldquogood in generalrdquo butmdashmore stronglymdashthe universal source of all goodness Here is the body of the reply

It is impossible for any created good to constitute manrsquos happiness For happiness is the perfect good which lulls the appetite altogether else it would not be the last end if something yet remained to be desired Now the object of the will ie of manrsquos appetite is the universal good (universale bonum) just as the object of the intellect is the universal true Hence it is evident that naught can lull manrsquos will save the uni-versal good This is to be found not in any creature but in God alone because every creature has goodness by participation Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will of man18

(28c emphasis added)

This conception of willmdashwhich is problematic as I will urge below19mdashdoes not have any obvious parallel in Aristotle but instead seems clearly like the notion of the transcendent Good as our goal to be Platonic in origin reminiscent of the motivational role assigned to erocircs in the Symposium20 Kevin Staley traces

18 [I]mpossibile est beatitudinem hominis esse in aliquo bono creato Beatitudo enim est bonum per-fectum quod totaliter quietat appetitum alioquin non esset ultimus finis si adhuc restaret aliquid appe-tendum Obiectum autem voluntatis quae est appetitus humanus est universale bonum sicut obiectum intellectus est universale verum Ex quo patet quod nihil potest quietare voluntatem hominis nisi bonum universale Quod non invenitur in aliquo creato sed solum in Deo quia omnis creatura habet bonitatem participatam Unde solus Deus voluntatem hominis implere potest

19 As is the argument of 28 itself for if the term ldquouniversal goodrdquo simply means God the premise asserts the same as the conclusion and the latter becomes true by definition The argumentrsquos prima facie plausibility turns on Thomasrsquos earlier characterization of the object (in the grammatical sense) of the will as ldquothe end and the good in universalrdquo finis et bonum in universali (12ad 3) This is a clas-sical notion just as the object of intellect is not some particular thing but the universal (the form or essence) so the object of will as rational appetite is not any particular good but the idea of good-ness These are statements about the rational (as opposed to sensual) nature of intellect and will ldquothere can be no will in those things that lack reason and intellect since they cannot apprehend the universalrdquo [non potest esse voluntas in his quae carent ratione et intellectu cum non possint apprehendere universale] (ibid) But in 28 this grammatical point becomes an existential assertion the universal good is God Hence I take the argument to turn on an equivocation

20 There Socrates reports the teaching of Diotima ldquolsquoNow thenrsquo she said lsquoCan we simply say that people love (erocircsin) the goodrsquo lsquoYesrsquo said I lsquoBut shouldnrsquot we add that in loving it they want the good to be theirsrsquo lsquoWe shouldrsquo lsquoAnd not only thatrsquo she said lsquoThey want the good to be theirs forever donrsquot theyrsquo lsquoWe should add that toorsquo lsquoIn a word then love (erocircs) is wanting to possess the good


Thomasrsquos source to Augustinersquos early De beata vita (386 CE)21 Be that as it may we have in these early sections of the Treatise on Happiness a good example (which we will see repeated later in Thomasrsquos treatment of virtue) of the overlap-ping influences of both Aristotle and Augustine in his work Whether he is able to make these influences fully compatible with one another is open to question

Several other significant non-Aristotelian elements in the IaIIae should be mentioned briefly First we noted in chapter 2 the long-standing debate about whether Aristotle accords any role to reason in onersquos coming to have the correct life-goal He certainly stresses a developmental process (consisting especially of habituation) as opposed to deliberation and rational choice ldquoMoral excellencerdquo he says ldquocomes about as a result of habitrdquo22 (NE II1 1103a16ndash17) We did find grounds for thinking that Aristotle does not rule out a role for reason but the issue is contested Not so in the case of Aquinas Thomas argues that the moral life is rooted in innate practical principles and that these are in part cognitive in nature not merely the result of well-trained emotions He even projects this view back into Aristotle For example when commenting on what the Philoso-pher says in NE II1 about the acquisition of virtue Thomas writes

The perfection of moral virtue consists in reasonrsquos control of the appetite Now the first principles of reason no less in moral than in speculative matters have been given us by nature23

(SLE IIlect4n7)

Aquinas is appealing here to a Christian patristic doctrine the human mind has the natural disposition or habit called ldquosynderesisrdquo which directly apprehends

22 ἡ δ᾽ [ἀρετή] ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται23 [P]erfectio virtutis moralis consistit in hoc quod appetitus reguletur secundum rationem Prima

autem rationis principia sunt naturaliter nobis indita ita in operativis sicut in speculativis

foreverrsquordquo [ἆρrsquo οὖν ἦ δ᾽ ἥ οὕτως ἁπλοῦν ἐστι λέγειν ὅτι οἱ ἄνθρωποι τἀγαθοῦ ἐρῶσιν ναί ἔφην τί δέ οὐ προσθετέον ἔφη ὅτι καὶ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὑτοῖς ἐρῶσιν προσθετέον ἆρrsquo οὖν ἔφη καὶ οὐ μόνον εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀεὶ εἶναι καὶ τοῦτο προσθετέον ἔστιν ἄρα συλλήβδην ἔφη ὁ ἔρως τοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὑτῷ εἶναι ἀεί] (206a) Transl Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff in Plato Complete Works ed John M Cooper (Indianapolis IN Hackett Publ Co 1997) 489 On Augustinersquos complex relation to the concept of erocircs cf Rist Augustine ch 5

21 Kevin M Staley ldquoAristotle Augustine and Aquinas on the Good and the Human Good A Note on Summa Theologiae I-II QQ 1-3rdquo The Modern Schoolman 62 (May 1995) 311ndash22 at 320 Staley makes a persuasive case for the non-Aristotelian character of Aquinasrsquos treatment of the will and the summum bonum in IaIIae though his claim for De beata vita limps somewhat since Thomas does not cite that work in IaIIae 1ndash3 For a more general examination of Platonic elements in Thomasrsquos ethics see Gerson ldquoPlato Aquinas and the Universal Goodrdquo Gerson finds a marked similarity between Plato and Aquinas in their common critiques of self-love or pride (and as noted earlier we can add Augustine to this list who makes a very similar point)


the first principles of practical reason implanted in us by the Creator the good is to be done and evil avoided24 This disposition plays an important role in Thomasrsquos theory of natural law Whether the Christian doctrine has a Stoic fore-bear or not nothing as definite as its emphasis on the rational apprehension of our final end is to be found in Aristotle25 This is a clear case of Thomas anachro-nistically ldquoreading-inrdquo

In chapter 2 we also saw another debate among Aristotle scholars this one about whether in the NE Aristotle claims that contemplation alone constitutes human eudaimonia The ldquoexclusivistsrdquo think so while ldquoinclusivistsrdquo argue that ldquocompleterdquo happiness for Aristotle encompasses both contemplation and the moral excellences with the latter representing a genuine though secondary and inferior happiness Although Thomas is more willing than Augustine to speak of the possibility of a kind of happiness in this earthly life (and to see ldquoordinaryrdquo contemplation as constituting the highest such happiness) there is no doubt at all that for him the best of what can be attained in via pales before the happiness of the Beatific Vision in patria ie in the life to come

We unconditionally concede that the true beatitude of man is after this life We do not deny however that there is able to be some participa-tion of beatitude in this life in so far as a man is perfect primarily in the good of speculative reason and secondarily of practical reason26

(SENTIVd49II4c)

24 St Jerome initiated what became the medieval debate about synderesis eg in his commen-tary on the vision of Ezekiel see Commentariorum In Hiezekielem ed Franciscus Glorie CCSL 75 (Turnhout Brepols 1964) 12 217ndash36 Cf the discussion of synderesis in Bradley Aquinas on the Twofold 153 and 244 ff

25 Of course Thomas well understands that a ldquorational apprehensionrdquo of the end proper to humans cannot qua rational move us to act to attain it we must also desire it It is thus crucial that this same end apprehended by synderesis be what we naturally desire And this is in fact the case in spite of the disorder introduced into the human soul by original sin Our will is naturally oriented to the good andmdashas rational desiremdashto the good in general ldquoGood in general [is what] the will tends to natu-rally as does each power to its object and again it is the last end which stands in the same relation to things appetible as the first principles of demonstrations to things intelligiblerdquo [Hoc autem est bonum in communi in quod voluntas naturaliter tendit sicut etiam quaelibet potentia in suum obiectum et etiam ipse finis ultimus qui hoc modo se habet in appetibilibus sicut prima principia demonstrationum in intel-ligibilibus] (IaIIae 101c) As Bradley notes ldquoThe natural law has an intellectual and an appetitive sourcerdquo (Aquinas on the Twofold 325) If the two were not in fundamental agreement there would be an ineradicable contradiction in human nature a state of affairs that would be contrary to both Aristotelian teleology and the Christian notion of a providential Creator

26 Et ideo simpliciter concedimus veram hominis beatitudinem esse post hanc vitam Non negamus tamen quin aliqua beatitudinis participatio in hac vita esse possit secundum quod homo est perfectus in bonis rationis speculativae principaliter et practicae secundario et de hac felicitate philosophus in Lib Ethic determinat aliam quae est post hanc vitam nec asserens nec negans Thomas seems thus to be both an exclusivist (about ldquotrue beatituderdquo) and an inclusivist (with respect to ldquobeatitude in this liferdquo)


There are difficulties about this view as we will see but not much room for con-troversy about what Thomasrsquos intent is

Finally Aquinasrsquos brief but influential remarks on political theory show sig-nificant shifts from Aristotlersquos Politics (on which Thomas wrote an incomplete commentary) Among the enormous changes in the political landscape since the death of Aristotle had been the eclipse of the Greek city-states the rise (and fall) of first the Roman Republic and then its successor empire in the West the emergence of the institutional Christian Church with sometimes powerful popes leading it the revival of the imperial ideal among the Carolingians and then the German emperors and the rise of national monarchies None of these developments could well have been foreseen by Aristotle and perhaps most startling of all for him would have been the advent of an influential and largely independent religious bodymdashthe Christian Churchmdashthat was destined to clash with the political authorities for supremacy and that furthermore would teach that human perfection can be attained only through divine grace and in an after-life However much Thomas may have learned from studying Aristotlersquos Politics the Philosopherrsquos theories had to be fitted to a radically different context and combined with an evolving tradition of Christian thought about obedience to secular authorities and the simultaneous obligation of such authorities to leave the large and ill-defined sphere of ecclesiastical matters in the hands of the church This last issue led to endless conflicts about the ldquotwo swordsrdquo (an issue that continues in various forms even today27) Thomas endorses under limited circumstances the authority of the church to depose a secular ruler The under-lying principle was that a valid human law must be in alignment with natural law

As Augustine says (DLA I51133) that which is not just seems to be no law at all Hence the force of a law depends on its justice Now in human affairs a thing is said to be just from being right according to the rule of reason But the first rule of reason is the law of nature Con-sequently every human law has just so much of the nature of law as it is derived from the law of nature But if in any point it departs from the law of nature it is no longer a law but a perversion of law28

(IaIIae 952c)

27 Consider the current dispute in the United States over whether religious organizations qua employers may be compelled to pay for the health insurance of their employees if that insurance covers contraceptive services that the employer finds contrary to the faith

28 [S]icut Augustinus dicit in I de Lib Arb non videtur esse lex quae iusta non fuerit Unde inquan-tum habet de iustitia intantum habet de virtute legis In rebus autem humanis dicitur esse aliquid iustum ex eo quod est rectum secundum regulam rationis Rationis autem prima regula est lex naturae Unde omnis lex humanitus posita intantum habet de ratione legis inquantum a lege naturae derivatur Si vero in aliquo a lege naturali discordet iam non erit lex sed legis corruptio


In particular Thomas teaches that a prince may be deposed if he has become an apostate or heretic

As soon as sentence of excommunication is passed on a man on account of apostasy from the faith his subjects are ipso facto absolved from his authority and from the oath of allegiance whereby they were bound to him 29

(IIaIIae122c)

Like Aristotle Thomas has a harsh opinion of tyranny and allows that ldquothe mul-tituderdquo (ie the populace) may ldquodepose a king that they instituted or bridle his power if he should abuse the royal power tyrannicallyrdquo30 But however much Thomas and the Philosopher agree in their dislike of tyranny the central conceptsmdashof ldquonatural lawrdquo and the ldquorule of reasonrdquomdashon which Thomas bases his dislike are not there in Aristotle

To return to our main theme having claimed in STh 28 that our happiness cannot consist in any created good Thomas goes on to argue in 38 that it must consist in the vision of the divine essence (the Beatific Vision) But this claim introduces a paradoxical elementmdashforeshadowed in the Platonic concept of willmdashinto Aquinasrsquos doctrine of happiness ie that the completion it allegedly longs for is ldquobeyond [our] capacityrdquo (supra naturam) (55c) But human nature is equipped with ldquofree choice [liberum arbitrium] with which [a human being] can turn to God that He may make him happyrdquo31 (ibid ad 1)

Thomas certainly wants to be a teleological eudaimonist every bit as much as Aristotle did Yet from the point of view of virtue ethics his argument in the Treatise on Happiness leads him into a dilemma the most our unaided human nature is capable of is the ldquoimperfect happiness (that) can be acquired by man by his natural powers in the same way as virtue in whose operation it con-sistsrdquo32 (ibid c) Yet our willmdashin a sense modeled ultimately it seems on Pla-torsquos erocircsmdashis such that we long for a perfect happiness the Beatific Vision that is beyond our means and in Thomasrsquos view could only be a divine gift to us as

29 [Q]uam cito aliquis per sententiam denuntiatur excommunicatus propter apostasiam a fide ipso facto eius subditi sunt absoluti a dominio eius et iuramento fidelitatis quo ei tenebantur Some have seen a line of influence here from Aquinas to Locke to Thomas Jefferson

30 [N]on iniuste ab eadem rex institutus potest destitui vel refrenari eius potestas si potestate regia tyrannice abutatur On the Government of Rulers (De regimine principorum) I77 trans James M Blythe (Philadelphia University of Pennsylvania Press 1997) 76 Thomasrsquos authorship of this work is disputed

31 [Q]uo possit converti ad Deum qui eum faceret beatum32 [B]eatitudo imperfecta quae in hac vita haberi potest potest ab homine acquiri per sua naturalia eo

modo quo et virtus in cuius operatione consistit


a reward for our meritorious virtuous behavior Two troubling questions arise First can the notions of merit an extrinsic reward and virtue coexist in a coher-ent ethic Further does it make sense to say that the happiness or fulfillment of creatures of a given nature is ldquobeyond the capacityrdquo of that nature Before we take up each of these questions in turn it will help to recall the discussion in chapter 1 of Aquinasrsquos teleological conception of human action and of the willrsquos role therein

Thomasrsquos analysis of human action itself is as thoroughly teleological as Aristotlersquos though far more detailed and developed and the space accorded to the notion of will (voluntas) is vastly greater33 We saw that boulecircsis (which can contra Thomas be at most partially identified with will) receives less than a page of attention in the NE while Thomas devotes nearly one hundred pages to voluntas in STh IaIIae (Questions 6 to 17) and roughly another twenty in the Treatise on Human Nature Ia 82ndash83 The comparison by volume is somewhat unfair however since Aristotle does discuss choice at length and Thomas fol-lows Augustine in making choice (arbitrium electio) part of will in its extended sense (along with intention consent use and enjoyment none of these four latter notions receive treatment from Aristotle)34 At the same time and unlike Aristotle Thomas was writing in a tradition that since at least Augustine had devoted a great deal of careful attention to the analysis of sin (and not least original sin) hence a thorough explication of the basis of any such analysis was of pressing concern to him

In any event for this study what is important to note are these three elements in Thomasrsquos view of human action that it is essentially a teleological notion that at its core is the complex Thomistic concept of will with its intrinsic orientation to the summum bonum and that the role of action in the human quest for be-atitudo is mediated by the virtues and complicated by grace At the very start of the Treatise on Happiness where Thomas speaks of ldquothe ultimate end of human liferdquo (de ultimo fine humanae vitae) he argues that it ldquobelongsrdquomdashin a strong sensemdashto human beings to act for an end

Of actions done by a human being those alone are properly called ldquohumanrdquo which are proper to the human qua human Now the human

33 Comprehensive discussions of his treatment of action and will are given in Ralph McInerny Aquinas on Human Action A Theory of Practice (Washington DC Catholic University of America Press 1992) Daniel Westberg Right Practical Reason Aristotle Action and Prudence in Aquinas (Oxford Clarendon Press 1994) and Bradley Aquinas on the Twofold while a briefer overview is offered by Donagan in ldquoThomas Aquinas on Human Actionrdquo

34 In ldquoWho Discovered the Willrdquo Irwin argues that Aristotle would (or at least should) have been open to seeing choice prohairesis as the central notion of will But Aristotlersquos prohairesis is limited to a subset of actions while from Augustine onward will is not


being differs from irrational animals in this that he is master (domi-nus) of his actions Wherefore those actions alone are properly called human of which he is master Now the human being is master of his actions through his reason and will35 Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will And if any other actions are found in a human being they can be called actions ldquoof a human beingrdquo but not properly ldquohumanrdquo actions since they are not proper to the human qua human Now it is clear that whatever actions proceed from a power are caused by that power in accordance with the nature of its object But the object of the will is the end and the good Therefore all human actions must be for an end36

(IaIIae11c)

ldquoEvery agent of necessity acts for an endrdquo37 (12c) this is as true of animals and even inanimate objects as it is of human beings But among terrestrial beings only humans ldquomove themselves to an end because they have dominion over their actions through their free choicerdquo38 (ibid emphasis added) Thus it is a defin-ing characteristic of human beings to act through their own intellect and will for an end39

In thus claiming such an expansive and defining role for teleology in human action Thomas is preparing the way for a further and weightier claim that every human action has a last end and indeed the same end The argument goes like this every human action has by definition a final end something desired for its own sake and not for the sake of something further (the chain of purposes must come to an end if action is ever to begin) (14) Second each person can have

35 For Aristotle one is master (kurios) of an action if it is performed voluntarily which in some sense implies reason but does not necessarily involve what he calls wish or will (boulecircsis)

36 [A]ctionum quae ab homine aguntur illae solae proprie dicuntur humanae quae sunt propriae hominis inquantum est homo Differt autem homo ab aliis irrationalibus creaturis in hoc quod est suorum actuum dominus Unde illae solae actiones vocantur proprie humanae quarum homo est dominus Est autem homo dominus suorum actuum per rationem et voluntatem unde et liberum arbitrium esse dicitur facultas voluntatis et rationis Illae ergo actiones proprie humanae dicuntur quae ex voluntate deliberata procedunt Si quae autem aliae actiones homini conveniant possunt dici quidem hominis actiones sed non proprie humanae cum non sint hominis inquantum est homo Manifestum est autem quod omnes actiones quae procedunt ab aliqua potentia causantur ab ea secundum rationem sui obiecti Obiectum autem volun-tatis est finis et bonum Unde oportet quod omnes actiones humanae propter finem sint

37 [O]mnia agentia necesse est agere propter finem38 [S]eipsa movent ad finem quia habent dominium suorum actuum per liberum arbitrium39 Thomas does not claim that a casual gesture such as stroking the hair on onersquos head need be

done for an end but such acts though done by a human being are not properly ldquohuman actsrdquo since they ldquodo not proceed from deliberation of [practical] reason which is the proper principle of human actionsrdquo (11ad 3)


only one final goal (since it is of the nature of the ldquoperfect and crowning goodrdquo to be unique for if there were two essential components of that goodmdashhealth and wealth saymdashthe conjunction of them would necessarily be required for hap-piness and thus together constitute the goal) (15)40 Third he claims that this goal is necessarily the source of the motivation in every human action an agent performs as itself either the direct goal of that action or as that perfect good toward which its direct goal tends (appetatur ut tendens in bonum perfectum) ldquoHuman beings must of necessity desire all whatsoever they desire for the last endrdquo41 (16c) This seems to imply that if I say arrange to meet an acquaintance in town to chat with him over tea my action in doing so aims at and perhaps achieves a (partial) fulfillment of my ultimate goal In effect Thomas is claiming that there are no independent chains of purposeful action in a rational agentrsquos life every such chain ultimately aimsmdasheither explicitly or implicitlymdashat the same thing Indeed since we all share the same nature this goal is the same for all ldquoa human beingrsquos last end is happiness which all desirerdquo42 (18sc) And this he goes on to claim can be found only in the Beatific Vision (38)

One might say that the conclusion of this argumentmdashthat each of us desires just one ultimate end in his or her life indeed we all desire the same end which is the Beatific Vision as the goal (implicitly) sought in every fully human actionmdashis the very acme of ldquoliving with a whyrdquo every morally significant (ie deliberated) human action is done with a single ultimate purpose to attain the Beatific Vision (even if we are unaware that this is what we want) It is as if Thomas sees no way to want any good that one can attain by acting without thereby (at least implic-itly) wanting the best of all possible goods as the final rationale for onersquos deed At first glance this seems an extreme notion Thomas can hardly have supposed that people ordinarily think of their actionsmdasheg meeting an acquaintance for teamdashand those of others in this way Should I really add that part of the goal of my going for tea is also eventually to see God But Thomas seems not to be saying there is need for any conscious intention here and the idea of unconscious intention was presumably foreign to him What then is left The argument in 15c begins this way

It is impossible for a manrsquos will to be directed at the same time to diverse things as last ends [for] since everything desires its own perfection

40 Since Thomas wants to establish that each of us deep down desires one specific end ie the Beatific Vision it hardly helps his argument to claim that someone who regularly vacillates between say a life of acquisition and a life of asceticism is thereby seeking a single goal Cf Irwin Development of Ethics 453 n 74

41 [N]ecesse est quod omnia quae homo appetit appetat propter ultimum finem42 [U]ltimus finis hominum est beatitudo quam omnes appetunt


a man desires for his ultimate end that which he desires as his perfect and crowning good43

And in 16c he says

Man must of necessity desire all whatsoever he desires for the last end44

ldquoImpossiblerdquo ldquomust of necessityrdquo Aquinas is plainly not making an empirical claim about what people do but instead a conceptual case about the relationship among the will its ultimate end and the perfect(ing) good As Scott MacDonald has argued Thomas is in effect analyzing the notion of a fully rational agent as one whose will meets this criterion otherwise his ultimate desire (or desires since Thomasrsquos claim is formally compatible with a conjunctive set of distinct goods serving as onersquos ultimate end) runs an unnecessary risk of frustration which would be irrational45

Many have rejected Aquinasrsquos argument (and a similar one in Aristotle at the start of the NE)46 Whether ultimately defensible or not it makes abundantly clear how goal directed Thomasrsquos conception of the will and human action is I will not take a position on the validity of his argument Instead I wish to treat it as a kind of zenith of Christian teleological eudaimonism and point out for now several things that it presupposes First human beings are finite creatures and thus stand in need ofmdashand havemdasha goal or end that completes and per-fects them Second it is the will as rational appetite that (in concert with the intellect) is focused on attaining the perfective good of human beings Third the acts (in the Aristotelian sense of actualizations of a potency) by which the will properly tends toward its goal are rational intentional and virtuous human actions And fourth if these actions are to be salvific ie fully virtuous they require divine grace as well as human effort The example in chapter 1 of Louise choosing to calm her nerves with Daoist breathing rather than with alcohol is patterned on the Aquinas model (minus the inscrutable aspect of grace) But

43 [I]mpossibile est quod voluntas unius hominis simul se habeat ad diversa sicut ad ultimos fines cum unumquodque appetat suam perfectionem illud appetit aliquis ut ultimum finem quod appetit ut bonum perfectum et completivum sui ipsius

44 [N]ecesse est quod omnia quae homo appetit appetat propter ultimum finem45 This is part of the argument in MacDonald ldquoUltimate Endsrdquo cf particularly 46ndash5946 Even as sympathetic a reader of the NE and the STh as G E M Anscombe dismissed this view

Cf Intention sect21 So did Anthony Kenny ldquoAristotle on Happinessrdquo reprinted in Articles on Aristotle Vol 2 Ethics and Politics eds J Barnes M Schofield and R Sorabji (London Duckworth 1977) MacDonald in ldquoUltimate Endsrdquo has defended it against such criticisms albeit with many emenda-tions and caveats


it is important to bear in mind that Thomas sees this pattern at work in every voluntary action Hence he believes someone such as Louise is (implicitly) seek-ing the Vision of God not only when she is making what we would ordinarily recognize as a moral choice but also when she calculates the latest sales figures decides not to add milk to her coffee during an afternoon break or chooses not to watch the latest televised episode of Downton Abbey 47 We will return to this topic in chapter 6 For now we turn to Thomasrsquos doctrine of the virtues

As we saw Aristotle defines virtue (or excellence) this way

Excellence then is a state concerned with choice lying in a mean ie the mean relative to us this being determined by reason and in the way in which the man of practical wisdom would determine it48


By ldquostaterdquo he means habit and the form of reason that determines the mean is practical reason (phronecircsis) As for the all-important ldquoway in which the man of practical wisdom would determinerdquo the mean Aristotle had spelled that out earlier

[I]f the acts that are in accordance with the virtues have themselves a certain character it does not follow that they are done justly or temper-ately The agent also must be in a certain condition when he does them in the first place he must have knowledge secondly he must choose the acts and choose them for their own sakes and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character49

(II4 1105a29ndash32)

Note the virtuous person chooses to perform the virtuous act for its own sake One might wonder why Aristotle thought this condition necessary Why canrsquot we simply call someone brave for instance if she or he stands firm in battle for whatever reason The answer seems to be that Aristotle was above all inter-ested in the development of good character A person of good character will for

47 Perhaps Thomas could have avoided this relentless teleologism with a version of Aristotlersquos distinction between praxis and poiesis In that case her action qua calculation of sales figures need not be seen as oriented to the final good (though again it might be thus oriented qua fulfilling a duty to her employer)


49 τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα οὐκ ἐὰν αὐτά πως ἔχῃ δικαίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ὁ πράττων πῶς ἔχων πράττῃ πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδώς ἔπειτ᾽ ἐὰν προαιρούμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος δι᾽ αὐτά τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἐὰν καὶ βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττῃ


example do what is brave not only when it is pleasant or expedient to do so (or as one might say colloquially ldquowhen itrsquos in her own interestrdquo) Such actionsmdashdone simply because they are bravemdashare examples of to kalon the fine or noble or admirable

The brave person will face [dangers] as he ought and as reason directs and he will face them for the sake of what is noble for this is the end of excellence50

(III7 1115b10ndash13)

What is noble in such a deed is of course the deed itself thus to do something for the sake of the noble is to do it qua virtuous deed for its own sake Hence motive is crucial where motive here means not the goal or intention of the actionmdashto defeat the enemy saymdashbut rather its psychological source in the agent For example three soldiers might all stand strong in battle one because it is kalon to do so another because he is reckless while the third perversely enjoys carnage only the first is brave in Aristotlersquos sense and the brave behavior proceeds from this character trait rather than from a vice (recklessness) or a base desire (bloodthirstiness)51 We will return shortly to this question of performing virtuous deeds for their own sake in the case of Thomas

Measured simply by the sheer volume of the attention given to the virtues in his Summa Thomas is clearly a virtue ethicist But his treatment is peculiar in a number of ways When he gives what one could call his own official definition of virtue52 he quotes as we saw from Augustinersquos ideas in DLA II19 ldquoVirtue is a good quality of mind whereby we live rightly which no one misuses and that God works in us without usrdquo53 But at other times (eg in IaIIae 1009) Aquinas uses the definition of virtue given by Aristotle though the two are very differ-ent in spirit as well as in various substantive points54 Thomas was certainly not inclined to follow orthodox Aristotelianism which would require of him some-thing like the fideist path of Boethius of Dacia (to be discussed below p 109) But

50 ὁ δὲ ἀνδρεῖος ἀνέκπληκτος ὡς ἄνθρωπος φοβήσεται μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὡς δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος ὑπομενεῖ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς

51 This sense of motivemdashas rooted in a character trait in the agentmdashwill be important later for our understanding of Eckhartrsquos ldquolive without whyrdquo

52 At STh IaIIae 554 and again at De Virtutibus I253 This particular authoritative citation is itself odd since Augustine whose focus in that work is

on the will and theodicy seems not to be attempting a formal definition of virtue so much as distin-guishing it from free choice both are goods but the latter can while the former cannot be misused

54 Most strikingly Augustine attributes all virtue to divine grace while as we saw Aristotle stresses the virtuous agentrsquos choice of her deed ldquofor its own sakerdquo Perhaps Thomas was trying to downplay the differences to make his own adaptation of Aristotle more acceptable


he also did not want to condemn the Aristotelian approach outright The result is a three-tiered doctrine of virtue ldquoacquiredrdquomdashthese would be virtues in the Aris-totelian mode ldquotheologicalrdquomdashfaith hope and charity which are divine gifts that function as the basis for the third tier the ldquoinfusedrdquo virtues These latter two levels would more readily fit the Augustinian characterization

As for the first tier Thomas characterizes Aristotlersquos idea of eudaimoniamdashliving an active life of the theoretical and moral virtuesmdashas a form of happiness but an imperfect one55 for a life of the human virtues cannot by itself satisfy our deepest longing56 Still Aquinas acknowledges (eg in IaIIae 632) that there are indeed such human virtues something that Augustine was loathe to con-cede57 Further in his treatise on the topic Thomas agrees with Aristotle that the virtues are habits (DeVir I1) and that they ldquolie in a meanrdquo (virtus autem moralis est in medio ibid I 13) that is determined by reason (ibid) But two prominent features of the Aristotelian approach to virtue are largely or entirely ignored by Thomas First there is Aristotlersquos stress on the practically wise person (ho spoudaios) as the standard of right conduct As we noted earlier in this chapter (p 92) Thomas instead emphasizes the divine law implanted in the soul and recognized by the natural habit of synderesis Finally Thomas basically ignores Aristotlersquos condition on virtuous action that the agent must ldquochoose them for their own sakesrdquo In his commentary on the NE he does correctly identify the condition (SLE 283) And in DeVir (I2obj 17) he mentions the point that

virtue is not among the greatest goods since the greatest is desired for its own sake and that is not the case with virtue which is sought for the sake of something else namely happiness58

This is a denial or at least a distortion of Aristotlersquos view in the NE that

every excellence (ie virtue) we choose indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them) but

55 ldquoThe imperfect happiness that can be had in this life can be acquired by man by his natural powers in the same way as virtue in whose operation it consistsrdquo [Beatitudo imperfecta quae in hac vita haberi potest potest ab homine acquiri per sua naturalia eo modo quo et virtus in cuius operatione consistit] (IaIIae55c)

56 ldquoIt is impossible for any created good to constitute manrsquos happinessrdquo [Impossibile est beatitudi-nem hominis esse in aliquo bono creato](Ibid28c)

57 In City of God XIX 25 Augustine calls the pagan virtues ldquorather vices than virtuesrdquo (vitia sunt potius quam virtutes) since the actions they inspire are done in the wrong spirit without ldquoreference to Godrdquo (rettulerit nisi ad Deum)

58 Sed virtus non est de maximis bonis quia maxima bona sunt quae propter se appetuntur quod non convenit virtutibus cum propter aliud appetantur quia propter felicitatem


we choose them also for the sake of happiness judging that through them we shall be happy59

(I7 1097b2ndash5)

Thomas simply omits the ldquowe choose them indeed for themselvesrdquo andmdashan important point I will urgemdashhe makes happiness ldquosomething elserdquo than the vir-tues while Aristotle is at pains to argue that eudaimonia (in large part at least) consists in a life of virtuous activity

We can Thomas says acquire a modicum of happiness by our human efforts but by no means can it finally satisfy our yearning Are we then what Sartre called ldquoa useless passionrdquo longing for something we cannot attain60 Thomas of course thinks not The Christian promise that the saved will see God ldquoface to facerdquo (I Cor 1312) implies he argues that our nature can somehow be trans-formed so as to become capable of this Beatific Vision Attaining this transfor-mation is made possible by the divine gift of grace in the form of supernatural (or ldquotheologicalrdquo) virtues that enable us to act meritoriously61 The gist of his view on grace in the Summa can be put this way for us to attain the completion we long for in the Beatific Vision we require Godrsquos supernatural assistance in the form both of a permanent alteration or restoration of our nature (ldquosanctifying gracerdquo gratia gratum faciens) and of ongoing assistance in the formation of the will and the execution of meritorious actions (ldquoactualrdquo or ldquocooperating gracerdquo operantem et cooperantem) 62 The effect of all this on the soul is to transform the ordinary (or Aristotelian) virtues which have their original root in our human nature into supernatural virtues both with respect to their goal (God in one way or another) and their inspiration (which comes from the ldquosuper-naturerdquo of the theological virtues63)

59 πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἱρούμεθα μὲν καὶ δι᾽ αὐτά (μηθενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαίνοντος ἑλοίμεθ᾽ ἂν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν) αἱρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσειν

60 The phrase appears at the very end of part 4 chapter 2 III of Being and Nothingness transl Hazel Barnes (New York Washington Square Press1966) 754

61 Aquinasrsquos teachings on the topic of grace ldquoare complex and difficult to followrdquo and their devel-opment over the course of his mature years reflects ldquohis growing pessimism over humanityrsquos natural facultiesrdquo according to Alister McGrath Justitia Dei A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification 3rd ed (Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2005) 136 I restrict myself to Thomasrsquos mature view in STh Clearly in this work meritorious virtuous action presupposes grace

62 Cf the distinctions drawn in IaIIae111263 Thus for instance the theological virtue of charity inspires ldquoinfusedrdquo courage in the Christian

to undergo martyrdom should this become necessary ldquoCharity inclines one to the act of martyr-dom as its first and chief motive cause being the virtue commanding it whereas courage inclines thereto as being its proper motive cause being the virtue that elicits itrdquo [ad actum martyrii inclinat quidem caritas sicut primum et principale motivum per modum virtutis imperantis fortitudo autem sicut motivum proprium per modum virtutis elicientis] (IIaIIae1242ad 2)


Faith hope and charitymdashinfused in us by Godmdashmake it possible in Aqui-nasrsquos view for us to live a life of the virtues that is ldquosuperior to the human levelrdquo (to transpose a phrase that Aristotle applied to the contemplative life) They play the role in the lives of the faithful that human nature itself plays in each human being on the Aristotelian view ie they are the basis for the infused virtuesmdasheg infused courage or justicemdashand the inspiration for the practice and devel-opment of those virtues That practice enables us to earn the eternal reward Thomas says with Augustine as his authority

Human beings by will do works meritorious of everlasting life but for this it is necessary that the human will should be prepared with grace by God64

(STh 1095ad 1)

While this would be seen by some in the Reformation as granting too much power and freedom to the human will and its works for Aquinas himself this ldquoThomist synthesisrdquo must have seemed a neat path between the grace-only lean-ings of Augustine and the virtueaction orientation of Aristotle But it raises the two serious problems alluded to earlier to which we must now return

First there is a dilemma about virtue that looms for the Thomist variety of teleological eudaimonism Aquinasrsquos approach is threatened by a kind of instru-mentalism the goal of the Beatific Vision is at least in part extrinsic to and a reward for the virtuous life This is not to say that Thomas is ldquoan egoistic ratio-nalistrdquo someone for whom the sole point of virtuous behavior is to be rewarded for it65 By comparison a charge of egoism could not really touch Aristotle if we understand egoism to be in tension with what one standardly thinks of as virtuousmdashand hence in part altruisticmdashliving For Aristotle the virtuous life is in fact the one most suited to the real interests of the individual so altruis-tic virtues such as justice or liberality cannot truly conflict with genuine self-interest But the plausibility of this claim is rooted in Aristotlersquos view that living virtuously is itself the perfection of our nature here there is no toe-hold for instrumentalism Not entirely so for Thomas in his view the perfection of our

64 [H]omo sua voluntate facit opera meritoria vitae aeternae sed sicut Augustinus in eodem libro dicit ad hoc exigitur quod voluntas hominis praeparetur a Deo per gratiam

65 I borrow the phrase (and use it in a slightly altered sense) from Scott MacDonald ldquoEgoistic Rationalism Aquinasrsquos Basis for Christian Moralityrdquo in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philoso-phy ed Michael D Beaty (Notre Dame IN University of Notre Dame Press 1990) 327ndash54 Put perhaps over simply MacDonaldrsquos view is that for Thomas human beings naturally seek their own complete good and they do so by means of the exercise of intellect and will A critique of this kind of position can be found in chapter 3 of Thomas Osborne Love of Self and Love of God in Thirteenth-Century Ethics (Notre Dame IN University of Notre Dame Press 2005)


nature is twofold Something like Aristotlersquos view may be correct at the inferior ldquonaturalrdquo level66 but our inborn teleology points beyond the sphere of nature ldquoOur heart is restless until it rests in Yourdquo according to the famous prayer of Au-gustine (Conf11) Each of us wants more infinitely more and that can only be obtained through a divine reward for our meritorious behavior

Still it cannot be quite right to call Thomas an egoist and leave it at that True in his view virtue is not (or not only) its own reward But at the same time the principal form grace takes in our actions is charity the greatest of the theologi-cal virtues No mere disposition to alms-giving and the like charity for Thomas means nothing less than a form of the love with which God loves Himself ie a love of God for Godrsquos own perfect goodness a love beyond ordinary human ability andmdashcruciallymdasha love that is not self-serving As Brian Davies puts it ldquo[B]y charity we share in what God is from eternity insofar as we love God in the way God loves God it is the presence (in us) of the Holy Spirit because it is caused by the Holy Spirit who thereby produces in us what love is in Godrdquo67 Charity enables us to act in selfless ways that are by definition done for the love of God not for the sake of a reward though such acts de facto merit the Be-atific Vision As Thomas sees it the Christian revelation points to an avenue that leads to a perfect beatitude undreamed of by the ancients God offers to make us deiform ldquoparticipants in the divine naturerdquo (2 Peter 13f) As a result those who are saved can in Heaven enjoy a knowledge of the divine essence while in this life (in via) Godrsquos grace blesses them with faith hope and charity each of which gives a foretaste of the joys of heaven Indeed as already mentioned these three theological virtuesmdashunknown to the pagan thinkersmdashso transform the lives of the faithful that even those virtues praised by the ancients are made new inspir-ing just or courageous or generous actions that are now performed from charity ie from the love of God for Godrsquos own sake This then is the best life possible for human beings in via a life in which we perform virtuous and meritorious deeds out of charity Such a life can hardly be called egoism

But has Thomas then in describing the graced lives of the truly faithful thereby avoided ethical instrumentalism altogether Is his system a variant of that of Aristotle who as we saw thought of virtuous behavior as done for its own sake and for the sake of happiness Can we read him as saying that an action is meritorious (and that God rewards that action in the Beatific Vision) while at the same time the agent does not undertake it as a means to this end Indeed could we not say the action is meritorious precisely because it is not intended

66 ldquoThe happiness of human beings is two-fold One which is imperfect is found in this life The Philosopher speaks about this rdquo [duplex est felicitas hominis Una imperfecta quae est in via de qua loquitur philosophus] (Super de Trinitate 364ad 3)

67 Brian Davies The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford Clarendon Press 1992) 288ndash89


as a means to any further end68 Although Thomas sometimes seems to suggest such a noninstrumental view of the theologically virtuous life it is not his main thrust In IaIIae 623c he claims the theological virtues ldquodirect man to super-natural happiness in the same way as by the natural inclination man is directed to his connatural endrdquo69 This might seem noninstrumental as Aristotlersquos treatment of the virtues arguably is But unlike with the Aristotelian ldquonaturalrdquo virtues the practice of the supernatural variety cannot constitute supernatural happiness and of course Thomas thinks of such practice (and the practice of the infused virtues which they make possible) as meriting the ultimate goal So it is accurate to call these virtues goal oriented in a much stronger sense than that in which it could be said of Aristotelian virtues (which do not merit happiness but instead in large part constitute it) In particular Thomas says that by hope ldquothe will is directed to this end [the Beatific Vision] as something attainablerdquo70 (623c emphases added) In this life we believe by the theological virtue of faith in the possibil-ity of the Beatific Vision we are inspired by grace to hope for it by grace we perform actions meritorious of it (1095ad 1) while by charitymdashie the divine love itself in us through gracemdashwe enjoy a certain anticipation of the union we hope for in the life to come In other words in Thomasrsquos view we are meant to aspire to the Beatific Vision an aspiration that at the same time we must realize can only be fulfilled as a reward for our merits Aspiration is of course a form of desire we want not just the practice of the virtues but above all we want that Vision and it is a reward for merit

These points are made very explicitly by Thomas in a passage in which he dis-cusses whether the angels merit their beatitude (Ia624) Though Thomas here primarily discusses angels the claim about beatitude and merit is perfectly gen-eral and meant to apply to human beings as well He writes (emphases added)

Perfect beatitude is natural only to God because existence and beati-tude are one and the same thing in Him Beatitude however is not of the nature of the creature but is its end Now everything attains its last end by its operation Such operation leading to the end is either pro-ductive of the end when such end is not beyond the power of the agent working for the end as the healing art is productive of health or else it is deserving of the end when such end is beyond the capacity of the agent

68 I am indebted for this suggestion to an anonymous reviewer of my article ldquoEudaimonism Tele-ology and the Pursuit of Happiness Meister Eckhart on lsquoLiving without a Whyrsquordquo Faith and Philoso-phy 263 (2009) 274ndash96 in which I first explored this question

69 [V]irtutes theologicae hoc modo ordinant hominem ad beatitudinem supernaturalem sicut per natu-ralem inclinationem ordinatur homo in finem sibi connaturalem

70 [V]oluntas ordinatur in illum finem et quantum ad motum intentionis in ipsum tendentem sicut in id quod est possibile consequi


striving to attain it wherefore it is looked for from anotherrsquos bestowing ultimate beatitude exceeds both the angelic and the human nature It remains then that both man and angel merited their beatitude And if the angel was created in grace without which there is no merit there would be no difficulty in saying that he merited beatitude as also if one were to say that he had grace in any way before he had glory But if he had no grace before entering upon beatitude it would then have to be said that he had beatitude without merit even as we have grace This however is quite foreign to the idea of beatitude which conveys the notion of an end and is the reward of virtue71

(Ia624c)

Although a reward may be bestowed on someone who was not aiming for it (and who may even have been unaware that a reward was possible) an end for a ra-tional agent is something that the agent wants and at which she aims Putting these two notions together it is hard to avoid the conclusion that for Thomas it is from our desire for beatitude that we perform ldquooperationsrdquo (actions) that simultaneously are aimed at that goal and also performed selflessly (aimlessly) out of charity and for which God willing we receive the heavenly reward This is surely a form of consequentialism72

This same point also emerges in the way mentioned earlier ie in the fact that this life of the theological (and other) virtues is not itself our beatitudo our happiness Such a life is clearly the best we can hope for while on earth and so we must think of it as a certain level of happiness But surely a Thomist Chris-tian would and should be disappointed if this were ldquoallrdquo she were to attain For although her life of the Christian virtues is the best one possible in via (far better presumably than its Aristotelian counterpart) and is to an extent chosen for its

71 [S]oli Deo beatitudo perfecta est naturalis quia idem est sibi esse et beatum esse Cuiuslibet autem creaturae esse beatum non est natura sed ultimus finis Quaelibet autem res ad ultimum finem per suam op-erationem pertingit Quae quidem operatio in finem ducens vel est factiva finis quando finis non excedit vir-tutem eius quod operatur propter finem sicut medicatio est factiva sanitatis vel est meritoria finis quando finis excedit virtutem operantis propter finem unde expectatur finis ex dono alterius Beatitudo autem ultima excedit et naturam angelicam et humanam ut ex dictis patet Unde relinquitur quod tam homo quam Angelus suam beatitudinem meruerit Et si quidem Angelus in gratia creatus fuit sine qua nullum est meritum absque difficultate dicere possumus quod suam beatitudinem meruerit Et similiter si quis diceret quod qualitercumque gratiam habuerit antequam gloriam Si vero gratiam non habuit antequam esset beatus sic oportet dicere quod beatitudinem absque merito habuit sicut nos gratiam Quod tamen est contra rationem beatitudinis quae habet rationem finis et est praemium virtutis

72 It is though distinct from the ldquoimpartialisticrdquo kind found in modern theories such as utilitari-anism Cf Don Adams ldquoAquinas and Modern Consequentialismrdquo International Journal of Philosophi-cal Studies 124 (2004) 395ndash417


own sake she certainly also wantsmdashand wants above allmdashthe Beatific Vision it is the object of her deepest desire The theological virtues despite any talk of ldquofor their own sakerdquo are essentially aimed at attaining a Good beyond them-selves an end state that for Thomas is a reward73 Such an ethic while perhaps not egoistic in any objectionable sense is certainly consequentialist But this creates an unavoidable and perhaps unsupportable tension The Christian is in effect told by Thomas that God willing her deepest desire will be fulfilled but only if she succeeds in both letting (as faith and hope dictate) andmdashas charity demandsmdashnot letting that desire motivate her actions

But there is anothermdashand possibly more damagingmdashconsequence of the Thomistic approach If one conceives of the human summum bonum as distinct from virtuous living and indeed as a reward that one hopes to attain for it then virtuous deeds become expedients means to a more valuable end Whether the notion of virtue is even consistent with such a role is questionable If it is not consistent then the instrumental attitude threatens to undermine onersquos ldquo virtuesrdquomdashfor one would not be acting justly or bravely for the sake of justice or couragemdashand then the question presents itself How can nonmoral conduct possibly merit salvation

ldquoButrdquo we can imagine Thomas countering

ldquosurely one can have both kinds of motivation acting bravely both because it is noble (Aristotlersquos kalon) to do so and because one will be rewarded for it Aristotle was no stranger to the mixed motives of most human beings Why should bravery exclude a soldierrsquos hope of reward from the king After all Aristotle himself apparently argued that living morally is a necessary condition if one is to enjoy the practice of the intellectual virtues both of which we want so the former becomes a means for the latter My own view is rather like that if with the help of divine grace we act in a morally commendable fashion we will be rewarded with the opportunity to engage in the activitymdashthe Beatific Visionmdashthat we most deeply desire and which alone can still our yearning for fulfillmentrdquo

And yet the differences of his views from Aristotlersquos are more profound than Thomasrsquos imagined defense here allows for Let us recall that in book I6 of the

73 As Joseph Wawrykow says ldquoWhen speaking of merit (in IaIIae 114) Thomas repeatedly refers to the life of the Christian as a lsquojourneyrsquo or lsquomovementrsquo The basic idea here is that the Christian life is a journey in which one who is in grace moves further away from sin and draws nearer to God through the good actionsmerits one performs Eventually the Christian will attain in this way the ultimate destination of this journey God Himselfrdquo In Godrsquos Grace and Human Action (Notre Dame IN Univer-sity of Notre Dame Press 1995) 267 fn 13 emphasis added


NE Aristotle rejects the whole Platonic framework that posits a transcendent good as the goal of human striving74 His rejection is based on several reasons First that sort of goodmdashif it existsmdashis the wrong sort of thing for an inquiry into human happiness

Even if there is some one good which is capable of separate and independent existence clearly it could not be achieved or attained by humans but we are now [in ethics] seeking something attainable75

(1096b32-1097a1 translation slightly altered)

Aristotle is here anticipating the results of his ldquofunction argumentrdquo in I7 that eudaimonia consists in ldquoactivity of soul in accordance with virtue and if there is more than one virtue in accordance with the best and most completerdquo76 (1098a16-18) The virtuesexcellences in question are those that pertain to the human function and

we state the function of man to be a certain kind of life and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle77

(Ibid 12ndash14)

The human good must consist in some excellent rational activity of the soul and not in the attainment of any object however good Except as it might figure in some such activity a transcendent good is of no use to the human quest for happiness and as transcendent it is not something humans could possess (oude ktecircton anthrocircpocirci) True we can contemplate such a good and Aristotle does in fact think of such contemplation as sublime the highest activity available to humans Still it is a this-worldly activity one that makes the practitioner blessed but ldquoblessed as a human being isrdquo78 (1101a20-21)

Relatedly we also find in Aristotlersquos rejection of the Platonic variety of eudaimonism something akin to the Kantian critique of heteronomy in ethics For Kant an action is heteronomous if it is determined by eg inclination ie by something other than a demand (or command) of practical reason Though the details are of course very different Aristotle also rejects motivations that are extrinsic to the moral sphere That is he ldquocontrasts acting for the sake of the

74 Cf the excerpt from Symposium cited earlier in note 2075 εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἕν τι τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον ἀγαθὸν ἢ χωριστὸν αὐτό τι καθ᾽ αὑτό δῆλον ὡς

οὐκ ἂν εἴη πρακτὸν οὐδὲ κτητὸν ἀνθρώπῳ νῦν δὲ τοιοῦτόν τι πρὸς τὰ κτητὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν76 ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ᾽ ἀρετήν εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην77 ἀνθρώπου δὲ τίθεμεν ἔργον ζωήν τινα ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου78 μακαρίους δ᾽ ἀνθρώπους


noble (to kalon) with acting for the sake of ends external to virtuerdquo79 Strange as it may seem to Christian ears to say so the Beatific Vision is such an extrinsic end To act justly is not per se to act in order to attain that vision However if one does have such a desire to attain something of infinite value surely it must swamp the desire for any finite good such as to act justly for its own sake For a Thomist Christian moral motivationmdashin Aristotlersquos sensemdashmust inevitably take a back seat to a nonmoral (or supra-moral) motivation the desire for the Beatific Vision if indeed the former can compete at all

Thus it seems that if one were to follow a truly Aristotelian line on the role of virtue in human happiness (as eg Boethius of Dacia did in Thomasrsquos own time) one would have to separate a philosophical or rational ethics altogether from the Christian promise of a supernatural salvation (viewed as a matter of faith) at least if that is conceived as the reward for a virtuous life Writing and teaching in thirteenth-century Paris Boethius repeatedly makes the point that rational ethics is exclusively concerned with the good that can be achieved by human beings through their natural powers80 In what could be seen as a kind of fideism with respect to eternal salvation Boethiusmdashas we seemdashurges that what corresponds to human nature as its fulfillment is a natural goal excellence in the moral and intellectual spheres belief in a supernatural end must be a matter for faith (fides) alone The relationship between such fulfillment and eternal salvation is not the concern of a philosopher per se Such a framework avoids the problem of making Aristotlersquos virtues into means to a further goal and not ends in themselves By contrast when Thomas claims that ldquohuman beings are perfected by virtue with respect to those actions whereby they are directed to happinessrdquo81 (IaIIae 62 1 c) he primarily means virtue and happiness that are supernatural Yet if our perfect happiness is both extrinsic to our activities and a divine reward for themmdashthe Beatific Visionmdashthen we have what is an ethic that for an Aristotelian is incoherent if not self-contradictory

80 Cf the opening lines of his De Summo Bono in On the Supreme Good On the Eternity of the World On Dreams trans J Wippel (Toronto Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies 1987) ldquoSince in every kind of being there is a supreme possible good and since man too is a certain kind (ie species) of being there must be a supreme possible good for man I do not speak of a good which is supreme in an absolute sense but of one that is supreme for man for the goods which are accessible to man are limited and do not extend to infinity By reason let us seek to determine what the supreme good is which is accessible to manrdquo [Cum in omni specie entis sit aliquod summum bonum possibile et homo quaedam est species entis oportet quod aliquod summum bonum sit homim possibile Non dico summum bonum absolute sed summum sibi bona enim possibila homini finem habent nec procedunt in infinitum Quid autem sit hoc summum bonum quod est homini possibile per rationem investigemus]

81 [P]er virtutem perficitur homo ad actus quibus in beatitudinem ordinatur

79 Christopher Cordner ldquoAristotelian Virtue and Its Limitationsrdquo Philosophy 69269 ( July 1994) 291ndash316 at 296


This point is very important for the central issue of the present study As noted above Thomas is well aware of Aristotlersquos inclusion in his definition of the requirement that the agent must choose the virtuous act for its own sake Com-menting on NE 1105a31-32 he notes that

the [virtuous] action should be done by a choice that is not made for the sake of something else as happens when a person performs a good action for money or vainglory82

(SLE II lect 44)

Further in IaIae 1009c when discussing whether the ldquomoderdquo of acting accord-ing to virtue falls under the precept of the law Thomas again cites the Aristote-lian condition But when giving his own definition of virtue in IaIIae 554 and in De Virtutibus I 2c he instead adopts with several modifications the one he attributes to Augustine as we saw In it there is no mention of the requirement that virtuous behavior be performed for its own sake Indeed Augustine himself in a passage that Thomas must have known explicitly rejected that notion

For although some suppose that virtues which have a reference only to themselves and are desired only on their own account are yet true and genuine virtues the fact is that even then they are inflated with pride and are therefore to be reckoned vices rather than virtues83

(DCD XIX 25)

In other words in Augustinersquos view virtue ldquofor its own sake alonerdquo is actually the opposite of genuine virtue in its hubristic reliance on onersquos own power rather than on God a familiar theme in Augustine

Perhaps it is the Augustinian influence that inclines Thomas to ignore Aristotlersquos ldquofor their own sakerdquo requirement for virtue In the remark just quoted from his commentary on the NE Thomas clouds the issue by suggesting that the alternative to performing the virtuous act for its own sake is to do it for an indifferent or even ignoble end (ldquomoney or vaingloryrdquo) But does he think that for example if someone were on a given occasion to act temperately in order to please her parents she would thereby be a temperate person And if not what about her doing it in order to please God Thomas leaves us in the dark on this

82 [S]ed operetur ex electione aliud autem est ut electio operis virtuosi non sit propter aliquid aliud sicut cum quis operatur opus virtutis propter lucrum vel propter inanem gloriam

83 Nam licet a quibusdam tunc verae atque honestae putentur esse virtutes cum referuntur ad se ipsas nec propter aliud expetuntur etiam tunc inflatae ac superbae sunt ideo non virtutes sed vitia iudicanda sunt


crucial point Recall by contrast the view attributed to Eckhart in the eighth article of condemnation (cited on p 1) ldquoThose who seek nothing neither honor nor profit nor inwardness nor holiness nor reward nor heaven but who have renounced all including what is their ownmdashin such persons is God honoredrdquo Thomas apparently sees no problem in the idea of seeking heaven as a reward But separating happiness from virtuous action in this way surely seemsmdashfrom an Aristotelian perspectivemdasha threat to the latter84

Thomas is widely and correctly recognized as a teleological eudaimonist85 but we should distinguish his eudaimonism from Aristotlersquos It is not simply a matter of disagreement about what our eudaimonia consists in More impor-tantly it concerns the relationship between human eudaimonia and human nature For Aristotle the end or fulfillment of any being is necessarily a func-tion of its nature and for humans it must consist in a life of those virtues that perfect that nature a form of life that is clearly open to us to choose (and cer-tainly not one that anyone else can give us) It represents the perfection of our human nature is thoroughly this-worldly andmdashfrom an orthodox Christian perspectivemdashPelagian in its perfectionism as well as incomplete at best since it takes no account of the Christian revelation But there are a number of ways a Christian thinker influenced by Aristotle might respond One would be the philosophical fideism recommended by Boethius of Dacia but his ethical views were condemned by the Bishop of Paris in 127786 Thomasrsquos way in this situa-tion is to adopt a Platonic conception of the willrsquos orientation our true ultimate goal hidden from reason but implicit in both reasonrsquos orientation to the true in general and the willrsquos insatiable desire for universal good is known only through revelation Thus the goal cannot according to Thomas be the connatural per-fection of our finite created human nature (as Aristotle thought) but rather something ldquobeyond the nature of any created intellectrdquo (IaIae55 cf also Ia124 and 621) Hence in the Treatise on Happiness a substantial tension becomes obvious although Thomas adopts Aristotlersquos overall teleological framework his Platonic notion of the will implies a profound alteration of Aristotelian eudai-monism (which indeed no Christian could embrace as the full account of our

84 In addition to the implicit criticism in Eckhart just noted this point perhaps also underlies the distinctions drawn by both Anselm of Canterbury and John Duns Scotus between two quite distinct inclinations in the will toward justice for its own sake and toward the willrsquos own happiness or perfec-tion the former is the primary moral motivation Cf the summary discussion in Bonnie Kent ldquoThe Moral Liferdquo in The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy ed A S McGrade (Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2003) 235ndash37 and 239ndash41

85 ldquoAquinas holds to an eudaimonistic lsquomoral point of viewrsquo rdquo Bradley Aquinas on the Twofold 53 ldquoSt Thomas adopted a similar [ie to Aristotlersquos] eudaemonological [sic] and teleological stand-point rdquo Frederick Copleston SJ A History of Philosophy Vol 2 Mediaeval Philosophy Part II (Garden City NY Image Books 1962) 119

86 For a brief discussion and further references see John Wippelrsquos introduction to Boethius


destiny) But Christianityrsquos new and dramatically elevated notion of the content of human fulfillment raises the question whether that fulfillment (the Beatific Vision) is proportional in any sense to our nature Thomasrsquos alterations of Aris-totlersquos framework when thought through are such that one must ask whether his constellation of positionsmdashthat is a Christian teleological ethics that lo-cates the human telos not in the fulfillment of our nature but in a supernatural destinymdashis fully coherent Eckhart I will argue seems to think not As we will see in coming chapters Eckhartrsquos approach represents a ldquothird wayrdquo of dealing with Aristotle next to those of Thomas and Boethius

Thomasrsquos puzzling doctrine of virtue is related to the second major problem confronting his version of human eudaimonia ie how the Beatific Vision is pos-sible for ldquofinite created beingsrdquo His view is threatened by paradox Let us look first at what Thomas explicitly says about this (in 1ndash4 below)

1 Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the divine Essence87 (IaIIae38c)

for this vision alone can still all our longings Further he claims

2 Happiness is the attainment of the perfect good Whoever therefore is capable of the Perfect Good can attain happiness88 (51c)

This seems unobjectionable at first glance but there are ambiguities lurking here for one thing ldquoPerfect Goodrdquo can refer to the best of all things by def-inition God ormdashas Boethius heldmdashto the best of all things to which a given kind of creature (for example a human being) can by its nature aspire (As we saw for Aristotle this consists in contemplation a ldquodivinerdquo activity but one car-ried out in this life by ordinarymdashif giftedmdashmortals and without the need for any divine grace) Second what is meant by ldquoattainment of the Perfect Goodrdquo Aristotle thought that the happiness of the activity of contemplation is ldquoperfectrdquo (teleia) but this will be a happiness ldquoappropriate to human beingsrdquo (makarious drsquoanthropousmdashEN 111 1101a 20) subject to all the interruptions and infirmi-ties that beset our lives Thomas clearly has much moremdashinfinitely moremdashin mind But then is he still talking of human happiness How can we expectmdashor enjoy for that mattermdasha happiness that is not apportioned to our nature Thomas himself seems to give this problem a clear statement in this 55c

87 [U]ltima et perfecta beatitudo non potest esse nisi in visione divinae essentiae88 [B]eatitudo nominat adeptionem perfecti boni Quicumque ergo est capax perfecti boni potest ad

beatitudinem pervenire


3 Manrsquos perfect happiness as stated above (Question 3 Article 8) consists in the [eternal] vision of the divine Essence Now the vision of Godrsquos Essence surpasses the nature not only of man but also of every creature as was shown in Ia12489 (emphasis added)

Thomas lets the apparent paradoxmdashour human beatitude consists in the Beatific Vision but this Vision exceeds our naturemdashpass uncommented here though he hints at what his resolution of it will be when he modifies the last claim in this way

4 Consequently neither humans nor any creature can attain final happiness by their natural powersrdquo90 (ibid emphasis added)

How exactly the (tacit) appeal to ldquomore-than-naturalrdquo powers is meant to work remains to be seen

For the moment however it would seem that everyone must also agree with the following general principle

5 No one not even God can transform a creature ie something created into something uncreated (since that would involve a contradiction)

If this is correct it seems we can conclude from 3 and 5 (pending a further expla-nation of what Thomas means by [4]) either that

6 Perfect happiness is impossible for human beings91

or else since the stumbling block seems to be our finiteness as creatures or per-haps our very createdness that

7 We humans are somehow (in part) uncreated (ie divine) and hence thereby capable of perfect happiness

89 [B]eatitudo hominis perfecta sicut supra dictum est consistit in visione divinae essentiae Videre autem Deum per essentiam est supra naturam non solum hominis sed etiam omnis creaturae ut in primo ostensum est

90 [N]ec homo nec aliqua creatura potest consequi beatitudinem ultimam per sua naturalia91 This conclusion might seem overly strong should we not rather say ldquoimpossible for human

beings on their own powerrdquo Thomas might claim this but the question is does the final phrase really add anything After all for a Thomist human beings do not even exist ldquoon their own powerrdquo So if in addition to creating us God could have given us something further that would make us capable of perfect happiness then that capacity would have been part of our nature But ldquothe vision of Godrsquos Essence surpasses the nature not only of man but also of every creaturerdquo which would seem to mean that we could not have been created with such a capacity But given that how then could it be granted to us subsequently


Thomas clearly wants to reject both 6 and 7 Why Proposition 6 would seem to say we can hope for only imperfect or finite happiness One way to under-stand this would be as a regression to the paganism of the Greeks and hence contrary to Christian faith Another way to take it would be along the lines of the fideism of Boethius of Dacia ie as claiming that human reason can discern only a limited and natural fulfillment for humans but such a position was anathema to church officials in the thirteenth century and Thomas himself argued at the very start of the STh that ldquosacred doctrinerdquo is a science thus we must base moral teaching on both reason and revelation not restrict it to the former92

Thomasrsquos resistance to anything like proposition 7 may have been the result of its association with a variety of views condemned by the church in the thir-teenth century some as pantheistic others as smacking of the ldquoheresy of the Free Spiritrdquo93 Apparently according to the adherents of this latter view the Beatific Vision is possible but only because the human soul is itself (in part at least) divine a mere creature could never attain such a fulfillment Among those whose views were linked to this movement in the decades preceding Thomas were Joachim of Fiore (d 1202 his writings were declared heretical in 1263) and Amalric of Bena (d ca 1207 his teachings were also condemned) Thomas rejected the pantheistic views of Amalricrsquos followers (STh Ia 38) and he rebut-ted a portion of the teaching attributed to Joachim on the coming of a ldquonew agerdquo (IaIIae 1064)94

Amalric may also be the target of Thomasrsquos concern in Ia 121c

[W]hat is supremely knowable in itself [ie God] may not be knowable to a particular intellect because of the excess of the intelligible object above the intellect as for example the sun which is supremely visible cannot be seen by the bat because of the excess of light Therefore some

92 This Thomist principle is the burden of the argument in Bradleyrsquos Aquinas on the Twofold that many Thomists have succumbed to ldquomisconstruing the integrally theological character of Aquinasrsquos rational argumentationrdquo (xi) Further ldquoUnderlying (Thomasrsquos) confident assertions of the harmony of faith and reason is a theological notion of reason In endowing men with reason God has created us in a lsquolikeness of the uncreated truthrsquordquo (54)

93 A classic study of this movement (if it really was one) is Robert E Lerner The Heresy of the Free Spirit in the Later Middle Ages (Berkeley University of California Press 1972)

94 Though it really belongs to the history of theology this conflict has some bearing on the pres-ent study because Meister Eckhart was suspected of ldquoFree Spiritrdquo tendencies though he explicitly denied the charge Amalricrsquos exposition of Aristotle at the University of Paris was a prime reason for the ban on Aristotle imposed there in 1210 The zeal for orthodoxy swelling in that period was also apparent in the 1225 condemnation by Pope Honorius III of John Scotus Eriugenarsquos ninth-century Neoplatonist work Periphyseon which apparently had influenced Amalric


who considered this held that no created intellect can see the essence of God95 (Emphasis added)

Although this view would seem to have solid warrant from Aristotle for whom the human intellect is de facto dependent on the senses for inputmdashAmalric was admired for his knowledge of the PhilosophermdashThomas will have none of this conclusion since he says the view is both ldquoopposed to faithrdquo and ldquoalso against reasonrdquo With respect to faith he remarks

If we suppose that a created intellect could never see God it would either never attain to beatitude or its beatitude would consist in some-thing else beside God96 (ibid)

Thomas seems to assume that his readers will need little convincing of the het-erodoxy of such a view since he has just quoted 1 Jn32 ldquoWe shall see Him as He isrdquo But even if we leave aside the creedal requirements of the Christian faith97 Thomas contends that reason too demands we reject the idea that ldquoa cre-ated intellect could never see Godrdquo How so one might wonder since Thomas himself seems repeatedly to say just this (ldquo beyond the nature rdquo) His answer appeals to a fundamental view he inherited and then adapted from Aristotle

For there resides in everyone a natural desire to know the cause of any effect which he sees But if the intellect of the rational creature could not attain to the first cause of things [ie God] the natural desire would remain vainrdquo98 (ibid)

95 [Q]uod est maxime cognoscibile in se alicui intellectui cognoscibile non est propter excessum intel-ligibilis supra intellectum sicut sol qui est maxime visibilis videri non potest a vespertilione propter exces-sum luminis Hoc igitur attendentes quidam posuerunt quod nullus intellectus creatus essentiam Dei videre potest

96 [S]i nunquam essentiam Dei videre potest intellectus creatus vel nunquam beatitudinem obtinebit vel in alio eius beatitudo consistet quam in Deo

97 The Beatific Vision is not mentioned in the Nicene Creedmdashwhich speaks of ldquothe resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to comerdquomdash but it was widely assumed by theologians none more strongly than Thomas In a papal bull of 1336 ldquoBenedictus Deusrdquo Pope Benedict XII declared as a doctrine of faith that the saved once their souls have been purified ldquosee the divine essence with an intuitive vision and even face to facerdquo prior to the Last Judgment

98 Inest enim homini naturale desiderium cognoscendi causam cum intuetur effectum Si igitur intel-lectus rationalis creaturae pertingere non possit ad primam causam rerum remanebit inane desiderium naturae


The tacit premise here is ldquoNature makes nothing in vainrdquo (found eg in Aristo-tle Politics I 2 1253a9)99 This premise is a cornerstone of Aristotelian natural teleology and Aquinas states it explicitly elsewhere100 applying it here to our desire for a fulfillment that is perfect in every way Most twenty-first-century thinkers no longer adherents of Aristotelian science and very familiar with unsatisfiable desires101 might well be skeptical about the truth of this principle But even granting it (perhaps in the sense that such success must be at least pos-sible if the desire is not to be vain) its relevance is questionable on two counts For one thing how is one to reconcile it with Thomasrsquos proposition 3 above the notion that this very vision of Godrsquos essence that we allegedly desire most of all and whose possible attainment Aristotlersquos dictum is said to guarantee is at the same time said to ldquosurpass the nature of every creaturerdquo If that fulfillment is beyond our nature how can our nature be such as to require it in accord with Aristotelian teleologymdashand even to assure at least the possibility of our achieve-ment of it 102 How can we be supposed even to desire it given that it is so far out of proportion with our nature103 How can we be said to need it to achieve ourmdashhumanmdashperfection

99 οὐθὲν γάρ μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ100 In addition to its central role in Aristotelian science and metaphysics Thomas also thinks of

it as an expression of the divine providence and power Cf SCG III511 for a clear expression of the metaphysical principle he states the theological view at STh I1037c ldquoTherefore as God is the first universal cause not of one genus only but of all being in general it is impossible for anything to occur outside the order of the divine governmentrdquo [Cum igitur Deus sit prima causa universalis non unius generis tantum sed universaliter totius entis impossibile est quod aliquid contingat praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis] Nature does nothing in vain because it is the product of a wise omnipotent Creator

101 Would a physicist not love to know in detail what if anything preceded the Big Bang Or a linguist what the first human language sounded like And so on

102 This problem greatly exercised a number of Thomasrsquos Renaissance commentators such as Cajetan A summary of their struggles with the teaching is given by Bradley Aquinas on the Twofold 440ndash48 Bradley himself speaks of Aquinasrsquos ldquoparadoxical ethicrdquo (ch 9 title) and also of what seems to be an ldquoantinomyrdquo in Thomasrsquos conclusions But for Bradley the antinomy is only apparent Thomas saves himself from contradiction by virtue of using an expanded (ldquotwofoldrdquo) notion of human nature at once ldquonaturalrdquo (in the Aristotelian sense) and supernatural (in the sense of being made ldquoin Godrsquos imagerdquo) See Aquinas on the Twofold ch 9 passim But one wonders can Bradleyrsquos reading be recon-ciled with Thomasrsquos repeated emphasis on proposition 3 above Not to mention the oddity of the claim that we have two natures Still the nub of the issue seems to be how to reconcile the Jewish and Christian notion of human beings made ldquoin Godrsquos imagerdquo with Aristotelian teleology If Bradley is right then Thomasrsquos intent may be more similar to what we will see Eckhartrsquos to have been than many suppose

103 In several places (eg in DeVer 142reply and STh IaIIae1142c) Thomas himself insists on this saying (in the former text) that the Beatific Vision is a ldquogood which is out of all proportion with manrsquos nature because his natural powers are not enough to attain to it either in thought or desire It is promised to man only through the divine liberality lsquoThe eye hath not seenrsquo (1 Cor 29)rdquo (emphasis added) [Aliud est bonum hominis naturae humanae proportionem excedens quia ad ipsum obtinendum


A second problem with Thomasrsquos use of the gnomic ldquoNature makes nothing in vainrdquo is how to square it with a crucial part of the worldview of the Christian faith According to the latter the Beatific Vision is a free gift of God and not any-thing metaphysically necessary or to which we can lay claim by right Thomas himself seems to say as much ldquoIf this [Beatific] Vision exceeds the capacity of a created nature as we have proved then any created intellect may be understood to enjoy complete existence in the species proper to its nature without seeing the substance of Godrdquo104 (SCG III534) But if this is metaphysically possible as Thomas here allows how can he at the same time use Aristotlersquos principle to show that the Beatific Vision is the fulfillment of a natural human desire that cannot be in vain and the fulfillment of which is said to constitute ldquothe Perfect Goodrdquo for humans It would seem that either we naturally desire that fulfill-ment in which case it cannot be in principle beyond our grasp (by Aristotlersquos doctrine) or it is beyond our nature and we therefore cannot in desiring it be desiring our fulfillment105 In the view of Denis Bradley Aquinas is trying to thread a tiny needlersquos eye here

A desire that can never be satisfied is ldquoin vainrdquo Aquinas however does not say that the vision of God is necessary rather he concludes that it is necessary to say that the vision of God is possible

(Aquinas on the Twofold 436ndash37)

Presumably this means that natural reason (philosophy) cannot rule out the supernatural fulfillment foreseen in the scriptures But if this is Thomasrsquos

104 Nam si talis visio facultatem naturae creatae excedit ut probatum est potest intelligi quivis intellec-tus creatus in specie suae naturae consistere absque hoc quod Dei substantiam videat Tr Vernon Bourke (New York Hanover House 1955ndash57)

105 Which is not to claim we cannot desire it at all People do in fact desire things ldquobeyond their naturerdquo (to fly like a bird say or to live a thousand years) but it would be bizarre to claim that happinessmdashin Aristotlersquos sense of eudaimoniamdashwould be unattainable unless such a wish could come true In medieval terms such a fanciful desire was called a velleitas a mere wish with no expecta-tion of or right to fulfillment Thomas defines the term in IaIIae135ad1 ldquoThe incomplete act of the will is in respect of the impossible and by some is called lsquovelleityrsquo because to wit one would will [vellet] such a thing were it possiblerdquo (Voluntas incompleta est de impossibili quae secundum quosdam velleitas dicitur quia scilicet aliquis vellet illud si esset possibile)

vires naturales non sufficiunt nec etiam ad cognoscendum vel desiderandum sed ex sola divina liberalitate homini repromittitur I Corinth II 9 oculus non vidit etc] The suggestion is strong here that we are able to have even the idea of such a fulfillment solely through revelation See also this remark ldquoIn this work [the NE] the Philosopher speaks about the happiness which is able to be attained in this life For the happiness of the other life exceeds all rational investigationrdquo (SLE I lect 911) [Loqui-tur enim in hoc libro philosophus de felicitate qualis in hac vita potest haberi Nam felicitas alterius vitae omnem investigationem rationis excedit] Yet Thomas also claims that reason demands this fulfillment Perhaps he means that reason once informed by faith demands it


conclusion it seems too weak For from his premises that (i) nature (or Provi-dence) does nothing in vain and that (ii) humans do naturally desire even if inchoately the Beatific Vision for their happiness it follows straightforwardly that it is necessary that this Vision be attainable by (at least some) humans but the reference to necessity makes this an unacceptable conclusion for Thomas first because it would deny the divine freedom and second because such a ful-fillment is ldquobeyond the nature etcrdquo hence his preference for the weaker version identified by Bradley106 The prima facie plausibility of Aquinasrsquos argument (in Bradleyrsquos formulation) may trade on the fact that what is necessary for a species might not per accidens be achieved by any given individual or on the fact that the conclusion in Bradleyrsquos formulation is itself implied by the stronger proposi-tion that in my view is actually warranted by Thomasrsquos premises If we can see that the attainment of the Beatific Vision is somehow necessary for the fulfill-ment of human beings given our natural desire for it then surely it follows that it is possible for humans to attain it ldquomustrdquo here implies ldquocanrdquo107

But whether on Thomasrsquos principles the vision of God is necessary or not a dilemma threatens On its face it simply will not do to argue as Thomas does in IaIIae 55c that God can alter our nature supernaturallymdashby be-stowing the so-called lumen gloriaemdashto make our intellect capable of the Beatific Vision For the reason why we cannot naturally attain it he had ear-lier said (in Ia124) is not merely some temporary infirmity but rather it is that our nature is created and finite But it is logically impossible for what is created and finite to be transformed into something uncreated and infinite Consider if God could ldquoelevate the human mind so that [it] may be informed by the divine essencerdquo108 then God surely could have created such ldquoelevatedrdquo humans (or angels for that matter) in the first place This would however contradict Aquinasrsquos oft-repeated claim (eg at IaIae 55c) that the vision of the divine essence ldquosurpasses the nature not only of man but also of every

106 It may be that Thomas would defend his approach by saying that in the absence of a divine revelation the desire to see the essence of God must seem outlandish a mere ldquovelleityrdquo and thus we would have no reason to regard it as the sort of desire that ldquocannot be in vainrdquo However Thomas also knew of Neoplatonism whichmdashon purely rational groundsmdashtaught that a union with the divine is not only possible but represents the pinnacle of human beatitude Did he regard this as a delusion a mere velleity

107 One major difficulty for understanding Thomasrsquos teaching on this issuemdashand one much com-mented onmdashis his apparent internal inconsistency On the one hand he sometimes speaks of the natural desire for the Beatific Vision (eg in SCG III511 and STh IaIIae38c) while at the same time (even in the same work) denying that there is any such natural desire (cf eg DeVer 227c) Patrick Bastable points out that Thomasrsquos puzzling inconsistency on this matter occurs both early and late in his career Desire for God Does Man Aspire Naturally to the Beatific Vision An Analysis of this Question and its History (London Burns Oates amp Washbourne Ltd 1947) ch 2

108 As Bradley Aquinas on the Twofold 480 formulates the idea


creaturerdquo (emphasis added) Must not especially the final clause of this claim be understood as implying that creatureliness itself is inconsistent with the Beatific Vision109 If metaphysically God could not create a mind that by its nature were able to understand the divine essence how could He be sup-posed to ldquoelevaterdquo a created mind to that status

We thus seem pushed after all either in the direction of a naturalistic Aristo-telian ethic (in which our happiness is completely proportioned to our human nature and the question of the afterlife is at best left as a mystery for faithmdashbut then how to reconcile the supernatural promises of faith and the naturalistic claims of ethics) or else we are drawn toward something like proposition 7 above if our beatitude does require the Beatific Vision wemdashor something in usmdashmust be uncreated and hence proportionate to that Vision110 The prec-edent for such an idea was there both in classical thought (the Neoplatonic notion of intellectual ascent and Aristotlersquos reflections on nous as partaking in the divine) and in Eastern Orthodox patristic reflections on divinization but Thomas apparently chooses not to go down any of these paths

As we will see in later chapters Meister Eckhart did embrace something akin to proposition 7 Interestingly enough although he drew opposite conclusions from Thomasrsquos he was often citing the same authorities and texts eg with respect to Aquinasrsquos teachings about the nature of the soul For any Christian thinker a crucial problem is how to square scriptural promises that the saved will see God111 with the manifest limitations of our cognitive powers In the Aristo-telian tradition the operation of our intellect is limited to what it can abstract from the deliverances of the senses which thus clearly excludes the Deity But Aquinas Eckhart and other Christian thinkers found a clue to the solution of

109 The only apparent alternative way of understanding Thomasrsquos view here would seem to be the notion that God could have created beings naturally capable of the Beatific Vision but simply chose not to But this is definitely not the tack Thomas takes The argument in Ia124 is entirely philosophical based on what various kinds of intellect (human angelic divine) can naturally know Its conclusion is that ldquoa created intellect cannot see the essence of God unless God by His grace unites himself to the created intellect as an object made intelligible to itrdquo [non igitur potest intellectus creatus Deum per essentiam videre nisi inquantum Deus per suam gratiam se intellectui creato coniungit ut intelli-gibile ab ipso] I confess I do not see how what follows ldquounlessrdquo can avoid contradicting the preceding argument

110 Thus the Beatific Vision would be beyond us qua human but not to the extent that we share in the divine There is of course an echo here of Stephen Bushrsquos ldquodualistrdquo interpretation of Aristotlersquos puzzling claims about eudaimonia in Book X of NE Cf Bush ldquoDivine and Human Happinessrdquo And is Bradley himself saying something similar when he interprets Thomas as affirming ldquoa supernatural end that is above not contrary to human naturerdquo (463)

111 In addition to the text from 1 Jn above there is for instance the famous passage from 1 Cor-inthians 1312 ldquoFor now we see only a reflection as in a mirror then we shall see face to face Now I know in part then I shall know fully even as I am fully knownrdquo (New International Version)


this dilemma in the claim of Avicenna that in the case of the rational soul ldquothe perfection proper to it consists in its becoming an intellectual world (saeculum in-tellectuale) in which there is impressed the form of the wholerdquo112 He says the form of the whole not merely of sensible objects Avicenna was understood to be refer-ring to the capacity of the ldquopassive intellectrdquo which in our everyday life receives the forms in Aristotlersquos sense abstracted by the ldquoactive (or agent) intellectrdquo from the deliverances of our sense organs113 This suggests the existence of a kind of excess capacity in the passive part of our cognitive abilities As Aquinas put it

The agent intellect is not sufficient of itself to actuate completely the possible intellect because the determinate natures of all things do not exist in it as has been explained Therefore to acquire complete perfec-tion the possible intellect needs to be united in a certain way to that Agent in whom the exemplars of all things exist namely God114

(QDA 5ad 9)

We will later see that for Eckhart this collaboration between the ldquoDivine Agent [intellect]rdquo and the human passive intellect is possible in this life Aquinas for his part sees in this capacity of the human passive intellect an aspect of our similitude to the Creator but Who he hastens to add remains nonetheless infinitely above us

The Beatific Vision and knowledge are to some extent above the nature of the rational soul inasmuch as it cannot reach it of its own strength but in another way it is in accordance with its nature inasmuch as it is

113 In Aristotlersquos psychology perception of say a tree requires (i) sensory data coming from the tree (ii) the abstraction from that data of its rational content the form or essence of tree and (iii) the appropriation of this form in the mind of the perceiver The abstracting is done by the ldquoagentrdquo (or active) intellect the appropriation by the ldquopassiverdquo or receptive intellect

114 [I]ntellectus agens non sufficit per se ad reducendum intellectum possibilem perfecte in actum cum non sint in eo determinatae rationes omnium rerum ut dictum est Et ideo requiritur ad ultimam perfectionem intellectus possibilis quod uniatur aliqualiter illi agenti in quo sunt rationes omnium rerum scilicet Deo

الكل 112 صورة فيها مرتسما عقليا عالما تصير أن بها الخاص كمالها الناطقة النفس Avicenna Metaphysics of The إن Healing IX711 Avicenna goes on to say ldquo[The perfected rational soul] thus becomes trans-formed into an intelligible world that parallels the existing world in its entirety witnessing that which is absolute good absolute beneficence (and) true absolute beauty becoming united with it imprinted with its example and form affiliated with it and becoming of its substancerdquo المطلق] الحق والجمال المطلق والخير المطلق الحسن هو لما مشاهدة كله الموجود للعالم موازيا معقولا عالما فتنقلب Tr Michael E Marmura (Provo UT Brigham [ ومتحدة به ومنتقشة بمثاله وهيئته ومنخرطة في سلكه وصائرة من جوهرهYoung University Press 2005) 350 The idea seems to derive from Plotinus (Enneads III43 έσμεν έκαστος κόςμος νoητός ldquowe are each of an intelligible cosmosrdquo) via the Arabic Theology of Aristotle I am indebted for the references to Jon McGinnis and Jules Janssens and to my colleague Suleiman Mourad for assistance with the Arabic original


capable of it by nature having been made to the likeness of God as stated above But the uncreated knowledge is in every way above the nature of the human soul115

(STh III92ad3 emphasis added)

The by now familiar problem should be obvious how can the rational soul be ldquocapable of [the Beatific Vision] by naturerdquo when that Vision ldquois in every way above the nature of the human soulrdquo

Thomas is left with a curiously split ethic foreordained I would suggest in his notion of the human will as by nature oriented to a fulfillment it cannot natu-rally attain ie the Beatific Vision Since in his view there is an (Aristotelian) end that is proportional to our nature but one that cannot completely satisfy our deepest longing for happiness our condition points at a kind of completion that is beyond both our unaided nature and this life itself Hence in a passage we saw earlier he speaks of our ldquotwofold endrdquo

Man has a twofold final good which first moves the will as a final end The first of these is proportionate to human nature since natural powers are capable of attaining it This is the happiness about which the philosophers speak either as contemplative which consists in the act of wisdom or active which consists first of all in the act of prudence and in the acts of the other moral virtues as they depend on prudence The other is the good which is out of all proportion with manrsquos nature be-cause his natural powers are not enough to attain to it either in thought or desire It is promised to man only through the divine liberality ldquoThe eye hath not seen rdquo (1 Cor29) This is life everlasting116

(DVer 142reply cf also STh IaIIae 32 ad4 and 36c)

115 [V]isio seu scientia beata est quodammodo supra naturam animae rationalis inquantum scilicet propria virtute ad eam pervenire non potest Alio vero modo est secundum naturam ipsius inquantum scilicet per naturam suam est capax eius prout scilicet ad imaginem Dei facta est ut supra dictum est Sed scientia increata est omnibus modis supra naturam animae humanae Eckhart would agree with this cita-tion up to the final sentence How that sentence can avoid contradicting what precedes it is mysteri-ous As Bradley says of the passage ldquoAquinas flatly states that the desire for the vision of God is both natural and not naturalrdquo Aquinas on the Twofold 456 To the extent that the desire is natural ie to the extent that humans as rational beings are capax dei to that extent the visio must also be natural but this Thomas explicitly denies

116 Est autem duplex hominis bonum ultimum quod primo voluntatem movet quasi ultimus finis Quorum unum est proportionatum naturae humanae quia ad ipsum obtinendum vires naturales suffici-unt et hoc est felicitas de qua philosophi locuti sunt vel contemplativa quae consistit in actu sapientiae vel activa quae consistit primo in actu prudentiae et consequenter in actibus aliarum virtutum moralium Aliud est bonum hominis naturae humanae proportionem excedens quia ad ipsum obtinendum vires naturales non sufficiunt nec etiam ad cognoscendum vel desiderandum sed ex sola divina liberalitate homini repromittitur I Corinth II 9 oculus non vidit etc et hoc est vita aeterna


As the first sentence of this text indicates the willmdashalong with the goal-oriented works to which it gives risemdashhas a role in the attainment of both kinds of ful-fillment But how a finite created will can possibly succeed in attaining a super-natural fulfillment that is apparently suited only for uncreated beings remains a mystery117

The difficulty that in my view afflicts Thomasrsquos teachings about the human will and human beatitude is closely related to his conception of two notionsmdashnamely images and analogymdashboth of which are crucial for understanding Eck-hartrsquos importantly different views Both are connected to the question of the relationship between the human and the divine since in Genesis 126 we are told that humans were made in Godrsquos image In chapter 1 (p 5) we saw that Aquinas begins the second main part of the STh by quoting John of Damascus to the effect that ldquoman is said to be made to Godrsquos image in so far as the image implies an intelligent being endowed with free choice and self-movementrdquo Fur-ther in chapter 3 we saw how Augustine interpreted Genesis 126 ldquoThen God said lsquoLet us make man in our image in our likenessrsquordquo and noted the role his reading gave to the idea of divinization Thomas also addresses these issues and we begin with his reading of that Genesis text in STh Ia93

Thomasrsquos views follow those of Augustine fairly closely First of all the notion of image adds to that of likeness the element of origin ldquoan image adds something to likenessmdashnamely that it is copied from something elserdquo118 (Ia931c) ldquoButrdquo Thomas immediately adds

equality does not belong to the essence of an image for as Augustine says (QQ 8374) ldquoWhere there is an image there is not necessarily equalityrdquo as we see in a personrsquos image reflected in a glass Yet this is of the essence of a perfect image for in a perfect image nothing is wanting that is to be found in that of which it is a copy119

117 Discussion of this ldquomysteriousrdquo doctrine continues even today It has been at the center of an intense debate in recent Roman Catholic theology ignited by the publication of the book Surnaturel by Henri de Lubac SJ in 1946 De Lubac argued against the notion of a twofold good for human beings according to which a purely natural though in its way complete fulfillment is possible for us on the contrary according to his view (and he thinks Aquinasrsquos) our nature is thoroughly open to the divine and capable only of a supernatural perfection The triumph of this view at the Second Vati-can Council and the subsequent disputes about it are the subjects of a summary review by Edward T Oakes SJ ldquoThe Surnaturel Controversy a Survey and a Responserdquo Nova et Vetera English Edition 93 (2011) 625ndash56 I am indebted to Tobias Hoffmann for this reference

118 [I]mago aliquid addit supra rationem similitudinis scilicet quod sit ex alio expressum119 Aequalitas autem non est de ratione imaginis quia ut Augustinus ibidem dicit ubi est imago non

continuo est aequalitas ut patet in imagine alicuius in speculo relucente Est tamen de ratione perfectae imaginis nam in perfecta imagine non deest aliquid imagini quod insit illi de quo expressa est


In a reply to an objection (ad 2) Aquinas draws a contrast between the Son ldquothe First-Born of creatures [who] is the perfect Image of Godrdquo and human beings who are ldquosaid to be both lsquoimagersquo by reason of the likeness and lsquoto the imagersquo by reason of the imperfect likenessrdquo120 This mix of perfect and imperfect is the mark of a special and important kind of relation namely ldquoanalogy or propor-tionrdquo He continues ldquoIn this sense a creature is one with God or like to Himrdquo121 (931ad 3) In what sense In what way(s) is the human being the image of God According to Thomas

[W]e see that the image of God is in man in three ways First inas-much as man possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God and this aptitude consists in the very nature of the mind which is common to all men Secondly inasmuch as man actually and habitu-ally knows and loves God though imperfectly and this image consists in the conformity of grace Thirdly inasmuch as man knows and loves God perfectly and this image consists in the likeness of glory122

(STh Ia 934c)

According to the first way we have the divine image in the very existence of our minds the intellect and will according to the second we can (albeit imper-fectly) through grace know and love God which are the very modes of divine action itself and finally by the third way those who are glorified (deified) can know and love God perfectly in the Beatific Vision In this final way we become by grace a perfect image

The progression among these three ways is essential It is not merely our mental capacities per se that make us an imago Dei but especially their orien-tation the fact that the intellect and will are fundamentally made for God As Thomas puts it

Augustine says (De Trin xiv12) ldquoThe image of God exists in the mind not because it has a remembrance of itself loves itself and understands itself but because it can also remember understand and love God by

120 [P]rimogenitus omnis creaturae est imago Dei Homo vero et propter similitudinem dicitur imago et propter imperfectionem similitudinis dicitur ad imaginem

121 [S]ic est unitas vel convenientia creaturae ad Deum122 Unde imago Dei tripliciter potest considerari in homine Uno quidem modo secundum quod homo

habet aptitudinem naturalem ad intelligendum et amandum Deum et haec aptitudo consistit in ipsa natura mentis quae est communis omnibus hominibus Alio modo secundum quod homo actu vel habitu Deum cognoscit et amat sed tamen imperfecte et haec est imago per conformitatem gratiae Tertio modo secundum quod homo Deum actu cognoscit et amat perfecte et sic attenditur imago secundum similitudi-nem gloriae


Whom it was maderdquo Much less therefore is the image of God in the soul in respect of other objects123

(STh 938sc)

That is to say ldquothe image of God is found in the soul according as the soul turns to God or possesses a nature that enables it to turn to Godrdquo124 (938c) This turning is what the mind was made for Through it or at least the capacity for it we are images of God But we are always or at least until glorified images of God in an analogical sense A brief look at Thomasrsquos thought about analogy and univocality will pave the way for a look at Eckhartrsquos views on these seemingly abstruse topics that nonetheless are the key to understanding his advice to live without why

Thomas rejects out of hand the idea of a univocally divine component in the (unglorified) human soul Having discussed in Question 12 of STh Part 1 ldquoHow God is known by usrdquo he next offers a refutation of any such idea His line is that we are (undeniably) creatures and that creatures and God have literally nothing that is the same or as he subsequently puts it ldquoUnivocal predication is impossible between God and creaturesrdquo125 (Ia135c) This was part of Aqui-nasrsquos response to the claim of Moses Maimonides and some Christian thinkers that nothing positive at all could be said of God They overstate the case ac-cording to Aquinas He concedes to the ldquonegative theologiansrdquo the point that nothing that is truly said of human beings is also true of the Creator in the same sense so great is the difference between the finite and the infinite But he resists the conclusion that predications of God and creatures are necessarily equivo-cal Instead taking his cue from both Aristotle and St Paul he insists that such predications (ldquonamesrdquo) are used analogically That is when we for example say that God is wise and that Socrates is wise the predicate ldquois wiserdquo is used neither ambiguously (equivocally) nor univocally for we mean the two usages in neither a radically different sense nor in the identical sense In his summary treatment of the question ldquoWhether what is said of God and of creatures is univocally said of themrdquo Aquinas responded

[E]very effect which is not an adequate result of the power of the efficient cause receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree but in a measure that falls short so that what is divided and

123 [Q]uod Augustinus dicit XIV de Trin quod non propterea est Dei imago in mente quia sui meminit et intelligit et diligit se sed quia potest etiam meminisse intelligere et amare Deum a quo facta est Multo igitur minus secundum alia obiecta attenditur imago Dei in mente

124 Et sic imago Dei attenditur in anima secundum quod fertur vel nata est ferri in Deum125 [I]mpossibile est aliquid praedicari de Deo et creaturis univoce


multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply and in the same manner as for example the sun by exercise of its own power produces manifold and various forms in all inferior things In the same way all perfections existing in creatures divided and multiplied pre-exist in God unitedly Thus when any term expressing perfection is applied to a creature it signifies that perfection distinct in idea from other per-fections as for instance by the term ldquowiserdquo applied to man we signify some perfection distinct from a manrsquos essence and distinct from his power and existence and from all similar things whereas when we apply it to God we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His essence or power or existence Thus also this term ldquowiserdquo applied to man in some degree circumscribes and comprehends the thing sig-nified whereas this is not the case when it is applied to God but it leaves the thing signified as uncomprehended and as exceeding the signification of the name Hence it is evident that this term ldquowiserdquo is not applied in the same way to God and to man The same rule applies to other terms Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures 126

(STh Ia135)

By the same token Aquinas insists that

neither on the other hand are names applied to God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense as some [eg Maimonides and other propo-nents of negative theology] have said Because if that were so it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about

126 Quia omnis effectus non adaequans virtutem causae agentis recipit similitudinem agentis non secun-dum eandem rationem sed deficienter ita ut quod divisim et multipliciter est in effectibus in causa est sim-pliciter et eodem modo sicut sol secundum unam virtutem multiformes et varias formas in istis inferioribus producit Eodem modo ut supra dictum est omnes rerum perfectiones quae sunt in rebus creatis divisim et multipliciter in Deo praeexistunt unite Sic igitur cum aliquod nomen ad perfectionem pertinens de crea-tura dicitur significat illam perfectionem ut distinctam secundum rationem definitionis ab aliis puta cum hoc nomen sapiens de homine dicitur significamus aliquam perfectionem distinctam ab essentia hominis et a potentia et ab esse ipsius et ab omnibus huiusmodi Sed cum hoc nomen de Deo dicimus non intendi-mus significare aliquid distinctum ab essentia vel potentia vel esse ipsius Et sic cum hoc nomen sapiens de homine dicitur quodammodo circumscribit et comprehendit rem significatam non autem cum dicitur de Deo sed relinquit rem significatam ut incomprehensam et excedentem nominis significationem Unde patet quod non secundum eandem rationem hoc nomen sapiens de Deo et de homine dicitur Et eadem ratio est de aliis Unde nullum nomen univoce de Deo et creaturis praedicatur In the first sentence Thomas is assum-ing the Aristotelian notion that every per se (ie nonaccidental) causal agent produces effects similar to itself Omne agens agit sibi simile Cf eg STh Ia43


God at all for the reasoning would always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation127

(Ibid)

The obvious solution he thinks is clear ldquoIt must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense ie according to proportionrdquo128 (ibid) God and Socrates are both wise but not in exactly the same way or sense

We should also note that univocation analogy and ambiguity (or equivoca-tion) are for Aquinas properties of terms eg identity of term-meaning in the case of univocation diversity of meaningmdashmore or less completemdashin the other two cases As Ralph McInerny puts it

A point of extreme importance which warrants repetition is that things are said to be (dicuntur) equivocals or univocals In themselves in rerum natura they are neither for in order to be univocals or equivocals they must be known and named by us We are talking about the things signi-fied in so far as they are signified The problem of equivocals is a logical problem the problem of univocals is a logical one129

Thomasrsquos teaching on this is drawn from Aristotlersquos Categories

When things have the name in common and the definition of being which corresponds to the name is the same they are called synonymous [ie univocal] Thus for example both a man and an ox are animals Each of these is called by a common name an animal and the defi-nition of being is also the same for if one is to give the definition of eachmdashwhat being an animal is for each of themmdashone will give the same definition130

(I 1a7ndash12)

127 Sed nec etiam pure aequivoce ut aliqui dixerunt Quia secundum hoc ex creaturis nihil posset cog-nosci de Deo nec demonstrari sed semper incideret fallacia aequivocationis

128 Dicendum est igitur quod huiusmodi nomina dicuntur de Deo et creaturis secundum analogiam idest proportionem

129 Ralph McInerny The Logic of Analogy An Interpretation of St Thomas (The Hague Marti-nus Nijhoff 1971) 71 This is a problem area familiar to analytic philosophers under the guise of ldquoanalyticityrdquo

130 συνώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὧν τό τε ὄνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός οἷον ζῷονὅτεἄνθρωποςκαὶὁβοῦςbullτούτωνγὰρἑκάτερονκοινῷὀνόματιπροσαγορεύεταιζῷονκαὶὁλόγοςδὲτῆςοὐσίαςὁαὐτόςbullἐὰνγὰρἀποδιδῷτιςτὸνἑκατέρουλόγοντίἐστιναὐτῶνἑκατέρῳτὸζῴῳεἶναιτὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἀποδώσει The Complete Works of Aristotle The Revised Oxford Translation transl J L Ackrill ed Jonathan Barnes Vol 1 [Princeton Princeton University Press 1984] p 3


Thomas argues that where a name is used of two things that share neither species nor genus it is not used univocally Hence any likeness between the two will be analogous

If there is an agent not contained in any ldquogenusrdquo its effect will still more distantly reproduce the form of the agent not that is so as to partici-pate in the likeness of the agentrsquos form according to the same specific or generic formality but only according to some sort of analogy as exis-tence is common to all In this way all created things so far as they are beings are like God as the first and universal principle of all being131

(STh Ia 43c)

Thus a discourse is possible even on Aristotelian terms in which we apply the same terms to God and humans but we do so only analogously What how-ever of the talk in the Christian scriptures of a parentchild relationship between God and the human being ie of a relationship that in ordinary life is always univocal Thomas must treat such talk as metaphorical But Meister Eckhart as we will see disagrees arguing that there is a literal or univocal sense in which humans can be said to be Godrsquos children

In any event the question whether the application of a name to two entities a and b is univocal or analogous can sensibly arise only within a discourse or con-ceptual scheme For example does the term (name) ldquoplanetrdquo apply both to say Mars and Earth For a medieval thinker the answer would clearly be ldquoNo Mars Jupiter et al are planets (ie lsquowandering starsrsquo) but Earth is not since it was created by God in the center and is immovable If a human were somehow trans-ported to the sphere of Mars which does move it might seem to that observer that the Earth is moving but that would only be apparent motion since it would be the sphere that was moving and not the Earth Hence Earth and Mars cannot both be said to be lsquoplanetsrsquo in the same sense Still from the vantage-point of the sphere of Mars the Earth could be called a planet by lsquoanalogy or proportionrsquo eg because of its apparent motion and hence its resemblance to genuine planetsrdquo Today however in post-Copernican astronomy Earth is classified quite literally as a planet along with Mars Jupiter et al with which it shares the same defini-tion Hence the term ldquoplanetrdquo is today applied to both Earth and Mars univo-cally Putting the point more generally to ask whether two entities a and b are

131 Si igitur sit aliquod agens quod non in genere contineatur effectus eius adhuc magis accedent remote ad similitudinem formae agentis non tamen ita quod participent similitudinem formae agentis secundum eandem rationem speciei aut generis sed secundum aliqualem analogiam sicut ipsum esse est commune omnibus Et hoc modo illa quae sunt a Deo assimilantur ei inquantum sunt entia ut primo et universali principio totius esse


univocally related is to ask whether there is an accepted frame of discourse in which a and b belong to the same species or genus

The importance of this point for our investigation is that univocal relatedness is a matter of how the entities in question are defined and hence of how we think and talk about them We turn next to Meister Eckhartrsquos view on this topic It will turn out to provide a key to understanding his teaching on living without why

129

5

Meister Eckhart Living on Two Levels

Thus far we have seen some important similarities and differences among the virtue-ethical systems of Aristotle Augustine and Thomas Aquinas Each seeks to be a eudaimonist viewing the goal of happiness as something to be achieved through a process of acquiring by moral education (or otherwise coming to possess) various virtues and each thinks of the will (or in Aristotlersquos case boulecircsis rational wish and prohairesis choice) and action conceived in means-end terms as occupying a crucial place in the quest for the happy life The prin-cipal differences among them we saw lie in their respective conceptions of what eudaimonia consists in and in their differing opinions about the virtues what they are how we come to have them and their place in the happy life For Aris-totle they are excellences of mind and character that we gain by habituation and effort and the virtuous life constitutes eudaimonia In the case of Augustine the classical virtues he initially admired came to be seen as tainted by self-reliance while their Christian counterparts are subsumed under the heading of love thought of as an orientation of will to the highest Good (while vice is self-love an orientation to a lesser good) For him and for Thomas even an earthly life of the divinely infused virtues is infinitely inferior to but also (if one is blest with grace) preparatory for the reward of bliss that awaits the just in Heaven In Meis-ter Eckhart we encounter a fourth and importantly different version of virtue eudaimonism one that is not teleological and the key to understanding the dif-ference is to understand the way he parts company with those eminent Christian authorities on the issues of images and analogy

Eckhart von Hochheim born in Thuringia around 1260 when Thomas was coming into his prime himself became an eminent philosophertheologian and one of Aquinasrsquos successors as the Dominican regent master for theol-ogy at the University of Paris He was accorded the unusual honor of appoint-ment to this rotating chair twice (1302ndash1303 and 1311ndash1313) In between he held important administrative posts in his order After completing his second regency Eckhart was given special pastoral assignments by his superiors that called for him to do much vernacular preaching in the Rhineland As one of the


first to translate philosophical and theological terminology into Middle High Germanmdashhe coined for example the term wuumlrklicheit (Wirklichkeit) for the Latin actualitas (reality)1mdashhe became a celebrated (some would say notorious) figure in the pulpit In the religious turbulence of the early fourteenth century he was as we saw above eventually accused of heresy and tried before the In-quisition In 1329 Pope John XXII who had canonized Thomas Aquinas a few years before condemned as heretical or misleading twenty-eight propositions from Eckhartrsquos writings a substantial number of which involved his criticisms of aspects of teleological ethics2 In this chapter we will outline the metaphysicaltheological views that underlay his ethical theory In the next chapter we will look more directly at that theory

It should be remarked at the start that unlike Thomas Aquinas Eckhart did not draw a sharp distinction between metaphysics and theology His general atti-tude is well expressed in this claim made in his interpretation of John 117 (ldquoFor the Law was given through Moses grace and truth were realized through Jesus Christrdquo)

Accordingly the holy scripture is very appropriately explained in such a way that it is consonant with what the philosophers have written about the nature of things and their properties especially since everything that is true proceeds from a single root of truth whether in being or in knowing in the scripture or in nature In harmony with this is what I noted above in the last explanation of the words ldquoall things were made through him and without him nothing was maderdquo ( Jn 13) Agreeing with this in every way is the verse ldquoIn the beginning God created the heaven and the earthrdquo (Gn 11) So it is the same thing that Moses Christ and the Philosopher teach the only difference is in the manner ie as credible as acceptable or probable and as true3

(In Ioh n185 LW 3154ndash55)

1 I am indebted for this piece of information to Achatz von Muumlller2 Articles 7 through 22 of the bull deal with Eckhartrsquos views on how we should live eg ldquoThe

sixteenth article God does not properly command an exterior actrdquo (Deus proprie non precipit actum exteriorem) The bull denounces Eckhart in harsh terms But in 1987 when members of the Do-minican Order were urging that Rome lift the bullrsquos condemnation Pope John Paul II himself a phi-losopher spoke approvingly of Eckhartrsquos central teachings However then-Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger was more cautious warning of the ldquodanger of syncretismrdquo John Paul IIrsquos remarks and Cardinal Ratzingerrsquos can be found respectively at httpwwweckhartsocietyorgeckharteckhart-man and httpwwwewtncomlibrarycuriacdfmedhtm

3 [C]onvenienter valde scriptura sacra sic exponitur ut in ipsa sint consona quae philosophi de rerum naturis et ipsarum proprietatibus scripserunt praesertim cum ex uno fonte et una radice procedat veritatis omne quod verum est sive essendo sive cognoscendo in scriptura et in natura Ad hoc facit quod iam supra notavi in ultima expositione ejus quod dicitur lsquoomnia per ipsum facta sunt et sine ipso factum est nihilrsquo Cui

Me i s te r E ckhar t L iv ing on Two L e vel s 131

Truth is assigned of course to the teaching of Christ faith is called for toward the teaching of Moses and credence (on probabilistic grounds) to the views of Aristotle and other philosophers In more general and sweeping terms Eckhart laid out his program at the start of this same Commentary on John

In interpreting this Word [ldquoIn the beginning was the Wordrdquo] and every-thing else that follows my intention is the same as in all my worksmdashto explain what the holy Christian faith and the two Testaments main-tain through the help of the natural arguments of the philosophers4 Moreover it is the intention of this work to show how the truths of natural principles conclusions and properties are well intimated for him ldquowho has ears to hearrdquo (Mt 1343) in the very words of sacred scripture which are interpreted through these natural truths Now and then some moral interpretations will be advanced5

(In Ioh nn2ndash3 LW 344ndash17 McGinn Essential Sermons 122ndash23)

Eckhart goes so far as to identify theology the science of revelation with meta-physics for ldquothe Gospel considers being as beingrdquo6 (In Ioh n 444 LW 3380 13ndash14) In thus applying Aristotlersquos definition of metaphysics (Met IV 1003a21) to the Gospel however Eckhart does not stop with the Philosopherrsquos approach According to Burkhard Mojsisch

He takes up in his metaphysics the entire wealth of the tradition avail-able to him whether of theological or philosophical provenience thereby founding a new metaphysics which does not set aside but actually discusses contents like the Trinity and the Incarnationmdasha metaphysics which for this very reason is a fundamental science one investigating above all the realm of the godly (divina) in accordance with which everything else is fashioned7

4 Already here one can see a profound change from the largely hostile stance toward (pagan) philosophy taken by Augustine especially in his later writings

5 In cujus verbi expositione et aliorum quae sequuntur intentio est auctoris sicut et in omnibus suis editionibus ea quae sacra asserit fides christiana et utriusque testimenti scriptura exponere per rationes na-turales philosophorum Rursus intentio operis est ostendere quomodo veritates principiorum et conclusio-num et proprietatum naturalium innuntur luculentermdashlsquoqui habet aures audiendimdashin ipsis verbis sacrae scripturae quae per illa naturalia exponuntur Interdum etiam ponuntur expositiones aliquae morales

6 [E]vangelium contemplatur ens in quantum ens7 Burkhard Mojsisch Meister Eckhart Analogy Univocity and Unity transl Orrin F Summerell

(AmsterdamPhiladelphia John Benjamins Publ Co 20011983) 10ndash11

per omnia concordat illud lsquoin principio creavit deus caelum et terramrsquo Gen 1 Idem ergo est quod docet Moyses Christus et philosophus solum quantum ad modem differens scilicet ut credibile probabile sive verisimile et veritas That Eckhartrsquos project was to present a philosophically grounded version of Chris-tianity is the thesis of Kurt Flasch Meister Eckhart Philosoph des Christentums


Finally we must also note that Eckhart at one point quotes with approval the identification of theology (and thus metaphysics) with ethics adding

The moral philosopher or theologian inquires into the ideas of things which have existed in the mind of God in intelligible form from all eter-nity before proceeding into the physical world8

(Sermo die n 2 LW 5908ndash10)

Clearly Eckhart is not referring to ldquopracticalrdquo or applied ethics here but rather to what we might call the ontological or metaphysical basis of ethics to which we will return later (in chapter 6 pp 181 ff) In any case it is from these inquiriesmdashmetaphysical-theological-ethicalmdashintermixed with a substantial amount of Aristotelian natural philosophy that Eckhart derives his highly origi-nal antiteleological practical philosophy expressed in the motto ldquoLive without whyrdquo We must look closely at how he brings this about

Although generally regarded as a Neoplatonist on whom the works of Au-gustine also had a substantial impact ldquothere isrdquo as Bernard McGinn has pointed out ldquono philosopher [Eckhart] knew better or cited more often than Aristotlerdquo9 Furthermore Eckhart quotes Thomas hundreds of times especially in his Latin writings And he repeatedly uses the standard Aristotelian framework of final causality often as a source of comparisons between the workings of nature and the human quest for happiness A typical example is the opening paragraph of his exegesis of John 143 Sequere me (ldquoFollow merdquo)

First of all one must know that through the creation God says and pro-claims advises and orders all creaturesmdashprecisely by creating themmdashto follow Him the First Cause of their entire being to orient themselves to Him to return to Him and hurry to Him according to the Scripture ldquoTo the place from which the waters flow they shall returnrdquo [Ecclesiastes I 7] This is why the creature by its nature loves God indeed more than itself10

(In Ioh n226 LW 3189 8ndash12)

8 Ethicus sive theologus ideas rerum quae in mente divina antequam prodirent in corpora ab aeterno quo modo ibi intelligibiliter exstiterunt subtilius intuetur

9 Bernard McGinn The Mystical Thought of Meister Eckhart (New York Crossroad Publishing 2001) 168

10 Quantum ergo ad primum sciendum quod deus omnem creaturam creando ipsi dicit et indicit con-sulit et praecipit hoc ipso quod creat sequi et ordinari reflecti et recurrere in deum tamquam in causam primam totius sui esse secundhm illud Eccl 1 lsquoad locum unde exeunt flumina revertunturrsquo Hinc est quod creatura ipsum deum amat naturaliter plus etiam quam se ipsam Eckhartrsquos citation here is based on an older translation of Ecclesiastes


Further Eckhart at times seems expressly to endorse or at least tolerate a ldquomerit-rewardrdquo schema of living that seems very like that of Aquinas He writes for instance in his Commentary on the Book of Wisdom

ldquoThey will live foreverrdquo Here the reward [of the just person] is pointed out ldquoAnd their reward is with the Lordrdquo nothing but God is the reward of the just11

(In Sap nn 69ndash70 LW 23971 and 12 and 3981)

Or again in Pr 26

All things that are in time have a lsquoWhyrsquo Ask a man why he eats lsquoFor strengthrsquomdashlsquoWhy do you sleeprsquomdashlsquoFor the same reasonrsquo And so on for all things that are in time12

(DW 22719ndash22 Walshe 96)

But if ldquonothing but God is the reward of the justrdquo and ldquoall creatures have a whyrdquo and are meant to ldquoorient themselvesrdquo to God ldquoto return to Him and hurry to Himrdquo it is all the more surprising when Eckhart plainly criticizes teleological conceptions of the good life This criticism is the more puzzling as the official Dominican theologian Thomas Aquinas had so extensively and authorita-tively formulated one such conception during Eckhartrsquos own lifetime Eckhartrsquos flat and repeated rejections of an intuitively plausible approach to such a cen-trally important issue namely how we should live is unusual and given other statements of his such as those just cited surprising13 His rejection is further-more often couched in memorable (and what seems deliberately provocative) imagerymdashat one point he calls those who think of salvation in teleological terms (ie as a reward) esel (ldquoassesrdquo) How to explain this

11 lsquo[I]n perpetuum viventrsquo ubi notatur praemium lsquoEt apud dominum est merces eorumrsquo nihil citra deum est merces justi

12 Alliu dinc diu in der zȋt sint diu hȃnt ein warumbe Als der einen menschen vrȃgete lsquowar umbe izzest dȗrsquomdashlsquodar umbe daz ich kraft habersquo lsquowar umbe slaeligfest dȗrsquomdashlsquoumbe daz selbersquo und alsus sint alliu dinc diu dȃ sint in der zȋt

13 Eckhartrsquos critique in both German and Latin works of teleological eudaimonism is never ex-plicitly stated as a criticism of Thomas Augustine or Aristotle He comes close to doing so however in German sermon 101 where he declares the superiority of complete detachmentmdashldquoto keep still and silent and let God speak and workrdquo (daz der mensche sich halte in einem swȋgenne in einer stille und lȃze got in im sprechen und wuumlrken)mdashto a more active one could say Aristotelian or Thomist form of contemplationmdashldquoto do something to imagine and think about Godrdquo (daz der mensche etwaz sȋnes werkes dar zuo tuo als ein ȋnbilden und ein gedenken an got) (DW 4ndash13543ndash5 Walshe 33) Interestingly this very aspect of Eckhartrsquos teaching was raised as an object of suspicion by Cardinal Ratzingermdashcf note 2 above


We begin as we did earlier with the central question of the goal of life Eckhart could say with Aristotle that we all want to be happy that what our hap-piness consists in is a function of our nature and that we are initially de facto ignorant of that nature and thus of what our bliss consists in He agrees too that its attainment requires attention and effort on our part So Eckhartrsquos ethic as with Aristotle Augustine and Thomas is what we called ldquobroadly teleologicalrdquo that is it aims to discover describe and advocate a process of human develop-ment toward the goal of life It is also (in an albeit peculiar sense) a virtue ethic since justice in particular plays a central role But Eckhart gives all these ideas a radical twist In German sermon (Pr) 1 Jesus intravit in templum (ldquoJesus entered the Templerdquo DW 14 ff) Eckhart preaches on the Gospel text (Matthew 2112) that tells of Jesus driving the merchants from the temple After identifying in his typically allegorical fashion14 the temple with the (highest part of the) soul Eckhart asks what the Evangelist meant by the merchants in the templesoul He answers that the merchants (and he explicitly says he is talking of none but good people) are those whose inclination it is to

do good works to the glory of God such as fasts vigils prayers and the rest all kinds of good works but [to] do them in order that our Lord may give them something in return or that God may do something they wish formdashall these are merchants That is plain to see for they want to give one thing in exchange for another and so to barter with our Lord15

(DW 172ndash7 Walshe 66ndash67)

The ldquospiritual merchantrdquo16 is seeking a reward for his efforts his merits Eckhartrsquos counterpart to such is the ldquojust personrdquo (der gerehte in his Middle High

14 I have discussed Eckhartrsquos hermeneutical approach with many further references to the copi-ous recent literature in ldquoApplicatio and Explicatio in Gadamer and Eckhartrdquo in Gadamerrsquos Century Essays in Honor of Hans-Georg Gadamer eds Jeff Malpas Ulrich Arnswald and Jens Kertscher (Cam-bridge MA and London MIT Press 2002)

15 [T]uont ir guoten werk gote ze ȇren als vasten wachen beten und swaz des ist aller hande guotiu werk und tuont sie doch dar umbe daz in unser herre etwaz dar umbe gebe oder daz in got iht dar umbe tuo daz in liep sȋ diz sint allez koufliute Daz ist grop ze verstȃnne wan sie wellent daz eine umbe daz ander geben und wellent alsȏ koufen mit unserm herren

16 Eckhart appears to have principally in mind those monks nuns and others who think that their ascetic practices will assure salvation for themselves They cling to such practices with attach-ment and seek to offer them in barter to God By contrast Eckhart calls it ldquoa fair bargain and equal exchangerdquo (ein glȋcher kouf) when one ldquosurrenders all thingsrdquo (alliu dinc begeben) all onersquos attach-ments and thereby ldquoreceives all thingsrdquo (alliu dinc nemen) from God (RdU 23 DW 52952ndash3 Walshe 518) The criticism of mercantile praise of God was prominent in Bernard of Clairvauxrsquos De diligendo Deo eg ldquoOne praises God because he is mighty another because he is gracious yet another solely because he is essential goodness The first is a slave and fears for himself the second is greedy


German) In Pr 6 Justi vivent in aeternum (ldquoThe just shall live foreverrdquo DW 199 ff Walshe 328 ff) Eckhart explains that the just person is one ldquowho gives to God His due and to the saints and angels theirs and to his fellow man what is hisrdquo17 (ibid996ndash8 ) It is in the first of these that the contrast to the merchant most strikingly emerges

Godrsquos due is honor Who are they who honor God Those who have gone completely out of themselves and seek not their own in anything at all whatever it may be whether great or small who pay special heed to nothing anywhere neither above nor below nor next to nor on them-selves who aim not at possessions or honors or comfort or pleasure or utility or inwardness or holiness or reward or heaven and who have re-nounced all of this all that is theirs From such people God has honor and they honor God in the proper sense and give Him his due18

(Ibid1001ndash7 Walshe 328 emphasis added)

Again in Pr 41 Qui sequitur justitiam (ldquoThose who pursue justicerdquo) Eckhart says

[The just person] wants and seeks nothing for he knows no why He acts without a why just in the same way as God does and just as life lives for its own sake and seeks no why for the sake of which it lives so too the just person knows no why for the sake of which he would do something19

(DW 22892ndash5 Walshe 239 emphasis added)

17 Die Gote gebent daz sȋn ist und den heiligen und den engeln daz ir ist und dem ebenmenschen daz sȋn ist

18 Gotes ist diu ȇre Wer sint die got ȇrent Die ihr selbes alzemȃle ȗzgegangen und des irn alzemȃle niht ensuochent an keinen dingen swaz ez joch sȋ noch grȏz noch klein die niht ensehent under sich noch uumlber sich noch neben sich noch an sich die niht enmeinent noch guot noch ȇre noch gemach noch lust noch nuz noch innicheit noch heilicheit noch lȏn noch himelrȋche und dis alles sint ȗzgegangen alles des irn dirre liute hȃt got ȇre und die ȇrent got eigenlȋche und gebent im daz sȋn ist As we saw in chapter 1 this text is the source of the eighth of the condemned propositions at Avignon

19 [E]r enwil niht noch ensuochet niht wan er enhȃt kein warumbe dar umbe er iht tuo alsȏ als got wuumlrket sunder warumbe und kein warumbe enhȃt In der wȋse als got wuumlrket alsȏ wuumlrket ouch der gerehte sunder warumbe

(mercenarius) desiring further benefits but the third is a son who honors his Father He who fears he who profits are both concerned about self-interestrdquo [Est qui confitetur Domino quoniam potens est et est qui confitetur quoniam sibi bonus est et item qui confitetur quoniam simpliciter bonus est Primus servus est et timet sibi secundus mercenarius et cupit sibi tertius filius et defert patri Itaque et qui timet et cupit utrique pro se agunt] (XII34)


In sermon 6 we are told that the truly just differ from those who merely ldquowant what God wants but [who] if they should fall sick would wish it were Godrsquos will that they should be betterrdquo By contrast ldquothe just have no will at all whatever God wills it is all one to them however great the hardshiprdquo20 (DW 110212ndash14 Walshe 329 emphasis added) Importantly such people ldquoare so set on justice that if God were not just they would not care a bean for Godrdquo21 (ibid1031ndash2 Walshe 329) Eckhart places the highest importance on this teaching ldquoWhoever understands about the just one and justice understands all that I am sayingrdquo22 (ibid1052ndash3 Walshe 329) What can warrant such puzzling and extravagant-sounding claims

For Aristotle the just or virtuous life is itself (a central aspect of) happiness so in a way he too could say ldquoThe just man wants and seeks nothing [other than justice] he knows no whyrdquo ie has no further goal in acting virtuously For Thomas on the other hand although the just person does what is just for its own sake such behavior does not constitute (complete) happiness at best it may (with the help of grace) merit it and this happiness too he seeks by dint of his actions Thus in his moral theology a door is (perhaps inadvertently) left open to spiritual or ethical mercantilism to thinking of virtuous behavior as a means of barter It is this door that Eckhart means to close even though such teleologi-cal behavior was (and still is) regularly encouraged by Christian churches What does Eckhart think is lacking in action that to ordinary common sense not to mention church teachings seems commendable And why does he dwell on ldquogoing out of oneselfrdquo elsewhere identified as detachment (abegescheidenheit) of which he says in the treatise ldquoOn Detachmentrdquo that it ldquosurpasses all things for all virtues have some regard to creatures but detachment is free of all creaturesrdquo23 (DW 54016ndash7 Walshe 566)

For Eckhart what is wrong with the merchant mentality in the search for eudaimonia is that merchants have made the most fundamental of mistakes ie as to whomdashor whatmdashthey themselves are and what their true relationship to God is Knowledge of these thingsmdashwhose role we saw in Thomas Aquinasrsquos

20 [D]ie wellent wol waz got wil waeligren sie siech so woumllten sie wol daz ez gotes wille waeligre daz sie gesunt waeligren Die gerehten enhȃnt zemȃle keinen willen waz got wil daz ist in allez glȋch swie grȏz daz ungemach sȋ Note again the contrast with Augustine in this case the view cited above in chapter 3 p 84 according to which the humble are those who align their wills with Godrsquos will

21 [D]en ist alsȏ ernst ze der gerechticheit waeligre daz got niht gereht waeligre sie enahteten eine bȏne niht ȗf got Contrast again this attitude to Augustinersquos here the view in Ad Simplicianum according to which whatever God does is considered just whether or not we can see the justice in it See chapter 3 p 75

22 Swer underscheit verstȃt von gerehticheit und von gerehtem der verstȃt allez daz ich sage23 [D]az lȗteriu abegescheidenheit ob allen dingen sȋ wan alle tugende hȃnt etwaz ȗfsehennes ȗf die

crȇatȗre sȏ stȃt abegescheidenheit ledic aller crȇatȗren


thoughtmdashis essential if one is to know what eudaimonia consists in and there-fore how we should live As we have seen the standard Christian view of the Godndashhuman relationshipmdashwhich Genesis 126 depicts as creation in the divine image and likenessmdashwas in the formulation by Aquinas (and itself rooted in Augustinersquos teaching) that nothing that is truly said of human beings is also true of the Creator in the same sense so great is the difference between the finite and the infinite Predications eg of wisdom or goodness that are true of God and the created must stand in an analogical relationship to one another ldquoUnivocal predication is impossible between God and creaturesrdquo24 (STh Ia135c)

In a way Eckhart can agree with everything Thomas claims in STh Ia13525 He too thinks that ldquounivocal predication is impossible between God and crea-turesrdquo That is between God and creatures thus described For examplemdashand this is one of his favorite themesmdashhe says the relation between ldquouncreated Jus-ticerdquo (which as a spiritual perfection he equates with God) and a concrete just person or just action ldquois one of analogy by way of exemplar and antecedentrdquo26 (In Sap n44 LW 23671 Walshe 475) But now one aspect of this relationship is that the perfection in question here justice is only truly present in uncreated Justice which bestows it on creatures in the form of a grace ldquoon loanrdquo as it were

For the virtues [in the creature] such as justice and the like are more like gradual acts of conformation than anything imprinted and imma-nent which has its fixed root in the virtuous man they are in a continu-ous state of becoming like the glow of light in mid-air or the image in a mirror27

(Ibid n45 LW 23684ndash7 Walshe 475)

The same applies he says to transcendental qualities such as being and oneness they are actually the qualities of God alone who loans them temporarily to crea-tures28 But the creatures in themselves are a pure nothing ldquoThus every creature in

24 [I]mpossibile est aliquid praedicari de Deo et creaturis univoce25 The full citation of Thomasrsquos view is given in chapter 4 pp 124ndash2626 analogice exemplariter et per prius Note that in this example and often Eckhart is clearly speak-

ing of formal causality the kind that he regards as suitable for metaphysical analysis (uncreated) Jus-tice is the analogical formal cause of the justice in just persons or actions we call them ldquojustrdquo because their actions somehow resemble the exemplar

27 Virtutes enim justitia et huismodi sunt potius quaedam actu configurationes quam quid figuratum immanens et habens fixionem et radicem in virtuoso et sunt in continuo fieri sicut splendor in medio et imago in speculo

28 Cf for instance Tabula Prologorum in opus tripartitum LW 11324ndash6 An English version is given by Armand Maurer CSB in Meister Eckhart Parisian Questions and Prologues (Toronto Pon-tifical Institute of Medieval Studies 1974) 79


itself is from nothing and is nothingrdquo (In Ioh n308 LW 32566ndash7)29 The very being of creatures itself and not only their spiritual qualities (ldquojustice and the likerdquo) is to be compared with the image in a mirror which is truly present there but only as long as its original its source is in front of the glass

Although Eckhartrsquos general view of analogy was condemned in 1329 it is arguably based on or at least consistent with that of Aquinas who had claimed (using the same example that Eckhart would later employ)

[W]hen anything is predicated of many things analogically it is found in only one of them according to its proper nature and from this one the rest are denominated although health is neither in medicine nor in urine yet in either there is something whereby the one causes and the other indicates health30

(STh Ia166c)

As health is only truly in a living being it is predicated of medicine and urine ldquoby loanrdquo as it were So too according to Eckhart since being etc are only truly in God they are said of (imputed to) creatures by loan

Eckhartrsquos conception of the Godndashhuman relationship is however not limited to analogy and as a result is radically different from the lesson one might draw from a straightforward reading of St Thomas For Eckhart thinks that in a cer-tain carefully defined sense there is also a univocal relation between God and the human being to the extent that the latter is for example just that is just as such Thus Eckhart asserts near the start of the Commentary on John

The just one as such is in justice itself for how would he be just if he were apart from justice if he stood outside and apart from justice31

(n14 LW 3134ndash5 McGinn Essential Sermons 126)

29 Sic omnis creatura id quod in se est ex nihilo est et nihil est This claim often repeated by Eckhart scandalized his censors It is included as one of the eleven propositions condemned as ldquoevil-sound-ing rash and suspect of heresyrdquo in the papal bull (male sonare et multum esse temerarios de heresique suspectos LW 56001ndash2 McGinn Essential Sermons 80) This although the same had been said by the newly sainted Aquinas almost word for word in STh IaIae1092ad 2 ldquoNow as every created thing has its being from another and considered in itself is nothing rdquo [Unaquaeque autem res creata sicut esse non habet nisi ab alio et in se considerata est nihil]

30 [Q]uando aliquid dicitur analogice de multis illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum a quo alia denominantur quamvis sanitas non sit in medicina neque in urina tamen in utroque est aliquid per quod hoc quidem facit illud autem significat sanitatem

31 [J]ustus ut sic est in ipsa justitia Quomodo enim justus esset si extra justitiam esset divisus a justitia foris staret The theory of predication in this citation was derived from Aristotle its use by Eckhart is explored at length by Flasch in Meister Eckhart eg pp 212ndash24


Here the talk is not of the just person or action ie not of a concrete particu-lar not of a creature but simply of the justus ut sic the just one as not further modified Bearing in mind that analogy ambiguity and univocity are properties of descriptions of terms let us note that in these early sections of the Commen-tary Eckhart introduces a number of terms that are the hallmarks of his view the building blocks of his discourse on univocity the just one is ldquothe wordrdquo of justice ldquothrough which justice speaks and manifests itselfrdquo32 (ibid n 15 LW 3138ndash9 McGinn Essential Sermons 126 emphasis added) the just one ldquoproceeds from and is born of justice and in this way distinguishes itself from itrdquo33 (ibid n 16146 McGinn Essential Sermons 127 emphasis added) the just one is ldquothe offspring and son of justice another in person not in naturerdquo34 (ibid ll 11ndash12 McGinn Essential Sermons 127 emphasis added) In connection with this last claim Eckhart observes that the two are ldquolsquoonersquo in nature because otherwise justice would not give birth to the just one nor the father to the son who would become different nor would this be univocal generation (generatio univoca)rdquo35 (ibid ll 13ndash15) In other words Eckhart is providing examples that purport to amend or extend in an important way Aquinasrsquos sweeping claim that ldquoit is impossible for anything to be predicated univocally of God and of creaturesrdquo36 (STh Ia135c)

The point of these terminological pairs speaker-word birthing father-birthed son etc is to stress their univocal character Thomas had written

The begotten furthermore receives its nature from the generator If then the Son is begotten by the Father it follows that He has received the nature which He has from the Father But it is not possible that He has received from the Father a nature numerically other than the Father has but the same in species as happens in univocal generations when man generates man or fire fire37

(SCG IV104)

32 [J]ustus verbum est justitiae quo justitia se ipsam dicit et manifestat33 [J]ustus procedens et genitus a justitia hoc ipso ab illa distinguitur34 [J]ustus est proles et filius iustitiae alius in persona non aliud in natura35 lsquo[U]numrsquo in natura quia aliter justitia non gigneret justum nec pater filium qui fieret alius nec esset

generatio univoca36 Eckhartrsquos contemporary the Franciscan John Duns Scotus who was in Paris at the same time

as Eckhart in the early 1300s reached a similar conclusion about the univocity of ldquobeingrdquo Cf Mary Beth Ingham and Mechthild Dreyer The Philosophical Vision of John Duns Scotus An Introduction (Washington DC Catholic University of America Press 2004) 38 ff

37 Genitum naturam accipit a generante Si ergo filius genitus est a Deo patre oportet quod naturam quam habet a patre acceperit Non est autem possibile quod acceperit a patre aliam naturam numero quam pater habet et similem specie sicut fit in generationibus univocis ut cum homo generat hominem et ignis ignem


Eckhart seems to have this definition in mind Certainly the ldquoman generates manrdquo motif is present in the birthing fatherbirthed son pairing But Thomas also thinks univocal generation requires that the form of what is generated preexists in the generator according to the same mode of being and in similar matter Thus one can see at once why he would claim that univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures For creatures and God do not share the same mode of being much less similar matter To overcome these hurdles Eckhart first makes clear that his focus is on spiritual not material perfections Justice goodness and the like are not properties of material entities as material A crucial difference is that in the univocal reception of these spiritual perfec-tions what is involved is not a loan but permanent possession The ldquojust onerdquo qua just is just

With spiritual things eg justice and the like it is one and the same to desire and to possess them Conception is (here) possession38

(In Ex n205 LW 217216ndash17)

Secondly Eckhart is at pains to argue that with respect to this realm of the spiritual perfectionsmdashwhich at the same time is the realm of intellectmdashthere is a sense in which the human being or an aspect thereof is that just one the Word of Justice the Son and one with the Father the Principiate of the Principal It is important to appreciate that these claims on which Eckhartrsquos reputation as a mystic is based are derived not from mystical experience but from an intricately developed only partially Aristotelian metaphysical structure Eckhart intended a systematic presentation of that structure in his planned Three-Part Work of which only fragments have come down to us with the result that the status of many of his claims presented piecemeal in various surviving texts can seem obscure or ungrounded39 But they are clearly not meant as reports of personal mystical experiencemdashEckhart is silent or even dismissive on this scoremdashnor are they wild random speculation In any case he is very clear that the spiritual life he wants his listeners and readers to follow is based on theirour univocal and

38 In rebus autem spiritualibus puta in iustitia et similibus ipsa concupiscere utique est ista adipisci et habere ipsa conceptio est ipsa adeptio An English translation appears in Meister Eckhart Teacher and Preacher ed Bernard McGinn (Mahwah NJ Paulist Press 1986) 108

39 It is not known exactly how much of the planned Opus Tripartitum Eckhart actually succeeded in composing during his three years in Paris (or elsewhere) Loris Sturlese has written ldquoWhereas even today works like the quodlibeta of Henry of Ghent fill the shelves of old libraries all that remains of Eckhartrsquos two periods as Master at Paris is five quaestionesmdashan unparalleled catastropherdquo ldquoMys-ticism and Theology in Meister Eckhartrsquos Theory of the Imagerdquo Eckhart Review 2 (March 1993) 18ndash31 at 20


not analogical connection with God In his German treatise The Book of Divine Consolation he lays out exactly this contrast

Solomon says [Proverbs 1221] ldquoThe just will not grieve whatever may befallrdquo He does not say ldquothe just manrdquo or ldquothe just angelrdquo or this or that he says ldquothe justrdquo Whatever belongs in some way to the just in particu-lar whatever in any way makes his justice his and that he is just all that is son and has a father on earth and is creature made and created for his father is creature made and created But the pure just one since it has no made or created father and God and justice are one and justice alone is its father therefore pain and sorrow cannot enter into such a one any more than into God40

(BgT DW 5127ndash15 Walshe 526 transl slightly altered Eckhart makes the same point in Pr 39 DW 2258 Walshe 306)

The personal the particularmdashfor example my just behavior in settling a debt to the extent it concerns me as a specific human beingmdashin a word the analogical with respect to the divine perfections all this is set against ldquothe pure onerdquo pure in the sense that such a one is detached from the personal and the particular (and indeed from time and space) Its perfections are said of it in the same sense as of God41 But one must wonder what aspect of us is Eckhart talking about and how does he suppose it to overcome Thomasrsquos scruples about univocal pred-ication of God and creatures

Immediately following his remarks about Justice and the just one in the Com-mentary on John Eckhart says ldquoOn the basis of the above a great deal in the scrip-tures can be explained especially what was written about the only begotten Son of God such as that he is lsquothe image of Godrsquo (2 Cor 44 Col 115)rdquo42 (In Ioh n23 LW III193ndash4 Essential 129) The centrally important Eckhartian theme of the image provides a good example of his use of Neoplatonism to interpret scriptural texts for instance when he says

40 S a l o m ȏ n sprichet lsquoden gerehten enbetruumlbet niht allez daz im geschehen macrsquo Er ensprichet niht lsquoden gerehten menschenrsquo noch lsquoden gerehten engelrsquo noch diz noch daz Er sprichet lsquoden gerehtenrsquo Swaz des ge-rehten ihtes ist sunder daz sȋn gerehticheit ist und daz er gereht ist daz ist sun und hȃt vater ȗf ertrȋche und crȇatȗre und ist gemachet und geschaffen wan sȋn vater ist crȇatȗre gemachet oder geschaffen Aber gereht lȗter wan daz niht geschaffen noch gemachet vater enhȃt und got und gerehticheit al ein ist und gerehticheit aleine sȋn vater ist dar umbe mac leit und ungemach als wȇnic in in gevallen als in got

41 More will be said of this ldquounivocal correlationrdquo of humans and the divine in the next chapter where we look more closely at Eckhartrsquos teaching on the transcendentals and the spiritual perfections such as justice

42 Ex praemissis possunt exponi quam plurima in scriptura specialiter illa quae de filio dei unigenito scribuntur puta quod est lsquoimago deirsquo


[A]n image properly speaking is a simple formal emanation that trans-mits the whole pure naked essence This is what the metaphysician considers leaving aside the efficient and final cause which for the phi-losopher of nature constitute the basis of the study of nature An image is thus an emanation from the innermost while everything exterior is silent and excluded It is life which one can imagine as though of itself and in itself an essence swells and surges up while the swelling over is not yet considered43

(Sermo XLIX n511 LW 442514ndash4264 McGinn Teacher and Preacher 236 emphasis added)

In Neoplatonism essence desires to manifest and communicate itself to extend itself through its image or ldquooffspringrdquo44 In the Commentary on John Eckhart gives us nine theses about images that are very similar in content to those about the relationship between Justice and the just one eg ldquoThe image as image receives nothing of what belongs to it from the subject in which it is rather it receives its entire being from the object whose image it isrdquo And further ldquoIt receives its being from [the imaged object] alonerdquo And ldquoThe image is in its prototype [ie its object] for that is where it receives its entire beingrdquo And again ldquoIt follows that the image and that of which it is the image insofar as they are such are onerdquo45 (nn 23ndash24 LW 3195ndash202 McGinn Essential Sermons 129) Eckhart obviously is referring to what we might call the essential notion of being an imagemdashthe ldquopure intentionality of the imagerdquomdashas opposed to any actual image in its particularity The relevance of this observation becomes clearer when seen in the light of Eckhartrsquos further claim that the traditional distinguishing mark of the human being ie reason is in a certain way itself essentially to be an image

Here is an example that might help illustrate what Eckhart means in these claims about images Take some factmdashsay that Paris is in Francemdashand give it some form of expression eg in an English sentence ldquoParis is in Francerdquo then the sentence could be said to be an image or expression even the picture of

43 [I]mago proprie est emanatio simplex formalis transfusiva totius essentiae purae nudae qualem considerat metaphysicus circumscriptio efficiente et fine sub quibus causis cadunt naturae in consideratione physici Est ergo imago emanatio ab intimis in silentio et exclusione omnis forinseci vita quaedam ac si imagineris rem ex se ipsa et in se ipsa intumescere et bullire in se ipsa necdum cointellecta ebullitione

44 On Eckhartrsquos teaching about images cf Donald F Duclow ldquolsquoWhose image is thisrsquo in Eckhartrsquos Sermonesrdquo Mystics Quarterly 15 (1989) 29ndash40 as well as Sturlese ldquoMysticism and Theologyrdquo and Mojsisch Meister Eckhart 86ndash94

45 [I]mago enim inquantum imago est nihil sui accipit a subiecto in quo est sed totum suum esse accipit ab obiecto cuius est imago accipit esse suum a solo illo imago est in suo exemplari Nam ibi accipit totum suum esse sequitur quod imago et cuius est imago in quantum huiusmodi unum sunt


the fact46 In itself this imaging relation is intentional not causal the sentence means the (purported) fact Now consider a German translation of the sentence ldquoParis ist in Frankreichrdquo Although physically different from the English version it shares something essentialmdashits contentmdashwith both the original thought and the English sentence Frege called this abstract content a lsquosensersquo (Sinn) It is in virtue of expressing a certain sense that a term can refer to an object (or a con-cept) a sentence can have a truth-value and translational equivalents have the same meaning47 Eckhart might say that the meaning of an imagemdashthe object intendedmdashis its being and that hence a (purported) fact or object and its ex-pression qua expression or image share the same being Further the Fregean notion of sense corresponds to Eckhartrsquos claim that the ldquothe image as image (imago inquantum imago est) receives nothing of what belongs to it from the sub-ject in which it is rather it receives its entire being from the object whose image it isrdquo The ldquoimage as imagerdquo would be the expression qua sense-bearer the ldquoobject whose image it isrdquo would be the purported fact or object while the ldquosubject in which it isrdquo would be the English or German sentence the spoken or written ldquovesselrdquo48 The sense that the latter carry is identical with that of the object or purported fact from which it originates just asmdashfor Eckhartmdashthe image in-quantum image is identical with its prototype with this one difference the one is the source the other the recipient

The comparison limps slightly however in that for Eckhart the central case is where the prototype is a Thinker (or better lsquoThinkingrsquo) while its thoughtexpressionmdashits ldquoWordrdquomdashis the prototypersquos image Drawing on both Christian and Neoplatonic traditions Eckhart in his Parisian Questions uses this notion of univocal correlation to upend the common view of his scholastic predecessors preeminently Aquinas on the nature of the Deity

[I]t is not my present opinion that God understands because he exists but rather that he exists because he understands God is an intellect and understanding and his understanding is itself the ground of his existence It is said in John 1 ldquoIn the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God and the Word was Godrdquo The Evangelist did not

46 Something like this was indeed said memorably by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Tractatus ldquoThe logical picture of facts is the thoughtrdquo (3) ldquoThe thought is the proposition with a senserdquo (4) ldquoThe proposition shows its senserdquo (4022) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus trans D F Pears and B F Mac-guinness (London Routledge amp Kegan Paul 1961)

47 Gottlob Frege ldquoUumlber Sinn und Bedeutungrdquo Zeitschrift fuumlr Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 100(1892) 25ndash50 English version ldquoOn Sense and Meaningrdquo in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege eds PT Geach and M Black 3rd ed (Oxford Blackwell 1980)

48 One of Eckhartrsquos presentations of the image-doctrine is in Pr 16B in which he applies a scrip-tural text beginning ldquoLike a vessel of solid gold rdquo to St Augustine and to ldquoevery good holy soulrdquo (einer ieglȋchen guoten heiligen sȇle) (DW 12633ndash4 Walshe 114)


say ldquoIn the beginning was being and God was beingrdquo A word is com-pletely related to an intellect where it is either the speaker or what is spoken and not existence or a composite being After the text of John 1 just quoted there follows ldquoAll things were made through himrdquo ( Jn 13) This should read ldquoAll things made through him are (exist)rdquo so that existence itself comes to creatures afterward49 Thus the author of the Book of Causes says ldquoThe first of created things is beingrdquo50 Hence as soon as we come to being we come to a creature51

(Qu Par n4 LW 5404ndash417 Parisian 45)

In addition to the Neoplatonic element Eckhartrsquos unusual view is also based on a more conventional idea one found for instance in Aquinas that ldquoHis [ie Godrsquos] knowledge is the cause of things whereas our knowledge is caused by themrdquo52 (ibid n8 LW 54411ndash12 Parisian 48) It follows Eckhart says that ldquosince our knowledge is dependent upon the being by which it is caused with equal reason being itself is dependent upon Godrsquos knowledgerdquo53 (ibid) If one complains that one cannot imagine an intellect beyond being Eckhart concedes that ldquohere the imagination fails (hic imaginatio deficit)rdquo unable to distinguish Godrsquos knowledge from our own He is willing to make concessions to this weak-ness ldquoOf course if you wish to call understanding lsquobeingrsquo I do not mindrdquo But it is more proper to see that ldquosince being belongs to creatures it is not in God except as its cause Therefore being is not in God but the purity of beingrdquo54 a notion that Eckhart associates with the transcendent ldquoIrdquo of the Divinity

49 The Latin of Jn 13 is ldquoOmnia per ipsum facta suntrdquo Eckhartrsquos reading requires a comma or pause after ldquofactardquo

50 Liber de causis prop 4 Based on the writings of Proclus (fifth century CE) the Liber was among the most influential sources of Neoplatonic thought in the High Middle Ages

51 [N]on ita videtur mihi modo ut quia sit ideo intelligat sed quia intelligit ideo est ita quod deus est intellectus et intelligere et est ipsum intelligere fundamentum ipsius esse Quia dicitur Ioh 1 lsquoin principio erat verbum et verbum erat apud deum et deus erat verbumrsquo Verbum autem se toto est ad intellectum et est ibi dicens vel dictum et non esse vel ens commixtum Et sequitur post verbum assumptum Ioh 1 lsquoomnia per ipsum facta suntrsquo ut sic legatur lsquoomnia per ipsum facta sunt ut ipsis factis ipsum esse post conveniat Unde dicit auctor D e c a u s i s ldquoprima rerum creatarum est esserdquo Unde statim cum venimus ad esse venimus ad creaturam

52 [S]cientia dei est causa rerum et scientia nostra est causata a rebus Aquinas uses the notion at eg STh IaIIae35obj1 Godrsquos practical intellect is causa rerum intellectarum

53 [I]deo cum scientia nostra cadat sub ente a quo causatur et ipsum ens pari ratione cadit sub scientia dei54 Et si tu intelligere velis vocare esse placet mihi Et ideo cum esse conveniat creaturis non est in

deo nisi sicut in causa et ideo in deo non est esse sed puritas essendi In ibid nn8ndash9 LW 5453ndash11 n 12488 Where Maurer translates ldquoesserdquo as ldquoexistencerdquo I prefer ldquobeingrdquo Compare Sermons and Lec-tures on Ecclesiasticus n8 LW 2 23514ndash15 where Eckhart connects the ldquopurityrdquo of Godrsquos wisdom with lsquoIrsquo ldquoFor lsquoIrsquo denotes the naked and pure substancerdquo (Li lsquoegorsquo enim meram et puram substaniam significat)


The phrase ldquopurity of beingrdquo may have been meant as a concession to the oddity (not to say scandal) of placing God above being altogether The ldquoGod beyond beingrdquo was an important theme among Neoplatonists including such Christian thinkers as the Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite and it recalls the Plotinian One of which nothing at all can be predicated not even being But whereas the One of Plotinus is prior to Intellect (nous)mdashand indeed is its sourcemdashEckhart in a sense identifies the two by drawing on Aristotlersquos contention (itself derived from Anaxagoras) that ldquobefore it thinks [the in-tellect or rational part of the soul] is not actually any real thingrdquo55 (De anima III429a22ndash24) Eckhart does not call God a res intelligens but simply intelligere prior to any res Accordingly Godrsquos Word or Image will also essentially be intel-ligere intellect and the term will be used univocally of both God and Word Eckhartrsquos audacious claim is that an aspect of the human intellectmdashand indeed a particular use of that aspectmdashis identical with ie non-distinct from this Word and therefore from its Source

The lamentable absence of Eckhartrsquos systematic treatises is from the vantage point of this study especially unfortunate in the area of psychology If we had from him even a commentary on Aristotlersquos De anima it would likely shed much important light on his views of the intellect As it is all we have are scattered remarks in various works an important example of which appears in German sermon 69 Eckhart is here preaching on the Gospel text John 1616mdashldquoA little while and you will no longer see merdquo Unsurprisingly this leads him to reflect on vision as well as the medium in which we see and the nature of images Eckhart wants to say that we do not see objects directly but instead their images but this does not give rise to a regress

I do not see my hand or a stone but rather I see an image of the stone But I do not see that image in another image or a medium Rather I see it without means and without image for the image is the means and not another means an image is imageless in that it is not seen in another image56


The image par excellence is Godrsquos Word ldquoThe eternal Word is the medium and the image itself which is without means or image so that the soul may grasp

55 ὁ ἄρα καλούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς οὐθέν ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ τῶν ὄντων πρὶν νοεῖν56 Dar umbe ensihe ich niht die hant oder den stein mȇr ich sihe ein bilde von dem steine Aber daz

selbe bilde daz ensihe ich niht in einem andern bilde oder in einem mittel mȇr ich sihe ez ȃne mittel und ȃne bilde wan daz bilde ίst daz mittel und niht ein ander mittel Alsȏ ist ouch bilde ȃne bilde wan ez enwirt niht gesehen in einem andern bilde


God in the eternal Word and know him im-mediately and without any imagerdquo57 (ibid ll8ndash9 Walshe 235) Since the Word is the univocal correlate of the Prin-cipal or Speaker God it has what McGinn calls the ldquounion of indistinctionrdquo with God58 Hence and paradoxically it both serves as medium and abolishes the medium at the same time so that grasping the WordImage is grasping the Prototype

At this point in the sermon we might expect Eckhart to explain how one can grasp the Word Instead he seems to embark on a digression stating

There is a power in the soul which is the intellect From the moment that it becomes aware of God and tastes Him it has five properties The first is that it becomes detached from here and now The second is that it is like nothing The third is that it is pure and uncompounded The fourth is that it is active and seeking in itself The fifth is that it is an image59

(Ibid1691ndash5 Walshe 235)

In each of these ways the soulintellect that has become aware of God be-comes like the Word indeed for Eckhart it (by grace) becomes ldquoindistinctly onerdquo with the Word For example in becoming ldquodetached from here and nowrdquo it shifts its perspective from the sensible to the intelligible world in becoming ldquolike nothingrdquo ie empty or detached the intellect paradoxically becomes like God the Indistinct One (Creatures differ from one another through their multiple distinctions but God has none of those characteristics is in-comparably other a state the intellect can approximate by detaching from all things)60

It is with the fifth of these properties that the theme of image and Word is taken up again

57 Daz ȇwic wort ist daz mittel und daz bilde selbe daz dȃ ist ȃne mittel und ȃne bilde ȗf daz diu sȇle in dem ȇwigen worte got begrȋfet und bekennet ȃne mittel und ȃne bilde

58 McGinn Mystical Thought 4859 Ein kraft ist in der sȇle daz ist vernuumlnfticheit Von ȇrste sȏ diu gotes gewar wirt und gesmecket sȏ hȃt

si vuumlnf eigenschefte an ir Daz ȇrste ist daz si abescheidet von hie und von nȗ Daz ander daz si nihte glȋch enist Daz dritte daz si lȗter und unvermenget ist Daz vierde daz si in ir selber wuumlrkende oder suochende ist Daz vuumlnfte daz si ein bilde ist

60 Eckhartrsquos important reflections on the One as Indistinct are briefly outlined in his Commentary on the Book of Wisdom nn154ndash55 LW 2489ndash91 Teacher 169ndash70 Eckhartrsquos theory is discussed (as ldquodialectical Neoplatonismrdquo) by McGinn in Mystical Thought 90ndash100 and by Mojsisch (as ldquoobjective paradox-theoryrdquo) in Meister Eckhart sects 52ndash521


[The soul is] an image Well now Mark this well and remember it here you have the whole sermon in a nutshell Image and image[d]61 are so fully one and joined that no difference can be discerned We can well understand fire without heat and heat without fire We can understand the sun without light and light without the sun But we can understand no difference between image and image[d] I say further God in His omnipotence can understand no difference between them for they are born together and die together if the image should perish that is formed after God then Godrsquos image would also disappear62

(Ibid1763ndash1782 Walshe 236ndash37)

I suggest that the ldquoimage that is formed after Godrdquo refers to the intellect qua intellect while ldquoGodrsquos imagerdquo here is the Word The justification for Eckhartrsquos claim lies in the univocal-correlational relationship among the three God-the-Father the Son-as-Word and the intellectmdashthese necessarily co-exist with one another

In thus highlighting the intellect Eckhart drew on a wide field of philosophi-cal speculation reaching back to antiquity Roughly speaking according to vari-ous views originally inspired by Plato and Aristotle and enjoying currency in the Middle Ages ordinary human intellection involves a kind of identification of knower and known the two become identical in form though not in matter when the form of the object comes to be present in the soul or mind of the knower63 In addition to memory and experience this process assumes the use of the senses while the work of the intellect is divided into two functions The

61 Here I depart from Walshersquos literal rendering of the original ldquobilde und bilderdquo in favor of a version of the modern German translation (ldquoBild und ltUrgtbildrdquo) given by Josef Quint editor and translator of several volumes of the Deutsche Werke (here DW III176ndash77) This seems to me to make better sense of the text and brings it into line with what Eckhart says elsewhere On the other hand ldquoimage and imagerdquo could also be acceptable if the preacher means that the soul as image is image of the Word itself an Image (of God)

62 [D]az ez ein bilde ist Eyȃ nȗ merket mit vlȋze und gehaltet diz wol in dem hȃt ir die predige alzemȃle bilde und bilde ist sȏ gar ein und mit einander daz man keinen underscheit dȃ verstȃn enmac Man verstȃt wol daz viur ȃne die hitze und die hitze ȃne daz viur Man verstȃt wol die sunnen ȃne daz lieht und daz lieht ȃne die sunnen Aber man enmac keinen underscheit verstȃn zwischen bilde und bilde Ich spriche mȇ got mit sȋner almehticheit enmac keinen underscheit dȃ verstȃn wan ez wirt mit einander geborn und stirbet mit einander vergienge daz bilde daz nȃch gote gebildet ist sȏ vergienge ouch daz bilde gotes

63 ldquoAnd in fact thought as we have described it is what it is by virtue of becoming all things actual knowledge is identical with its objectrdquo (καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι τὸ δ αὐτό ἐστιν ἡ κατ ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι) Aristotle DA III5430 a13ndash15 and a20 (Complete Works vol 1 684 transl J A Smith)


ldquoactiverdquo (ldquoproductiverdquo or ldquoagentrdquo) intellect abstracts the intelligible forms of objects from the lsquoperceptual speciesrsquo produced by the various senses and coordinated by the common sense Of this function Aristotle says ldquoit makes all thingsrdquo (ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν DA 430 a12) while the other functionmdashdubbed ldquopassiverdquo or ldquopotentialrdquo intellectmdashldquois what it is by virtue of becom-ing all thingsrdquo (ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι) The references to ldquoall thingsrdquo indicate the infinite or unlimited capacity of the intellect In ad-dition Aristotle says of the active intellect that it is ldquoseparablerdquo and ldquowhen separated it is alone just what it is immortal and eternalrdquo64 (DA 430a17 and 23ndash24)

These latter remarks both cryptic and provocative about a non-material aspect of the soul that is ldquoimmortal and eternalrdquo understandably inspired much speculation both in later antiquity and especially among Muslim Jewish and Christian thinkers in the Middle Ages for instance on whether there is a single active intellect for all intelligent beings In this ongoing debate Eckhartrsquos older Dominican contemporary Dietrich of Freiberg drew on diverse sourcesmdashAristotle Augustine Neoplatonism Averroes and Albert the Greatmdashto assign a decisive role to the active intellect in the human quest for happiness the possible intellect is ultimately a hindrance in this quest and one needs the help of grace to overcome it though there is then no need of further grace for the active intellect to attain its natu-ral object the vision of God65 Quite different was the view of Eckhart In German sermon 104 he says

Now observe We spoke just now of an active intellect and a passive intellect The active intellect abstracts images from outward things stripping them of matter and of accidents and introduces them to the passive intellect begetting their mental image therein And the passive intellect made pregnant by the active in this way cherishes and knows these things with the aid of the active intellect Even then the passive intellect cannot keep on knowing these things unless the active intellect illumines them afresh Now observe what the active intellect does for the natural man that and far more God does for one with detachment

65 For a summary of the views of Dietrich and how they differ from Eckhartrsquos as well as of how both were received in the early fourteenth century cf Niklaus Largier ldquolsquointellectus in deum ascen-susrsquo Intellekttheoretische Auseinandersetzungen in Texten der deutschen Mystikrdquo Deutsche Viertel-jahrschrift fuumlr Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte 69 (1995) 423ndash71

64 χωριστὸς χωρισθεὶς δ ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ ὅπερ ἐστί καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον


He takes away the active intellect from him and installing Himself in its stead He Himself undertakes all that the intellect ought to be doing 66

(DW 4-15858ndash5879 Walshe 49 emphasis added)67

Unlike Dietrich Eckhart apparently sees only a natural application for the human intellectus agens ie a use restricted to abstracting the essences from the sensory presentations of objects in this world But neither our highest knowledge nor our blessedness is creaturely so our attainment of them cannot be a matter of the active intellect Indeed we must cease seeking outside in the world of the senses and turn inward for the intellect is also endowed for this task through its passive or receptive side

The special mark of the Eckhartian path is that it transcends the level on which we are analogously related to God ie as creatures of the Creator beingsmdashfrom the perspective of both Augustine and Aquinasmdashwhose highest aspirations seem to depend entirely on a transformation of our human nature through Godrsquos grace For Eckhart too grace is absolutely necessary but it does not so much transform our true nature as reveal it and make it once again accessible to us it restores our original (ie pre-Fall) rectitude The intellect both active and pas-sive is part of our human nature indeed its defining element To the extent that we are creatures it shares in our creatureliness and with its natural use we are thoroughly familiar But Eckhart suggests that it has a more-than-natural use paradoxically by way of indeed in its nonuse ie complete detachment This means a turning away from the intellectus agens altogether Through the thus de-tached intellectus possibilis the rational soul becomes pure possibility According to the last text quoted for example once we quiet the restless striving of the natural intellect the subsequent action is entirely from the side of God and Eck-hart describes it principally in terms of grace

66 Nȗ merket Wir hȃn dȃ vor gesprochen von einer wuumlrkender vernunft und von einer lȋdender ver-nunft Diu wuumlrkende vernunft houwet diu bilde abe von den ȗzern dingen und entkleidet sie von materie und von zuovalle und setzet sie in die lȋdende vernunft und diu gebirt ir geistlȋchiu bilde in sie Und sȏ diu lȋdende vernunft von der wuumlrkenden swanger worden ist sȏ behebet und bekennet si diu dinc mit helfe der wuumlrkenden vernunft Nochdenne enmac diu lȋdende vernunft diu dinc niht behalten in bekantnisse diu wuumlrkende enmuumleze sie anderwerbe erliuhten Sehet allez daz diu wuumlrkende vernunft tuot an einem natiurlȋchen menschen daz selbe und verre mȇ tuot got einem abegescheiden menschen Er nimet im abe die wuumlrkende vernunft und setzet sich selber an ir stat wider und wuumlrket selber dȃ allez daz daz diu wuumlrk-ende vernunft solte wuumlrken

67 There has been disagreement about whether Eckhart himself wrote this sermon Largier (in ldquointellectusrdquo) for example thought this was certainly not the case though he agrees that the content is Eckhartian But in 2003 the editor of volume 41 of the Deutsche Werke Georg Steer argued strongly for Eckhartrsquos authorship and published a critical edition of the sermon (as Pr 104)


What is grace according to Eckhart68 He gives a metaphorical and quite gen-eral characterization when he says

Grace is a kind of boiling over [ebullitio] from the generation of the Son [by the Father] and has its root in the innermost heart of the Father It is life not just beingmdashldquoHis name is the Wordrdquo [Revel 1913]mdashhigher than nature

(Sermo XXV-2 n263 LW 423910ndash2401 McGinn Teacher and Preacher 219ndash20)69

Grace is a divine overflow ie it is the divine life itself Every form of grace ldquocomes from God alone from the same ground as being itself rdquo70 (ibid n 264 LW 42407 McGinn Teacher and Preacher 220) Importantly grace is twofold

The first [grace] comes from God insofar as he is understood as a being or rather as something good The second grace comes from God as He is understood under the property of ldquopersonal notionrdquo71 for which reason only an intellective being which properly reflects the image of the Trinity can receive it Further God as good is the principle of the boiling over [ebullitio] on the outside [but] as personal notion [ie as Father Son etc] He is the principle of the boiling [bullitio] within himself which is the cause and exemplar of the boiling over Thus the

68 My understanding of Eckhartrsquos complex pronouncements on grace is much indebted to the writings of McGinn and Largier Cf McGinn Mystical Thought 127ndash31 and Largier ldquozu Sermo XXV Gratia dei sum id quod sumrdquo in Lectura Eckhardi II Predigten Meister Eckharts von Fachgelehrten gelesen und gedeutet eds G Steer and L Sturlese (Stuttgart Kohlhammer Verlag 2003) 177ndash203 as well as Largierrsquos commentary in his edition Meister Eckhart Werke in zwei Baumlnden (Frankfurt am Main Deutscher Klassiker Verlag 1993) vol II 904ndash09 Cf the rather different and tentative in-vestigation by Kurt Flasch in ldquozu Predigt 52 Beati pauperes spiriturdquo Lectura Eckhardi I Predigten Meister Eckharts von Fachgelehrten gelesen und gedeutet eds Georg Steer and Loris Sturlese (Stuttgart Kohlhammer 1998) 182ndash99 esp 194ndash97 Flasch also traces the development of mainline views about grace in Latin Christendom from Peter Lombard to Eckhart in Meister Eckhart esp 284ndash87

69 Gratia est ebullitio quaedam parturitionis filii radicem habens in ipso patris pectore intimo Vita est non solum essemdashlsquonomen eius verbumrsquomdasheminentior natura Eckhartrsquos view of grace is widely expressed in his writings I will focus on the two parts of Sermo XXV both because this Latin work is a more sustained treatise-like discussion and because it is readily available in English translation in Teacher 216ndash23 I am indebted to Marco Broumlsch and the Cusanus-Stift for the opportunity to examine Nico-laus Cusanusrsquos own copy of Sermo XXV with his original marginal notes

70 [G]ratia est a solo deo pari ratione sicut et ipsum esse71 In the medieval discussion a notio is ldquothe proper idea whereby we know a divine Personrdquo

( Aquinas STh I323c notio dicitur id quod est propria ratio cognoscendi divinam personam) Examples would be paternity sonship etc As we will see Eckhart plainly means to tie the second kind of grace closely to the relations among the Three Persons in the Trinity


emanation of the persons in the Godhead is prior the cause and exem-plar of creation The first grace consists in a type of flowing out a departure from God the second consists in a type of flowing back a return to God Himself Both first and second grace have in common that they are from God alone The reason is that it is of the nature of grace to be given without merits freely for nothing without any prepa-ratory medium That belongs only to what is First Therefore every act of God in the creature is grace72

(Ibid n258ndash59 LW 42359ndash23710 McGinn Teacher and Preacher 218ndash19)

This twofold distinction that Eckhart appeals to is Neoplatonic in origin the contrast between the ldquoboilingrdquo within the divine and the ldquoboiling overrdquo that produces the whole creation Eckhart goes on to blend it with an established scholastic contrast that between gratia gratis data ldquograce freely bestowed [on all]rdquo and gratia gratum faciens the ldquograce that makes one acceptable [to God]rdquo (denoted ldquosanctifying gracerdquo) Let us call these ldquograce-1rdquo and ldquograce-2rdquo respec-tively The latter grace-2 according to Eckhart in a German sermon is the bul-litio of the Trinity as received by a soul that is ldquocollected into the single power that knows Godrdquo (gesament ist an die envaltige kraft diu got bekennet) ie the passive intellect

This grace springs up in the heart of the Father and flows into the Son and in the union of both it flows out of the wisdom of the Son and pours into the goodness of the Holy Ghost and is sent with the Holy Ghost into the soul And this grace is a face of God and is impressed without cooperation in the soul with the Holy Ghost and forms the soul like God73

(Pr 81 DW 33992ndash6 Walshe 323ndash24)

72 Prima procedit a deo sub ratione et proprietate entis sive boni potius Secunda gratia procedit a deo sub ratione et proprietate personalis notionis Propter quod ipsius capax est solum intellectivun in quo relu-cet proprie imago trinitatis Rursus deus sub ratione boni est principium bullitionis in se ipso quae se habet causaliter et exemplar[iter] ad ebulitionem Propter quod emanatio personarum in divinis est prior causa et exemplar creationis prima gratia consistit in quodam effluxu egressu a deo Secunda consistit in quodam reflexu sive regressu in ipsum deum Hoc tamen habent commune gratia prima et secunda quod utraque est a solo deo Ratio quia gratia est ex sui natura quod datu sine meritis datur gratis pro nihilo sine medio disponente Hoc autem competit tantum primo Sic ergo omnis operatio dei in creatura gratia est

73 Diu gnȃde entspringet in dem herzen des vaters und vliuzet in den sun und in der vereinunge ir beider vliuzet si ȗz der wȋsheit des sunes und vliuzet in die guumlete des heiligen geistes und wirt gesant mit dem heiligen geiste in die sȇle Und diu gnȃde ist ein antluumlze gotes und wirt ȃne underscheit gedruumlcket in die sȇle mit dem heiligen geiste und bildet die sȇle nȃch gote Flasch Meister Eckhart 284ndash87 stresses the identification of grace in the soul with the Holy Spirit and he traces it to Peter Lombard in the twelfth century


Eckhart calls this ldquosaving gracerdquo (gratia gratum faciens) and remarks that it is ldquoproper only to intellective and good creaturesrdquo74 (S XXV-2 n258 LW 42358 McGinn Teacher and Preacher 218) While this way of looking at grace-2 sounds traditional enough Eckhart quite unusually identifies grace-1 with ebullitio the overflowing that creates and is ldquocommon to good and evil and indeed all crea-turesrdquo (ibid2357ndash8 McGinn Teacher and Preacher 218)75

But even in the case of grace-2 Eckhartrsquos view is not as traditional as it might seem For when he says that only creatures who are both ldquorational and goodrdquo have a share in grace-2 he is relying on his view of the intellect qua intellect as univocally correlated with the divine as itself Son and Image of the divine and hence partaking in the bullitio-dynamic of the Trinity But this image is also lodged in a creature in human beings who qua creatures are analogically related to the Creator and are furthermore fallen Thus the immediate task of such an intellective creature is to begin the process of restoration to its original rectitude by laying aside its attachment to creatureliness and restoringmdashthrough grace-2 or the divine presence in the soulmdashthe predominance of that aspect of its soul that is Son and Image As a result Eckhartrsquos original twofold contrast among the divine activities of bullitio and ebullitio acquires a crucial complication The inner-Trinitarian bullitio assumes in its relation to the now-detached rational creature the form of gratia gratum faciens making the good rational creature ldquo acceptablerdquo to God ie divine76 It can do this only because the intellect by its own nature has a capacity that is more than natural

The gratia gratum faciens which is called supernatural is in the intel-lective power alone but it is not in it [the intellect] as a natural thing rather it is in it qua intellect insofar as it tastes the divine nature and as it

75 On the tradition cf Alister McGrath ldquoIn broad terms gratia gratum faciens came to be under-stood [in the thirteenth century] as a supernatural habit [ie an infused virtuous disposition] within man while gratia gratis data was understood as external divine assistance whether direct or indirectrdquo Justitia Dei 103 Grace-2 one could say reforms the soul into something pleasing to God while on this traditional view gratia gratis data is the assistance the soul receives in performing individual meritorious acts This latter of course is quite different from Eckhartrsquos usage

76 Ormdashin Eckhartian termsmdashcapable of receiving the ldquobirth of Godrsquos Son in the ground of the soulrdquo We will have more to say about this theme below

74 propria tantum intellectivis et bonis

Thomas by contrast thinks of grace not as a direct divine presence in the soul but rather as a ldquodivine qualityrdquo which God bestows on the soul For example at STh IaIIae 1102c Aquinas writes that God infuses ldquointo such as He moves towards the acquisition of supernatural good certain forms or super-natural qualities whereby they may be moved by Him sweetly and promptly to acquire eternal good and thus the gift of grace is a qualityrdquo [illis quos movet ad consequendum bonum supernaturale aeternum infundit aliquas formas seu qualitates supernaturales secundum quas suaviter et prompte ab ipso moveantur ad bonum aeternum consequendum Et sic donum gratiae qualitas quaedam est]


is thus superior to nature Therefore it is all and only supernatural and saving grace [ie grace-2] that is received and brought about there [ie in the intellect]77

(In Sap n273 LW 26037ndash6042 my emphasis)78

Eckhart seems largely uninterested in the medieval controversies over the respective contributions to our salvation of divine grace and unaided human ef-forts It might seem that if grace-2 alone is crucial to our search for blessedness ie to our ldquoflowing back [and] return to God Himselfrdquo and this grace is simply there as it were waiting for us in the intellect qua intellect then it would follow that for Eckhart no additional grace is needed to turn us to the path that leads to ldquothe Templerdquo79 we only need to want to turn Eckhart would thus be at least a semi-Pelagian But this conclusion would overlook Eckhartrsquos (again unusual) teaching about grace-1 which is freely bestowed on all creatures in the act of creation One aspect of this grace is surely what we saw Eckhart say on p 132 above

[T]hrough the creation God says and proclaims advises and orders all creaturesmdashprecisely by creating themmdashto follow Him the First Cause of their entire being to orient themselves to Him to return to Him and hurry to Him according to the Scripture ldquoTo the place from which the waters flow they shall returnrdquo [Ecclesiastes I7] This is why the creature by its nature loves God indeed more than itself


Like all creatures we humans are ldquoordered to Godrdquo we ldquolove God indeed more than [ourselves]rdquo To be sure as fallen creatures we have forgotten the way home But the desire to find it is alive in the natural human desire for happiness which is ours by grace-1 Thus his position however peculiar is technically not Pela-gian since grace is needed to move us toward God80 Eckhart suggests that this

77 [G]ratia gratum faciens quae et supernaturalis dicitur est in solo intellectivo sed nec in illo ut res est et natura sed est in ipso ut intellectus et ut naturam sapit divinam et ut sic est superior natura Propter quod omne et solum hoc est supernaturale et gratia gratum faciens quod ibi recipitur et agitur

78 This notion of a supernatural capacity of the (passive) intellect could have saved Aquinas from the embarrassment he experienced in trying to explain how a purely natural capacity could literally see God

79 This is one of Eckhartrsquos terms for the ground of the soul Cf Pr 1 DW 155ndash6 Walshe 6680 However one might ask how something that is part of the nature of creatures can be called

ldquogracerdquo which is normally thought of as supernatural Still the Inquisitors did not object to his views on grace Be that all as it may there is no denying that Eckhartrsquos overall view about the availability of grace is far less restrictive than what we saw were Augustinersquos conclusions on the subject


desire can fruitfully combine with our capacity for self-reflection enabling us to see first that everything created that we possess is a pure gift of God and hence a loan not our own and second that both the gospels and philosophy teach that blessedness depends on the fact that at our core there is something divine and uncreated something we can however access or realize only in the process of letting go of our attachment to creatureliness The interplay of ldquoown-effortrdquo and divine help is audible in this text from RdU

One work does indeed truly and genuinely belong to [us] and that is the annihilation of self But this annihilation and shrinking of self is never so great but it lacks something unless God completes it in us81


The work of grace-1 given us in creation plainly needs the help of grace-2 to complete the task of self-emptying

For creatures such as us the ldquoflowing backrdquo or return to God through grace proceeds via the passive intellect not through the active intellect (as Dietrich of Freiberg had taught) nor the will82 This focus on detachment and passiv-ity seems initially strange since we are used to thinking of salvation or the at-tainment of happiness as something we must actively strive for even if we need the prior gift of grace to do so Eckhart agrees with Augustine and Thomas that ldquograce is from God alonerdquo83 (S XXV-1 n259 LW 4373ndash4 McGinn Teacher and Preacher 218) we cannot produce it in ourselves ldquoNo creature can bring about the work of gracerdquo84 (ibid n2682442 McGinn Teacher and Preacher 221) But at the same time in order to be capable (capax) of receiving grace (presumably grace-2) the creature must be ldquoordered to God and detached and freed from all relationship and regard for itself or another creature or any this and thatrdquo85 (ibid n 26624113ndash2421 McGinn Teacher and Preacher 220) It is for this reason that as we will see in more detail in the next chapter Eckhart regards detachment as ldquothe best and highest virtuerdquo It is what makes one a ldquogood

81 [Eacute]in werk blȋbet im billȋchen und eigenlȋchen doch daz ist ein vernihten sȋn selbes Doch ist daz vernihten und verkleinen niemer sȏ grȏz sȋn selbes got envolbringe ouch daz selbe in im selber sȏ gebrichet im

82 By contrast Aquinasmdashfollowing Augustinemdashstressed the effect of grace on the will as op-posed to the intellect and thus on our ability to love selflessly eg writing that in our fallen state humans need grace ldquofor two reasons ie in order to be healed and furthermore in order to carry out works of supernatural virtue which are meritoriousrdquo (STh IaIIae 1092 emphasis added)

83 [G]ratia prima et secunda utraque est a solo deo84 [N]ulla creatura in opus potest gratiae85 [S]olum ut in ordine ad deum circumscripta et exuta ab omni ordine et respectu sui ad se aut ad aliud

creatum sive ad hoc et hoc


[intellective] beingrdquo open to the reception of grace-2 which then completes the work of divinization on its own ie by making the ready soul a participant in the divine ldquoflowing backrdquo or ldquoreturnrdquo86 Only a person who is thus passively aligned with the intellective ground of the soul is able to participate in the ldquoreturnrdquo in what Eckhart memorably calls ldquothe birth of Godrsquos Son in the soulrdquo In another Latin sermon Eckhart deftly brings together both of these aspects of grace-2 the soulrsquos passive reception of it from God and its participation in the return via the ldquoBirthrdquo

The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ [2 Cor1313]Note that this is said either because he [ Jesus Christ] gives the grace

to the extent he is God or because the Son of God alone receives the grace For grace itself makes the one who receives it the Son of God it brings it about that this person is a Christian a brother of Christ from the same parents87

(S II-2 LW 41910ndash12)

As he frequently does Eckhart here takes a scriptural phrase which at first glance expresses a familiar doctrinemdashie grace comes to us through Jesus Christmdashand suggests a grammatically admissible rereading of it that opens up an unobvious (even subversive) new meaning ldquo[the grace] of Christrdquo (read as a subjective genitive) is that which the Son has and bestows [on us] ie ldquoThe Son graces usrdquo but read as an objective genitive it is that by which the recipient (and by implication I-the-listener-as-Son) becomes gives birth to the Son of God in the soul ldquoOnly the Son can receive this gracerdquo88 Thus the giving (by God) and re-ceiving (by the soul) of grace play the decisive role in ldquothe birth of Godrsquos Son in the soulrdquo

Before we turn to this theme let us note that with one or two exceptions the numerous citations of authorities in Sermo XXV are all from the Hebrew and Christian traditions Thus one might be tempted to think that Eckhartrsquos claims about grace and hence about the path to human blessedness are largely

86 It would be an overstatement to say that for Eckhart humility or detachment alone ldquois what makes one a lsquogood [intellective being]rsquo and open to the reception of gracerdquo His view seems rather to be that detachment completes the process that also includes the practice of the virtues etc Cf following chapter 174 ff

87 Gratia domini nostri Iesu Christi Nota quod sic dictum est aut quia gratiam dat in quantum deus aut quia solus ille gratiam accipit qui est filius dei Ipsa enim gratia facit suscipientem filium dei facit esse christianum fratrem Christi ex utroque parente

88 More on Eckhartrsquos various rhetorical strategies with copious references to the secondary litera-ture can be found in chapter 2 of McGinn Mystical Thought and in Michael Sells Mystical Languages of Unsaying (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1994) chs 6ndash7


or even purely theological in nature based on faith But one must not forget his programmatic aspiration ldquoto show how the truths of natural principles con-clusions and properties are well intimated for him lsquowho has ears to hearrsquo (Mt 1343) in the very words of sacred scripture which are interpreted through these natural truthsrdquo89 (In Ioh nn2ndash3 LW 3414ndash17 McGinn Essential Ser-mons 122ndash23) At the very least we should ask whether there is a purely phil-osophical version of grace that Eckhart was inspired by or which at least he might have endorsed

One authority outside the Christian tradition whom Eckhart does cite with approval in Sermo XXVmdashand frequently elsewheremdashis the (anonymous) Neo-platonic author of the Book of Causes Eckhart writes ldquoNo creature has any power over grace because nothing acts upon what is above it (lsquoThe First is always rich in itselfrsquo Liber de causis prop 31)rdquo90 (n268 LW 42442ndash3 Teacher 221) In the (Neo-)Platonic tradition the One (ldquothe Firstrdquo) and the Good are self-diffusive Plotinus for example wrote that

[A]ll existences as long as they retain their character producemdashabout themselves from their essence in virtue of the power which must be in themmdashsome necessary outward-facing hypostasis continuously attached to them and representing in image the engendering arche-types thus fire gives out heat [A]ll that is fully achieved engen-ders therefore the eternally achieved [the One] eternally engenders an eternal being [the Intellect] The Intellect stands as the image of the One

(Enneads V16ndash7)91

From the One the Source of all which is identical with the Good itself there is an effusive radiation outward Its converse attractive power qua Good is im-mensely strong but most creatures are entirely or largely unconscious of it lost in the life of the senses and worldly attachments so much so that a conversion requires more than human efforts ldquoif we couldrdquo instead of looking outward

89 [Q]uomodo veritates principiorum et conclusionum et proprietatum naturalium innuuntur luculentermdashlsquoqui habet aures audiendirsquomdashin ipsis verbis sacrae scripturae quae per illa naturalia exponuntur

90 Nihil enim agit in suum superius quia lsquoprimumrsquo semper lsquoest dives per sersquo91 Καὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἕως μένει ἐκ τῆς αὐτῶν οὐσίας ἀναγκαίαν τὴν περὶ αὐτὰ πρὸς τὸ ἔξω αὐτῶν

ἐκ τῆς παρούσης δυνάμεως δίδωσιν αὐτῶν ἐξηρτημένην ὑπόστασιν εἰκόνα οὖσαν οἷον ἀρχετύπων ὧν ἐξέφυ πῦρ μὲν τὴν παρacute αὐτοῦ θερμότητα Καὶ πάντα δὲ ὅσα ἤδη τέλεια γεννᾷ τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ τέλειον ἀεὶ καὶ ἀίδιον γεννᾷ καὶ ἔλαττον δὲ ἑαυτοῦ γεννᾷ Εἰκόνα δὲ ἐκείνου λέγομεν εἶναι τὸν νοῦν Eckhart did not know this work directly But he certainly was familiar with other Neoplatonist classics as well as with Augustinersquos esteem for ldquothe Platonistsrdquo in general and for Plotinus in particular


ldquoturn aroundmdasheither spontaneously or if we were lucky enough to lsquohave Athena pull us by the hairrsquo [Iliad I194 ff]mdashthen all at once we would see God our-selves and the Allrdquo92 (Enneads VI57) For Plotinus the role of Athena in getting us to change our perspective is played by the Good itself Even recognizing that the highest principle of our soul is the intellect itself a part of the cosmic Intel-ligence is not enough to move us away from the world of the senses

Prior to [awareness of the Good] the soul is not attracted by the Intelli-gence beautiful though the latter may be for the beauty of Intelligence is as it were inert before it receives the light of the Good93

(Ibid VI722)

Though the issue was somewhat ambiguous in Plato for Plotinus it is clear that the Good reaches out to us as it were True we must purify ourselves and be prepared for the inner epiphany of the divine Though all but invisible to worldly eyes the divine is already within us ldquoWhen the soul has the good for-tune to meet him and he comes to hermdashrather once he already present makes his presence knownmdash then suddenly she sees him appear within herrdquo94 (ibid VI734 my emphasis) Plotinus calls this epiphany an ldquooutflowrdquo (ἀπορροὴ ibid VI722) and also refers to it as a ldquogracerdquo (χάριτας ibid) As Pierre Hadot remarks

The grace [Plotinus] speaks of reveals to us the gratuitousness of divine initiative [what I say here] is not an attempt to Christianize Plotinus [But] if philosophical reflection goes to its own extreme and still more if it attempts to express the content of mystical experi-ence it too will be led to this notion of gratuitousness It will moreover become clear upon reflection that all necessity and all duty presuppose the absolute initiative of an original love and freedom95

For our part in this process of return we must ldquotake away everything [worldly]rdquo96 (Enneads V317) so that the intellect in us can turn back to its source However

92 Εἰ δέ τις ἐπιστραφῆναι δύναιτο ἢ παρacute αὐτοῦ ἢ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς αὐτῆς εὐτυχήσας τῆς ἕλξεως θεόν τε καὶ αὑτὸν καὶ τὸ πᾶν ὄψεται

93 Πρὸ τοῦδε οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸν νοῦν κινεῖται καίπερ καλὸν ὄντα ἀργόν τε γὰρ τὸ κάλλος αὐτοῦ πρὶν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φῶς λάβῃ

94 Ὅταν δὲ τούτου εὐτυχήσῃ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ἥκῃ πρὸς αὐτήν μᾶλλον δὲ παρὸν φανῇ ἰδοῦσα δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐξαίφνης φανέντα

95 Pierre Hadot Plotinus or the Simplicity of Vision (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1993) 51

96 Ἄφελε πάντα


for Plotinus too a successful outcome is not attainable through the intellectrsquos efforts alone Fortunately the Source is always beckoning to its lost children and sending them strength for their journey home

There are numerous similarities here to Eckhartrsquos views (and indeed to those of Augustine as he detailed at length in book 7 of Confessions) Plotinusrsquos One or Good is nameless and ineffable as is Eckhartrsquos Godhead seekers must empty themselves to be open to the grace that is freely given they must thereby become ldquolike the Goodrdquo etc Eckhart knew and greatly admired Neoplatonism (though he could have read no more than excerpts of the Enneads themselves perhaps in Macrobiusrsquos Commentary on the Dream of Scipio)97 In this purely philosophical tradition he no doubt found an awareness of the importance for human eudai-monia of an element at least comparable to the specifically Christian notion of grace a gift from the nameless Other indeed the presence of that Other in the soul On this crucial topic as elsewhere Eckhart could find a convergence of theology and philosophy98

As already mentioned the grace-2 that is the divine birth in the soul is only receivable when the intellect has become detached from all ldquothis or thatrdquo all creaturely distinction Thus ldquoall God wants of you is to go out of yourself in the way of creatureliness and let God be God within yourdquo99 (Pr 5b DW 1927ndash9 Walshe 110) Indeed as Eckhart repeatedly insists God cannot but enter into the soul that has emptied itself of its creaturely attachments

I said in the schools of Paris that all things shall be accomplished in the truly humble man [who] has no need to pray to God for anything

97 Cf McGinnrsquos discussion of Eckhartrsquos access to Neoplatonist writings Mystical Thought 170ndash7198 A similar conclusion is reached by Niklaus Largier writing about Eckhartrsquos insistence on tran-

scending the intellect itself if one is to attain true freedom ldquoOne would like to ask whatmdashgiven this starting pointmdashone can make of the concept of grace What is lsquogracersquo in this context other than a concept that refers to this fundamental heteronomy or generally to the alterity of the ground as the ground of the possibility of freedom lsquoGracersquo can then here too be understood entirely philosophi-cally How else but with a concept of lsquogracersquo or of lsquogiftrsquo can a relationship of grounding be conceived that should not be thought of instrumentally nor in terms of purpose and not in concepts of reflex-ivity representation or referentiality that is thus never a relationship or a processrdquo Largier ldquoNega-tivitaumlt Moumlglichkeit Freiheit Zur Differenz zwischen der Philosophie Dietrichs von Freiberg und Eckharts von Hochheimrdquo in Dietrich von Freiberg Neue Perspektiven seiner Philosophie Theologie u Naturwissenschaft eds Karl-Hermann Kandler Burkhard Mojsisch and Franz-Bernhard Stammkoumlt-ter (Amsterdam Philadelphia BR Gruener 1999) 149ndash68 at 167 my translation Kant too in his Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason AK 644 also sees the need for the concept of grace ldquosome supernatural cooperation is also needed to [onersquos] becoming good or betterrdquo Ed and tr Allen Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1998) 65

99 Nȗ begert got niht mȇ von dir wan daz dȗ dȋn selbes ȗzgangest in crȇatiurlȋcher wȋse und lȃzest got got in dir sȋn


he can command God for the height of the Godhead seeks nothing but the depth of humility100

(Pr 14 DW 12354ndash9 Walshe 267)

In the imagery of Pr 1 (on Jesus driving the merchants from the temple) the ldquohumblerdquo soul is the ldquoempty Templerdquo from which the ldquomerchantsrdquo (of the crea-turely teleological framework) and the ldquodovesrdquo (attachment to our own proper-ties our ldquothis and thatrdquo) have been removed101 God wants it empty ldquoso that He may be there all alonerdquo102 (DW 162ndash3 Walshe 66) it is only in the unencum-bered Temple that Jesus the Word can ldquobegin to speakrdquo Eckhart picks up this same theme with a different set of biblical images in Pr 2 where he admonishes the listener to be ldquoa virgin who is a wiferdquo A ldquovirginrdquo he says is ldquoa person who is void of alien images as empty as he was when he did not existrdquo103 (DW 1251ndash2 Walshe 77) We are empty in this virginal way when we indeed have images (for we are still creatures who live in the world) but have them acircne eigenschaft without ownership or attachment (ibid) But however necessary this virginal state is it is not enough ldquoIf a person were to be ever virginal he would bear no fruit If he is to be fruitful he must needs be a wiferdquo For

only the fruitfulness of the gifts is the thanks rendered for that gift and herein is the spirit a wife whose gratitude is fecundity bearing Jesus again in Godrsquos paternal heart104


100 Ich sprach zo paris in der schoelen dat alle dynck sollen volbracht werden an deme rechten oitmo-edegen mynschene der in darff got neit byden hey mach gode gebeden want de hoede der gotheit in suit neyt anders an den de doifde der oitmoedicheit McGinn has remarked that it is strange this very radical-sounding position did not draw fire from church authorities (Mystical Thought 137) This is a good point though as Loris Sturlese has pointed out Eckhartrsquos use of ldquocommandingrdquo even in his earliest works is really a metaphorical reference to a metaphysical necessity The emptied soul is ipso facto open to its own univocal correlation with God in the ground Cf Sturlese ldquoA Portrait of Meister Eckhartrdquo Eckhart Review 5(1996) 7ndash12 at 9ndash10

101 See the detailed analysis of the imagery and themes in this sermon by Alessandra Bec-carisi ldquoZu Predigt 1 Intravit Jesus in templumrdquo in Lectura Eckhardi II Predigten Meister Eckharts von Fachgelehrten gelesen und gedeutet eds Georg Steer and Loris Sturlese (Stuttgart Kohlhammer Verlag 2003) 1ndash27

102 daz ouch niht mȇ dar inne sȋ dan er aleine103 [E]in mensche der von allen vremden bilden ledic ist alsȏ ledic als er was dȏ er niht enwas104 Daz nȗ der mensche iemer mȇ juncvrouwe waeligre sȏ enkaeligme keine vruht von im Sol er vruhtbaeligre

werden sȏ muoz daz von nȏt sȋn daz er ein wȋp sȋ wan vruhtbaeligrkeit der gȃbe daz ist aleine dank-baeligrkeit der gȃbe und dȃ ist der geist ein wȋp in der widerbernden dankbaeligrkeit dȃ er gote widergebirt Jȇsum in daz veterliche herze


The point of emptying the temple or of becoming a virgin is to become a wife a spiritual mother and to let the Word be born and speak in our souls

Eckhart frequently connects to the theme of detachment the idea of coming from knowing to a ldquonot-knowingrdquo (unwizzen) that is to be distin-guished from ignorance (compare Nicholas of Cusarsquos docta ignorantia105) As Eckhart says

[H]ere we must come to a transformed knowledge and this unknow-ing must not come from ignorance but rather from knowing we must get to this unknowing Then we shall become knowing with divine knowing and our unknowing will be ennobled and adorned with su-pernatural knowing106

(Pr 102 DW 4-14205ndash8 Walshe 43)

Eckhart does not elaborate very much about this ldquounknowingrdquo that is ldquoen-nobled and adorned with supernatural knowingrdquo But the theme is impor-tant for this present investigation because in one of his most famous and radical sermons he presents not-knowing as parallel to living without why In Pr 52 on the Beatitude ldquoBlessed are the poor in spiritrdquo Eckhart claims that our happiness depends on our becoming spiritually poor The person who is poor in spirit he claims is one who ldquowants nothing knows nothing and has nothingrdquo107 (DW 24885ndash6 Walshe 420) This has nothing to do with poverty in the ordinary sense even of the voluntary variety (which Eckhart says is ldquomuch to be commendedrdquo) Instead we are again in the now-familiar territory of detachment The results of detachment in the realm of the will ie of ldquowanting nothingrdquo will be our focus in the next chapter As for ldquoknow-ing nothingrdquo Eckhart has this to say

For a man to possess this poverty he must live so that he is unaware that he does not live for himself or for truth or for God He must be so lack-ing in all knowledge that he neither knows nor recognizes nor feels that God lives in him more still he must be free of all the understanding

106 [M]an sol hie komen in ein uumlberformet wizzen Noch diz unwizzen ensol niht komen von unwiz-zenne mȇr von wizzenne sol man komen in ein unwizzen Danne suln wir werden wizzende mit dem goumltlȋchen wizzenne und danne wirt geadelt und gezieret unser unwizzen mit dem uumlbernatiurlȋchen wizzenne

107 [D]az ist ein arm mensche der niht enwil und niht enweiz und niht enhȃt

105 Cf his On Learned Ignorance The term apparently was first used by Augustine ldquoEst ergo in nobis quaedam ut dicam docta ignorantia sed docta spiritu dei qui adiuvat infirmitatem nostramrdquo (Epist ad Probam 1301528)


that lives in him a man should be as free from all his own knowledge as he was when he was not108


The point is apparently that the ldquopoor personrdquo has become empty of all knowl-edge that involves difference or distance from Self and God As Kurt Flasch puts it in his commentary on this sermon

The spiritually poor one renounces knowledge to the extent that knowledge has an other-than-itself for content For to the extent that the person is in Godmdashin His essence ideas His world-creating skillmdashthat person is indistinctly one with Him and with everything109

The phrase ldquoas free from all x [here knowledge] as he was when he was notrdquo ap-pears in a number of places in Eckhartrsquos corpus It has been variously interpreted Josef Quint among others takes ldquoas he was when he was notrdquo to refer to ldquothe [pre-]existence of the person as an idea in Godrdquo110 This rather Augustinian read-ing however has been contested eg by Mojsisch He argues that Eckhart here refers to the special character of the ldquoground and essence of the soulrdquo of which this same Pr 52 goes on to say

[T]here is something in the soul from which both knowledge and love flow but it does not itself know nor does it love in the way the powers of the soul do Whoever knows this knows the seat of blessedness It has neither before nor after nor is it expecting anything to come for it can neither gain nor lose For this reason it is so bereft that it does not know God is working in it rather it just is itself enjoying itself as God does It is in this manner I declare that a man should be so acquitted and free that he neither knows nor realizes that God is at work in him in that way can a man possess poverty111


108 [D]er mensche der diz armuumlete haben sol der sol leben alsȏ daz er niht enweiz daz er niht enlebe in keiner wȋse weder im selben noch der wȃhreit noch gote mȇr er sol alsȏ ledic sȋn alles wizzenes daz er niht enwizze noch enbekenne noch enbevinde daz Got in im lebe mȇr er sol ledic sȋn alles des beken-nennes daz in im lebende ist daz der mensche alsȏ ledic sol stȃn sȋnes eigenen wizzennes als er tete dȏ er niht enwas

109 Flasch ldquoZu Predigt 52rdquo 186 my translation110 Quint in DW 125 fn 1111 [E]inez ist in der sȇle von dem vliuzet bekennen und minnen daz enbekennet selber niht noch enmin-

net niht alsȏ als die krefte der sȇle Der diz bekennet der bekennet war ane saeliglicheit lige Diz enhȃt weder vor noch nȃch und ez enist niht wartende keines zuokomenden dinges wan ez enmac weder gewinnen noch


As we will see in a moment Mojsisch contends that Eckhartrsquos journey of the soul goes several steps beyond the level of the possible intellect and its univocal cor-relation to the SonWordImage initially to the origin of that correlation ie ldquoto the ISelf in its univocal-transcendental function as Source ie as transcenden-tal beingrdquo Thus Eckhartrsquos phrase ldquoas he was when he was notrdquo does not mean ldquo[when he was] an idea in God especially since for the ISelf God is not yet even Godrdquo112 At this level Self and God-as-ldquotranscendental beingrdquo are so united that the subject-object duality essential to our relational notion of knowledge has no place Here one can no longer speak of knowledge in this ordinary sense hence the Self knows nothing113

The ldquoground and essence of the soulrdquo is where Eckhart locates what he calls ldquothe birth of Godrsquos Sonrdquo For the Meister there is no theme more typical or re-nowned114 Not surprisingly the phrase has been variously interpreted In light of the line taken in this chapter it can be understood in this way qua detached intellect the soulrsquos ground and essence is the image of and univocally correlated with the divine intellect as such it is uncreated ie not a creature not ana-logically related to the Creator thus from all eternity it is the birthplace of Godrsquos Son but only qua detached intellect115 At the same time however it functions as the essence and ground of a created soul with its powers and which animates a human being alive in the world When this human being turns with the help of grace-1 away from its attachment to the things of this world including its own body and its (created) soul and is flooded with the divine grace-2 it realizes

113 The same point is made in different terms by Largier for Eckhart ldquopoverty means absolute immediacyrdquo ie nonmediation or nondifferentiation Meister Eckhart 1 1059

114 It is noteworthy that Eckhart replaces the common metaphorical description of salvation as the ldquobeatific visionrdquo with the decidedly female metaphor of giving birth A concise summary of Eck-hartrsquos teaching on the birth of Godrsquos Son is given by McGinn Mystical Thought ch 4 and also ch 6 139ndash42

115 Qua detached there is nothing to distinguish it from any other detached passive intellect Aristotle seems to have thought of the active intellect in such impersonal terms concluding that the active intellect is ldquoimmortal and eternalrdquo as we saw

112 That is God is here conceived as prior to the characteristics we think of as divine eg good-ness truth etc but also prior to the ldquopersonal notionsrdquo of Father Son Holy Spirit More on this below The Mojsisch citation is from Meister Eckhart 62 139 fn 51 There he gives numerous cita-tions to Eckhartrsquos views on transcendental being the ldquopurity of beingrdquo eg ldquoFourthly lsquoIrsquo indicates the bare purity of the divine being bare of any admixture For goodness and wisdom and whatever may be attributed to God are all admixtures to Godrsquos naked being rdquo [Ze dem vierden mȃle meinet ez die blȏzen lȗterkeit goumltlȋches wesens daz blȏz ȃne allez mitewesen ist Wan guumlete und wȋsheit und swaz man von gote sprechen mac daz ist allez mitewesen gotes blȏzen wesens] (Pr 77 DW 33411ndash3 Walshe 264 transl slightly altered)

verliesen Her umbe sȏ ist ez beroubet daz ez niht enweiz got in im ze wuumlrkenne mȇr ez ist selbe daz selbe daz sȋn selbes gebrȗchet nȃch der wȋse gotes Alsȏ sprechen wir daz der mensche sol quȋt und ledic stȃn das er niht enwizze noch enbekenne daz got in im wuumlrke alsȏ mac der mensche armuot besitzen


its true nature and one result is that the created soul is transformed by its ac-ceptance of the eternal Birth in its own ground In this way the Word is literally incarnated ldquomade fleshrdquo in this soul this person The created soul has become one might say transparent to the divine light within116 receiving it and pouring it out in its own activities We will return to this theme of ldquopouring outrdquo below

The description ldquobirth of the Son in the soulrdquo can be misleading for the birth does not take place in the soul as ordinarily conceived eg as the source of life or as its powers of perception intellect or will To attain this birth one must go beyond the powers of the soul and enter its nameless ground (grunt in Middle High German by which Eckhart means sometimes cause or origin or essen-tial cause or sometimes simply essence117) It is only in the uncreated-but-born ground of the soul that the birth takes place Given his teaching on univocal cor-relationmdasheg in the case of prototypeimagemdashit should not surprise that Eck-hart insists that ldquoGodrsquos ground and the soulrsquos ground is one groundrdquo118 (Pr 15 DW 12536 Walshe 273) Taken out of context this kind of statement sounds like a kind of pantheism or the rhapsodic claim of a seer For Eckhart it is nei-ther but rather the teaching of scripture (ldquoI and the Father are onerdquo Jn1410)mdashphilosophically interpretedmdashand it is the consequence of what he regards as well-established truths ie that God is intellect that intellect is prior to and the source of being by nature it thinksspeaks its thoughtword is its image one in nature and coeval with it regardless of the bearer in which the image might be

116 Eckhart himself uses the image of transparency in Pr 102 ldquoIt is a property of this birth that it always comes with fresh light It always brings a great light to the soul for it is the nature of good to diffuse itself In this birth God streams into the soul in such abundance of light so flooding the essence and ground of the soul that it runs over and floods into the powers and the outward man No sinner can receive this light nor is he worthy to being full of sin and wickedness which is called lsquodarknessrsquo That is because the paths by which the light would enter are choked and obstructed with guile and darknessrdquo [Eigenschaft dirre geburt is daz si alwege geschihet mit niuwem liehte Si bringet alwege grȏz lieht in die sȇle wan der guumlete art ist daz si sich muoz ergiezen swȃ si ist In dirre geburt eriuzet sich got in die sȇle mit liehte alsȏ daz daz lieht alsȏ grȏz wirt in dem wesene und in dem grunde der sȇle daz ez sich ȗzwirfet und uumlbervliuzet in die krefte ouch in den ȗzern menschen Des enmac der suumlnder niht enpfȃhen noch enist sȋn niht wirdic wan er ervuumlllet ist mit den suumlnden und mit bȏsheit daz dȃ heizet vinsternisse Daz ist des schult wan die wege dȃ daz lieht ȋn solte gȃn bekuumlmbert und versperret sint mit valscheit und mit vinsternisse] (DW 4ndash14125ndash4135 Walshe 40)

117 There is a vast literature on the grunt copious references are given in McGinn Mystical Thought ch 3 Eckhartrsquos understanding of ldquoessential causerdquo in his Latin works seems to me to fit in a number of ways his use of grunt in the German writings In In Ioh 38 Eckhart lists the four marks of an essential cause or principal it contains its principiate in itself as the effect in the cause it contains in itself its principiate in a higher or more eminent way than the latter is in itself the principal is always pure intellect and principal and principiate are coeval Essential 135 In Sermo II-1 Eckhart gives as an example of such a cause ldquothe power through which the Father begets and the Son is bornrdquo (potentia qua pater generat et filius generatur) (N6 LW 4812ndash13)

118 [G]ottes grund und der sele grund ain grund ist


found etc One could say that for Eckhart the notion of the birth of Godrsquos Son in the soul marks the pinnacle of self-realization and indeed of happiness for ldquothe just onersquos blessedness and Godrsquos blessedness are one blessednessrdquo119 (Pr 39 DW 22572ndash3 Walshe 306) Union with God in the ground of the soul is for us at once task reality and bliss

As major aspects of Eckhartrsquos teaching about the human relationship to God and how we can attain union with the divine the themes of detachment and the Birth are of central relevance to the topics of this book the will virtues and the search for happiness But it would distort Eckhartrsquos metaphysics if we did not recognize that as Mojsisch says

[F]or Eckhart himself the univocity-theorem of the Birth of God with its ethical implications is a beloved and frequent theme but it is also not the center of his thought For wherever multiplicity appears even in transcendental-univocal correlationality there one finds unified being but not absolutely unified being120

The end of the soulrsquos search for happiness lies not in a life of virtuous activity as Aristotle thought not in the Beatific Vision as generally understood by Christian thinkers nor even in the Birth as Eckhart has described it For the ground and essence of the soul is pure intellect and as such it cannot rest until it can dissolve in ldquoabsolutely unified beingrdquo This can happen only in what Eckhart variously called ldquothe Templerdquo ldquothe Castlerdquo (buumlrgelicircn) ldquothe Sparkrdquo (vuumlnkelicircn) ldquoa lightrdquo or as the core of the soul that is ldquofree of all names and naked of all forms entirely empty and free as God is empty and freerdquo121 (Pr 2 DW 1401ndash3 Walshe 80 transl altered) That it is in this ldquoplaceless placerdquo that our blessedness lies Eckhart states frequently including in this lengthy but crystal-clear passage in Pr 48

[I]f a man turns away from self and all created things thenmdashto the extent that you do this you will attain to oneness and blessedness in your soulrsquos spark which time and place never touched This spark is opposed to all creatures it wants nothing but God naked just as He is It is not satisfied with the Father or the Son or the Holy Ghost or all three Persons so far as they preserve their several properties (eigen-schaft) I declare in truth this light would not be satisfied with the unity of the whole fertility of the divine nature In fact I will say still more

121 [V]on allen namen vrȋ und von allen formen blȏz ledic und vrȋ zemȃle als got ledic und vrȋ ist in im selber

119 [D]es gerehten saeliglicheit und gotes saeliglicheit ist eacutein saeliglicheit120 Mojsisch Meister Eckhart 162


which sounds even stranger I declare in all truth by the eternal and everlasting truth that this light is not content with the simple change-less divine being which neither gives nor takes rather it seeks to know whence this being comes122 it wants to get into its simple ground into the silent desert into which no distinction ever peeped of Father Son or Holy Ghost In the inmost part where none is at home there that light finds satisfaction and there it is more one than it is in itself for this ground is a simple stillness motionless in itself and by this immobility all things are moved and all those lives are conceived that live rationally in themselves That we may live rationally in this sense may the eternal truth of which I have spoken help us123

(DW 24191ndash4215 Walshe 310ndash11 transl slightly altered)

A few points to note ldquooneness and blessednessrdquo are found ldquoin your soulrsquos sparkrdquo which is ldquoa simple stillnessrdquo a ldquosilent desert into which no distinction ever peepedrdquo neither the persons of the Trinity nor even ldquothe simple changeless divine beingrdquo ie transcendental being with which the soul can become unified but not thereby ldquosimply onerdquo This nameless ldquosparkrdquo of the soul is absolutely one with the nameless Godhead and this oneness is our blessedness To live from this ground of oneness is to live rationally in a certain sense it is to live from the deepest realization of the nature of reason ie absolute unity

This final step in the soulrsquos self-realization is what Eckhart calls ldquobreaking throughrdquo ie the pure recognition of unitymdashas opposed to unification or be-coming unified or united124mdashin the Godhead that is beyond and is the source

122 This notion of the relentless quest of the intellect for the causa omnium we saw also in Thomas see chapter 4 p 115

123 [S]wenne sich der mensche bekȇret von im selben und von allen geschaffenen dingenmdashals vil als dȗ daz tuost als vil wirst dȗ geeiniget und gesaeligliget in dem vunken in der sȇle der zȋt noch stat nie enberuorte Dirre vunke widersaget allen crȇatȗren und enwil niht dan got blȏz als er in im selben ist Im engenuumlget noch an vater noch an sune noch an heiligem geiste noch an den drin persȏnen als verre als ein ieglȋchiu bestȃt in ir eingenschaft Ich spriche waeligrliche daz diesm liehte niht engenuumleget an der einbaeligrkeit der vruhtbaeligrlȋchen art goumltlȋcher natȗre Ich wil noch mȇ sprechen daz noch wunderlȋcher hillet ich spriche ez bȋ guoter wȃrheit und bȋ der ȇwigen wȃrheit und bȋ iemerwernder wȃrheit daz disem selben liehte niht engenuumleget an dem einvaltigen stillestȃnden goumltlȋchen wesene daz weder gibet noch nimet mȇr er wil wizzen von wannen diz wesen her kome ez wil in den einvaltigen grunt in die stillen wuumleste dȃ nie underscheit ȋngeluogete weder vater noch sun noch heiliger geist in dem innigesten dȃ nieman heime einist dȃ genuumleget ez jenem liehte und dȃ ist ez inniger dan ez in im selben sȋ wan dirre grunt ist ein einvlatic stille diu in ir selben unbewe-gelich ist und von dirre unbeweglicheit werdent beweget alliu dinc und werdent enpfangen alliu leben diu vernuumlnfticlȋche lebende in in selben sint Daz wir alsus vernuumlnfticlȋche leben des helfe uns diu iemerwernde wȃrheit von der ich gesprochen hȃn Ȃmen

124 Eckhart makes this distinction in eg Pr 12 ldquoAs I have said before there is something in the soul that is so near akin to God that it is one and not unitedrdquo [Als ich mȇr gesprochen hȃn daz etwaz in der sȇle ist daz gote alsȏ sippe ist daz ez ein ist und niht vereinet] (DW 11978ndash9 Walshe 296ndash97)


of God However we think of Godmdashas transcendental Being or as Father (Son and Holy Spirit) or as Creatormdashfor Eckhart each such aspect of the complex-ity in the divinity the ldquopurityrdquo of (transcendental) Being the ldquoboilingrdquo in the Trinity and the ldquoboiling overrdquo in Creation has its counterpart in the soul The individual soul and its powers are created as Godrsquos likeness125 but as detached intellect the soul is Godrsquos image univocally correlated with the WordSon In-tellect however is not satisfied with the realization of its relational role in the Sonship nor with its unification with the transcendental and spiritual perfec-tionsmdashnot even with its grasp qua pure intellect of transcendental being itself (the puritas essendi) For as intellect per se as ground of the soul its drive is to find unity and to grasp the source of all where God ldquois neither Father Son nor Holy Ghost and yet is a Something which is neither this nor thatrdquo126 (Pr 2 DW 1441ndash2 Walshe 81) Here Eckhartrsquos Neoplatonically inspired thinking bears its final fruit behind and beyond all determinations distinctions and differences lies their source itself undetermined indistinct undifferentiated127 Summing up Eckhartrsquos teaching on the breakthrough McGinn speaks of a ldquomysticism of the groundrdquo and Mojsisch of a ldquometaphysics of the groundrdquo128 The latter writes

Eckhartrsquos original contribution consists on one hand in his conceiv-ing of the ground of the soul in connection with the birth of the Son in the soul and hence what is highest in the soul in its identity with the Son of God as univocally related to transcendental being on the other hand in his having the ground of the soul transcend even this transcen-dental relationality in order to locate it there where it is the indistinct unity as divine essence the I129

(153ndash54)

129 Mojsisch Meister Eckhart 153ndash54

125 As Augustine claimed in De Trinitate126 [D]ȃ enist er vater noch sun noch heiliger geist in disem sinne und ist doch ein waz daz enist noch

diz noch daz127 He himself in Pr 28 credits as his authority ldquoPlato that great cleric [] who speaks of

something pure that is not in the world It remains ever the One that continually wells up in itself Ego the word lsquoIrsquo is proper to none but God in His oneness Vos this word means lsquoyoursquo that you are one in unity so that ego and vos I and you stand for unityrdquo [P l ȃ t o der grȏze pfaffe sprichet von einer lȗterkeit diu enist in der werlt niht Ez blȋbet allez daz eine daz in im selben quellende ist lsquoEgorsquo daz wort lsquoichrsquo enist nieman eigen dan gote aleine in sȋner einicheit lsquoVosrsquo daz wort daz spriceht als vil als lsquoirrsquo daz ir sȋt in der einicheit daz ist daz wort lsquoegorsquo und lsquovos lsquoichrsquo und lsquoirrsquo daz meinet die einicheit] (DW 2671ndash692 Walshe 131ndash32)

128 Cf McGinn Mystical Thought ch 3 and Mojsisch Meister Eckhart ch 653


We must now ask how Eckhart puts the metaphysical framework outlined in this chapter to work in his thinking about how we ought to live in the world For it can certainly seem as though his path is a purely mental one as though our bliss consists in a series of inner realizations (or perhaps revelations) to which human action and the virtues are apparently irrelevant But this is not Eckhartrsquos view Detachment and interiority are clearly meant to play a central role in the happy life but Eckhart is far from suggesting that to attain happiness we need to become hermits or enter a religious order These paths are fine for some but they are not necessary and they have their own spiritual dangers To appreciate this we must understand what Eckhart means when he says we should ldquolive without whyrdquo and must see how exactly he supposes that his ldquometaphysics of the groundrdquo implies this curious injunction Although much of his inspiration ismdashas I have suggestedmdashNeoplatonic in origin his position is not open to the typical criti-cism that by encouraging an attitude of detachment understood as attending to onersquos own bliss this path leads us to an unchristian ignoring of the world and the needs of other creatures We turn now to these and other questions about Eckhartrsquos ethics

168

6

Meister Eckhart Living without Will

I claimed above that Eckhartrsquos ethicmdashas with Aristotle Augustine and Thomasmdashcan be called ldquobroadly teleologicalrdquo that is it aims to discover de-scribe and advocate a process of human development toward a perfected moral life As we have seen detachmentmdashldquonot-doingrdquomdash plays a crucial role for Eckhart in that process and its endpoint lies in a recognition and acceptance through grace of the indistinct union of the ground of the soul and the Godhead Eck-hart could also be called a (somewhat peculiar) eudaimonist but he has no use for the sort of teleological eudaimonism we found in Thomas where every vol-untary action is seen as (at least implicitly) seeking the highest good the end whose attainment constitutes our perfection and where the virtues are means to this end That perfection is already in our nature on Eckhartrsquos view and it needs only to be acknowledged released from encumbrance and embraced The virtues play two roles for Eckhart while they are essential to a well-ordered soul and thus are a precondition for the kind of detachment that opens our minds to the divine within an expandedmdashone might say supernaturalmdashlife of the virtues is a consequence of the birth of Godrsquos Son in the soul Nonetheless like his predecessors Eckhart sees the created world in a teleological framework all creatures by their very nature seek God in one way or another Still he resists even scornfully teleology in the further two ethical senses we identified as set-ting the means-end framework of human action andmdashespeciallymdashin the idea of virtuous action as itself a means The question arose earlier what accounts for this ambivalent attitude to the teleological To begin an answer let us return to those three texts quoted early in the last chapter We should now be in a posi-tion to see why Eckhart can seem both at times to be endorsing the teleological frameworkmdashor even recommending it as an approach to the search for happi-nessmdashwhile at other times decisively rejecting it

The first text was his interpretation of John 143 Sequere me (ldquoFollow merdquo)

First of all one must know that through the creation God says and pro-claims advises and orders all creaturesmdashprecisely by creating themmdashto

Me i s te r E ckhar t L iv ing w i th out Wi l l 169

follow Him the First Cause of their entire being to orient themselves to Him to return to Him and hurry to Him according to the Scripture ldquoTo the place from which the waters flow they shall returnrdquo [Ecclesiates I 7] This is why the creature by its nature loves God indeed more than itself

(In Ioh n226 LW 31898ndash12 the Latin in given in chapter 5 p 132)

The teleological-eudaimonist framework is here applied to creatures ie to beings that stand in an analogical relationship to the Creator As we saw Eckhart regards such beings as a pure nothing in themselves Everything they have even their being itself is the gift gratia gratis data (grace-1) of their Source Hence they are ldquoordered to God in being truth and goodnessrdquo Nonrational beings are of course ignorant of their utter dependence on the Creator and we fallen humans have largely forgotten it instead viewing ourselves as autonomous beings in our own right This view Eckhart notes amounts to ldquoa lierdquo ( mendaciummdashS XXV-2 n264 LW 424012)1 The theory of analogy sets the record straight As Moj-sisch remarks

[T]he dynamic revealing itself in the relation between esse [being] as the prime analogate [God] and esse as secundum analogatum [the creature] is the constant reception of what is external implying at the same time an uninterrupted thirst or hunger an uninterrupted striving Things consume being since they are yet they hunger for being since they are from another2

Thus Eckhart can say as we just saw ldquothrough the creation God says and pro-claims advises and orders all creaturesmdashprecisely by creating themmdashto follow Him the First Cause of their entire being to orient themselves to Him to return to Him and hurry to Himrdquo In other words creation is teleologically ordered to the Creator As creatures we are called back to God But as kin we in a certain sense never left home

In the second text quoted in chapter 5 p 133mdashpart of his commentary on the Book of Wisdommdashwe noted that Eckhart seems expressly to endorse a ldquomerit-rewardrdquo schema of living that seems very like what we saw in chapter 4 in the Summa Theologiae of Aquinas

1 Note that if a lie is an intentional falsehood meant to deceive then Eckhart here seems to be claiming that at some level we know we are not the autonomous embodied creatures we claim our-selves to be

2 Mojsisch Meister Eckhart 64


ldquoThey will live foreverrdquo Here the reward [of the just] is pointed out ldquoAnd their reward is with the Lordrdquo Nothing but God is the reward of the just(In Sap nn69ndash70 LW 2 3971ndash3991 for the Latin see ch 5 p 133)

But the full context of these remarks shows that Eckhart is not speaking ana-logically at all For instance ldquothey [the just] will live foreverrdquo refers not to the promised future reward in heaven but instead to ldquothe life that God brings about not in the body but in the soul itself and furthermore not in time but in eter-nity That is the sense of these words rdquo3 (ibid n 69 LW 23975ndash7) Eckhart plainly means the Sonrsquos Birth in the soul the basis of which is the univocal cor-relation of the soulrsquos ground and essence to Godrsquos ground and essence Similarly Eckhartrsquos reading of ldquoTheir reward is with the Lordrdquo stresses the equality of the just one ldquowithrdquo Uncreated Justice saying that ldquothe reward of the just consists in the fact that they are Sons of God For the Sonmdashand He alonemdashis with the Lordrdquo By contrast creatures qua creatures are under God are ldquoservants and hire-lingsrdquo their reward ldquois not with the Lord for such people set themselves goals that are outside of God and under God not God himself and not lsquowith Godrsquordquo4 (ibid n70 3986ndash7)

Finally here is the third of the quotes with which we began



This is plainly said of creatures (ldquothings that are in timerdquo) including human crea-tures Again the context of the remark clarifies Eckhartrsquos meaning In Pr 26 he is explicitly contrasting a creaturely mode of thought and behavior with that of ldquoa good personrdquo ie one who realizes her univocal relationship with the Father Of the former he says ldquoIf you seek God and seek Him for your own profit and bliss then in truth you are not seeking Godrdquo6 (ibid6ndash7) Note ldquoyour ownrdquo

3 [V]ita quam operatur deus non anima operatur etiam non in corpore sed in ipsa anima non in tempore sed in perpetuitate Et hoc est quod hic dicitur

4 [M]erces justorum est quod sint filii dei quia ut dictum est filius et his solus est apud dominum Nemo ergo heres nisi filius lsquoapud deumrsquo Secus de servo de mercennario cujus merces non est apud dominum quia talis sibimet ponit finem aliquid citra deum et sub deo non ipsum deum nec lsquoapud deumrsquo


6 Suochest dȗ got und suochest dȗ got umbe dȋnen eigenen nutz oder umbe dȋne eigene saeliglicheit in der wȃrheit sȏ ensuochest dȗ got niht


This signals the self-consciousness of a creature a being that regards itself as distinct from its Creator on whom it is analogically dependent7 By contrast Eckhart says

Ask a good man ldquoWhy do you seek GodrdquomdashldquoBecause He is GodrdquomdashldquoWhy do you seek truthrdquomdashldquoBecause it is truthrdquomdashldquoWhy do you seek justicerdquomdashldquoBecause it is justicerdquo With such persons all is right8

(Ibid268ndash273 my translation)

Eckhartrsquos complaint is not so much that the people who ldquoseek Godrdquo for their ldquoown profit and blissrdquo are behaving selfishly as that they completely mistake what they themselves are what their proper relationship is to God and whatmdashor howmdashit is proper to want They take themselves to be ldquoservants and hire-lingsrdquo (servi et mercennarii) who are ldquobeneath Godrdquo (sub deo) when in fact they are by nature ldquoSonsrdquo who are ldquowith Godrdquo (apud deum) (In Sap n70 LW 23986ndash11)

In addition these ldquoservants and hirelingsrdquo are also ldquomerchantsrdquo (koufliute) for they seek God for their own profit and bliss convinced that only God can bestow these goods on them and can only do so from without Hence they do ldquogood works to the glory of God but they do them in order that our Lord may give them something in return or that God may do something they wish formdashall these are merchantsrdquo9 (Pr 1 DW 172ndash5 Walshe 66ndash67) We are now in a better position to understand what lies behind this kind of criticism by Eckhart In one sense ldquomercantilerdquo behavior may look like the familiar teleological means-end schema we use in our everyday activity we think we need some object y so we do (or ldquospendrdquo) x in order to get (or ldquobuyrdquo) y fair and equal exchange As Eckhart himself says ldquoAll things that are in time have a lsquoWhyrsquordquo To be sure there is nothing at all per se foolish about working to earn a living traveling to broaden onersquos horizons or taking a daily walk for the health of onersquos heart So why does Eckhart say the merchants ldquoare very foolish folkrdquo (tȏrehte liute Pr 1 DW 185ndash6 Walshe 67) Initially it seems to be because they take the means-end schema which is unavoidable for creaturely maintenance and creature-creature

7 Much has been written recently about Eckhartrsquos notion of eigenschaft literally own-ness or prop-erty (in both the ordinary legal and the related but more general philosophical senses) Cf Ales-sandra Beccarisi ldquoZu Predigt 1rdquo and Largier Meister Eckhart 1 754ndash57

8 Ein guot mensche der ze dem spraeligche lsquowar umbe suochest dȗ gotrsquomdash lsquodar umbe daz er got istrsquo lsquowar umbe suochest dȗ die wȃrheitrsquomdash lsquodar umbe daz ez diu wȃrheit istrsquo lsquowar umbe suochest dȗ die gerehti-cheitrsquomdash lsquodar umbe daz ez diu gerehticheit istrsquo den liuten ist gar reht

9 [T]uont ir guoten werk gote ze ȇren und tuont sie doch dar umbe daz in unser herre etwaz dar umbe gebe oder daz in got iht dar umbe tuo daz in liep sȋ diz sint allez koufliute


interactions and attempt to transfer it to a realm where it is completely out of place ie to our dealings with God When Eckhart faults the ldquomerchantsrdquo for being ldquomistaken in the bargainrdquomdashthey in fact have nothing of their own to give to God ldquofor what they are they are from God and what they have they get from God and not from themselvesrdquo10mdashhe is pointing to their twofold mistake first they imagine their salvation can only take place within the confines of their ana-logical relationship to God and second even if they were right about this they mistakenly think that they actually own something with which they can barter with God But creatures qua creatures are truly naked empty-handed before God By contrast qua intellective beings their task is to detach from creatureli-ness and accept the gift of Sonship which is a consequence of their true blessed-ness ie union in the Godhead

But Eckhart ldquosays furtherrdquo since he regards our entire lives as in one way or another involved with God

I say further as long as a man in all his doings desires anything at all that God can or will give still he ranks with these merchants If you would be free of any taint of trading so that God may let you enter this temple [the ground of the soul] then you must do all that you can in all your works solely to Godrsquos glory and be as free of it as Nothing is free which is neither here nor there You should ask nothing whatever in return Whenever you act thus your works are spiritual and godly and the merchants are driven right out of the temple and God is in there alone for one is thinking only of God11

(Ibid97ndash103 Walshe 67 emphases added)

This is a truly radical claim a complete rejection not of teleology but of te-leological eudaimonism It casts a revealing light on what Eckhartrsquos notion of detachment means not indeed an ascetic rejection of life but an attitude of ultimate acceptance come what may Here is a homely example Suppose I get into my car one morning to go to work I turn the key in the ignition and noth-ing happens If I am made angry anxious or frustrated by this result it shows that there was something I ldquodesiredrdquo here in the sense criticized by Eckhart

10 An disem koufe sint sie betrogen wan daz sie sint daz sint sie von gote und daz sie hȃnt daz hȃnt sie von gote und niht von in selber (DW 177ndash81)

11 Ich spriche noch mȇ alle die wȋle der mensche ihtes iht suochet in allen sȋnen werken von allem dem daz got gegeben mac oder geben wil sȏ ist er disen koufliuten glȋch Wiltȗ koufmanschaft zemȃle ledic sȋn alsȏ daz dich got in disem tempel lȃze sȏ soltȗ allez daz dȗ vermaht in allen dȋnen werken daz soltȗ lȗterlich tuon gote ze einem lobe und solt des alsȏ ledic stȃn als daz niht ledic ist daz noch hie noch dȃ enist Dȗ ensolt nihtes niht dar umbe begern Swenne dȗ alsȏ wuumlrkest sȏ sint dȋniu werk geistlich und goumltlich und denne sint die koufliute ȗz dem tempel getriben alzemȃle und got ist aleine dar inne wan der mensche niht wan got meinet


as ldquomercantilerdquo my failure to achieve my goal is not something I am going to accept easily and this shows I am a merchant But does an Eckhartian agent then not desire to go to work I suggest that such an agent can and does want things but does so without attachment (ȃne eigenschaft) If the ignition switch does not work an Eckhartian accepts that with equanimity (though of course she will take steps to address the problem since her work is also an obligation or interest) To react with agitation or anger is to cling to the result we wanted in a sense to make an idol of it12 Perhaps a distinction from Buddhism can help to clarify the intended distinction The Noble Truths identify attachment-desire-craving-clinging as the sources of suffering while the Eightfold Path describes the means we must take to overcome them The latter however includes Right Action and Right Livelihood as essential steps which of course involve eg wanting to get to work wanting butmdashherersquos the catchmdashwithout clinging or attachment13 There is no apparent linguistic marker for this distinction of kinds of wanting in either English or as far as I can see in Eckhartrsquos Middle High Germanmdashone can want something with or without attachmentmdashbut the fact that the notion of wanting without attachment is central to a major religious and philosophical tradition such as Buddhism may help us to see its coherence and one mark of this kind of conative attitude is the tranquil way one reacts to its frustration by events

I believe this notion is the key to an understanding of Eckhartrsquos motto ldquolive without whyrdquo In Aquinasrsquos teleological eudaimonism every human action is de facto aimed at the attainment of happiness which in actuality consists in the Beatific Vision So everybody from Mother Teresa to a Mafioso is in fact seek-ing the Beatific Vision in everything they do The true path to that happiness involves divine grace and virtuous behavior In Eckhartrsquos view this is a substan-tive and profoundly mistaken thesis MacDonald has argued that what Aquinas actually gives us is an analysis of rational action14 But this is persuasive only if we identify rational action with teleologically eudaimonistic action Whether one chooses to do so or not will largely depend on onersquos metaphysical commitments eg in the medieval Christian world we have been discussing whether or not

12 In Pr 76 Eckhart connects the achievement of such equanimity with the Birth of the Son in the soul ldquoAnd so when you have reached the point where nothing is grievous or hard to you and where pain is not pain to you when everything is perfect joy to you then your child has really been bornrdquo [Dar umbe sȏ dȗ dar zuo kumest daz dȗ noch leit noch swȃrheit hȃn enmaht umbe iht und daz dir leit niht leit enist und daz dir alliu dinc ein lȗter vroumlude sint sȏ ist daz kint in der wȃrheit geborn] (DW 33287ndash3292 Walshe 76)

13 Thich Nhat Hanh the Vietnamese Buddhist monk once advised an audience to regard a red traffic light not as an annoyance but as a welcome opportunity for a momentrsquos meditation For those who learned to drive in places such as New York City the size of the challenge will be immediately evident

14 MacDonald ldquoUltimate Endsrdquo 46ndash59 Cf also Irwin Development of Ethics ch 17


one thinks humans are related to God in a purely analogical manner Eckhart clearly rejected this view Through the passive intellect and the gift of grace humans can become what the Son is by nature and the attainment of this status depends not on action but on detachment ie not on aiming each of our deeds at ultimate bliss but on accepting that this bliss already dwells within us though its realization in our lives requires that we surrender our creaturely attachments (eigenschaften)

Yet even given all of this Eckhart can be seen as a kind of eudaimonist to realize our oneness with God which is the most pressing task in our lives is to realize our happiness Does this leave a role in his version of eudaimonism for human action and the virtues Yes thus far we have only an incomplete picture of the Eckhartian ethic which I now seek to emend We begin with the virtues recalling that for Aristotle a life of the virtues constitutes happiness Augustine sees the genuine (ie Christian) virtues as so many forms of the love of God as opposed to love of self and hence as necessary conditions for salvation though we have no way of fulfilling these conditions without divine grace For Aquinas by contrast to Aristotle a life of the ldquonaturalrdquo virtues makes for only a limited sort of happiness while the supernatural (ldquoinfusedrdquo) virtues play an instrumen-tal role in the attainment of salvation or true blessedness St Thomas (and the Christian tradition quite generally) distinguished between these two different kinds of virtue a distinction not altogether absent in Eckhart though he seldom mentions much less discusses it One mention of it occurs in the Latin Sermo XXV-1

A virtue or habit is born in us from actions that are still strange and therefore come about with difficulty It is different with an infused habit15

(n260 LW 4237 12ndash2381 Teacher 219)

How is it ldquodifferentrdquo Eckhart does not say but he presumably means that an infused habit is not ldquoborn in us from actionsrdquo nor perhaps is it associated with ldquodifficultyrdquo We should note the context of this remark ie in the Latin sermon on grace which we looked at carefully earlier in which Eckhart distinguished grace-1 which is bestowed on all creatures in their creation from grace-2 the gratia gratum faciens which is reserved for beings that are intellective and good I want to suggest that for Eckhart the two kinds of virtue correspond to the two kinds of grace I proposed earlier (chapter 5 p 153) that his (peculiar) notion of grace-1 protects Eckhart from the taint of Pelagianism by sheer dint of being

15 Virtus enim sive habitus in nobis ex actibus adhuc dissimilibus nascitur ideo cum labore Secus de habitu infuso


created by God creatures are at the same time called by grace back to Him each according to its kind Virtue at this level is the set of practices that tend to perfect the creature in question For plants and nonhuman animals healthy growth is an expression of a thingrsquos ordinary development in accord with its nature But for us fallen human beings such (naturally perfective) practices are ldquoborn from actions that are still strangerdquo or are the product of learning ldquowith difficultyrdquo So for instance it is of such habitsmdashcall them ldquovirtue-1rdquomdashthat I take Eckhart to be speaking in Pr 104

All outward works were established and ordained to direct the outer person to God and to train him to spiritual living and good deeds that he might not stray into ineptitudes to act as a curb to his inclination to escape from self to things outside all works and virtuous prac-ticesmdashpraying reading singing vigils fasting penance or whatever virtuous practice it may bemdashthese were invented to catch a person and restrain him from things alien and ungodly Thus when a person real-izes that Godrsquos spirit is not working in him and that the inner person is forsaken by God it is very important for the outer person to practice these virtues16

(DW 4-16031ndash6044 Walshe 52)

Without such outward discipline we cannot overcome our human ldquoinclination to escape from self to things outsiderdquo17 That is we cannot detach from outer things from our eigenschaft and hence cannot open ourselves to grace-2 Here then is a task of grace-1 in human beings just as it leads lesser creatures by natu-ral instinct toward their perfection it leads a person via ldquooutward worksrdquo (the works of virtue-1 acquired with ldquodifficultyrdquo) to a kind of earthly perfection a readiness for the divine call ldquoso that God may find him near at hand when He chooses to return and act in his soulrdquo18 (ibid60412ndash13)

It would however be a mistake to think that Eckhart has thus adopted some-thing like the position of Aquinas on the role of the virtues in our quest for eu-daimonia Thomas wrote ldquo[T]he theological virtues direct man to supernatural

16 Alliu ȗzwendigiu werk sint dar umbe gesetzet und geordent daz der ȗzer mensche dȃ mite werde in got gerihtet und geordent und ze geistlȋchem lebene und ze guoten dingen daz er im selber niht entgȇ ze keiner unglȋcheit daz er hie mite gezemet werde daz er im selber iht entloufe in vremdiu dinc [dar umbe ist] allez wuumlrken vunden umbe uumlebunge der tugende beten lesen singen vasten wachen und swaz tugentlȋcher uumlebunge ist daz der mensche dȃ mite werde gevangen und enthalten von vremden und un-goumltlichen dingen Dar umbe wan der mensche gewar wirt daz der geist gotes in im niht enwuumlrket und daz der inner mensche von gote gelȃzen ist sȏ ist ez gar nȏt daz sich der ȗzer mensche in allen tugenden uumlebe

17 A ldquothunder-claprdquo revelation like that of St Paul is an obvious exception to the rule18 [D]az in got nȃhe vinde swenne er wider komen wil und sȋn werk wuumlrken in der sȇle


happiness in the same way as by the natural inclination man is directed to his con-natural endrdquo19 (STh IaIIae623c emphasis added) That is just as all desire hap-piness and by the use of natural reason can discern that this lies in a life of the virtues so the infused theological virtues (faith hope and charity) ldquodirect man to supernatural happinessrdquo ie to the performance of deeds meritorious of salvation (ibid1095ad 1) But neither part of this is Eckhartrsquos view His grace-1 makes it possible for us to acquire the virtues-1 but he has almost nothing to say about ldquonatural happinessrdquo Nor as we shall see is it the role of the virtues-2 to ldquodirect man to supernatural happinessrdquo for Eckhart Instead virtues-1 are for him a necessary component of being a ldquogood personrdquo and this in turn is ordinarily a necessary con-dition for receiving or accepting grace-2 Necessary but not sufficient Take for in-stance the spiritual merchants of whom Eckhart complains in Pr 1 He is speaking he tells us ldquoof none but good peoplerdquo (niht dan von guoten liuten) For to repeat

See those all are merchants who while avoiding mortal sin and wish-ing to be good do good works to the glory of God such as fasts vigils prayers and the rest all kinds of good works but they do them in order that our Lord may give them something in return or that God may do something they wish formdashall these are merchants20


By the same token those who have become virtuous in this realm of ldquoouter worksrdquo must also beware of another spiritual trap ie becoming wedded to the outer practices Virtue-1 is no replacement for detachment Reliance on it alone would be akin to the Pelagianism that Augustine found so objectionable

A similar distinction between kinds or levels of virtue seems to be at work in a passage in the Book of Divine Consolation Here Eckhart contrasts ldquonatu-ral human virtuerdquo (which is ldquoso excellent and so strong that there is no exter-nal work too difficult for itrdquo) with virtuersquos ldquointerior workrdquo (which is ldquodivine and of God and tastes of divinity [and] receives and creates its whole being out of nowhere else than from and in the heart of God It receives the Son and is born Son in the bosom of the heavenly Fatherrdquo21) (DW 5383ndash4 4015ndash16 and 412ndash3 Walshe 539ndash41)


20 Sehet diz sint allez koufliute die sich huumletent vor groben suumlnden und waeligren guote liute und tuont ir guoten werk gote ze ȇren und tuont sie doch dar umbe daz in unser herre etwaz dar umbe gebe oder daz in got iht dar umbe tuo daz in liep sȋ diz sint allez koufliute

21 [N]atiurlȋchiu menschlichȋu tugent [ist] so edel und sȏ kreftic daz ir kein ȗzerlȋches werk ze swaeligre ist ouch ist daz inner werk dar ane goumltlich und gotvar und smacket goumltliche eigenschaft [ez] nimet und schepfet allez sȋn wesen niergen dan von und in gotes herzen ez nimet den sun und wirt sun geborn in des himelschen vaters schȏze


With this ldquointerior workrdquo we have clearly left behind the creaturely realm of grace-1 and virtue-1 and are now in the realm of grace-2 How if my dis-tinction is accurate does Eckhart think of virtue-2

To understand Eckhartrsquos view on the ldquoinner workrdquo of virtue we need to consider his unusual doctrine of the ldquotranscendentalsrdquo (being goodness unity and truth) and the related ldquospiritual perfectionsrdquo chiefly wisdom and justice22 For in his scattered discussions of virtue Eckhart assigns pride of place to detachment (abegescheidenheit) as well as to justice (gerehticheit)23 and he identifies both the spiritual perfections and the transcendentals with God24 For him it is no mere metaphor to say as in the Book of Divine Conso-lation ldquoGod and justice are onerdquo no more than to say that God and being or God and truth are one Eckhart conceives of all these perfections as them-selves in a way constituting a single abstract or spiritual entity (ldquoabstractrdquo in the sense of having no spatial or temporal determinations) They are liter-ally absolute ie unlimited Being for example is per se undetermined but in a concrete individual being eg Martha Washington being is ldquocapturedrdquo or formed for example she is (or was) a woman born in Virginia in 1731 was the wife of the first president of the United States cooked for the sol-diers during the Revolutionary War etc As we saw Eckhart regards beingmdashas well as unity truth and goodnessmdashas only a ldquoloanrdquo to the creature not truly the creaturersquos own ldquoBeingrdquo as he says ldquois Godrdquo25 (ProlGen n11 LW 1-22912 Parisian 85ndash86) But since the transcendentalmdashas well as the spiritualmdashperfections are convertible with one another the same features

22 Cf the discussion of the transcendentals in Eckhartrsquos thinking in Aertsen ldquoMetaphysikrdquo and the English summary in Aertsenrsquos entry ldquoMeister Eckhartrdquo in Gracia and Noone Companion to Phi-losophy 434ndash42

23 In his treatise On Detachment he calls detachment ldquothe best and highest virtue whereby a man may chiefly and most firmly join himself to God and whereby a man may become by grace what God is by naturerdquo [welhiu diu hœhste und diu beste tugent dȃ mite der mensche sich ze gote aller-meist und aller naelighest gevuumlegen muumlge und mit der der mensche von gnȃden werden muumlge daz got ist von natȗre] (DW 54003ndash4012 Walshe 566) On the other hand many of Eckhartrsquos writings Latin and German include discussions of justice and he says in Pr 39 ldquothe just one accepts and practices all virtues in justice for they are justice itself rdquo [der gerehte nimet und wuumlrket alle tugende in der gerehticheit als sie diu gerehticheit selbe sint] (DW 22605ndash6 Walshe 306 emphasis added translation slightly altered) The clash between these statements may be only apparent since Eckhart also holds that all the virtues are in the end one

24 In general justice seems to stand for all the moral virtues for Eckhart and wisdom for the intel-lectual virtues As noted in the preceding footnote he says in Pr 39 ldquoall virtues are justice itselfrdquo

25 Esse est deus


apply to all of them26 ldquoGod alone is properly being one true and goodrdquo27 (Prologue to the Book of Propositions n4 LW 1-2431ndash2 Parisian 94)28

In each case the abstract perfectionmdashbeing or justice etcmdash exists prior to its concrete instances and is (formally) generative of them is their ldquofatherrdquo as Eck-hart likes to say One of his most important statements on this theme especially as it applies to the topics of this study is found in section I of the German Book of Divine Consolation which lays out the connections in Eckhartrsquos understanding among (i) the transcendental and spiritual perfections (ii) the Birth of Godrsquos Son in the soul and (iii) the will It begins

In the first place we should know that the wise one and wisdom the true one and truth the good one and goodness are in correspondence and are related to each other as follows goodness is not created nor made nor begotten it is procreative and begets the good the good one in as far as it is good is unmade and uncreated and yet the begotten child and son of goodness29

(DW 595ndash9 Walshe 524ndash25 transl corrected30)

Here we find Eckhart applying what Flasch calls his ldquometaphysics of the son-shiprdquo31 (or of generation) and the by-now familiar concept of univocal correla-tion the good one and goodness itself are one in goodness ldquoThe good one and

26 Cf Largier Meister Eckhart 2 75527 [S]olus deus propter est ens unum verum et bonum28 At the same time Eckhart claimed in Parisian that ldquoGod is intellectrdquo and that intellect is above

being The idea seems to be that being is one of Godrsquos ldquoproper attributesrdquo but does not constitute the divine essence Cf McGinn Mystical Thought 97ndash99 for a discussion of this issue with copious further references

29 Von dem ȇrsten sol man wizzen daz der wȋse und wȋsheit wȃre und wȃrheit gerehte und gerehticheit guote und guumlete sich einander anesehent und alsȏ ze einander haltent diu guumlete enist noch geschaffen noch gemachet noch geborn mȇr si ist gebernde und gebirt den guoten und der guote als verre sȏ er guot ist ist ungemachet und ungeschaffen und doch geborn kint und sun der guumlete In Eckhartrsquos view the spiritual per-fections eg justice or wisdom pertain to the intellect and thus are uncreatable since whoever could create them must first have them Cf Qu Par LW 5 n44110ndash11 Cf also Flasch Meister Eckhart 116 and 272 ff where Flasch adds ldquoWisdom is one and cannot according to its essence be thought of as created This is the simple foundational thought of Eckhartrsquos philosophyrdquo (at 273)

30 Compare In Sap n42 ldquo[T]he just one as such receives its whole being from justice itself so that justice is in truth the parent and father of the just one and the just one as such is the offspring and son of justicerdquo [[J]ustus ut sic totum suum esse accipit ab ipsa iustitia ita ut justitia vere sit parens et pater iusti et justus ut sic vere sit proles genita et filius justitiae] (LW 23645ndash7 Walshe 473 transl cor-rected as above to reflect the distinction Eckhart himself makes between the ldquojust onerdquo and the ldquojust manrdquo at DW 5127ndash9 Walshe 3 64) Cf chapter 5 pp 138ndash39

31 Meister Eckhart 266ndash70


goodness are nothing but one goodness all in one apart from the bearing and being born All that belongs to the good one it gets from goodness and in goodnessrdquo32 (ibid912ndash16 Walshe 525) In other words the goodness that the Father is and has the Son has as well by his very nature which is nothing but the Fatherrsquos nature itself More broadly

All that I have said of the good one and goodness applies to every God-begotten thing that has no father on earth and into which too nothing is born that is created and not God in which there is no image but God alone naked and pure33

(Ibid1011ndash16 Walshe ibid translation slightly altered)

Created human beings can by grace share in that same nature because the ldquoground and being of the soulrdquo has that nature since it was not created but be-gotten as the image of God In one of his German sermons Eckhart put this (cer-tainly controversial) teaching in this way ldquoThere is a power in the soul of which I have spoken before If the whole soul were like it she would be uncreated and uncreateable It is one in unity [with God] not like in likenessrdquo34 (Pr 13 DW 12204ndash5 and 2221ndash2 Walshe 161)

But the ldquowhole soulrdquo and especially the will is not ldquolikerdquo its ground in a number of crucial respects it is created it has a ldquofather on earthrdquo and its powers of intellect and will are what Augustine called ldquodisorderedrdquo ie they are de facto not oriented to God alone Since the will is central to this study we want to focus on what Eckhart writes of it in this same passage in the BgT

St John says in his gospel ldquoTo all of them [who received the Word who believed in His name] is given the power to become Sons of God who are born not of blood nor of the will of the flesh nor of the will of man but of God and from God alonerdquo ( Jn112f) By the blood [St John] means everything in man not subordinate to the human will By the will of the flesh he means whatever in a man is subject to his will but with resistance and reluctance which inclines to the carnal appe-tites and is common to the body and the soul not peculiar to the soul

33 Allez daz ich nȗ hȃn gesprochen von dem guoten und von der guumlete daz ist ouch glȋche war von allem dem daz von gote geborn ist und daz niht enhȃt vater ȗf ertrȋche in daz sich niht gebirt allez daz geschaffen ist allez daz niht got enist in dem kein bilde enist dan got blȏz lȗter aleine

34 Ein kraft ist in der sȇle von der ich mȇr gesprochen hȃnmdashund waeligre diu sȇle alliu alsȏ sȏ waeligre si ungeschaffen und ungeschepflich si ist ein in der einicheit niht glȋch mit der glȋcheit The teaching was included as number 27 in the list of incriminated doctrines in the papal bull

32 Guot und guumlete ensint niht wan eacutein guumlete al ein in allem sunder gebern und geborn-werden Allez daz des guoten ist daz nimet er beidiu von der guumlete und in der guumlete


alone By the will of man St John means the highest powers of the soul whose nature and work is unmixed with flesh which reside in the pure nature of the soul in which man is of Godrsquos lineage and Godrsquos kindred And yet since they are not God Himself but are in the soul and created with the soul therefore they must lose their form and be trans-formed into God and be born in God and from God with only God for Father for thus they too become Godrsquos sons and Godrsquos only-begotten Son a man should strive earnestly to de-form himself of himself and of all creatures and know no father but God alone35

(DW 51017ndash131 Walshe 525ndash27 emphasis added)

Note first that Eckhart here takes over the tripartite conception of soul found in the Nicomachean Ethics and Aquinas vegetative (as not subject to will) sen-sate (subject to the will but with resistance and reluctance) and rational (with which we desire the rational or universal good thus ldquounmixed with fleshrdquo) What Eckhart adds crucially are two elements his version of the Jewish and Chris-tian notion that human beingsmdashhere summed up in the highest powers of the soul ie intellect and willmdashwere created in ldquothe likeness of Godrdquo (Gn 126) to which he adds the Christian and Neoplatonic idea of a higher noncreaturely destiny for the soul (made possible by the even nobler origin of its ground or ldquosparkrdquo the vuumlnkelicircn) To attain this destiny the powers ldquomust lose their form and be transformed into God and be born in God and from God with only God for Father for thus they too become Godrsquos sons and Godrsquos only-begotten Sonrdquo Roughly speaking this implies both coming to think divinely (Eckhart speaks of ldquoseeing all things in Godrdquo) and will divinely We have seen what this divine behavior requires with respect to the intellect it must detach from its active form-abstracting world-oriented (ldquoactiverdquo) part in order to become totally pas-sive and open to the divine grace But what does ldquolosing its formrdquo imply with respect to the will

35 sant J o h a n n e s [sprichet] in sȋnem ȇwangeliȏ daz lsquoallen den ist gegeben maht und mugent gotes suumlne ze werdenne die niht von bluote noch von vleisches willen noch von mannes willen sunder von gote und ȗz gote aleine geborn sintrsquo Bȋ dem bluote meinet er allez daz an dem menschen niht undertaelignic ist des menschen willen Bȋ des vleisches willen meinet er allez daz in dem menschen sȋnem willen undertaelignic ist doch mit einem widerkriege und mit einem widerstrȋte und neiget nȃch des vleisches begerunge und ist geme-ine der sȇle und dem lȋbe und enist niht eigenlȋche in der sȇle aleine Bȋ dem willen des mannes meinet sant J o h a n n e s die hœhsten krefte der sȇle der natȗre und ir werk ist unvermischet mit dem vleische und stȃnt in der sȇle lȗterkeit in den der mensche nȃch got gebildet ist in den der mensche gotes geslehte ist und gotes sippe Und doch wan sie got selben niht ensint und in der sȇle und mit der sȇle geschaffen sint so muumlezen sie ir selbes entbildet werden und in got aleine uumlberbildet und in gote und ȗz gote geborn werden daz got aleine vater sȋ wan alsȏ sint sie ouch gotes suumlne und gotes eingeborn sun Herumbe sol der men-sche gar vlȋzic sȋn daz er sich entbilde sȋn selbes und aller crȇatȗren noch vater wizze dan got aleine


If Eckhartrsquos advice concerning our cognitive side is to ldquolive without (the active) intellectrdquo it is not surprising that he says with respect to our conative side our will ldquoLive without whyrdquo ie without creaturely will Let us look again at Pr 104

When you have completely stripped yourself of your own self and all things and every kind of attachment and have transferred made over and abandoned yourself to God in utter faith and perfect love then whatever is born in you or touches you within or without joyful or sorrowful sour or sweet that is no longer yours it is altogether your Godrsquos to whom you have abandoned yourself God bears the Word in the [ground of the] soul and the soul conceives it and passes it on to her powers in varied guise now as desire now as good intent now as charity now as gratitude or however it may affect you It is all His and not yours at all36


The detached person has thus surrendered the soulrsquos created powers ie her (active) intellect and her will This latter must mean primarily the ldquowill of manrdquo of which we just saw Eckhart speak ie onersquos own creaturely and rational con-ception of the human good of what we as humans want most of all The result Eckhart tells us is that this ldquowill-lessrdquo person is guided by the inner Word in the ground of the soul presumably working in its guise of Justice itself and Wisdom itself In such a person the soulrsquos highest powers have followed the injunction to ldquolose their form and be trans-formed into God and be born in God and from God with only God for Fatherrdquo In such a soul the Birth takes place and the person becomes by grace what the Word is by nature

We get a somewhat different description of Eckhartrsquos teaching on the re-form (or transformation) of the will from a relatively brief and elegant German sermon Pr 30 on the Pauline injunction Praedica verbum vigila in omnibus labora ldquoPreach the word be vigilant labor in all thingsrdquo (2 Tim425) This sermon was given on the feast of St Dominic the founder of Eckhartrsquos own Order of Preachers and it clearly shows his reflections on that orderrsquos defin-ing task But typically for Eckhart since the concept of the word (or Word) the

36 Swenne dȗ dich alzemȃle entblœzet hȃst von dir selber und von allen dingen und von aller eigenschaft in aller wȋse und dȗ dich gote ȗfgetragen und geeigenet und gelȃzen hȃst mit aller triuwe und in ganzer minne swaz denne in dir geborn wirt und dich begrȋfet ich spriche ez sȋ joch ȗzerlich oder innerlich ez sȋ liep oder leit sȗr oder suumleze daz enist alzemȃle niht dȋn mȇr ez ist alzemȃle dȋnes gotes dem dȗ dich gelȃzen hȃst got gebirt in der sȇle sȋn geburt und sȋn wort und diu sȇle enpfaelighet ez und gibet ez vuumlrbaz den kreften in maniger wȋse nȗ in einer begerunge nȗ in guoter meinunge nȗ in minnewerken nȗ in dank-baeligrkeit oder swie ez dich ruumleret Ez ist allez sȋn und niht dȋn mit nihte


verbum is central to his discourse of univocal correlation the sermon quickly takes on broader indeed cosmic dimensions Beginning with the observation that it is ldquovery wonderful that the Word should pour forth and still remain withinrdquo the first part of the sermon deals with the various modes of the divine omnipresence and culminates in the Birth of the Son in the soulrsquos ldquoinmost and highest partrdquo (the Temple)

God is in all things but as God is divine and intelligible so God is no-where so truly as in the soul and in the angels if you will in the inmost soul in the summit of the soul The Father bears His Son in the inmost part of the soul and bears you with his only-begotten Son no less If I am to be the Son then I must be Son in the same essence as that in which He is Son and not otherwise37


Eckhart then reminds his listeners that the Latin praedica (literally ldquospeak forthrdquo or ldquopublishrdquo) ldquoimplies that you have it [the Word] within yourdquo and that ldquothe reason why He became man was that he might bear you as His only-begotten Son no lessrdquo38 (ibid976ndash988 Walshe 134) Having thus arrived at his familiar theme of the Birth Eckhart thenmdashseemingly out of contextmdashreports an anecdote

Yesterday I sat in a certain place and quoted a text from the Lordrsquos Prayer which is ldquoThy will be donerdquo But it would be better to say ldquoMay will become thinerdquo for what the Lordrsquos Prayer means is that my will should become His that I should become He39


37 Ez ist ein wunderlich dinc daz daz wort ȗzvliuzet und doch inneblȋbet Got ist in allen dingen aber als got goumltlich ist und als got vernuumlnftic ist alsȏ ist got niendert als eigenlȋche als in der sȇle und in dem engel ob dȗ wilt in dem innigesten der sȇle und in dem hœhsten der sȇle Der vater gebirt sȋnen sun in dem innigesten der sȇle und gebirt dich mit sȋnen eingeborenen sune niht minner Sol ich sun sȋn sȏ muoz ich in dem selben wesene sun sȋn dȃ er sun inne ist und in keinem andern

38 lsquoSprich ez her ȗzrsquo daz ist bevint daz diz in dir ist dar umbe ist er mensche worden daz er dich geber sȋnen eingebornen sun und niht minner

39 Ich saz gester an einer stat dȏ sprach ich ein woumlrtelȋn daz stȃt in dem pater noster und sprichet lsquodȋn wille der werdersquo Mȇr ez waeligre bezzer lsquowerde wille dȋnrsquo daz mȋn wille sȋn wille werde daz ich er werde daz meinet daz pater noster Literally the Latin fiat voluntas tua can mean either I disagree with those commentatorsmdasheg Quint (DW 299) and Largier (Meister Eckhart 1971)mdashwho call Eckhartrsquos retranslation of this petition in the Lordrsquos Prayer ldquoarbitraryrdquo For him whoever truly accepts Jesusrsquos teaching ldquosees God in all thingsrdquo and can thus accept whatever happens in her life For her ldquoThy will be donerdquo does indeed mean ldquoMay will become thinerdquo She has become ldquoblessedrdquo in the sense which Eckhart in Pr 52 (DW 2486 ff Walshe 420 ff) gives to the Beatitude ldquoBlessed are the poor in spiritrdquo ie she ldquowants nothingrdquo with her creaturely will indeed she has surrendered it For Eckhart his re-translation is more accurate than the traditional one


The transition here appears abrupt but the passage is central to the sermon the rest of which is in one way or another a comment on it Its connection to what went before seems to be this the Son or Word is in us we are commanded to ldquospeak it [Him] forthrdquo which in turn is done in various ways all of which require that our creaturely will be surrendered (that we ldquobe asleep to all thingsrdquo) letting the divine will replace it ldquoAnd so when all creatures are asleep in you you can know what God works in yourdquo40 (ibid1006 Walshe 134)

The mention of ldquowhat God works in yourdquo41 brings Eckhart back to the epistle text ldquoin omnibus laborardquo which he says has three meanings first ldquosee God in all things for God is in all thingsrdquo second ldquolove God above all things and your neighbor as yourselfrdquo and third ldquolove God in all things equally as much in poverty as in riches in sickness as in healthrdquo etc42 (ibid1007ndash1062 Walshe 134ndash36) These three kinds of working of laboring are equally divine the effects of grace working in us Summing up in the final paragraph and no doubt speaking as much to himself as to his audience Eckhart says

ldquoLabor in all thingsrdquo means When you stand on manifold things and not on bare pure simple being let this be your labor ldquostrive in all things and fulfill your servicerdquo (2 Tim 45) This means as much as ldquoLift up your headrdquo which has two meanings The first is Put off all that is your own and make yourself over to God Then God will be your own just as He is His own and He will be God to you just as He is God to Himself no less The second meaning is ldquoDirect all your works to Godrdquo43


41 The echo of Aquinasrsquos Augustinian definition of virtue is unmistakable (STh IaIIae554)42 Daz wort lsquoarbeite in allen dingenrsquo daz hȃt drȋe sinne in im Ez sprichet als vil als nim got in allen

dingen wan got ist in allen dingen Der ander sin ist lsquominne got obe allen dingen und dȋnen naelighsten als dich selbenrsquo minne got in allen dingen glȋche daz ist minne got als gerne in armuot als in rȋchtuome und habe in als liep in siechtuome als in gesuntheit

43 lsquoArbeite in allen dingenrsquo daz ist swȃ dȗ dich vindest ȗf manicvaltigen dingen und anders dan ȗf einem blȏzen lȗtern einvaltigen wesene daz lȃz dir ein arbeit sȋn daz ist lsquoarbeite in allen dingenrsquo lsquovuumlllende dȋnen dienestrsquo Daz sprichet als vil als hebe ȗf dȋn houbet Daz hȃt zwȇne sinne Der ȇrste ist lege abe allez daz dȋn ist und eigene dich gote sȏ wirt got dȋn eigen als er sȋn selbes eigen ist und er ist dir got als er im selben got ist und niht minner der ander sin ist rihte aliu dȋniu werk in got

40 Dar umbe slȃfent alle crȇatȗren in dir sȏ maht dȗ vernemen waz got in dir wuumlrket This shift ef-fected by detachment (or ldquoobediencerdquo or ldquohumilityrdquo) is a frequent theme in Eckhart particularly in his Talks of Instruction For example ldquoWhenever a man in obedience goes out of his own and gives up what is his in the same moment God must go in thererdquo [Swȃ der mensche in gehȏrsame des sȋnen ȗzgȃt und sich des sȋnen erwiget dȃ an dem selben muoz got von nȏt wider ȋngȃn] (DW 51871ndash2 Walshe 486)


Since in this life we de facto can hardly fail to ldquostand on manifold thingsrdquo our task according to Eckhart is always to ldquostrive in all things and fulfill [our] servicerdquo the prerequisite of which is that we practice detachment (ldquoput off all that is [our] ownrdquo) and then ldquodirect all [our] works to Godrdquo

Let us return to our example in chapters 1 and 4 of Louise the successful but harried executive who in order to calm her nerves at work has decided to prac-tice Daoist breathing exercises and not to imbibe strong drink Let us imagine now that she is has become an accomplished follower of the teachings of Meister Eckhart What would her action look like Presumably no different in outcome Louise would still prefer the breathing exercises But her thinking her motiva-tion will be different from those of an Aristotelian or Thomist Louise Eckhart wants us to act from a keen appreciation of our inner union with the Divine where as he says in Pr 5b ldquoGodrsquos ground is my ground and my ground is Godrsquos groundrdquo44 (DW 1908 Walshe 109) He continues

Here I live from my own as God lives from His own For the man who has once for an instant looked into this ground a thousand marks of red minted gold are the same as a brass farthing Out of this inmost ground all your works should be wrought without Why I say truly as long as you do works for the sake of heaven or God or eternal bliss from with-out you are at fault It may pass muster but it is not the best45

(Ibid 909ndash1003 Walshe 109ndash10)

In this ldquoinmost groundrdquo our Eckhartian Louise is one with God who is Justice and Wisdom thus in acting ldquoout of this inmost groundrdquo she is concerned solely to act justly and wisely Drinking strong alcohol while at work would be neither just nor wise hence she abstains whereas the breathing exercises pass both tests so she chooses them Note that Eckhart says that if she were to act for the sake of any gain or profit that is external (ldquofrom withoutrdquo) she would be ldquoat faultrdquo46 He does not claim that such external motivation makes onersquos deeds sinful (ldquoit may pass musterrdquo) but it is clearly undesirable presumably because of its mistaken basis

44 Hie ist gotes grunt mȋn grunt und mȋn grunt gotes grunt45 Hie lebe ich ȗzer mȋnem eigen als got lebet ȗzer sȋnem eigen Swer in disen grunt ie geluogete einen

ougenblik dem menschen sint tȗsent mark rȏtes geslagenen goldes als ein valscher haller Ȗzer disem in-nersten grunde solt dȗ wuumlrken alliu dȋniu werk sunder warumbe Ich spriche waeligrliche al die wȋle dȗ dȋniu werk wuumlrkest umbe himelrȋche oder umbe got oder umbe dȋn ȇwige saeliglicheit von ȗzen zuo sȏ ist dir waeligrlȋche unreht Man mac dich aber wol lȋden doch ist ez daz beste niht

46 The anticipation here of Kantrsquos claim of the incompatibility of acting from inclination and acting from moral duty is palpable


As a creature analogically related to God Louise cannot help but plan form intentions perhaps hope for rewardsmdasheven heavenly rewardsmdashand seek her own happiness in the process But if she understands the tradition as Eckhart does she will realize that she has a different and incompatible status as well ie as Godrsquos Offspring univocally related to the Source47 and this status requires of her a different motivation in her life that must supersede her creaturely (teleo-logical) desires The external acts performed under either motivation may well bemdashor at least look48mdashthe same But the life of the teleologically eudaimonist agent is for Eckhart a kind of dream an illusion oblivious of the agentrsquos true nature and thus ldquonot the bestrdquo What import does this have for the conception of the virtues and hence the state of onersquos soul

Recall that we were struck by the fact that in his teaching on the path to our blessedness Eckhart makes no reference to the need for (teleologically oriented) action or virtue except what we called ldquovirtue-1rdquo ie habits that help keep our creaturely impulses in check His central point is for us to recognize the ground of the soul for as Pr 52 puts it ldquoWhoever knows this knows the seat of bless-ednessrdquo49 (DW 24964ndash5 Walshe 422) If blessedness lies somehow in the ground of the soul then what role in our quest for beatitude is played by virtue-2 Is our happiness a matter simply of recognizing this ground andor the Birth that takes place in it Or does virtue-2 have some important role This question led us to Eckhartrsquos teaching on the transcendentals eg on the ldquojust one and justicerdquo who are respectively ldquoGodrsquos Son and God the Fatherrdquo a ldquoSon in which there is no image but God alone naked and purerdquo50 (DW 51013ndash16 Walshe 525) Central for Eckhart is not the just act but the just one ie becoming one with Justice This he connects with John 112f on becoming Sons of God ie being born not ldquoof the will of man but of God and from God alonerdquo which in turn means that the soulrsquos highest powers intellect and will must be remade and the will transformed into the divine will itself As Pr 30 teaches we must ldquostrive in all things and fulfill our servicerdquo If we have surrendered our creaturely wills and the Birth has taken place in the ground of our souls then the works we perform by grace will be by definition works of goodness justice and wisdom For ldquoIt is all His and not yours at allrdquo51 (DW 4-16002ndash3 Walshe 51) Our job is to keep the creaturely will in check the divine will can then act through us As

47 It is tempting to see in Eckhartrsquos approach something analogous to Kantrsquos notion of the nou-menal self

48 ldquolsquoI am not ashamed of what I did then but of the intention which I hadrsquomdashAnd didnrsquot the inten-tion lie also in what I did What justifies the shame The whole history of the incidentrdquo Ludwig Witt-genstein Philosophical Investigations 4th ed (Malden MAOxford WileyBlackwell 2009 sect644)

49 Der diz bekennet der bekennet war ane saeliglicheit lige50 [G]otes sune und gote dem vater [ein sune] in dem kein bilde enist dan got blȏz lȗter aleine51 Es ist allez sȋn und niht dȋn mit nihte


the poet Hopkins put it ldquothe just man justicesrdquo52 He does so not in order to attain blessedness for qua just one (justus der gerehte) he is by definition already in ldquothe seat of blessednessrdquo Virtue-2 is what he qua Son has become and his virtuous deeds are simply the expression of that fact ldquofor none loves virtue but he who is virtue itself rdquo53 (Pr 29 DW 27911ndash801 Walshe 125)

The Father bears His Son His Word without ceasing and He bears it in whatever is (passive) intellect including the ground of the soul The detached or ldquovirginalrdquo personrsquos soul has opened its powers to become transparent to this Birth so that they too may become productive of thoughts desires and deeds that are the expression of the Sonrsquos Birth Thus the thoughts desires deeds etc that proceed from this ground are an extension of the bullitio in the Trinity itself in particular of the Fatherrsquos Birth-giving To the extent they are such they are ipso facto expressions of virtue of the divine justice goodness and wisdom Just as grace-2 makes us participants in the life of the Trinity as adopted Sons it simultaneously enables us to become practitioners of virtue-2 performers of just and loving deeds without why simply because they are just and loving as proceeding from the divine ground within These deeds are performed ldquowithout whyrdquo since ldquoGod acts without why and has no whyrdquo54 (Pr 41 DW 22893ndash4 Walshe 239) As the highest virtuesmdashgoodness justice wisdommdashare identi-fied as spiritual perfections with God55 the newly aware person recognizes that her unity with God amounts to a unity with these virtues themselves As Rolf Schoumlnberger puts it

The unity of human beings with God is thus an ontological fact and at the same time a norm Now it is first and foremost from this fact that the peculiar structure of what one calls ldquomystical ethicsrdquo results the ldquoshouldrdquo [of ethics] follows not from manrsquos ldquogoal-determined beingrdquo that is from his final cause (as in Aristotle) but instead from his inner nature or formal cause which is his emptiness and freedom as the image of God

52 ldquoIacute say moacutere the just man justices Keacuteeps graacutece thaacutet keeps all his goings graces Acts in Godrsquos eye what in Godrsquos eye he ismdash Chriacutestmdashfor Christ plays in ten thousand places Lovely in limbs and lovely in eyes not his To the Father through the features of menrsquos facesrdquo (From G M Hopkins ldquoAs Kingfishers Catch Firerdquo)

53 Wan nieman enminnet die tugent dan der diu tugent selber ist54 [G]ot wuumlrket sunder warumbe und [enhȃt] kein warumbe55 ldquoIt has been written that a virtue is no virtue unless it comes from God or through God one

of these things must always be If it were otherwise it would not be a virtue for whatever one seeks without God is too small Virtue is God or without mediation in Godrdquo [Ein geschrift sprichet diu tugent enist niemer ein tugent si enkome denn von gote oder durch got oder in gote der drȋer muoz iemer einez sȋn Ob si joch wol anders waeligre sȏ enwaeligre ez doch niht ein tugent wan swaz man meinet ȃne got daz ist ze kleine Diu tugent ist got oder ȃne mittel in gote] (Pr 41 DW 22966ndash9 Walshe 241ndash42) ldquo Writtenrdquo as we saw in the earlier chapters by Augustine and Aquinas


Thus Schoumlnberger can speak of ldquoEckhartrsquos ontologizing of ethicsrdquo56

In a passage from In Ioh (n 583) Eckhart comments on verse 1410 ldquoIt is the Father living in me who does the workrdquo and describes the goodness of an action as a state of its being its formal cause

In every good work there are two things to consider the inner and the outer act The former is in the soul in the will and it is this that is truly praiseworthy meritorious and divine and God brings it about in us this is the act of virtue which makes both the person who has it and also the external act good The outer act however does not make the person good For how should something make a person good that is outside the person and not in her and that depends on another and that can be hindered and interrupted against the personrsquos will But the inner act which is divine can be neither interrupted nor hindered it is constantly at work neither sleeping nor slumbering but watching over the person who possesses it 57

(LW 35107ndash5112)

He then proceeds to give as ldquoan appropriate examplerdquo of the relationship be-tween the ldquoinner and the outer actrdquo the inclination of a stone to fall ie a formal cause58 Just as a stonersquos natural heaviness can be overcome by ldquohindrancerdquo and by what Aristotle called ldquoviolent motionrdquo so too our ldquoGod-formednessrdquo can be hindered violated not by external obstacles but rather when we allow ourselves to be distracted by the particularities of life and our own finite self-centered pur-poses our ldquohoc et hocrdquo

56 Rolf Schoumlnberger ldquoSecundum rationem esse Zur Ontologisierung der Ethik bei Meister Eck-hartrdquo in ΟΙΚΕΙΩΣΙΣ Festschrift fuumlr Robert Spaemann ed Reinhard Loumlw Acta Humaniora (Wein-heim VCH 1987) 262 A clear statement of this ontologizing is Eckhartrsquos ldquovirtue is Godrdquo (see previous footnote)

57 [I]n omni opere bono est duo considerare actum scilicet interiorem et actum exteriorem Actus inte-rior ipse est in anima in voluntate et ipse est laudabilis proprie meritorius divinus quem deus operatur in nobis Et hoc est quod hic dicitur pater in me manens ipse facit opera Iste est actus virtutis qui bonum facit habentem et opus eius etiam exterius bonum reddit Actus vero exterior non facit hominem bonum Quomodo enim bonum faceret hominem quod est extra hominem et non in homine et quod dependet ab altero et quod impediri potest et intercipi potest invito homine Actus vero interior utpote divinus inter-cipi non potest nec impediri semper operatur nec dormit neque dormitat sed custodit hominem habentem se

58 In Aristotelian physics gravity is an intrinsic property of objects essential to their corporeality Eckhart goes on to say of it ldquoGravity and its father the substantial form which it follows work right from the start of the stonersquos existence continuously tending downwardrdquo (ibid 511)


[God] is a thousand times more eager to give to us than we are to re-ceive But we do Him violence and wrong in hindering His natural work by our unreadiness59

(RdU DW 528012ndash2812 Walshe 514)

Our ldquoreadinessrdquo is achieved in full self-abandonment and the subsequent Birth which transform the finite historical individualrsquos self-awareness to that of an image of the divine an adopted Son and thus a fountain of virtue who like God performs justgoodwise deeds simply because they are justgoodwise Virtuous acts ldquopour forthrdquo from such an individual for the sake of no further goal or purpose Their role in the drama of salvation is thus never that of means to an end (a role they play in part in Aquinas) nor that of constituting the goal (Aristotle) but are rather a manifestation of the goalrsquos already having been attained60

One might legitimately wonder whether Eckhart is not overly optimistic about our human capacity for true detachment and thus for allowing God to work through us We are inclined to think (and not unreasonably) ldquoThe occa-sional saint may be able to achieve such equanimity but not ordinary mortals such as almost all of us arerdquo This impression may stem from the fact that in his preaching Eckhart is often speaking on the level of univocal correlation much of what he says for example is more true of the ldquojust onerdquo than the ldquojust personrdquo the concrete embodied human being struggling to find her way through the many obstacles and temptations of this vale of tears Are his exhortations too demanding for ordinary mortals

Though his precepts do in fact often invite the reaction that they are too chal-lenging there is another side to Eckhart one more sympathetic to our common weaknesses Recall that for him all genuine virtues are really in God and in us humans only by grace and intermittently He says for instance in the Latin Ser-mons and Lectures on Ecclesiasticus (n 52)

[B]eing and every perfection particularly the general ones such as being oneness truth goodness light justice and the like are said analogously of God and creatures From this it follows that goodness justice and the like [in creatures] have their goodness entirely from

59 [Got] ist tȗsentstunt gaeligher ze gebenne wan uns ze nemenne Aber wir tuon im gewalt und unreht mit dem daz wir in sȋnes natiurlȋchen werkes hindern mit unser unbereitschaft

60 ldquoIn place of a guarantee [of salvation] via works we have in them the expression of the Guaran-tor and of what has been guaranteed [ie salvation] the imprinted sealrdquo Dietmar Mieth ldquoPredigt 86 lsquoIntravit Jesus in quoddam castellumrsquordquo in Lectura II 173


a being outside of themselves that is God to which they stand in an analogous relationship61

(LW 22811ndash5 Teacher 178)

And a few pages earlier in n 45

Every finite being has its being not from itself but from a superior being for which it thirsts hungers and longs Thus it thirsts for the presence of the superior and one can more properly say that it continu-ally receives its being than that it has it as its own fixed or even partially fixed possession62


From the vantage point of onersquos own finite being one can mistakenlymdasheven disastrouslymdashthink one has in oneself a firm and fixed just character just as one is tempted to think of oneself as an autonomous substance in onersquos own right63 What is at first glance puzzling is that Eckhart seems to be denying that the just person really is just as we usually understand this in terms of a habit (acquired or infused) He is aware of this problem and seeks to allay the worry

What we want to say is that the virtuesmdashjustice and the likemdashare something more like gradually proceeding conformations than some-thing impressed and remaining firmly rooted in the virtuous person They are in a constant becoming like the luster of light in its medium and the image in a mirror64

(In Sap n45 LW 23683ndash6 Teacher 175 Walshe 475 here my translation)

61 [E]sse et omnis perfectio maxime generalis puta esse unum verum bonum lux justitia et huius-modi dicutur de deo et creaturis analogice Ex quo sequitur quod bonitas et iustitia et similia bonitatem suam habent totaliter ab aliquo extra ad quod analogantur deus scilicet

62 [O]mne ens non habet ex se sed ab alio superiori esse quod sitit esurit et appetit Propter hoc semper sitit presentiam sui superioris et potius et proprius accepit continue esse quam habeat fixum aut etiam inchoatum ipsum esse

63 Remember that both assumptions are in a sense true on Thomasrsquos understanding of analogy according to which it is equally true to say that God is and that I am though the verb lsquoto bersquo is used analogously not univocally in the two cases Cf eg STh Ia135 By contrast Eckhart says that ldquoGod alone properly speaking exists and is called being one true and goodrdquo while our being oneness etc are borrowed from His (Tabula Prologorum LW 1132 Parisian 79)

64 Et hoc est quod volumus dicere Virtutes enim justitia et huiusmodi sunt potius quaedam actu con-figurationes quam quid figuratum immanens et habens fixionem et radicem in virtuoso et sunt in continuo fieri sicut splendor in medio et imago in speculo One could argue that Eckhartrsquos doctrine of the virtues is in this respect more true to experience than Aristotlersquos whose approach makes even the possibility of moral weakness in the virtuous hard to fathom


While the Son is the just one (and hence so too are all humans in the ground and being of the soul) each of us individually is also a creature in whom ldquojustice and likerdquo ie our identification with the Son or with the Birth of the Son in the soul are at best ldquogradually proceeding conformationsrdquo If onersquos creaturely ego gets in the way of this process Eckhart advises that one pray for assistance65 If the prayer seems unanswered he does not advise striving through onersquos own ef-forts ldquoIn truth I should be satisfied with Godrsquos will whatever God wished to do or give rdquo66 (RdU DW 53035ndash6 Walshe 520)

The person who has ldquogone out of herself rdquo has given up the notion that her eudaimonia is a matter of fulfilling her particular purposes be they banal and everyday or sublime and far-reaching But it would be mistaken to think that she is meant to withdraw into quietism or nonaction ie to give up purposes altogether We shall take a closer look in a moment at how one lives and acts ldquowithout whyrdquo but for now we focus on the idea that to the extent she is uni-fied with justice (for example) the just person acts justly even as the released stone falls because of its ldquoinner actrdquo Paradoxical as it may sound just (and good and wise) action becomes natural to such a person precisely in her state of detachment In this way Eckhartrsquos ldquomysticismrdquo has no more to do with avoid-ing the world than it does with ldquomystical experiencesrdquo but it has much to do with the realization of onersquos unity with God and the results of this realization in action as Dietmar Mieth notes Eckhart ldquoanticipated the idea of the in actione contemplativusrdquo67 Mieth has written extensively on the action-oriented aspect of Eckhartrsquos thought68 He points out that Eckhart has given us several examples of such ldquoactive contemplativesrdquo One was Martha (of the Gospel story of Martha and Mary Lk 10 38ndash42 both in Pr 2 and especially Pr 86) another was St Elisabeth of Thuumlringen in Pr 3269 Eckhart could say of each of them that she

65 As he himself generally does at the end of most German sermons eg at the end of the famous justice sermon (Pr 6) ldquoMay God help us to love justice for its own sake and God without why Amenrdquo [Daz wir die gerehticheit minnen durch sich selben und got ȃne warumbe des helfe uns got Amen] (DW 11155ndash6 Walshe 332) The clear suggestion is that such love is not possible for the unaided likes of us and not easy for the others

66 In der wȃrheit alsȏ solte mir genuumlegen an dem willen gotes in allem dem dȃ got woumllte wuumlrken oder geben

67 In Lectura II 164 The Latin epithet comes from Jeroacutenimo Nadal a sixteenth-century Jesuit who advocated being contemplative both in prayer and in action

68 In addition to the works cited directly in this essay see also his Die Einheit von vita activa und vita contemplativa in den deutschen Predigten und Traktaten Meister Eckharts und bei Johannes Tauler (Regensburg Verlag Friedrich Pustet 1969)

69 Elisabeth (1207ndash1231) was born in Hungary but spent much of her brief life at the court in Thuringia and later Marburg She became very attracted to the ideals of the then-new Franciscan order eventually assuming the habit of the lay third order Her piety and charity were legendary inspiring the foundation of orders of nuns devoted to the care of the sick and the poor


was ldquoso well grounded in her essence that her activity was no hindrance to herrdquo70 (Pr 86 DW 34916ndash7 Walshe 89) Of Elisabeth he tells his audience

[W]hen her outward comforts failed her she fled to Him to whom all creatures flee setting at naught the world and self In that way she tran-scended self and scorned the scorn of men so that it did not touch her and she lost none of her perfection Her desire was to wash and tend sick and filthy people with a pure heart71


We see here a good example of the Eckhartian dynamic of virtuous action The person who realizes the emptiness of ldquooutward comfortsrdquo (hoc et hoc) ldquoflees to God to whom all creatures fleerdquo (an example of grace-1 at work) by ldquosetting at naught the world and selfrdquo She thus ldquotranscends [the worldly] selfrdquo becoming immune to human praise and blame (ldquoscorning the scorn of menrdquo) and thusmdashvia grace-2mdashdwells securely in ldquoher perfectionrdquo ie her union with God From this union and without why (this is her ldquopure heartrdquo) came her desire to perform her acts of selfless love In Pr 86 it is not Mary the sister who famously sits at the feet of Jesus to absorb everything he says but rather Martha who busily tends to the needs of the guest and the household who exemplifies ldquogroundedness in the essencerdquo from that ground she does her good works

Thus for Eckhart no less than for Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas the virtues and the virtuous actions to which they give rise play a central role For Aristotle they are the very essence of happiness and it is fundamental to his conception of virtuous action qua virtuous that it is performed for its own sake Aquinas as we saw argues that a life of virtuous behavior for its own sake is not our true happi-ness virtuous behavior remains crucial but nowmdashaided by gracemdashis equally a means to the end the Beatific Vision Eckhart for all his distance from Aristotle on the question of the nature of our blessedness avoids Aquinasrsquos instrumental-ization of virtuous action Indeed his idea that the just person qua just acts justly for its own sake and not for some goal distinct from it is Aristotelian through and through So another way to express the idea of ldquoliving without whyrdquo would

70 Marthȃ was sȏ weselich daz sie ir gewerb niht enhinderte The sermon treats of Jesusrsquos visit to the home of Martha and Mary in which Eckhart contrary to most of the tradition portrays the ldquocon-templatively activerdquo Martha as the one who deserves the highest praise So radical is the sermonrsquos departure from his predecessors and from what seems the manifest sense of the Gospel text that some commentators have doubted that Eckhart was its author

71 Und dȏ ir der ȗzwendic trȏst abegie dȏ vlȏch si ze dem alle crȇatȗren vliehent und versȃhte die werlt und sich selben Dȃ mite kam si uumlber sich selben und versmȃhte daz man sie versmȃhte alsȏ daz si sich dȃ mite niht enbewar und daz si ir volkomenheit dar umbe niht enliez Si gerte des daz si sieche und unvlaeligtige liute waschen und handeln muumleste mit einem reinen herzen


be to say ldquolive virtuouslyrdquo ie ldquovirtuously-2rdquo That is be just good wise etc as God is without thought of reward without the spiritual merchantrsquos mental-ity for that is your true nature A third way to put Eckharts point might be this since in his discourse of univocal correlation our very being by adoption is the divine being and since this mode of being is rational life itselfmdashwhich means to live justly etcmdashit follows that for us to lsquolive genuinelyrsquo is to live rationally which is a life of the virtues-2 a living without why

Let us turn now to the notion of action itself which as we saw has a thoroughly teleologicaleudaimonist cast in Aristotle Augustine and Aquinas If they are right that most human action de facto takes place in a means-end framework founded as G E M Anscombe reminded us72 on the reasons-seeking question ldquoWhyrdquo what sense can we make of Eckhartrsquos striking injunction to ldquolive with-out whyrdquo How is it even possible to live in that way if meaningful action can for the most part only be conceived in teleological ie means-end terms When we ask an agent why she did this or that we often expect to be told her goal or intention in what she did And yet Eckhart says in Pr 5b ldquoIf you were to ask a genuine man who acted from his own ground lsquoWhy do you actrsquo if he were to answer properly he would simply say lsquoI act because I actrsquordquo73 (DW 1923ndash6 Walshe 110) But in everyday life such an answer would likely be regarded as either disingenuous or a rebuff to the questioner as if to say ldquoDonrsquot bother me with your foolish questionsrdquo Could Eckhart seriously be proposing that we altogether eliminate the teleological framework to which this why- question is central

No I think not Note first that in the sermon just quoted Eckhart is using a by-now familiar contrast between ldquoa genuine person (einen wacircrhaften menschen) who acts out his own groundrdquo ie a person fully aware of his union with God with one who ldquodoes works for the sake of heaven or God or eternal bliss from withoutrdquo in other words a spiritual merchant whose deeds are characterized in terms of having an ultimate purposemdashwhat Aristotle called the agentrsquos boulecircsis and Thomas the goal or endmdashbut they have it ldquofrom withoutrdquo (von ȗzen zuo See ibid91ndash92 Walshe 109ndash10) We should no longer be surprised that within the discourse of univocal correlation the ldquogenuine personrdquo ie an ldquoadopted Sonrdquo would act the way God acts ie without why since God seeksmdashindeed can seekmdashnothing ldquofrom withoutrdquo The rebuff in Pr 5b is as much as to say ldquoI do the right thing for its own sake because I love justice if your question lsquoWhyrsquo is looking for some further goal something I hope to attain by acting justly I have none suchrdquo Secondly recall the example of the stone whose inner inclination is

72 In Anscombe Intention73 Swer nȗ vrȃgte einen wȃrhaften menschen der dȃ wuumlrket ȗz eigenem grunde war umbe wuumlrkest

dȗ dȋniu werk solte er rehte antwuumlrten er spraeligche niht anders dan ich wuumlrke dar umbe daz ich wuumlrke


realized by falling when the circumstances are right So too the goodjustwise personrsquos inclinations are realized as Theo Kobusch says

[in] the concrete moral action [which] is characterized by the fact that it has its meaning in itself Just as God performs all his works ldquowithout a whyrdquo and life is lived for its own sake without needing to seek for a purpose outside of itself so too the moral person as such acts ldquowithout a whyrdquo because he regards his activity as meaningful and purposeful in itself an effect of the birth of the Son in the person74

Qua just actions a further goal is neither necessary nor possible for actions per-formed from Justice within

Eckhartrsquos ldquoontologizationrdquo of ethics his stress on what we truly are in the ground of the soul and thus should become as creatures in the world relies upon an important distinction between the ldquoinner actrdquo and the ldquoouter actrdquo if an agent has ldquogone outrdquo of her everyday self and recognized her true identity as Son or Image of the divine Source then she realizes that her inner act is justice while her outer act can and should become its concretization in given empirical circumstances eg in St Elisabethrsquos case her attending to the needs of some particular poor person For Eckhart what is moral per se about her action is the inner act that motivates it indeed the same outer act (alms-giving) could be performed by a ldquospiritual merchantrdquo but since it would not be performed for its own sake and from the divine ground it could not express virtue-2 (God never acts for a why) Now it might seem that what Eckhart means by the just onersquos ldquoinner actrdquo is the agentrsquos intention ie some desired state of affairs that the ldquoouter actrdquo eg moving onersquos limbs in a certain way is meant to bring about As Thomas Aquinas says

Intention denotes a certain order to an end [it is] an act of the will [that] regards an end For we are said to intend health not only be-cause we will it but because we will to attain it by means of something else75

(STh IaIIae12obj3c ad 3 ad 4)

74 Theo Kobusch ldquoMystik als Metaphysik des moralischen Seinsrdquo in Abendlaumlndische Mystik im Mittelalter Symposion Kloster Engelberg 1984 ed Kurt Ruh (Stuttgart J B Metzlersche Verlagsbuch-handlung 1986) 58

75 [I]ntentio designat ordinationem quandam in finem intentio primo et principaliter pertinet ad id quod movet ad finem Non enim solum ex hoc intendere dicimur sanitatem quia volumus eam sed quia volumus ad eam per aliquid aliud pervenire


Thus we intend to be healthy by exercising and to carry this out on a given day by Daoist breathing ldquoinner actrdquo (intending) and ldquoouter actrdquo (Daoist breathing) Is this Eckhartrsquos meaning

I think not I want to claim that the intention as such is an integral part of what Eckhart means by the outer act for it makes the outer act the spatio-temporal particular that it is eg Daoist breathing for the sake of health and equanimity Eckhartrsquos ldquoinner actrdquo by contrast is the agents nature as seen in the example of the stone and its inclination to fall The ldquofatherrdquo of this inclination is Eckhart says the stonersquos ldquosubstantial formrdquo (forma substantialis see In Ioh n583 LW 351110) Our divine nature-by-adoption (ie by grace) is an Image or Off-spring of Godrsquos nature It hence can express itself outwardly only in acts of virtue that is acts of justice goodness etc marked by free choice performed for their own sake and proceeding from that internal inclination For Aristotle these are fixed habits in the virtuous person76 but for Eckhart as we saw they ldquoare some-thing more like gradually proceeding conformationsrdquo of the spatio-temporal creature to the inner divine ldquosparkrdquo This line of thought is powerfully developed in a passage in the Book of Divine Consolation where Eckhart says in part

[No one] can hinder this [inner] work of virtue any more than one can hinder God Day and night this work glistens and shines We have a clear illustration of this teaching [on inner and outer work] in a stone [whose] downward tendency is inherent in it In the same way I say that virtue has an inner work a will and tendency toward all good and a flight from and repugnance to all that is bad evil and incom-patible with God and goodness rdquo77

(BgT DW 53815ndash3910 The entire long passage runs from page 383 to page 4220 Walshe 539 ff)

Thus the ldquoinner actrdquo is a (complex) disposition a form for Eckhart while in this tradition an intention is an ldquoact of willrdquo

But surely one might say the spiritual merchant is a human being too and thus has the same nature as St Elisabeth or Martha So how can his nature not be manifested in his outward acts as Eckhart claims The stone after all has no choice about its inclination to fall This is true but our intellectual nature

76 Though the moral and logical problem of akrasia creates difficulties for his account77 Ouch enmac daz inner werk der tugent als wȇnic ieman gehindern als man got niht hinder enmac

Daz werk glenzet und liuhtet tac und naht Dirre lȇre hȃn wir ein offenbȃre bewȋsunge an dem steine [mit seiner] neigunge niderwert und daz ist im anegeborn Rehte alsȏ spriche ich von der tugent daz si hȃt ein innigez werk wellen und neigen ze allem guoten und ȋlen und widerkriegen von allem dem daz bœse und uumlbel ist guumlete und gote unglȋch


demands that we choose not only what to do but also the motivation from which to do it Just as a stage actor can adopt the character of a sinner or a saint so too must each of us decide what we are and thus how and why to act For Eckhart it makes all the difference whether my act of alms-giving is done for the sake of obtaining some reward or rather done without why simply because it is just

The distinction and interplay between motive and intention are subtle yet crucial for understanding Eckhartrsquos point The ldquojust onerdquomdashwho by the grace of adoption is Image of the divine prototype Son of the Fathermdashis what we are in the ground of the soul But this groundmdashEckhart is very clear on thismdashis out-side of time and space (ie it is not creaturely)78 The ldquojust personrdquo however is a flesh-and-blood denizen of the world one who is made just by her identifica-tion through detachment with the uncreated uncreateable Justice in the ground Through this identification she becomes a channel for Justice to manifest itself in the world Thus her actions qua just and with justice as her motivation have by definition no exterior purpose or goal But Justice ldquoincarnatesrdquo or embodies itself in concrete deeds and each of these like ldquoall things that are in time[] have a lsquowhyrsquordquo79 (Pr 26 DW 2273ndash4 Walshe 96) Martha of the Gospel pours wine into a pitcher in order to serve her guest If she is thereby acting from the motive of Justice she has no further goal in her intentional deed no why for treating her guest hospitably and thereby ldquofulfilling her servicerdquo Her motive is what could be called ldquogeneral justicerdquo and it has no further purpose By contrast a spiritual merchant donates money to the church in order to gain heaven his motive in this intentional act is profit Qua creatures analogously related to the Creator each of them performs actions with an intention we might say with a ldquowhy-1rdquo ie with one or another goal But qua justa a just one univocally correlated with the Father Martharsquos intentional act is not done for any reward it has no ldquowhy-2rdquo no external motivation She embodies Justice in her deed and can only do so without a why without an external goal or further intention But the merchantrsquos action embodies his creaturely profit-motive in its orientation to an additional goal heaven If asked ldquoWhy do you pour wine for the guestrdquo Martha can only say ldquoI act because I actrdquo ie ldquoI have no further reason (for doing what is right)rdquo The merchant on the other hand does have a further reason he wants to be rewarded for his benefaction

Anscombe distinguished between three kinds of motive ldquoforward-lookingrdquo (which is the same as intention) ldquobackward-lookingrdquo (toward something that has happened as in revenge or gratitude) and ldquomotive-in-generalrdquo (such as

78 ldquoThe inner act falls not under time it is always being born not interrupted rdquo [actus interior non cadit sub tempore semper nascitur non intercipitur ] (In Ioh n585 LW 35128)

79 Alliu dinc diu in der zȋt sint diu hȃnt ein warumbe


admiration curiosity spite friendship fear love of truth despair etc)80 With respect to human action Aquinas does not often speak of motive (motivum) and it is notable that he does not treat it at all in his systematic discussions of the will in the STh IaIIae 6ndash18 In one place where it does come up (IaIIae 72 on the distinction of vice and sin) it is treated as equivalent to (further) intention81 In Eckhart by contrast the central use of the notion I suggest is as ldquomotive-in-generalrdquo One important feature of this kind of motive is the way it tends to exclude particular sorts of intentions and of course other motivations

How can a motive(-in-general) ldquotend to excluderdquo certain kinds of inten-tions and (other) motives Actually the phenomenon is quite familiar To the extent my motive for repaying a loan is honesty my primary intention in doing so cannot be to hoodwink you so that you will later loan me a larger sum that I plan to abscond with82 Motives-in-general while distinguishable from other aspects of our psychological make-up have characteristic expressions in actions intentions wishes emotions and the like Generosity as a motive does not rule out that one profit through onersquos actions but it does clash with acting in order to swindle Likewise venality as a motive comports poorly with making a hefty donation to charity out of the motive of religious duty Envy a powerful and familiar motivator finds a characteristic outlet in schadenfreude but is in opposi-tion to feelings and acts of love generosity and kindness Of course our lives are de facto replete with such conflicts and our motivations are perhaps never en-tirely pure The Christian tradition in which Eckhart stands is under no illusions on this score Indeed Augustine heldmdashas we sawmdashthat without divine grace we can never act from worthy ie non-egoistic motives Eckhartrsquos point is similar if less jaundiced those who properly understand ldquoGodrsquos truthrdquo will act without why as for those who do not they may still be ldquogood peoplerdquo whose ldquointention is right and we commend them for it May God in His mercy grant them the kingdom of heavenrdquo83 (Pr 52 DW 24904ndash6 Walshe 421) But the proper understanding of Godrsquos truth clearly implies correct motivation in our actions Kurt Flasch puts the point this way

80 Anscombe Intention sectsect 12ndash1481 ldquoWherever there is a special motive for sinning there is a different species of sin because the

motive for sinning is the end and object of sinrdquo [Ubi occurrit aliud motivum ad peccandum ibi est alia peccati species quia motivum ad peccandum est finis et obiectum] emphasis added

82 Motives of course can be mixed Honesty does not per se rule out a self-serving purpose but the two comport uneasily with one another the one threatening to unseat the other For someone like Aristotle the more one is self-serving the less is one honest

83 Dise menschen sint wol dar ane wan ir meinunge ist guot her umbe wellen wir sie loben Got der sol in geben daz himelrȋche von sȋner barmherzicheit Of course they also may not be ldquogood peoplerdquo but Eckhart is less interested in discussing these


The just person insofar as he is just is justice next to that heaven and earth purgatory and hell count for nothing This leads to the elimina-tion of the reward-motive and every means-end construction of life Life is its own goal The just person lives in justice he lives not to do the will of God and thereby attain heaven God only interests him insofar as God is justice itself84

We may in fact seldom attain this ideal but Eckhart wants us to recognize its possibility in our lives

If the motive of the just person qua just is justice then it would seem that the motive of the merchant is in a word profit The merchant gives in order to get and it may be his job do his best to come out ahead in the bargain Indeed in everyday life this may seem unavoidable and in itself harmless or morally neutral but Eckhart gives us reason to pause True the medieval church though opposed to usury had no problem with fair profit per se Nor does Eckhart who is hostile to it only to the extent that it interferes with detachment and the mo-tivation of Justice The imagery of Pr 1 is about keeping the merchant mentality out of the Temple the inner sanctum of the soul and our place of union with the divine where it has no right to be

God wants this Temple cleared that He may be there all alone This is because the Temple is so agreeable to Him because it so like Him and He is so comfortable in this Temple when He is alone there85


One might be tempted to think this way about Eckhartrsquos polemic against mer-cantilism it is confined to the discourse of univocal correlation which is meant to constitute our spiritual lives while the mercantile attitude has its natural home in the creaturely world where we have many needs that must be met and the organization of society into markets is one reasonable way to achieve that86 Markets of course work on the notion of mutual profit their maxim is ldquoAct with whyrdquo and their home is the agora not the Temple The admonition to live and act without why is and can only be applicable to the Temple it belongs to the Sabbath alone not to the Work-Week one might say figuratively

84 Kurt Flasch ldquoZu Predigt 6rdquo 50 emphasis added Compare Bruce Milem The Unspoken Word (Washington DC Catholic University of America Press 2002) 125

85 Her umbe wil got disen tempel ledic hȃn daz ouch niht mȇ dar inne sȋ dan er aleine Daz ist dar umbe daz im dirre tempel sȏ wol gevellet wan er im alsȏ rehte glȋch ist und im selber alsȏ wol behaget in disem tempel swenne er aleine dar inne ist

86 Or so argued ldquothat great priestrdquo Plato in Republic 2 368 ff eg ldquo[A] city comes to be because none of us is self-sufficient but we all need many thingsrdquo (369b)


But this attempt to ldquodomesticaterdquo Eckhart to make his views more compat-ible with our everyday ldquobuying and sellingrdquo in the broadest sense must fail if we take seriously the continuation of his reasoning in Pr 1 as already cited in this chapter p 171

So long as a man in all his doings desires anything at all that God can or will give still he ranks with these merchants If you would be free of any taint of trading so that God may let you enter this temple [the ground of the soul] then you must do all that you can in all your works solely to Godrsquos glory87 and be as free of it as Nothing is free which is neither here nor there You should ask nothing whatever in return Whenever you act thus your works are spiritual and godly and the merchants are driven right out of the temple and God is in there alone for one is thinking only of God


Eckhart clearly means the agora of our lives including our personal relations of all kinds and not merely the Temple Behaving as a ldquospiritual merchantrdquo out in the marketplace makes it impossible for God to get ldquoin thererdquo our lives are all of a piece and hence the choice between being a spiritual merchant and a gerehte (just one) is a stark and decisive one

Think again of the ldquogenuine manrdquo of Pr 5 who says ldquoI act because I actrdquo and recall that Eckhart elsewhere says of the gerehte the just one

The just are so set on justice that if God were not just they would not care a bean for God 88


Eckhartrsquos point here is both profound and radical One of its most startling as-pects is its implied rejection of the ultimate claim of teleological eudaimonism that the path to Happiness consists of acts the doing of which leads (with the help of grace) to Heaven the Beatific Vision Eckhart concedes that by virtue of our creation by God we are impelled as we saw to ldquoreturn to Him and hurry

87 Wittgenstein writes in the foreword to Philosophical Remarks ldquoI would like to say lsquothis book is written to the glory of Godrsquo [ie] written in good will and so far as it was not but was written from vanity etc the author would wish to see it condemnedrdquo See Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophical Remarks ed Rush Rhees trans R Hargreaves and R White (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1975) 7 This connection between acting ldquoto the glory of Godrdquo and ldquogood willrdquo is one of a number of Eckhartian echoes in Wittgensteinrsquos thought

88 Den gerehten menschen den ist alsȏ ernst ze der gerehticheit waeligre daz got niht gereht waeligre sie enahteten eine bȏne niht ȗf got


to Him according to the Scripture lsquoTo the place from which the waters flow they shall returnrsquo [Eccl1 7] This is why the creature by its nature loves God indeed more than itself rdquo (LW 31898ndash12) Yet precisely this motivationmdashwhich is natural to creaturesmdashis part of the mercantilism Eckhart rejects The coherence of his rejection rests of course on his claim that we are not only creatures that as intellectual beings and Sons by adoption we have a univocal connection to the divine and hence our task is to forsake the profit-seeking of the agora as the framework for our lives and embrace the Temple instead living without why Thus the audacious claim at the beginning of Pr 6 that those who honor God ldquoseek not their own in anything whatever it may be whether great or small [] not clinging to possessions nor [to] holiness nor reward nor heavenrdquo As we saw this was condemned in the eighth article of the bull89 What marks off the motivation of the just or ldquogenuinerdquo agent derives its content not from anything whatsoever considered to be outside of one but from the ldquoinner actrdquo thus

one should not work for any lsquowhyrsquo neither for God nor onersquos honor nor for anything at all that is outside of oneself but only for that which is onersquos own being and onersquos own life within oneself90


Remembering what Flasch said about the ldquojust person [who] lives in justice he lives not to do the will of God and thereby attain heavenrdquo we can see what Eckhartrsquos ldquogenuine manrdquo means ldquoI qua just act thus because Justice with which I am one acts through me and itmdashwhich is my motivemdashhas no goal outside itself Its demand is absoluterdquo

At stake in insisting that Eckhart is talking about motive not intention when he advises that we ldquolive without whyrdquo is not a merely verbal point Intentions are unavoidable We are inclined to think that an intention is by its very nature part of the ldquomeans-end constructionrdquo of our lives As we saw above in sum-ming up the tradition and his own views Aquinas defined intention as an ldquoact of the willrdquo one that is a willing of both an end and a means to that end (STh IaIIae12) a characterization that also nicely expresses the commitment to act that we associate with intending as opposed to mere wishing Coupled with the Thomist view that every human action is for the sake of attaining the ultimate

89 When coupled with the canonization of Thomas Aquinas six years earlier by the same Pope John XXII this article virtually amounts to an official endorsement by the Catholic Church of teleo-logical eudaimonism

90 [N]och man ensol dienen noch wuumlrken umbe kein warumbe noch umbe got noch umbe sȋn ȇre noch umbe nihtes niht daz ȗzer im sȋ wan aleine umbe daz daz sȋn eigen wesen und sȋn eigen leben ist in im


goal of happiness it also places intention for Thomas squarely within the mer-cantile framework that Flasch referred to ie within the sphere of analogical de-pendence But it does so only when combined with teleological eudaimonism An Eckhartian agent has intentions too but they are not mercantile per se for their motivation is different No matter how complex they may be they are un-dertaken with detachment Such agents have means and ends in their action but their lives are not constructed that way Consider what Eckhart says at In Ioh n 68

If you want to know if your work is done in God then see if your work is alive For it is said here ldquowhat was made was life in himrdquo [ Jn13ndash4] But that work is alive that has no motive (movens) and no goal aside from God and beyond Godrdquo91

(LW 3571ndash3 McGinn Essential Sermons 146)

What moves God is only love (standing for all the spiritual perfections)

For God and everything divine have as such neither origin nor goal For if as Aristotle says [Met996a29ndash31] in the realm of the mathematical we speak of neither good nor evil but only of the formal cause so too all the more in the realm of the metaphysical and the divine And this is what prevents the divine person from having a father and mother on earth [Mt 239] These words [ldquoSo it is with everyone who is born of the spiritrdquo] show that the divine work as such knows neither source nor goal it does not bother about such nor think about it nor look at it it has God alone as its formal cause ldquoI became a lover of his formrdquo [Ws82]92

(In Iohn336 LW 32847ndash2855 my translation)

As creatures we cannot but have means and ends ie intentions and goals How-ever the movensmdashin the sense of ldquomotive-in-generalrdquomdashof the divine person qua divine is God alone who is Justice and Goodness and these perfections consti-tute the inner act and are thereby the motive the moving cause of her actions

91 [V]is scire si opus tuum factum sit in deo vide si opus tuum sit vivum Nam hic dicitur quod factum est in ipso vita erat Vivum autem opus est quod extra deum et praeter deum non habet movens nec finem

92 [Q]uia deus et omne divinum in quantum huiusmodi nescit principium a quo nec finem ad quem Si enim lsquoin mathematicis non est bonumrsquo et finis sed solum causa formalis ut ait p h i l o s o p h u s quanto magis in metaphysicis et divinis Et hoc est quod homo divinus prohibetur habere patrem et matrem super terram Matth23 In quibus verbis [Sic est omnis qui natus est ex spiritu Ioh 38] significatur quod opus divinum ut sic non habet non curat nec cogitat nec intuetur principium nec finem sed solum deum causam formalem lsquoamator factus sum formae illiusrsquo


Her intentions which are acts of her will constitutemdashalong with the appropri-ate bodily movementsmdashthe outer act

But what of those passages in the English versions of Eckhartrsquos works where he seems to speak of intentions in a way directly contrary to my claims here ie as an attitude we should adopt toward our final end Take for instance a line from the early German work Rede der underscheidunge in the version of Edmund Colledge where Eckhart is speaking of the detached person ldquoHe has only God and his intention is toward God alonerdquo (McGinn Essential Sermons 251 a translation of DW 520111) The original has und meinet aleine got liter-ally ldquoand means God alonerdquo The crucial question is the rendering of the verb meinen (and the noun form meinung) which Colledge regularly (and Walshe sometimes as well as Quint in the modern German translation) gives as ldquointen-tionrdquo (German Absicht) But this is a translational choice since the Middle High German noun can mean a variety of things including sense meaning thought intention will friendship love attitude or disposition93 In the present case I think Walshersquos version ldquothinks only of Godrdquo (to which Eckhart later adds the caution ldquobut not in a continuous and equal thinking of Himrdquo) is more consis-tent than Colledgersquos with Eckhartrsquos stated views on living without why94

But there are certain passages in his Latin writings where Eckhart uses the term intentio in ways that seem precisely to parallel the Middle High German und meinet aleine got ie where he speaks of God as the end or goal as in In Ioh n68 just cited

The principal of an activity brings about nothing beyond its nature ac-cordingly if the goal of your intention is God [si finis intentionis tuae est deus] and nothing else then your deed will be divine good worthy of eternal life worthy of God ldquoI am your rewardrdquo (Gn 151) This deed the Father begins in you who also completes it95


The choice of the English ldquointentionrdquo is unavoidable here but what does it mean To begin withmdashand quite apart from Eckhartrsquos many explicit rejections of ldquothe means-end construction of liferdquomdashnote the peculiarity in speaking of

93 Cf Matthias Lexer Mittelhochdeutsches Taschenwoumlrterbuch mit grammatischer Einleitung (Leipzig Verlag von S Hirzel 1881) 117

94 Examples of this kind are copious but I restrict myself to this one for reasons of economy95 Nihil agit ultra suam speciem principium operationis ergo si finis intentionis tuae deus nihil praeter

eum ipsum opus divinum bonum dignum erit vita aeterna dignum deo merces eius solus deus Gen 151 lsquoego merces tuarsquo Ipsum pater in te principiat qui et finit


God as opposed to ldquothe vision of Godrdquo or ldquoattaining Godrdquo as a goal and also in talking of God as the ldquogoal of [an] intentionrdquo A statement of intention typically has its own goal or end-state built in eg to bake a loaf of bread How does God become a goal of that kind of intention I suggest these peculiarities are explained by the sentence that follows ldquoThis deed the Father begins in you who also completes itrdquo Eckhart was fond of quoting Jn 1410 where Jesus says ldquoThe Father dwelling in me does the worksrdquo What is true of Jesus-the-Son is also true of us qua Sons-by-grace-of-adoption The person who has emptied herself and turned decisively toward God within her has in this (very literal) sense in-tended (ie pointed herself toward) God thereby making the divine attributes (Goodness Justice etc) her motive I suggest we should understand Eckhartrsquos admonition to ldquomake God the goal of your intentionrdquo in this sense we have a choice between living our lives as ldquomerchantsrdquo or as ldquogerehterdquo just ones Sons In either case we must have intentions to structure our deeds For merchants those intentions ultimately aim at ldquoprofitrdquo for themselves from with-out for a Son they aim at God who ldquobegins the deed [in the Son] and also completes itrdquo But God can have no external goals whatsoever God performs in eternity one act only the generation of the Son thus the homo divinus acting in time must do the same mutatis mutandis the performance of various acts of justice and goodness are different forms of a single act the Birth of the Son Why did Elisabeth perform her many acts of tending to the sick ldquoFor the glory of Godrdquo which I take to mean as an expression an outward manifestation a birth-giving of the divine in the ground of her soul In this sense God can be the goal (and of course source) of her intention in each single act of tending the sick

I have not found any discussion of the distinction between intention and motive among Eckhartrsquos modern interpreters This may help explain why there is sometimes a lack of clarity in what they write on key questions When Ales-sandra Beccarisi for instance says that

God in whom the general perfections are united is at work in man to the extent he is good or just that is in man in a non-creaturely sense who is not guided by external principles but rather lsquoattends to no why outside himself rsquo but acts only through himself 96

she is right about Eckhart but what precisely is meant by the phrases ldquonot guided by external principlesrdquo and ldquoacts only through himself rdquo Is she referring here to intentions Or motives So too with Theo Kobusch

96 Beccarisi ldquoZu Predigt 1rdquo in Lectura II 16


This [ground-act of ] self-negation detaching from oneself and sur-rendering is to be thought of as a movement of the will For this reason Eckhart can speak in the same sense of ldquogiving up the willrdquo It is not at all that giving up the will makes a person will-less rather it annihilates only the ldquonatural willrdquo to use the terminology of Eckhart and Hegel that is the particular will with its drives desires and inclinations97

True enough but Kobusch does not specify what ldquogiving uprdquo this ldquonatural willrdquo that ldquodoes not make one will-lessrdquo might mean In medieval thought acts (or actualizations) of will (voluntas) can include inclinations desires choices intentions enjoyment etc to which one can appropriately add motives-in- general (ie as distinct from intentions) Which is it that Eckhartrsquos ldquogenuine manrdquo gives up

In an important passage for this theme Kobusch writes

The object of every act of will is the good However while the crea-turely will always wants only ldquothisrdquo or ldquothatrdquo that is wants ldquoto haverdquo the moral person places his will in the Good that lies beyond all ways in the simply and unconditionally Good or as Eckhart says the ldquoAbsolute Goodrdquo the Good in its truth This moral good in the sense of general justice cannot be an object of the will like the many external goods Rather as the actually and finally willed it determines the essence of the human being So that everything that one does out of willing this absolute good bears the character of the moral98

I agree with the first italicized phrase but not with the suggestion in the next two sentences if the terms ldquowilledrdquo and ldquowillingrdquo are meant to designate some special ldquoultimaterdquo goal since this would automatically imply a ldquowhyrdquo and thus would impute to Eckhart an un-Eckhartian claim ldquoLive not for this why but for that onerdquo99 Instead I suggest we see Eckhart as using (tacitly) a distinction between motive and intention His ldquogeneral justicerdquo of the homo divinus is the new motive replacing the merchantrsquos reward-motive the ldquowhyrdquo of the ldquonatural personrdquo that we should reject But it is a motive we reject not the framework of

98 Ibid 56ndash57 emphases added99 I find a similar confusion in Largier Meister Eckhart 1746 ldquoIn his criticism [in Pr 1] of the

lsquomerchantsrsquo Eckhart is aiming primarily at the why at the intentional actions of human beings rdquo (Emphasis added) In my view the target is a motive not the framework of intentional action itself which as I have stressed is indispensable

97 Kobusch ldquoMystikrdquo 54 The Eckhart text referred to is in DW V4512


means and ends itself Acting out of this core the divine one is motivated to do all that she does The Eckhartian agent becomes new in that she now has a dif-ferent motivation for everything she does including those samemdashintentionalmdashdeeds eg attending to the needs of her guests (Martha) or of the poor and sick (Elisabeth) which she might formerly have performed out of a different and on Eckhartrsquos view radically inferior motivation

Putting the point differently if onersquos actions (eg tending the sick or serving a guest) were not intentional they could not express any motive at all A con-sciously motivated act is ipso facto intentional Only an external goal or inten-tion one that implies acting from the conviction of creaturehood makes onersquos action unworthy according to Eckhart since its motivation is inconsistent with ldquogeneral justicerdquo

I once said and it is very true Whatever a man draws into himself or receives from without is wrong (unreht) One should not receive God nor consider Him as outside oneself but as onersquos own and as what is within oneself100


What one might ask of bodily needs eg for food and drink Is attending to them automatically unreht for Eckhart Again it depends on the motivation To treat food and drink as components of onersquos happiness or completion is to regard oneself as essentially embodied which for Eckhart is a serious error But the use of intellectual capacities which are essential to us and to our happiness requires as things stand care of the body and hence food and drink

A spiritual merchantrsquos failing is not that she has goals or intentions in her ac-tions these are unavoidable Her error is to perform her good deeds out of an instrumental conception of virtue She misunderstands herself and her relationship to Godmdashwhich she takes to be purely analogical in naturemdashand hence her mo-tivation is defective (unreht) Hers is a reward-motivation oriented to a future or further end an end ldquofrom withoutrdquo Her actions are based on the misconcep-tion that her eudaimonia lies in something to be achieved by her own virtuous deeds consisting either in those deeds themselves (Aristotle) or in a state of beatitude outside of and attained either entirely by grace (Augustine) or also in part by her meritorious works (Thomas) As we have seen what underlies this whole way of thinking is the conviction that we are beings entirely separate from

100 Ich sprach einest alhie und ist ouch wȃr waz der mensche ȗzer im ziuhet oder nimet dem ist unreht Man ensol got niht nemen noch ahten ȗzer im sunder als mȋn eigen und daz in im ist


God One wonders whether Eckhart could have been thinking ironically of his august and learned predecessors when he wrote in the final paragraph of Pr 6

Some simple folk imagine they will see God as if He were standing there and they here That is not so God and I are one101


101 Sumlȋche einveltige liute waelignent sie suumlln got sehen als er dȃ stande und sie hie Des enist niht Got und ich wir sint ein

206

7

Living without Why Conclusion

Meister Eckhartrsquos critique of the medieval conception of the will turns out in the end not to be a rejection of purposeful or intentional action per se nor a quietistic call to withdrawal from the world say in the later spirit of Miguel de Molinos1 As we have seen it is not acting intentionally per se that is the focus of his criticismmdashto criticize and theorize as he did in treatises and sermons is of course itself to act intentionallymdashbut rather to act intentionally with what he metaphorically characterizes as the ldquomercantilerdquo mentality Ministering to the sick and the poor (Elisabeth) or attending to the needs of onersquos guest (Martha) are intentional purposeful actions But according to Eckhart those holy women did not perform their deeds ldquoin order that our Lord may give them something in return or that God may do something they wish formdashall [such] are merchantsrdquo (Pr 1)

To escape from mercantilism in Eckhartrsquos view it is not enoughmdashit is perhaps not even rightmdashto engage in asceticism or to remove oneself from the turbulence and demands of the world Neither Elisabeth nor Martha are praised for such practices In the imagery of Pr 2 each is ldquoa virgin who is [also] a wiferdquo virginal in that by detachment they emptied the Temple of their souls so that God alone might dwell there but also wifely in that their detachment allowed the begetting of ldquomany and big fruitsrdquo in works of justice and love

Numberless indeed are [a wifersquos] labors begotten of the most noble ground or to speak more truly of the very ground where the Father

1 This is so even though there are many terminological conceptual and even biographical similar-ities between him and Eckhart Molinosrsquos work initially widely influential in Rome and praised even by his friend Pope Innocent XI was later condemned by Innocent (1687) Sadly Molinos himself was imprisoned and tortured for heresy Eckhart was fortunate to have avoided this fate

L iv ing w i th out W hy C on clu s i on 207

ever begets His eternal Wordmdashit is thence she becomes fruitful and shares in the procreation2


ldquoThe most noble groundrdquo as we saw is the essence of the soul wherein no dis-tinction can be drawn between God and soul other than that the one engenders and the other is engendered Whoever acts from this ground acts divinelymdashie justly wisely etcmdashbe the act ever so humble in worldly terms There is no suggestion in Eckhartrsquos writings that our involvement in the world should be reduced to a minimum he certainly did not do so in his own busy career as lese- und lebemeister (ldquomaster of letters and of liferdquo as Heidegger called him3) As scholar teacher preacher and administrator of his order Eckhart was outstand-ingly successful and all of these tasks involve countless intentional deeds and a willingness if not eagerness to accept substantial responsibility touching the lives of many people To use his own metaphor the Meister was by all accounts himself both ldquovirgin and wiferdquo

Eckhart did not invent the injunction ldquoto live without whyrdquo Conceptually the idea is almost certainly inspired by the thought of Bernard of Clairvaux the great twelfth-century Cistercian who wrote in his commentary on the Song of Songs ldquoI love because I love I love that I may loverdquo4 The first known use of the phrase ldquoto live without whyrdquo has been traced to the Cistercian Abbess Beatrijs van Nazareth (d 1268) whence it was used in the writings of the well-known Beguines Hadewijch of Brabant and Marguerite Porete5 Porete had the tragic fate of having her book The Mirror of Simple Souls (in which the term is rendered ldquose donner sans pourquoyrdquo) condemned twice as a result of which she herself was burned at the stake in Paris in 1310 Eckhart who returned to Paris the following year as regent master and lived in the same house as Margueritersquos chief inquisitor very likely got to know this book but he had also been using the notion decades earlier in his ver-nacular Talks of Instruction (1294)

2 [V]ruht joch ȃne zal gebernde und vruhtbaeligre werdende ȗz dem aller edelsten grunde noch baz gesprochen jȃ ȗz dem selben grunde dȃ der vater ȗz gebernde ist sȋn ȇwic wort dar ȗz wirt sie vruhtbaeligre mitgebernde

3 Der Feldweg (Frankfurt am Main Vittorio Klostermann Verlag 1986) 44 Amo quia amo amo ut amem From Sermones in Cantica Canticorum 834 PL 1831183 The

concept is used by Bernard in a number of places and is central in his treatise De diligendo Deo5 At around the same time the notion also appears in the religious poetry of the Italian Spiritual

Franciscan Jacopone da Todi (d 1306) an interesting medieval example of rapid transmission from a Dutch original into other vernaculars


When in fact virtue performs itself more by itself and for love of virtue without any why or whereforemdashthen one has the perfection of virtue and not before6


Though he was not the first Eckhart was probably the most influential user of this idea which went on to appear in the fourteenth-century Theologia Deutsch as well as in the mystical writings of Catherine of Genoa (d 1510) who lived a life reminiscent of St Elisabeth of Thuringia and Angelus Silesius (d 1677) whose use of the theme later would attract the attention of Heidegger7 Eckhart was surely the first to give the notion of living without why a thoroughgoing theological and philosophical justification the outlines of which were laid out in chapters 5 and 6 In its simplest formulation we should live without why because it is our task in life to lay aside our creaturely nature and identifymdashwith the help of divine gracemdashwith the essence and ground of the intellectual soul in this identification we achieve indistinct union with God and God exists and acts without why These claims whichmdashas we just sawmdashthey repeatedly found fer-tile ground among Christians before and after Eckhart8 apparently shocked his Inquisitors Thus although those claims were grounded in the work of respected philosophical patristic and theological authorities (which may have made them doubly troubling to the Papal Court) they were condemned9 This fact which likely contributed to the disappearance of many of Eckhartrsquos treatises may well be the reason why even at Catholic institutions his work is rarely given the atten-tion it would seem to deserve

But if Catholic thinkers treat Eckhart with suspicion secular philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition ignore him virtually completely Indeed his work would likely strike most of them as bizarre even though that work is rooted in some of the most revered names in the history of the discipline Bernard

6 und wenne si wuumlrket sich als mȇr durch sich selber und durch die minne der tugent und umbe kein warumbemdashdenne hȃt man die tugent volkomenlȋche und niht ȇ

7 My sketch of the conceptrsquos history is indebted to Louise Gnaumldinger ldquoDie spekulative Mystik im lsquoCherubinischen Wandersmannrsquo des Johannes Angelus Silesiusrdquo Studi Germanici Neue Folge 4 (1966) 29ndash59 and 145ndash90 at 174ndash82 Of the Theologia Deutsch Martin Luther later wrote in the preface to his own 1518 edition of that work ldquoNext to the Bible and St Augustine no book has ever come into my hands from which I have learned more of God and Christ and man and all things that arerdquo Of course such exuberant praise from the Reformer probably did little to inspire enthusiasm among Catholics for that book and the (Eckhartian) mystical mode of thought it contains

8 Though as my brief survey showed these Christians were often enough condemned as heretics The theme has also had its adherents among Jews Muslims and members of other (and no) religions

9 Kurt Flasch argues that the condemnation if not laudable was at least to be expected quite apart from any political or personal animosities given the philosophical and theological climate among Catholic clerics in the 1320s Cf Flasch Meister Eckhart ch 20


McGinn has provided a valuable overview of Eckhartrsquos sources which were clas-sical scriptural patristic and later Christian Jewish and Muslim Eckhart had command of a vast array of learning he could (and did) provide trenchant argu-ments and could cite respected antecedents for each of his positions10

Aristotle was the ancient thinker most frequently cited by Eckhart in whose era the works of ldquothe Philosopherrdquo were still being digested by Christian think-ers11 But he also called Plato ldquothe great priestrdquo doubtless a sign of his respect (though he had hardly any direct access to Platonic texts) Clearly he saw Plato through the lens of Neoplatonism and not so much the Neoplatonism of Ploti-nus and Porphyry as that of later writers such as Proclus the Pseudo- Dionysius and the author(s) of the Book of Causes His crucial division of the intellect into passive and active parts is thoroughly Aristotelian as is the contention that when the intellect is still ldquoemptyrdquo (ie prior to knowing) it is literally a no-thing Equally Aristotelian as we saw in chapter 6 is the important interpretation he makes of the division of the soul in the Gospel of John into the three parts veg-etative sensory and intellectual

True the notion of a univocal relationship between the intellect and God has only faint echoes in Aristotle namely in the latterrsquos reference to the (active) intellect as ldquoimmortal and eternalrdquo (and thus presumably divine or akin thereto) as well as in the well-known sections in book X of Nicomachean Ethics about the life of contemplation as ldquodivinerdquo based as it is in the highest part of the soul the intellect But the ideas of the ineffability of the One of our univocal relationship with It and of our mission to return to the original union with It all are clearly present in the emanationist thought of Neoplatonic thinkers From there it is but a short step to the notion of the birth of Godrsquos Son (Image Word etc) in the soul or for that matter to that of the ultimate return to the Godhead a step which Eckhart refers to as the ldquobreakthroughrdquo

So Eckhartrsquos philosophical pedigree is flawless Yet although Plato and Aristotle (sometimes with at least a passing reference to Augustine Aquinas and even William of Ockham) are taught today in virtually every Western- oriented philosophy department in most of them Eckhartrsquos thoroughly Platonic Aristotelian works must seem outlandish Why is this With some few excep-tions (notably at Catholic universities) Western philosophy departments today are dominated by a scientific (and often scientistic) outlook inherited from Cartesianism and especially British empiricism To the extent that these latter movements have their original roots in classical philosophy these are not with Plato and Aristotle but rather with the views of the Atomists Talk of God is

10 McGinn Mystical Thought 162ndash8211 In Pr15 alonemdasha vernacular sermon no lessmdashwhich is a mere five pages in Walshersquos English

translation Eckhart cites Aristotle by name seven times


today often relegated to the religious studies department while the philosophy of psychology takes its cues largely from neuroscience and computationalism and the general outlook is often dubbed ldquonaturalisticrdquo12 And yet some essential aspects of Eckhartrsquos project are not altogether beyond the range of interests of philosophers within this self-styled naturalist tradition One sign of this is the mainstream revival of virtue ethics in recent decades which of course has its roots in Aristotle and his successors The idea that virtuous behavior is the core of living well lies close to the heart of Eckhartrsquos views

In addition I have at several points alluded to similarities especially in the sphere of ethics between Eckhart and Kant almost universally regarded as the greatest of early modern philosophers No one could have had more admiration for Newtonian science than Kant did yet in his moral philosophy he found it necessary to make room for normative elements that themselves go beyond the concepts used in the modern natural sciences13 Thus Kant held that the only way to explain the rational demands of duty was to appeal to the autonomy of the will and human freedom and hence to the notion of a noumenal self beyond the spatio-temporal realm universally governed by causal laws of nature In this separate realm the will as practical reason can formulate rationally consistent maxims of action which we experience as ldquocategorical imperativesrdquo This con-ception of a second higher self undisturbed by the distractions of the flesh and thus capable of perfect rationality is reminiscent of Eckhartrsquos view that we are at once ldquocreaturesrdquomdashimmersed in space and timemdashand ldquoSonsrdquo or ldquoImagesrdquo who exist in a transcendent realm where the demands of duty ( Justice Goodness etc) are of primary concern14

Closely related to this similarity is one concerning the will Kant distin-guished between the Wille the will as our capacity to form rationally binding

12 For interesting and somewhat skeptical reflections on philosophic ldquonaturalismrdquo by one of the leading philosophers of science see Hilary Putnam ldquoThe Content and Appeal of lsquoNaturalismrsquordquo in Philosophy in an Age of Science Physics Mathematics and Skepticism eds Mario de Caro and David Macarthur (Cambridge MA Harvard University Press 2012) ch 5

13 Nor should we lose sight of the fact that Eckhart himself was every bit as much of a ldquoscien-tific thinkerrdquo as Kant though the dominant science (or ldquonatural philosophyrdquo) of his day was (neo-) Aristotelian which was on its way to becoming an active questioning discipline in its own right (The great Nicole Oresme who among other things proposed the rotation of the Earth 200 years before Copernicus was born in the final decade of Eckhartrsquos life)

14 Of course both Kant and Eckhartmdashand indeed most Christian thinkersmdashhave to confront the thorny issue how this purer noumenal self could fall ie allow itself in the absence of sensate temp-tations to turn away from the demands of reason Kantrsquos notion of ldquoradical evilrdquo is his version of the classical Augustinian notion of ldquooriginal sinrdquo and his most sustained treatment of these issues is in his Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason eds Allen Wood and George Digiovanni (Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1998) Eckhartrsquos more cursory treatment is in his In Gen I nn201 ff LW 1348 ff


or acceptable goals for action (ldquomaximsrdquo) and Willkuumlr our capacity for choice ie for adopting or rejecting those maxims a distinction reminiscent of that of Augustine between the original free will (libera voluntas lost for us by Adam and Eve) and free choice (liberum arbitrium) Kant writes ldquo[T]here is in man a power of self-determination independent of any coercion through sensuous impulsesrdquo15 as rational beings we (can) act according to concepts But Willkuumlr he calls a ldquopathologically affected capacity of choicerdquo since we are subject to sen-sual inclinations16 Whereas Wille represents the demand of the moral law to act in accordance with it Willkuumlr is our power to choose to act on that demand or not and can determine the ground or rationale of our acting on it The morally good person not only chooses ie exercises her Willkuumlr in accord with the com-mands of Wille ie acts in accord with the moral law she also acts out of respect for it In Eckhartian terms she is gereht just and not a merchant Similar is the Eckhartian notion of the Birth in which the agent qua Son surrenders her natu-ral desires for self-realization and acts in accord with her internalized demands of Justice Wisdom etc17

It might be thought that this notion of acting according to the divine will is automatically heteronomous and thus directly contrary to Kantrsquos insistence that the moral must be autonomous But this would be a complete misunderstand-ing of Eckhart in whose view the divine is precisely not ldquoan Otherrdquo except to the extent we (mistakenly) identify ourselves with the phenomenal self Indeed what could be more Kantian in spirit and less heteronomous than Eckhartrsquos pro-vocative claim in Pr 6 that ldquothe just are so set on justice that if God were not just they would not care a bean for Godrdquo This is surely close to a formulation of the categorical imperative Or in the same sermon ldquoIf you count one thing more than another that is not the right way You must go right out of self-willrdquo18

15 Immanuel Kantrsquos Critique of Pure Reason trans Norman Kemp Smith (London Macmillan amp Co 1964) 465

16 Immanuel Kant Critique of Practical Reason trans Lewis White Beck (IndianapolisNew York Bobbs-Merrill Co 1956) 32ndash33

17 In his Erfurter Rede Eckhart wrote ldquothere are two different meanings of lsquowillrsquo the one is an accidental and non-essential will and the other is a decisive will a creative and trained willrdquo [Ez sint zwȇne sinne ze nemenne an dem willen der ein ist ein zuovallender und ein ungewesenter wille der ander ist ein zuoverhengender wille und machender wille und ein gewenter wille] (In RdU n21 DW 52803ndash4 Walshe 513) In Kantian terms the distinction might be that between a Willkuumlr that is determined by its ldquopathological affectionsrdquo and one in harmony with the rational demands of Wille of practical reason in its spontaneity In his later writings Eckhart repeatedly refers to this ldquoother willrdquo as the inner dwelling divinely inspired will My thinking about similarities and differences between Eckhart and Kant has been helped by exchanges with Lara Denis

18 Den gerehten menschen den ist alsȏ ernst ze der gerehticheit waeligre daz got niht gereht waeligre sie enahteten eine bȏne niht ȗf got Wigest dȗ daz ein iht mȇr dan daz ander sȏ ist im unreht Dȗ solt dȋnes eigenen willen alzemȃle ȗzgȃn Pr 6 DW I103 1ndash2 102 4ndash5 Walshe 329


where the context makes clear that ldquoself-willrdquo is very like that of a Kantian ldquopatho-logically affectedrdquo Willkuumlr19 For both thinkers the moral task is to rise above demands arising in the realm of ldquothis and thatrdquo (Eckhart) or the ldquophenomenalsensualrdquo (Kant) to those at home in the rational or noumenal20 The Eckhartian obligation of the just one to act justly (and wisely well etc ie according to the transcendental perfections) with no consideration of ldquowhyrdquo seems very much in the Kantian spirit

The most important similarity between the two German thinkers follows directly from the above their hostility to teleological and eudaimonist concep-tions of ethics and their advocacy instead of a form of morality that advocates acting out of an identification with the highest ideals and capacities of which we are capablemdashin a word justice (Eckhart) or duty (Kant) If Kantrsquos deontologi-cal approach to ethics stands against the predominantly teleological or conse-quentialist trend of modern moral thought by the same token Eckhartrsquos ldquolive without whyrdquo represents a very similar revolt against the leading direction of medieval moral philosophy The eminent Kant scholar Paul Guyer has written that Kant ldquoeradicated the last traces of the medieval worldview from modern philosophyrdquo21 While this is doubtless true in some ways (eg the overthrowing in the first Critique of all speculative proofs of Godrsquos existence and the avowed admiration for the Newtonian worldview) one should not overstate the extent of the rejection Kant was raised in a profoundly LutheranPietist household where the notion of duty for its own sake was surely prominent Luther was himself impressed through Eckhartrsquos pupil Johannes Tauler and the treatise Theologia Deutsch by Eckhartian ideas including the notion of living without why It may well be that via this route Eckhartrsquos opposition to teleological eu-daimonism and indeed his deontological viewsmdashrare in medieval thoughtmdash indirectly influenced Kant22

19 That is the self-will is ldquopathologically affectedrdquo Both citations are from Pr6 DW 11024ndash5 and 1031ndash2 Walshe 329

20 Robert Pasnaumdashin his Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature (Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2002) 462ndash63 fn3mdashnotes the kinship between Eckhart and Kant (Leibniz too) on the in-herent dignity of the human intellect which makes humans ldquoends in themselvesrdquo (Kant) and led Eckhart to say that the just soul should be ldquoequal with God and beside God just equal neither below nor aboverdquo (glȋch bȋ gote sȋn und bȋ neben gote rehte glȋch noch unden noch oben) (Pr6 DW 11073ndash4 Walshe 330)

21 Paul Guyer ldquoKant Immanuelrdquo In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy ed E Craig (London Routledge 1998 2004) Retrieved July 13 2012 from httpwwwreproutledgecomarticleDB047

22 For another instance of Kantrsquos indebtednessmdashin his Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reasonmdashto the medieval Christian tradition especially Augustine see Philip Quinnrsquos ldquoIn Adamrsquos Fall We Sinned Allrdquo Philosophical Topics 16 2 (1988) 89ndash118 On the Lutheran aspects of Kantrsquos thought especially in his Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason see the Introduction by Robert Merrihew Adams to the edition of that work by Allen Wood and George DiGiovanni viindashxxxii


Whatever their (indirect) influence on the great Enlightenment thinker (and hence modern secular thought) may have been Eckhartrsquos ethical ideas certainly provoked hostility at the Papal Court in Avignon But it was not because that court regarded Eckhartrsquos philosophical pedigree as inept that it found reason for its harsh condemnation Here is the opening section in full of Pope John XXIIrsquos In agro dominico (In the field of the Lord)

In the field of the Lord over which we though unworthy are guardians and laborers by heavenly dispensation we ought to exercise spiritual care so watchfully and prudently that if an enemy should ever sow tares over the seeds of truth (Mt 1328) they may be choked at the start before they grow up as weeds of an evil growth Thus with the destruc-tion of the evil seed and the uprooting of the thorns of error the good crop of Catholic truth may take firm root We are indeed sad to report that in these days someone by the name of Eckhart from Germany a doctor of sacred theology (as is said) and a professor of the Order of Preachers wished to know more than he should and not in accordance with sobriety and the measure of faith because he turned his ear from the truth and followed fables The man was led astray by the Father of Lies who often turns himself into an angel of light in order to replace the light of truth with a dark and gloomy cloud of the senses and he sowed thorns and obstacles contrary to the very clear truth of faith in the field of the Church and worked to produce harmful thistles and poisonous thorn bushes He presented many things as dogma that were designed to cloud the true faith in the hearts of many things which he put forth especially before the uneducated crowd in his sermons and that he also admitted into his writings23

(LW 55972ndash17 Essential 77)

23 In agro dominico cuius dispositione superna licet inmeriti sumus custodes et operarii oportet nos sic vigilanter et prudenter spiritualem exercere culturam ut siquando in eo inimicus homo supra semen veritatis zizania seminet priusquam se in incrementa noxie pullulationis extollant prefocentur in ortu ut enecato semine vitiorum et spinis errorum evulsis leta seges veritatis catholicae coalescat Sane dolenter referimus quod quidam hiis temporibus de partibus Theutonie Ekardus nomine doctorque ut fertur sacre pagine ac professor ordinis fratrum Predicatorum plura voluit sapere quam oportuit et non ad sobrietatem neque secumdum mensuram fidei quia a veritate auditum avertens ad fabulas se conversit Per illum enim patrem mendacii qui se frequenter in lucis angelum transfigurat ut obscuram et tetram caliginem sensuum pro lumine veritatis effundat homo iste seductus contra lucidissimam veritatem fidei in agro ecclesie spinas et tribulos germinans ac nocivos carduos et venenosos palliuros producere stagens dogmatizavit multa fidem veram in cordibus multorum obnubilantia que docuit quam maxime coram vulgo simplici in suis predica-tionibus que etiam redegit in scriptis March 27 1329


There has been much discussion in the past few decades whether John XXIIrsquos claims about Eckhartrsquos teaching are in fact true were they really contrary to Catholic dogma Evidence has recently emerged that the Vatican has in effect tacitly overturned the negative conclusions of the Bull of 132924 Among the arguments for such a reversal was the presentation of proof that much of what Eckhart taught is to be found in earlier fathers and doctors of the church

Whether or not Eckhartrsquos theological views were in fact heretical the effect of the Bull was to cast a cloud over his name which surely inhibited the free discus-sion of his views since the Bull threatened with a charge of heresy ldquoanyone [who] should presume to defend or approve the same articlesrdquo But given the impres-sive authorities Eckhart offered in his own defense many have wondered what motivated the condemnation (which as we saw targeted among other things an articlemdashon the per se nothingness of creaturesmdashthat had been expressly endorsed by the recently canonized Aquinas) Aside from ecclesial and secular politics in Cologne and beyond one element in the papal readiness to issue the Bull clearly lies in its mentions of Eckhartrsquos vernacular preaching to ldquothe uned-ucated crowdrdquo and the ldquohearts of the simplerdquo John XXII himself the son of a French shoemaker had risen to eminence via the study of medicine and law and had controversial theological views of his own He and his court were alarmed that the deliberately provocative Eckhart25 was preaching in the vernacular to ordinary Christians and not simply circulating his controversial ideas in Latin among other scholars Many have noted that in this troubled era of the churchrsquos history the authorities were especially vigilant against any signs of the ldquoheresy of the lsquofree spiritrsquordquo In his book on this theme Robert Lerner catches what the church regarded as the central faults of this movement namely ldquotwo heresiesrdquo

Pantheism (or more properly autotheism ) and antinomianism that is not only can a soul become one with God but in consequence of such a state it can ignore the moral law26

The earliest traces of this trend were thought to be found in Amalric of Bena (cf chapter 4) and others early in the thirteenth century but ecclesiastical vigi-lance was heightened in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries when such views came to be attributed to some of the lay Beghards and Beguines such

24 Markus Vinzent describes the decades-long attempt by English Dominicans and other Eu-ropean scholars to have the condemnation revoked Though the results are somewhat unclear the efforts appear to have been successful see his ldquoDiscussion Meister Eckhart rehabilitated by the Poperdquo httpacademicicloud9networkcomblogaspxbid=10026

25 Eckhart prided himself on the effects of his teaching nova et rara ldquothe new and unusualrdquo Prolgen n2 LW 11491

26 Lerner Heresy 1


as Marguerite Porete That Eckhart gave an appearance of having taken up their cause was surely one reason for the Bullrsquos strong condemnation

I want to suggest that one central aspect of his views may have been espe-cially provocative Eckhart taught that salvation lies within Each human being has a divine core in the passive intellect Grace-1 is given to all the virtues-1 are clearly possible for all (non-Christians and Christians alike) and there is noth-ing in his writings to suggest that grace-2 ie the sharing in the life of the Trinity is available only to baptized Christians If Plato was ldquothe great priestrdquo this was not because the venerable pre-Christian-era Athenian had been ordained by some bishop It would seem to follow though Eckhart did not say so openly that membership in the Catholic Church and use of the sacraments are not strictly necessary for salvation27 This is not to say that in his eyes the church was super-fluous As conservator and interpreter of the scriptures the church was for Eck-hart an immensely important institution something he sought to represent in exemplary fashion in his own roles of teacher and preacher Still the suggestion of his work is hard to overlook the crucial step toward salvation is detachment and the rest must be left to God Indeed many of his most trenchant criticisms are of what he regarded as excessive and unnecessary ascetic practices found in some religious orders as well as among the laity

Eckhartrsquos teaching thus implies I contend that the church hierarchy does not have the authority to control access to salvation He nowhere says this explicitly but he did not always leave the implication altogether hidden In the powerful Pr 5b on the text (1 Jn49) ldquoGodrsquos love was disclosed and revealed to us in this that God sent His only-begotten Son into the world that we might live with the Son and in the Son and through the Sonrdquo Eckhart stresses that in the Incarna-tion God not only became man but also ldquotook on human naturerdquo28 (DW 186 Walshe 108) We praise and magnify Christ

because He was a messenger from God to us and has brought our blessedness to us The blessedness He brought us was our own Where the Father bears His Son in the innermost ground this nature flows in there Whoever would exist in the nakedness of this nature free

27 He avoids such a claim even in his almost extravagant paean to the Eucharist in the twentieth of the Talks of Instruction Access to the sacramentsmdashand thus by traditional Catholic teachingmdashto the possibility of salvation was and still is a powerful disciplinary tool in the hands of the church hierarchy (Compare the attempts by some US Catholic bishops to deny access to the eucharist to prochoice politicians) On Eckhartrsquos views see also Markus Vinzent ldquoSalus extra ecclesiam Meister Eckharts Institutionenskepsisrdquo in Mystik Recht und Freiheit Religioumlse Erfahrung und kirchliche Institu-tionen im Spaumltmittelalter eds Dietmar Mieth and Britta Muumlller-Schauenburg (Stuttgart Verlag W Kohlhammer 2012)

28 [Got] hȃt menschlȋche natȗre an sich genomen


from all mediation must have left behind all distinction of persons [Further] you must be pure of heart for that heart alone is pure that has abolished creatureliness As surely as the Father in His simple nature bears the Son naturally just as surely He bears Him in the inmost re-cesses of the spirit and this is the inner world Here Godrsquos ground is my ground and my ground is Godrsquos ground Out of this inmost ground all your works should be wrought without why 29

(Ibid874ndash9012 Walshe 108ndash09 emphasis added)

This is all familiar territory by now but based on it Eckhart in his conclusion to this sermon boldly states

People often say to me ldquoPray for merdquo And I think ldquoWhy do you go out Why do you not stay within yourself and draw on your own treasure For you have the whole truth in its essence within yourdquo That we may thus truly stay within that we may possess all truth immediately with-out distinction in true blessedness may God help us Amen30

(Pr5b DW 1954ndash963 Walshe 111)

In this sermon Eckhart gives a capsule summary of his teaching on salvation The only role for the church explicitly recognized is that of its teachers die meister among whom he counts himself (and he heremdashas oftenmdashcorrects the ldquocommon opinionrdquo of the others) The sacraments are not mentioned nor the cross nor the Resurrection Crucial is the Birth the inner one and essential to it is detachment As a result it is a mistake if we look to any other human being to mediate for us which would of course be a prime example of attachment ldquoWhy do you go outrdquo he asks the treasure is within you The pope and the Curia can scarcely have overlooked the threat this contained to their authority and control it was perhaps meant as one of the ldquomany things [Eckhart taught] designed to cloud the true faith in the hearts of manyrdquo as the Bull states But it is not included directly in the list of incriminated doctrines a curious omission given

29 wan er ist gewesen ein bote von gote ze uns und hȃt uns zuo getragen unser saeliglicheit Diu saeliglicheit die er uns zuo truoc diu was unser Dȃ der vater sȋnen sun gebirt in dem innersten grunde dȃ hȃt ein ȋnsweben disiu natȗre swer in der blȏzheit dirre natȗre ȃne mitel sol bestȃn der muoz aller persȏnen ȗzgegangen sȋn Ze dem andern mȃle solt dȗ reines herzen sȋn wan daz herze aleine reine daz alle geschaffenheit vernihtet hȃt Als waeligrlȋche der vater in sȋner einvaltigen natȗre gebirt sȋnen sun natiurlȋche als gewaeligrliche gebirt er in in des geistes innigestez und diz ist diu inner werlt Hie ist gotes grunt mȋn grunt und mȋn grunt gotes grunt Ȗzer disem innersten grunde solt dȗ wuumlrken alliu dȋniu werk sunder warumbe

30 Die liute sprechent dicke zuo mir bitet vuumlr mich Sȏ gedenke ich war umbe gȃt ir ȗz war umbe blȋbet ir niht in iu selben und grȋfet in iuwer eigen guot ir traget doch alle wȃrheit wesenlich in iu Daz wir alsȏ waeligrliche inne muumlezen blicircben daz wir alle wȃrheit besitzen ȃne mitel und ȃne underscheit in rehter saeliglicheit des helfe uns got


its explosive content Perhaps the officials who drew up the Bull were loath even to mention the idea publicly31

The extent of papal authority and hence the correct structure of the Christian Church were very much in dispute in this period A prominent anti-papal figure in these disputes was none other than the Franciscan William of Ockham After being embroiled during the 1320s in the conflict with John XXII over the issue of Christian poverty32 Ockham wound up fleeing for protection from papal wrath to the court of Ludwig IV of Bavaria one of the claimants to the imperial crown and an enemy of the pope There William composed polemical tracts against John as well as more generally against papal claims to supremacy over secular rulers

Ockham is of special interest here because in conclusion I wish to return to the question raised earlier why does Eckhartrsquos work receive so little notice from Anglo-American philosophers Eckhart and Ockham may well have known one another personally33 They surely knew of one anotherrsquos works at least to the extent that those works had aroused papal suspicion For remark-ably enough both of them were under investigation by the Curia in Avignon at the same time We know nothing of any interaction between them but Ockham later ridiculed some of Eckhartrsquos philosophical views including the proposi-tion that all creatures are in themselves a pure nothing The proposition is a straightforward consequence of Eckhartrsquos views on the relationship between Creator and created and as we saw above had earlier been endorsed by Thomas Aquinas Ockham derided the idea ldquoand others similar most absurd [which] were advanced by a certain master of theology of the Order of Preachers called Aychardus [sic] a German who afterwards came to Avignon and when investigators had been assigned to him did not deny that he had taught and preached themrdquo34 Ockhamrsquos scorn in these sentences was surely heightened by his polemical intent in writing them in 1334 for the context is one of an attack

31 The contrast between ldquogoing outrdquo and ldquostaying withinrdquo is a commonplace in Neoplatonic thought and it was also an important theme for Augustine Cf OrsquoDonovan Problem of Self-Love 71 ff

32 Ockham lent his considerable rhetorical skills to defense of the views of the Franciscan ldquoSpiri-tualsrdquo the party that held that Jesus and his disciples had owned no property either individually or collectively a position implicitly critical of the pomp and wealth of the papacy and of many bishops cardinals abbots etc

33 Eckhart may also have been personally acquainted with another eminent British Franciscan John Duns Scotus with whom he overlapped in Paris during the academic year 1302ndash1303 He cer-tainly conducted a disputation important parts of which survive with the General of the Franciscan Order whose assistant Scotus was

34 [E]t alia similia absurdissima opinabatur quidam magister in theologia de ordine Fratrum Praedi-catorum nomine Aycardus Theutonicus de quibus accusatus fuit primo vel denunciatus Qui postea veniens in Avinionem assignatis sibi auditoribus se praedicta docuisse et praedicasse non negavit Dialogus III22viii ldquoDe potestate papae et clerirdquo Text and tr by John Scott at httpwwwbritacacukpubsdialogust32d2Conhtml


on John XXII whom he (bizarrely) presents as endorsing Eckhartrsquos teachings (did he not know of the papal condemnation) But there can be no doubt that he whom one might call a ldquoprogressive Aristotelianrdquo genuinely had little or no sympathy for Eckhartrsquos Neoplatonist views

To secular Anglo-American philosophers Ockham is probably the most accessible and appealing medieval thinker Like them he had strong interests in logic and the workings of language to both of which fields he made important contributions He was also actively involved in the emerging critique of Aristo-telian physical science took a dim view of teleological explanations (except with respect to human actions) andmdashas already notedmdashchampioned something like the separation of church and state He was also an ethical voluntarist his views on universals at times seem nominalist and he clearly had an empiricist bent In all of this we can see an ancestor of Hobbes Locke Hume Mill and Russell in other words of a dominant stream in Anglo-American thought By contrast Eck-hart with his focus on the intellect the self and the transcendent is frequently regarded as a forerunner of German Idealism Thus already in the 1320s the Anglo Continental rift emerges clearly in the collocationmdashif not confrontationmdashof these two great thinkers each defending his cause before the Papal Court in Avi-gnon Perhaps like many another rift this one might profitably be revisited and if not overcome at the least learned from After all in our new century with its environmental climatic financial terrorist and other threatsmdashnot to mention the ever-accelerating pace of our lives and our other personal challengesmdashthe idea of living without why may be more appealing and important than ever

Meister Eckhart has struggled from his own lifetime right down to the pres-ent to be heard and understood correctly Philosophers are proverbially quar-relsome but in Eckhartrsquos case some of the criticsmdashthe accusers in Cologne the papal commission even the polemical Ockhammdashseem not to have made enough effort to understand what he was saying The shadow of the condemna-tion of 1329 then made it dangerous to take Eckhartrsquos part in any of the ongoing disputes Even the powerful cardinal Nicolaus of Cusa who admired Eckhartrsquos thinking wrote in the fifteenth century that ldquohis books should be removed from public places for the people are not ready for what he often interspersesrdquo even though (Cusanus adds) ldquothe intelligent find in [these works] many astute and useful thingsrdquo35 Now that Eckhartrsquos works or what remains of them are fully available and the papal ban has apparently been lifted perhaps both ldquothe peoplerdquo and ldquothe intelligentrdquo will take the trouble to explore the riches of those works and thereby learn why we should in Eckhartrsquos view live without why

35 [S]ed optavit quod libri sui amoverentur de locis publicis quia vulgus non est aptus ad ea quae praeter consuetudinem aliorum doctorum ipse saepe intermiscet licet per intelligentes multa subtilia et utilia in ipsis reperiantur Nicholas of Cusa Apologia doctae ignorantiae vol 2 ed Raymond Klibansky (Leipzig Felix Meiner Verlag 1932) 25 7ndash12

219

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

ADAMS DON ldquoAquinas and Modern Consequentialismrdquo International Journal of Philosophical Studies 124 (December 2004) 395ndash417

ADAMS ROBERT MERRIHEW ldquoIntroductionrdquo In Kant Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Other Writings viindashxxxii

AERTSEN JAN ldquoMeister Eckhartrdquo In A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages eds GRACIA J J C and NOONE T B (Oxford Blackwell 2003)

mdashmdashmdash ldquoMeister Eckhart Eine ausserordentliche Metaphysikrdquo Recherches de Theacuteologie et Philoso-phie Meacutedieacutevales 661 (1999) 1ndash20

ANSCOMBE G E M Intention (Oxford Basil Blackwell 1957)ARISTOTLE Nicomachean Ethics trans ROWE CHRISTOPHER intr and comm BROADIE

SARAH (Oxford Oxford University Press 2002)BAKER LYNNE R ldquoWhy Christians Should Not Be Libertarians An Augustinian Challengerdquo

Faith and Philosophy 20 (2003) 460ndash78BASTABLE PATRICK Desire for God Does Man Aspire Naturally to the Beatific Vision An Analysis

of this Question and Its History (London Burns Oates amp Washbourne Ltd 1947)BECCARISI ALESSANDRA ldquoZu Predigt 1 Intravit Jesus in templumrdquo In STEER and STUR-

LESE Lectura Eckhardi II 1ndash27BEJCZY ISTVAacuteN ed Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages Commentaries on Aristotlersquos Nicomachean

Ethics 1200ndash1500 (Leiden-Boston Brill 2008)BLACKBURN SIMON ed The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Oxford Oxford University

Press 2008)BOETHIUS OF DACIA De Summo Bono in On the Supreme Good On the Eternity of the World

On Dreams ed and trans WIPPEL John Mediaeval Sources in Translation (Toronto ON Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies 1987)

BONNER GERALD ldquoAugustinersquos Doctrine of Man Image of God and Sinnerrdquo Augustinianum 24 (1984) 495ndash514

BOURQUE VERNON ed and trans The Essential Augustine 2nd ed (Indianapolis IN Hackett Publ Co1974)

BRADLEY DENIS Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good (Washington DC Catholic University of America Press 1997)

BROWN PETER Augustine of Hippo A Biography (Berkeley University of California Press 19672000)

BROWN ROBERT F ldquoThe First Evil Will Must Be Incomprehensible A Critique of Augustinerdquo Journal of the American Academy of Religion 463 (1978) 315ndash29

BUSH STEPHEN ldquoDivine and Human Happiness in Nicomachean Ethicsrdquo Philosophical Review 1171 (2008) 49ndash75

220 b i b l i o g r a p h y

BYERS SARAH ldquoThe Meaning of Voluntas in Augustinerdquo Augustinian Studies 372 (2006) 171ndash89

CHAPPELL TIMOTHY Aristotle and Augustine on Freedom (Houndmills and London Macmillan 1995)

mdashmdashmdash ldquoExplaining the Inexplicable Augustine on the Fallrdquo Journal of the American Academy of Religion 623 (1994) 869ndash84

CONNOLLY JOHN ldquoApplicatio and Explicatio in Gadamer and Eckhartrdquo In Gadamers Century Essays in Honor of Hans-Georg Gadamer eds MALPAS J E von ARNSWALD ULRICH and KERTSCHER JENS (CambridgeLondon MIT Press 2002) 77ndash96

mdashmdashmdash ldquoEudaimonism Teleology and the Pursuit of Happiness Meister Eckhart on lsquoLiving without a Whyrsquordquo Faith and Philosophy 263 ( July 2009) 274ndash96

COOPER JOHN M Reason and Human Good in Aristotle Cambridge Harvard University Press 1975

COPLESTON FREDERICK SJ A History of Philosophy Vol 2 Mediaeval Philosophy Part II (Garden City NY Image Books 1962)

CORDNER CHRISTOPHER ldquoAristotelian Virtue and its Limitationsrdquo Philosophy 69 ( July 1994) 291ndash316

DAVIDSON DONALD Essays on Actions amp Events (Oxford Oxford University Press 1980)DAVIES BRIAN The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford Clarendon Press 1992)DE VOGEL C J ldquoOn the Character of Aristotlersquos Ethicsrdquo Schriften zur aristotelischen Ethik ed

MUELLER-GOLDINGEN C (Hildesheim Olms Verlag 1988) 227ndash39DEN BOK NICO W ldquoFreedom of the Will A Systematic and Biographical Sounding of Augus-

tinersquos Thoughts on Human Willrdquo Augustiniana 44 (1994) 237ndash70DI MUZIO GIANLUCA ldquoAristotle on Improving Onersquos Characterrdquo Phronesis 453 (2000)

205ndash19DIHLE ALBRECHT The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity (Berkeley University of California

Press 1982)DONAGAN ALAN ldquoThomas Aquinas on Human Actionrdquo In The Cambridge History of Later Me-

dieval Philosophy eds KRETZMAN N KENNY A and PINBERG J (Cambridge Cam-bridge University Press 1982)

DREYER MECHTHILD and INGHAM MARY BETH The Philosophical Vision of John Duns Scotus An Introduction (Washington DC Catholic University of America Press 2004)

DUCLOW DONALD F ldquolsquoWhose image is thisrsquo in Eckhartrsquos Sermonesrdquo Mystics Quarterly 15 (1989) 29ndash40

FLASCH KURT ed Logik des Schreckens Augustinus von Hippo die Gnadenlehre von 397 (Mainz Dieterichrsquosche Verlagsbuchhandlung 1990)

mdashmdashmdash Meister Eckhart Philosoph des Christentums (Munich C H Beck Verlag 2010)mdashmdashmdash ldquoZu Predigt 6 Justi vivent in aeterumrdquo In STEER GEORG and STURLESE LORIS eds

Lectura Eckhardi II Predigten Meister Eckharts von Fachgelehrten gelesen und gedeutetmdashmdashmdash ldquoZu Predigt 52 Beati pauperes spiriturdquo In STEER GEORG and STURLESE LORIS

eds Lectura Eckhardi I Predigten Meister Eckharts von Fachgelehrten gelesen und gedeutetFORTENBAUGH WILLIAM ldquoAristotle Emotion and Moral Virtuerdquo Arethusa 2 (1969)

163ndash85FREGE GOTTLOB ldquoUumlber Sinn und Bedeutungrdquo Zeitschrift fuumlr Philosophie und philosophische

Kritik 100 (1892) 25ndash50 English translation in GEACH PT and BLACK M (eds)GALLAGHER DAVID ldquoThomas Aquinas on Will as Rational Appetiterdquo Journal of the History of

Philosophy 294 (1991) 559ndash84GEACH PT and BLACK M (eds) ldquoOn Sense and Meaningrdquo Translations from the Philosophical

Writings of Gottlob Frege 3rd ed (Oxford Blackwell 1980)GERSON LLOYD P ldquoPlato Aquinas and the Universal Goodrdquo The New Scholasticism 582

(1984) 131ndash44GNAumlDINGER LOUISE ldquoDie spekulative Mystik im lsquoCherubinischen Wandersmannrsquo des

Johannes Angelus Silesiusrdquo Studi Germanici Neue Folge 4 (1966) 29ndash59 and 145ndash90

b i b l i o g r a p h y 221

GUYER PAUL ldquoKant Immanuelrdquo In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy ed CRAIG E (London Routledge 1998) 200

HADOT PIERRE Plotinus or the Simplicity of Vision (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1993)

HARRISON SIMON Augustinersquos Way into the Will The Theological and Philosophical Significance of De libero arbitrio (OxfordNew York Oxford University Press 2006)

HEIDEGGER MARTIN Der Feldweg (FrankfurtM Vittorio Klostermann Verlag 1986)HOPKO THOMAS ldquoThe Trinity in the Cappadociansrdquo In Christian Spirituality Origins to the

Twelfth Century eds MCGINN BERNARD MEYENDORFF JOHN and LECLERQ JEAN

HUME DAVID Treatise of Human Nature ed L A Selby-Bigge rev P H Nidditch (Oxford Clarendon Press 1978)

HURSTHOUSE ROSALIND Virtue Ethics (Oxford Clarendon Press 1999)IRWIN TERENCE ldquoWho Discovered the Willrdquo In Philosophical Perspectives 6 Ethics ed

TOMBERLIN JAMES (Atascadero CA Ridgeview Publ Co 1992) 453ndash73mdashmdashmdash ed Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 2nd ed (Indianapolis Hackett Publ Co 1999)mdashmdashmdash The Development of Ethics Volume I From Socrates to the Reformation 2nd ed (Oxford

New York Oxford University Press 2011)JEROME Commentariorum in Hiezekielem CCSL 75 ed and trans GLORIE FRANCISCUS

(Turnhout Brepols 1964)JOHNSON GALEN ldquoThe Protestant Reformersrsquo Readings of Romans 9-11 with Modern Criti-

cal Responserdquo Quodlibet Journal 61 (2004)KAHN CHARLES ldquoDiscovering the Will from Aristotle to Augustinerdquo In The Question of lsquoEclecti-

cismrsquo Studies in Later Greek Philosophy eds DILLON JOHN M and LONG AA (Berke-ley University of California Press 1988) 235ndash59

KANT IMMANUEL Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Other Writings eds WOOD ALLEN and DIGIOVANNI GEORGE (Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1998)

mdashmdashmdash Critique of Pure Reason trans KEMP SMITH NORMAN (London Macmillan amp Co 1964)

mdashmdashmdash Critique of Practical Reason trans BECK LEWIS WHITE (IndianapolisNew York Bobbs-Merrill Co 1956)

KENNY ANTHONY ldquoAquinas on Aristotelian Happinessrdquo In Aquinasrsquos Moral Theory Essays in Honor of Norman Kretzmann eds MACDONALD SCOTT and STUMP ELEONORE (Ithaca NY Cornell University Press 1999) 15ndash27

mdashmdashmdash ldquoAristotle on Happinessrdquo Rptin Articles on Aristotle Vol 2 Ethics and Politics eds BARNES J SCHOFIELD M and SORABJI R (London Duckworth 1977) 25ndash32

mdashmdashmdash ldquoThe Thomism of John Paul IIrdquo Rpt in Essays on the Aristotelian Tradition (Oxford Oxford University Press 2000) 119ndash26

KENT BONNIE ldquoThe Moral Liferdquo In The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy ed MCGRADE AS (Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2003) 231ndash53

KEYT DAVID ldquoIntellectualism in Aristotlerdquo In Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy Vol 2 eds ANTON JOHN and PREUS ANTHONY (Albany State University of New York Press 1983) 364ndash87

KIRWAN CHRISTOPHER Augustine (London New York Routledge 1989)KOBUSCH THEO ldquoMystik als Metaphysik des moralischen Seinsrdquo In Abendlaumlndische Mystik im

Mittelalter Symposion Kloster Engelberg 1984 ed RUH KURT (Stuttgart J B Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung 1986)

LARGIER NIKLAUS ldquolsquoIntellectus in deum ascensusrsquo Intellekttheoretische Auseinandersetzungen in Texten der deutschen Mystikrdquo Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift fuumlr Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte 69 (1995) 432ndash71

mdashmdashmdash ed Meister Eckhart Werke in zwei Baumlnden (Frankfurt am Main Deutscher Klassiker Verlag 1993)


LARGIER NIKLAUS ldquoNegativitaumlt Moumlglichkeit Freiheit Zur Differenz zwischen der Philosophie Dietrichs von Freiberg und Eckharts von Hochheimrdquo In Dietrich von Freiberg Neue Perspektiven seiner Philosophie Theologie u Naturwissenschaft eds KANDLER HERMAN MOJSISCH BURKHARD and STAMKOumlTTER FRANZ-BERNHARD (B R Gruner Amsterdam Philadelphia 1999) 149ndash68

mdashmdashmdash ldquozu Sermo XXV Gratia dei sum id quod sumrdquo In STEER and STURLESE Lectura Eckhardi II 177ndash204

LERNER ROBERT E The Heresy of the Free Spirit in the Later Middle Ages (Berkeley University of California Press 1972)

LEXER MATTHIAS Mittelhochdeutsches Taschenwoumlrterbuch mit grammatischer Einleitung (Leipzig Verlag S Hirzel 1881)

MACDONALD SCOTT ldquoAugustinerdquo In A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages eds GRACIA J J C and NOONE T B (Oxford Blackwell 2003) 154ndash71

mdashmdashmdash ldquoEgoistic Rationalism Aquinasrsquos Basis for Christian Moralityrdquo In Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy ed BEATY MICHAEL D (Notre Dame University of Notre Dame Press 1990)

mdashmdashmdash ldquoPrimal Sinrdquo In The Augustinian Tradition ed MATTHEWS GARETH (Berkeley University of California Press 1999)

mdashmdashmdash ldquoUltimate Ends in Practical Reasoning Aquinasrsquos Aristotelian Moral Psychology and An-scombersquos Fallacyrdquo The Philosophical Review 100 (1) 31ndash66

MACINTYRE ALASDAIR Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (Notre Dame IN University of Notre Dame Press 1990)

MCCOOL GERALD SJ ldquoThe Ambrosian Origin of St Augustinersquos Theology of the Image of God in Manrdquo Theological Studies 20 (1959) 62ndash81

MCGINN BERNARD MEYENDORFF JOHN and LECLERQ JEAN Christian Spirituality Origins to the Twelfth Century (London Routledge amp Kegan Paul 1986)

MCGINN BERNARD ldquoChrist as Savior in the Westrdquo In Christian Spirituality Origins to the Twelfth Century eds MCGINN BERNARD MEYENDORFF JOHN and LECLERQ JEAN

mdashmdashmdash ldquoThe Human Person as Image of God II Western Christianityrdquo In Christian Spirituality Origins to the Twelfth Century eds MCGINN BERNARD MEYENDORFF JOHN and LECLERQ JEAN

mdashmdashmdash The Mystical Thought of Meister Eckhart (New York Crossroad Publishing 2001)MCGRATH ALISTER Justitia Dei A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification (Cambridge

Cambridge University Press 20053)MCINERNY RALPH Aquinas on Human Action A Theory of Practice (Washington DC

Catholic University of America Press 1992)mdashmdashmdash The Logic of Analogy An Interpretation of St Thomas (The Hague Martinus Nijhoff 1971)MIETH DIETMAR Die Einheit von vita activa und vita contemplativa in den deutschen Predigten

und Traktaten Meister Eckharts und bei Johannes Tauler (Regensburg Verlag Friedrich Pustet 1969)

mdashmdashmdash ldquoPredigt 86 lsquoIntravit Jesus in quoddam castellumrsquordquo in STEER and STURLESE Lectura IIMILEM BRUCE The Unspoken Word (Washington DC Catholic University of America Press

2002)MOJSISCH BURKHARD Meister Eckhart Analogy Univocity and Unity tr Orrin F Summerell

(AmsterdamPhiladelphia John Benjamins Publishing Co 2001)MONK RAY Wittgenstein The Duty of Genius (New York The Free Press 1990)NICHOLAS OF CUSA Apologia doctae ignorantiae ed KLIBANSKY RAYMOND (Leipzig

Felix Meiner Verlag 1932)NUSSBAUM MARTHA ldquoVirtue Ethics A Misleading Categoryrdquo Journal of Ethics 33 (1999)

163ndash201OAKES EDWARD T S J ldquoThe Surnaturel Controversy A Survey and a Responserdquo Nova et

Vetera (English edition) 93(2011) 625ndash56


OrsquoCONNELL ROBERT J S J ldquoAction and Contemplationrdquo In Augustine a Collection of Critical Essays ed MARKUS R A (Garden City NY Anchor Books 1972)

OrsquoDONOVAN OLIVER The Problem of Self-Love in St Augustine (New Haven and London Yale University Press 1980)

OSBORNE THOMAS Love of Self and Love of God in Thirteenth-Century Ethics (Notre Dame IN University of Notre Dame Press 2005)

PASNAU ROBERT Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature (Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2002)

PINCKAERS SERVAIS OP ldquoBeatitude and the Beatitudes in Aquinasrsquos Summa Theologiaerdquo In The Pinckaers Reader Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology eds BERKMAN JOHN and TITUS CRAIG STEVEN (Washington DC Catholic University of America Press 2005)

PLOTINUS The Enneads trans MACKENNA STEPHEN (Burdett NY Larson Publications 1992)

PUTNAM HILARY ldquoThe Content and Appeal of lsquoNaturalismrsquordquo In Philosophy in an Age of Science Physics Mathematics and Skepticism eds DE CARO MARIO and MACARTHUR DAVID (Cambridge MA Harvard University Press 2012)

QUINN PHILIP ldquoIn Adamrsquos Fall We Sinned Allrdquo Philosophical Topics 162 (1988) 89ndash118RIST J M Augustine Ancient Thought Baptized (Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1994)RORTY AMELIE O ed Essays on Aristotlersquos Ethics (Berkeley University of California Press

1980)ROSEN STANLEY ldquoThe Role of Erocircs in Platorsquos Republicrdquo The Review of Metaphysics 183

(March 1965) 452ndash75SAARINEN RISTO Weakness of the Will in Medieval Thought From Augustine to Buridan Studien

und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 44 (Leiden Brill 1994)SARTRE JEAN-PAUL Being and Nothingness transl Hazel Barnes (New York Washington

Square Press 1966)SCHOumlNBERGER ROLF ldquoSecundum rationem esse Zur Ontologisierung der Ethik bei Meister

Eckhartrdquo In OIKEIΩΣΙΣ Festschrift fuumlr Robert Spaemann ed LOumlW REINHARD (Acta Humaniora) (Weinheim VCH 1987)

SCOTT DOMINIC ldquoPrimary and Secondary Eudaimoniardquo Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society suppl 73 (1999) 225ndash42

SELLS MICHAEL Mystical Languages of Unsaying (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1994)SORABJI RICHARD ldquoThe Concept of the Will from Plato to Maximus the Confessorrdquo In

The Will and Human Action From Antiquity to the Present Day eds PINK THOMAS and STONE M W F (London Routledge 2004) 6ndash28

mdashmdashmdash ldquoAristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtuerdquo In Essays on Aristotlersquos Ethics ed Amelie O Rorty 201ndash19

STALEY KEVIN M ldquoAristotle Augustine and Aquinas on the Good and the Human Good A Note on Summa Theologiae I-II AA 1-3rdquo The Modern Schoolman 62 (1995) 311ndash22

STEER GEORG and STURLESE LORIS eds Lectura Eckhardi Predigten Meister Eckharts von Fachgelehrten gelesen und gedeutet 3 vols (BerlinStuttgart Kohlhammer Verlag 1998 2003 2009)

STUMP ELEONORE ldquoAugustine on Free Willrdquo In The Cambridge Companion to Augustine eds STUMP E and KRETZMANN N (Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2006)

STURLESE LORIS ldquoMysticism and Theology in Meister Eckhartrsquos Theory of the Imagerdquo Eckhart Review 2 (March 1993) 18ndash31

mdashmdashmdash ldquoA Portrait of Meister Eckhartrdquo Eckhart Review 5 (1996) 7ndash12URMSON J O Aristotlersquos Ethics (Oxford Basil Blackwell 1988)VAN DE WEYER ROBERT ed The Letters of Pelagius (New York Morehouse Publishing

1997)VAN RIEL GERD ldquoAugustinersquos Will An Aristotelian Notion On the Antecedents of Augustinersquos

Doctrine of the Willrdquo Augustinian Studies 381 (2007) 255ndash79


VINZENT MARKUS ldquoDiscussion Meister Eckhart rehabilitated by the Poperdquo httpacade-micicloud9networkcomblogaspxbid=10026 2010

mdashmdashmdash ldquoSalus extra ecclesiam Meister Eckharts Institutionenskepsisrdquo in Mystik Recht und Freiheit Religioumlse Erfahrung und kirchliche Institutionen im Spaumltmittelalter eds MIETH DIETMAR and MUumlLLER-SCHAUENBURG BRITTA (Stuttgart Verlag W Kohlhammer 2012)

WAWRYKOW JOSEPH Godrsquos Grace and Human Action (Notre Dame IN University of Notre Dame Press 1995)

WESTBERG DANIEL Right Practical Reason Aristotle Action and Prudence in Aquinas (Oxford Clarendon Press 1994)

WETZEL JAMES Augustine and the Limits of Virtue (Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1992)

WILLIAM OF OCKHAM ldquoDe potestate papae et clerirdquo Dialogus III 22viii Text and trans SCOTT JOHN at httpwwwbritacacukpubsdialogust32d2Conhtml

WITTGENSTEIN LUDWIG Philosophical Investigations 4th ed (Malden MAOxford WileyBlackwell 2009)

mdashmdashmdash Philosophical Remarks ed RHEES RUSH transl HARGREAVES R and WHITE R (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1975)

mdashmdashmdash Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus transl D F PEARS and B F MCGUINNESS (London Routledge amp Kegan Paul 1961)

225

abegescheidenheit (detachment) x 136 177 See also detachment

Absicht (intention) 201 See also intentionabsolutely unified being 164Academic skepticism 43ndash44Ackrill John L 33n44 33n45 126n130Action-oriented psychological (or propositional)

attitudes 11 See attitudeaction x 2 5 9 10 11n16 12 17ndash22 24 27

29 38 39n61 40ndash41 46ndash47 59 62n69 71 76 77ndash78 84ndash85 86ndash88 92n25 95ndash97 99ndash111 123 129 130n2 135ndash137 139 149 152n75 167ndash168 172ndash175 184 186ndash188 190ndash191 195ndash202 207 210ndash212 218

intention 12ndash13 16 21 49 95 97 100 185 192ndash196 199ndash200 203ndash204

intentional 13ndash14 16n27 39ndash40 98 104 195 203n99 204 206

motive 40 68 77ndash78 85 96ndash97 100 107ndash110 184ndash185 193 195ndash196 199ndash200 203ndash204

involuntary 10 15 85voluntary 6 8ndash12 13ndash14 28 30n34 47 54n36

60 61n66 62 70 72ndash73 85 96n35 99 160 168 See also hekousion

active intellect See intellect activeactive life 18 32 101 121 190 191n70acts of will 12 16 201actualizations 98 203Adam and Eve 55 59 61 71ndash72 84 211Adams Don 106n72 219Adams Robert Merrihew 212n22 219adoption 82 192 194ndash195 199 202Aertsen Jan 3n7 177n22 219afterlife 5 38 93 119agent 3 10n11 11ndash12 14 20ndash21 26 27n24 28

30n34 39ndash40 47 53 59ndash61 76 96ndash101

104ndash106 110 120 124ndash125 127 148 173 185 192ndash194 199ndash200 204 211

akolastos (licentious person) 27 29n33 68akrasia akratic 14ndash15 39ndash40 42 52 54n36 68

194n76 See also incontinenceAlbert the Great 7 87n4 148Amalric of Bena 114ndash115 214ambiguity 57n51 126 139 See also equivocationamor 49 50n24 51nn27ndash29 56nn48ndash49

69n87 85n139 See also erocircs loveanalogy analogical analogically 81n126 88

122ndash124 126ndash127 129 137ndash139 141 149 152 162 169ndash172 174 185 188 189n63 195 200 204

analyticity 126n129Anaxagoras 145angels 70n92 81 105ndash106 118 135 141 182

213aniatos (incurable) 29n33Anscombe G E M 12n23 18n1 98n46 192

195 196n80 219Anselm of Canterbury 111n84antecedent 137 See also analogyantiteleological philosophy 9 132apostasy 94appetite 6 10ndash12 21 28 39n61 90ndash91

98 179Aquinas Thomas See Thomas Aquinasarchetypes 156Aristotle 2 6 42ndash43 46 61ndash63 68 72n99

87n4 90 93 98 100 106 114n94 115 117n105 121 124 125n126 127 132 133n13 138n31 147 164 168 184 186 187n58 188 196n82 218ndash219

and active intellect 36 120n113 148ndash149 162n115 209

Categories 48n19 64 126De anima 12 25 36 83n132 145 147ndash148

I N D E X

226 i n d e x

virtue 8ndash9 12 14ndash15 39ndash41 43 47ndash52 56ndash57 61ndash63 72ndash73 75 77 79 85 100ndash101 104 129 134 137 168 174 176 183n41 204 as forms of pride 38 64 69 70n91 78 84 91n21 110

will 7ndash8 39ndash40 42ndash43 45ndash47 49n20 49n23 51ndash64 66ndash81 81n126 84ndash85 95n34 129 136n20 179 211

autonomy 16 60 210Averroes 148Avicenna 120Avignon 1 135n18 213 217ndash218Aychardus (Eckhart) 217

Baker Lynne R 61n64 219barter (with God) 134 136 172Basil of Caesarea 81n124 83Bastable Patrick 118n107 219Beatific Vision 88 89n14 92 94 97 102ndash105

107 109 112ndash114 115n97 116n103 117 118n107 119ndash121 123 162n114 164 173 191 198

beatitude beatitudo 5n1 6 8 43 46n10 46n12 47 48n16 75 87ndash89 90n18 92 95 97n42 101n55 101n56 104ndash106 109n81 112n87 112n88 113 115 118n106 119 122 160 176n19 182n39 185 204 See also happiness

Beccarisi Alessandra 159n101 171n7 202 219Beghards 214Beguines 207 214Bejczy Istvaacuten 87n4 219belief 9 11n16 28ndash29 59 64n75 89 109benevolence 15 See also voluntasBennett William 8n7Bernard of Clairvaux 134 135n16 207biology 17bios politikos 35bios praktikos 32n42 See also active lifeBirth of Godrsquos Son in soul 152n76 155 162

164 168 170 173n12 178 181ndash182 185ndash186 188 190 193 202 209 211 216

Bishop Ambrose 81blessedness 51 87 149 153ndash155 161 164ndash165

172 174 185ndash186 191 215ndash216 See also beatitude beatitudo bliss eudaimonia eudaimonism eudaimonists

bliss 5 129 134 164 167 170ndash171 174 184 192

Boethius 48n19Boethius of Dacia 100 109 111ndash112

114 219boiling (bullitio) 150ndash152 166 186boiling over (ebullitio) 142n43 150ndash152 166boldness 69Bonner Gerald 82n129 219Book of Causes 144 156 209

Aristotle (continued)eudaimonia (happiness) 4 9 12ndash13 15ndash16

18ndash21 26 29ndash30 33ndash35 37ndash41 51 54 73 78 88ndash89 92 94 101ndash102 104ndash105 108ndash109 111ndash112 119 129 134 136 174 191ndash192 204 See also eudaimonism teleological eudaimonism

Metaphysics 36 38n59 83n132 131 200Nicomachean Ethics 7ndash8 17ndash20 22ndash32 34ndash39

47 48n18 52 67n84 80 85ndash89 91ndash92 95 98ndash101 108 110 117n103 119n110 180 209

nous (intellect) 31 33ndash34 36 38 119 145passive intellect 120 148 162n115phronecircsis (practical wisdom) 22 24 25n15

26ndash28 30ndash32 35ndash39 99praxis 15 21ndash22 23n11 24 32 38 40ndash41

99n47sophia (intellectualtheoretical wisdom) 30ndash32

35ndash39and virtue 8ndash9 12ndash15 19ndash27 30ndash41 47ndash49

51ndash52 56 73 78 85 91ndash95 99ndash112 129 134 136 168 174 188 189n64 191 194 204 210

and will See boulecircsisasceticism 97n40 206astronomy 38n59 127Athanasius of Alexandria 81n124 82Athena 157Atomists 209attachment 134n16 152 154 156 158ndash159

162 173ndash174 181 216 See also eigenschaftattitude 3 11 62n69 107 130 167ndash168

172ndash173 197 201audacia (boldness) 69Augustine 2 4 6 14 18n2 86 92 122 131n4

132 133n13 134 137 143n48 148 156n91 160n105 161 166n125 168 186n55 208n7 209 210n14 212n22 219

Ad Simplicianum 43 70 74ndash76 136n21and Manichees 44 53 67 70and Pelagians 56 79ndash80 176City of God 46 51 59n57 60n63 63 69n87

69n90 76 78n120 84n136 89 101n57 110Confessions 43ndash47 48n19 51 58n53 64ndash66

67n84 68 70 83ndash85 104 158De beata vita 45 91evil problem of 43ndash44 52ndash55 57 61 64

69ndash70 See also God and evilgrace See grace Augustine onhappiness 8 12 42ndash43 45ndash47 49 51 54 56

58n53 60n63 61 63ndash64 75ndash76 83 89love 46ndash47 49ndash52 56ndash57 59n57 61ndash63 68

76 79ndash80 81n126 84ndash85 89 123 129 174

On Free Choice of the Will (DLA) 43 45ndash48 50ndash54 57 60ndash64 68ndash70 73ndash75 78nn119ndash120 79ndash80 83 93 100

i n d e x 227

contemplation 32n41 33ndash38 45n5 80 88 89n14 92 103 108 112 121 133n13 190 191n70 209

control 5 10n11 37 55 58 68ndash69 70n91 91conversion 27 43ndash44 62 64 66ndash67 69 81

85n141 156Cooper John M 34n46 220Copleston SJ Frederick 111n85 220Cordner Christopher 109n79 220cosmology 38n59courage 20 41 102n63 103 107Creator 42 44 54 72ndash73 75 81 92 116n100

120 124 137 149 152 162 166 169 171 195 217

Curia 216ndash217Cusanus Nicolaus 150n69 218 See also

Nicholas of CusaCusanus-Stift 150n69

da Todi Jacopone 207n5Damascene ( John of Damascus) 5 122Davidson Donald 11 12n23 59ndash60 220Davies Brian 104 220de Lubac SJ Henri 122n117de Molinos Miguel 206de Vogel C J 18n2 220decision 16 21 53 60deduction 27n24 31deification 82 84 See also divinizationdeiform 104deity 42 44 54 73 119 143delectatio See delightdeliberation 10ndash12 15 16n27 21ndash22 24 26

28ndash29 32 60 91 96ndash97delight 58 77ndash78 89n14Demetrias 79demonstration 27n24 31den Bok Nico W 78n118 220Denis Lara x 211n17deontology 212 See also Kant ImmanuelDescartes Reneacute 39 See also Cartesianismdesire(s) 10 19ndash21 28 39ndash40 51ndash52 55ndash57

59ndash62 67 69 71ndash72 79 88 98 100ndash101 107 110 140 142 154 172ndash173 180ndash181 185ndash186 191 193 198 203 211

for happiness 11ndash15 17 23ndash26 40 42 46ndash47 49 52 68 76 81n124 83 89ndash90 92n25 96ndash97 111 153 176

for the Beatific Vision 88 97ndash98 105ndash106 109 111 115ndash118 121

detachment 2 7 56 83 133n13 136 148ndash149 154ndash155 155n86 160 164 167ndash168 172 174 176ndash177 183n40 184 188 190 195 197 200 206 215ndash216 See also abegescheidenheit

determinism 77n116Di Muzio Gianluca 67n84 220Dietrich of Freiberg 148ndash149 154 158n98

boulecircsis 11ndash12 14ndash15 22 23n11 24ndash26 28 30 32 39ndash40 49 51ndash52 54n36 57 62n67 67 76 78 95 96n35 129 192 See also will wish

Bradley Denis 16n27 18n2 27n24 33n45 35n50 92n24 92n25 95n33 111n85 114n92 116n102 117ndash118 119n110 121n115 220

British empiricism 209British Meister Eckhart Society xBroadie Sarah 32n41 219Broumlsch Marco 150n69Brown Peter 66n78 75 220Brown Robert F 59n58Buddhism 173Bull See Papal Bull (In agro dominico)bullitio See boilingbuumlrgelicircn (castle of soul) 164Bush Stephen 33n45 34ndash35 119n110 220Byers Sarah 62n69 220

Cajetan (Tomasso de Vio) 116n102calculative part of soul 25 31caritas 50n26Cartesianism 209 See also Descartes ReneacuteCatherine of Genoa 208Catholicism Catholics 8 47 83 122n117

199n89 208ndash209 213ndash215Chappell Timothy 48n18 59n58 61n66

64n75 220character 13ndash14 20ndash23 25ndash26 30 40 61n66

67 77 99ndash100 129 189 195 203charity 9 64ndash65 77 87 101 102n63 103ndash107

176 181 190n69 196choice 5 10nn11ndash12 14 15n25 16ndash17 21ndash24

25n15 26ndash29 39 52ndash53 57ndash58 59n57 61 62n69 67 71ndash73 75ndash76 91 94ndash96 99 100n53 100n54 110 122 129 194 198 202ndash203 211 See also prohairesis

Cicero 43ndash45 48n19 62n69 85n141Cistercian 207Clarke SJ W Norris vclinging 45 173 199 See also attachmentcognitive 10 26ndash27 31 64 91 119ndash120 181Colledge Edmund OSA xv 1n1 201Cologne 2 214 218communion 43conation 10 53 173 181concupiscence 59 76 85condemnation (of Eckhart) 111 130n2 208n9

213ndash215 218 See also twenty-eight propositions condemned 1329

conduct 23 40 58 101 107connatural 105 111 176Connolly John M 105n68 220consent 11 16 73 76ndash77 95consequentialism consequentialists 3 41

106ndash107 212

228 i n d e x

Expositio Libri Genesis Commentary on the Book of Genesis (In GenI) 210

Expositio sancti Evangelii secundum Iohannem Commentary on John (In Ioh) 130ndash132 138ndash139 141ndash142 153 156 163n117 169 187 194 195n78 200ndash201

Expositio Libri Sapientiae Commentary on the Book of Wisdom (In Sap) 133 137 146n60 153 169ndash171 178n30 189

grace See grace Eckhart onmerchant mentality 85 134ndash136 159 171ndash173

176 192ndash195 197ndash199 202ndash204 206 211

Predigt 1 134ndash136 153n79 159 171 176 197ndash198 203n99 204 206

Predigt 2 159 164 166 190 206Predigt 5b 158 184 192 198 215ndash216Predigt 6 135 190n65 198ndash199 205 211

212n19 212n20Predigt 28 2 166n127Predigt 29 186Predigt 30 181ndash185Predigt 41 135 186Predigt 48 164Predigt 52 160ndash162 182n39 185 196Predigt 69 145ndash147Predigt 76 173n12Predigt 77 162n112Predigt 81 151Predigt 86 190ndash191Predigt 102 160 163n116Predigt 104 148 149n67 175 181Prologus generalis in Opus tripartitum General

Prologue to the Tripartite Work (Prolgen) 177 214

Quaetiones Parisienses Parisian Questions (Qu Par) 140n39 144 178n29

Sermo die beati Augustini Parisius habitus Parisian Sermon on the Feast of St Augustine (Sermo die) 132

Sermones et Lectiones super Ecclesiastici Sermons and Lectures on Ecclesiasticus (In Eccli) 144n54 188ndash189

Tabula Prologorum in Opus Tripartitum 137n28 189n63

on virtue 8ndash9 40ndash41 129 134 136ndash137 143 154 155n86 164 167ndash168 173ndash174 183n41 187ndash189 191ndash192 194 198 204 208 210 215 virtue-1 175ndash177 185 virtue-2 177 185ndash186 193

Von abegescheidenheit On Detachment (Vab) 136 177n23

without whywill ixndashx 2ndash4 7 9 15ndash16 40 83ndash84 100n51 124 128 132 135 160 167 173 181 184 186 190ndash193 195ndash197 199 201 207ndash208 212 216 218

egoism egoist 103ndash104 107 196egotism 59

Dihle Albrecht 39n62 42n1 220Diotima 90n20discernment 26disorder 15 55 57 66 92n25 179disposition 39n61 45 47 62n69 91ndash92 104

152n75 194 201divine 2 5ndash9 13n24 34ndash36 40ndash41 53 57

63ndash64 69 77 80 84ndash85 89n14 94 101 104ndash105 109 112ndash113 115n97 116n100 118ndash119 122n117 129 137 141 157 160 162ndash166 162n112 176 178n28 182ndash183 192 195 199ndash202 204

aspect of human soul 33 36 38 101ndash102 107 113ndash114 119n110 120 123ndash124 158 162 168 175 182ndash183 186ndash188 193ndash194 197 202 209 211 215

grace 27n26 38 72ndash73 78 85 87n6 88 93 98 100n54 102 112 116n103 121 150ndash155 162 173ndash175 176ndash177 180 196 208 215

will 183 185 211See also Beatific Vision God transcendence

divinity 36 144 166 176divinization 81 83 119 122 155Dominican 1 4 7 9 129 130n2 133 148

214n24Donagan Alan 16n27 95n33 220Dreyer Mechthild 139n36 220dualism dualists 34 35n51 53 119n110Duclow Donald F 142n44

Eastern Orthodoxy 81 119ebullitio See boiling over (ebullitio)ecclesiastic concerns 2 93 214Eckhart Meister 88 116n102 119ndash122 124

127ndash128 131 137ndash138 145 161 165ndash166 217ndash218

Birth of Godrsquos Son in soul 152n76 155 162 164 168 178 209

condemnation of 1 3ndash4 111 114 130n2 135 138 199 208 213ndash215 218

Daz buoch der goetlichen troestunge Book of Divine Consolation (BgT) 3n6 141 176ndash179 194

der gerehte 134 135n19 136n20 136n22 141n40 164n119 177n23 178n29 186 198 202 211n18 See also just one

detachment x 2 7 56 83 133n13 136 141 146 148ndash149 152 154 155n86 158 160 164 166ndash168 172 174ndash177 180ndash181 183ndash184 183n40 186 188 190 195 197 200ndash201 203 206 215ndash216

Die rede der underscheidunge Talks of Instruction (RdU) 134n16 154 183n40 188 190 207ndash208 211n17 215n27

Expositio Libri Exodi Commentary on the Book of Exodus (In Ex) 7ndash8 140

i n d e x 229

faculty of will 40 53 57n51 61n66 62failure 22 70 173faith 7 64 73ndash74 79ndash81 87 93n27 94

101 103ndash105 107 109 114ndash115 117 119 131 156 176 181 213 216

Fall 42 59 72ndash73 76 84 149 169 175 210n14 212n22

Father 3 69 135n16 139ndash140 147 150ndash151 162n112 162ndash166 170 176 179ndash182 185ndash187 195 201ndash202 206 213 215ndash216

final causality 132First Cause 115 132 153 169Flasch Kurt 3n7 75n106 131n3 138n31

150n68 151n73 161 178 196 197n84 199ndash200 208n9 220

Fortenbaugh William 25n15 220fortitude 47 49 51Franciscan Spirituals See spiritual

Franciscansfree choice 5 57ndash59 59n57 61 71ndash73

75ndash76 94 96 100n53 122 194 211 See also consent liberum arbitrium

Free Spirit 114 214freedom 56ndash59 61n64 76 83 103 118 157

158n98 186 210Frege Gottlob 143 143n47 220friendship 20 52 89n14 196 201fulfillment 4 6 8ndash9 13 17ndash18 37 80 83 88

95 97 107 109 111ndash112 114 116ndash118 121ndash122 See also happiness

function argument 18ndash20 108 134

Gallagher David 10n11 221Garfield Jay x 39n63generosity 20 196gerehte 134 186 198 202 211n18 See also just

onegerehticheit 136n22 141n40 171n8 177

178n29 190n65 198n88 211n18 See also justice

German Idealism 218Gerson Lloyd 70n91 91n21 221gift 18 38n60 65 69ndash70 74 82n128 94

101ndash102 117 152n73 154 158ndash159 169 172 174 See also grace

Gnaumldinger Louise 208n7 221goal 2 9 11ndash15 17 18n1 24 26 28ndash29 36

38ndash41 46ndash47 49 51ndash52 65 67ndash68 78n120 83 87 88n8 89ndash91 97ndash98 100 102ndash103 105ndash106 108ndash109 111 122 129 134 136 170 173 186 188 191ndash193 195 197 199ndash204 211 See also end ultimate end

goallessness 2

eigenschaft 15 159 163n116 164 171n7 173ndash175 181n36 See also attachment

Eightfold Path 173Elisabeth of Thuumlringen See St Elisabethemotions 19ndash20 27 47 53 91 196end 6 9ndash12 15 16ndash18 20ndash22 23n11 24ndash29

36 38 40ndash41 86 88 90 92 95ndash98 100 104ndash107 109ndash111 119n110 121 129 164 168 171 176 188 191ndash193 196n81 197 199 200ndash202 204 212n20 See also goal ultimate end

Epictetus 56n47 66n79Epicurus 55equanimity 173 188 194equivocals 124ndash126equivocation 126 See also ambiguityEriugena John Scotus 114n94erocircs (love desire) 49 84 90n20 91n20 94

See also amor loveerror 29 46 60n63 71ndash72 204 213Esau and Jacob 74eternal law 55ndash56ethics 2 7ndash9 12 17 18n2 23 26ndash27 30

37ndash41 48nn18ndash19 49n20 51 56 63 66 79 86ndash89 91n21 94ndash95 100 104 107ndash109 111ndash112 116n102 119 121 129ndash130 132 134 136 164 167ndash168 174 210 212ndash213 218

consequentialism and 41 106eudamonism and See eudaimonia etcldquomystical ethicsrdquo ldquoontologizingrdquo of ethics

186ndash187 193teleology and See teleological ethics etcvirtue and See virtue

ecircthikecirc 30ethos 30 See also habits habituationeudaimonia eudaimonism eudaimonists 2n4 4 9

12ndash13 17ndash18 21 29 33 35 37ndash41 43ndash44 46ndash47 52 60n63 63ndash64 68 75 83 87ndash88 92 94 98 101ndash103 108 111ndash112 117n105 119n110 129 133n13 136137 158 168ndash169 172ndash175 185 190 192 198 199n89 200 204 212

eupraxia 21evil 43ndash44 52ndash55 57 61 64 69ndash70 73

84n136 92 138n29 152 194 200 210n14 213

Evodius 48 52 57 60n62 61excellences (virtues) 19 21ndash22 24 26 30ndash31

34 38 91ndash92 99ndash101 108ndash109 129excess 20ndash22 70n91 114 120 215exclusivism exclusivists 19 33ndash35 92excommunication 94exemplar 5 137 150ndash151experience 30 37 85n141 140 147 157 210external acts 2ndash3 130n2 185external compulsion 72Ezekiel 92n24

230 i n d e x

117n105 118ndash119 121 129 132 134 136 148 153ndash154 160 164 167ndash168 173ndash174 176 185 191 198 200 204 See also beatitude beatitudo bliss eudaimonia eudaimonism eudaimonists

Harrison Simon 61n65 63n70 221health 32 35 97 105 138 171 183 193ndash194heaven(s) 1 38n59 51 81 104 106 111

129ndash130 135 170 184 192 195ndash199Hegel Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 203Heidegger Martin 207ndash208 221hekousion 11n18 28 54n36 61ndash62 See also

actions voluntaryheresy 114 130 138n29 206n1 214hermits 4 167heterodoxy 115 See also heresyheteronomy 108 158n98High Middle Ages 48n18 144n50Hobbes Thomas 218Hoffmann Tobias x 122n117holiness 1 111 135 199Holy Ghost Holy Spirit 81n126 104 151n73

162n112 164ndash166Homer Homeric ethic 27 41hope 87 101 103ndash107 114 176 185 192Hopkins G M 186n52Hopko Thomas 81n124 221Hortensius See Cicerohuman nature 18n2 27 37 71 73 79 92n25

94 102ndash103 106 109 111 116n102 119 121 149 215

Hume David 25 218 221humility 64ndash65 79 84 155n86 159 183n40Hursthouse Rosalind 8n7 221hypostasis (substance reality) 156

ISelf 162ignorance 15 71ndash72 76 82 160ill will See malevolenceimage(s) 5ndash6 38 43 59 80ndash83 87 111

116n102 122ndash124 129 137ndash138 141ndash143 143n48 145ndash148 150 152 156 159 162ndash163 166 179 186 188ndash189 193ndash195 197 209ndash210

immediacy 162n113immortality immortals 33 36 81 84 148

162n115 209In agro dominico 1 213 See also Papal Bull

(In agro dominico)inclination(s) 9ndash10 25 57 61 105 108

111n84 134 175ndash176 184n46 187 192ndash194 203 211

inclusivism inclusivists 20 33 35 92incontinence 14 59 67n84 See also akrasia

akraticIndistinct Oneunion 146 161 166 208induction 26

God 1ndash3 5ndash8 36ndash38 42ndash44 47 52ndash55 57ndash59 61 63ndash85 87ndash90 94 97 99ndash107 110ndash127 130 132ndash141 143ndash155 157ndash166 168ndash172 174ndash194 196ndash202 204ndash209 211ndash212 214ndash216

analogous relation to 81 123ndash124 126ndash127 137ndash138 141 149 152 162 169ndash172 174 185 188ndash189 195 200 204

and evil 43ndash44 52ndash55 57 59 61 70Beatific Vision of See Beatific Visionis without why 2n3 7ndash8 184 186 192 208love of 49ndash51 59n57 63 76univocal relation to 124ndash125 127 137ndash141

143 145ndash147 152 159n100 162ndash164 166 170 178 182 185 188 189n63 192 195 197 199 209

Trinity 131 150ndash152 165ndash166 186 215Godhead 151 158ndash159 165 168 172 209God-the-Father 147 185Gospel 9 131 134 154 179 190 191n70 195

209Gospel Beatitudes 87grace 9 15 18 38 112 148 156ndash158 198

Thomas Aquinas on 77n116 87ndash89 93 95 98 102ndash107 119n109 123 129 136ndash137 149 150n71 152n73 154n82 173 191 204

Augustine on 9 27n26 43 59n57 61 65ndash66 69 72ndash80 82ndash83 85 100n54 103 129 149 153n80 154 174 196 204

Eckhart on 130 133ndash137 146 148ndash149 150ndash156 168ndash169 173ndash177 179ndash181 183 185ndash186 188 198 208

grace-1 151ndash154 162 169 174ndash177 191 215grace-2 151ndash155 158 162 174ndash177 181

185ndash186 191 194ndash196 202 215Pelagius onPelagianism and 79ndash80 111 153

174 176sanctifying 102 151See also gift

greed 59 134n16ground of the soul 152n76 153n79 155 159n100

161ndash168 170 172 179 180ndash181 184ndash186 191ndash193 195 198 206ndash208 215ndash216

ground-act 203Guyer Paul 212n21 221

habits habituation 13 20 24ndash27 29ndash30 37 64n75 66ndash67 71 78 91 99 101 123 129 152n75 174ndash175 185 189 194

Hadewijch of Brabant 207Hadot Pierre 157 221Hanh Thich Nhat 173n13happiness 2n4 4 6 8ndash9 11ndash13 15ndash16 18ndash20

26 29ndash30 32ndash35 37ndash38 40ndash43 45ndash47 49 51 54 60n63 64 73 75ndash76 78 80 83 86ndash92 94ndash95 97ndash98 101ndash102 104ndash106 108ndash109 111ndash114 117n103

i n d e x 231

Kahn Charles 16n28 42n2 78 221kalon (fine noble right) 100 107 109Kant Immanuel 3 9 37n58 39ndash40 108

158n98 184n46 185n47 210ndash212 221Kenny Anthony 8n8 16n27 88n9 98n46 221Kent Bonnie 111n84 221Keyt David 35n51 221Kirwan Christopher 61n64 75n108 222knowledge 5 10n11 12 17 20ndash21 26 27n24

30ndash32 49 58 65 83 99 104 120ndash121 136 144 147n63 149 160ndash162

Kobusch Theo x 193 202ndash203 222koufliute (merchants) 134n15 171 172n11

176n20 See also mercantilism merchantskurios (master) 61 96n35

Largier Niklaus 148n65 149n67 150n68 158n98 162n113 171n7 178n26 182n39 203n99 222

Last Judgment 69 115n97learning 37 64 175 209Leclerq Jean 81n124 81n126 81n127 222leisure 32 37 46 63Lerner Robert E 114n93 214 222Letter to Simplician (Ad Simplicianum) 43

74ndash75 See also AugustineLevin Susan 38n59Lexer Matthias 201n93 222libertas voluntatis 59liberum arbitrium 6n2 73 94 96n36 96n38

211 See also free choicelibido cupiditas See disorderlibri Platonicorum 64Liddell amp Scott lexicon 23n11lie 60n63 169live without why 2ndash4 7 9 15 83 100n51 124

132 167 173 181 192 199 207ndash208 212 218 See also without will

Locke John 94n29 218Lombard Peter 86 150n68 151n73love 2n3 3 20 46ndash47 49ndash52 56ndash57 59n57

61ndash63 68 70n91 76 79 80 81n126 84ndash85 89 90n20 91n21 104ndash105 123 129 132 153 154n82 157 161 169 174 181 183 186 190ndash192 190n65 196 199ndash201 206ndash208 215

Lucifer 70n92 See also SatanLudwig IV of Bavaria 217lumen gloriae (light of glory) 118Luther Martin 208n7 212

MacDonald Scott 18n1 59n56 61n66 62n69 75n108 88n8 88n9 98 103n65 173 222

MacIntyre Alasdair 39n62 42n1 222Macrobius 158macrocosm 6

Ingham Mary Beth 139n36 220inmost groundsoul 165 182 184 216inner acts 187 190 193ndash194 195n78 199ndash200

See also interior actsinner one 216Inquisition Inquisitors 3 130 153n80 207ndash208instruction 25ndash26 79 See also Eckhart Talks of

Instructioninstrumentalism 9 103ndash104intellect 6 9ndash10 13n24 16n27 26ndash27 30

33ndash34 36ndash38 49 53 61n66 64 70 80 88 90 92 96 98 103n65 107 109 111 114ndash115 117ndash120 123 140 143ndash158 162ndash166 172 174 177n24 178n28 178n29 179ndash181 185ndash186 194 199 204 208ndash209 212n20 215 218

active 120n113 148ndash149 154 162n115passive 120 148 151 153n78 154 162n116

174 186 215See also nous

intellection 147intellectus agens 149intellectus possibilis 149intemperance 67n84intention(s) intentionally 4 11ndash14 16 21 40

53 62n69 95 97ndash98 100 131 142ndash143 169n1 185 192ndash196 199ndash204 206ndash207

interior acts 3 See also inner actsinteriority 167intermediate 21ndash22 45 58invitus 71n98 73 84inwardness 1 111 135irrational 25 30 37 55 96 98Irwin Terence 11 16 23n11 25n19 26 39n63

49n20 61n66 75n108 78n120 86n1 87n6 95n34 97n40 173n14 221

Janssens Jules 120n112Jerome 92n24 221Jesus Christ 63ndash65 72ndash73 80 85 130ndash131

134 155 159 182n39 186n52 191 202 208n7 215 217n32

Jews Judaism 48n18 55 116n102 148 180 208n8 209

Joachim of Fiore 114John of Damascus See Damascene ( John of

Damascus)Johnson Galen 76n12 221judgment 11n16 16n27 39 60n63 69 115n97just one 136 138ndash142 170 177n23 178n30

185ndash186 188 190 193 195 198 202 212 See also gerehte

justice 9 20ndash21 30 48ndash49 51 54 75 84 93 103 107 111n84 134ndash142 170ndash171 177ndash178 181 184ndash186 188ndash190 192ndash195 197ndash200 202ndash204 206 210ndash212 See also gerehticheit

232 i n d e x

development 40 44 46 48 63 74 85 99 102n61 103 134 168 175

moral philosophy 2 7 8n7 48n18 210 212Moses Maimonides See Maimonides Mosesmotivation 3ndash4 51 53n32 62n69 67ndash68

76ndash78 90 97 107ndash109 111n84 184ndash185 195ndash197 199ndash200 204 See also attitude

motive 22 40 53 76 85 100 102n63 107 195ndash197 199ndash200 202ndash204

Mourad Suleiman 120n112Muslim 48n18 55 148 208n8 209mysticism mystics 64 85n141 140 157 166

186 190 208

Nadal Jeroacutenimo 190n67natural law 87 92ndash94natural will 203needs 13 167 191 193 197 204Neoplatonism Neoplatonists 2 9 42ndash44

48ndash49 55 62ndash65 81 86 89 114n94 118n106 119 132 141ndash145 146n60 148 151 156 158 166ndash167 180 209 217n31 218

Newton John 27n26Nicene Creed 115n97Nicholas of Cusa 160 218 223 See also

Cusanus NicolausNoble Truths The 173noncompulsion See hekousionnondifferentiation See immediacynonmediation See immediacynonteleologist 41not-knowing 160nous 31 33 36 38 119 145Nussbaum Martha 8n7 223

OrsquoConnell SJ Robert J v ix 45n5 68n86 223OrsquoDonovan Oliver 45n5 50n26 82n130

217n31 223Oakes SJ Edward T 122n117 223obedience ixndashx 79 85 93 183n40oikeiocircsis See self-possessionOneness One 44 53 156 165 166n127 174 205Only-Begotten Son of God 3 141 180 182ontological 132 186order ordered 13n24 50 55ndash57 59 68

116n100 132 153ndash154 168ndash169 193Order of Preachers (Dominicans) 4 130 181

213 217Oresme Nicole 210n13Origen 81original sin 59 71ndash73 79 85 92n25 95

210n14orthodoxy 114n94Osborne Thomas 103n65 223OrsquoSullivan Jeremiah v

Maimonides Moses 124ndash125Malachi 74malevolence 15malista (most of all) 34Manichaeism Manichees 44 53 67 70Martha and Mary 190ndash191 194ndash195 204 206materialism 44 64mathematics 31 37maturity 40Maurer Armand 137n28 144n54McCool SJ Gerald 81n125 83n133 222McGinn Bernard x 1n1 81n124 81n126

81n127 131 132n9 138ndash139 140n38 142 146 150ndash152 154 155n88 156 158n97 159n100 162n114 163n117 166n128 178n28 200ndash201 209 222

McGinnis Jon 120n112McGrath Alister 102n61 152n75 222McInerny Ralph 95n33 126 222mean 13 21ndash22 26 99 101 See also eupraxiamedia bona 58medicine 32 138 214medieval See Middle AgesMeister Eckhart See Eckhart MeisterMeister-Eckhart-Gesellschaft xmendacium See lieMeno 77mercantilism merchants 85 134ndash136 159

171ndash173 176 192ndash193 194ndash195 197ndash200 202 203n99 204 206 211

mercenaries See greedmercy 74 196metaphysics metaphysicians 2ndash4 13n24 17

27n24 31ndash32 37 49 54 86 88 116n100 117 119 130ndash132 137n26 140 142 159n100 164 166ndash167 173 178 200

Meyendorff John 81n124 81n126 222microcosm 6Middle Ages medieval 2 14 38n59 42ndash43

48n18 48n19 75 86ndash87 92n24 117n105 127 144n50 147ndash148 150n71 153 173 197 203 206 207n5 212 218 See also High Middle Ages

Mierth Dietmar 188n60 190 215n27 222Milem Bruce 197n84 222Mill John Stuart 218moderation 13 See also mean temperanceMojsisch Burkhard 131 142n44 146n60

158n98 161ndash162 164 166 169 222monism See exclusivism exclusivistsMonk Ray 77n116moral 2 7ndash9 13 21ndash22 24ndash28 29ndash30 33ndash37

39n61 40 42ndash43 48n18 53 62 64 73 78n119 79 87ndash88 91ndash92 97 99 101 107ndash109 111n84 111n85 114 121 129 131ndash132 136 168 177n24 184n46 189n64 193 194n76 197 203 210ndash212 214

i n d e x 233

Porphyry 209possessiveness See eigenschaftpoverty 1n2 49 160ndash161 162n113 183 217practical 5 11ndash12 16n27 18n1 18n2 22

24 25n15 26ndash28 30n34 31 32n41 33 35ndash37 39 49 91ndash92 96n39 99 101 108 132 144n52 210 211n16

practical syllogism 14 24n14 30practical wisdom (prudence phronecircsis) 22 24

25n15 26 31ndash32 35ndash39 47 49 51 99 121

practice 8ndash9 13 20 32 34 36ndash38 78 103 105 107 134n16 155n86 175 177n23 184 206 215

praxis 15 21 23n11 24 32 38 40ndash41 99n47predestination 54 75 81predications 124 137 138n31 140ndash141pride 38 64 69 70n91 78 84 91n21 110 177primal sin 55 59ndash60 62prime analogate (God) 169 See also analogyPrime Mover 38n59principle 5 6n2 10 12 14 18ndash20 22 30ndash32

53 72n99 83 91ndash93 96n39 108 113 114n92 116ndash117 127 131 150 156ndash157 202

proairoumenoi 29Proclus 144n50 209prohairesis 27ndash29 39 95n34 129 See also choiceproportion See analogyPrototype 142ndash143 146 163 195providence 53 116n100 118prudence See practical wisdom (prudence)Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite 145 209psychology 2 11 28 40 42 67 86 100

120n113 145 196 210Putnam Hilary 210n12 223

Quinn Philip 212n22 223Quint Josef 147n61 161 182n39 201

rational appetite 6 9ndash11 90n19 98rational choice 11 39 91Ratzinger Cardinal Joseph 130n2 133n13reason 10ndash14 19ndash20 24ndash28 31 33 37 55

59ndash60 64n75 67 90n19 91ndash94 96 99ndash101 108 109n80 111 114ndash115 117 142 165 176 210n14

reception 140 155 169receptive intellect See intellect passiveReformation 3 103 106n71responsibility 44 47 61 70 72 79 207revelation 104 111 114 117n103 118n106

131 167 175n17right action 6 12 27 173right livelihood 173right will 6 78 See also boulecircsis

outer act 187 193ndash194 201outflow 157

paganism pagans 7 9 46 49 65 78n120 84 101n57 104 114 131n4

pantheism 114 163 214Papal Bull (In agro dominico) 1ndash3 130n2

138n29 179n34 199 214ndash218Papal Court 1 208 213 218Pasnau Robert 212n20 223passion 21ndash22 25 49n23 59ndash60 87 102passive intellect See intellect passivepassivity See intellect passivePaul Apostle 49 63n71 65ndash66 69 74 76 81

83 85n141 124 175n17 181Pelagius Pelagianism Pelagians 56 79ndash80 111

153 174 176Perfect Good 55 88n9 90 97 104 112 117perfection perfect happiness 9 35ndash38 40n64

41 44 49 75 78n120 79 80ndash82 88 90ndash93 97ndash98 103ndash104 109 111ndash113 116ndash117 120 122n117 125 137 140ndash141 166 168 175ndash178 186 188 191 202 208 212

Peripatetics 60n63perversion 15 46 57 64n75 66 69 70ndash71

93 100philia See friendshipPhilosopher the (Aristotle) 6 86 89 91 93ndash94

104n66 115 117n103 130ndash131 209philosophy philosophers 2 7ndash9 27n24 32

35n46 37 39 40 42 46 48n18 63n71 65 87 109 117 119n109 121 126n129 130ndash132 142 154 157ndash158 173 178n29 208ndash210 212ndash213 217ndash218

phronecircsis See practical wisdom (prudence)phronimos 22physics 17 187n58Pinckaers OP Servais 88n7 223Plato Platonism Platonists 9 32 36 38 43ndash44

48n19 49 51 63 65 70n91 80ndash81 83n132 89ndash90 91n21 94 108 111 147 156n91 157 166n127 197n86 209 215

pleasure 20ndash21 27ndash29 52 56 58 79 88 135Plotinian One 145 158Plotinus 69 82n130 83 120n112 145 156n91

156ndash158 209 223poiecircsis 15 21 39n61 40 99n47politics political theory 2 17 31 32n42 35n50

36ndash37 87n6 93 116 208n9 214Pope Benedict XII 115n97Pope Honorius III 114n94Pope Innocent XI 206n1Pope John Paul II 8n8 130Pope John XXII 1 4 130 199n89 213ndash214

217ndash218Porete Marguerite 207 215

234 i n d e x

Source (God) 47 145 156 158 162ndash163 165ndash166 169 185 193 202

Specht Ernst Konrad vspeculative reason 91ndash92 See also reasonspiritual Franciscans 1n2 207n5 217n32spiritual merchant 134 176 192ndash195 198 204

See also mercantilism merchantsspiritual perfections 140 141n41 166 177ndash178

186 200spirituality 2spoudaios (person of excellent virtue) 23ndash24

26 28 101St Elisabeth 190ndash191 193ndash194 202 204 206

208Staley Kevin M 90ndash91 223Steer Georg 149n67 150n68 159n101Stoicism Stoics 9n9 15n25 42ndash43 49 55n40

56 60n63 62ndash63 85n141 86 92Stump Eleonore 16n27 61n64 75n108

77n116 88n9 224Sturlese Loris 140n39 142n44 150n68

159n100 159n101 224substantialist view of evil 44summum bonum 67 87 91n21 95 107 109n80sunkatathesis (consent) 62superbia 69 84n136 See also pridesupernatural 88 102 105 109 112 116n102

117ndash119 122 149 152ndash153 154n82 158n98 160 168 174ndash176

supreme goalgood 18n1 29 49 64 67 90 109n80

syllogism 14 24 30Symposium 49ndash50 90 108n74synderesis 91 92n24 92n25 101synonym 126

Tauler Johannes 190n68 212teleia See perfectionteleological ethicsframeworkeudaimonism 2 4

9 12ndash13 17ndash18 37ndash41 46ndash47 52 63 75 83 88 92n25 94ndash96 98 99n47 103ndash104 111ndash112 116 129ndash130 133ndash134 136 159 168ndash169 171ndash173 185 192 198 199n89 200 212 218

telos See goaltemper (thumos) 28temperance temperate 13 15 20 25 39n61

47ndash49 51ndash52 99 110temporalia 56 83temptations 13ndash14 59 85 188 210n14theodicy 43 100n53Theologia Deutsch 208 212theology theologians 1ndash2 4 7ndash9 31ndash32 37ndash38

53 63 76 80 85 87 101ndash102 104ndash107 114n92 114n94 115n97 116n100 122n117 124ndash125 129ndash133 136 156 158 175ndash176 208 213ndash214 217

rigorism 79Rist J M 45n5 50n26 53n32 68n85 69n89

84 86n2 91n20 223Rosen Stanley 49 223Ross W D 23n11Russell Bertrand 218

Saarinen Risto 68n85 223sacred doctrine 5 114salvation 3 7 9 42 50n26 51 56 64 66 75

77n116 78ndash79 83 107 109 133 134n16 153ndash154 162n114 172 174 176 188 215ndash216

Sartre Jean-Paul 102 223Satan 55n38 See also LuciferSchoumlnberger Rolf 186ndash187 223Schopenhauer Arthur 39science 18n2 27n24 31ndash32 35 37 114 116

131 210 218Scott Dominic 34n47 35n51Scotus John Duns 9 12 15 39 111n84

139n36 217n33scriptures 2 38n59 55 63 65 83 117 127

141 215self-abandonment 188self-determination 211self-movement 5 122self-negation 203self-possession 15n25self-will 69 211ndash212 See also boldness prideSells Michael 155n88 223Silesius Angelus 208Simplician 43 70 74ndash76 See also Augustine

Ad Simplicianum Letter to Simplician (Ad Simplicianum)

sin sinners 14 29n33 37n58 45 53ndash55 57ndash61 68ndash69 70n91 70n92 71ndash73 77 79ndash80 84ndash85 92n25 95 107n73 163n116 176 184 196 210n14

Socrates 9n9 37n58 49n20 90n20 124 126Son 3 82 123 135n16 139ndash141 147 150ndash152

155 162ndash166 168 170ndash174 176 178ndash180 182ndash183 185ndash186 188 190 192ndash193 195 199 202 209ndash211 215ndash216

Song of Songs 50n26 207Sophia (theoretical wisdom) 30ndash32 35 37ndash39socircphrosucircnecirc See temperanceSorabji Richard 16n28 25n15 27 39n63 42n2

98n46 221 223soul 3 12 19ndash20 24ndash25 30 36ndash38 45 47ndash48

54ndash58 60 62 66ndash69 72 77n116 81 83ndash84 89 92n25 101ndash102 108 114 115n97 119ndash121 124 134 143n48 145ndash149 151ndash152 153n79 155 157ndash166 168 170 172 173n12 175 178ndash182 185ndash187 190 193 195 197ndash198 202 206ndash209 212n20 214

i n d e x 235

University of Paris 7 86 114n94 129univocal 124ndash128 137ndash141 143 145ndash147 152

159n100 162ndash164 166 170 178 182 185 188 189n63 192 195 197 199 209

univocation 126univocity-theorem 164unwizzen See not-knowingUrmson J O 11 23n11 223utilitarianism 106n72

Van Riel Gerd 49n20 62n67 62n69 78n119 78n120 224

Varro 48n19velleitas velleity 117n105 118n106 See also

wishvices 8 26 47 59n57 87 100 101n57 110

129 196Vinzent Markus 214n24 215n27virtue

in Aquinas See Thomas Aquinas on virtuein Aristotle See Aristotle and virtuein Augustine See Augustine virtuein Eckhart See Eckhart virtuesupernatural 102 105 109 112 122 149

152n73 152n75 154n82 158n98 168 174ndash176

virtue ethics 8 40 94 210vision(s) (mystical) 85n141 202 See also

Beatific Visionvolition 62n69voluntarie See actions voluntaryvoluntariness See actions voluntaryvoluntarists 12 61n66 62 64n75 218voluntas 6n10 10n12 10n14 11 14ndash15 39

45n8 54 55n43 57 58n55 60n61 61 62n67 66n80 67ndash68 73 77n113 78n117 84n136 90n19 92n25 95 98n43 103n64 117n105 182n39 203 211 See also benevolence will

von Muumlller Achatz 130n1vuumlnkelicircn (little spark) 164 180

Walshe MOrsquoC xv 147n61 178n30 201Wawrykow Joseph 107n73 224weakness of will 14 59 68n85 See also akrasia

akratic incontinencewell-being See happinessWestberg Daniel 95n33 224Western philosophy and tradition 4 7 40 42

48n18 67 86n3 209Wetzel James 75n108 224why-questions 21 192will 2ndash16 27 33 37ndash47 102ndash103 129 162

history of concept 16 39 42 49in Aristotle 20 22ndash23 and wish (boulecircsis) 23

39ndash41 49n20 62 129

theocircrein 32 89n14theocircria 32n42this-worldliness 9 108 111Thomas Aquinas 2 4 7ndash8 10ndash12 14 16 18n1

23n12 24 33n45 35n50 39ndash41 47 48n18 49n23 54 60 63 70n91 83 85ndash87 89 90n19 91ndash107 109ndash111 113ndash119 121ndash123 130 132ndash134 136 143ndash144 165n122 168 174ndash176 180 183n41 186n55 188 191ndash193 196 199n89 200 204 209 214 217

on analogy 88 122ndash129 137ndash141 149 189n63 200

on Beatific Vision 88 89n14 92 94 97 99 102ndash105 107 109 112ndash115 115n97 117ndash121 123 173 191

on grace See grace Aquinas onon the two-fold human good 104 116n102

121 122n117Summa Theologiae 5ndash6 9 10n12 16n27 47

49n23 60 63 70n91 86ndash89 94ndash95 98n46 100n52 102n61 103 114 116n100 116n103 118n107 121ndash125 127 137ndash139 144n52 150n71 152n73 154n82 169 176 183n41 189n63 193 196 199

on virtue 8ndash9 12 24 39ndash41 48 85 87ndash88 91 94ndash95 98ndash112 116 121 129 134 136ndash137 154n82 168 174ndash176 183n41 188 191 204

Thomist(ic) 89n14 95 103 106ndash107 109 113n91 114n92 133n13 184 199 See also Thomas Aquinas

tolma See boldness self-will pridetranscendencetranscendent good 40 89ndash90

108 144 210 218 See also divinetranscendental being 162 165ndash166transcendentals 141n41 177 185Trinity 81 131 150ndash152 165ndash166 186 215truth 18n2 20 23 27 31 44 48 50 55 58 63ndash

66 68ndash69 71 114n92 116 130ndash131 143 156 160 162n112 163ndash165 169ndash171 173 177ndash178 188 196 203 213 216

twenty-eight propositions (condemned 1329) 1 130 135n18

twofold naturegood 104 116n102 121 122n117

ultimate end 6 18 86 88 95 97ndash98 See also end goal

understanding 31 46 143ndash144 See also nousungovernedness See akrasia akraticunified being 164union of indistinction 146union (with the divine) 64 105 118n106 151

164 168 172 184 191ndash192 197 208ndash209university faculty of liberal arts 7 37n58

236 i n d e x

will-centered tradition 7William of Ockham 1n2 209 217 224Williams Thomas 45n7Willkuumlr (Kant) 211ndash212Wippel John 109n80 111n86wish 11 14 22ndash25 28ndash30 32 39 52ndash53 68

96n35 117n105 129 134 136 171 176 196 199 206 See also boulecircsis will

without will 2 4 16 84 See also live without why

Wittgenstein Ludwig x 77n116 143n46 185n48 198n87 224

Word 81n124 81n126 131 140 143 145ndash147 150 159ndash160 162ndash163 166 179 181ndash183 186 207 209

works 3 7ndash8 63 77 79ndash80 100 103 122 134 154n82 171ndash172 175ndash176 183ndash185 188n60 191ndash193 198 202 204 206 216

wuumlrklicheit (Wirklichkeit reality) 130

will (continued)in Augustine 40 42ndash43 45ndash49 49n20 49n23

51ndash81 81n126 85 100n53 129 154n82 and freedom of the will 59 70n93 72ndash73 and ldquotwo willsrdquo 66ndash67 and the ldquowill of gracerdquo 79ndash80 154n82 and Godrsquos will 84

in Aquinas as rational appetite 5ndash16 49n23 86ndash87 90ndash92 95ndash98 129 154n82 and Platonic erocircs 94 111 and grace 102ndash103 154n82 and the Beatific Vision 105ndash106 111ndash112 121ndash123 and velleitas 117n105 and intention 193 199

in Eckhart 40 154 163ndash164 178ndash183 187 206 creaturely willdivine will 183 185 190 Godrsquos will 136 the just have no will 136 160 197 199 and virtue 194 and Wittgenstein on good will 198n87 and intentions 193ndash195 201 and Beccarisi 202 and Kobusch 203

in Kant 40n64 210ndash212

Cover

Contents

PREFACE

ABBREVIATIONS

Introduction

1 The Will as ldquoRational Appetiterdquo

2 Aristotlersquos Teleological Eudaimonism

3 Augustinersquos Christian Conception of Will

4 Aquinas on Happiness and the Will

5 Meister Eckhart Living on Two Levels

6 Meister Eckhart Living without Will

7 Living without Why Conclusion

BIBLIOGRAPHY

INDEX

Living without WhyMeister Eckhartrsquos Critique of the

Medieval Concept of Will

J O H N M C O N N O L LY

1





















1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2


Dedicatedto







vii

C O N T E N T S

Preface ix

Abbreviations xiii

Introduction 1








Bibliography 219

Index 225

ix

P R E F A C E




x p r e f a c e





p r e f a c e xi





xiii






Latin Works












German Works





Translations














Augustine
















Church Fathers


Thomas Aquinas









1

Introduction














Int roduc t i on 3














5

1









































(IaIIae 6 2 ad 2)

























































17

2























































































































































(NE 1177b26ndash1178a8)



(NE 1178a5ndash6)























































42

3








I






(Conf VII2026)








(2 10)



(DLAII1952)



(Ibid II1953)









(X1)



(DLA II926)







(II1641)




























(DDC XV25)









(Gen litt IV37)









(DLA I1327)


II








(I11)








(DLA I24)


























(I1635)












(II1953)


















(36)





































(Conf VII2026)











(Ibid)



















(Gen litt II1520)











(I1329)












(III1954)



(III1953)







(III1852)









(III1029)



(II2054)





III





























(I221)



























IV

















































(De Spir 813)





86

4
























(1096b32ndash35)


















(SLE IIlect4n7)










(SENTIVd49II4c)








(IaIIae 952c)






(IIaIIae122c)

















(IaIIae11c)















And in 16c he says










































(I7 1097b2ndash5)











(STh 1095ad 1)




















(Ia624c)


















(Ibid 12ndash14)














(SLE II lect 44)



(DCD XIX 25)



















































































(QDA 5ad 9)


























(STh Ia 934c)









(STh 938sc)








(STh Ia135)






(Ibid)






(I 1a7ndash12)








(STh Ia 43c)







129

5






































Or again in Pr 26
















































(STh Ia166c)












(SCG IV104)



























































































































































(Ibid VI722)

















































































(153ndash54)








168

6














































































25 Esse est deus















































































(LW 35107ndash5112)





























































































































































206

7
































































26 Lerner Heresy 1






























219



































































































































225





















87n4 90 93 98 100 106 114n94 115 117n105 121 124 125n126 127 132 133n13 138n31 147 164 168 184 186 187n58 188 196n82 218ndash219



I N D E X

226 i n d e x





107 109 112ndash114 115n97 116n103 117 118n107 119ndash121 123 162n114 164 173 191 198



164 168 170 173n12 178 181ndash182 185ndash186 188 190 193 202 209 211 216



bliss 5 129 134 164 167 170ndash171 174 184 192















132 133n13 134 137 143n48 148 156n91 160n105 161 166n125 168 186n55 208n7 209 210n14 212n22 219






76 79ndash80 81n126 84ndash85 89 123 129 174


i n d e x 227




120 124 137 149 152 162 166 169 171 195 217






















106ndash107 212

228 i n d e x



































i n d e x 229


101 103ndash105 107 109 114ndash115 117 119 131 156 176 181 213 216

Fall 42 59 72ndash73 76 84 149 169 175 210n14 212n22



150n68 151n73 161 178 196 197n84 199ndash200 208n9 220















goallessness 2












84n136 92 138n29 152 194 200 210n14 213



230 i n d e x






94 102ndash103 106 109 111 116n102 119 121 149 215







111n84 134 175ndash176 184n46 187 192ndash194 203 211






143 145ndash147 152 159n100 162ndash164 166 170 178 182 185 188 189n63 192 195 197 199 209















i n d e x 231

























49n20 61n66 75n108 78n120 86n1 87n6 95n34 97n40 173n14 221


134 155 159 182n39 186n52 191 202 208n7 215 217n32

Jews Judaism 48n18 55 116n102 148 180 208n8 209





232 i n d e x

development 40 44 46 48 63 74 85 99 102n61 103 134 168 175





186 190 208





















i n d e x 233




25n15 26 31ndash32 35ndash39 47 49 51 99 121





120n113 145 196 210Putnam Hilary 210n12 223























234 i n d e x
























139n36 217n33scriptures 2 38n59 55 63 65 83 117 127









i n d e x 235


159n100 162ndash164 166 170 178 182 185 188 189n63 192 195 197 199 209




wishvices 8 26 47 59n57 87 100 101n57 110



152n73 152n75 154n82 158n98 168 174ndash176









39ndash41 49n20 62 129


















236 i n d e x













Cover

Contents

PREFACE

ABBREVIATIONS

Introduction








BIBLIOGRAPHY

INDEX





















1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2


Dedicatedto







vii

C O N T E N T S

Preface ix

Abbreviations xiii

Introduction 1








Bibliography 219

Index 225

ix

P R E F A C E




x p r e f a c e





p r e f a c e xi





xiii






Latin Works












German Works





Translations














Augustine
















Church Fathers


Thomas Aquinas









1

Introduction














Int roduc t i on 3














5

1









































(IaIIae 6 2 ad 2)

























































17

2























































































































































(NE 1177b26ndash1178a8)



(NE 1178a5ndash6)























































42

3








I






(Conf VII2026)








(2 10)



(DLAII1952)



(Ibid II1953)









(X1)



(DLA II926)







(II1641)




























(DDC XV25)









(Gen litt IV37)









(DLA I1327)


II








(I11)








(DLA I24)


























(I1635)












(II1953)


















(36)





































(Conf VII2026)











(Ibid)



















(Gen litt II1520)











(I1329)












(III1954)



(III1953)







(III1852)









(III1029)



(II2054)





III





























(I221)



























IV

















































(De Spir 813)





86

4
























(1096b32ndash35)


















(SLE IIlect4n7)










(SENTIVd49II4c)








(IaIIae 952c)






(IIaIIae122c)

















(IaIIae11c)















And in 16c he says










































(I7 1097b2ndash5)











(STh 1095ad 1)




















(Ia624c)


















(Ibid 12ndash14)














(SLE II lect 44)



(DCD XIX 25)



















































































(QDA 5ad 9)


























(STh Ia 934c)









(STh 938sc)








(STh Ia135)






(Ibid)






(I 1a7ndash12)








(STh Ia 43c)







129

5






































Or again in Pr 26
















































(STh Ia166c)












(SCG IV104)



























































































































































(Ibid VI722)

















































































(153ndash54)








168

6














































































25 Esse est deus















































































(LW 35107ndash5112)





























































































































































206

7
































































26 Lerner Heresy 1






























219



































































































































225





















87n4 90 93 98 100 106 114n94 115 117n105 121 124 125n126 127 132 133n13 138n31 147 164 168 184 186 187n58 188 196n82 218ndash219



I N D E X

226 i n d e x





107 109 112ndash114 115n97 116n103 117 118n107 119ndash121 123 162n114 164 173 191 198



164 168 170 173n12 178 181ndash182 185ndash186 188 190 193 202 209 211 216



bliss 5 129 134 164 167 170ndash171 174 184 192















132 133n13 134 137 143n48 148 156n91 160n105 161 166n125 168 186n55 208n7 209 210n14 212n22 219






76 79ndash80 81n126 84ndash85 89 123 129 174


i n d e x 227




120 124 137 149 152 162 166 169 171 195 217






















106ndash107 212

228 i n d e x



































i n d e x 229


101 103ndash105 107 109 114ndash115 117 119 131 156 176 181 213 216

Fall 42 59 72ndash73 76 84 149 169 175 210n14 212n22



150n68 151n73 161 178 196 197n84 199ndash200 208n9 220















goallessness 2












84n136 92 138n29 152 194 200 210n14 213



230 i n d e x






94 102ndash103 106 109 111 116n102 119 121 149 215







111n84 134 175ndash176 184n46 187 192ndash194 203 211






143 145ndash147 152 159n100 162ndash164 166 170 178 182 185 188 189n63 192 195 197 199 209















i n d e x 231

























49n20 61n66 75n108 78n120 86n1 87n6 95n34 97n40 173n14 221


134 155 159 182n39 186n52 191 202 208n7 215 217n32

Jews Judaism 48n18 55 116n102 148 180 208n8 209





232 i n d e x

development 40 44 46 48 63 74 85 99 102n61 103 134 168 175





186 190 208





















i n d e x 233




25n15 26 31ndash32 35ndash39 47 49 51 99 121





120n113 145 196 210Putnam Hilary 210n12 223























234 i n d e x
























139n36 217n33scriptures 2 38n59 55 63 65 83 117 127









i n d e x 235


159n100 162ndash164 166 170 178 182 185 188 189n63 192 195 197 199 209




wishvices 8 26 47 59n57 87 100 101n57 110



152n73 152n75 154n82 158n98 168 174ndash176









39ndash41 49n20 62 129


















236 i n d e x













Cover

Contents

PREFACE

ABBREVIATIONS

Introduction








BIBLIOGRAPHY

INDEX

living without why · connolly, john m. living without why : meister eckhart’s critique of the...

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