lost links and mid air collisions-the problems with domestic drones

7/31/2019 Lost Links and Mid Air Collisions-The Problems With Domestic Drones

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Lost-Links and Mid-Air Collisions- The Problems With

Domestic Drones

April 18, 2012 in Featured

A map of current military remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) operations as of 2011 is presented withan overlay of flight paths through the national airspace in a U.S. Air Force Chief Scientistpresentation.

Public Intelligence

Most of the public discussion surrounding the use of drones both internationally anddomestically has focused on issues of privacy or civilian casualties. Due to the technicalcomplexity of drone operations, there has been little media examination of the practicalfeasibility of widespread domestic drone deployment. In February, the FAA Reauthorization Actof 2012 was signed into law clearing the way for more than 30,000 domestic drones by 2020.The law requires the FAA to create procedures for commercially-operated drones by 2015 andenables law enforcement agencies to operate small-scale drones at low altitudes. While this has anumber of negative implications for the right to privacy, such as the lack of any laws governing

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the usage of data collected via drones, the thought of a future where U.S. skies are filled with anarray of drones has a much larger, more practical problem: is it even logistically possible tooperate thousands of pilot-less aircraft in the domestic airspace?

Lost-Links

The first set of problems that will likely plague any attempt at the widespread use of dronesinside the U.S. relate to frequency allocation and electromagnetic interference (EMI). In order tobe controlled from a remote location, drones must communicate via with a ground control stationvia some sort of data link. In order for this link to be maintained, there must be protection againstelectromagnetic interference that can disrupt the communications link. If the interference issufficient in scale, it can lead to what is called a lost link event causing the drone to lose contactwith its operator. Sometimes the link is reestablished and the pilot is able to maintain control of the drone. Sometimes the link cannot be reestablished and the drone is effectively turned into azombie that can drift far from its intended target, as may have occurred recently with the RQ-170captured by Iran in December 2011.

A U.S. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board report from April 2011 obtained by PublicIntelligence warns of the potential vulnerabilities of communications links used for remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs): ―Limited communications systems result in communications latency,link vulnerabilities, and lost-link events, which limits mission roles assigned to RPAs,operational flexibility, and resiliency in the face of unanticipated events.‖ The report notes thatthere are a ―wide range of methods that a determined adversary can use for attacking RPAguidance and navigation systems‖ such as constructing ―simple GPS noise jammers‖ that ―can beeasily constructed and employed by an unsophisticated adversary.‖

http://www.salon.com/2012/04/10/the_drones_are_coming_to_america/singleton/



http://jeffreycarr.blogspot.com/2011/12/open-source-analysis-of-rq-170-stealth.html




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A diagram of the data link between a drone and its ground data terminal (GDT). The datatransmitted through the GDT is sent to a ground control station (GCS) where the drone pilotoperates the unmanned aircraft.

Finding unallocated frequencies that can be used for drone aircraft can also be a difficult task.

For example, when the Department of Defense‘s Joint Spectrum Center analyzed the deploymentof Predator B drones in 2004 along a section of the Mexico-Arizona border, they conductedextensive analysis of the potential for electromagnetic interference and other frequencydisruptions. The report examines potential conflicts between Mexican fixed microwave links,National Science Foundation radio astronomy observatories and various other potential sourcesof interference. When several Predator drones were needed for tests at Creech Air Force Base inNevada, the Joint Spectrum Center had to study the potential for interaction with residentialindoor and industrial outdoor radio local area networks, outdoor video surveillance networks andother potential signals arising from a nearby residential community.

The issue of communications interference and lost-link events is ―a major concern and failure of

[common data link or CDL] communications due to EMI has resulted in numerous UASaccidents‖ according to a 2010 U.S. Army Command and General Staff College report. ―Theomnidirectional antennas the aircraft uses to establish the CDL leaves the system open tointerference. Environmental EMI from communications systems produce sufficient energy todisrupt CDLs and are responsible for 15 percent of Army UAS accidents.‖

To make matters worse, the data links used to communicate with many types of drones arecompletely unencrypted . In 2010, the Air Force produced a report on lessons learned from theuse of small unmanned aircraft systems (SUAS) that argues the current communications systemsused by smaller drones are vulnerable and unsustainable: ―Many of the current SUAS usedatalink equipment that is not interoperable with other datalinks or tunable to other frequencies.

In fact, the number of available proprietary SUAS frequencies is so limited US military SUASoperations are threatened by interference from other operations. Additionally, SUAS datalinksare unencrypted and are thus susceptible to enemy exploitation. Since datalinks are alsounprotected, GCS are jammable and locations can even be triangulated and possibly physicallyattacked.‖

Mid-Air Collisions

The second set of problems facing domestic drones center around their ability to avoid collisionsboth in the air and with objects on the ground. Current military drone operations in places likeAfghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen occur in an airspace environment that is relatively

unoccupied. There is not a tremendous amount of air traffic in Somalia, for example, or Yemenand the terrain is largely devoid of high-rise buildings and other grounded objects that couldcreate impediments to small-scale drone operations. Yet, even in these environments, avoidingcollisions and deconflicting airspace is a major concern for drone operators.

A U.S. Army handbook designed to inform soldiers about airspace control details the complexprocedures necessary for the safe and effective use of small unmanned aerial vehicles (SUAVs)in combat missions. First a mission plan must be organized and approved before being

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http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/uas-vuln.pdf



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submitted to an airspace control authority who analyzes the plan against other proposed missionplans for deconfliction. If there are conflicts between the proposed mission and other activitiesoccurring in the area, then the mission is adjusted to maintain safe control over the airspace. Thehandbook repeatedly warns that ―Failure to conduct airspace coordination prior to SUAVoperations may contribute to a mid-air collision resulting in severe injury or death to personnel.‖

A diagram of the small unmanned aerial vehicle (SUAV) mission planning process as presentedin a U.S. Army manual.

In fact, mid-air collisions have occurred in the course of combat operations. In May 2011, a RQ-7B Shadow and a C-130 cargo plane collided over Afghanistan. Though no one was injured, theC-130 was forced to make an emergency landing. In response to the incident, a FAAspokesperson told AOL Defense that there are several studies indicating that ―you could not useTCAS to reliably have other aircraft detect the unmanned aircraft.‖

TCAS or the Traffic Collision Avoidance System is the standard technology used by commercialaircraft around the world to help avoid mid-air collisions. The system, based on transponders thatoperate in each aircraft independent of air traffic control, reportedly has difficulties incorporatingdrones due to their lack of a pilot and often unpredictable flight patterns. A U.S. Air Force studyconducted by MIT states that TCAS was ―designed under the assumption that a pilot was on-board the aircraft to interpret displays and perform visual acquisition. The TCAS traffic displayis intended to aid visual acquisition by indicating the proper sector to search out the cockpit, butdoes not by itself provide sufficient bearing or altitude rate accuracy to support avoidance

http://defense.aol.com/2011/08/17/drone-collides-over-afghanistan-with-u-s-warplane/




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maneuvers. The role of a TCAS traffic display in a UAV ground control station is thereforeunder debate.‖

The FAA‘s own website makes it clear that due to drones‘ ―inability to comply with ‗sense andavoid‘ rules, a ground observer or an accompanying ‗chase‘ aircraft must maintain visual contact

with the UAS and serve as its ‗eyes‘ when operating outside of airspace that is restricted fromother users.‖ A 2011 presentation from the U.S. Air Force Chief Scientist acknowledges thisneed for increased integration of domestic drone operations into the national airspace, as well asimprovement in collision avoidance systems capable of surviving ―lost-link‖ events where thedrone loses contact with its ground control station.

The potential for mid-air collisions has already caused problems for domestic drone operations inHawaii, where the state purchased a $70,000 drone to monitor Honolulu Harbor without theknowledge that FAA approval would be required to operate the device. When the FAA analyzedthe case, they found that traffic from Honolulu International Airport and a nearby Air Force basemade operating the drone too dangerous and denied the state‘s request. Situations like this will

likely arise with greater frequency as the push toward domestic drone operations is continued inthe U.S. and other Western countries.

Drones over U.S. get OK by Congress

By Shaun Waterman

The Washington Times

Tuesday, February 7, 2012

U.S. Customs and Border Protection uses qualified pilots to operate Predator drones for surveillancealong the border. Under the FAA Reauthorization Act, drones eventually could be used by police

agencies and private companies across the U.S. (Associated Press)

Look! Up in the sky! Is it a bird? Is it a plane? It‘s … a drone, and it‘s watching you. That‘s whatprivacy advocates fear from a bill Congress passed this week to make it easier for thegovernment to fly unmanned spy planes in U.S. airspace.

http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/media/uas_fact_sheet.pdf



http://dronewarsuk.wordpress.com/2011/10/18/usaf-presentation-on-future-of-drones-rpa/



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The FAA Reauthorization Act, which President Obama is expected to sign, also orders theFederal Aviation Administration to develop regulations for the testing and licensing of commercial drones by 2015.

Privacy advocates say the measure will lead to widespread use of drones for electronic

surveillance by police agencies across the country and eventually by private companies as well.

―There are serious policy questions on the horizon about privacy and surveillance, by bothgovernment agencies and commercial entities,‖ said Steven Aftergood, who heads the Project onGovernment Secrecy at the Federation of American Scientists.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation also is ―concerned about the implications for surveillance bygovernment agencies,‖ said attorney Jennifer Lynch.

The provision in the legislation is the fruit of ―a huge push by lawmakers and the defense sector to expand the use of drones‖ in American airspace, she added.

According to some estimates, the commercial drone market in the United States could be worthhundreds of millions of dollars once the FAA clears their use.

The agency projects that 30,000 drones could be in the nation‘s skies by 2020.

The highest-profile use of drones by the United States has been in the CIA‘s armed Predator -drone program, which targets al Qaeda terrorist leaders. But the vast majority of U.S. dronemissions, even in war zones, are flown for surveillance. Some drones are as small as modelaircraft, while others have the wingspan of a full-size jet.

In Afghanistan, the U.S. use of drone surveillance has grown so rapidly that it has created a glutof video material to be analyzed.

The legislation would order the FAA, before the end of the year, to expedite the process throughwhich it authorizes the use of drones by federal, state and local police and other agencies. TheFAA currently issues certificates, which can cover multiple flights by more than one aircraft in aparticular area, on a case-by-case basis.

The Department of Homeland Security is the only federal agency to discuss openly its use of drones in domestic airspace.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection, an agency within the department, operates nine drones,variants of the CIA‘s feared Predator. The aircraft, which are flown remotely by a team of 80fully qualified pilots, are used principally for border and counternarcotics surveillance under fourlong-term FAA certificates.

Officials say they can be used on a short-term basis for a variety of other public-safety andemergency-management missions if a separate certificate is issued for that mission.

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―It‘s not all about surveillance,‖ Mr. Aftergood said.

Homeland Security has deployed drones to support disaster relief operations. Unmanned aircraftalso could be useful for fighting fires or finding missing climbers or hikers, he added.

The FAA has issued hundreds of certificates to police and other government agencies, and ahandful to research institutions to allow them to fly drones of various kinds over the UnitedStates for particular missions.

The agency said it issued 313 certificates in 2011 and 295 of them were still active at the end of the year, but the FAA refuses to disclose which agencies have the certificates and what theirpurposes are.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation is suing the FAA to obtain records of the certifications.

―We need a list so we can ask [each agency], ‗What are your policies on drone use? How do you

protect privacy? How do you ensure compliance with the Fourth Amendment?‘ ‖ Ms. Lynch said.

―Currently, the only barr ier to the routine use of drones for persistent surveillance are theprocedural requirements imposed by the FAA for the issuance of certificates,‖ said AmieStepanovich, national security counsel for the Electronic Privacy Information Center, a researchcenter in Washington.

The Department of Transportation, the parent agency of the FAA, has announced plans tostreamline the certification process for government drone flights this year, she said.

―We are looking at our options‖ to oppose that, she added.

Section 332 of the new FAA legislation also orders the agency to develop a system for licensingcommercial drone flights as part of the nation‘s air traffic control system by 2015.

The agency must establish six flight ranges across the country where drones can be test-flown todetermine whether they are safe for travel in congested skies.

Representatives of the fast-growing unmanned aircraft systems industry say they worked hard toget the provisions into law.

―It sets deadlines for the integration of [the drones] into the national airspace,‖ said GretchenWest, executive vice president of the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International,an industry group.

She said drone technology is new to the FAA.

The legislation, which provides several deadlines for the FAA to report progress to Congress, ―will move the [drones] issue up their list of priorities,‖ Ms. West said.






















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Open Source Analysis of the RQ-170 Stealth Sentinel Loss to Iran

Courtesy of Recorded Future: https://www.recordedfuture.com/rf/s/2z0Cm4

The loss of the RQ-170 Stealth Sentinel drone to Iran is potentially one of the most critical events that has occurred in 2011

because it implies an offensive electronic warfare or cyber capability that no one expected Iran to have. Now that Iran has

released a video of the captured drone and the U.S. government has confirmed that it's authentic, it's clear that the originalFARS report claiming that it was captured via electronic means may have been accurate in spite of unanimous Western

media reports to the contrary; i.e., that it was shot down.

EMEA's strategic intelligence report on the RQ-170 says that the Stealth Sentinel is a high altitude and long endurance

unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) designed and manufactured by Skunk Works, a division of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for

the United States Air Force (USAF). According to EMEA:

The UAV can capture real time imagery of the battlefield and transfer the data to the ground control station (GCS) through a

line of sight (LOS) communication data link. The 27.43m wide and 1.82m high aerial vehicle was designed to execute

intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and target acquisition (ISTAR) and electronic warfare missions over a target area.

According to Earl Lum, President of EJL Wireless Research LLC what is supposed to happen when an Unmanned Aerial

Vehicle (UAV) like the RQ-170 loses its comms link is that it should autonomously follow a pre-programmed lost-link profile

consisting of waypoints at various altitudes, forming a loop until it re-establishes contact or crashes. The communication link

for the UAVs is typically today LOS (line of sight). If it falls below the mountains and loses LOS, it is supposed to then go

through this process. However while this applies to UAVs in general it may not be the case with the RQ-170.

Navigation technology

According to the EMEA report, the RQ-170 can be controlled either manually from the GCS or through autonomous mode.

An automatic launch and recovery (ALR) system facilitates the aircraft to land safely when communication with the control

station fails.



http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/iran-state-television-displays-downed-u-s-surveillance-drone-1.400377



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Ground control station

The GCS of the RQ-170 displays the real time imagery or videos captured by the vehicle's payload cameras onboard. The

data supplied by the vehicle is retrieved, processed, stored and monitored at the control station which was designed and

built by Skunk Works. The GCS tracks, controls and monitors the RQ-170 by transferring commands to the vehicle via LOS

SATCOM data link. The sentinel is being operated by 432nd wing of air combat command (ACC) at Creech Air Force Base,

Nevada, and 30th reconnaissance squadron at Tonopah Test Range, Nevada.

Related cyber incidents that may have compromised the RQ-170:

- A South Korean newspaper, JoongAng Daily, reported in December 2009 that the RQ-170 was flight tested in South Korea

to supersede the U-2 aircraft at Osan Air Base for carrying out missions over North Korea. North Korea is an ally of Iran and

has conducted offensive CNE (Computer Network Exploitation) and CNA (Computer Network Attack) missions against

South Korea repeatedly for several years. It's unknown what information has been stolen however this type of intelligence is

highly sought after and its reasonable to assume that the DPRK would include it on a CNE acquisitions list.

- Lockheed Martin reported a cyber attack in June, 2011 that lasted about one week. LM didn't report what was taken

however as with the DPRK example, UAV research has been targeted at U.S. defense firms as late as this past summer

according to my own confidential sources.

- Creech Air Force Base experienced a malware infection that impacted its UAV Ground Control Stations in October 2011.

It's public report on the incident was confusedly written and lacked details regarding the malware involved, its propagation

and its remediation.

Summary The objective of this article is to assess possibilities. Based on EMEA's report on the RQ-170, it appears that the drone had

the ability to land itself without operator control. I'd appreciate hearing from any experts who can confirm whether that's the

case or not. If it is, then Iran may have lucked out. If it isn't, then Iran's claim that it used its electronic warfare capacity to

assume operational control of this substantial U.S. military asset appears to be true. Considering how easy it is for an

adversary to conduct CNE against targeted U.S. networks, this is probably a capability that they obtained from one of many

mercenary hacker crews who engage in that type of activity. While the scope of this article is hypothetical, the CNE targeting

of UAV R&D is a fact born out by my own company's work in this area. Iran may or may not have that capability now but

eventually it will. The RQ-170 event should be a massive wake-up call on the part of the U.S. Air Force to reinstall a self-

destruct capability, harden the RQ-170's operating system, and examine potential vulnerabilities in its UAV fleet supply

chain.

UPDATE (1528 PST 09DEC11): From an article in today's SF Gate:

The most frightening prospect raised by what appears to be a largely intact Sentinel is that the Iranians' second claim abouthow they brought it down -- by hacking into its controls and landing it themselves -- might be true, said a U.S. intelligence

official, who spoke only on the basis of anonymity because the RQ-170 is part of a Secret Compartmented Intelligence (SCI)

program, a classification higher than Top Secret.

The official said the possibility that the Iranians or someone else hacked into the drone's satellite communications is doubly

alarming because it would mean that Iranian or other cyber-warfare officers were able to disable the Sentinel's automatic

self-destruct, holding pattern and return-to-base mechanisms. Those are intended to prevent the plane's secret flight control,

optical, radar, surveillance and communications technology from falling into the wrong hands if its controllers at Creech Lake

Air Force Base or the Tonopah Test Range, both in Nevada, lose contact with it.

UPDATE (1708 PST 22DEC11): Cryptome has an interesting thread on the use of the RSA cyber to protect the GPS Red

band used on military systems like the RQ-170. This suggests that data from the RSA breach last March may have been

shared with the Iranians.

UPDATE (0715 PST 05JAN12): AviationWeek has an excellent technical article on the F-22 technology used on the RQ-

170.

Related:

Was Iran's Downing of RQ-170 Related to the Malware Infection at Creech AFB?

How Iran May Have Captured An RQ-170 Stealth Drone

U.S. Air Force Demonstrates How Not To Report A Malware Attack

Posted 9th December 2011 by Jeffrey Carr

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/g/a/2011/12/09/bloomberg_articlesLVX0ER07SXKX.DTL#ixzz1g5DqHNdS



http://cryptome.org/0005/iran-rsa-cipher.htm



http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/awst/2012/01/02/AW_01_02_2012_p28-409855.xml&headline=F-22%20Technology%20On%20UAV%20That%20Crashed%20In%20Iran&next=0



http://jeffreycarr.blogspot.com/2011/12/was-irans-downing-of-rq-170-related-to.html


http://jeffreycarr.blogspot.com/2011/12/how-iran-may-have-captured-rq-170.html


http://jeffreycarr.blogspot.com/2011/10/us-air-force-demonstrates-how-not-to.html

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Labels: Korea Skunk Works rq-170 sentinel drone Iran Lockheed Martin Creech AFB

(U//FOUO) U.S. Air Force Small Unmanned Aircraft

Systems (SUAS) Airpower Lessons from Iraq andAfghanistan

The United States Air Force has long envisioned a strategic role for remotely piloted andautonomous aircraft. As early as May 1896, Samuel Pierpont Langley developed an unpilotedheavier-than-air vehicle which flew over the Potomac River. On V-J Day in August 1945,General Hap Arnold, US Army Air Forces, observed:

―We have just won a war with a lot of heroes flying around in planes. The next war may befought by airplanes with no men in them at all … Take everything you‘ve learned about aviation

in war, throw it out of the window, and let‘s go to work on tomorrow‘s aviation. It will bedifferent from anything the world has ever seen.‖

Since these early days, extended range, persistence, precision, and stealth have characterizedremotely piloted aircraft (RPA) advancements. RPAs have been employed in multiple combatroles and increasingly contested environments. This year, for the first time in history, thePresident‘s budget proposed a larger investment in RPAs than manned aircraft. A seeminglyinsatiable operational appetite for RPAs, however, has led to an Air Force manning bottleneck.This is exacerbated by a lack of common ground stations, unsatisfactory integration with civilianand international airspace, and vulnerabilities in communications and command and controllinks. Further complicating efforts, yet essential in irregular warfare, are directives to minimize

civilian casualties. General David Petraeus sees this need as a direct way to support a key centerof gravity:

―…We must fight the insurgents, and will use the tools at our disposal to both defeat the enemyand protect our forces. But we will not win based on the number of Taliban we kill, but insteadon our ability to separate insurgents from the center of gravity – the people …‖

Our Panel conducted an extensive set of visits and received numerous briefings from a widerange of key stakeholders in government, industry, and academia. Taking a human-centered,evidence-based approach, our study seeks to address operational challenges as well as point tonew opportunities for future RPAs. That RPAs will be a foundational element of the Air Force‘s

force structure is no longer debatable. The real question is how to maximize their current andfuture potential. Our intention is that this study will help provide both vector and thrust in how todo so in the irregular warfare context, as well as other applications.

…

RPAs are revolutionary surveillance and weapons delivery systems – changing the way the AirForce builds situation awareness and engages enemy forces – but their full potential has yet to be

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realized. To begin to address this issue, the Air Force initiated this study to review the state-of-the-art in RPA operations, focusing on control and connectivity in an irregular warfare (IW)environment. The Panel was specifically tasked to identify RPA architectures and operationalconcepts centered on human-systems integration, distributed systems operations, and effectivecommand and control – a cluster of concepts and technologies we subsequently labeled as

―mission management‖ enablers. The Panel was also tasked to recommend mid- to far-term S&Tdevelopment roadmaps for advancing these technologies to improve the flexibility and capabilityof RPA operations. The study terms of reference (TOR) identified a number of core issues whichwere further articulated by the Study Panel to include:

1. Issue #1: Manning and personnel shortfalls are concerns in RPA deployment. Exploitersrepresent the largest manning dependency (39 percent), exacerbated by expected significantexploiter growth from new sensor suites (e.g., ARGUS-IS, Gorgon Stare). Current sensors (e.g.,Constant Hawk and Angel Fire) and expected sensors (e.g., ARGUS-IS) produce data at rates of 10 to over 1000 times projected communications data transmission capacities, and will farexceed human analytic capacity.

2. Issue #2: Manually intensive airspace management and integration requiring exclusion zonesand Certificates of Authorization (COAs) make inefficient use of national and internationalairspace, will not scale to accommodate future RPA growth, hampers manned/unmannedintegration, and presents special challenges for small RPAs.

3. Issue #3: Minimizing collateral damage (CD) and fratricide is not a requirement unique toRPA strike operations. For manned and unmanned platforms, the lack of positive ID (PID) andtactical patience are the most significant causes of civilian casualties (CIVCAS) in currentconflicts (8 percent CIVCAS compared with 66 percent caused by insurgents). Persistence; up-close access; highresolution intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); improved

situation awareness; and improved mission management will permit RPAs to minimizeCD/fratricide. Small-focused lethality munitions and non-lethal optionsfor RPAs promise to further minimize CD and CIVCAS (e.g., as low as 5 percent).

4. Issue #4: In spite of current low RPA losses, inexpensive physical threats (e.g., MANPADS,low-end SAMs, air-to-air missiles) and electronic threats (e.g., acoustic detectors, low costacquisition radars, jammers) threaten future operations.

…

2.3 Issue (3): Minimizing Collateral Damage/Fratricide

A third issue identified by the Study Panel was collateral damage/fratricide (Figure 2-8). RPAs,originally developed for ISR operations, have become important weapons platforms for tacticaland special strike missions in IW. Their expanded use in CAS missions in the future requirestechnology improvements for mission management to minimize fratricide, collateral damage(CD), and civilian casualties (CIVCAS).In IW, success requires winning the ―hearts and minds‖ of the population in the face of anadaptable and agile adversary hiding amongst them. A missile fired (e.g. Hellfire missile) from a



RPA is no different from a Hellfire missile fired from other platforms like the AH-64 Apache.Causing collateral damage is not an issue unique to RPAs. Data obtained from the AfghanistanAOR17 confirms that insurgents have caused approximately two thirds of CIVCAS. The exactnumber of CIVCAS caused by US forces was not reported, but an estimate from available datasuggests the figure to be less than 10 percent. Of these CIVCAS, approximately half were caused

by air-to-ground munitions, but the role of RPAs in these CIVCAS was also not reported. In themajority of these CIVCAS, inadequate acquisition and maintenance of positive targetidentification (PID) was the primary cause, and the ability to provide tactical patience duringoperations would have improved mission success and minimized CIVCAS. In an article by theWashington Post, it was reported that within a recent 15-month period, the CIA conducted 70RPA strikes using the low collateral damage focused lethality Scorpion weapon, killing 400terrorists and insurgents while causing 20 CIVCAS. This CIVCAS figure was based on the useof RPAs to conduct pre-strike ISR and post-strike battle damage assessments. Because of precision targeting and focused lethality, CIVCAS is now primarily dependent on the humanintelligence and situation awareness upon which the targeting decision is based.

… 3.3.4 Encryption and Potential C2 Link Vulnerabilities

Historically, sensor/data downlinks for some RPAs have not been encrypted or obfuscated.Unencrypted sensor data (e.g., FMV) is beneficial because the downlink is used to feed ROVERsystems used by Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC) and other ground personnel,including uncleared coalition members and contractors. This is a life-saving capability. Nevertheless, not protecting against interception of sensor data has been criticized. ―Fixing‖ thissecurity issue by mandating NSA Type 1 encryption is likely to lead to an unacceptable keymanagement burden because of the large number of users of RPA data that have a wide variety

of access rights. However, commercial-grade, NSA-approved cryptography is available (―SuiteB‖). Commercial cryptography of this kind does not require the same degree of rigor in handlingkey material and encryption devices, and is not limited in operation to cleared personnel. Thereis relevant Department of Defense (DOD) activity in this general area.

Encryption has generally been used on C2 messages because the risks associated withcompromise are higher (loss of the vehicle), and there is a greatly reduced need for sharing of theC2 data as compared with sensor data. However, crypto issues will likely be exacerbated whendoing coalition/joint swarming across platforms that require shared C2 across security domains – a capability that is desired to fully exploit the potential of networked RPA operations.



http://info.publicintelligence.net/JFCOM-UAS-PocketGuide.pdf



(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Predator Drone Unmanned Aircraft

Systems (UAS) Tactical Pocket Guide

EMPLOYMENT OF GROUP 3/4/5 ORGANIC/NON ORGANIC UAS TACTICAL POCKET GUIDE

MQ-1B PREDATOR, MQ-1 WARRIOR A, MQ-1C ER/MP, MQ-9 REAPER, MQ-5B HUNTER, RQ-7B

SHADOW Joint Unmanned Aircraft System Center of Excellence (JUAS-COE) 178 pages For Official Use Only

February 2010

THIS POCKET GUIDE PROVIDES INFORMATION USED BY BATTLE STAFFSINVOLVED IN PLANNING, COORDINATING, SYNCHRONIZING OR EXECUTINGACTIONS THAT SUPPORT THE EFFECTIVE EMPLOYMENT OF UNMANNED

AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) ON THE BATTLEFIELD. ALTHOUGH THIS POCKETGUIDE IS PRIMARILY FOCUSED ON NON-ORGANIC UAS, THOSE ASSETSCONTROLLED AT DIVISION LEVEL OR HIGHER, BOTH ORGANIC AND NON-ORGANIC UAS ARE STILL NEW TOOLS TO MOST UNITS. UNDERSTANDING THECAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF UAS CURRENTLY USED BY U.S. FORCESWILL HELP STAFFS MORE EFFECTIVELY USE THESE KEY ASSETS TO THEFULLEST POTENTIAL IN SUPPORT OF GROUND UNIT OPERATIONS.

UAS Planning

UAS currently bring numerous ISR and Tactical Air Support capabilities to Army units,providing near-real-time reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) and fires.They can be employed on the forward line of own troops (FLOT), on the flanks, or in rear areas.Employed as a team, UAS and manned systems provide excellent reconnaissance and attackresolution. Most UA can be fitted with laser designators to mark targets and others may bearmed. Other key capabilities include route, area, and zone reconnaissance, Battle DamageAssessment (BDA), passing target coordinates, teaming with manned systems, andcommunication relay. Planning for organic and non-organic UA as an integrated element withinthe combined arms team can be challenging and is essential.

…

UAS Employment

In general, employment of UAS support of tactical operations falls into two major categories:ISR and Tactical Air Support. Specific employment of UAS capabilities and platforms are afunction of enemy, terrain, weather, troop location, support, time availability, and civilconsiderations (METT-TC).

http://publicintelligence.net/ufouo-u-s-army-predator-drone-pocket-guide/







ISR Missions – ISR is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets and processing, exploitation, dissemination systems in direct support of currentand future operations. UAS ISR missions are broadly considered tactical air reconnaissance orsurveillance.

Reconnaissance – Reconnaissance missions obtain combat information about enemy andindigenous population activities and resources through sensor payloads.Route Reconnaissance – Is the directed effort to obtain detailed information of a specified routeand all terrain from which the enemy could influence movement along that route. UAS, withmulti-sensor capabilities, are well-suited to reconnoiter the front, flanks and rear providing earlywarning, ambush detection, and over watch. Additional UAS support roles are: ground elementover watch, trafficability assessment, landing site and hazard location, threat and suspicious itemidentification. The best results occur when synchronized and commanded by ground elements.

…

Kill Boxes – is a three-dimensional fire support coordinating measure (FSCM) used to facilitatethe expeditious air-to-surface lethal attack of targets, which may be augmented by or integratedwith surface-to-surface indirect fires.

Restricted operating zones/areas (ROZ/ROA) – is airspace of defined dimensions created inresponse to specific operational situations (e.g. UAS launch and recovery zone) or requirementswithin which the operation of one or more airspace users is restricted.

…



…

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(U//LES) Radio Frequency Jammers Used to Disrupt

Communication Devices

(U//LES) Radio frequency jammers are devices designed to prevent communication devices

from operating by deliberately broadcasting disruptive radio transmissions on the frequenciesused by the targeted devices. Radio frequency jammers have been used to interfere withcommunications between law enforcement officers.

…

(U//FOUO) U.S. Air Force Small Unmanned AircraftSystems (SUAS) Airpower Lessons from Iraq and

Afghanistan

―Enduring Airpower Lessons from Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and OperationIRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)‖ is one of three lessons learned (L2) focus areas directed by the Chief

http://publicintelligence.net/ules-radio-frequency-jammers-used-to-disrupt-communication-devices/







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of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) at CORONA Top 2008. This report is the third and last in aseries of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) L2 reports produced for fiscal year 2009 andfocuses on Small UAS (SUAS) capabilities and issues.

Five key observations provide insight into SUAS issues:

OBSERVATION 1: Insufficient analysis and education exist on the capabilities of SUAS andhow they could be effectively employed by the USAF.

OBSERVATION 2: The USAF does not have a comprehensive strategy for the acquisition,sustainment and development of SUAS capabilities; and the USAF has not properly fundedSUAS programs.

OBSERVATION 3: HQ AFSOC received funding and has developed the first Air Force SUASFormal Training Unit (FTU).

OBSERVATION 4: There are no full-time, dedicated professional uniformed Group 2 and 3UAS operators and maintainers.

OBSERVATION 5: Frequency and bandwidth management, communications

infrastructure and datalinks will only be more stressed with the proliferation of SUAS; and

SUAS Ground Control Station (GCS) frequencies are unencrypted and unprotected.

…

OBSERVATION 5: Frequency and bandwidth management, communications infrastructure anddatalinks will only be more stressed with the proliferation of SUAS; and SUAS GCS frequencies

are unencrypted and unprotected.

Discussion: With the proliferation of SUAS on the battlefield of the near future, the currentSUAS GCS proprietary datalinks are not flexible and sustainable. Many of the current SUAS usedatalink equipment that is not interoperable with other datalinks or tunable to other frequencies.In fact, the number of available proprietary SUAS frequencies is so limited US military SUASoperations are threatened by interference from other operations. Additionally, SUAS datalinksare unencrypted and are thus susceptible to enemy exploitation. Since datalinks are alsounprotected, GCS are jammable and locations can even be triangulated and possibly physicallyattacked.

Not all Group 2 and 3 UAS are Cursor on Target (CoT) capable. Among other capabilities, CoTenables users to communicate from a common set of applications to various datalinks such asLink-16 and Situational Awareness Data Link (SADL). Any GCS standards must deliver CoTcompatibility to enable existing CoT systems to seamlessly integrate, thereby decreasingintegration costs and simplifying transition.

Given that SUAS datalink frequencies are not tunable, they may be prohibited from operating inother regions and countries of the world. This limitation is due to the potentiality of interfering



with host-nation communications frequencies. Additionally, SUAS datalinks are notinteroperable with manpack radios, burdening operators to transport multiple pieces of communications hardware on the battlefield.

Effective 1 October 2009, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information

Integration) (ASD (NII)) mandated the use of Common Data Link (CDL) for all UAS greaterthan 30 lbs. As it was originally designed and fielded in the late 1970s, CDL was adequate.According to HQ AFSOC, CDL is not small enough for Group 1 SUAS operations, but will beleveraged on Group 2 and 3 systems. However, the continued proliferation of CDL enabledairborne assets has already reached a tipping point. CDL is a huge and inefficient frequencyspace consumer. This dated, yet capable, waveform needs modernization, to include ―dial-a-rate‖speeds, more efficient error correction coding, multiple encoding rates, expanded frequency bandalternatives (e.g., into L, S, C and extended Ku) and importability to software defined radios.Such modifications could improve UAS density 3 to 15 times what it is today. As it stands,failure to modernize the CDL waveform will limit the number of participants that can operatewithin a region (or suffer degraded video quality) and require strict frequency deconfliction.

Lessons Identified: Develop tunable, interoperable, and unrestricted SUAS GCS frequencies since available radio

frequency spectrum is an essential enabler for UAS operations.

Secure and protect SUAS GCS frequencies.

Develop SUAS GCS datalinks capable of Voice-Over Internet Protocol (VoIP), video and datamulticast.

Make all Group 2 and 3 UAS CoT capable.

Develop digital SUAS GCS datalinks that are interoperable with field radios. Modernize CDL waveform.



http://info.publicintelligence.net/USArmy-ShadowTroop.pdf



U.S. Army RQ7-B Shadow Tactical Unmanned Aircraft

System (TUAS) Handbook

Shadow Troop Handbook

57 pages

2011

1-1. The Shadow TUAS extends the ARS Commander‘s ability to support the full spectrum of conflict through reconnaissance, security, aerial surveillance, communications relay, and laserdesignation.

1-2. The UAS supports the full spectrum capability through augmenting all warfightingfunctions:

a. Movement and Maneuver: Provides the full depth of the reconnaissance and security missionsin order to aid the ground commander in movement of friendly forces and provide the groundforces with freedom to maneuver.

b. Intelligence: The Shadow Troop provides Near Real Time (NRT) intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance (ISR) and extends the capability through flexible RSTA platforms as anorganic asset to the ARS and CAB commanders. They greatly improve the situational awarenessof the ARS and aid in employing the Scout Weapons Team (SWT) in high threat environments.

c. Fires: Coupling the Communication Relay Package (CRP) with the Laser-Designating (LD)payload, the Shadow aids in all levels of the Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Asses cycle.

d. Protection: Through continuous reconnaissance, the Shadow Troop can significantly increasethe force protection in and around secure operational bases.

e. Sustainment: The Shadow provides reconnaissance and security along supply routes andlogistics support areas. Using the CRP, the Shadow can talk directly to the convoy commanderfor immediate reaction.

f. Command and Control: The Shadow greatly increases the ARS commander‘s ability to controlthe fight. The CRP package extends radio transmission ranges to 240 kilometers. With properTTPs, the Shadow can serve as an emergency re-transmitting capability to isolated personnel.

1-3. The Shadow Troop aids the ARS and CAB commanders through the full spectrum of operations from stable peace to general war:

a. Peacetime Military Engagement: The Shadow Troop provides counterdrug activities, recoveryoperations, security assistance, and multinational training events and exercises.

http://publicintelligence.net/u-s-army-rq7-b-shadow-tactical-unmanned-aircraft-system-tuas-handbook/







b. Limited Intervention: Provides search for evacuation operations, security for strike and raidoperations, foreign humanitarian assistance (search of survivors during disaster relief), andsearching for weapons of mass destruction.

c. Peace operations: Provides peacekeeping through surveillance and security for peace

enforcement operations.

d. Irregular Warfare: Assists in tracking enemy personnel while combating terrorism andunconventional warfare.

e. Major Combat Operations: Provides the capability to extend the communication of friendlyunits, emergency retransmitting capability to isolated personnel, target acquisition, and laserdesignation.

…

ONE SYSTEM GROUND CONTROL STATION POSITIONING

2-6. OSGCS positioning is critical to successful employment of UAS. The OSGCS provides thetechnical means to receive UA sensor data. The unmanned aircraft operator, PO, and MCassigned to the OSGCS provide tactical and technical expertise to facilitate UAS operations. TheCAB commander advises the division commander on placement of this critical UAS componentto maximize its effectiveness. The CAB, BFSB, Fires brigade, and BCT conduct disparatemissions simultaneously across the division area of operation, with different TTP, focus, andskill sets required. This requires integration of overall aviation operations at division-level toavoid redundancy of effort. An additional consideration is the Shadow platoons in the IBCTBSTBs and the OSGCSs that remain in their control. With a cohesive ATP relationship built

between the IBCT Shadow platoons and the ARS Shadow Troop, direct support missions to theIBCT in an extended range environment can be controlled by the IBCT Shadow operators, POs,and MCs.

Single-Site Operations

2-7. In single-site operations, the entire UAS unit is co-located. Single-site operations allow foreasier unit command, control, communication, and logistics. Coordination with the supportedunit may be more difficult due to distance from and communications with the supported unit. Inaddition, single-site operations emit a greater electronic and physical signature.

Split-Site Operations2-8. In split-site operations, the UAS element is typically split into two distinct sites: the missionplanning control site (MPCS) and the L/R site. The MPCS is normally located at the supportedunit‘s main or tactical CP location. The L/R site is normally located in more secure area,positioned to best support operations.



2-9. The IBCT Shadow platoons should also consider consolidating launch-recovery with theARS Shadow Troop in order to receive the additional benefits of the ARSs large logisticalfootprint. The IBCT Shadow platoons can focus directly on the MPCS with forward-stagedGCSs.

…

ZONE RECONNAISSANCE

3-20. Zone reconnaissance is conducted to find any significant signs of positions of enemyactivity within a given area defined by boundaries. It is conducted only in conjunction with alarger reconnaissance element and is an extremely detailed reconnaissance effort. For this reason,the zone reconnaissance will normally be conducted in a MURT, which will also be a part of alarger task force.

3-21. Similar to the route reconnaissance, the Shadow will extend further towards enemy activity

and work further ahead of the Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT). The Shadow will clearterritory for any major threats one phase line ahead of the SWT and report any significantactivity. The primary goal of the Shadow during a zone reconnaissance is to ensure the freedomof maneuver for the SWT. The SWT is focused primarily on the freedom of maneuver of thelarger friendly reconnaissance element.

AREA RECONNAISSANCE

3-22. Area reconnaissance gathers intelligence or conducts surveillance of a specified area. Thisarea may be key terrain or other features critical to an operation. Similar to a routereconnaissance, the TUAS may conduct an area reconnaissance autonomously or in a MURT.

3-23. The autonomous area reconnaissance will focus outwards and move into the objective area.The flanks of the overall objective area are secured; then, reconnaissance efforts are focusedinward. UAS may establish a screen on the flank to provide security for ground forces, if used.

3-24. The MURT will use the Shadow to continue reconnaissance efforts on any terrain that caninfluence the given objective area while the SWT moves inward towards the main objective area.This provides NRT intelligence on any changes or significant activities during the conduct of thereconnaissance.

AERIAL SURVEILLANCE

3-25. Aerial surveillance is the systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas,places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means to collectinformation. Aerial surveillance is usually passive and may be continuous.

3-26. UAS surveillance of base camps, airfields, and key logistic sites in lesser-contested areasmay free combat forces to perform other missions and help prevent surprise.



3-27. The TUAS provides easily maintained and lower detectable aerial surveillance to the ARSand CAB commander to help develop the commander‘s intent and concept of the operation. TheShadow Troop provides 24 hour coverage for an NAI in order to:

• Track pattern of life VIA Full Motion Video (FMV)

• Observe a specific area for enemy activity • Provide early warning and detection on a specific high speed avenue of approach

3-28. The difference between an aerial surveillance and standard reconnaissance is the amount of movement for the Shadow payload. During an aerial surveillance, the payload should remaingenerally stabilized to gather information on an extremely specific area of the battlefield.

DHS/CBP Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)

September 7, 2009 in Customs and Border Protection , Department of Homeland Security

http://publicintelligence.net/dhscbp-unmanned-aircraft-system-uas/


http://publicintelligence.net/category/documents/united-states-documents/dhs/customs-and-border-protection/



http://publicintelligence.net/category/documents/united-states-documents/dhs/



http://info.publicintelligence.net/murphy_0610.pdf






Technology Solutions Program Office (TSPO)

18 pages For Official Use Only

October 31, 2006

DHS/CBP UAV Program DescriptionProvides Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS), operations, maintenance, technical support, pilots,and sensor operators to surveil the Southwest border of the United States. Over the next severalyears UAV border surveillance will improve sensor/video surveillance capabilities of the current,monitored base system through persistent 24 hours per day / 7 days per week surveillance;integrate new surveillance technologies (aerial sensor suites), and increase interoperability withother law enforcement agencies and initiatives.

Background

UAS use as part of National Objective “Establish substantial probability of apprehending terrorists and their weapons as they attempt

to illegally enter the United States between the ports of entry”

“Deter illegal entries through improved enforcement”

“Apprehend and deter smugglers of humans, drugs, and other contraband”

“Leverage “Smart Border” technology to multiply the effect of enforcement personnel”

The UAS has demonstrated an ability to enhance operational effectiveness of interdictionelements as part of the National Objective in the areas of: (1) search of high activity areas; (2)remote sensor alarm response; and (3) integration of apprehension operations that enhancessituational awareness

…



Restricted U.S. Military Multi-Service Joint Application of

Firepower (JFIRE) Manual

March 18, 2012 in U.S. Air Force , U.S. Army , U.S. Marine Corps , U.S. Navy

http://publicintelligence.net/restricted-u-s-military-multi-service-joint-application-of-firepower-jfire-manual/



http://publicintelligence.net/category/documents/united-states-documents/department-of-defense/u-s-air-force-department-of-defense-united-states-documents-documents/



http://publicintelligence.net/category/documents/united-states-documents/department-of-defense/u-s-army-department-of-defense-documents/



http://publicintelligence.net/category/documents/united-states-documents/department-of-defense/u-s-marine-corps-department-of-defense-documents/



http://publicintelligence.net/category/documents/united-states-documents/department-of-defense/u-s-navy/



http://info.publicintelligence.net/MTTP-JFIRE.pdf

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http://info.publicintelligence.net/MTTP-JFIRE.pdf

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MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR THE JOINT APPLICATION OF

FIREPOWER

FM 3-09.32 148 pages

Distribution authorized to the DOD, DOD contractors, Australia, Canada, Czech Republic,Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, andthe United Kingdom only to protect technical or operational information from automaticdissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means.

December 2007

JFIRE is a pocket-size, quick-reference guide for requesting fire support in accordance withapproved joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). JFIRE contains calls for fire, joint airattack team (JAAT) techniques, a format for joint air strike requests, close air support (CAS)coordination and planning procedures, communications architecture, and weapons data.

ScopeJFIRE applies to the tactical and special operating forces of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, andAir Force. It is a United States (US) unilateral-only document, but includes some North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO) formats where appropriate. Information in JFIRE has beenextracted from existing Service directives. It is primarily intended for use by members of battalion and squadronlevel combat units.

…

5. Unmanned Aircraft Systems Considerations

UASs consist of one or more unmanned aircraft (UA), a control station, datalinks, and payloads.The capability of UASs to support or execute CAS varies greatly between systems. For example,US Air Force (USAF) MQ-1 and MQ-9 are armed with air-to-surface weapons, have radiocommunications aboard the UA, and are flown by rated aviators trained in CAS procedures.Other systems may not be similarly equipped or flown by CAS-qualified crews but may beemployed for situational awareness, target marking, or as an observer for Types 2 or 3 control bythe controlling JTAC. (See appendices A and B for more information on UASs.) The followingUAS CAS considerations are intended for use with CAS-capable UAS and CAS-qualified UASoperators only:

a. Threat: Unmanned aircraft are unlikely to survive in a heavily defended environment.Consideration must be given to enemy air-to-air and surface-to-air weapons with the ability toengage a UA at its operating location and altitude. UAs are not normally equipped with warningreceivers or countermeasures and depend on threat avoidance for mission survivability. Datalinksmay be susceptible to jamming or interference.

b. Weather: UAs are susceptible to turbulence, icing, and visible precipitation. Electro-optical(EO) / IR sensors and laser designators / range finders / target markers require unobstructed LOS



to the target. Intervening haze, clouds, or blowing dust may interfere with or prevent missionaccomplishment. On the other hand, synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and inertially aidedmunitions (IAMs) are unaffected by haze, cloud cover, or dust. High winds aloft may make itdifficult for the UA to maintain station in a highly restricted location or may unacceptably delaytransit between target areas.

c. Signature: UAs vary in visual, radar, IR, and acoustic signature and in system ability and crewproficiency to manage the signature. For example, when minimum noise is desired to avoidtipping off a target, it may be possible to modulate power and trade altitude for airspeed in orderto reduce the noise signature while approaching closer to a target. On the other hand, it may bedesirable to announce presence in order to stimulate a desired response or intimidate the target.

d. Deconfliction: While UASs presently lack the ability to see and avoid other aircraft, there areother means to integrate UASs (e.g., voice radio; tactical datalinks; identification, friend or foe[IFF]). Formal and informal airspace control measures apply to UASs. UAs may hold overheador offset from a target. Relatively slow airspeeds can permit a UA to operate in a smaller

segment of airspace than other aircraft. Depending upon performance capabilities of the specificUAS and communications with the crew, it may take several minutes to reposition the UA orchange altitude blocks. JTACs must trade off the best position for the UASs to employ sensors / weapons against the desired target(s) with the ability to best employ other assets. Considerationshould also be given to the ―lost link‖ profile autonomously flown by UA if the control datalink is lost. Upon initial check-in, the JTAC should query the UAS operator for the currentlyprogrammed lost-link profile. If unacceptable due to airspace limitations or other reasons, theJTAC should direct a new lost-link profile and receive verification that the UA has beenprogrammed.

e. Communication and Situational Awareness: Some UAs have onboard radios and / or secure

voice providing the ability to communicate with the UAS pilot as with any manned aircraft. Inaddition, some UASs have secure chat and voice over Internet Protocol, as well as additional airand ground situational awareness displays. Providing the ground scheme of maneuver to thesupporting UAS can significantly increase the crew‘s situational awareness and subsequentmission support.

f. Video Downlink (VDL) and Machine-to-machine Datalinks: Some UASs can accept andprovide machine-to-machine digital targeting information and many UASs provide LOS videodownlinks to users with compatible video receivers. This can significantly reduce voice trafficand reduce information transfer errors. (See table 21 VDL – Link / Frequency / Player Referenceon p.77 for more information.)

g. Tactics: UASs employ using a variety of tactics ranging from a wheel to a variant of an IP-target run-in. UA performance characteristics and sensor and weapons capabilities, along withthe environmental and tactical situation, influence the selection of tactics, ranges, altitudes, andtiming considerations.

…



U.S. Military Working to Produce Drones the Size of Insects

June 20, 2011 in News

http://publicintelligence.net/u-s-military-working-to-produce-drones-the-size-of-insects/


http://publicintelligence.net/category/news/



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Experimental drone models at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, two miles from the cow pasturein Ohio where the Wright Brothers learned to fly the first airplanes. Military researchers there are

at work on another revolution in the air: shrinking drones to the size of insects and birds. Credit:Chang W. Lee/The New York Times

War Evolves With Drones, Some Tiny as Bugs (New York Times):

Two miles from the cow pasture where the Wright Brothers learned to fly the first airplanes,military researchers are at work on another revolution in the air: shrinking unmanned drones, thekind that fire missiles into Pakistan and spy on insurgents in Afghanistan, to the size of insectsand birds.

The base‘s indoor flight lab is called the ―microaviary,‖ and for good reason. The drones in

development here are designed to replicate the flight mechanics of moths, hawks and otherinhabitants of the natural world. ―We‘re looking at how you hide in plain sight,‖ said GregParker, an aerospace engineer, as he held up a prototype of a mechanical hawk that in the futuremight carry out espionage or kill.

Half a world away in Afghanistan, Marines marvel at one of the new blimplike spy balloons thatfloat from a tether 15,000 feet above one of the bloodiest outposts of the war, Sangin in HelmandProvince. The balloon, called an aerostat, can transmit live video — from as far as 20 miles away

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/20/world/20drones.html



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— of insurgents planting homemade bombs. ―It‘s been a game-changer for me,‖ Capt. NickoliJohnson said in Sangin this spring. ―I want a bunch more put in.‖

From blimps to bugs, an explosion in aerial drones is transforming the way America fights andthinks about its wars. Predator drones, the Cessna-sized workhorses that have dominated

unmanned flight since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, are by now a brand name, known and fearedaround the world. But far less widely known are the sheer size, variety and audaciousness of arapidly expanding drone universe, along with the dilemmas that come with it.

…

―What it‘s doing out here is nothing special,‖ said Dr. Parker, the aerospace engineer. Theresearchers are using the helicopter to test technology that would make it possible for a computerto fly, say, a drone that looks like a dragonfly. ―To have a computer do it 100 percent of the time,and to do it with winds, and to do it when it doesn‘t really know where the vehicle is, those arethe kinds of technologies that we‘re trying to develop,‖ Dr. Parker said.

The push right now is developing ―flapping wing‖ technology, or recreating the physics of natural flight, but with a focus on insects rather than birds. Birds have complex muscles thatmove their wings, making it difficult to copy their aerodynamics. Designing insects is hard, too,but their wing motions are simpler. ―It‘s a lot easier problem,‖ Dr. Parker said.

In February, researchers unveiled a hummingbird drone, built by the firm AeroVironment for thesecretive Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which can fly at 11 miles per hour andperch on a windowsill. But it is still a prototype. One of the smallest drones in use on thebattlefield is the three-foot-long Raven, which troops in Afghanistan toss by hand like a modelairplane to peer over the next hill.



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U.S. Military Working to Produce Drones the Size of Insects

June 20, 2011 in News

Experimental drone models at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, two miles from the cow pasturein Ohio where the Wright Brothers learned to fly the first airplanes. Military researchers there areat work on another revolution in the air: shrinking drones to the size of insects and birds. Credit:Chang W. Lee/The New York Times

War Evolves With Drones, Some Tiny as Bugs (New York Times):

Two miles from the cow pasture where the Wright Brothers learned to fly the first airplanes,military researchers are at work on another revolution in the air: shrinking unmanned drones, thekind that fire missiles into Pakistan and spy on insurgents in Afghanistan, to the size of insectsand birds.

The base‘s indoor flight lab is called the ―microaviary,‖ and for good reason. The drones indevelopment here are designed to replicate the flight mechanics of moths, hawks and other









http://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/microdrones.jpg






inhabitants of the natural world. ―We‘re looking at how you hide in plain sight,‖ said GregParker, an aerospace engineer, as he held up a prototype of a mechanical hawk that in the futuremight carry out espionage or kill.

Half a world away in Afghanistan, Marines marvel at one of the new blimplike spy balloons that

float from a tether 15,000 feet above one of the bloodiest outposts of the war, Sangin in HelmandProvince. The balloon, called an aerostat, can transmit live video — from as far as 20 miles away — of insurgents planting homemade bombs. ―It‘s been a game-changer for me,‖ Capt. NickoliJohnson said in Sangin this spring. ―I want a bunch more put in.‖

From blimps to bugs, an explosion in aerial drones is transforming the way America fights andthinks about its wars. Predator drones, the Cessna-sized workhorses that have dominatedunmanned flight since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, are by now a brand name, known and fearedaround the world. But far less widely known are the sheer size, variety and audaciousness of arapidly expanding drone universe, along with the dilemmas that come with it.

…

―What it‘s doing out here is nothing special,‖ said Dr. Parker, the aerospace engineer. Theresearchers are using the helicopter to test technology that would make it possible for a computerto fly, say, a drone that looks like a dragonfly. ―To have a computer do it 100 percent of the time,and to do it with winds, and to do it when it doesn‘t really know where the vehicle is, those arethe kinds of technologies that we‘re trying to develop,‖ Dr. Parker said.

The push right now is developing ―flapping wing‖ technology, or recreating the physics of natural flight, but with a focus on insects rather than birds. Birds have complex muscles thatmove their wings, making it difficult to copy their aerodynamics. Designing insects is hard, too,

but their wing motions are simpler. ―It‘s a lot easier problem,‖ Dr. Parker said. In February, researchers unveiled a hummingbird drone, built by the firm AeroVironment for thesecretive Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which can fly at 11 miles per hour andperch on a windowsill. But it is still a prototype. One of the smallest drones in use on thebattlefield is the three-foot-long Raven, which troops in Afghanistan toss by hand like a modelairplane to peer over the next hill.



Head of DHS Drone Program Under Ethics Investigation

December 7, 2011 in News

U.S. Customs and Border Protection drones used near the Texas/Mexico.

Director of federal drone program targeted in ethics inquiry (Los Angeles Times):

The chief of the Homeland Security Department‘s drone aircraft program is facing an ethicsinvestigation for joining the board of directors of the largest industry group promoting the use of unmanned aircraft, officials said Monday.The internal affairs office of U.S. Customs and BorderProtection is reviewing whether Tom Faller, director of unmanned aircraft systems operations,violated internal rules when he took an unpaid position as a board member of the Assn. for

Unmanned Vehicle Systems International on Aug. 16.

Faller oversees eight Predator B surveillance drones that are chiefly used to help search forillegal immigrants and drug smugglers on the northern and southwestern borders.

In some cases, the drones also have been used to assist the Drug Enforcement Administrationand other law enforcement agencies in criminal investigations, and to survey damage after floods

http://publicintelligence.net/head-of-dhs-drone-program-under-ethics-investigation/





http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-drone-conflict-20111206,0,341601.story



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and other natural disasters.

After inquiries from the Los Angeles Times last month, Faller notified the group on Nov. 23 thathe was resigning from the board, said Melanie Hinton, a spokeswoman for the drone group. Shesaid Faller did not attend any board meetings.

―Internal affairs is reviewing issues related to an employee‘s outside associations,‖ JoanneFerreira, a Customs and Border Protection spokeswoman, said Monday in response to questionsabout Faller. ―We are unable to comment on any ongoing investigation.‖

AUVSI Announces Newly Elected Board of Directors (AUVSI):

The Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI) announced during itsannual AUVSI‘s Unmanned Systems North America 2011 its newly elected leaders on its Boardof Directors.The Executive Committee will be led by incoming Chairman of the Board PeterBale, Executive Vice Chair John Lademan, First Vice Chairman Ralph Alderson, Treasurer JoeBrannan; and Immediate Past Chairman John Lambert.

Newly elected AUVSI Board of Directors:COL (Ret) John BurkeTom FallerRADM (ret) Timothy HeelyNeil HunterDr. Mark PattersonDr. Virginia (Suzy) Young

Continuing Board of Directors Members:Michele KalphatChris MaileyChad PartridgeDave SeagleGrant BegleyMatt EnglandGene FraserStephen NewtonDavid PlacePeter Smith

Pakistani ISI Asks CIA to Stop Drone Strikes

May 23, 2011 in News

http://www.auvsi.org/news/



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Men hold up a placard during a Tehreek-e-Insaf rally against drone attacks in Karachi May 22,2011. The placard in Urdu reads "Oh cruel leaders, allow us to shoot down drones".REUTERS/Athar Hussain

ISI asks US to stop drone strikes (Pakistan Express Tribune):

ISI chief Lt Gen Ahmed Shuja Pasha is reported to have asked the US to stop its drone strikes inPakistan in a meeting between CIA deputy director Michael Morrell and senior ISI officials heldin Islamabad on Saturday.

Pasha, who faced tremendous criticism after the May 2 Abbottabad raid that killed al Qaedaleader Osama bin Laden, is reported to have taken a firm stance with the US on the drone strikesin Pakistan‘s tribal areas.

―We will be forced to respond if you do not come up with a strategy that stops the drone strikes,‖Pasha is reported to have told Morrell.

The ISI chief also described the recent incursion by Nato helicopters into Pakistani airspace as a‗shock‘ for defence cooperation between the United States and Pakistan.

Later on Saturday, Morrell met with operational leaders of the ISI, as well as members of itsrecently set-up counter-terrorism division. Both sides are reported to have discussed a wayforward that would involve the US stopping its drone strikes and expanding joint US-Pakistanoperations against militants.

http://tribune.com.pk/story/173665/isi-asks-us-to-stop-drone-strikes/



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Relations between the CIA and the ISI were strained even before the May 2 unilateral US raidthat killed Bin Laden, particularly since January. Earlier, a CIA operative shot and killed twoPakistani men in broad daylight in Lahore. The ISI was publicly embarrassed by the incident andhas been pressuring the US to reveal the extent of CIA activities inside Pakistan.

Thousands protest against US drone attacks in Pakistan (AFP):

Thousands demonstrated in Karachi on Sunday to demand an immediate end to US missilestrikes in Pakistan‘s lawless tribal areas and urge the blocking of NATO supplies passingthrough the country.

Activists from the Tehreek-e-Insaf (Movement for Justice) continued a two-day sit-in outside thecity‘s Arabian Sea port, urging the government to end its cooperation with Washington‘s ―war on terror‖.

―It is not Pakistan‘s war, this is America‘s war. This war has killed thousands of innocent

Pakistanis, women and children,‖ the group‘s leader and former cricketer Imran Khan told thegathering of around 7,000 supporters.

Karachi is Pakistan‘s economic hub, home to its stock exchange and a lifeline for a depressedeconomy wilting under inflation and stagnating foreign investment.

The city, the country‘s largest, is important to logistical support for NATO forces fightingagainst Taliban militants in Afghanistan.

―There was not a single Taliban militant in Pakistan before 9/11 but since we joined this war, weare facing acts of terrorism, bombing and drone strikes,‖ Khan said.

The demonstrators chanted anti-US slogans and carried banners and placards reading ―Death for America‖ and ―Stop drone strikes in Pakistan‖.

Khan said the US drone strikes were creating ―suicide bombing factories‖ and urged thegovernment to stop taking foreign aid.

―These attacks are against Pakistan‘s interests. I ask the government to stop NATO supplies viaPakistan, but I am sure they can‘t, because these shame- proof rulers are getting dollars,‖ he said.

U.S. Officials Lying About Civilian Deaths From Pakistan

Drone Strikes

July 28, 2011 in News

Obama’s drone war (Bureau of Investigative Journalism):

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5g3JQN8Z3jlWuGkS7o7sXvXykIJ1g?docId=CNG.076f1f6447aa97c29bac5277c2a3c00e.111



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Claims by a senior Obama administration official that ‗there hasn‘t been a single collateral[civilian] death‘ in Pakistan drone strikes since August 2010 have been found to be untrue.

Research by the Bureau reveals for the first time the extent of civilian casualties in CIA dronestrikes in the past year.

It comes less than a month after President Obama‘s chief counter -terrorism advisor JohnBrennan publicly stated: ‗…that nearly for the past year there hasn‘t been a single collateraldeath because of the exceptional proficiency, precision of the capabilities that we‘ve been able todevelop‘.

Asked on June 29 about US ‗targeted killings‘, a euphemism which in this case refers to the CIAdrone strikes, Brennan responded: ‗One of the things President Obama has insisted on is thatwe‘re exceptionally precise and surgical in terms of addressing the terrorist threat. And by that Imean, if there are terrorists who are within an area where there are women and children orothers, you know, we do not take such action that might put those innocent men, women and

children in danger.‘

…

The Bureau‘s findings

Our analysis of 116 drone strikes that took place between August 2010 and Brennan‘s speech onJune 29 reveals:

· Ten drone strikes in which a total of at least 45 civilians have been killed.

· Six named children killed by these drone strikes.

· At least 15 additional strikes are likely to have killed many more civilians.

· US drone strikes in Pakistan have risen from one a year in 2004 to one every four days underPresident Obama.

· The US continues to insist that drone strikes are ‗the most accurate weapon in history‘.

Study Rebuts U.S. Claims of “No Civilian Deaths” (IPS):

As the Pakistani public grows increasingly outraged at the United States‘ drone attacks in thenorthwest region of the country, a recent study by the London-based Bureau of InvestigativeJournalism is contradicting U.S. officials‘ insistence that ―not a single civilian life‖ has beenclaimed in the covert war.

Led by British investigative journalist Chris Woods and Pakistani journalist RahimullahYusufzai, the study found that at least 45 civilians, including six children, have been killed in 10

http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=56594






drone strikes since August 2010 alone, while another 15 attacks between then and June 2011likely killed many more.

According to the study, civilians die in one out of every five Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-operated drone attacks in the tribal region, located on the border with Afghanistan, a statistic that

the Bureau says can no longer be denied by the U.S. government.

The Woods-Yusufzai investigation was born in response to a statement made by the U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor and President Barack Obama‘s assistant on counterterrorism, JohnBrennan, who told a press conference here last month that ―the types of operations… that theU.S. has been involved in hasn‘t [resulted in] a single collateral death because of the exceptional proficiency, precision of the capabilities that we‘ve been able to develop.‖

The Bureau‘s investigation reveals Brennan‘s statement to be baseless.

U.S. Drone Attacks Killed More Than 950 People in

Pakistan Last Year

April 16, 2011 in News

Picture taken on the tarmac of Kandahar military airport on June 13, 2010 of a US Predatorunmanned drone armed with a missile. AFP PHOTO/Massoud HOSSAINI/POOL

http://publicintelligence.net/u-s-drone-attacks-killed-more-than-950-people-in-pakistan-last-year/






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Over 900 killed in drone attacks: HRCP (The Nation – Pakistan):

As many as 957 persons became victim of the US drone attacks while 12,580 were murdered,581 were kidnapped for ransom and 16,977 cases of abduction were reported in Pakistan duringthe year 2010, says a report on ‗State of Human Rights in 2010‘.

The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) launched the report on Thursday during aceremony held in a local hotel. Dr Mehdi Hasan, Chairman HRCP, and I.A. Rehman, SecretaryGeneral of the Commission, were also present on the occasion besides many others.

The report depicting the country‘s bad law and order situation says that 957 people becamevictims of US drones strikes during 2010 and what the report called extra-legal killings.

It says that 1,159 people were killed in 67 suicide attacks during 2010 and the fatalities included1,041 civilians while 2,542 people were killed and 5,062 injured in terrorist attacks.

―Violence, political and otherwise, led to the death of over 750 people in target killings inKarachi alone,‖ says the report. At least 237 political activists and 301 other civilians were killedin target killings in Karachi while 81 people were killed in Lyari gang wars. In addition to that,118 people were killed and 40 injured in 117 target killings in Balochistan besides bodies of 59missing persons were found in the province. According to the report, 34 new cases of enforceddisappearance were reported to HRCP during 2010.

State of Human Rights 2010 (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan):

Extrajudicial killings by various actors continued in the country. There were killings by policeacross the country, US drone strikes in FATA and attacks and targeted killings of members of

religious minority and ethnic communities as well as political activists. According to mediareports, US drones launched 134 attacks in the tribal areas of Pakistan in 2010, killing at least957 people and injuring another 383. There was no way of independently verifying claims of killing of militants in these attacks. Several media reports stated that women and children werealso among those killed in the drone strikes. The highest number of attacks, 117, was reportedfrom North Waziristan Agency, accounting for 802 deaths and injuries to over 300 persons. InJune, HRCP drew the government‘s attention to the report of a United Nations expert on targetedkillings, including those through drone strikes, and urged Pakistan to ensure that the conduct of its own forces was not in violation of human rights and humanitarian law. HRCP stated that suchactions did grave damage to the rules designed to protect the right to life and to preventextrajudicial executions. The report by UN Special Reporter on Extrajudicial Executions PhilipAlston had called the United States ―the most pro

lific user of targeted killings, primarily throughdrone attacks, which Mr Alston referred to as ill-defined license to kill without accountability‖.The report also raised the issue of death of innocent civilians in drone strikes and noted that even―[a] consenting state may only lawfully authorize a killing by the targeting State to the extentthat the killing is carried out in accordance with applicable IHL [international humanitarian law]or human rights law.

http://nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Regional/Islamabad/15-Apr-2011/Over-900-killed-in-drone-attacks-HRCP





http://www.hrcp-web.org/Publications/AR2010.pdf







CIA Deaths Prompt Surge in U.S. Drone Strikes

January 24, 2010 in News

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By Scott Shane and Eric SchmittNew York Times January 22, 2010

WASHINGTON — Since the suicide bombing that took the lives of seven Americans in

Afghanistan on Dec. 30, the Central Intelligence Agency has struck back against militants inPakistan with the most intensive series of missile strikes from drone aircraft since the covertprogram began.

Beginning the day after the attack on a C.I.A. base in Khost, Afghanistan, the agency has carriedout 11 strikes that have killed about 90 people suspected of being militants, according toPakistani news reports, which make almost no mention of civilian casualties. The assault hasincluded strikes on a mud fortress in North Waziristan on Jan. 6 that killed 17 people and avolley of missiles on a compound in South Waziristan last Sunday that killed at least 20.

―For the C.I.A., there is certainly an element of wanting to show that they can hit back,‖ said Bill

Roggio, editor of The Long War Journal, an online publication that tracks the C.I.A.‘s dronecampaign. Mr. Roggio, as well as Pakistani and American intelligence officials, said many of therecent strikes had focused on the Pakistani Taliban and its leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, whoclaimed responsibility for the Khost bombing.

The Khost attack cost the agency dearly, taking the lives of the most experienced analysts of AlQaeda whose intelligence helped guide the drone attacks. Yet the agency has responded byredoubling its assault. Drone strikes have come roughly every other day this month, up fromabout once a week last year and the most furious pace since the drone campaign began in earnestin the summer of 2008.

Pakistan‘s announcement on Thursday that its army would delay any new offensives againstmilitants in North Waziristan for 6 to 12 months is likely to increase American reliance on thedrone strikes, administration and counterterrorism officials said. By next year, the C.I.A. isexpected to more than double its fleet of the latest Reaper aircraft — bigger, faster and moreheavily armed than the older Predators — to 14 from 6, an Obama administration official said.

Even before the Khost attack, White House officials had made it clear to Dennis C. Blair, thedirector of national intelligence, and Leon E. Panetta, the C.I.A. director, that they expectedsignificant results from the drone strikes in reducing the threat from Al Qaeda and the PakistaniTaliban, according to an administration official and a former senior C.I.A. official with close tiesto the White House.

These concerns only heightened after the attempted Dec. 25 bombing of a Detroit-bound airliner.While that plot involved a Nigerian man sent by a Qaeda offshoot in Yemen, intelligenceofficials say they believe that Al Qaeda‘s top leaders in Pakistan have called on affiliates to carryout attacks against the West. ―There‘s huge pressure from the White House on Blair andPanetta,‖ said the former C.I.A. official, who spoke on condition of anonymity out of concernabout angering the White House. ―The feeling is, the clock is ticking.‖

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/23/world/asia/23drone.html





After the Khost bombing, intelligence officials vowed that they would retaliate. One angry seniorAmerican intelligence official said the C.I.A. would ―avenge‖ the Khost attack. ―Some very bad people will eventually have a very bad day,‖ the official said at the time, speaking on thecondition he not be identified describing a classified program.

Today, officials deny that vengeance is driving the increased attacks, though one called the dronestrikes ―the purest form of self -defense.‖

Officials point to other factors. For one, Pakistan recently dropped restrictions on the droneprogram it had requested last fall to accompany a ground offensive against militants in SouthWaziristan. And tips on the whereabouts of extremists ebb and flow unpredictably.

A C.I.A. spokesman, Paul Gimigliano, declined to comment on the drone strikes. But he said,―The agency‘s counterterrorism operations — lawful, aggressive, precise and effective — continue without pause.‖

The strikes, carried out from a secret base in Pakistan and controlled by satellite link from C.I.A.headquarters in Virginia, have been expanded by President Obama and praised by both parties inCongress as a potent weapon against terrorism that puts no American lives at risk. Thatcalculation must be revised in light of the Khost bombing, which revealed the critical presence of C.I.A. officers in dangerous territory to direct the strikes.

Some legal scholars have questioned the legitimacy under international law of killings by acivilian agency in a country where the United States is not officially at war. This month, theAmerican Civil Liberties Union filed a request under the Freedom of Information Act forgovernment documents revealing procedures for approving targets and legal justifications for thekillings.

Critics have contended that collateral civilian deaths are too high a price to pay. Pakistaniofficials have periodically denounced the strikes as a violation of their nation‘s sovereignty, evenas they have provided a launching base for the drones.

The increase in drone attacks has caused panic among rank-and-file militants, particularly inNorth Waziristan, where some now avoid using private vehicles, according to Pakistaniintelligence and security officials. Fewer foreign extremists are now in Miram Shah, NorthWaziristan‘s capital, which was previously awash with them, said local tribesmen and securityofficials.

Despite the consensus in Washington behind the drone program, some experts are dissenters.John Arquilla, a professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School who frequentlyadvises the military, said, ―The more the drone campaign works, the more it fails — as increasedattacks only make the Pakistanis angrier at the collateral damage and sustained violation of theirsovereignty.‖



If the United States expands the drone strikes beyond the lawless tribal areas to neighboringBaluchistan, as is under discussion, the backlash ―might even spark a social revolution inPakistan,‖ Mr. Arquilla said.

So far the reaction in Pakistan to the increased drone strikes has been muted. Last week, Prime

Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani of Pakistan told Richard C. Holbrooke, the administration‘s senior diplomat for Afghanistan and Pakistan, that the drones undermined the larger war effort. But theissue was not at the top of the agenda as it was a year ago.

Hasan Askari Rizvi, a military analyst in Lahore, said public opposition had been decliningbecause the campaign was viewed as a success. Yet one Pakistani general, who supports thedrone strikes as a tactic for keeping militants off balance, questioned the long-term impact.

―Has the situation stabilized in the past two years?‖ asked the general, speaking on condition of anonymity. ―Are the tribal areas more stable?‖ Yes, he said, Baitullah Mehsud, founder of thePakistani Taliban, was killed by a missile last August. ―But he‘s been replaced and the number of

fighters is increasing,‖ the general said.

Sabrina Tavernise contributed reporting from Islamabad, Pakistan, and Ismail Khan from

Peshawar.

Drone aircraft are patrolling U.S. Cities

April 26, 2010 in News

Public Intelligence

Public Intelligence has received several messages from the Las Vegas Metropolitan PoliceDepartment requesting the removal of a Law Enforcement Sensitive document which was

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published on March 25, 2010 regarding Nevada‘s ―Silver Shield‖ infrastructure protectionprogram. The document, which is from November 2007, reveals that Las Vegas Police are usingunmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and systems to patrol the city and deliver aerial imagery duringincidents or special events. Though isolated reports of domestic UAV use do exist, there has notbeen widespread coverage of the growing use of unmanned aircraft systems over U.S. cities. In

March 2006, Declan McCullagh of CNET News reported that police agencies around the countrywere looking at the use of UAVs for all sorts of purposes, including everything from borderpatrol to domestic surveillance. In an article titled ―Drone aircraft may prowl U.S. skies‖ McCullagh writes:

In a scene that could have been inspired by the movie ―Minority Report,‖ one North Carolinacounty is using a UAV equipped with low-light and infrared cameras to keep watch on itscitizens. The aircraft has been dispatched to monitor gatherings of motorcycle riders at theGaston County fairgrounds from just a few hundred feet in the air--close enough to identifyfaces--and many more uses, such as the aerial detection of marijuana fields, are planned. Thatraises not just privacy concerns, but also safety concerns because of the possibility of collisions

with commercial and general aviation aircraft.In early January 2010, KPRC News Houston reported on the Houston Police Department and theDepartment of Homeland Security deploying UAVs for surveillance purposes:

The document released by Public Intelligence corroborates these previous reports, indicating thatas early as November 2007, Nevada law enforcement officials were discussing plans toimplement the use of UAVs for aerial surveillance during special events and during incidentresponse. Given the character of earlier reports concerning the use of UAVs in other states, it isreasonable to assume that the usage of these unmanned systems is likely be widespreadthroughout the U.S. The document also indicates that the UAVs feed into a system that is

integrated with the local fusion center, along with various systems for recording and geo-mapping ―Suspicious Activity Reports‖ which may be filed by businesses and ―criticalinfrastructure‖ throughout the state.

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Naval Unmanned Aircraft Systems Airworthiness

August 18, 2009 in U.S. Navy

NTSB UAS Conference

Pete Heasley

13 pages

For Official Use Only

April 30, 2008

The Navy‘s Airworthiness Office (AIR -4.0P) is responsible for the independent engineeringassessment of all aircraft (manned and unmanned) and airborne weapon systems to ensure theseair vehicles can be operated safely within defined operating limits.

•U.S.C. Title X, Chapter 503, Section 5013, Secretary of the Navy

•SECNAVINST 5400.15B

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http://info.publicintelligence.net/Equipment_Design_Standards-Heasley.pdf





•CNO has delegated the authority to COMNAVAIRSYSCOM (AIR -00) to issue flightclearances for all Navy/Marine Corps Manned and Unmanned aircraft via the following:

– For NATOPS: IAW OPNAVINST 3710.7T

– For NATIP/TACMAN: IAW OPNAVINST 3510.15

– For Interim Flight Clearances (IFC): IAW 3710.7T

•These Flight Clearances are issued IAW NAVAIRINST 13034.1C

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…


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United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Report on Operating Next-Generation

Remotely Piloted Aircraft for Irregular Warfare

110 pages Distribution Statement D

For Official Use Only

April 2011 3.6 MB

The United States Air Force has long envisioned a strategic role for remotely piloted andautonomous aircraft. As early as May 1896, Samuel Pierpont Langley developed an unpilotedheavier-than-air vehicle which flew over the Potomac River. On V-J Day in August 1945,General Hap Arnold, US Army Air Forces, observed:

―We have just won a war with a lot of heroes flying around in planes. The next war may befought by airplanes with no men in them at all … Take everything you‘ve learned about aviationin war, throw it out of the window, and let‘s go to work on tomorrow‘s aviation. It will bedifferent from anything the world has ever seen.‖

Since these early days, extended range, persistence, precision, and stealth have characterizedremotely piloted aircraft (RPA) advancements. RPAs have been employed in multiple combat

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roles and increasingly contested environments. This year, for the first time in history, thePresident‘s budget proposed a larger investment in RPAs than manned aircraft. A seeminglyinsatiable operational appetite for RPAs, however, has led to an Air Force manning bottleneck.This is exacerbated by a lack of common ground stations, unsatisfactory integration with civilianand international airspace, and vulnerabilities in communications and command and control

links. Further complicating efforts, yet essential in irregular warfare, are directives to minimizecivilian casualties. General David Petraeus sees this need as a direct way to support a key centerof gravity:

―…We must fight the insurgents, and will use the tools at our disposal to both defeat the enemyand protect our forces. But we will not win based on the number of Taliban we kill, but insteadon our ability to separate insurgents from the center of gravity – the people …‖

Our Panel conducted an extensive set of visits and received numerous briefings from a widerange of key stakeholders in government, industry, and academia. Taking a human-centered,evidence-based approach, our study seeks to address operational challenges as well as point to

new opportunities for future RPAs. That RPAs will be a foundational element of the Air Force‘sforce structure is no longer debatable. The real question is how to maximize their current andfuture potential. Our intention is that this study will help provide both vector and thrust in how todo so in the irregular warfare context, as well as other applications.

…

RPAs are revolutionary surveillance and weapons delivery systems – changing the way the AirForce builds situation awareness and engages enemy forces – but their full potential has yet to berealized. To begin to address this issue, the Air Force initiated this study to review the state-of-the-art in RPA operations, focusing on control and connectivity in an irregular warfare (IW)

environment. The Panel was specifically tasked to identify RPA architectures and operationalconcepts centered on human-systems integration, distributed systems operations, and effectivecommand and control – a cluster of concepts and technologies we subsequently labeled as―mission management‖ enablers. The Panel was also tasked to recommend mid- to far-term S&Tdevelopment roadmaps for advancing these technologies to improve the flexibility and capabilityof RPA operations. The study terms of reference (TOR) identified a number of core issues whichwere further articulated by the Study Panel to include:

1. Issue #1: Manning and personnel shortfalls are concerns in RPA deployment. Exploitersrepresent the largest manning dependency (39 percent), exacerbated by expected significantexploiter growth from new sensor suites (e.g., ARGUS-IS, Gorgon Stare). Current sensors (e.g.,Constant Hawk and Angel Fire) and expected sensors (e.g., ARGUS-IS) produce data at rates of 10 to over 1000 times projected communications data transmission capacities, and will farexceed human analytic capacity.

2. Issue #2: Manually intensive airspace management and integration requiring exclusion zonesand Certificates of Authorization (COAs) make inefficient use of national and internationalairspace, will not scale to accommodate future RPA growth, hampers manned/unmannedintegration, and presents special challenges for small RPAs.



3. Issue #3: Minimizing collateral damage (CD) and fratricide is not a requirement unique toRPA strike operations. For manned and unmanned platforms, the lack of positive ID (PID) andtactical patience are the most significant causes of civilian casualties (CIVCAS) in currentconflicts (8 percent CIVCAS compared with 66 percent caused by insurgents). Persistence; up-close access; highresolution intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); improved

situation awareness; and improved mission management will permit RPAs to minimizeCD/fratricide. Small-focused lethality munitions and non-lethal optionsfor RPAs promise to further minimize CD and CIVCAS (e.g., as low as 5 percent).

4. Issue #4: In spite of current low RPA losses, inexpensive physical threats (e.g., MANPADS,low-end SAMs, air-to-air missiles) and electronic threats (e.g., acoustic detectors, low costacquisition radars, jammers) threaten future operations.

…

2.3 Issue (3): Minimizing Collateral Damage/Fratricide

A third issue identified by the Study Panel was collateral damage/fratricide (Figure 2-8). RPAs,originally developed for ISR operations, have become important weapons platforms for tacticaland special strike missions in IW. Their expanded use in CAS missions in the future requirestechnology improvements for mission management to minimize fratricide, collateral damage(CD), and civilian casualties (CIVCAS).In IW, success requires winning the ―hearts and minds‖ of the population in the face of anadaptable and agile adversary hiding amongst them. A missile fired (e.g. Hellfire missile) from aRPA is no different from a Hellfire missile fired from other platforms like the AH-64 Apache.Causing collateral damage is not an issue unique to RPAs. Data obtained from the AfghanistanAOR17 confirms that insurgents have caused approximately two thirds of CIVCAS. The exact

number of CIVCAS caused by US forces was not reported, but an estimate from available datasuggests the figure to be less than 10 percent. Of these CIVCAS, approximately half were causedby air-to-ground munitions, but the role of RPAs in these CIVCAS was also not reported. In themajority of these CIVCAS, inadequate acquisition and maintenance of positive targetidentification (PID) was the primary cause, and the ability to provide tactical patience duringoperations would have improved mission success and minimized CIVCAS. In an article by theWashington Post, it was reported that within a recent 15-month period, the CIA conducted 70RPA strikes using the low collateral damage focused lethality Scorpion weapon, killing 400terrorists and insurgents while causing 20 CIVCAS. This CIVCAS figure was based on the useof RPAs to conduct pre-strike ISR and post-strike battle damage assessments. Because of precision targeting and focused lethality, CIVCAS is now primarily dependent on the humanintelligence and situation awareness upon which the targeting decision is based.

…

3.3.4 Encryption and Potential C2 Link Vulnerabilities

Historically, sensor/data downlinks for some RPAs have not been encrypted or obfuscated.Unencrypted sensor data (e.g., FMV) is beneficial because the downlink is used to feed ROVER



systems used by Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC) and other ground personnel,including uncleared coalition members and contractors. This is a life-saving capability. Nevertheless, not protecting against interception of sensor data has been criticized. ―Fixing‖ thissecurity issue by mandating NSA Type 1 encryption is likely to lead to an unacceptable keymanagement burden because of the large number of users of RPA data that have a wide variety

of access rights. However, commercial-grade, NSA-approved cryptography is available (―SuiteB‖). Commercial cryptography of this kind does not require the same degree of rigor in handlingkey material and encryption devices, and is not limited in operation to cleared personnel. Thereis relevant Department of Defense (DOD) activity in this general area.

Encryption has generally been used on C2 messages because the risks associated withcompromise are higher (loss of the vehicle), and there is a greatly reduced need for sharing of theC2 data as compared with sensor data. However, crypto issues will likely be exacerbated whendoing coalition/joint swarming across platforms that require shared C2 across security domains – a capability that is desired to fully exploit the potential of networked RPA operations.

Drones for “urban warfare”

Manufacturers are targeting U.S. police forces for sales, as

drones move from the Middle East to Main Street

By Jefferson Morley

(Credit: romakoma via

Shutterstock/Aurora Flight Sciences/Benjamin Wheelock)

http://www.salon.com/2012/04/24/drones_for_urban_warfare/singleton/

http://www.salon.com/writer/jefferson_morley/



http://www.shutterstock.com/gallery-857293p1.html



http://www.shutterstock.com/





http://www.salon.com/2012/04/24/drones_for_urban_warfare/singleton/



In November 2010, a police lieutenant from Parma, Ohio, asked Vanguard Defense Industries if the Texas- based drone manufacturer could mount a ―grenade launcher and/or 12-gauge shotgun‖on its ShadowHawk drone for U.S. law enforcement agencies. The answer was yes.

Last month, police officers from 10 public safety departments around the Washington, D.C.,

metropolitan area gathered at an airfield in southern Maryland to view a demonstration of acamera-equipped aerial drone — first developed for military use — that flies at speeds up to 20knots or hovers for as long as an hour.

And in late March, South Korean police and military flew a Canadian-designed drone as part of ―advance security preparations‖ for the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul where protestersclashed with police.

In short, the business of marketing drones to law enforcement is booming. Now that Congresshas ordered the Federal Aviation Administration to open up U.S. airspace to unmanned vehicles,the aerial surveillance technology first developed in the battle space of Iraq, Afghanistan and

Pakistan is fueling a burgeoning market in North America. And even though they‘re movingfrom war zones to American markets, the language of combat and conflict remains an importantpart of their sales pitch — a fact that ought to concern citizens worried about the privacyimplications of domestic drones.

―As part of the push to increase uses of civilian drones,‖ the Wall Street Journal reported lastweek, nearly 50 companies are developing some 150 different systems, ranging from miniaturemodels to those with wingspans comparable to airliners.‖ Law enforcement and public safetyagencies are a prime target of this industry, which some predict will have $6 billion in U.S. salesby 2016.

Altogether, the drone industry‘s lobbying group, Association for Unmanned Vehicle SystemsInternational, claims 507 corporate members in 55 countries. The industry proved its clout inFebruary when Congress mandated the FAA open U.S. airspace to drones starting this year.According to the AUVSI‘s annual report, the group was responsible for the legislative languageordering the FAA to expedite the applications of qualified public safety agencies seeking to flydrones weighing less than 4.4 pounds this year. Larger drones will be eligible to fly in U.S.airspace by 2015.

Perhaps the most prominent firm in the U.S. drone market is Vanguard Defense Industries inTexas, which sold a $275,000 drone called the ShadowHawk to the Montgomery CountySheriff‘s Office in Texas last year. The company is run by CEO Michael Buscher, a 24-yearveteran of U.S. Army Special Operations. In his LinkedIn profile, Buscher says that VDI offerstechnology ―that will dramatically extend U.S. national security capabilities.‖

Uniquely among U.S. manufacturers, VDI touts its ability to weaponize drones for local policedepartments. ―If you think weaponized unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are still too new tocombat zones for law enforcement to consider them for domestic use, think again,‖ said theeditors of Special Weapons for Military and Police in February:

http://www.aeryon.com/news/pressreleases/397-g50-security-2012.html



http://www.bloomberg.com/slideshow/2012-03-26/seoul-nuclear-security-summit.html#slide12




http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424052702304331204577354331959335276-lMyQjAxMTAyMDEwOTExNDkyWj.html?mod=wsj_share_email_bot



http://www.salon.com/writer/jefferson_morley/ww.marketresearch.com/BCC-Research-v374/Robotics-Technologies-Global-6481848



http://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/AUVSI/958c920a-7f9b-4ad2-9807-f9a4e95d1ef1/UploadedImages/2011_AnnualReport.pdf



http://vanguarddefense.com/public-safety/



http://vanguarddefense.com/montgomery-county-receives-shadowhawk-uas/



http://www.linkedin.com/profile/view?id=22051448&authType=NAME_SEARCH&authToken=34fU&locale=en_US&srchid=c4a3dead-c6d9-4f13-88a8-27ce2bfd2517-0&srchindex=1&srchtotal=15&goback=%2Efps_PBCK_*1_Michael_Buscher_*1_*1_*1_*1_*2_*1_Y_*1_*1_*1_false_1_R_*1_*51_*1_*51_true_*2_*2_*2_*2_*2_*2_*2_*2_*2_*2_*2_*2_*2_*2_*2_*2_*2_*2_*2_*2_*2&pvs=ps&trk=pp_profile_name_link



http://www.tactical-life.com/online/special-weapons/vanguard-shadowhawk/















The Kevlar fuel tank mounted beneath the ShadowHawk allows it to stay in the air long enoughto provide complete surveillance of an area and engage suspects with buckshot, tear gas,grenades and less-lethal capabilities.

Vanguard has touted the weaponized ShadowHawk to police departments in Ohio and Illinois,

according to emails published online by the hackers collective AntiSec. The group hacked theemail account of Richard Garcia, a VDI vice president and a former FBI agent, with the statedgoal of causing ―embarrassment and disruption‖ to the company. (VDI says a group of Britishhackers arrested in England were responsible for the hacking. VDI did not respond to a requestfor comment.)

Other drone manufacturers aren‘t quite as open about the machines‘ weaponization capabilities.Three Israeli drone manufacturers have targeted the ―homeland security‖ market, which seems tofall somewhere between combat and law enforcement.

Israeli Aerospace Industries, which has an office in Arlington, Va., says its ―Ghost‖ drone is

―uniquely designed to support urban warfare ISR [Intelligence, Search, Reconnaissance]missions.‖ A video touts the Ghost‘s ability to conduct day and nighttime operations silently. IAIdid not respond to request for comment.

BlueBird Aero Systems, also based in Israel, boasts in a promotional video that it is ―leveragingmilitary UAS [unmanned aviation systems] know-how and innovative approaches to the military,homeland security and civilian markets.‖ The company says its MicroB drone can be used for―urban environment monitoring for homeland security and law enforcement.‖ The two-poundcraft ―can be autonomously launched within seconds even in a crowded urban environment, andprovides up to one hour of real-time, enhanced visual intelligence of stringent situations.‖

Military expertise is part of the firms‘ pitch to homeland security and law enforcementcustomers. BlueBird says its leadership is ―comprised of high-ranking military veterans as wellas experts of the defense and security industries in both Israel and North America. ‖ Aeronautics, another Israeli drone manufacturer, touts an advisory committee that includes a former chief of staff of the Israeli Defense Forces.

Major defense contractors are also beginning to move into the U.S. domestic market. Jeff Brody,a vice president of AAI, a Maryland-based division of Textron that supplies unmanned aviationsystems to the Pentagon, says there is ―pent-up demand and an insatiable desire‖ for the FAA toclarify the rules. While AAI has talked to law enforcement agencies about its products, Brodysaid the company needs to see new FAA regulations before it can modify war-zone drones fordomestic use.

Other Pentagon contractors are already marketing to U.S. public safety agencies. Insitu, aWashington state-based subsidiary of Boeing, touts its ―Inceptor‖ drone as an all-weatherinstantaneous ―eye in the sky‖ for U.S. police, fire and rescue workers. The Virginia-basedAurora Flight Sciences offers the Skate drone with three full-motion video cameras for policedepartments looking to conduct search and rescue operations and perform accidentinvestigations. BAE Systems, another Pentagon contractor, says it has tested a small drone for

http://thepiratebay.se/torrent/6615674/Fuck_FBI_Friday_IV__Vanguard_Defense_Industries



http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bauCF6PQNk0




http://vanguarddefense.com/computer-hacker-arrested-for-attack-against-vanguard/#more-817



http://www.iai.co.il/36078-43473-EN/Groups_Military_Aircraft_MALAT_Products.aspx



http://www.bluebird-uav.com/



http://www.bluebird-uav.com/Products_micro.html



http://www.aeronautics-sys.com/?CategoryID=264



http://www.aaicorp.com/products/uas/uas_main.html




http://www.insitu.com/first_response


http://www.aurora.aero/Downloads/Products/Skate.pdf



http://www.baesystems.com/article/BAES_021677/bae-systems-partners-with-national-oceanic-and-atmospheric-administration-on-first-test-flight-of-coyote-unmanned-aircraft-system

















civil use but a spokesman declined to answer questions about its other products for the domesticmarket.

With 56 domestic government agencies now authorized by the FAA to fly drones in U.S.airspace, law enforcement is leading the way in the adoption of unmanned vehicles. According to

documents published last week by Electronic Frontier Foundation, 22 of the authorized agenciesare primarily law enforcement departments, while another 24 entities (mainly universities) havelaw enforcement functions under them.

Among the domestic users are the Department of Homeland Security, which flies a fleet of ninedrones over the country‘s northern and southern borders, and the FBI. A Bureau spokesmandeclined to comment on the nature and purpose of the FBI‘s drones saying that he could notdiscuss ―investigative techniques.‖

While industry spokesmen say existing laws will adequately protect civil liberties and privacy,Congress held no hearings on the implications of domestic drones, and a wide range of

opponents insist the drones pose a threat to privacy.

In Washington, activist groups Code Pink, Reprieve and the Center for Constitutional Rights areholding a ―drone summit‖ this week, declaring it is ―time to organize to end current abuses andto prevent the potentially widespread misuse both overseas and here at home.‖

The FAA ―has the opportunity and the responsibility to ensure that the privacy of individuals isprotected and that the public is fully informed about who is using drones in public airspace andwhy,‖ said U.S. Reps. Ed Markey, D-Mass., and Joe Barton, R-Texas, in a letter to the FAA lastweek.

―How will the public be notified about when and where drones are used, who will operate thedrones, what data will be collected, how the data will be used, how the data will be retained andwho will have access to the date?‖ they asked.

Carl Schaefer , director of small UAS products for Aurora Flight Sciences, in Manassas, Va.,says he isn‘t worried.

―My personal view is that complaints about privacy are overblown and unfounded,‖ he said in atelephone interview. ―Police departments want UAVs to increase awareness more quicklywhether at a crime scene or a hostage situation. These guys want to see around a corner. Theyaren‘t peering in windows. We‘ve never got a request to do that kind of stuff and we‘ve had very

extensive discussions with potential customers.‖ Ian McDonald, a vice president at Aeryon Labs, a Canadian unmanned vehicle firm, discountedconcerns about the weaponization of drones. ―That‘s not a request we‘ve had from our customers,‖ he said. Aeryon‘s customers, which include Canadian law enforcement agencies,―want a close-in aerial perspective and to remove officers or responders from danger.‖



http://deeplinks/2012/04/faa-releases-its-list-drone-certificates-leaves-many-questions-unanswered



http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20111228-cbp-receives-its-ninth-uav




http://www.reprieve.org.uk/



http://ccrjustice.org/



http://www.codepinkalert.org/article.php?id=6065



http://markey.house.gov/sites/markey.house.gov/files/documents/4-19-12.Letter%20FAA%20Drones%20.pdf



http://www.aeryon.com/products/avs.html














But with a technology born in combat zones and marketed by defense contractors from countriesthat don‘t have baseline privacy laws (U.S.) or have poor human rights records justified in thename of ―homeland security‖ (Israel), the American public may want more explicit guaranteesthat they will be the beneficiaries, not the target, of drones over America.

Tuesday, Apr 10, 2012 04:45 AM MST

The drones are coming— to America

Congress has opened up U.S. airspace to the drone industry

-- and your privacy is about to be at risk

By Jefferson Morley

(Credit: Salon)

A drone is probably heading toward your personal airspace soon. With Congress requiring theFederal Aviation Administration to simplify and expedite drone applications from U.S. police

departments by May 15, industry and watchdog groups agree: It won‘t be long before cops andfirst responders put them into action.

Thanks to a law passed without much public debate in March, the FAA must allow lawenforcement agencies to operate small drones (i.e., less than 4.4 pounds) at altitudes of less than400 feet. ―The demand is huge,‖ says Catherine Crump, an attorney for the American CivilLiberties Union. Michael Toscano, president of the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems







http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/drone-journalism-businesses-and-policing--the-pilotless-aircraft-could-soon-fill-us-skies/2012/02/21/gIQAxB2gRR_blog.html








International, a trade group, says there are nearly 19,000 law enforcement entities in the UnitedStates, of which only 300 now have aerial surveillance capacities.

―Those departments have helicopters which cost about $1,500 an hour to operate,‖ Toscano says.―You can fly these drones for maybe less than $50 hour. A lot of smaller departments can now

afford this technology.‖

It is easy to imagine the benefits of having an eye in the sky. ―You don‘t have to call off a searchfor a missing person because of darkness or inclement weather,‖ Toscano says. Using airbornesensors, a drone could pinpoint the most dangerous areas of a fire for firefighters on the ground.

The downside is obvious too. Drones are mostly known for their use in war zones in Iraq andAfghanistan and in the controversial targeted killing of overseas U.S. citizens allegedly involvedin terrorism. The introduction of surveillance drones into U.S. airspace signals an unprecedentedconflation of homeland security, counterterrorism and domestic law enforcement, a combinationthat is galvanizing civil society activists.

Technology developed for attacking armed enemies abroad is being repurposed for enforcing thelaw at home — without any new safeguards for privacy and civil liberties. Domestic drones canengage in constant surveillance from the sky, which the Supreme Court has ruled does notconstitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment strictures against unreasonable search.Photographs of political demonstrators could be fed into facial recognition software on a scalepreviously unimaginable. Drones can also be weaponized with tear gas or tasers for remotecrowd control. Michael Buscher, president of Vanguard Defense Industries, a dronemanufacturer in Texas, told the Daily that police drones could have ―rubber buckshot better available for large crowd dispersal.‖

―With these aircraft hovering above our heads, privacy is at risk as drone technology has far outpaced the development of corresponding regulatory laws,‖ says Eugene Chow, editor of theHomeland Security News wire.

The ACLU‘s Crump adds: ―There‘s no federal law that controls the use of data [collected viadrones].‖

―The controlling law [for data] would probably be the state equivalents of the Privacy Act,‖ saysHarley Geiger of the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) in Washington. ―These arevery skimpy protections. Part of the reason is the courts have said we have no expectation of privacy if we are standing in a public place or in a place that is observable from a public place.

For a drone hovering at 400 or 500 feet, the airspace is considered public space. So if there is acamera up there that can observe you, you have no reasonable expectation of privacy. It‘s acompletely outdated understanding of privacy.‖

Toscano says the drone industry thinks existing laws are sufficient: ‖We believe that your Fourth Amendment rights are protected. There are laws in place for what you can and cannot dowith a drone.‖

http://www.thedaily.com/page/2012/03/12/031212-news-armed-drones-1-2/



http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eugene-k-chow/domestic-drone-surveillance_b_1324546.html







“The acquisition of more systems”

The opening of domestic airspace to drones has been driven by industry and the Pentagonwithout much attention to privacy and civil liberties issues. The drones, first developed in the1990s, became popular with U.S. military commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan as a way of

targeting enemies without risking U.S. soldiers. As those wars wind down, the Pentagon islooking to expand their use outside of war theaters.

―The stuff from Afghanistan is going to come back,‖ Steve Pennington, the Air Force‘s director of ranges, bases and airspace, said at a drone conference in February, according to the LosAngeles Times. The Department of Defense ―doesn‘t want a segregated environment‖ for operating drones. ―We want a fully integrated environment.‖

The integration of drones into U.S. airspace has already begun with the U.S. Customs and BorderProtection agency of the Department of Homeland Security, now operating nine drones fromsites along the country‘s northern and southern borders, according to director Michael Kostelnik,

a retired Air Force general. The CPB shares information with Immigration Customs Enforcementand other law enforcement agencies, he said in an interview.

With the emergence of the Unmanned Systems Caucus on Capitol Hill, domestic drones are now backed by the proverbial ―iron triangle‖ of Washington policymaking: congressionalcommittees, executive branch agencies and the private sector. The drone caucus, a group of 53representatives, 16 of whom come from districts in Southern California and Texas where dronecontractors are concentrated, led the push to force the FAA to open the airspace to lawenforcement immediately and to the commercial drones by 2015. The caucus defines its missionas educating Congress and the public ―on the strategic, tactical, and scientific value of unmannedsystems‖ and to ―actively‖ supporting ―further development and acquisition of more systems.‖

The caucus enjoys the backing of the defense industry. The co-chairs of the caucus, Reps. BuckMcKeon, R-Calif., and Henry Cuellar, D-Texas, received $64,000 and $7,400, respectively, fromGeneral Atomics, the firm that developed the first military drones, according to the Center forResponsive Politics. So far during the 2012 campaign cycle the General Atomics PAC hascontributed $68,500 to 15 drone caucus members, reports the Texas Independent.

The caucus, in turn, works closely with the drone industry, says Toscano of the Association forUnmanned Vehicle Systems International. ―The only changes made to the [unmanned aviationsystems] section of the House FAA bill were made at the request of AUVSI,‖ according to aPowerPoint presentation made by Toscano and obtained by Republic Report. ―Our suggestionswere often taken word-for-word,‖ Toscano boasted at the time, a claim he repeated in a phoneinterview.

And the industry is counting on government agencies to fund the growth of the dronemarket. For example, Vanguard Defense Industries in Texas advises police departments to obtainHomeland Security funding for the purchase of drones. Vanguard says it helped law enforcementofficials in Montgomery County, north of Dallas, obtain money for a drone under the HomelandSecurity Grant Program, which funds strategies to ―address the identified planning, organization,

http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/13/business/la-fi-military-drones-20120214




http://www.cbp.gov/

http://www.cbp.gov/

http://www.cbp.gov/

http://www.cbp.gov/

http://unmannedsystemscaucus.mckeon.house.gov/






http://www.americanindependent.com/category/the-texas-independent/



http://www.republicreport.org/2012/drone-powerpoint-lobby-plan/


http://www.republicreport.org/



http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/hsgp/index.shtm











http://www.cbp.gov/

http://www.cbp.gov/





equipment, training, and exercise needed to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, andrecover from acts of terrorism and other catastrophic events.‖

The open-ended justification of domestic surveillance as ―homeland security‖ is triggering alarmamong activists. Knowdrones.com seeks an international ban on weaponized drones and

surveillance drones. Code Pink and the Center for Constitutional Rights are sponsoring a DroneSummit in Washington later this month.

―What we have to worry about is closed circuit television or a Trafficam on steroids in whichlaw enforcement can watch everything that is going on in minute detail,‖ says Geiger. ―In thename of public safety, there are lots of people who would be more than happy to put a systemlike that in the air now.‖

The emerging drone market points up the need for a comprehensive privacy law like those of other industrial countries, Geiger says. ―If we cannot get baseline privacy legislation, we willneed legislation specific to the FAA.‖ As first steps, he says CDT favors banning weaponization

of domestic drones and requiring the FAA to conduct a Privacy Impact Statement. So farCongress has shown no interest in such measures and indeed has barred the FAA fromconsidering any factors other than safety in opening up domestic airspace to drones.

The law is playing catch-up to a revolutionary technology.

―How long will it be before there are enough drones in the sky that the general population startsto notice?‖ asks Geiger. ―There will be thousands of them of them in five years.‖

Jefferson Morley is a staff writer for Salon in Washington and author of the forthcoming book,Snow-Storm in August: Washington City, Francis Scott Key, and the Forgotten Race Riot of 1835 (Nan Talese/Doubleday).

DoD Joint Spectrum Center Predator Drone Frequency

Analysis Reports

April 12, 2012 in Department of Defense

The following reports from the Department of Defense‘s Joint Spectrum Center were originallypublished in April 2010 by a small blog called DoD Leaks. The blog published less than a dozendocuments over a two month span and then ceased all activity. The blog‘s description states thatit was created in response to Cryptome‘s call for more publication of ―for official use only‖documents that are available in the public sphere. These documents relate to frequency

http://www.knowdrones.com/







http://www.amazon.com/Snow-Storm-August-Washington-Francis-Forgotten/dp/0385533373/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1322431122&sr=8-1






http://publicintelligence.net/category/documents/united-states-documents/department-of-defense/



http://dodleaks.wordpress.com/



http://dodleaks.wordpress.com/about/




















allocation and electromagnetic interference tests conducted in relation to datalinks used byPredator drones.

ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY

ANALYSIS OF THE PREDATOR UAV LINE-OF-

SIGHT DATA LINK TERMINAL WITH THECOMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

ENVIRONMENT AT INDIAN SPRINGS AIR

FORCE AUXILIARY FIELD

November2003

50pages

Download

PREDATOR UAV C-BAND DATA LINK EMC

WITH 5-GHZ

CFR 47 PART 15 AND PART 90 DEVICES

November

2003

30

pages Download

COMMON DATA LINK EMC ANALYSIS September

2004

59

pages

Download

INDIAN SPRINGS C-BAND LINE-OF-SIGHT

FREQUENCY REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS

January

2005

54

pages Download

C-BAND AND Ku-BAND UAV LINE-OF-SIGHT

DATA LINK EMC ANALYSIS FOR TWO

OPERATIONAL SCENARIOS

October

2004

35

pages Download

PREDATOR UAV LINE-OF-SIGHT DATALINK

TERMINAL RADIO FREQUENCY TEST

REPORT

September

2004

44

pages Download

http://info.publicintelligence.net/JSC-03-024.pdf




















U.S. Army Europe Unmanned Aircraft System Flight

Regulations

September 30, 2011 in U.S. Army

http://publicintelligence.net/u-s-army-europe-unmanned-aircraft-system-flight-regulations/






http://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/jsc-predator.png






United States Army Europe Unmanned Aircraft System Flight Regulations

Regulation 95-23 41 pages September 3, 2009

This regulation —

http://info.publicintelligence.net/USArmy-EuropeUAVs.pdf



● Provides policy on unmanned aircraft system operations, unmanned aircraft crewmember training and currency requirements, and flight rules.● Covers Army unmanned aircraft system general provisions, training, standardization, andmanagement of unmanned aircraft system resources.● Must be used with AR 95-23.

Applicability. This regulation applies to members of the active Army, Army Reserve, and ArmyNational Guard; and DOD civilians and civilian contractors who provide training on or areinvolved in the operation, standardization, and maintenance of unmanned aircraft systems.During mobilization, the policy in this regulation may be modified by the proponent.

…

This regulation —

a. Prescribes policy and procedures for Army unmanned aircraft system (UAS) aircrew training

and standardization, and for operating UASs in USEUCOM areas under CG, USAREUR,control.

b. Is not intended to be used in place of AR 95-23. The intent of this regulation is to provideadditional guidance for UAS operations in USAREUR. When differences between the policy inthis regulation and AR 95-23 exist, the more stringent policy will be followed.

c. Applies to all Army UASs, including Hunter, Raven, Shadow, and Warrior. Personnelresponsible for other military or nonstandard UASs will adhere to all UAS regulations andcoordinate with the USAREUR G3 (AEAGC-AV) before using these systems for flightoperations.

(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

(SUAV) Airspace Command and Control (A2C2) Handbook

April 11, 2012 in U.S. Army












LEADER’S GUIDE TO A2C2 AT BRIGADE AND BELOW

34 pages For Official Use Only

June 2005 4.85 MB

The purpose of this handbook is to enhance understanding of Army airspace command andcontrol (A2C2) to mitigate risks between small unit unmanned aerial vehicles (SUAVs) androtary wing operations below the coordinating altitude. This handbook provides leaders at thebrigade and below with guidelines in the form of airspace coordination techniques andprocedures regarding SUAV mission planning and airspace deconfliction.

http://info.publicintelligence.net/CALL-A2C2.pdf



This handbook is the result of combining information from several sources, including Ravenoperators currently deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation IraqiFreedom.

…

2. TYPES OF SEPARATION

There are three primary means of maintaining separation between manned and unmannedaircraft: lateral, time, and vertical separation. Beyond the need to ensure physical separationexists, leaders must plan for frequency separation between unmanned vehicles.

a. Lateral separation spaces aircraft that may be operating at the same altitude by not havingthem operate in the same geographic space. This can be done through the assignment of flightcorridors, ROA/ROZ, and other graphic control measures such as phase lines and unitboundaries.

b. Time separation spaces aircraft that may be operating in the same geographic area or at thesame operating altitudes by not allowing them to operate at the same time. Time separation mayalso be required when aircraft, manned and unmanned, must fly near indirect-fire trajectories orordnance effects. The timing of surface fires must be coordinated with aircraft routing. Thisensures that, even though aircraft and surface fires may occupy the same space, they do not do soat the same time.

c. Vertical separation spaces aircraft based on operating altitude or by assigning differentoperating altitudes to other aircraft that may be working in the same geographic area. Verticalseparation is the least preferred method since SUAVs and rotary wing aircraft normally operate

from the surface to 500 feet above ground level (AGL).

…



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Drone Collides Over Afghanistan With U.S. Warplane

By Colin Clark

Published: August 17, 2011

Washington: A relatively small unmanned aircraft struck a C-130 cargo plane over Afghanistan, injuring

no one but raising questions anew about whether drones can fly safely in American airspace.

For more news and information on the swiftly-changing defense industry, please sign up for the AOL

Defense newsletter . You can also catch us on Twitter @AOLDefense .

The drone, a Shadow made by a unit of Textron Systems, boasts a maximum operating altitude of about

15,000 feet but usually operates at lower altitudes to perform its tactical reconnaissance mission.

No one was injured in the collision, but the C-130 did make an emergency landing, according to the WallStreet Journal, which broke the story. The 12-foot drone went down. No word yet on its condition or

whether anyone on the ground was injured. The Shadow was probably flown by an Army or Marine unit.

Ironically, the unmanned plane struck the very type of manned plane that usually carries it into action --

one of Lockheed Martin's C-130s.

Defense companies, eager to expand their market, have pressed the Federal Aviation Administration for

years to open U.S. civil airspace to unmanned aircraft.

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"The use of unmanned systems and the use manned systems in the same airspace is not going away,"

Dave Vos, senior director of control technologies at Rockwell Collins, said today at the Association of

Unmanned Vehicle Systems International's annual conference. "It is only going to get more prolific" as

technology advances. The strike is generating much conversation at the conference, the biggest drone

event in the world.

The FAA, concerned about drones -- which don't boast Traffic Collision Avoidance Systems such as large

airliners use -- has moved slowly and cautiously.

"We are going to make sure we are going to guarantee the safety of other pilots and people on the

ground," Les Dorr, an FAA spokesman, told AOL Defense. He said that several studies "indicate you

could not use TCAS to reliably have other aircraft detect the unmanned aircraft."

When I pressed Dorr on the possible significance of the collision to FAA efforts to open the skies, he

noted that "there is a world of difference between operations in Afghanistan and those in the U.S." It is, he

said, "like comparing apples and Oldsmobiles."

"Wholesale integration" of unmanned aircraft into U.S. airspace "is a number of years away," Dorr said.However, the agency plans to publish a draft rule "late this fall" for rules governing "small unmanned

aircraft" of less than 55 pounds.

Today, a drone operator must get a special experimental certificate to fly in U.S. civil airspace. As of a

year ago, less than 80 such permits had been granted. Military or other government flights can get a

waiver to operate for a set period of time in a carefully defined area.

As the FAA website notes: "Due to the UASs inability to comply with 'sense and avoid' rules, a ground

observer or an accompanying "chase" aircraft must maintain visual contact with the UAS and serve as its

'eyes' when operating outside of airspace that is restricted from other users."

Traffic collision avoidance systemFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

(Redirected from TCAS)

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Traffic collision avoidance system

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TCAS and IVSI cockpit display (monochrome)

TCAS and EHSI cockpit display (color)

A traffic collision avoidance system or traffic alert and collision avoidance system (bothabbreviated as TCAS) is an aircraft collision avoidance system designed to reduce the incidenceof mid-air collisions between aircraft. It monitors the airspace around an aircraft for other aircraftequipped with a corresponding active transponder, independent of air traffic control, and warnspilots of the presence of other transponder-equipped aircraft which may present a threat of mid-

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air collision (MAC). It is a type of airborne collision avoidance system mandated by theInternational Civil Aviation Organization to be fitted to all aircraft with a maximum take-off mass (MTOM) of over 5700 kg (12,586 lbs) or authorized to carry more than 19 passengers.

Official definition from PANS-ATM (Nov 2007): ACAS / TCAS is an aircraft system based on

secondary surveillance radar (SSR) transponder signals, which operates independently of ground-based equipment to provide advice to the pilot on potential conflicting aircraft that areequipped with SSR transponders.

In modern glass cockpit aircraft, the TCAS display may be integrated in the Navigation Display(ND) or Electronic Horizontal Situation Indicator (EHSI); in older glass cockpit aircraft andthose with mechanical instrumentation, such an integrated TCAS display may replace themechanical Vertical Speed Indicator (which indicates the rate with which the aircraft isdescending or climbing).

Contents

[hide]

1 Impetus for a collision prevention system 2 TCAS basics

o 2.1 System description o 2.2 System components

3 TCAS operation

o 3.1 TCAS operation modes

o 3.2 TCAS alerts o 3.3 Types of traffic and resolution advisories

o 3.4 Pilot/aircrew interaction during a TCAS event 4 Safety aspects of TCAS

5 Relationship to automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B)

6 Drawbacks to TCAS and ADS-B 7 Versions of TCAS

o 7.1 Passive o 7.2 TCAS I o 7.3 TCAS II o 7.4 TCAS III o 7.5 TCAS IV

8 Current implementation

o 8.1 Current TCAS Limitations o 8.2 Regulatory situation around the world

9 See also

10 References

11 External links

[edit] Impetus for a collision prevention system



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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#System_components


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#TCAS_operation


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#TCAS_operation_modes


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#TCAS_alerts


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#Types_of_traffic_and_resolution_advisories


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#Pilot.2Faircrew_interaction_during_a_TCAS_event


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#Safety_aspects_of_TCAS


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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#Versions_of_TCAS


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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#TCAS_I


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#TCAS_II


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#TCAS_III


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#TCAS_IV


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#Current_implementation


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#Current_TCAS_Limitations


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#Regulatory_situation_around_the_world


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Research into collision avoidance systems has been ongoing since at least the 1950s. ICAO andaviation authorities such as the Federal Aviation Administration were spurred into action afterseveral major mid-air collisions involving great loss of life.[1][2] Some of these mid-air accidentsinclude:

Grand Canyon midair collision in 1956; The New York air disaster in 1960; The Asheville midair collision in 1967;

The Zagreb mid-air collision in 1976;

PSA Flight 182, a Boeing 727 which collided with a Cessna 172 in 1978;

The Ukraine Aeroflot mid-air collision, between two Tupolev Tu-134 in 1979;

Aeroméxico Flight 498, a 1986 collision similar to PSA Flight 182, which finally spurred the USCongress and other regulatory bodies into action and led to mandatory collision avoidance

equipment. Chakri Dadri midair collision over a town near New Delhi, India in 1996;

The implementation of TCAS added a safety barrier to help prevent mid-air collisions. However,further study, refinements, training and regulatory measures were still required, because thelimitations and misuse of the system still resulted in other incidents and fatal accidents, whichinclude:

The Japan Airlines near-miss incident in 2001; The Überlingen mid-air collision, between a Boeing 757 and a Tupolev Tu-154 in 2002, where

the Tupolev pilots declined to follow their TCAS resolution advisory (RA), instead following thedirections of the air traffic controller, while the Boeing pilots followed their TCAS RA. having noATC instruction. By the time the crews of the two planes actually saw each other, it was too lateand the planes collided, killing 71;

The Gol Flight 1907 collision with an Embraer Legacy 600 in 2006;

For more examples, see Category:Mid-air collisions.

[edit] TCAS basics

[edit ] System description

TCAS involves communication between all aircraft equipped with an appropriate transponder (provided the transponder is enabled and set up properly). Each TCAS-equipped aircraftinterrogates all other aircraft in a determined range about their position (via the 1,030 MHz radio

frequency), and all other aircraft reply to other interrogations (via 1,090 MHz). Thisinterrogation-and-response cycle may occur several times per second.[1][2]

The TCAS system builds a three dimensional map of aircraft in the airspace, incorporating theirrange (garnered from the interrogation and response round trip time), altitude (as reported by theinterrogated aircraft), and bearing (by the directional antenna from the response). Then, byextrapolating current range and altitude difference to anticipated future values, it determines if apotential collision threat exists.

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TCAS and its variants are only able to interact with aircraft that have a correctly operating modeC or mode S transponder. A unique 24-bit identifier is assigned to each aircraft that has a mode Stransponder Identification friend or foe#Modes.

The next step beyond identifying potential collisions is automatically negotiating a mutual

avoidance maneuver (currently, maneuvers are restricted to changes in altitude and modificationof climb/sink rates) between the two (or more) conflicting aircraft. These avoidance maneuversare communicated to the flight crew by a cockpit display and by synthesized voiceinstructions.[1][2]

A protected volume of airspace surrounds each TCAS equipped aircraft. The size of theprotected volume depends on the altitude, speed, and heading of the aircraft involved in theencounter. The illustration below gives an example of a typical TCAS protection volume.

[edit ] System components

A TCAS installation consists of the following components:[1][2]

TCAS computer unit

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Performs airspace surveillance, intruder tracking, its own aircraft altitude tracking, threat

detection, RA maneuver determination and selection, and generation of advisories. The TCAS

Processor uses pressure altitude, radar altitude, and discrete aircraft status inputs from its own

aircraft to control the collision avoidance logic parameters that determine the protection

volume around the TCAS aircraft.

Antennas

The antennas used by TCAS II include a directional antenna that is mounted on the top of the

aircraft and either an omnidirectional or a directional antenna mounted on the bottom of the

aircraft. Most installations use the optional directional antenna on the bottom of the aircraft. In

addition to the two TCAS antennas, two antennas are also required for the Mode S transponder.

One antenna is mounted on the top of the aircraft while the other is mounted on the bottom.

These antennas enable the Mode S transponder to receive interrogations at 1030 MHz and reply

to the received interrogations at 1090 MHz.

Cockpit presentation

The TCAS interface with the pilots is provided by two displays: the traffic display and the RA

display. These two displays can be implemented in a number of ways, including displays that

incorporate both displays into a single, physical unit. Regardless of the implementation, the

information displayed is identical. The standards for both the traffic display and the RA display

are defined in DO-185A.[3]

[edit] TCAS operation

The following section describes the TCAS operation based on TCAS II, since this is the versionthat has been adopted as an international standard (ACAS II) by ICAO and aviation authoritiesworldwide.[1][2]

[edit ] TCAS operation modes

TCAS II can be currently operated in the following modes:[1][2]

Stand-by

Power is applied to the TCAS Processor and the mode S transponder, but TCAS does not issue

any interrogations and the transponder will reply to only discrete interrogations.

Transponder

The mode S transponder is fully operational and will reply to all appropriate ground and TCAS

interrogations. TCAS remains in stand-by.

Traffic advisories only

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The mode S transponder is fully operational. TCAS will operate normally and issue the

appropriate interrogations and perform all tracking functions. However, TCAS will only issue

traffic advisories (TA), and the resolution advisories (RA) will be inhibited.

Automatic (traffic/resolution advisories)

The mode S transponder is fully operational. TCAS will operate normally and issue the

appropriate interrogations and perform all tracking functions. TCAS will issue traffic advisories

(TA) and resolution advisories (RA), when appropriate.

TCAS works in a coordinated manner, so when an RA is issued to conflicting aircraft, a requiredaction (i.e., Climb. Climb.) has to be immediately performed by one of the aircraft, while theother one receives a similar RA in the opposite direction (i.e., Descend. Descend.).

[edit ] TCAS alerts

TCAS II typical envelope

TCAS II types of RA

TCAS II issues the following types of aural annunciations:




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Traffic advisory (TA)

Resolution advisory (RA)

Clear of conflict

When a TA is issued, pilots are instructed to initiate a visual search for the traffic causing the

TA. If the traffic is visually acquired, pilots are instructed to maintain visual separation from thetraffic. The pilot training programs also indicate that no horizontal maneuvers are to be madebased solely on information shown on the traffic display. Slight adjustments in vertical speedwhile climbing or descending, or slight adjustments in airspeed while still complying with theATC clearance are acceptable.[4]

When an RA is issued, pilots are expected to respond immediately to the RA unless doing sowould jeopardize the safe operation of the flight. This means that aircraft will at times have tomanoeuver contrary to ATC instructions or disregard ATC instructions. In these cases, thecontroller is no longer responsible for separation of the aircraft involved in the RA until theconflict is terminated.

On the other hand, ATC can potentially interfere with the pilot‘s response to RAs. If aconflicting ATC instruction coincides with an RA, the pilot may assume that ATC is fully awareof the situation and is providing the better resolution. But in reality ATC is not aware of the RAuntil the RA is reported by the pilot. Once the RA is reported by the pilot, ATC is required not toattempt to modify the flight path of the aircraft involved in the encounter. Hence, the pilot isexpected to ―follow the RA‖ but in practice this does not yet always happen.

Some States have implemented ―RA downlink‖ which provides air traffic controllers withinformation about RAs posted in the cockpit obtained via Mode S radars. Currently, there are noICAO provisions concerning the use of RA downlink by air traffic controllers.

The following points receive emphasis during pilot training:

Do not manoeuver in a direction opposite to that indicated by the RA because this may result ina collision.

Inform the controller of the RA as soon as permitted by flight crew workload after responding tothe RA. There is no requirement to make this notification prior to initiating the RA response.

Be alert for the removal of RAs or the weakening of RAs so that deviations from a clearedaltitude are minimized.

If possible, comply with the controller’s clearance, e.g. turn to intercept an airway or localizer, at

the same time as responding to an RA.

When the RA event is completed, promptly return to the previous ATC clearance or instruction

or comply with a revised ATC clearance or instruction.[4]

[edit ] Types of traffic and resolution advisories

Type Text Meaning Required action[1][2][5]

TA Traffic; traffic. Intruder near both horizontally and Attempt visual contact, and be

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vertically. prepared to maneuver if an RA occurs.

RA Climb; climb. Intruder will pass below Begin climbing at 1500 –2000 ft/min

RA Descend. Descend. Intruder will pass above. Begin descending at 1500 –2000 ft/min

RA Increase climb. Intruder will pass just below Climb at 2500 – 3000 ft/min.

RA Increase descent. Intruder will pass just above. Descend at 2500 – 3000 ft/min.

RA Reduce climb. Intruder is probably well below. Climb at a slower rate.

RA Reduce descent. Intruder is probably well above. Descend at a slower rate.

RA Climb; climb now. Intruder that was passing above, will

now pass below. Change from a descent to a climb.

RA Descend; descend

now.

Intruder that was passing below, will

now pass above. Change from a climb to a descent.

RA Maintain vertical

speed; maintain.

Intruder will be avoided if vertical

rate is maintained. Maintain current vertical rate.

RA Adjust vertical

speed; adjust.

Intruder considerably away, or

weakening of initial RA. Begin to level off.

RA Monitor vertical speed.

Intruder ahead in level flight, aboveor below.

Remain in level flight.

RA Crossing. Passing through the intruder's level.

Usually added to any other RA.

Proceed according to the associated

RA.

CC Clear of conflict. Intruder is no longer a threat. Return promptly to previous ATC

clearance.

[edit ] Pilot/aircrew interaction during a TCAS event

TCAS event interaction[4]

Aircrew Controller

Traffic advisory (TA)

Shall not manoeuver their aircraft in Remains responsible for ATC separation










response to traffic advisories (TAs) only

Should prepare for appropriate action if an

RA occurs; but as far as practicable, pilots

should not request traffic information

If requested by the aircrew, shall give traffic

information

Resolution advisory (RA)

Shall respond immediately and manoeuver

as indicated, unless doing so would

jeopardize the safety of the airplane

Shall not attempt to modify the flight path of an

aircraft responding to an RA

Shall follow the RA even if there is a conflict

between the RA and an Air Traffic Control

(ATC) instruction to manoeuver

Shall not issue any clearance or instruction to the

aircraft involved until the pilot reports returning to the

terms of the assigned ATC clearance or instruction

Shall never manoeuver in the opposite

sense to an RA, nor maintain a vertical rate

in the opposite sense to an RA

Shall acknowledge the report by using the phrase

"ROGER"

When deviating from an air traffic control

instruction or clearance in response to any

RA, shall:

As soon as permitted by flight crewworkload, notify the appropriate

ATC unit of the deviation. Immediately inform ATC when they

are unable to comply with aclearance or instruction thatconflicts with an RA.

If requested by the aircrew, shall give traffic

information

Shall promptly comply with any subsequent

RAs issued by TCAS

Ceases to be responsible for providing separation

between that aircraft and any other aircraft affected as

a direct consequence of the manoeuver induced by the

RA, as long as the pilot reported the TCAS RA.

Shall limit the alterations of the flight path

to the minimum extent necessary to comply

with the resolution advisories

Clear of conflict (CC)

Shall promptly return to the terms of the Shall resume responsibility for providing separation for



into the path of the intruder above, who is descending to land. A change proposal has been issuedto correct this problem.[7]

[edit] Relationship to automatic dependent surveillance-

broadcast (ADS-B)Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) messages are transmitted from aircraftequipped with suitable transponders, containing information such as identity, location, andvelocity. The signals are broadcast on the 1090 MHz radio frequency. ADS-B messages are alsocarried on a Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) in the 978 MHz band.[8]

TCAS equipment which is capable of processing ADS-B messages may use this information toenhance the performance of TCAS, using techniques known as "hybrid surveillance". Ascurrently implemented, hybrid surveillance uses reception of ADS-B messages from an aircraftto reduce the rate at which the TCAS equipment interrogates that aircraft. This reduction in

interrogations reduces the use of the 1030/1090 MHz radio channel, and will over time extendthe operationally useful life of TCAS technology. The ADS-B messages will also allow low cost(for aircraft) technology to provide real time traffic in the cockpit for small aircraft. CurrentlyUAT based traffic uplinks are provided in Alaska and in regions of the East coast of the USA.

Hybrid surveillance does not include the use any of the aircraft flight information in the TCASconflict detection algorithms; ADS-B is used only to identify aircraft that can safely beinterrogated at a lower rate.

In the future, prediction capabilities may be improved by using the state vector informationpresent in ADS-B messages. Also, since ADS-B messages can be received at greater range than

TCAS normally operates, aircraft can be acquired earlier by the TCAS tracking algorithms.The identity information present in ADS-B messages can be used to label other aircraft on thecockpit display (where present), painting a picture similar to what an air traffic controller wouldsee and improving situational awareness.[9][10]

[edit] Drawbacks to TCAS and ADS-B

The major demonstrated problem of the ADS-B protocol integration is this added verbosity of the extra information transmitted, which is considered unnecessary for collision avoidancepurposes. The more data transmitted from one aircraft in accordance with the system design, the

lesser the number of aircraft that can participate in the system, due to the fixed and limitedchannel data bandwidth (1 megabit/second with the 26/64 data bits to packet length bit capacityof the Mode S downlink data format packet). For every Mode S message of 64 bits, the overheaddemands 8 for clock sync at the receiver and Mode S packet discovery, 6 for type of Mode Spacket, 24 for who it came from. Since that leaves only 26 for information, multiple packetsmust be used to convey a single message. The ADS-B "fix" proposal is to go to a 128 bit packet,which is not an accepted international standard.[8] Either approach increases channel trafficabove the level sustainable for environments such as the Los Angeles Basin.

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[edit] Versions of TCAS

[edit ] Passive

See also: Portable Collision Avoidance System

Collision Avoidance systems which rely on transponder replies triggered by ground and airbornesystems are considered passive. Ground and airborne interrogators query nearby transponders formode C altitude information, which can be monitored by third-party systems for trafficinformation. Passive systems display traffic similar to TCAS, however generally have a range of less than 7 nautical miles (13 km).[citation needed ]

[edit ] TCAS I

TCAS I is the first generation of collision avoidance technology. It is cheaper but less capablethan the modern TCAS II system, and is mainly intended for general aviation use. TCAS Isystems are able to monitor the traffic situation around a plane (to a range of about 40 miles) andoffer information on the approximate bearing and altitude of other aircraft. It can also generatecollision warnings in the form of a "Traffic Advisory" (TA). The TA warns the pilot that anotheraircraft is in near vicinity, announcing "Traffic, traffic", but does not offer any suggestedremedy; it is up to the pilot to decide what to do, usually with the assistance of Air TrafficControl. When a threat has passed, the system announces "Clear of conflict".[11]

[edit ] TCAS II

Change proposal CP112E graphical explanation






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Change proposal CP115 graphical explanation

TCAS II is the second and current generation of instrument warning TCAS, used in the majorityof commercial aviation aircraft (see table below). It offers all the benefits of TCAS I, but will

also offer the pilot direct, vocalized instructions to avoid danger, known as a "ResolutionAdvisory" (RA). The suggestive action may be "corrective", suggesting the pilot change verticalspeed by announcing, "Descend, descend", "Climb, climb" or "Adjust Vertical Speed Adjust" (meaning reduce vertical speed). By contrast a "preventive" RA may be issued which simplywarns the pilots not to deviate from their present vertical speed, announcing, "Monitor vertical

speed" or "Maintain vertical speed, Maintain". TCAS II systems coordinate their resolutionadvisories before issuing commands to the pilots, so that if one aircraft is instructed to descend,the other will typically be told to climb — maximising the separation between the twoaircraft.[1][2]

As of 2006, the only implementation that meets the ACAS II standards set by ICAO[12] was

Version 7.0 of TCAS II[1]

, produced by three avionics manufacturers: Rockwell Collins, Honeywell, and ACSS (Aviation Communication & Surveillance Systems; an L-3Communications and Thales Avionics company).

After the Überlingen mid-air collision (July 1, 2002), studies have been made to improve TCASII capabilities. Following extensive Eurocontrol input and pressure, a revised TCAS II MinimumOperational Performance Standards (MOPS) document has been jointly developed by RTCA(Special Committee SC-147[13]) and EUROCAE. As a result, by 2008 the standards for Version7.1 of TCAS II have been issued[14] and published as RTCA DO-185B[3] (June 2008) andEUROCAE ED-143 (September 2008).

TCAS II Version 7.1[2]

will be able to issue RA reversals in coordinated encounters, in case oneof the aircraft doesn't follow the original RA instructions (Change proposal CP112E).[15] Otherchanges in this version are the replacement of the ambiguous "Adjust Vertical Speed, Adjust" RAwith the "Level off, Level off" RA, to prevent improper response by the pilots (Change proposalCP115).;[16] and the improved handling of corrective/preventive annunciation and removal of green arc display when a positive RA weakens solely due to an extreme low or high altitudecondition (1000 feet AGL or below, or near the aircraft top ceiling) to prevent incorrect andpossibly dangerous guidance to the pilot (Change proposal CP116).[7][17]

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Studies conducted for Eurocontrol, using recently recorded operational data, indicate thatcurrently the probability of a mid-air collision in European airspace is 2.7 x 10−8 which equatesto one in every 3 years. When TCAS II Version 7.1 is implemented, that probability will bereduced by a factor of 4.[17]

[edit ] TCAS III

Originally designated TCAS II Enhanced, TCAS III was envisioned as an expansion of theTCAS II concept to include horizontal resolution advisory capability. TCAS III was the "nextgeneration" of collision avoidance technology which underwent development by aviationcompanies such as Honeywell. TCAS III incorporated technical upgrades to the TCAS II system,and had the capability to offer traffic advisories and resolve traffic conflicts using horizontal aswell as vertical manouevring directives to pilots. For instance, in a head-on situation, one aircraftmight be directed, "turn right, climb" while the other would be directed "turn right, descend."This would act to further increase the total separation between aircraft, in both horizontal andvertical aspects. Horizontal directives would be useful in a conflict between two aircraft close to

the ground where there may be little if any vertical maneuvering space.

[18]

TCAS III attempts to use the TCAS directional antenna to assign a bearing to other aircraft, andthus be able to generate a horizontal maneuver (e.g. turn left or right). However, it was judged bythe industry to be unfeasible due to limitations in the accuracy of the TCAS directional antennas.The directional antennas were judged not to be accurate enough to generate an accuratehorizontal-plane position, and thus an accurate horizontal resolution. By 1995, years of testingand analysis determined that the concept was unworkable using available surveillancetechnology (due to the inadequacy of horizontal position information), and that horizontal RAswere unlikely to be invoked in most encounter geometries. Hence, all work on TCAS III wassuspended and there are no plans for its implementation. The concept has later evolved and been

replaced by TCAS IV.

[19][20]

[edit ] TCAS IV

TCAS IV uses additional information encoded by the target aircraft in the Mode S transponder reply (i.e. target encodes its own position into the transponder signal) to generate a horizontalresolution to an RA. Obviously, this requires the target aircraft to have some data link capabilityat a minimum. In addition, some reliable source of position (such as Inertial Navigation System or GPS) is needed on the target aircraft in order for it to be encoded.

TCAS IV has replaced the TCAS III concept by the mid 1990s. One of the results of TCAS III

experience has been that the directional antenna used by the TCAS processor to assign a bearingto a received transponder reply is not accurate enough to generate an accurate horizontalposition, and thus a safe horizontal resolution. TCAS IV uses additional position informationencoded on an air-to-air data link to generate the bearing information, so the accuracy of thedirectional antenna would not be a factor.

TCAS IV development continued for some years, but the appearance of new trends in data linksuch as Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) have pointed out a need to re-







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evaluate whether a data link system dedicated to collision avoidance such as TCAS IV should beincorporated into a more generic system of air-to-air data link for additional applications. As aresult of these issues, the TCAS IV concept was abandoned as ADS-B development started.[20][21]

[edit] Current implementation

Although the system occasionally suffers from false alarms, pilots are now under strictinstructions to regard all TCAS messages as genuine alerts demanding an immediate, high-priority response. Windshear Detection and GPWS alerts and warnings have higher priority thanthe TCAS. The FAA and most other countries' authorities' rules state that in the case of a conflictbetween TCAS RA and air traffic control (ATC) instructions, the TCAS RA always takesprecedence (this is mainly because of the TCAS-RA inherently possessing a more current andcomprehensive picture of the situation than air traffic controllers, whose radar / transponder updates usually happen at a much slower rate than the TCAS interrogations).[1][2] If one aircraftfollows a TCAS RA and the other follows conflicting ATC instructions, a collision can occur,such as the July 1, 2002 Überlingen disaster. In this mid-air collision, both airplanes were fitted

with TCAS II Version 7.0 systems which functioned properly, but one obeyed the TCASadvisory while the other ignored the TCAS and obeyed the controller; both aircraft descendedinto a fatal collision.[22]

This accident could have been prevented if TCAS was able to reverse the original RA for one of the aircraft when it detects that the crew of the other one is not following their original TCASRA, but conflicting ATC instructions instead. This is one of the features that will beimplemented within Version 7.1 of TCAS II.[14][23][24]

Implementation of TCAS II Version 7.1 has been originally planned to start between 2009 and2011 by retrofitting and forward fitting all the TCAS II equipped aircraft, with the goal that by

2014 the version 7.0 will be completely phased out and replaced by version 7.1. The FAA andEASA have already published the TCAS II Version 7.1 Technical Standard Order (TSO-C119c[25] and ETSO-C119c,[26] respectively) effective since 2009, based on the RTCA DO-185B[3] and EUROCAE ED-143 standards. On 25 September 2009 FAA issued AdvisoryCircular AC 20-151A[27] providing guidance for obtaining airworthiness approval for TCAS IIsystems, including the new version 7.1. On 5 October 2009 the Association of European Airlines(AEA) published a Position Paper[28] showing the need to mandate TCAS II Version 7.1 on allaircraft as a matter of priority. On 25 March 2010 the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) published Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) No. 2010-03 pertaining to the introduction of ACAS II software version 7.1.[29] On 14 September 2010 EASA published the CommentResponse Document (CRD) to the above mentioned NPA.[30] Separately, a proposal has been

made to amend the ICAO standard to require TCAS II Version 7.1 for compliance with ACAS IISARPs.

ICAO has circulated an amendment for formal member state agreement which recommendsTCAS II Change 7.1 adoption by 1 January 2014 for forward fit and 1 January 2017 for retrofit.Following the feedback and comments from airline operators, EASA has proposed the followingdates for the TCAS II Version 7.1 mandate in European airspace: forward fit (for new aircraft) 1March 2012, retrofit (for existing aircraft) 1 December 2015. These dates are proposed dates,




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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_note-ETSO-C119c-25








http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_note-AC-20-151A-26


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_of_European_Airlines




http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_note-AEA-PP-27






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subject to further regulatory processes, and are not final until the Implementing Rule has beenpublished.[17]

Among the system manufacturers, by February 2010 ACSS[31] certified Change 7.1 for theirTCAS 2000 and Legacy TCAS II systems,[32] and is currently offering Change 7.1 upgrade for

their customers.

[33]

By June 2010 Honeywell published a white paper with their proposedsolutions for TCAS II Version 7.1.[34] Rockwell Collins currently announces that their TCAS-94,TCAS-4000 and TSS-4100 TCAS II compliant systems are software upgradeable to Change 7.1when available.[35]

[edit ] Current TCAS Limitations

This unreferenced section requires citations to ensure verifiability.

While the safety benefits of current TCAS implementations are self-evident, the full technical

and operational potential of TCAS is not fully exploited due to limitations in currentimplementations (most of which will need to be addressed in order to further facilitate the designand implementation of Free flight):

TCAS is limited to supporting only vertical separation advisories, more complex traffic conflictscenarios may however be more easily and efficiently remedied by also making use of lateralresolution maneuvers; this applies in particular to traffic conflicts with marginal terrainclearance, or conflict scenarios that are similarly restricted by vertical constraints (e.g. in busy

RVSM airspace) ATC can be automatically informed about resolution advisories issued by TCAS only when the

aircraft is within an area covered by a Mode S, or an ADS-B monitoring network. In other cases

controllers may be unaware of TCAS-based resolution advisories or even issue conflictinginstructions (unless ATC is explicitly informed by cockpit crew members about an issued RAduring a high-workload situation), which may be a source of confusion for the affected crewswhile additionally also increasing pilot work load. In May 2009, Luxembourg, Hungary and theCzech Republic show downlinked RAs to controllers.

In the above context, TCAS lacks automated facilities to enable pilots to easily report andacknowledge reception of a (mandatory) RA to ATC (and intention to comply with it), so thatvoice radio is currently the only option to do so, which however additionally increases pilot andATC workload, as well as frequency congestion during critical situations.

In the same context, situational awareness of ATC depends on exact information about aircraftmaneuvering, especially during conflict scenarios that may possibly cause or contribute to newconflicts by deviating from planned routing, so automatically visualizing issued resolutionadvisories and recalculating the traffic situation within the affected sector would obviously helpATC in updating and maintaining situational awareness even during unplanned, ad hoc routingchanges induced by separation conflicts.

Today's TCAS displays do not provide information about resolution advisories issued to other(conflicting) aircraft, while resolution advisories issued to other aircraft may seem irrelevant toanother aircraft, this information would enable and help crews to assess whether other aircraft(conflicting traffic) actually comply with RAs by comparing the actual rate of (altitude) changewith the requested rate of change (which could be done automatically and visualized




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accordingly by modern avionics), thereby providing crucial realtime information for situationalawareness during highly critical situations.

TCAS displays today are often primarily range-based, as such they only show the traffic situationwithin a configurable range of miles/feet, however under certain circumstances a "time-based"representation (i.e. within the next xx minutes) might be more intuitive.

Lack of terrain/ground and obstacle awareness (e.g. connection to TAWS, including MSA sectorawareness), which might be critical for creating feasible (non-dangerous, in the context of terrain clearance) and useful resolution advisories (i.e. prevent extreme descent instructions if close to terrain), to ensure that TCAS RAs never facilitate CFIT (Controlled Flight into Terrain)scenarios.

Aircraft performance in general and current performance capabilities in particular (due to activeaircraft configuration) are not taken into account during the negotiation and creation of resolution advisories (as it is the case for differences between different types of aircraft, e.g.

turboprop/jet vs. helicopters), so that it is theoretically possible that resolution advisories areissued that demand climb or sink rates outside the normal/safe flight envelope of an aircraftduring a certain phase of flight (i.e. due to the aircraft's current configuration). Furthermore, asall traffic is being dealt with equally, there's no distinction taking place between different types

of aircraft, neglecting the option of exploiting aircraft-specific (performance) information toissue customized and optimized instructions for any given traffic conflict (i.e. by issuing climbinstructions to those aircraft that can provide the best climb rates, while issuing descendinstructions to aircraft providing comparatively better sink rates, thereby hopefully maximizingaltitude change per time unit, that is separation). As an example, TCAS can order an aircraft toclimb when it is already at its service ceiling for its current configuration .[36]

TCAS is primarily extrapolation-oriented, as such it is using algorithms trying to approximate 4Dtrajectory prediction using the "flight path history", in order to assess and evaluate the currenttraffic situation within an aircraft's proximity, however the degree of data- reliability and

usefulness could be significantly improved by enhancing said information with limited access torelevant flight plan information, as well as to relevant ATC instructions to get a more

comprehensive picture of other traffic's (route) plans and intentions, so that flight pathpredictions would no longer be merely based on estimations but rather actual aircraft routing(FMS flight plan) and ATC instructions. If TCAS is modified to use data that is used by othersystems, care will be required to ensure that the risks of common failure modes are sufficientlysmall.

TCAS is not fitted to many smaller aircraft mainly due to the high costs involved (between$25,000 and $150,000). Many smaller personal business jets for example, are currently notlegally required to have TCAS installed, even though they fly in the same airspace as largeraircraft that are required to have proper TCAS equipment on board. The TCAS system can onlyperform at its true operational potential once all aircraft in any given airspace have a properlyworking TCAS unit on board.

[edit ] Regulatory situation around the world

Jurisdiction

(Agency) Classification of aircraft TCAS mode

Date of

mandate

India(DGCA) Aeroplane having a maximum certified passenger

seating configuration of more than 30 seats or aTCAS II 31st

December,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrain_awareness_and_warning_system



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minimum_Safety_Altitude



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maximum payload capacity of more than 3 tons[37] 1998

USA (FAA)

All commercial turbine-powered transport aircraft

with more than 30 passenger seats (or MTOW

above 33,000 lb/15,000 kg)

TCAS II 1 January

1993

Europe (EASA)

All civil turbine-powered transport aircraft with

more than 30 passenger seats (or MTOW above

15,000 kg)[38]

TCAS II 1 January

2000

Europe (EASA)

All civil turbine powered transport aircraft with


5,700 kg)[38]

ACAS II

(Effectively TCAS

II Version 7.0)

1 January

2005

Australia (CASA)

All commercial turbine powered transport aircraft

with more than 30 passenger seats (or MTOWabove 15,000 kg)[39]

TCAS II

1 January

2000

Hong Kong, China

(Civil Aviation

Department)

All aircraft in Hong Kong with more than 9

passenger seats (or MTOW greater than

5,700 kg)[40]

TCAS II Version

7.0

1 January

2000

Brazil (National Civil

Aviation Agency)

All transport category aircraft with more than 30

passenger seats

TCAS II Version

7.0

1 January

2008

Peru (Dirección

General de

Aeronáutica Civil)

All civil turbine powered transport aircraft with


5,700 kg))[41][42]

ACAS II

(Effectively TCAS

II Version 7.0)

1 January2005

[edit] See also

Mid-air collision (MAC) Gol Transportes Aéreos Flight 1907 1996 Charkhi Dadri mid-air collision—November 12, 1996

Bashkirian Airlines Flight 2937—July 1, 2002

Bitching Betty Ground Proximity Warning System Portable Collision Avoidance System

[edit] References

1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Introduction to TCAS II Version 7

2. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Introduction to TCAS II Version 7.1

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_note-DGCA_AIR_TRANSPORT_CIRCULAR-36



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FAA



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EASA



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_note-eurocontrol-37









http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_Aviation_Safety_Authority



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_note-casa-38



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_Aviation_Department_(Hong_Kong)




http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_note-cad-39



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Civil_Aviation_Agency_of_Brazil




http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Directorate_General_of_Civil_Aviation_of_Peru&action=edit&redlink=1





http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_note-RAP121K-40









http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1996_Charkhi_Dadri_mid-air_collision


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bitching_Betty


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ground_proximity_warning_system






http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-TCAS70_0-0






















http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/service_units/nextgen/research_tech_dev/eng_dev_serv/tcas/media/pdf/tcas.pdf

























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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1996_Charkhi_Dadri_mid-air_collision
























3. ^ a b c FAA DO-185 Materials and RTCA SC-147 Activities

4. ^ a b c ICAO Document 9863 - Chapter 6

5. ^ Honeywell TCAS System User Manual

6. ^ ACAS Programme Work Package 1

7. ^ a b Change proposal CP116

8. ^ a b ADS-B System Description for the UAT

9. ^ Potential cooperation between TCAS and ASAS 10. ^ Terms of Reference - Future ADS-B / TCAS Relationships

11. ^ FAA TCAS Home Page

12. ^ ACAS II ICAO Provisions 13. ^ SC-147 Terms of Reference - Revision 9

14. ^ a b Decision criteria for regulatory measures on TCAS II version 7.1

15. ^ Change proposal CP112E 16. ^ Change proposal CP115

17. ^ a b c EUROCONTROL - TCAS II Version 7.1

18. ^ Project Report ATC-231

19. ^ Skybrary ACAS 20. ^

a b TCAS and Transponders

21. ^ FAA Engineering Development Services Group - TCAS Support

22. ^ BFU Investigation Report AX001-1-2/02

23. ^ TCAS Safety Study - Collision risk due to TCAS safety issues 24. ^ TCAS Safety Study - Collision risk due to TCAS safety issues (Presentation)

25. ^ FAA Technical Standard Order TSO-C119c

26. ^ European Technical Standard Order ETSO-C119c

27. ^ FAA Advisory Circular AC 20-151A - Airworthiness Approval of Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance

Systems (TCAS II), Versions 7.0 & 7.1 and Associated Mode S Transponders

28. ^ AEA Position Paper on TCAS Version 7.1 implementation

29. ^ EASA Deviation Request #56

30. ^ Comment Response Document (CRD) to NPA 2010-03

31. ^ ACSS Change 7.1 for TCAS II

32. ^ Press Release - ACSS Certifies Change 7.1 for TCAS 2000 and Legacy TCAS II

33. ^ ACSS Change 7.1 for TCAS II flyer 34. ^ Honeywell Solutions for TCAS II Change 7.1

35. ^ Rockwell Collins Traffic surveillance products

36. ^ http://www.airliners.net/aviation-forums/general_aviation/read.main/361350 37. ^ [1]

38. ^ a b European ACAS II Mandate

39. ^ Explanatory Statement regarding TCAS for CASA(PDF)

40. ^ Airworthiness Notice No. 24 (PDF) 41. ^ DGAC Perú - RAP 121 - Subpart K (PDF)

42. ^ DGAC Perú - RAP 135 - Subpart C (PDF)

[edit] External links

EUROCONTROL ACAS Website TCAS II Version 7.1

Discussion of TCAS

AIS-P/TailLight alternative to TCAS and ADS-B without the problems of TCAS and ADS-B

Critical discussion of TCAS using hypothetical abuse/exploit scenarios of TCAS usage

Introduction to TCAS II Version 7

Introduction to TCAS II Version 7.1

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-DO-185_2-0






http://adsb.tc.faa.gov/SC-147.htm



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-DOC9863-6_3-0






http://www.eurocontrol.int/msa/gallery/content/public/documents/Doc9863_ACAS_Controller_Training_chp6_1.pdf



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-4

http://www.sisadminov.net/tcas/docs/cas81_pilotguide.pdf



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-ACASA_5-0

http://www.eurocontrol.int/msa/gallery/content/public/documents/Safety/WP1.pdf



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-CP116_6-0




http://adsb.tc.faa.gov/TCAS/CPs/CP116.pdf



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-ADS-B_UAT_7-0




http://adsb.tc.faa.gov/WG5_Meetings/Meeting1/UAT-WP-1-09.pdf




http://www.narcap.org/articles/hci_aero.pdf



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-TOR_ADS-B_9-0

http://www.rtca.org/CMS_DOC/TOR%20-%20Initial%20-%20ADS-B%20-%20TCAS%20Relationship.pdf



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-FAA-TCAS_10-0

http://adsb.tc.faa.gov/TCAS.htm




http://www.eurocontrol.int/msa/public/standard_page/ACAS_ICAO_Provisions.html



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-SC-147_12-0

http://www.rtca.org/CMS_DOC/SC-147%20TOR%20Rev9%20-%20PMC%20Approved%20-%2006-10-2010.pdf



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-SIRE_13-0




http://www.eurocontrol.int/msa/gallery/content/public/documents/SIRE+_WP7_69D_v1.2.pdf



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-CP112E_14-0

http://adsb.tc.faa.gov/TCAS/CPs/CP112E.pdf







http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-EUROTCAS71_16-0






http://www.eurocontrol.int/msa/public/standard_page/ACAS_Upcoming_Changes.html



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-TCASIII_17-0

http://www.ll.mit.edu/mission/aviation/publications/publication-files/atc-reports/Burgess_1995_ATC-231_WW-15318.pdf



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-skybrary_18-0

http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/ACAS



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-sci_aeronautics_19-0




http://yarchive.net/air/airliners/tcas.html



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-FAA_TCAS_20-0

http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/service_units/nextgen/research_tech_dev/eng_dev_serv/tcas/



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-BFUAX001_21-0

http://www.bfu-web.de/cln_003/nn_53140/EN/Publications/Investigation_20Report/2002/Report__02__AX001-1-2___C3_9Cberlingen__Report,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/Report_02_AX001-1-2_%C3%9Cberlingen_Report.pdf




http://www.eurocontrol.int/msa/gallery/content/public/documents/acas/TCAS-SAF-T2-D07_v1.2.pdf







http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-TSO-C119c_24-0

http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgtso.nsf/0/95b393711426c9c78625759b006481ea/$FILE/TSO-C119c.pdf



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-ETSO-C119c_25-0

http://easa.europa.eu/ws_prod/g/doc/Agency_Mesures/Agency_Decisions/2009/cs_etso_5/Annex%20II%20-%20ETSO.pdf



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-AC-20-151A_26-0

http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC%2020-151A.pdf




http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-AEA-PP_27-0

http://hub.easa.europa.eu/crt/docs/viewcrdattachment/cid_41072/aid_460/fmd_3f25c67f0cd4b56f59cb31e18ad71a35



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-ETSO_Dev56_28-0

http://easa.europa.eu/certification/docs/deviation/ETSO%20DevP%2057.pdf



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-CRD201003_29-0

https://easa.europa.eu/rulemaking/docs/crd/CRD%202010-03.pdf



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-ACSS71_30-0

http://www.acss.com/change71



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-ACSSTCAS_31-0

http://www.acss.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Press%20Releases/Change%207-1%20TSO.pdf



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-ACSSUP71_32-0

http://www.acss.com/Advertisements/Change%207-1%20Web%20page.pdf



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-HWTCAS_33-0

http://www.honeywellairlinesolutions.com/downloads/TCAS.pdf



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-RCTCAS_34-0

http://www.rockwellcollins.com/Products_and_Systems/Radar_and_Surveillance/Traffic.aspx




http://www.airliners.net/aviation-forums/general_aviation/read.main/361350



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-DGCA_AIR_TRANSPORT_CIRCULAR_36-0

http://dgca.nic.in/circular/atc2_1998.htm



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-eurocontrol_37-0




http://www.eurocontrol.int/msa/public/standard_page/ACAS_Equipage_Requirements.html



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-casa_38-0

http://casa.gov.au/download/orders/amend/2001stat348expl.pdf



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-cad_39-0

http://www.cad.gov.hk/reports/HKAN/AN024%20%20Issue04%20I.pdf



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-RAP121K_40-0

http://www.mtc.gob.pe/portal/transportes/aereo/regulaciones/docs/rap_rev17/rap121/rap121_subparte_k_rev%2017.pdf



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-RAP135C_41-0

http://www.mtc.gob.pe/portal/transportes/aereo/regulaciones/docs/rap_rev18/rap135/rap_135_subparte_c_rev17.PDF





http://www.eurocontrol.int/msa/public/standard_page/ACAS_Startpage.html




http://www.allstar.fiu.edu/aero/TCAS.htm


http://www.collisionavoidance.org/


http://www.airsport-corp.com/adsb2.htm















http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-RAP135C_41-0


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-RAP121K_40-0


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-cad_39-0


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-casa_38-0





http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-DGCA_AIR_TRANSPORT_CIRCULAR_36-0




http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-RCTCAS_34-0


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-HWTCAS_33-0


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-ACSSUP71_32-0


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-ACSSTCAS_31-0


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-ACSS71_30-0


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-CRD201003_29-0


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-ETSO_Dev56_28-0


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-AEA-PP_27-0



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-AC-20-151A_26-0


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-ETSO-C119c_25-0


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-TSO-C119c_24-0






http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-BFUAX001_21-0


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-FAA_TCAS_20-0





http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-skybrary_18-0


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-TCASIII_17-0








http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-CP112E_14-0





http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-SC-147_12-0




http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-FAA-TCAS_10-0


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-TOR_ADS-B_9-0










http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCAS#cite_ref-ACASA_5-0













Decision criteria for regulatory measures on TCAS II version 7.1

TCAS User Interface Awareness video toolkit on Skybrary

Collision avoidance on the UKCS (TCAS II Trial) by Mark Prior (Bristow)

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USAF presentation on future of drones (RPA)18/10/2011

Click image to see full presentation (note may take a while to download)

Last week I posted two presentations by the RAF on British drones. Here is a presentation by DrMark Maybury, USAF Chief Scientist on the future development of USAF drones orRemotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) as he prefers to call them. The presentation was given at aconference in Indiana in September 2011.

Highlights from the presentation include:

The USAF currently flies 54 Combat Air Patrols per day using drones

It takes 168 people to run a Predator drone Combat Air Patrol and 300 for a Global Hawk.Hence the push for greater autonomy for drones.

Predicts ultra-long endurance drones that will stay aloft for years and “large airships containingfootball field size radars giv[ing] extreme resolution / persistence”

Advocates for greater autonomy for drones and suggests that in the future the operator willonly decide the “mission intent and constraints” and leave it up to the drone to find the best(and I quote) “execution path”

Researchers working on best way to control multiple drones so they can act as “single

coordinated unit to meet mission need”

Tiny micro drones “open up new opportunities for close-in sensing in urban areas”

To view full presentation click on the image above.

FACT SHEET

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chief_Scientist_of_the_U.S._Air_Force




http://dronewarsuk.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/usaf-future-of-rpa.pdf





Updated July 2011IntroductionUnmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) come in a variety of shapes and sizes and serve diverse purposes.They may have a wingspan as large as a Boeing 737 or be smaller than a radio-controlled modelaircraft. A designated pilot in command is always in control of a UAS.Historically, UAS have mainly supported military and security operations overseas, with trainingoccurring in the United States. In addition, UAS are utilized in U.S. border and port surveillance bythe Department of Homeland Security, scientific research and environmental monitoring by NASAand NOAA, public safety by law enforcement agencies, research by state universities, and variousother uses by public (government) agencies. Interest is growing in civil uses, including commercialphotography, aerial mapping, crop monitoring, advertising, communications and broadcasting.Unmanned aircraft systems may increase efficiency, save money, enhance safety, and even savelives.

In the United States alone, approximately 50 companies, universities, and government organizationsare developing and producing over 155 unmanned aircraft designs.

The FAA’s Role: Safety FirstThe FAA‘s main concern about UAS operations in the National Airspace System (NAS) is safety.The NAS encompasses an average of more than 100,000 aviation operations per day, including aircarrier, air taxi, general aviation, and military aircraft. There are approximately 18,000 air carrieraircraft and 230,000 active general aviation aircraft in the U.S. It is critical that UAS do not endangercurrent users of the NAS, including manned and other unmanned aircraft, or compromise the safetyof persons or property on the ground.In addition to recreational use of UAS by modelers, there are two acceptable means of operatingUAS in the NAS outside of ―restricted‖ airspace: Special Airworthiness Certificates in theExperimental Category (SAC-EC) and Certificates of Waiver or Authorization (COA). Model Aircraft

Recreational use of the NAS is covered by FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 91-57, which generallylimits operations to below 400 feet above ground level and away from airports and air traffic. Experimental UAS

An SAC-EC is the only certification means available to civil operators for UAS and optionally-piloted aircraft (OPA). Due to regulatory requirements, this approval precludes carrying persons orproperty for compensation or hire, but does allow operations for research and development, marketsurvey, and crew training.Since July 2005, the FAA has issued 94 SAC-EC, to 13 civil operators covering 20 unique UAS andOPA types. The FAA works with these operators to collect technical and operational data to improvethe UAS airworthiness certification process.



Public UAS

The COA process is available to public entities, including military, law enforcement, and othergovernmental agencies who want to fly a UAS in civil airspace. Applicants apply online and theFAA evaluates the request. The FAA issues a COA generally based on the following principles:

The COA authorizes an operator to use defined airspace and includes special provisions unique to theproposed operation. For instance, a COA may include a requirement to operate only under VisualFlight Rules (VFR) and/or only during daylight hours. Most COAs are issued for a specified timeperiod (up to one year, in most cases).

Most COAs require coordination with an appropriate air traffic control facility and may require theUAS to have a transponder to operate in certain types of airspace.

Due to the inability of UAS to comply with ―see and avoid‖ rules as manned aircraft operations do, avisual observer or an accompanying ―chase‖ aircraft must maintain visual contact with the UAS andserve as its ―eyes‖ when operating outside of airspace that is restricted from other users.

The FAA issued 146 COAs in 2009 and 298 in 2010, more than doubling in one year. As of June 28,2011, there were 251 active COAs, 90 different proponents, and 77 different aircraft types.Civil UAS (Future Operations)

With the proposed small UAS Rule (described below) and the update to the Civil UAS NASIntegration Roadmap, the FAA is laying the path forward for safe integration of civil UAS into theNAS. The roadmap will describe the research and development necessary for the FAA to developstandards and policy for safe integration. An evolved transition will occur, with access increasingfrom accommodation to integration into today‘s NAS, and ultimately into the future NAS as itevolves over time.Operation and Certification StandardsTo address the increasing civil market and the desire by civilian operators to fly UAS, the FAA isdeveloping new policies, procedures, and approval processes. Developing and implementing newUAS standards and guidance is a long-term effort.

The FAA created the Unmanned Aircraft Program Office (UAPO), within Aviation Safety (AVS),and the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Group, within Air Traffic Organization (ATO), to integrateUAS safely and efficiently into the NAS. These specific AVS and ATO offices are co-located toenhance communication and efficiency.

The FAA, working closely with stakeholders in the UAS community to define operational andcertification requirements, stood up UAS Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) to bring inputsand recommendations to the FAA on UAS matters. It is critical to develop and validate appropriateoperational procedures, regulatory standards, and policies to enable routine UAS access to the NAS.

The FAA has asked RTCA – a group that frequently advises the agency on technical issues – to workwith industry and develop UAS standards. RTCA will answer two key questions:

1. How will UAS handle communication, command, and control? 2. How will UAS “sense and

avoid” other aircraft?



In addition, the FAA continues to work closely with its international counterparts to harmonizestandards, policies, procedures, and regulatory requirements.

Data is Key

More safety data is needed to assist the FAA in making informed decisions on integration of UASinto the NAS, where the public travels each day. Currently, operations under COAs are required toreport monthly operational data and incident/accident data. Increased data collection will allow theFAA to assess and enhance safety and expand the use of this technology.Small Eyes in the SkyThe FAA expects small UAS (sUAS) to experience the greatest near-term growth in civil andcommercial operations because of their versatility and relatively low initial cost and operatingexpenses. The agency has received extensive public comment on sUAS, both from proponents whobelieve their small size warrants minimal regulation and from groups concerned about hazards tomanned general aviation aircraft and persons or property on the ground.In April 2008, the FAA chartered the ARC to examine these operational and safety issues and make

recommendations for proceeding with regulating sUAS. From this process, the agency drafted aNotice of Proposed Rulemaking with anticipated publication, late 2011.One of the most promising potential uses for sUAS is in law enforcement. Although the sUAS ARCwas not focused specifically on law enforcement organizations, these proponents were activeparticipants on the ARC. Currently, any law enforcement organization must follow the COA processto conduct demonstration flights. The FAA is working with urban police departments in majormetropolitan areas as well as national public safety organizations on test programs involvingunmanned aircraft. The goal is to identify the challenges that UAS will bring into this environment todetermine the operations that can be conducted safely by law enforcement.The Bottom LineBecause of their inherent differences from manned aircraft, such as the pilot removed from theaircraft and the need for ―sense and avoid,‖ introduction of UAS into the NAS is challenging for both

the FAA and aviation community. In addition, UAS must be integrated into an evolving NAS, fromone with ground-based navigational aids to a GPS-based system in NextGen.Each year, public agency interest and use of COAs have increased. With the introduction of thesUAS Rule for civil operators, there will be an increase in the number and scope of UAS flights in analready busy NAS. Decisions being made about UAS airworthiness and operational requirementsmust fully address safety implications of UAS flying in the same airspace as manned aircraft, andperhaps more importantly, aircraft with passengers.Overcoming these challenges associated with the differences between manned and unmanned

aircraft while simultaneously transitioning to NextGen further amplifies the need for extensive

cooperation between the FAA, other government agencies, and industry.



State Surveillance Drone Has Never Left The Ground

Honolulu harbor surveillance drone

BY JIM DOOLEY - The state purchased an unmanned aerial surveillance drone last year topatrol the skies over Honolulu Harbor but the aircraft can‘t be flown because of heavy air trafficin the area.

The $75,000 drone was delivered last June – six months after Hawaii Reporter disclosed that thestate had not sought and was unlikely to receive federal approval to actually fly the aircraft.

It has been stored since then in a state office on the Honolulu waterfront.

Harbors Division administrator Davis Yogi said the state didn‘t check with the Federal AviationAdministration about flying the drone until it received inquiries from Hawaii Reporter inJanuary 2011 on the subject. The FAA then told the state the drone could not be deployed in thecrowded airspace adjacent to Honolulu International Airport and Hickam Air Force Base.

―It was a glitch,‖ said Yogi. ―It works, we‘re maintaining it, but we just can‘t fly it.‖

The drone ―was already built‖ by the time the state talked to the FAA, Yogi continued. ―We hadto accept it,‖ he said.

Transportation Department spokesman Dan Meisenzahl said the drone purchase, by harborsecurity contractor Hawaiya Technologies, Inc., was a ―mistake‖ and an example of ‖government not working.‖

The state may try to sell the drone or partner with another government agency for its use, said

Meisenzahl.

http://www.hawaiireporter.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Screen-shot-2012-04-10-at-10.34.17-PM1.png

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Hawaiya Technologies was hired under a sole source $1.4 million harbor security contract in2009.

Current Transportation Department Director Glenn Okimoto first sought approval of theHawaiya sole source contract, including the drone acquisition, in 2007 when Okimoto was head

of the DOT harbors division.

The drone is a small part of a much larger security system now in operation at several waterfrontlocations on Oahu. A second system is now being installed on Maui and more are planned for theBig Island and Kauai. Paperwork for the Maui security system said deployment of another dronewas planned there, but Yogi said only the Honolulu drone was acquired.

Hawaii Reporter first began asking questions about the drone purchase in November 2010, butstate officials delayed responding for months.

In early January of last year, the state was asked specifically if it had ―sought or secured‖ an

FAA ―certificate of authorization‖ to fly drones over Honolulu harbor.

In February 2011, Meisenzahl noted that the drone surveillance idea was first approved duringthe administration of Gov. Linda Lingle.

After Gov. Neil Abercrombie took office in late 2010, his administration undertook an analysisof the harbor security

Harbors official Davis Yogi at security center video display

contract, Mesienzahl said in February 2011.

―Every significant expenditure and operational practice is under review including the UAV

(unmanned aerial vehicle) portion of this project,‖ said Meisenzahl.

After learning that FAA approval was necessary to fly the drone, the state approached the federalagency for a certificate of authorization, Meisenzahl said.

―The DOT has taken the first step in this process. It is part of the contractor's obligation toassemble all of the necessary paperwork,‖ Meisenzahl said.




Four months later, the drone was delivered to Hawaii and put into storage at Pier 1 on thewaterfront.

The state has been silent about the presence of the drone here, and its grounded status, since lastyear. HawaiiNewsNow last night reported that the drone had been delivered last June.

Hawaiya founder Paul Schultz flatly refused to discuss the company's harbor security work lastyear.

"This is not a friendly story,‖ Schultz told Hawaii Reporter . ‖You're coming after me. You cancome after me by yourself. But don't call me looking for information.‖

After the drone was delivered, a key state official who oversaw Hawaiya‘s work for the state,

Kelvin Ogata, left his state job and went to work for a nonprofit companyheaded by Hawaiya owners Schultz and Mun Won Chang.

Schultz and Chang were the subjects of a long-running investigation conducted by the NavalCriminal Investigation Service concerning expenditure of Navy research funds when Schultzserved as a U.S. Navy Rear Admiral and Chang worked as a civilian Navy employee.

Both left government service with no charges filed against them. Schultz was reduced in rank tocaptain before he retired. The pair are now married and active in local Democratic Party politics.

Schultz and Chang are business associates of former Hawaii Governor John Waihee. A companyin which all three are involved, Aina Kai Environmental, performed subcontracting work onHawaiya Technologies‘ state harbor contract, according to records on file with the State CivilDefense Division.

The Honolulu and Maui harbor security systems were financed with grants of $1.4 million and$900,000 from the Federal Emergency Management Agency administered by the Civil Defenseoffice.

Yogi said that although the two systems were installed under non-bid contracts to HawaiiyaTechnologies, the state is seeking competitive bids for design and installation of the Big Islandand Kauai harbor security programs.

The Honolulu surveillance drone was touted as an anti-terrorism tool in purchasing documentssubmitted to the state Office of Procurement.




The craft is equipped with a high-tech camera to scan and track surface activities.

Law enforcement agencies around the country are increasingly interested in using unmannedflying drones for surveillance and intelligence-gathering purposes.

The aircraft are far less expensive and intrusive than helicopters or piloted planes.

The Federal Aviation Administration is developing regulations for their use in civilian air space.

The American Civil Liberties Union has expressed concern about invasion of privacy issuesraised by use of surveillance drones in other states and is monitoring the situation in Hawaii.

―Use of ‗Unmanned Aerial Vehicles‘ or ‗drones‘ by law enforcement has a vast potential for abuse,‖ Daniel Gluck, senior staff attorney for ACLU Hawaii, told Hawaii Reporter last year.

―The Hawaii Supreme Court has already ruled that warrantless infrared surveillance of people‘s

homes is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.‖ Gluck said.

―The ACLU of Hawaii will monitor the details of this particular program (the kinds of technology used to perform the surveillance and the areas where it is used) to ensure it does notintrude on Hawaii residents‘ and businesses‘ protected privacy rights,‖ said Gluck.