G.R. No. L-29075 June 10, 1971

APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE, ELDRED FEWKES, applicant-appellant, vs. NACITA VASQUEZ, DOMINGO VASQUEZ, TRINIDAD GERARTE, HEIRS OF AUGUSTO ARAMBURO, SIMEON ARAMBURO, RAMON VELASCO, JOSEFINA VELASCO ISAAC, EMILIA VELASCO SAMSON, HEIRS OF JUAN VELASCO, SEGUNDO CERDENIA, MAURICIO SAYSON, PACITA SAMSON and FLORENCIO DYCOCO, oppositors-appellees.

Ignacio Calleja, jr. & Rafael Lucila for applicant-appellant. Victoriano Abrera for oppositor-appellee Florencio Dycoco.

Antonio Alfane, & C. Bautista for oppositors-appellees Ramon Velasco, et al.

Delfin de Vera for oppositors-appellees Nacita Vasquez, et al.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal (before Republic Act 5440) from the order of the Court of First Instance of Albay (In Land Reg. Case No. N-434), dismissing an application for registration on jurisdictional grounds.

On 2 March 1967, Eldred Fewkews, an American citizen, commenced in the Court of First Instance of Albay a proceeding for the registration of 2 lots and the improvements thereon. It was alleged in the application that Fewkes acquired by purchase from Juan G. Velasco, Jr., Brigida C. Velasco and Trinidad G. Velasco two (2) parcels of land, referred to as Lot No. 21-A of Psu-61470 (a portion of Lot No. 1383, Libon PLs-763 D), with an area of 223, 241 square meters more or less, and Lot with an area of 11,283 square meters, situated in barrio Bubulusan (Bulusan), municipality of Libon, province of Albay; that applicant was in actual possession of the lots, and that said properties were free from any encumbrance. Attached to the application were the tracing cloth and blue print of plans Psu-61470 and the corresponding technical descriptions of Lots 21-A and 21-B of Psu-61470, the certified copies of the tax declarations on said land, and the two deeds of absolute sale dated 20 June 1966 and 27 January 1967, executed by the Velascos in favor of applicant.

On 31 March 1967, finding that the application did not contain the plans and technical description of the parcels of land sought to be registered and the surveyor's certificate, the court required the applicant to submit the same. Upon compliance with the foregoing requirement, the applicant then submitted a motion praying the court that the Director of Lands and/or the Land Registration Commission be directed to approve subdivision plan Psu-61470, wherein it appeared that the lots sought to be registered are parts of a bigger lot identified in said subdivision plan as Lot No. 21.

In its order of 28 April 1967, the court denied the motion reasoning that the application being for registration of land, it had nothing to do with the approval of the subdivision plan. On 2 August 1967, the court issued another order, this time for amendment of the application in order to include the respective postal addresses of the adjoining owners named therein.

On 23 February 1968, after the initial hearing of case, the court issued an order dismissing the application for warrant of jurisdiction, based on the finding that the properties sought to be registered only formed part of a bigger tract, of land which was described in the plan attached to the application, and that the notice of initial hearing did not delineate accurately the portions of the land involved in the registration proceeding. When the motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid dismissal-order was denied, applicant filed the present appeal.

Appellant's complaint in this instance actually is directed against the outright dismissal of the application. It is not denied that what was published in the Official Gazette at applicant's expense, 1 was not the description of the two lots subject of the registration proceeding but that of a bigger parcel of land identified as Lot No. 1383 of Libon Pls-763-D referred to as Lot No. 21 of Psu-61470). It is here contended, however, that since the published description includes the motions being registered, then the court below erred in declaring itself without jurisdiction over the proceeding. In other words, according to appellant, as the description of the bigger parcel, 1383 of Pls-764-D, of which the properties sought to be registered formed part, was already published, then there would have been no necessity for further publication of the aforesaid small portions in order to vest jurisdiction on the land registration court. The flaw in this argument lies in the assumption that by the publication of the bigger tract of land, jurisdiction over the said property was acquired by the court below. That is not correct.

Under Section 21 of the Land Registration Act an application for registration of land is required to contain, among others, a description of the land subject of the proceeding, the name, status and address of the applicant, as well as the names and addresses of all occupants of the land and of all adjoining owners, if known, or if unknown, of the steps taken to locate them. When the application is set by the court for initial hearing, it is then that notice (of the hearing), addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the lot being registered and the adjoining owners, and indicating the

location, boundaries and technical description of the land being registered, 2 shall be published in the Official Gazette for two consecutive times. It is this publication of the notice of hearing that is considered one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court in land registration cases, 3 for the proceedings being in rem, it is only when there is constructive seizure of the land, effected by the publication and notice, that jurisdiction over the res is vested on the court. Furthermore, it is such notice and publication of the hearing that would enable all persons concerned, who may have any rights or interests in the property, to come forward and show to the court why the application for registration thereof is not to be granted.

It must be remembered that the application in this case filed in the court below was for registration, not of the big parcel of land (Lot No. 1383, Pls-764-D or Lot No. 21), but of certain portions thereof designated by applicant-appellant as Lots Nos. 21-A and 21-B. It is the technical description of these 2 smaller lots, therefore, that must be published in order that the persons who may be affected by their registration may be notified thereof. For, considering that the adjoining owners of Lot No. 21 would not be the same as the owners of the properties adjoining Lots Nos. 21-A and 21-B, the notification of the adjoining owners of the big lot would not be the notice to the adjoining owners or occupants of the smolder lots required by law. In short, it is the publication of the specific boundaries of Lots Nos. 21-A and 21-B that would actually put the interested parties on notice of the registration proceeding, and would confer authority on the land registration court to pass upon the issue of the registerability of said lots in favor of the applicant.

Appellant insists, however, that the lower court should have merely directed the amendment of the application or the approval by the Director of Lands of the subdivision plan, instead of issuing an order of dismissal. There is no merit in this contention. Considering that it has been dully apprised of the absence of the requisite survey plan and the technical description of the lots being registered. and of the inadequacy of the necessary publication and notice to the interested parties, and consequently of the existence of jurisdictional defects in the application, the lower court could not have taken any other course of action than to order the dismissal of the case. In Escueta vs. Director of Lands, 16 Phil. 482, this Court ruled:

'It is not permissible to make amendments or alterations in the description of the land after its publication in the newspapers and after the registration of the property has been decreed, without the publication of new notifications and advertisements making known to everyone the said alterations and amendments. Otherwise, the law would be infringed with respect to the publicity which characterizes the procedure, and third parties who have not had an opportunity to present their claims, might be seriously affected in their rights, through failure of opportune notice.'

Nor was the court below technically qualified to declare the subdivision plan true and correct, and compel its approval by the land authorities.

It may even be pointed out that on two occasions, the lower court had already directed appellant's counsel to submit necessary annexes and amend the application. It can not really be charged, therefore, that said court had been unfair or unduly harsh on the applicant-appellant when, finding the application to be still fatally defective, it ordered the dismissal of the case.

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the order appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. The dismissal of the application here is understood to be without, prejudice to the filing of a proper application in conformity with the legal requirements.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Castro and Villamor, JJ., took no part.

.

DIR. OF LANDS VS IAC AND ACME G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986

Lessons Applicable: Sec. 3 Art. XII, 1987 Constitution (Land Titles and Deeds)

FACTS:

Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land

o possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan o land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian

Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain

o Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements o ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal

Officials of Maconacon, Isabela donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela

IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of

ISSUES:

1. W/N the land is already a private land - YES 2. W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations applies- NO

HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc

1. YES

already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient

o it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption

The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.

The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law

2. NO

If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition

The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares

Republic V CA and Sps Lapina Fact: On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the time of the purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens.

On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time, however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization.

An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have presented their respective evidence, the court a quo rendered a decision confirming private respondents' title to the lots. In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for registration of title on the ground of foreign nationality. Issue: Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)? Ruling: In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process, the possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. In addition, private respondents have constructed a house of strong materials on the contested property, now occupied by respondent Lapias mother.

But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that the Constitution itself allows private respondents to register the contested parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of the Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to wit:

Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is similar to Section 15, Article XIV of the then 1973 Constitution which reads:

Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private land, for use by him as his residence, as the Batasang Pambansa may provide.

Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant provision of which provides:

Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of one thousand square meters, in the case of urban land, or one hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.

In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a transferee of an additional urban or rural lands for residential purposes which, when added to those already owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas herein authorized.

From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law has been passed by the legislature on the same subject. Thus, what governs the disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185.

Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for registration of the properties in question, said properties as discussed above were already private lands; consequently, there could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the public domain. They are already private in character since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence (BP 185).

It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural-born citizens of the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not significant whether private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or registered the parcels of land in question. What is important is that private respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that private respondents were able to prove the requisite period and character of possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots, their application for registration of title must perforce be approved.

MINDANAO VS DIR OF LANDS G.R. No. L-19535 July 10, 1967 MAKALINTAL, J.:

Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Batangas (Lipa City) dismissing appellants' "application for registration of the parcel of land consisting of 107 hectares, more or less, situated in the barrio of Sampiro, Municipality of San Juan, Province of Batangas, and designated in amended plan PSU-103696 as Lot A."

The proceedings in the court a quo are not disputed.

On August 4, 1960 appellants filed an application for registration of the land above described pursuant to the provisions of Act 496. They alleged that the land had been inherited by them from their grandfather, Pelagio Zara, who in turn acquired the same under a Spanish grant known as "Composicion de Terrenos Realengos" issued in 1888. Alternatively, should the provisions of the Land Registration Act be not applicable, applicants invoke the benefits of the provisions of Chapter VIII, Section 48, subsection (b) of C.A. 141 as amended, on the ground that they and their predecessor-in-interest had been in continuous and adverse possession of the land in concept of owner for more than 30 years immediately preceding the application.

Oppositions were filed by the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry and by Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. The latter's opposition recites:

x x x that the parcel of land sought to be registered by the applicants consisting of 107 hectares, more or less, was included in the area of the parcel of land applied for registration by Vicente S. de Villa, Sr. in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 in this Court, which was decided by this same Court through the then incumbent Judge, the Honorable Juan P. Enriquez, on September 30, 1949; that the parcel sought to be registered by the applicants was declared public land in said decision; that they (the oppositors Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. and Vicente S. de Villa, Sr.) have an interest over the land in question because for a period more than sixty (60) years, the de Villas have been in possession, and which possession, according to them, was open continuous, notorious and under the claim of ownership; that the proceeding being in rem, the failure of the applicants to appear at the case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 to prove their imperfect and incomplete title over the property, barred them from raising the same issue in another case; and that as far as the decision in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 which was affirmed in the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 5847-R is concerned, there is already "res-adjudicata" in other words, the cause of action of the applicant is now barred by prior judgment; and that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the subject matter, the decision of the Court in said case having transferred to the Director of Lands.

On November 15, 1960 the De Villas (De Villa, Sr. was subsequently included as oppositor) filed a motion to dismiss, invoking the same grounds alleged in its opposition, but principally the fact that the land applied for had already been declared public land by the judgment in the former registration case.

The trial court, over the objection of the applicants, granted the motion to dismiss by order dated January 27, 1961, holding, inter alia, that "once a parcel of land is declared or adjudged public land by the court having jurisdiction x x x it cannot be the subject anymore of another land registration proceeding x x x (that) it is only the Director of Lands who can dispose of the same by sale, by lease, by free patent or by homestead."

In the present appeal from the order of dismissal neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forestry filed a brief as appellee. The decisive issue posed by applicants-appellants is whether the 1949 judgment in the previous case, denying the application of Vicente S. de Villa, Sr., and declaring the 107 hectares in question to be public land, precludes a subsequent application by an alleged possessor for judicial confirmation of title on the basis of continuous possession for at least thirty years, pursuant to Section 48, subsection (b) of the Public Land Law, C.A. 141, as amended. This provision reads as follows:

The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

x x x x x x x x x

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.1wph1.t

The right to file an application under the foregoing provision has been extended by Republic Act No. 2061 to December 31, 1968.

It should be noted that appellants' application is in the alternative: for registration of their title of ownership under Act 496 or for judicial confirmation of their "imperfect" title or claim based on adverse and continuous possession for at least thirty years. It may be that although they were not actual parties in that previous case the judgment therein is a bar to their claim as owners under the first alternative, since the proceeding was in rem, of which they and their predecessor had constructive notice by publication. Even so this is a defense that properly pertains to the Government, in view of the fact that the judgment declared the land in question to be public land. In any case, appellants' imperfect possessory title was not disturbed or foreclosed by such declaration, for precisely the proceeding contemplated in the aforecited provision of Commonwealth Act 141 presupposes that the land is public. The basis of the decree of judicial confirmation authorized therein is not that the land is already privately owned and hence no longer part of the public domain, but rather that by reason of the claimant's possession for thirty years he is conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant.

On the question of whether or not the private oppositors-appellees have the necessary personality to file an opposition, we find in their favor, considering that they also claim to be in possession of the land, and have furthermore applied for its purchase from the Bureau of Lands.1wph1.t

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the Court a quo for trial and judgment on the merits, with costs against the private oppositors-appellees.

Reyes, J.B.L., Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur. Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-47847 July 31, 1981

DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

[G.R. No. L-47847. July 31, 1981.]

DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MANUELA PASTOR, respondents.

SYNOPSIS

In 1974, Manuela Pastor filed an application for confirmation of her imperfect title over 7 lots which she allegedly inherited from her father who died in 1938, and over 6 lots which she allegedly inherited from an aunt who died in 1950. Manuela testified and presented evidence showing that she has remained the owner and possessor of the lots in question; that her possession has been peaceful, public, continuous, adverse and in the concept of an owner; and that she has paid the taxes thereon. Manuela also presented 2 certifications from the Land Registration Commissioner, one stating that 2 of the lots were declared public land in a cadastral case, and another to the effect that the other lots were the subject of a decision in another cadastral case although no decree of registration has yet been issued. The Court of First Instance, acting as a land registration court, decreed the registration of the lots in favor of Manuela. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the lone oppositor, the Director of Lands, interposed for the first time the defense that the decisions in the earlier cadastral cases constituted res adjudicata and that the 30-year prior possession required by law has not been sufficiently shown. The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the decision in toto. Hence, this petition.

The Supreme Court held that the defense of res adjudicata cannot be pleaded for the first time on appeal; that a judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public land does not preclude even the same applicant from subsequently seeking judicial confirmation of his title to the same land under certain conditions; and that the evidence presented by the applicant in this case are unthinkable indicia that she has performed and complied with all the conditions essential to entitle her to a confirmation of her imperfect title.

Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; PLEADING AND PRACTICE; DEFENSE OF RES ADJUDICATA MAY NOT BE PLEADED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL; CASE AT BAR. It is clear from the evidence on record that in the proceedings had before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, acting as a land registration court, the oppositor Director of Lands, petitioner herein, did not interpose any objection nor set up the defense of res adjudicata with respect to the lots in question. Such failure on the part of oppositor Director of Lands, to Our mind, is a procedural infirmity which cannot be cured on appeal. All defenses not interposed in a motion to dismiss or in an answer are deemed waived.

2. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; PUBLIC LAND LAW; CADASTRAL PROCEEDINGS; JUDICIAL DECLARATION THAT LAND IS PUBLIC LAND, NOT A BAR TO SUBSEQUENT APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE OVER SAME LAND. The decision in Cadastral Case No. 41 does not constitute a bar to the application of respondent Manuela Pastor; because a decision in a cadastral proceeding declaring a lot public land is not the final decree contemplated in Sections 38 and 40 of the Land Registration Act. A judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude even the same applicant from subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided he thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as long as said public land remains alienable and disposable (now sections 3 and 4, P.D. No. 1073).

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE; CONDITIONS THEREFOR. The uncontradicted testimony of private respondent Manuela Pastor, which was further corroborated by the testimony of Antonio Pastor, conclusively established beyond doubt that the respondent, together with her predecessors-in-interest since the year 1913 and up to the present, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the lots in question under a bona fide claim of ownership. Moreover, the documentary evidence submitted by private respondent also show that the lots have been declared for taxation purposes in the name of respondent Manuela Pastor (Exhibit 'I'), and the taxes thereon have been paid by said respondent herein (Exhibits 'J', 'J-1' to 'J-5', 'K', 'K-1' and 'K-2'). And finally, Geodetic Engineer Quirino Clemeneo, who conducted the survey of some of the lots and verified the survey conducted by the Bureau of Lands, testified that the thirteen (13) lots in question did not encroach upon public or private lands. All these are unmistakable indicia that respondent Manuela Pastor has performed and complied with all the conditions essential to entitle her to a confirmation of her imperfect title over the thirteen (13) lots subject of her application.

D E C I S I O N

MAKASIAR, J p:

By this petition for review on certiorari, the Director of Lands seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. No. 59853-R affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in LRC Case No. N-893 granting the application for registration under R.A. 496 of thirteen (13) parcels of land in the name of herein private respondent Manuela Pastor.

It appears that on May 8, 1974, respondent Manuela Pastor filed with the Court of First Instance of Batangas LRC Case No. N-893, an application for confirmation of imperfect title over thirteen (13) lots situated in Gulod and Pallocan, Batangas City. LexLib

The application shows that seven (7) of the lots, specifically Lots Nos. 9186-A, 9186-B, 9186-D, 9330-A, 9330-C, 9402-A and 9402-D were allegedly inherited by respondent Manuela Pastor from her parents Rafael Pastor and Natalia Quinio who died on July 1, 1938 and July 12, 1908, respectively. The other six (6) lots, namely Lots Nos. 9402-B, 9402-E, 9397-B, 9397-D, 9367 and 9360 were allegedly inherited by respondent from her aunt Rosario Pastor who died on January 13, 1950 without any surviving heir except respondent herein. In her application, the respondent claims that she and her predecessors-in-interest had been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse and notorious possession of the lots under claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years. LexLib

On June 24, 1974 the application was amended to correct the description of two lots.

The Director of Lands filed an opposition to the application on the ground that applicant Manuela Pastor and her predecessors-in-interest neither had title in fee simple nor imperfect title under Section 48 of the Public Land Law, as amended, over the lots in question.

No other persons filed opposition to the application.

Accordingly, the Court of First Instance of Batangas, acting as a land registration court, issued an order of general default with the exception of the Director of Lands, and then proceeded to hear the applicant, her witnesses, and oppositor Director of Lands.

During the hearings, the applicant presented as her witnesses her nephew Antonio M. Pastor, and Geodetic Engineer Quirino P. Clemeneo. Applicant Manuela Pastor testified on her behalf that she has remained the owner and possessor of the lots in question; that her possession has been peaceful, public, open, continuous, adverse against the whole world and in the concept of owner; that she had paid the taxes thereon; and that the said lots were planted to sugar cane.

Witness Antonio M. Pastor corroborated in all material respects the testimony of his aunt Manuela Pastor.

The Geodetic Engineer, Quirino P. Clemeneo, testified that he conducted the survey of some of the lots and verified the survey conducted by the Bureau of Lands on the others. He found that the lots did not encroach upon private and public lands.

As part of her documentary evidence, applicant Manuela Pastor presented the certifications of the Treasurer of Batangas City showing payments of the real estate tax on the lots from 1965 to 1974 (Exhibits J, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4 and J-5) and official receipts of payments of real estate tax on the same lots for 1975 (Exhibits K, K-1 and K-2).

Apart from the foregoing, applicant presented, however, a certification from the Land Registration Commission (Exhibit L) stating that Lot No. 9330 of the Cadastral Survey of Batangas, Province of Batangas, was declared public land in Cadastral Case No. 41, LRC Cad. Record No. 1706. She likewise submitted another certification from the Land Registration Commission (Exhibit L-1) to the effect that Lots Nos. 9186, 9360, 9367, 9397 and 9402 of the Cadastral Survey of Batangas, Province of Batangas, were the subject of a decision in Cad. Case No. 43, LRC Cad. Record No. 1712, although no decree of registration has as yet been issued. cdrep

On August 6, 1975 the Court of First Instance of Batangas rendered a decision pertinent portions of which read as follows:

"From the evidence presented, it has been established that as early as in the year 1913, the original owners of the seven (7) parcels of land located in the barrio of Gulod, Batangas City, designated as Lots Nos. 9330-A, 9330-C, 9186-A, 9186-B, 9186-D, 9402-A and 9402-D, as reflected in the plan Csd-12122 Sheet 1 (Exhibit 'E'), were spouses Rafael Pastor and Natalia Quinio. Natalia Quinio died on July 12, 1908. Since then, Rafael Pastor possessed the said lots peacefully, openly, continuously, adversely against the whole world and in the concept of owner up to his death in 1938. After the death of Rafael Pastor on July 1, 1938, Manuela Pastor, the applicant herein, being the only child and sole heiress, came into possession and ownership thereof by way of inheritance. From 1938 when the applicant inherited the said lots from her deceased parents and up to the present, she has remained the owner and possessor thereof; that her possession over the said lots has been peaceful, public, open, continuous, adverse against the whole world and in the concept of owner up to the present; that the applicant had paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon before the Japanese Occupation; that the said lots were planted with sugar cane, and since the year 1964 there were no tenants but paid workers were provided with huts for their use therein; that there were no buildings, houses or other improvements thereon. The other six (6) lots located in the barrio of Pallocan, Batangas City, designated as Lots Nos. 9397-B, 9397-D, 9367, 9360, 9402-B and 9402-E, as reflected in the plans marked as Exhibits 'E', 'G', 'H', 'H-1', 'H-1-a' and 'H-2', were originally owned by the applicant's aunt, Dra. Rosario Pastor; that the latter possessed the said lots peacefully, openly, continuously, adversely against the whole world and in the concept of owner up to her death in 1950; that after the death of Dra. Rosario Pastor on January 13, 1950, the applicant, Manuela Pastor, being the only niece and sole heiress, came into possession and ownership thereof by way of inheritance. From 1950 when the said applicant inherited the said lots from her deceased aunt and up to the present, she has remained the owner and possessor thereof; that her possession over the said lots has been peaceful, public, open, continuous, adverse against the whole world and in the concept of owner up to the present; that the applicant had paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon; that the said lots were planted with sugar cane, and since the year 1964 there were no tenants but paid workers were provided with huts for their use therein; that there were no buildings, houses or other improvements thereon.

"Evidence further shows that the late Rafael Pastor and Dra. Rosario Pastor, are brother and sister. Dra. Pastor died single and without issue; that applicant, Manuela Pastor, together with her predecessors-in-interest since the year 1913 and up to the present have been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, adverse and uninterrupted possession over the said thirteen (13) lots in question; that said lots were covered by tax declarations in the name of herein applicant, as shown in the Assessment Certificate issued by the City Assessor of Batangas (Exhibit '1'), and the taxes thereon have been paid by the applicant (Exhibits 'J', 'J-1', 'J-5', 'K', 'K-1' and 'K-2'); that there were no lien or incumbrance affecting said lots. Furthermore, applicant testified that she did not claim any portion of the road which bounded the lots in question, nor the portion of the creeks or river; that any of the said lots were not within any reservation of any kind.

"As required by this Court, the applicant submitted the following:

"(a) a certification of the Land Registration Commission that Lot No. 9330 of the Cadastral Survey of Batangas Record No. 1706 was declared 'public land' in the decision rendered thereon. It is further certified that copy of said decision relative to the aforementioned lot is not available in this Commission (Exhibit 'L'); (b) a certification of the Land Registration Commission, that no decrees of registration have as yet been issued to lots Nos. 9186, 9360, 9367 and 9397 and 9402 of the Cadastral Survey of Batangas (Exh. 'L-1'); and (c) a certification issued by officer-in-charge Records Division of the Bureau of Lands to the effect that the thirteen (13) lots situated in Barrios Gulod and Pallocan, Batangas City, are not covered by any kind of public land, application or patent (Exh. 'M').

"All the documentary exhibits of applicant were submitted in evidence as offered, there being no objection on the part of the oppositor. Oppositor Director of Lands through City Fiscal of Batangas did not offer any contradictory evidence.

"Indisputably and by highly credible evidence, the applicant gave more than ample proof of her rights to the grant of title over the properties in question. By herself and through her predecessors-in-interest, the applicant has been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the thirteen (13) parcels of land up to the present all for the requisite period of time and under a bona fide claim of ownership which entitle her to confirmation of title over the properties subject of this application.

". . . finding the application for confirmation and grant to title under Act 496 as amended, to be well-founded and fully substantiated by evidence sufficient and requisite under the law, the Court hereby decrees the registration of:

"xxx xxx xxx

"in favor of applicant, MANUELA PASTOR . . ." (pp. 49-60, Record on Appeal, p. 45, rec.).

Not, satisfied with the decision of the Court of First Instance, petitioner Director of Lands appealed the same to the Court of Appeals assigning the following errors:

'First Assignment of Error

'THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION OF MANUELA PASTOR FOR CONFIRMATION OF HER ALLEGED IMPERFECT TITLE TO LOTS NO. 9330-A AND 9330-C DESPITE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY APPLICANT HERSELF THAT SAID LOTS WERE DECLARED PUBLIC LAND IN A PREVIOUS CADASTRAL PROCEEDING.'

'Second Assignment of Error

'THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION OF MANUELA PASTOR FOR CONFIRMATION OF HER ALLEGED IMPERFECT TITLE TO LOTS NO. 9186-A, 9186-B, 9186-D, 9402-A, 9402-B, 9402-D, 9402-E, 9397-B, 9397-D, 9367 and 9360 DESPITE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY APPLICANT HERSELF THAT A DECISION RESPECTING SAID LOTS HAD BEEN RENDERED IN A PREVIOUS CADASTRAL PROCEEDING.'

'Third Assignment of Error

'THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS ADEQUATE EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED IMPERFECT TITLE OF MANUELA PASTOR TO THE THIRTEEN (13) LOTS SUBJECT OF THE APPLICATION' (pp. 11-12, rec.).

On February 9, 1978 the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming in toto the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas.

Hence, this petition.

I

Substantially, the same issues, as raised by petitioner in the Court of Appeals, are brought before US.

Petitioner asserts that the decision rendered in Cadastral Case No. 41 (Exhibit L) declaring Lot No. 9330 from which Lots Nos. 9330-A and 9330-C were derived constitutes res adjudicata as to the nature of the lots in question and therefore, a bar to appellee's application.

Additionally, petitioner also argued that:

"Lots Nos. 9186-A, 9186-B and 9186-D of the Cadastral Survey of Batangas, were derived from Lot No. 9186. Lots Nos. 9402-A, 9402-B, 9402-D and 9402-E were derived from Lot No. 9402. Lots Nos. 9397-B and 9397-D were derived from Lot No. 9397.

"As shown by applicant's Exhibit L-1, Lots Nos. 9186, 9360, 9367, 9397 and 9402 were the subject of a decision rendered in Cad. Case No. 43, LRC Cad. Record No. 1712, although no decree of registration has as yet been issued therein.

"The certificate, Exhibit L-1, is dated June 4, 1975. The decision of the lower court was rendered more than two months later, on August 6, 1975. Thus, on the basis of Exhibit L, the decision of the cadastral court might already be final when the appealed decision was rendered. If such be the case, the decision of the cadastral court constitutes res adjudicata and it is a bar to the present land registration proceeding under Act No. 496 (Lopez v. Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 589; Section 1. paragraph (f), Rule 16, Rules of Court).

"Assuming that the decision of the cadastral court was not yet final when the appealed decision was rendered, it was nevertheless, litis pendentia which, under Section 1, paragraph (e), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, is likewise a bar to the present proceeding for land registration case under Act No. 496.

"Either way, whether the decision of the cadastral court in Cad. Case No. 43 had become final or not, the present proceeding for land registration under Act No. 496 cannot prosper because of the principles of res adjudicata and litis pendentia" (pp. 15-16, rec.).

WE find no legal basis to uphold the foregoing contentions of petitioner. It is clear from the evidence on record that in the proceedings had before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, acting as a land registration court, the oppositor Director of Lands, petitioner herein, did not interpose any objection nor set up the defense of res adjudicata with respect to the lots in question. Such failure on the part of oppositor Director of Lands, to OUR mind, is a procedural infirmity which cannot be cured on appeal. Section 2, Rule 9, Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in no uncertain language, provides that:

"SEC. 2. Defenses and objections not pleaded deemed waived. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived; . . ."

All defenses therefore not interposed in a motion to dismiss or in an answer are deemed waived (Santiago, et al. vs. Ramirez, et al., L-15237, May 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 157, 162; Torreda vs. Boncaros, L-39832, January 30, 1976, 69 SCRA 247, 253).

Thus, the defense of res adjudicata when not set up either in a motion to dismiss or in an answer, is deemed waived. It cannot be pleaded for the first time at the trial or on appeal (Phil. Coal Miner's Union vs. CEPOC, et al., L-19007, April 30, 1964, 10 SCRA 784, 789).

But granting for a moment, that the defenses, of res adjudicata was properly raised by petitioner herein, WE still hold that, factually, there is no prior final judgment at all to speak of. The decision in Cadastral Case No. 41 does not constitute a bar to the application of respondent Manuela Pastor; because a decision in a cadastral proceeding declaring a lot public land is not the final decree contemplated in Sections 38 and 40 of the Land Registration Act. cdll

A judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude even the same applicant from subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided he thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as long as said public land remains alienable and disposable (now sections 3 and 4, P.D. No. 1073).

With respect to Cadastral Case No. 43, the evidence on record is too scanty to sustain the view of the petitioner that the decision rendered therein constitutes res adjudicata, or in the absence of finality thereof, litis pendentia. On the contrary, private respondent has amply shown that no final decree whatsoever was issued in connection with said cadastral case, even as it is not known in whose favor said decision was rendered. As found by the Court of Appeals:

"Again, we sustain the appellee. There is an ambiguity as to what was adjudicated in Case No. 43. If the lots in question were in that case awarded to a third party, the latter should have intervened in this case. But no private party has challenged the application for registration" (p. 30, rec.).

II

Finally, petitioner argues for the first time on appeal that "there is no substantial evidence to show that she (private respondent Manuela Pastor) and her predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the lots sought to be titled for a period of at least thirty (30) years and in the manner provided in Section 48, as amended, of the Public Land Law."

WE find no merit in the foregoing argument of petitioner. The uncontradicted testimony of private respondent Manuela Pastor, which was further corroborated by the testimony of Antonio Pastor, conclusively established beyond doubt that the respondent, together with her predecessors-in-interest since the year 1913 and up to the present, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the lots in question under a bona fide claim of ownership. Moreover, the documentary evidence submitted by private respondent also show that the lots have been declared for taxation purposes in the name of respondent Manuela Pastor (Exhibit 'I'), and the taxes thereon have been paid by said respondent herein (Exhibits 'J', 'J-1' to 'J-5', 'K', 'K-1' and 'K-2'). And finally, Geodetic Engineer Quirino Clemeneo, who conducted the survey of some of the lots and verified the survey conducted by the Bureau of Lands, testified that the thirteen (13) lots in question did not encroach upon public or private lands. All these are unmistakable indicia that respondent Manuela Pastor has performed and complied with all the conditions essential to entitle her to a confirmation of her imperfect title over the thirteen (13) lots subject of her application. LLjur

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS AFFIRMED, AND THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED. NO COSTS.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 113549 July 5, 1996

REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

327 Phil 852

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 113549. July 5, 1996.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (Represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS), petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF LUIS RIBAYA, namely, ANDREA RIBAYA BUENVIAJE, LUIS RIBAYA, ANTONIA RIBAYA-CONDE, and JOHN DOE RIBAYA, all represented by ANDREA RIBAYA BUENVIAJE as Administratrix of the Estate of Luis Ribaya, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Ramon Fernandez and Carlos R. Buenviaje for private respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT, GENERALLY UPHELD ON APPEAL; CASE AT BAR, AN EXCEPTION. The Court of Appeals' reversal was primarily due to its disagreement with the trial court's findings of fact. Hence, such removes this case from the general rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals bind us in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We are thus compelled to review the factual antecedents.

2. CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; TORRENS SYSTEM OF LAND REGISTRATION; ONE YEAR PERIOD IN SECTION 38 OF THE ACT REFERS TO PETITION FOR REVIEW. The one-year period provided for in Section 38 of Act No. 496 merely refers to a petition for review and is reckoned from the entry of the decree.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; OTHER REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO PARTIES AGGRIEVED BY REGISTRATION. There are other remedies available to an aggrieved party after the said one-year period, e.g., reconveyance, covered by Section 65 of Act No. 496 which, inter alia, provides that "in all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title." Likewise, an action for damages is sanctioned in cases where the property has been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value, which may be filed within four years from discovery of the fraud. Recourse may also be had against the Assurance Fund.

4. ID.; PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS; PRESCRIPTION NEVER LIES AGAINST THE STATE. Prescription never lies against the State for the reversion of property which is part of the public forest or of a forest reservation which was registered in favor of any party. Then too, public land registered under the Land Registration Act may be recovered by the State at any time.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; STATE'S ACTION TO ANNUL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE AND REVERSION OF LAND WHICH WAS PART OF PUBLIC FOREST, NOT BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION. We therefore hold that since the land applied for by the spouses Ribaya was part of the public forest and released only on 31 December 1930, the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land, which was not yet alienable and disposable. Hence, the State's action to annul the certificates of title issued thereunder and for the reversion of the land is not barred by prescription.

6. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; LAND REGISTRATION COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER CASE FOR LACK OF PUBLICATION. The land registration court in LRC Case No. 52, G.L.R.O. Record No. 26050 never acquired jurisdiction over the land covered by either the original plan (Plan II-13961) or the amended plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.) for lack of sufficient publication of the first and total want of publication of the second. As found by both the trial court in Civil Case No. 6198 and the Court of Appeals, the notice of the hearing of application of the spouses Ribaya for the registration of the land covered by the original plan was published in the 17 March 1925 issue of the Official Gazette. In short, there was only one publication thereof. Section 31 of Act No. 496, the governing law then, required two publications. Hence, the decision of 18 September 1925 of the land registration court was void for want of the required publications. The requirement of dual publication is one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the registration court; it is a jurisdictional requisite.

7. ID.; ACTIONS; LAND REGISTRATION, A PROCEEDING IN REM; PUBLICATION AND SERVICE OF NOTICE, JURISDICTIONAL. Land registration is a proceeding in rem and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through publication and service of notice.

8. CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; TORRENS SYSTEM OF LAND REGISTRATION; DECREE OF REGISTRATION; AMENDED PLAN OF LOT; PUBLICATION INDISPENSABLE IN ADJUSTMENT OF DECREE. A decree of registration is required to recite the description of the land. On the basis of the decree, OCT No. 3947 was issued. It follows then that the land registration court may have amended its decision to conform to the amended plan for the four lots which ultimately found their way into the decree issued by the General Land Registration Office, and finally, into OCT No. 3947. Whether it did so or not and the General Land Registration Office merely adjusted the decree to conform to the amended plan, such aims were fatally flawed due to the absence of publication of the amended plan. As such, the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land embraced by the amended plan.

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BENIN DOCTRINE NOT APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. The Court of Appeals in its challenged resolution of 24 January 1994 and the private respondents, however, maintain that the publication of the amended plan was unnecessary under our pronouncements in Benin vs. Tuazon. This case reiterates our ruling in Philippine Manufacturing Co. vs. Imperial, Juan and Chuongco vs. Ortiz, Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acua, Lichauco vs. Herederos de Corpus, and Director of Lands vs. Benitez, that only where the original survey plan is amended during the registration proceedings, by the addition of land not previously included in the original plan, should publication be made in order to confer jurisdiction on the court to order the registration of the area added after the publication of the original plan. Conversely, if the amendment does not involve an addition, but on the contrary, a reduction of the original area that was

published, no new publication is required. Reliance on Benin and its predecessors is misplaced. In the first place, the amendment of the original survey plan for the land applied for by the spouses Ribaya was made after the land registration court rendered its decision. It follows then that a re-opening of the case was indispensable; however, no such re-opening appears to have been done therein. Second, as earlier shown, the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land covered by the original plan because of insufficient piblication in the Official Gazette. Third, it has not been sufficiently shown that the four parcels of land covered by OCT No. 3947, which are based on the amended plan, are but a small part of the same and covered by the original survey plan.

10. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; SECONDARY EVIDENCE LIKE MACHINE COPIES OF BLUEPRINT OF PLAN, WITHOUT PROBATIVE VALUE. The disagreement as to the original area covered by the plan between the trial court and the Court of Appeals cannot be definitely resolved because no reliable copy of the original Plan II-13961 was presented. Exhibits "6" and "6-A" are a machine copy of the blueprint of the said Plan, which is not the best evidence under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. They are, at most, secondary evidence, which are inadmissible for failure of the offeror to prove any of the exceptions provided therein and to establish the conditions for their admissibility. Even if they are admitted, they have no probative value. Clearly then, there is absence of factual basis to conclude that the four parcels of land included in OCT No. 3947 are but a part of the land covered by the original plan (Plan II-13961).

D E C I S I O N

DAVIDE, JR., J p:

Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Resolution 1 of 24 January 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 17351, which set aside its earlier decision 2 of 9 January 1991. The latter affirmed the decision 3 of 11 November 1987 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Legazpi City, in Civil Case No. 6198 which declared null and void an original certificate of title issued pursuant to a decree and a decision in a land registration case decided on 18 September 1925.

After the private respondents filed their Comment and the petitioner their Reply, we gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

The Court of Appeals' reversal was primarily due to its disagreement with the trial court's findings of fact. Hence, such removes this case from the general rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals bind us in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 4 We are thus compelled to review the factual antecedents.

From the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and the pleadings of the parties, the following were established:

On the basis of the private respondents' exhibits, 5 on 9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26, and 27 July 1920, a parcel of land located in the barrio of Magragondong, Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay, was surveyed for the spouses Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris (hereinafter the spouses Ribaya) by Telesforo Untalan, a Bureau of Lands surveyor. The parcel of land was found to comprise an area of 25,542,603 square meters. The survey plan was denominated as Plan II-13961 and allegedly approved by the Acting Director of Lands on 3 January 1922. However, as noted by the Court of Appeals in its 9 January 1991 decision, 6 these exhibits do not at all show the surveyor's signature. Moreover, as per Land Classification Map No. 871 of the Bureau of Forestry, the above parcel of land was considered part of the public forest and released for disposition only on 31 December 1930. 7

In 1925, the spouses Ribaya applied for registration and confirmation of title of the lot covered by Plan II-13961 before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Albay. The case was docketed as LRC Case No. 52, G.L.R.O. Record No. 26050. Notice of the application, and hearing thereof were published in the 17 March 1925 issue of the Official Gazette, 8 and in its decision of 18 September 1925, 9 the CFI granted the said application.

Sometime later, or on 18-21 November and 23-30 November 1925, a resurvey of the parcel of land covered by Plan II-13961 was conducted at the instance of the spouses Ribaya. This gave rise to Plan II13961-Amd., which embraced, inter alia, four different parcels of land with an aggregate area of only 10,975,022 square meters, instead of the original 25,542,603 square meters. Plan II-13961-Amd. appeared to have been approved by the Director of Lands on 26 February 1926. 10 The application was not amended to reflect the resurvey and the amended plan was not published.

On 31 July 1926, the corresponding decree of registration was issued, 11 while on 19 August 1926, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3947 covering the four lots embraced by Plan II-13961-Amd. was issued in the names of the spouses Ribaya. 12

On 11 September 1958, OCT No. 3947 was administratively reconstituted from the owner's duplicate copy thereof and the reconstituted title was denominated as OCT No. RO-10848 (3947). 13

In 1964, the heirs of Luis Ribaya (herein private respondents) received compensation from the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States for damages sustained by the land during the war. 14

In 1968, pursuant to a deed of partition executed by the private respondents herein, the land covered by OCT No. RO-10848 (3947) was subdivided per Subdivision Plan LRC Psd-96075, approved on 16 December 1968. 15 Then, OCT No. RO-10848 (3947) was cancelled and separate Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) were issued to the private respondents. 16

In a letter dated 6 January 1977, sixty-two (62) farmers occupying the land 17 and claiming ownership thereof, requested the Director of Lands to institute an action to annul OCT No. RO-10848 (3947). 18 Finding merit in the request, herein petitioner filed a verified complaint, dated 17 August 1978, with the CFI (now Regional Trial Court) of Albay, Branch V, for the declaration of nullity of OCT No. 3947, OCT No. RO-10848 (3947), and all subsequent titles emanating from the original title, viz., TCT Nos. T-31333 to T-31358, inclusive. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6198.

The petitioner claimed therein that OCT No. 3947 was obtained through fraud and that the land registration court did not acquire jurisdiction over the land for lack of republication of the amended plan, neither did the spouses-applicants comply with Section 45(b) of Act No. 2874. 19 The petitioner further alleged that at the time the petition for registration was filed, the land covered therein was forest land, and therefore, inalienable.

On 27 October 1979, the aforementioned 62 farmers filed a complaint-in-intervention and prayed that the land revert to the petitioner and their titles over the portions respectively occupied by them confirmed.

In its decision of 11 November 1987 20 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) held for the petitioner as follows:

WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered as follows :

1. Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 3947 and administratively reconstituted Original Certificate of Title No. RO-10848 (3947) as null and void ab initio and without force and effect;

2. Declaring separate Transfer Certificates of Title, to wit: T-31333, T-31334, T-31335, T-31336, T-31337, T-31338, T-31339, T-31340, T-31341, T-31342, T-31343, T-31344, T-31345, T-31346, T-31347, T-31348, T-31349, T-31350, T-31351, T-31352, T-31353, T-31354, T-31355, T-31356, T-31357 and T-31358, emanating from OCT No. 3947 and OCT No. RO-10848 (3947), all issued to the heirs of Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris, as likewise null and void and without force and effect;

3. Ordering [respondents] Heirs of Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris to surrender their copy of OCT No. RO-10848 (3947) as well as their separate transfer certificates of title to the Register of Deeds of Albay, who (sic) is thereafter directed or ordered to cancel the same;

4. Ordering the reversion of the land to [petitioner] Republic of the Philippines, as alienable and disposable land of the public domain;

5. And ordering the dismissal of the counterclaim.

The trial court found that at the time the spouses Ribaya filed their petition for registration, the land was already classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land; however, the then CFI, as a land registration court, did not acquire jurisdiction over the said lot due to lack of publication or republication in the Official Gazette of Plan II-13961-Amd., which was the basis of the decree of registration and OCT No. 3947. Consequently, said OCT No. 3947 and its derivative titles were void. 21 In so finding, it relied on Fewkes vs. Vasquez, 22 where it was held that any amendment or alteration in the description of the land after its publication and decree of registration was not permissible unless coupled with republication.

The trial court likewise ruled that there was no evidence that the possession of the spouses Ribaya and their predecessors-in-interests was open, continuous, and adverse under a bona fide claim of ownership for the required number of years; moreover, they failed to present any tax declarations. It then concluded that the said spouses may have occupied portions of the land at a later time, but not in the concept of bona fide owners, for mere casual cultivation and raising of cattle on the land did not constitute "possession" as contemplated by law. 23

The private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 17351), which, in its decision 24 of 9 January 1991, affirmed in toto the appealed decision of the trial court. The appellate court further pointed out another reason why the registration in favor of the applicants was invalid, thus:

[W]hen [the] spouses [Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris] applied for registration thereof in their names said land was still part of the public forest. The land was released for public disposition only on December 31, 1930 as shown by the Land Classification Map No. 871 of the Bureau of Forestry (Exhs. K, K-5). Consequently, OCT No. 3947 as reconstituted by OCT No. RO-10848 is void ab initio.

It is well-settled that lands of the public domain classified as forest or timber lands, are incapable of registration in the names of private persons and their inclusion in a title nullifies the title (Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177 and cases cited therein.) 25

In refuting the claim of the private respondents that publication of the amended survey plan was unnecessary in light of the decision of this Court in Benin vs. Tuazon, 26 the Court of Appeals held that the facts in Benin were different. In Benin, an approved survey plan was submitted before the property was decreed for registration, while in the present case:

[T]he land was decreed for registration on September 18, 1925, while its survey was performed sometime in November and December 1925. The amended survey plan (plan II-13961-Amd.) thereof was approved by the Director of Lands on February 26, 1926. In other words, the survey plan (plan II-13961-Amd.) of the land in the instant case was approved when the land was already decreed for registration. . . . 27

There was then, the Court of Appeals concluded, a violation of Sections 23 and 26 of Act No. 496. 28

The private respondents seasonably moved for a reconsideration of this decision.

In its resolution 29 of 24 January 1994, the Court of Appeals granted the motion for reconsideration and set aside its decision of 9 January 1991, reversed that of the trial court of 11 November 1987, and dismissed the complaint and the complaint-in-intervention in Civil Case No. 6198 of Branch 7 of the RTC of Legazpi City. In overturning its previous decision, the Court of Appeals ruled that OCT No. 3947 "is conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Government and all its branches (Sec. 38, Act No. 496) as to all matters contained therein (Sec. 47, Act No. 496). One (1) year after its transcription which is the date of its effectivity (Sec. 42, Act No. 496), said certificate of title became incontrovertible (Sec. 38, Act No. 496)." 30

It further applied the presumption of regularity in the grant of the land applied for by the spouses Ribaya, and even extended said presumption to their compliance with all conditions required by law, in particular, their "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894." It thus burdened the Republic "to prove otherwise." 31

It likewise ruled that the failure of the spouses Ribaya to present tax receipts was not fatal, and that although they actually lived in Oas, Albay, such did not negate the character of their possession for "[p]ossession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before he can be said that he is in possession." 32

The Court of Appeals also rejected the application of the Fewkes case and applied, instead, the decision in Benin, where this Court held that republication could be dispensed with in an amendment in the application or in the survey plan, where such amendment consisted of the exclusion of a portion covered by the original application and the original survey plan as published. Accordingly, the land registration court retained its jurisdiction.

Finally, the Court of Appeals withdrew its earlier finding that the land in question still formed part of the public forest at the time of the application for registration. It asserted, instead, that there was insufficient basis to conclude that a parcel of land only became open to disposition on the basis of the date of approval of the land classification map, because such approval may have been made later by authority of a prior executive declaration. 33

Unsatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition and asserts that: (1) the indefeasibility of title does not lie against the State in an action for reversion of land; (2) the spouses-applicants failed to prove possession of the land for the period required by law, and the evidence shows that their possession was not open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious under a bona fide claim of ownership; (3) the amended survey plan was not published, (4) the land covered by OCT No. 3947 was then part of the forest land, hence, inalienable; and (5) the accuracy of the land survey was doubtful. 34

In their Comment, the private respondents allege that the petition merely raises factual matters and argue that OCT No. 3947 is absolutely incontestable, considering that the land was no longer part of the public forest when it was decreed in favor of their parents. They further contend, invoking Benin, that the issue of republication is inapplicable since the publication of the original survey plan was already had in compliance with law. Moreover, possession of the land by their parents, the spouses-applicants, was duly proven, i.e., donations of portions thereof in favor of the government and the compensation they received from the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States for damages sustained by the land during the war sufficiently proved that they were the legitimate owners of the land. Finally, the original survey plan could no longer be questioned by the petitioner. 35

As the Court sees it, only two relevant issues need be resolved, to wit:

1. Whether the Republic of the Philippines is barred by prescription to bring the action for annulment of OCT No. 3947 and all its derivative certificates of title; and

2. Whether the land registration court acquired jurisdiction over the four parcels of land subject of the amended survey plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.) and covered by the decree issued on 31 July 1926 by the General Land Registration Office pursuant to the decision of the said court of 18 September 1925.

As to the first issue, we find that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that OCT No. 3947 was, to repeat:

[C]onclusive upon and against all persons, including the Government and all its branches (Sec. 38, Act No. 496) as to all matters contained therein (Sec. 47, Act No. 496). One (1) year after its transcription which is the date of its effectivity (Sec. 42, Act No. 496), said certificate of title became incontrovertible (Sec. 38, Act No. 496). 36

First, the one-year period provided for in Section 38 of Act No. 496 merely refers to a petition for review and is reckoned from the entry of the decree. In the second place, there are other remedies available to an aggrieved party after the said one-year period, e.g., reconveyance, covered by Section 65 of Act No. 496 which, inter alia, provides that "in all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title." 37 Likewise, an action for damages is sanctioned in cases where the property has been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value, which may be filed within four years from discovery of the fraud. 38 Recourse may also be had against the Assurance Fund. 39

Finally, prescription never lies against the State for the reversion of property which is part of the public forest or of a forest reservation which was registered in favor of any party. Then too, public land registered under the Land Registration Act may be recovered by the State at any time. In Republic vs. Animas, 40 we ruled:

Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the state in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. Prescription does not lie against the state in such cases for the Statute of Limitation does not run against the state. The right of reversion or reconveyance to the state is not barred by prescription.

We therefore hold that since the land applied for by the spouses Ribaya was part of the public forest and released only on 31 December 1930, 41 the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land, which was not yet alienable and disposable. Hence, the State's action to annul the certificates of title issued thereunder and for the reversion of the land is not barred by prescription.

Anent the second issue, we hold that the land registration court in LRC Case No. 52, G.L.R.O. Record No. 26050 never acquired jurisdiction over the land covered by either the original plan (Plan II-13961) or the amended plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.) for lack of sufficient publication of the first and total want of publication of the second.

As found by both the trial court in Civil Case No. 6198 and the Court of Appeals, the notice of the hearing of application of the spouses Ribaya for the registration of the land covered by the original plan was published in the 17 March 1925 issue of the Official Gazette. In short, there was only one publication thereof. Section 31 of Act No. 496, the governing law then, required two publications. Hence, the decision of 18 September 1925 of the land registration court was void for want of the required publications. The requirement of dual publication is one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the registration court; 42 it is a jurisdictional requisite. 43 Land registration is a proceeding in rem and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the Land through publication and service of notice. 44

Worse, the decision of 18 September 1925 was entirely based on an alleged original survey plan. The fact remains, however, that in November of that year that original plan was amended (Plan II-13961-Amd.) and the amended plan was not published at all. There is no evidence that the court amended its decision to conform to the amended plan, neither is there a showing that the parties even attempted publication thereof. However, the decree that was subsequently issued was based on the amended plan insofar as the four lots were concerned.

A decree of registration is required to recite the description of the land. 45 On the basis of the decree, OCT No. 3947 was issued. It follows then that the land registration court may have amended its decision to conform to the amended plan for the four lots which ultimately found their way into the decree issued by the General Land Registration Office, and finally, into OCT No. 3947. Whether it did so or not and the General Land Registration Office merely adjusted the decree to conform to the amended plan, such aims were fatally flawed due to the absence of publication of the amended plan. As such, the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land embraced by the amended plan.

The Court of Appeals in its challenged resolution of 24 January 1994 and the private respondents, however, maintain that the publication of the amended plan was unnecessary under our pronouncements in Benin vs. Tuazon. 46 This case reiterates our rulings in Philippine Manufacturing Co. vs. Imperial, 47 Juan and Chuongco vs. Ortiz, 48 Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Acua, 49 Lichauco vs. Herederos de Corpus, 50 and Director of Lands vs. Benitez, 51 that only where the original survey plan is amended during the registration proceedings, by the addition of land not previously included in the original plan, should publication be made in order to confer jurisdiction on the court to order the registration of the area added after the publication of the original plan. Conversely, if the amendment does not involve an addition, but on the contrary, a reduction of the original area that was published, no new publication is required.

Reliance on Benin and its predecessors is misplaced. In the first place, the amendment of the original survey plan for the land applied for by the spouses Ribaya was made after the land registration court rendered its decision. It follows then that a re-opening of the case was indispensable; however, no such re-opening appears to have been done therein. Second, as earlier shown, the land registration court acquired no jurisdiction over the land covered by the original plan because of insufficient publication in the Official Gazette. Third, it has not been sufficiently shown that the four parcels of land covered by OCT No. 3947, which are based on the amended plan, are but a small part of the same and covered by the original survey plan. This conclusion is thoroughly discussed below.

In the 24 January 1994 resolution of the Court of Appeals, it found the original areas covered by Plan II-13961 to be 25,542,603 square meters and the four parcels of land embraced in the amended plan, Plan II-13961-Amd., to be in the aggregate of 10,975,022 square meters. Thus:

In the case at bar, in 1925, the spouses Ribaya sought for a judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title of the land described as follows:

Parcel of land (Plan II-13961) containing an area of 25,542,603 square meters, with the buildings and improvements thereon, situated in the Barrio Magragondong, Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay, P.I. . . . (Emphasis Supplied).

Said 25,542,603 square meter land was surveyed on July 9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26 and 27, 1920 by Telesforo Untalan, a surveyor of the Bureau of Lands which survey was approved by the Acting Director of Lands on January 3, 1922, (Exh. 6).

The notice of application and hearing of the land as aforedescribed, was published in the March 17, 1925 issue of the Official Gazette (Exhs. J and J-1).

The land registration court issued a decision in favor of the spouses Ribaya on September 18, 1925 but for a smaller parcel of land than the 25,542,503 square meters are applied for. On November 23 and 30, 1925, said smaller parcel of land was surveyed by Land Surveyor Wenceslao Manuel, and was approved by the Director of Lands on February 26, 1926 as Plan II-13961-Amd. (Exh. H and series).

Plan II-13961-Amd. embraced 4 parcels of land in the aggregate area of 10,975,022 square meters separately described as follows:

1. A parcel of land (Lot No. 1 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 3,318,454 square meters, more or less;

2. A parcel of land (Lot No. 2 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 1,575,195 square meters more or less;

3. A parcel of land (Lot No. 3 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 4,844,205 square meters, more or less;

4. A parcel of land (Lot No. 4 Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 1,237,368 square meters, more or less. 52

This was also its finding in its earlier decision of 9 January 1991. 53

In their Comment of 30 May 1994, the private respondents do not, for obvious reasons, dispute such finding and so they not only quoted it therein, 54 they also explicitly assert that:

The undisputed facts are that the original plan of the land applied for which was published in the Official Gazette contained an area of 25,542,603 square meters. The land actually embraced in the decree of registration contained only 10,975,022 square meters. 55 (emphasis supplied)

In hectares, the 25,542,603 square meters means Two Thousand Five Hundred and Fifty Four Hectares, two ares, and six hundred and three centares (2,554 has., 2 ares, and 603 centares); and the 10,975,022 square meters means one thousand and ninety seven hectares, five ares, and twenty-two centares (1,097 has., 5 ares, and 22 centares).

However, the trial court is somewhat confused as to the area of the land covered by Plan II-13961, as well as, that covered by the amended plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.). Thus:

[A]nd on March 7, 1978 Land Investigator Selecio San Felipe wrote the Director of Lands that the report of the ocular inspection and investigation conducted on May 14, 15 and 16, 1977 was true and correct, . . . that Plan II-13961-Amd., Sheet no. 1, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area of 489.3649 hectares, located at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, was surveyed on November 18-21, December 8-9, 1925 by Private Land Surveyor Wenceslao Manuel, and was approved by the Director of Lands on February 26, 1926 (Exhibits G, G-1 and G-2 for plaintiff and Exhibits GG, GG-1 and GG-2 for Intervenors); that Plan II-13961 Amd., Sheet no. 2, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area of 608.1373 hectares, located at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, was surveyed on November 23-30, 1925 by Private Land Surveyor Wenceslao Manuel, and was approved by the Director of Lands on February 26, 1926 (Exhibits H, H-1 and H-2 for plaintiff and Exhibits HH, HH-1 and HH-2 for intervenors); . . . that Original Certificate of Title No RO-10848 (3947) covers 4 parcels of land, to wit: Lot No. 1, Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 3,318.454 square meters more or less, Lot No. 2, Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 1,575.195 square meters more or less, Lot No. 3, Plan II-13961- Amd.), containing an area of 4,844.005 square meters more or less, and Lot No. 4, Plan II-13961-Amd.), containing an area of 1,237.368 square meters more or less with a total of 10,975.022 square meters more or less; . . . that Plan II-13961 of property as surveyed for Luis Ribaya, situated in the barrio of Magragondong, Municipality of Ligao, province of Albay, containing an area of 25,542.603 square meters, was surveyed on July 9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26 and 27, 1920 in accordance with Section 45 of Act 2874 by Telesforo Untalan, a surveyor of the Bureau of Lands, and the said plan was approved by the Acting Director of Lands on January 3, 1922 (Exhibits 6 and 6-A) . . . 56 (emphasis supplied)

Note that instead of a comma (,) before the last three digits in the areas of the four lots covered by the amended plan, as well as the areas embraced in the original plan, the trial court placed a period (.). The change from a comma to a period is of vital significance. For, translated into hectares, the 25,542.603 square meters would be only Two (2) hectares, five (5) ares, and five hundred and forty-two (542) centares; and the aggregate of 10,975.022 square meters for the four lots embraced in Plan II-13961-Amd. would be one (1) hectare and nine hundred seventy-five (975) centares.

Indeed, the disagreement between the Court of Appeals and the trial court as to the land area of the original survey plan (Plan II-13961), i.e., whether it was 25,542,603 square meters (twenty-five million five hundred and forty-two thousand and six hundred three square meters) as found by the former, or 25,542.603 square meters (twenty-five thousand, five hundred forty-two point six hundred and three square meters) as found by the latter, only shows the unreliability of the original plan sought to be established through Exhibits "6" and "6-A." The Court of Appeals itself so found it to be in its decision of 9 January 1991 because these exhibits did not show that the survey plan was signed by the surveyor. Thus:

Although the trial court said so (decision, p. 4) its basis, which is (original) Plan II-13961 (Exhs. 6, 6-A), did not indubitably establish the same. In the first place, said original plan (plan II-13961) does not bear the signature of the surveyor thereof, thereby casting doubt on its genuineness and due execution. . . . 57 (emphasis supplied)

Such doubt gains strength if we consider that if indeed the area embraced therein was that found by the Court of Appeals, i.e., 25,542,603 square meters with a comma before the last three digits it would have been physically impossible to finish the survey thereof in only eleven days (9, 10, 12-16, 23, 24, 26, and 27 July 1920). Plainly, the present-day sophisticated survey instruments were not then available. Furthermore, the trial court indicated in its findings of fact that in addition to the four lots covered by OCT No. 3947, there were other large tracts covered by the amended survey plan (Plan II-13961-Amd.), viz.:

[T]hat Plan II-13961-Amd., Sheet no. 1, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area of 489.3649 hectares, located at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, . . . (Exhibits G, G-1 and G-2 for plaintiff and Exhibits GG, GG-1 and GG-2 for Intervenors); that Plan II-13961 Amd., Sheet no. 2, surveyed for Luis Ribaya, with an area of 608.1373 hectares, located at Magragondong, Ligao, Albay, (Exhibits H, H-1 and H-2 for plaintiff and Exhibits HH, HH-1 and HH-2 for intervenors); 58 (emphasis supplied)

The disagreement between the trial court and the Court of Appeals cannot be definitely resolved because no reliable copy of the original Plan II-13961 was presented. Exhibits "6" and "6-A" are a machine copy of the blueprint of the said Plan, which is not the best evidence under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. They are, at most, secondary evidence, which are inadmissible for failure of the offeror to prove any of the exception provided therein and to established the conditions for their admissibility. Even if they are admitted, they have no probative value.

Clearly then, there is absence of factual basis to conclude that the four parcels of land included in OCT No. 3947 are but a part of the land covered by the original plan (Plan II-13961).

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolution of 24 January 1994 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 17351 is SET ASIDE, while its decision therein of 9 January 1991 affirming in toto that of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City of 11 November 1987 in Civil Case No. 6198 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 85515 June 6, 1991

REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL. vs. FLORENCIA MARASIGAN, ET AL.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 85515. June 6, 1991.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. FLORENCIA MARASIGAN, and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner. J. Renato V. Leviste for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE (P.D. NO. 1529); VIEW OF RESPONDENT COURT THAT SECTION 13 OF R.A. NO. 26 APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN IMPLIEDLY AMENDED BY SAID DECREE, TOTALLY UNFOUNDED. We further find to be totally unfounded the view of the Court of Appeals that Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 "appears to have been at least impliedly amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529." There is absolutely nothing in P.D. No. 1529 which intimates or suggests, indirectly or even remotely, an intention to amend said Section 13. The Court of Appeals either misapprehended or read out of context that portion of Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 reading as follows: ". . . that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court." Worse, it committed a serious blunder when it used this clause to support its proposition of implied amendment of Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 by virtue of Section 110 of the Decree.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECTS OF SAID VIEW. The above view of the Court of Appeals negates one of the principal purposes of the Decree, which is clearly expressed in its exordium, namely, to strengthen the Torrens System through safeguards to prevent anomalous titling of real property. It opens wide the doors to fraud and irregularities in land registration proceedings and in proceedings for the reconstitution of certificates of title. Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that only very few have access to or could read the Official Gazette, which comes out in few copies only per issue. If publication in the Official Gazette of the notice of hearing in both proceedings would be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court, owners of both unregistered and registered lands may someday painfully find out that others have certificates of title to their land because scheming parties had caused their registration, or secured reconstituted certificates of title thereto and sold the property to third parties.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; THERE IS SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE WITH PUBLICATION IF NOTICE IS PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE. Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 was never meant to dispense with the requirement of notice by mailing and by posting. What it simply means is that in so far as publication is concerned, there is sufficient compliance if the notice is published in the Official Gazette, although the law mandates that it be published "once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines." However, publ