madigan the application of michel foucault's philosophy in the problem externalizing discourse of...

8/3/2019 MADIGAN the Application of Michel Foucault's Philosophy in the Problem Externalizing Discourse of Michael White

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Journal of Famib Therapy (1992) 14 265-27901634445 $3.00

The applicationof Michel Foucaults philosophyin the problem externalizing discourse fMichael WhiteStephen Patrick Madigan*

Thispaperexamines how Michael Whites heoretical andpracticeorientation anbemappedonto he work of Frenchphilosopher/historian Michel Foucault. Specifically, Foucaults analysis of his threemodes of the objectification of the subject and the inseparabilityf powerand knowledge will be viewed as similar to, and shaping of, Whitesconceptions of externalizing internalized problem discourse.Where religions once demanded the sacrijke of bodies, knowledge now calls f o rexperimentation on ourselves, calls us to the sacrafice of the subject of knowledgeMichel Foucault: Madness and Civilization

Michael Whites externalizing problem discourseThe AmericanAssociation for Marriageand Family Therapyhasrecently recognized Australian family therapist Michael White as aMaster linician.Whitesground-breaking work of externalizinginternalizedroblem discourse is perhaps his inglemost importantcontribution to the field. Karl Tomm (1989) describes externalizingas a major achievement and a tour de orce; Tomm warns the fieldthat o view thisexternalizingpracticeasmerelyamanoeuvreortechniquewould be bothnaive and imiting (K. Tomm, personalcommunication, 4 October 1990).In order o appreciate fully both heaestheticand hepoliticalsignificance of Whites use of externalizing practice, I will investigateand place he externalizing dea withinahistoricalcontextwhichincludes Whites nterpretation of MichelFoucaults deas and hispractical use of them. Without consideration of this history, readerswould be grossly limited in both their nderstanding and utilization fWhites externalizing practice.

* Yaletown Family Therapy, 1168 Hamilton Street, Suite207, Vancouver, BritishColumbia, Canada, V6B-2S2.


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266 Stephen PatrickadiganThe first part of this paper will highlight those significant pieces of

FoucaultsworkwhichWhiteutilizes as a means to describe heexternalizing roblem iscoursedea. Specifically, thesencludeFoucaults analysis of the three modes of objectification of subjectsand the inseparability of power and knowledge. I will include clearand concise definitions, as well as historical and present-day examplesof Foucaults unique terminology. I will then describe how WhitesexternalizingpracticemapsnaturallyontoFoucaults deas.Caseexamples of Whitesherapeutic work will be given to situateexternalizing in Foucaults philosophical writing. It is important tonote that White madea practice of externalizing clients problems intherapy before his introduction to the work of Michel Foucault.Michel Foucault: Dividing practices, subjectification,scientificclassification,and the inseparabilityof power and knowledgeWriting as both aphilosopherand a historian,MichelFoucaultspolemic voice was raised against the practice of systematizing anduniversalizing those political and scientific theories which act to turnpeople (subjects) into things (objects). He viewed all discourse whichargues for the supremacy of one idea as a discourse of social control.He positioned himself to deconstruct heseculturallyconstructeddiscoursesand epresentations of what is viewed asnormalandabnormal among a societys individuals. His writings are the sourcefor debate across disciplines as diverse as psychiatry and feminism.

Foucault attempts to locate historically those strands of discourseand representation of discourse which deal not only with the subjectbut also with those practices which involve knowledge and power. Inother words, his objective is to create a history of the different modesbywhich, nWesternculture,humanbeingsaremade ubjects(Foucault, 1984a).Dividing practicesFoucault called the first modef objectification of the subject a ividingpractice (Foucault, 1965). Thesedividingpracticesare ocialandusually spatial: social, in that people of a particular social groupingwho xhibit ifference ould eubjectedo ertainmeans ofobjectification; and spatial, by being physically separated from thesocial group for exhibiting ifference. The actions of dividingpractices are tolerated and justified through the mediationof science


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Michel Fuucault and Michaelhite 267(or pseudoscience) and the power the social group gives to scientificclaims. In thisprocess of socialobjectification andcategorization,human beings are given both a social and a personal identity.Foucaults research surveys many historical examples of situationswhere people, specified by the state as abnormal, have been spatiallyand socially divided. An example is the confinement of the poor, theinsane and vagabonds in thegreat catch-allGeneralHospital inParis in 1656. Foucault argues that the classifications of disease andtheassociatedpractices of clinicalmedicine in earlynineteenth-century France, the rise of modern psychiatry and its entry into thehospitals, prisons and clinics throughout the nineteenthnd twentiethcenturies, and finally the medicalization, stigmatization and normal-ization of sexual deviance in modern Europe, have all helped shapemodern orms of dividingpractices (Foucault, 1965,1973,1979).Current examples of dividing practices might include the objectifi-cation nd isolation of certainmarginalgroups uch s thnicminorities and persons with AIDS.

Scientzfic classzficatiunThe second mode for turning human beings into objectified subjectsFoucaulteferso s scientijiclassijication (Foucault,1982).ForFoucault, scientific classification is the practice of making the body athing through, for example, the use of psychiatric diagnostic testing.Today we witness the use of DSM I11 technology being utilized as ameans for classification. This action emerges from discourse which isgiven the status of science (Foucault, 1982).Foucault shows how, at different stages of history, certain scientificuniversals regarding human social life were held privileged; throughthisprivileged status certain scientificclassificationshaveacted ospecify socialnorms (Foucault, 198413). Hence, ociallyproducedspecifications and categorizations of normal and abnormal behaviourevolved which perpetuated classification andwhatFoucault callstotalizatiun techniques (culturally produced notions about he specifi-cation of personhood) Foucault,1982). Theculturalpractice ofspecifying whatconstitutes henormalemployee,orasFoucaultwrites the subject who labours, is an example of a socially producedspecification (Foucault, 1982).

Another commonly used practice of classification is the documen-tation of lives which became available through the invention of files.The file enables individuals to be captured andixed in time through


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26% Stephen Patrickadiganwriting, and itsuse facilitates the gathering of statistics and the ixingof norms. The file can be used asan nstrument opromote heconstruction of unitary and globalknowledges about people. Thisturning of real lives into writing is viewed by Foucault as yet anothermechanism of social control.

SubjectiJicationFoucaults third mode of objectification analyses the ways in whichhuman beings turn themselves into subjects: he calls thisubjectijkation(Foucault, 1982). This process differs significantly from the other twomodes of objectification, in which the individual takes an essentiallypassive, constrained position. Foucault suggests that subjectificationinvolves those processes ofself-formationr identityn which the personis active. He is primarily concerned with isolating those techniquesthrough whicheoplenitiateheirwnctiveelf-formation.Foucault contends that this self-formation has a long and complicatedhistory as it takes place through a variety of operations on peoplesown bodies, thoughts and conduct (Foucault, 1980). These operationscharacteristically ntail rocess of self-understandinghroughinternalized ialoguemediatedhrough xternal ultural orms(Foucault, 1980,1982).The humanist psychologymovementpromotes he idea of self-determination-transcendence/understanding.Foucault suggests thatthese would be difficult to achieve since all ur actions,from eating todressing to working, are tied to and influenced by cultural discourse.It is therefore impossible to be outside of culture in any action inwhich we partake.Internalized personaldiscourse is viewed by Foucault as an action ofself-controlguided by set ocial standards Foucault,1982). Hesuggests that people monitor and conduct themselves according totheir nterpretation of set culturalnormsand mayalso seek outexternal authority figures such as a religious leader or psychoanalystfor further guidance (Foucault, 1982). Yet, these culturally producedfigureheads can only offer heavenly advice or transference interpreta-tions that have also been solely shaped by cultural discourse. After all,the point to which Foucault consistently returns s the idea that thereare no ruths: only interpretations of truthsituated(hopefully) inrhetorical ethics (Madigan, 1991) .Foucaults description of architect Jeremy Benthams seventeenth-century Panopticon is an exampleof control of the subject and subject


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Micheloucault and Michaelhite 269controlFoucault,979).Herehe Panopticons structurendfunction serves to promote n externalized cultural (normative) gazewhichsnternalized by the ubject, nd moves the ubjectopractices of the body deemed desirable by the culture of power.The inseparability o f power and knowledgeTaken together, the three odes ofobjectificationof the subject (thosethat categorize, distribute, and manipulate; those through which wehave come to understand ourselves scientifically; and those that wehave used to form ourselves nto meaning-giving selves) designate thelandscape of Foucaultsnquiries.Clusteredightly aroundheproblem of the subject are the twin terms of knowledge and power.Foucault espouses the position of the constitutive dimension of powerand knowledge (Foucault, 1980). This suggests that alldiscursivepractices all hewaysaculturecreatessocial and psychologicalrealities) are interpretations embedded in specific cultural discourse,where he ubject is consideredcreatedby, and creating of, thecultural discourse.Foucaults conception of the inseparability of power and knowledgeis reflected in his confrontationof those who argue for the ascendancyof a particular brand of knowledge over others (Foucault, 1984a). Forexample, the discourse of pharmaceutical medicine, propped up andsupported by a powerful industrial lobby, often overshadows the talkof lesser known, yet sometimes safer and more effective alternative ofnaturopathic medicines.Foucaultsuggests that alternative knowledges are often silencedthrough their disqualification. Foucault calls these ocal knowledges* incontrast to those cultural knowledges which survive and rise aboveothers: the latter he calls global knowledges.

The privileging of specific cultural practices over others also actsto disqualify whole groups of people, who through their actions areviewed by the culture as different. These groups, who for instancepractisedifferent exualpreference,ashion,dietor piritualorientation, are quiteften marginalized. Arguments for the ascendancy~ ~~ ~~ ~* In his descriptions of global totalitarian knowledge practices Foucault suggeststwo types of subjugated knowledges: erudite knowledges are those which have beenexcluded from written history, and local knowledges are those that,althoughcurrently surviving in particular cultural discourse, are denied the space to beadequately performed (Foucault, 1980).


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270 Stephen Patrickadiganof one idea or practice over another promote the rhetorical positionthat actual truths exist. Foucault (1980) writes: There can be nopossible exercise of power without certain economical discourses oftruth which operate through and on the basis of this association. Weare subjected o the productionof truth through power and we cannotexercise power except through the production of truth (p. 73).

Foucault differs from traditional perceptions f power which regardit as negative. He claims that power does not come from above, butrather, from below (the subject) where culturalknowledge claims areinternalized and produced in every social interaction. I t is thereforenotexercisednegatively rom theoutside,althoughnegationandrepression may be some of the effects. Once an individual becomespart of societys discourse, certain cultural truths are then integratedand privileged, thereby restraining the construction of alternatives.T o participate in these truths, certain less dominant, less scientific,or perhaps lesser accepted truths are subjugated. How our societyprivilegeshewhitemansccount of written istory ver anaboriginal persons account is an example of apower-through-knowledge practice.I would like to clarify that when Foucault is describing truths, heis not suggesting that an objective reality actually exists: ather he isreferring to those constructed ideas that are given a truth status.These truths act to set standards of normalization and influencehow people are to shape their lives.It would appear hat heprimarysubjugating effectof powerthrough truth and truth throughower is the specification of a formof individuality, and this in turn s a vehicle for power Parker, 1989).A knowledge practice viewed as truth within cultural discoursesetsstandards for the specifications of the individual, around which theindividualshapes his orher life (Foucault,1984a).Forexample,certain specified bodyweights for women have haped societiesperception ofgood and badbodyshapes;manyWestern womenexercise, diet, and even fast, as partof an obsession with getting theirbodies to match certain privileged body specifications.

Foucault suggests that the cultural construction of power is notrepressive but rather acts in such aay to subjugate other alternativeknowledges. He proposes that persons become docile bodies and areconscripted into performances of meaning which lend support to theproliferation of both globalknowledges as well as echniques ofpower Foucault,1980).Foucaultparallelsapostmodernanthro-pologicalposition, as hedoesnotpropose hat hereare global


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Micheloucaultndichaelhite 27 1knowledges that can be universally accepted as truth. For example,Tyler 1990)outlineshowexceedinglydifficult t is forWesternanthropologists o ranslate heirexperience of a ribemembersexperiencento actual cademic xperience, uch sournalwriting. Canadian aboriginal peoples are at present lobbying to berecognized as a distinct society with hopes of preserving their owncultural traditions. Over time, Native Peoples local knowledges havebeen reduced, re-authored and ascribed numerous definitions by thedominant white culture.Foucault (1980) specifies that knowledges which make global truthclaimsreupportedhrough knowledges of moderncientificdisciplines. He writes that as both participants and subjects of thispower through knowledge we are judgedcondemned,classified,determined in our undertaking, destined to a certain modef living ordying, as a function f the true discourses which are the bearers of thespecific effects of power (p. 94).

The application of Foucaults philosophy to family therapyMichael Whites practice of externalizing nternalizedproblem discourseputs into action Foucaults ideasf the three modesof objectification,and the inseparability of power and knowledge.

Whites herapeuticperformance could appear as implisticorgimmicky,yet ifwe recognize externalizing nternalized problemdiscourse in Foucaults work, the true elegance of the idea may bebrought forward. In the remainder of this paper, I aim to show howWhite nterpretsFoucaults deasandputs hem nto herapeuticpractice.

Whites readingof Foucault has enabled him to explore theoreticallythe therapeutic question: is the talk about the problem gaining moreinfluence over the person ors the persons talk gaining more influenceover the problem (White, 1988)? Whites consideration of this puzzleled him to unearth not only the oppressive effects which results fromtheways nwhichproblems are usuallydiscussed, but also theconstitutive and subjugating effectsof descriptive knowledge itself(White, personal communication, June 1990).In Western societies, objectifying practices which tend to thingifypersons and theirbodies are pervasive(Gergen and Gergen, 1984;Rose,1989).Examples nclude heclassification of mental llnessthroughDSM I11 labelling echnology, he instituting of mother-


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272 Stephen Patrick Ma di ga nblaming technology, or the belief in the inheritance of an alcoholic orchild-abusing gene.

Whites herapeuticpracticehelps people toexternalize specificinternalized self-subjugating cultural discourse. In addition, and inline with Foucaults thinking, White attempts to de-classify and de-thingify the people he works with in therapy. Through externalizingproblemdiscourse,he liberates those counter-discursive practices of apersons local knowledge; in other words, different stories about thesubject canemerge whichhighlight preferred outcomes. Counter-practices can be viewed as those actions which invite an alternativedescription; such descriptions iffer from those dominant descriptionsthe individual and others ave previously given regarding a particularevent. Thesenew descriptions of the subject in relation to theproblemstory are in a sense counter-cultural; they often act to help the clientbreak free of limiting cultural descriptions.White and his colleague David Epston describe this externalizingcounter-practice in their book NarrativeMeans to Therapeutic En ds(1989). They write:Externalizing is an approach to therapy that encourages persons to objectifyand, at times, to personify the problem hat they experience as oppressive.nthis process, the problem becomes a separate entity and is external to theperson or relationship that was ascribed as the problem. Those problemsthat are considered to be inherent, as well as those relatively fixed qualitiesthat are attributed to persons and to relationships, are rendered less fixedand less restricting. (p. 38)The therapeutic ractice of externalizing a persons problem discoursesets out to separate heperson(s) from theproblemand/or herestraints which act to maintain the dominant discourse or storiesabout heproblem.Theproblem is located outside he person orrelationship hathas been objectified, identified, and specified ashaving the problem; it itself is objectified and given a name (Whiteand Epston, 1990).

ExampleFor instance, in the case of a childs battle with encopresis, Whitesquestioning utilizes theculturalpractice of objectification againstitself. By objectifying and externalizing the problem, he mulatesFoucaults thinking as he challenges the objectification practices ofpeople (White, 1984, 1987). Heoinshe child and family in


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Michel Foucault andichaelhite 273considering how long they have all been victims of the avalanche ofthe encopresis, which has now been re-named Sneaky Poo.

White (1964) asks the child Are you more the boss over the SneakyPoo or is it more the boss over you?; or Do you want to stand up toSneaky Poo and haveyourwaywith t,orwould tbebest ocompletely give in and let your Sneaky Poo reign over you and yourparents?(p. 118). Questions of this nature are asked of all hoseparticipating in hediscourse of theproblem.How heprobleminfluences their lives and defines them as people, and how they act tokeep the problem alive are all considered (White, 1984).Whites model of practice assumes that, in order to make sense outof their lived experiences, peoplesituated in current global knowledgesoften act to disqualify their own special, or as Foucault defines them,localknowledges. It is often a personsstronglyheld belief in theculturally accepted description that keeps the person involved withthe articular roblem. People ften act tondividualizeheirexperiences, which they organize into what White calls a dominantstory about themselves. In an actof self-monitoring they internalize thesubjugating discourse which the dominant story has placed on themas subjects. Perhaps the person finds that this storyow offers a betteror more cceptableitwithhedominant ultural torybeingpromoted.ExampleWhen working with men over the issue of abusive behaviour, White(1991) asks them to speculate on nd articulate particular nowledgesregarding mens ways of being that subjugate others. He investigatesthe specific techniquesand strategies that men can rely on to institutethis subjugation, and the various structures and cultural conditionsthat support abusive behaviour. He then asks the man to which ofthese structures as e given up his life, andwonderswhattechnologies, echniques andstructuresrecruited him intoabusiveways of living.White asks hequestion, If amanwanted to control and odominate another person, what sortf structures andconditions couldhe arrange that would make this possible? (1991; p. 25). As therapycontinues, heman is asked o ake a positionon hese attitudes,structures and strategies. He is asked o decide whether or not hewanted to be further subjected to this particular knowledge of malepractices.Throughout he herapy an archaeology of themans


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274 Stephenatrick Madiganalternativeand preferredknowledges is explored regarding heirdesirability, worth and future possibilities. The man may eventuallydecide to trade-in a neglectful, abusive and strategic life-style, for anew story of caring and openness.The cost to the person for accepting societys cultural storyof themis often subjugation, estraint, ndoppression of all lternativedescriptions of themselves they may have entertained. White viewsthe clients problem story as being both subjugated and shaped bydominant globalknowledges:hence problem-saturateddominantstoriesbout oneself or thersreateperceptual lens thatinfluences the meaning that people ascribe to subsequent life events.Information that is classified by thepersonasconsistentwith hedominant story is restrained, selected out and expressed in behaviour.In Whites view, persons tend not to notice or give meaning to thoseaspects of lived experience that do not fit the specifications of thedominant narrative of global knowledge practices.

ExampleWhites therapy with people who are dying with AIDS invites a re-storying of alternativedescriptionsbeyondhe spoiled identityascription often given to these people by Western culture (White andEpston, 991).Whitencouragesommunity of sympatheticrelatives, friends and acquaintances to contribute to this alternativeaccount and to reflect on what thissays about the plans that thedying persons had for their life - about what they desired for theirlives, about what they were committed to, or perhaps, what it saysabout heir life as a work (WhiteandEpston, 1991; p . 13).Thealternativeaccount of thedominantstoryregarding personswithAIDS actso lessen theainroughtorth by theulturaltechnologies of isolating, omparing nddividing off thedyingsubject.Externalizing the problemTomm (1989) has described the therapeutic activity of externalizingtheproblemas a inguisticseparation of thedistinction of theproblem fromheersonaldentity of theperson]. It opensconceptual space for [people] to take more effective initiatives toescape the influence of the problem in their lives (p. 54).The challenge put forth through the externalization of the problem


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Micheloucault and Michae lhite 275serves to unite and empowerpeople to protest against the dominationof the problem description. Counter-practicesof local knowledges arebrought orth.This erodeshe ociallyproduced spects of theproblemhat reperpetuated by classification and totalizationtechniques (White, 1986).

Externalizing problem discourse enables people to separate fromtheominanttorieshat haveeen shapingheir lives andrelationships. In doing so, persons areable to identifypreviouslyneglected but vital aspects f lived experience - aspects that could nothave been predicted from a reading of the dominant story. FollowingGoffman ( 1974), White refers to these aspects of experience as uniqueoutcomes. White 1991) uggests hatuniqueoutcomesarealwayspresent and include a whole gamut of events, thoughts, actions andfeelings; heyhaveahistorical,present andfuture locationwhichcannot be accounted for by the dominant story. White (1991) writes:The externalization of theproblem-saturatedstorycan be nitiatedbyencouraging the externalization of the problem, and then by mapping of theproblems influence in the persons life and relationships. This is begun byasking persons about how the problem has been affecting their lives and theirrelationships. By achievinghis eparation romheproblem-saturateddescription of life, from this habitual reading of the dominant story, personsare more able to identify unique outcomes. (p. 16)

In the Sneaky Poo example, unique outcomes were identified inmost of theelationshipsbetweenheproblem ndheamilymembers,and n he elationships between heproblem and herelationships of family members. It is only necessary that one uniqueoutcomebe dentified norder o acilitateperformances of newmeaning. For instance, the child was,at certain times, able to put theSneaky Poo in its proper place and not let it come between herself andher family relationships.As unique outcomes are identified,ersonsn therapyreencouraged to engage ineformances of new meaning.* Success with thisendeavour requires that unique outcomese plotted intoan alternativestory of counter-practice about the persons life. White refers to thisalternative story,or the privileging of a persons local knowledge, s a

~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~ ~~~ ~~* White is referring to E. Brunersnotions that it is in the performance of anexpression that we re-experience, re-live, re-create, re-tell, re-construct,and re-fashion our culture. The performance does notelease a pre-existing meaning that iesdormant in the text: rather the performance itself is constitutive (1986: p. 11) .


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276 Stephen Patrickadiganunique account (White and Epston, 1990). Whites development ofexternalizingquestionsencouragespeople o ocate,generate,orresurrect alternative stories that makesense of unique outcomes.Through hesequestions,Whitesperformance cts tohighlightFoucaults argument for the insurrection of the subjugated know-ledges against the effect of knowledge and power practices that investin scientific discourse (Foucault, 1980; p. 84).By seeking alternative escriptions,Whites uestionsctoliberate peoplefrom thesubjugation of constrainedand totalizingdescriptions. In addition, his therapeutic posture of not allowing theperson obe eparated rom hepolitical,helpsdeconstruct hedominant scientific story being told about who the person s, and howthis person should conduct his or her life.Feminist critiquesFoucaults argument for the insurrection of alternative knowledgeshas been criticized by feminist writers. They disputehis wilful neglectof proposing a specific alternative ideology (Diamond and QuLby,1988).A similarcritiquemightbe levied againstWhites herapeuticpractice. However, his position of externalizing subjugating internal-ized discourse in favour of preferred alternative stories must beconsidered. White (personal communication, February,992) suggeststhat his position and practice in therapy is a political act. Whitesstance is different from Foucaults as he promotes a theoretical andtherapeutic position of rigorousaccountability and responsibilitytowards change. His therapeutic posture is by no means neutral, norwould he agree with the rhetoric of neutrality. He is not blind to thestory of power given over to him by virtue of his gender, position,education and title, unlike traditions of family therapy which espousea position of simply curiosity or neutrality (e.g. Cecchin, 1987).As a therapist, his aim is not simply to replace one problem storywith another. Nor does he merely want to fix the problem withoutfirst situatinghatproblemnhebroader ultural ontexts ofrestraint, .e.race,gender, class. Instead,White asksquestions ochallenge a persons performance of the dominant story of problemsaturation. I n addition he asks questions which act to situate peoplein their restrained narratives and culture context (Madigan, 1991) .Whites externalizing questions assist people in bringing forthocalknowledges of alternatives explanation and action. These questions


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Micheloucaultndichaelhite 277are performed by White to elicit alternative knowledges which he, thetherapist, along with the client, construct to be more preferred andproductive. The questioningbrings orthuniqueoutcomeswhichperturb the problem-saturated dominant story.ParallelingFoucault,Whitesperspectivesuggests hataperson(therapist) acts esponsibly when recognizing hat apersons problem-saturated descriptions are not entrenched inside the persons body.White (White and Epston, 1991) does not support his work through astructuralist orunctionalist hilosophy by suggesting thatheproblem is a by-product of familial relationships; instead, he situatesthe problem descriptions as embedded within the persons culturalcontext (White personal communication, May 1991).

As a herapistWhiteacts o iberate persons rom dominantknowledge and power practices. He acts with purpose in proposingthat personsbecomeinguistically adicalized gainsthem.Forexample, he would juxtapose the scientific or media-driven story ofthe person with the persons unique account story of themselves. Hewould take an oral account of mother-blaming technologies whichseem to be hindering he life of a sole womanparent; he would analysethe voices of specificationwhich ncouragehe norexics self-surveillance of her body.In the case of a family with a schizophrenic member, White mightfollow a line of questioning that investigates the totalizing techniquesof scientific classification which have given the person this label. Heconsiders how scientific technology might be acting to suppress otheralternativeand less oppressivedescriptions of theschizophrenicsbody. Through questions, hehopes to gain accessto the familys localknowledges and acts to consider both sides of the local knowledge/dominant knowledge distinction. This promotes the considerationf amore complete description.In describing schizophrenia as an in-the-corner-lifestyle, White asks avariety of questionswhich romotelterantive escriptions ofhistorical scientific classifications. Examples f these include, In whatways have you felt pushed into a cornerby schizophrenia?; and Howdid you manage to defy the in-the-corner-lifestyle and notonlyagree to the appointment for this meeting, but, as ell, follow throughwith it?; and What habits did you have to disobey to escape the in-the-corner-lifestyle on this occasion? (White, 1987; pp. 52-53). Aftertheproblemhasbeenexternalizedandunique ocalknowledgesconsidered and stabilized, White pursues aine of future questioning.These future questions unearth possible scenarios the family might


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278 Stephen Patrickadiganencounter, and ways in which their local knowledges could surviveand be privileged.

ConclusionThis paper set out to highlight those ideas of Michel Foucault whichhavedirectly nfluencedMichaelWhites herapeuticpractice ofexternalizing internalized problem discourse. This review illustrateshow MichaelWhitesexternalizingcanbeconsideredmuchmorethan a simple technique of linguistically separating the distinction oftheproblemfrom hepersonal dentity of the ndividual(Tomm,1989).Throughcarefulconsideration of apersons alternative stories,White highlights dominant cultural knowledges which act to specify,classify and subjugate. The majorifference between Michael Whitestherapeutic practice and many other popular American and Europeanschools of therapy is his deft ability to locate a persons problemexperience within the sociopolitical language context in which theylive. Hence, the persons body is not the problem, the problem is theproblem.AcknowledgementsI would like to thank David Epston of the Family Therapy Centre ofAuckland, New Zealand,andDrDouglasFlemmons of NOVAUniversity School of Social and Systemic Studies, Fort Lauderdale,Florida, for their support and encouragement during the writing ofthis paper.ReferencesBruner, E. (1986) Ethnography as narrative. In: V. Turner andE. Bruner (eds), TheAnthropology of Experience. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.Cecchin, G. (1987) Hypothesizing, circularity, and neutrality revisited: an invitation

to curiosity. Family Process, 26:405413.Diamond, I. and Quinby, L. (1988) FeminismandFoucault:Reflections on Resistance.Boston: Northeastern University Press.

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madigan the application of michel foucault's philosophy in the problem externalizing discourse of...

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