making decisions in the face of uncertainty: · pdf fileoffice of the prime minister’s...

OFFICEOFTHEPRIMEMINISTER’SCHIEFSCIENCEADVISORProfessorSirPeterGluckman,KNZMFRSNZFMedSciFRS

ChiefScienceAdvisor

Makingdecisionsinthefaceofuncertainty:Understandingrisk

Part2November2016OfficeofthePrimeMinister’sChiefScienceAdvisorPOBox108-117,SymondsStreet,Auckland1150,NewZealandTelephone:+6499236318Website:www.pmcsa.org.nzEmail:[email protected]

PMCSARiskSeries Part2

2

AcknowledgmentsThefirstdraftofthispaperwaspreparedbyDrAnneBardsleyoftheOfficeofthePMCSA.Othermembersofthe Office also provided input. Early drafts were reviewed by staff of the Ministry of Civil Defence andEmergencyManagement.Wespecificallyacknowledgethevaluableinputofthefollowingreviewers:MarkFerguson,ScienceFoundationIreland,ChiefScienceAdvisortotheGovernmentofIrelandDavidMair,JointResearchCentre,EuropeanCommissionVirginiaMurray,PublicHealthEngland,ConsultantinGlobalDisasterRiskReductionDavidJohnston,JointCentreforDisasterResearch,MasseyUniversity,andGNSScienceSarbJohal,JointCentreforDisasterResearch,MasseyUniversity,andGNSScienceEmmaHudson-Doyle,JointCentreforDisasterResearch,MasseyUniversity,andGNSScienceRichardBedford,RoyalSocietyofNewZealandandAucklandUniversityofTechnology


3

Part2:Riskperception,communicationandmanagement

TableofContents

Acknowledgments........................................................................................................................2

AimandScope.............................................................................................................................4

Introduction.................................................................................................................................5

1.Whatisan‘acceptable’risk?....................................................................................................5

2.Riskperception,biasesandvaluejudgments............................................................................62.1Emotionsand‘outragefactors’.........................................................................................................62.2Cognitivebiasesandtheinterpretationofrisk.................................................................................8

2.2.1Riskswewon’ttake:Lossaversionandstatusquobias....................................................................92.2.2Whatweheariswhatweknow:Informationavailabilityandfamiliaritybias.................................92.2.3Protectingourbeliefs:Confirmationbiasandculturalworldviews.................................................102.2.4Goingwiththeflow:Groupthinkbias.............................................................................................11

3.Ameetingofscienceandvalues.............................................................................................123.1Believingtheexperts......................................................................................................................143.2Lossoftrust....................................................................................................................................143.3Whensciencecan’tsolveit.............................................................................................................15

3.3.1Thepost-normalperspective:Evidenceandcontestedvalues........................................................16

4.Mediamessagesandriskperception......................................................................................174.1Strivingforbalance:Questioningconsensus...................................................................................184.2Goingviral:Thesocialmediaeffect.................................................................................................194.3Riskcommunication:Sendingtherightmessages...........................................................................19

4.3.1Pressureforcertainty.......................................................................................................................204.3.2Understandingvaluesandestablishingtrust...................................................................................20

5.Makingthedecisions:Dealingwithrisksanduncertainty.......................................................215.1Trade-offs......................................................................................................................................215.2Complexrisksandprecaution.........................................................................................................22

6.Movingforward:Risk-takingandinnovation..........................................................................22

References.................................................................................................................................24

Glossary.....................................................................................................................................26


4

AimandScopeThisessayisthesecondinathree-partseriesonhowwemakedecisionsinthefaceofuncertainty.Inrealitymost decisions involve some degree of uncertainty, including the many that we make collectively as asocietyandthatgovernmentsmakeonourbehalf.Allsuchdecisionsinvolvesomeassessment,consciousorotherwise, of the risks and benefits of one action versus those of another, whichmay include taking noaction.Asweprogressasasocietywearecontinuallyaccumulatingmoreknowledge,butparadoxicallywearealsoopeningthedoortomoreuncertainty.Butaswebecomemoreknowledgeablewealsoexpect,andindeedneedtobeabletomakeinformeddecisionsoverincreasinglycomplexmatters,rangingfromissuesofsocialdevelopmentandenvironmentalprotectionthroughtohowtouseorlimittheapplicationofaraftofnewtechnologies.Part 1 of this series outlined the basic concepts of risk and how it is evaluated, both objectively andsubjectively, as we seek to make decisions when we (both individually and as a society) don’t know orcannotknowallofthepossibleoutcomes.Inrealitythisoccurswithalmosteverydecisionwemake.Thissecondpaper(Part2)explorestheseissuesinmoredepthbyconsideringhowweperceiveriskinourownindividualandcollectivedecisionmaking–howourattitudestowardsdifferentriskscanbeswayedbyourexperience,culture,worldviews,andgroupassociations–andtheeffectthishasonhowweattempttomanage risk. The paper examines howwe all individually use a series ofmental shortcuts (heuristics) toevaluatethepotentialrisksweface,howtheseinformourconsiderationsofprecautionontheonehandandrisk-takingontheother,andthusinformourdecisions.Thepaperalsoconsidershowthemedia,andsocialmedia in particular, can have significant influences on the perceptions of risk – even where there is ascientificconsensusonsocietalissuesforwhichtheremaystillbemuchvalues-drivenpublicdebate.Finally,thepaperdescribesthevaryinginterpretationsofprecautionandhowthisinfluencesourabilitytoaddressfuturechallengesandrisks.The final paper (Part 3) in the serieswill be published early in 2017 andwill consider how governmentscontinuallymake risk-relateddecisionsonourbehalf. Itwillprovideanoverviewof theNewZealand risklandscapeandwaystothinkabouthowsocietalrisksmightbestbemanaged.Itwillspecificallyaddresstheroleofgovernmentinriskmanagement,andhowdecisionsaremadeinthefaceofuncertaintyandwhenarangeofsocietalvaluesanddifferentworldviewsmustbeconsidered.

IntroductionConfrontingriskanduncertaintyisunavoidableinourdailylives,andinplanningforthefuture.Wecanbeabsolutelycertainaboutvery little; infactnearlyallofourdecisionsaremadeinthefaceofeither recognized or unrecognized uncertainty.Our personal confidence in particular ‘truths’stems from complex interactions between ourknowledge, experience, inherent biases andvalues, and fromperceptionsgained fromothersin our society. Wemight thinkwe startwith an‘objective’ approach to weigh up choices andmakedecisionsbasedoncalculationsofcostsandbenefits, butwhatwe see as a cost or a benefitdepends heavily on our values, biases and pastexperiences. Andbecause of the different valuespeopleplaceonoutcomes,ourabilitytocalculateriskscollectively–evenusingscientificmethods–hasitslimits.Anyriskassessmentprocessconsiderswhichrisksmeritthemostattention,howlargetherisksare,andwhethercertainrisksareacceptablegiventheantipicated benefits. Part 1 of this series(Gluckman, 2016) described how scientistsapproach the ‘rational’ calculation of risk byputting a numerical value on risk consequencesandprobabilities.However,italsopointedouttheconsiderable limitations of such actuarialapproaches.Andthedecisionswetakeovermanymatters aremade subconsciously rather than byany formalandconsciousanalysis– forexample,whenwedecidetocrosstheroadatadangerousspotor ignore theodds stackedagainst uswhenbuyingalottoticket.Indeed, we know that many potential risks arehard to quantify, and involve subjectivejudgmentsofvalue.Weighingdifferentclassesofrisk based on numerical calculations ofconsequences can be criticised as ‘comparingapplesandoranges’becauseourvaluejudgmentswill differ for almost any type of risk.Nevertheless,weallhavetomakedecisions–andindividuals, societies and those we entrust tomake decisions on our behalf need a way toevaluate the options, the balance of risks and

benefits,andthepossibletrade-offsofmitigatingoneriskattheexpenseofanother.This paper focuses on the individual and societalfactorsthatshapeourriskperceptionsindifferentsituations – by seeming to amplify some riskswhile attenuating others, thereby influencingdecisions about what constitutes acceptable orunacceptable risk, both in relation to our owndecision-makingandthatofothers.

1.Whatisan‘acceptable’risk?Thequestionofwhatdegreeofriskis‘acceptable’isat thecoreofmanyof thedecisionswemake.The first paper in this series described the rangeof approaches we use to determine this, fromformal methods of risk assessment, to thefrequent, unconscious and informal decisionsweallmakeinthefaceofuncertainty.Oneapproachusedtodeterminethelevelofriskthatmightbe‘acceptable’iscost-benefitanalysis,whichweighsariskagainstthecostofreducingit.This approach questions whether the risk is bigenough(costlyenough)towarrantthecostof itsreduction. If thebenefitsofriskreductiondonotoutweighthecosts,thentheriskmaybedeemed‘acceptable’. In some cases mitigation activitiescan reduce the risk to a point where it isconsidered to be practically and essentially“negligible”(afairlyobjectivemeasure–seePart1 (Gluckman,2016))Aircraftdesign requires thatthislevelofriskreductionisachieved–theriskoffailurehastobeclosetozeroforittopasssafetytestsrequiredbyregulatoryauthorities.Aiming for negligible risk is not, however, themost common kind of risk assessmentwemake.More often we consider what is ‘tolerable’ – alevel of risk thatwe are prepared to livewith inorder to derive benefits, while accepting thattheremaybesomecosts.Forinstancetoreduceriskstoournationalpowersupply,extracapacity(and redundancy) is built into the grid, to thepointwhere the risk of failure is remote but notimpossible. The utility companies have judgedthatfurtherredundancyisnotcost-effective,andas general consumers of electricity we tolerate


6

the risk of occasional power failure in order tokeep costs down. However even greaterprotection is judged necessary in a hospital, sothey have extensive back-up power systemsinstalled.Similarly, most of us tolerate some risks to ourprivacy in order to enjoy the benefits of digitaltechnologies.Theriskscanbereducedbylimitingsomeofouractivitiesonline,butwewouldforegothebenefitsofmanyuseful apps andwebsites ifwe did not agree to their access terms.We giveaway a degree of privacy every time we searchsomething on Google or buy something off theweb.Numericalriskscoresortheuseofmetricssuchaspotential numbers of fatalities, injuries, etc. canalso provide comparisons, and thus a gauge ofacceptability or tolerability when comparingnewlydeterminedriskswithother,alreadyknownand tolerated risks. Yet while such numericalmethods are useful, individuals, and society ingeneral,tendtoviewriskrathermoresubjectivelywhendecidingwhatlevelofrisk(orkindofrisk)isacceptableorneedsmitigation.Ourpersonalperceptionsofriskarerelatedtoourawarenessandknowledgeofhazards[seePart1](Gluckman, 2016), but also involveour individualand societal values and beliefs about thedesirability of different outcomes. In manysituationsourlackofrelevantpriorexperienceofthe hazard and a lack of interpretable technicaldata,means our decisions are influenced by ourvalues, culture, worldview an innate biases, andfromtheperceptionsofotherswerespectorareinfluencedby.Asaresult,thejudgmentswemakeaboutriskacceptabilityareoftenatoddswiththeresultsofmorescientificriskappraisal.

2.Riskperception,biasesandvaluejudgmentsOur innate biases frequently confound ourevaluation of relative risk. We can be fearful ofrisks that expert evaluation suggests areinsignificant, just as we can be apathetic aboutrisks that should command our attention. Weoftenendup focusingon small risksarising fromfrequentlyencounteredhazardsattheexpenseoflookingatthebigpicture–ignoringrisksthataremore difficult to quantify. Wemayworrymuchmore about our child playing sport and gettinginjured than the long-term risks associated withnotgettingenoughexercise.Butwealsomaybecomefixatedonrisksthatarerareandremoteiftheyappeartohaveverylargeconsequences. This is becausewe view the risksthrough the lens of emotions and intuitivereactions, rather than technical or rationalassessments of likelihood. For example, thedramaticnatureofairplanecrashes,compoundedin recent years by the fear of terrorist hijacking,make air travel seemmore dangerous than roadtravel,despitetheactualriskofdeathbeingmuchgreaterfortravelingbycar.

2.1Emotionsand‘outragefactors’Our viewson risk are influencedby anumberofso-called ‘outrage factors’ (Sandman, 1989);emotion-based perceptions that bear upon riskacceptability (seeTable1).Risks thatareseen tobe imposed on us involuntarily can provokesubstantial outrage,whether or not the risks areactuallysignificant.Wehaveseenthis insomeofthe responses to the recommendation tofluoridatecommunitywatersupplies.


7

Table1.Outragefactorsthatnegativelyinfluencetheacceptabilityofrisk.(Sandman,1989)Factor ExampleLackofcontrol

Wecannottakepersonalprecautionstoprotectourselvesagainsttherisk.Controlisinthehandsofaninstitution(e.g.corporationorgovernment)

Risks of food or water contamination, or accidents caused byindustrial processes are less acceptable than risks from activitieswecontrolourselves(e.g.choosingtoeatunhealthyfood,drivingacar)

InvoluntaryexposureExposuretoriskisnotchosenbythoseexposed

Involuntary exposure to chemicals or radiation from industrialsources is less acceptable than voluntary exposure to cigarettesmokeorUVirradiationwhilesunbathing

UnfairnessRiskandconsequencesareinequitablydistributedinsociety

Risks thatareborneunequally in communities (e.g.asa resultofsiting of industrial waste dumps or factories) are less acceptablethanthosethatareborneequally(e.g.vaccinations)

Man-madehazardHumantechnologybasedratherthannatural

Industrial accidents (chemical spills, etc) caused by human errorare less acceptable than natural hazard events such as severestormsorfloods

DreadHazardexposureevokesfear-maycausehiddenandirreversibledamagewhichmayresultindiseasemanyyearslater

Exposures that may cause cancer (e.g. radiation, asbestos) orevents with potential for severe harm are less acceptable thanexposuresleadingtocommondiseasesorhouseholdaccidents

EventfocusedintimeandspaceSingleeventsthatkillmanypeopleatoncearelessacceptedthanhazardsthatkillfewerpeopleatonce,butkillmoreoften

Airline accidents are less acceptable than car crashes. Terroristincidentsormassshootingsarelessacceptablethanhomicides.

UnfamiliarityRiskstakenineverydaylifearetoleratedmorethannewunfamiliarrisks

Exposure to unfamiliar chemicals from industry is less acceptablethanexposuretohouseholdchemicals

Risks arising from natural hazards seem moreacceptable than those that are man-made. Anyhuman-induced risk (e.g. those generated byindustries (chemical or oil spills, biologicalcontaminants, pollution) or government action(failedregulationsorpolicies),maycauseoutragebecauseofafeelingthatitisimposed,unnatural,and/oroutofourcontrol.We also consider how much trust we have inthose who are imposing or communicating therisks, and whether the exposures andconsequences,aswellas thebenefits,areevenlydistributed.Outrageis likely ifthosecreatingandimposingtherisksdonotbear theburdenof thepotential negative consequences, and/or if thosewho are imposed upon do not reap the benefitsassociated with the risk-taking activity. Forexample, if an industrial activity might causepollution in the local community, and the profitsare not distributed within that community,outrage is likely tomake the pollution risk seemgreater,andtherisklessacceptable.

Some hazards that can harm or kill a relativelysmall number of people in a single incident (e.g.an industrial accident, acute chemical exposure)are viewed as less tolerable than those that canharmorkillmanypeopleovertime(e.g.smoking,poordiets),eveniftheoverallnumberoffatalitiesisthesame.Thisisinpartbecauseincidentswitha large number of fatalities or injuries receivemore media attention, alarming the public andkeeping the risk in the foreground of publicconsciousness. Playing on emotions can clearlyshift the balance against the objective evidenceabouttherelativelevelofrisk.Outragealsospringsfromtheunknown.‘Dreadedrisks’ are those that we gravely fear because ofdeep uncertainty about their possible impact, orthe fear that exposure to thehazardwill lead tohidden, long-term, and/or irreversible damage.Public perceptions of the risks surroundingnuclear energy and genetic modification provideenduringexamples.


8

There are also risks that also confound expertanalysis. So-called ‘black swan events’ have nohistorical recordorprecedentofoccurrence,andtakeusbysurprise–suchastheterroristattackson theWorld Trade Center and the Pentagon inthe US. There are also extremely rare hazardevents(shocks) forwhichaprobabilitycannotbecalculated,butwhichhaveconsequencesthatarepotentially catastrophic. These may be foreseenbysomeexperts,butbecauseofdeepuncertaintyaboutthetimingoftheiroccurrence,theymaybeessentially ignored. (Moller & Wikman-Svahn,2011).Forexample,itiscurrentlynotpossibletopredictthe timingofavolcanic ‘supereruption’ like thatwhich occurred at Krakatoa in what is nowIndonesia, in 1883, killing around 40,000 people.(Thornton,1997)LakeTaupowasformedbysuchaneruptionsome26,000yearsago.Althoughwenowhavemonitoringsystemsonallvolcanoes inNew Zealand, they only provide short-termwarnings(andmuchuncertainty)andwouldleaveminimaltimetoprepareforpotentialwidespreaddestruction if such an eruption were to occur.Black swan risks canaffectnotonlyhuman lives,but the critical systems that underpin national –and potentially global – social and economicviability. Such risks are unacceptable, but if wecan’tcalculatetheirprobability,whatexpensedowe go to in order to mitigate them whenresourcesarelimitedandmanyotherthreatsmaybeimminent?

Outrage factors, whether based on real orperceived risks, are important to consider whenunderstanding our own individual decision-making processes and the societal responses todecisions made by others. One of the mostimportant questions that arises for society iswhetherweshouldinvestintechnologiesthatwillreduce our vulnerabilities and increase ourresilience– forexampleaddingchlorinetowaterto reduce the risk of bacterial contamination, or

fluoride to reduce the societal burden of dentaldecay. Inthesetwocasesweknowthattherisksarenegligible,butwhatiftherisksoftheevolvingtechnologies themselves are uncertain? Whataboutthepossibilityofusingsyntheticbacteriatoclean up oil spills, or gene editing to stop Kauridieback?Thebenefitscouldbegreat,butthefullspectrumofpossibleconsequencesisnotknown,and because of this the use of the technologiesmayberesisted.Even when risks are well characterised, outragefactors can override the available evidence andexpert evaluation of the risk severity, leading topublic rejectionof thetechnologyor thescience.This happened in the public responses topositioningcell-phonetowersnearschools.Whensuch perceptions become a barrier to theintroductionof a technologyor industrial activityit isreferredtoasawithholdingof ‘social licenseto operate’. Industries with (either perceived orreal) potential detrimental social orenvironmental impacts are therefore givenstandards to meet including demonstratingcontinual risk monitoring and management. Thechallenges that arisewhen new technologies areconsidered will be discussed further in Part 3 ofthisseries.

2.2CognitivebiasesandtheinterpretationofriskOur assessment of risk and the decisions thatfollow do not always involve conscious thought.But even when we do decide consciously, mostoften we rely on “rule of thumb” (or heuristic)reasoning and on mental recall rather than anyformal calculation of risk.We generally estimatethe relative seriousness of a risk based on itsprominence inourconsciousness,andhoweasilywe can envisage harmful consequences or recallnegativeexperiences.(Kahan,2007)This intuitiveapproachtodecisionmakingiswhatwedowhenwe are ‘thinking fast’, in contrast to reasoningthrough rules of logic and evidence (e.g.probabilitytheory) inarational,deliberative,andanalytical manner, when we are ‘thinking slow’.(Kahneman,2011) Innatebiases inour reasoning(‘cognitive biases’) come into play whenprocessing information quickly and intuitively.Someof the different types of cognitive bias aredescribedbelow.


9

2.2.1Riskswewon’ttake:LossaversionandstatusquobiasAlthoughtheappetitefortakingriskvariesamongindividuals (and across our lives), and betweendifferent cultures and segments of society, thereis a general tendency for people to care moreabout avoiding potential losses than achievingpotential gains.Noone likes to lose. Perceptionscan be strongly influenced by wording choices(‘framing’) that highlight either negative (loss) orpositive (gain) aspects of the same decision.(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) For most of us, a75%chanceoflosingsoundsmuchworsethana1in4chanceofwinning.Inpublichealthmessagingto communicate risks and benefits of medicalscreening, ‘loss’ framing (e.g. the potential lossfrom not having a mammogram – a cancerdiagnosis might be missed) influences screeninguptake more than “gain” framing (the personalbenefit of finding out if you are free or not freefrombreastcancer)(Edwardsetal.,2001)The common bias towards ‘loss aversion’(avoiding loss) leads us to stick with previousdecisions – holding onto what we’ve got andmaintaining the status quo – rather than risklosing it by trying something new. (Kahneman&Tversky,1982)Inthefaceofuncertaintywetendto favour inaction over action, because we feelmore regret for bad outcomes that result fromtakingaction(andmorefeelingsofresponsibility),thanforharmthatcomesfromdoingnothing.Wemight regret advising a close friend or familymembertoinvestinsharesthatsubsequentlylostallof their valuemore thanwewould regret notadvisingthemtoinvestinsharesthatlatersoaredinprice.However this also leads us to underestimate therisk of inaction, which may be greater than therisksof action.Anactionwithgreatpotential formitigating one risk, and a small potential forcreatinganother,mightnotbetaken–essentiallycreating increased risk. For example, someparentsavoidimmunizationbecausetheyfeartherareandgenerallymildsideeffectsofthevaccine,and thereby takeonamuchgreater risk to theirchild and other children – the spread of(sometimesdeadly)infectiousdisease.

Whetherwearetakingrisksoravoidingthem,welearn from previous decisions we have made –and the outcome of such decisions can bias ourfuturethinking.Ifapastdecisionhasledtoagoodoutcome,wearelikelytomakethesamedecisionagain in similar situations. In this way, over-cautiousor risk-aversechoicescanbereinforcing– giving a perception of having avoided a‘disaster’, which reinforces the avoidancebehavior.

2.2.2Whatweheariswhatweknow:InformationavailabilityandfamiliaritybiasOne of the most common sources of biasedthinkingisthatofinformationavailability,oreaseof recall. Risks are generally perceived to behigher if their negative effects can be readilybroughttomind.Thiscanbegreatlyinfluencedbyexposure tomediamessages about the risk (seeSection4).Individualandcollectiveresponsesandperceptionmaybebasedonsingularmemorableeventsandtheirrelationtothem,ratherthanonarationalviewoftheprobabilityofsuchaneventoccurring.Forexample, ifaboltof lightningoncestruckthehouseofaclosefriendorrelative,youmayviewtheriskofalightningstriketobehigherthan it actually is. This phenomenon is welldemonstrated by the general view that the risksof being killed in a terrorist attack or in a planecrasharemuchhigherthantheyreallyare.The ease of recall of shocking (but mostly rare)negative consequences differs from the issue offamiliarity with common risks, which tends todecrease our estimates of risk magnitude – forexample we rarely think about the real – andeveryday – risk of driving or riding in a car.Likewise, employees over time become familiarwith what can be significant workplace risks, tothe point where they may fail to take advisedprecautions.Theseoldorfrequentlyencounteredhazards are viewed as less worrisome and aretreated more leniently than new ones becausetheyarewellunderstood,andwearedesensitisedto them. This also applies to old, but familiartechnologies that are known to be hazardous,such as the use of some chemicals for pest orweed control, which are accepted more readilythan new, but less well understood genetictechnologies thatmaybesubstantially safer. It isanattitudeof“betterthedevilyouknow”.


10

These attitudes are reflected in the regulationsthatgovernmentsdevelop,whichtendstofavourexisting technologies over new ones where therisks are potentially more uncertain. Regulatorsalsofinditmoredifficulttoremoveorregulateanexisting technology that, while potentiallyhazardous, is also associated with known andtangible benefits. An obvious example is our useof fossil fuels – while the hazards to theenvironment are becoming ever more apparent,society is finding it very difficult to move awayfromtheindustriesandtheautomobilesthatrelyon fossil fuel extraction and consumption. It iseasier to regulate against newhazards forwhichthebenefitsarenotyetsotangibleorthesocietalhabits entrenched, such as nanotechnology orgenetic modification. Regulations that maketrialing new technologiesmore costly or difficultwill result in fewer changes to current practice,evenifthatpracticeisitselfrisky.Thisbiasreinforcesour inclinationasasocietytomaintainthestatusquo,andalsooperatesontheindividual level. Most of us are more likely toadopt new technologies if they improve on anexisting habit, rather than forcing us to break ahabit or adopt a completely new one. Thegeneration that has grown up using mobilephones is more likely to communicate via socialmedia and take up new communicationtechnologies – and also see them as less risky –than older generations for which suchcommunication streams are less familiar andnothabitual. One generation might deny and theother might exaggerate either the potentialbenefits or the potential costs. In general, werequire strong evidence of potential gains torelinquishentrenchedhabitsorbeliefs.‘Disruptive’ innovation – that which radicallychangessocietalhabits–canbeseenasupsettingthe social structure, presenting an uncertainfuture that may be feared, and leading toperceptionsoflossofaparticularwayoflifethatis, if not perfect, at least familiar. How do wedecide on the balance between the potentiallong-term benefits or costs of innovation (e.g.communally-owned,self-drivingvehicles)andtheshort-term costs and benefits ofmaintaining thestatus quo? We shall return to this question inPart3ofthisseries.

2.2.3Protectingourbeliefs:Confirmationbiasandculturalworldviews

People are often unconcerned about risks thatevidence and experts have shown to besignificant.Sometimesthisisbecausetorecognisesomething as a hazard would threaten a set ofvalues or beliefs (e.g. climate change, risks tobeachfront/clifftop properties of coastal hazardsanderosion).On theotherhand, somerisks thatare the subject of significant public concern areconsidered minor by scientific risk assessment(e.g. health effects from radiofrequency fields orof fluoridationor chlorinationofwater supplies).Strongly-heldbeliefs related toone’s cultureandvalue system (their ‘worldview’) can lead peopletoevaluaterisksandrelatedevidenceselectively,in ways that reinforce their beliefs. (Kahan &Braman, 2006) This is reflected in a tendency toaccept at face value the conclusions of scientificstudies that supportprioropinions,and to rejectconflicting studies as invalid. (Lord et al., 1979)Somevocaladvocatesforveganism,forexample,will highlight any study that hints at negativeeffects of eating dairy or other animal products,ignoringnumerousvalidstudiesthatdemonstratebenefitsofsuchprotein inthediet. It iscommonto view an argument as valid ifwe believe in itsconclusions, rather than considering theargument’slogic(orlackthereof).(Evans&Curtis-Holmes,2005)In fact the evidence shows that people oftenactively seek out information that supports theirown opinions and beliefs about themselves andthe world. (Festinger, 1957) Such ‘confirmationbias’occursbecause it ishumannaturetodislikequestioning our own beliefs – we tend to seekconsistencyandavoidconflictbetweenourbeliefsandbehaviours,andour‘knowledge’.Whenthereis potential conflict, it might be alleviated bychanging the belief or the behaviour to fit withthe new knowledge, but more often, people insuch situations will downplay the significance ofthe conflicting knowledge and cherry-pick those

“Amanhearswhathewantstohearanddisregardstherest.”–SimonandGarfunkel,TheBoxer


11

bitsof informationthatconfirmtheirpriorviews.Thus,individualscanclaimtheirviewtobebasedon facts and logic, yet draw radically differentconclusionsfromtheselected‘facts’.Inmanysuchcases,ratherthansheddingbeliefs,science and facts will be rejected. For example,people who do not want to believe that theirlifestyles are possibly harmful to the planet aremore likely to reject the science supportinghuman-inducedclimatechange.Yetparadoxicallytheymightbemorelikelytoacceptthescienceofgeneticengineering,andviceversa.Suchrejectionof science is often associated with conspiracytheories. (Lewandowsky et al., 2013) Butproviding more evidence with the intention ofchanging this kind of thinking often onlystrengthens the position of the believer – it isturned around and used as evidence of aconspiracy or cover-up, thus strengthening theoriginalbeliefs.Unfortunately, the internet and socialmedia cancreate situations where confirmation biasbecomes even more likely. There are so manyopportunities now available to pick and choosethekindofinformationwewant,andwithmediaand advertising now delivered based onpreferences, personal profiles, and searchhistories,mostpeoplefindlittletochallengetheirbeliefs.

2.2.4Goingwiththeflow:Groupthinkbias

Our preference for consistency and certainty inour own beliefs and behaviours leads us to seekout the company of peoplewho reaffirm, ratherthan challenge those beliefs. One importantfunction of social groups is to provide socialvalidation of one’s attitudes and worldview.Aligningwithagroupthatsharesanideologycandiffuse an individual’s responsibility for thecontradictions that the ideology may posebetween personal beliefs, behaviours and/or

knowledge. The more cohesive the group, theeasieritistofeelthatdecisionsbeingmademustbeok–orat leastyoualonearenot responsibleformaking them. The comfort of such ‘collectiverationalization’ thus motivates people (usuallyunconsciously) to interpret technical informationinwaysthatreinforcetheirgroupconnections.This is particularly well demonstrated by a newform of group that has emerged – the ‘echochambers’ofsocialmedia–wherepeopletendtoconnect only to people of likemind. Discussionsoccurring within such social media groupsreinforcetheveryviewsthat ledthosepeople toform a group in the first place, and leadindividuals to overestimate the prevalence oftheir own opinion amongst the generalpopulation.(Levistonetal.,2013)Theechoeffectof social media can give license for views thatindividualsmightotherwisehavebeeninclinedtoquestion – potentially driving the whole grouptowardmoreextremeviews.Where strongly opposing views exist, providingmore scientifically robust information can thuspolarize the differing groups further, rather thanbringing them closer together. This is becausepeople construe and assimilate information inopposingwaystoreinforcetheirpriorperceptionsofrisk.Regardingtherisksofnanotechnologyforexample, perceptions of risk for peoplewith thesame initial and low level of familiarity with thetechnology,butwithdifferingculturalworldviews,diverge dramatically with increasing exposure totechnical information. In an experimental study,those initially opposing the technology becamemore opposed, and those supporting it becamemore supportive (Kahan et al., 2009). Thissuggests that it is a person’s worldview thataffects the interpretation of information andnotthe factual nature of the information itself,because people became more, not less, dividedwhenexposedtobalancedinformation.Similarobservationshavebeenmadewithrespecttoclimatechange.Onceviewshavebeenformed,providing more information just tends to pushpeoplefurtherapart,entrenchingopposingviewsratherthanfosteringsocietalconsensus.Attitudesto many other technologies (e.g. geneticmodification) and societal interventions (e.g.

“Once a course of action has gatheredsupport within a group, those not yet onboard tend to suppress their objections—however valid—and fall in line.” (Kaplan andMikes2012.Managingrisks:Anewframework.HarvardBusinessReview)


12

decriminalization of drugs; supervised sites forinjectionbyopiateaddicts,etc.)appearto followasimilartrend.Within groups, traditions, beliefs and ideologiesare continuously reinforced in order tomaintaincohesion and identity. Group solidarity is oftenmagnified by labels that are applied to describethegroup’s ideology,whetherby thegroup itselforbyoutsiders.Intheclimatechangedebate,forexample, theopposinggroupshavebeen labeledas‘supporters’and‘deniers’(or‘skeptics’),whichserves to emphasise group identity andhomogeneity.Assigningsuchlabels,however,failsto representmore subtle differences in opinionsthatarenotextreme,andincitesmorecombativedebate. It also tends to limit the carefulexaminationof individualclaims,whichareoftendisregardedbecausetheyareperceivedsimplyascoming from the opposing group’s viewpoint. Inthis situation, group labels encourage theprotection of group ideology and belonging overthoughtful analysis of evidence. (Howarth &Sharman,2015)

3.AmeetingofscienceandvaluesAs risks have become more complex andtechnological, society has come to increasinglydepend on experts and expert institutions fortheir interpretation. The mechanisms of thescientific process are designed to provide usefulinformationtoguidedecisionsandregulaterisks,andhavehelpedkeepussafefrommanypossible

harms. But science and technology can alsogenerate new risks (often technological, andeither perceived or real) that need to beconsidered.

Infact,alltechnologiessincethediscoveryoffirehaveprovidedbenefitsbuthavealsohadnegativeaspects and consequences and there are alwayssome uncertainties created when newtechnologies are adopted. Human history islargely determined by how technologies havebeen adopted, used and misused. Increasingawarenessofthepossiblenegativeimpactsofthevery rapid technological progress of recent yearshassowndoubtinthepublicconsciousnessaboutthe balance between benefits and harms. Forsome there is a growing distrust in the ability ofscience to provide assurances of safety. Indeed,on highly contentious issues, scientific/statisticalrisk assessment alone can no longer calm publicanxiety and can even contribute to a growingdistrust in expert institutions. (Fischer, 2000)Most concern until recently has focused ongenetic, environmental and public health issues[Box 1] but increasingly issues of cyber-security,loss of privacy, and autonomy are leading toconcernsaboutmanyotherformsoftechnology.

“Factsaloneliterallyhavenomeaninguntilouremotionsandinstinctsandexperiencesandlifecircumstancesgiverisetohowwefeelaboutthosefacts.”(Ropeik,D.2014Feelingsmattermorethanfactsalone:Achallengeandopportunityforscienceadvisers)


13

Box1Uncertainharms,corporatescienceandenvironmentaladvocacy–theglyphosatestoryGlyphosate istheactive ingredientintheworld’smostcommonlyusedweedkillers.Glyphosate-basedherbicides(GBHs)havebeenusedwidely inNew Zealandorchards, vineyards,pastures, roadways, sports fields, andhomegardenssince1976.Glyphosate replacedmoredangerous chemicals,andalloweda reduction intillageofsoil forweedcontrol,whichreducessoilerosionandCO2emissions.Initialriskassessmentsofglyphosateconsideredittoberelativelysafeforhumanexposure,becauseitinhibitsanenzyme that is found only in plants. However, concerns have been raised over its increasing use, and recentsuggestionsofitspotentialtoxicityinmammals(andpossiblyhumans)becauseofitspossibleendocrine-disruptingeffectsandcarcinogenicity. (Myersetal.,2016)GBHsfromagriculturecancontaminatewater suppliesand leaveresiduesonfoodcropswhensprayedshortlybeforeharvesting,whichcanbedetectedinhumantissue.These concerns led the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) to examine the current animal andepidemiological data, and to re-classify glyphosate as ‘probably carcinogenic to humans’ (Group 2A) in 2015.(Guyton et al., 2015).Other agencies also reviewed the same evidence, and came to different conclusions. TheEuropean Food Safety Authority (EFSA) assessment concluded that glyphosate is unlikely to pose a carcinogenichazard tohumans. (EuropeanFood SafetyAuthority,2015) In response tooutrage fromsomequartersover theapparentcontradictionwiththe IARCassessment,EFSAnotedthattheIARCprogrammeevaluatescancerhazardsbutnottherisksassociatedwithexposure(anditislikelythatlevelsofexposuredomatter).TheU.S.EnvironmentalProtectionAgency’sriskassessmentofGBHsisongoing,butpreliminarydocumentsstatethatacausalrelationshipbetweenglyphosateand cancer isnot supportedby the existing evidencebase. (EPACancerAssessmentReviewCommittee,2015)Likewise,theNZEnvironmentalProtectionAuthorityrecentlyconcludedthatnoreclassificationof glyphosate as a carcinogen or mutagen was required under the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms(HSNO)act.Aswithotherchemicalswithuncertainrisks,glyphosate isbeingactivelymonitored,andifsignificantnewinformationbecomesavailable,areassessmentwillbeinitiated.(Temple,2016)Theuncertaintiesintheriskassessmentsaroundglyphosatefurtherstokedanalreadyragingcontroversy-notonlyoverhumanhealthrisks,butovereffectsonpollinatorssuchasthemonarchbutterflyandhoneybeepopulations,astheirpreferredforagingfoodswerekilledoffbyglyphosate.(Haughtonetal.,2003)Butsocietaloutragewentfurther,becauseriskswereperceivedasbeingimposedinvoluntarilyandunfairlybytheagrichemicalindustry,andin particular by its main player,Monsanto, the developer of the first, and still the most extensively used GBHcommercial product, Roundup. After cornering the GBH market in the U.S., Monsanto developed genetically-modified, glyphosate-resistant crops— allowing evenmore Roundup to be used. Outrage over GMOs, and theperception that human and environmental health were suffering at the hands of a corporate giant, has keptadvocatesbusyonbothsidesofthedebate.EnvironmentalistsopposedtoGMOsandpesticideshavetendedtorejectthescienceonglyphosatesafetyasbeingbiased,and ignorethepotentialenvironmentalbenefits(reducedtillage,higheryieldsonless land).Butbiasgoesbothways.FundingfrombigorganicfoodcompanieswhowouldbenefitfromthevilificationofRoundupandGMcropsprovidedfinancialbackingtovocalacademic criticsofconventionalagriculture, (NewYorkTimes,2015) inordertopromotea credible ‘voiceofauthority’ to supporttheirclaimsofrisk,andessentiallyturningscience,orperhapspseudo-science,intoadvocacy.(Ropeik,2016)Therealrisksinthissituationremainuncertain–andmiredinthecontroversy.


14

3.1BelievingtheexpertsIn forming their views and assimilatinginformation, most people follow the lead ofcredible experts – but they define and choose‘experts’basedonwhomtheyperceiveassharingtheirvalues.Expertsarenotimmunetobias,and,as explained in Part 1 of this series, (Gluckman,2016)theactuarialapproachitselfisnotfreefromvalue judgments. Biases and values are inherentin the risk assessment process, beginning withwhatwerecogniseasahazard.Theycaninfluencetheprioritygiventothestudyofspecificrisksandthereby generate data necessary to promoteactiononthoserisks.

Scientists are human, with their own biases andvalues.Butmodernsciencehaslargelyevolvedasa set of internationally recognized processesdesigned tominimize such biases, at least in thecollection and analysis of the data. A core valuejudgmentthatremainsintheprocessesofscienceis in theevaluationof thesufficiencyofevidenceon which to draw a conclusion. Because thisjudgmentcanbesubjecttobias,itisimportanttohave independent replication and aggregation ofscientific evidence from different studies andsources in order to reach a scientific consensus.[Box2] Public trust in science and scientistsmaybe becoming increasingly tenuous as the issuesbecome ever more complex and contested.Scientistsmust find better ways to interact withdecisionmakersandthepublicinordertobolsterconfidenceintheauthorityoftheirexpertiseandthelegitimacyoftheadvicethattheyprovide.

3.2LossoftrustThecomplexnatureofoursocietalrisksandhowthey have been dealt with previously has led tothe emergence of what has been termed ‘post-trust’ society, (Lofstedt, 2005) characterizedby ageneralised public loss of trust in policymakers,regulators,industries,andscientistsas‘experts’.A

number of factors contribute to the erosion oftrust,notleastbeingthechainofhighlypublicizedregulatory scandals internationally aroundexposure to hazards (e.g. food safety,contaminated blood, asbestos), drug safety, orthreats to the natural environment, as well asdocumented manipulation of science by thetobaccoindustry.(Beroetal.,2006)Thereisoftenaperceptionoflackofimpartialityandfairnessinimportant decisions, mainly stemming from theperceived impactof interest groupson collectivedecisionmaking.New Zealand has not been immune tocontroversial issues that stir public distrust. Forinstance, concerns around health (fluoridation ofwater), new technologies (energy technologies,biotechnology), over-exploitation of naturalresources(fisheriesvsconservationofthemarineestate, fresh water quality), and preservingbiodiversity (using 1080 against invasive species)have all been and continue to be the subject ofvigorous debate. [Box 3] The increasing diversityof scientific and expert views portrayed in themedia,and themedia’sownpracticeof trying tocreate debate evenwhen it does not really existamong scientists (see section 4), leads toconfusing messages and the impression thatsciencecannolongerprovideusefulresponsestoimportant policy-relevant questions. As debatesbecome polarized, motivations and values arequestioned, and the science is increasinglycontested. In such situations, scientists andexpertsneedtostepuptheireffortstobehaveas‘honest brokers’ of expert knowledge andevidence and acknowledge their own biases andvalues.(Pielke,2007).Eventhoughtheremaybemuchthatisunknown,science has an essential and critical role to playforbothpublicsandpolicymakersinassistingtherisk assessment process. But this requires thatscientists do their best to minimize biases, andthat science communicators present to publicsand policy makers not only what is known, butwhat is not known, and how the scientificconsensushasbeenreached(ifthereisone).Thisis the ‘brokerage model” of sciencecommunication which tries to minimize ratherthanplayonpreexistingbiasesof individualsandsocieties.


15

3.3Whensciencecan’tsolveitEven if science cannot be definitive, it providesessential understandings to our individual andcollective decisions about risk. Science has anessential role to help characterize hazards,determine levelsof risk, forecast likelihoods, andunderstand potential consequences. But as ourrisks become ever more complex andinterconnected,sciencecanonlyofferanswers interms of probabilities, and arguably with lesscertainty. In assessing highly complex risksinvolving deep uncertainties, the ‘normal’scientific method, though necessary, is notsufficient to guide decision-making especiallywhen ethical, social and ecological issues comeinto play. Science doesn’t have all the answers,and claimed scientific facts can be controversial.Such situations–where the “factsareuncertain,

stakes are high, decisions are urgent” – havecreated a need for ‘post normal’ scientificthinking.(Ravetz,2004)Thiswayofthinkingaboutscience questions the view of perfect objectivityand certainty that has been the ideal oftraditional, applied science – i.e. that which iscarried outwhen uncertainties are low (‘normal’science(Kuhn,1962)). Itrecognizesthatscientificfindings need to be interpreted in the light ofindividualandcommunityvalues.Butwhenthesevalues are disputed, the complexities of sciencemaybeusedtostirpseudo-scientificdebatewhentherealdebateisoneofvalues.Forexample,onereasonforsomeofthoseobjectingtofluoridationof water or universal vaccination has nothing todowithsciencebutrelatestotheirviewthatit isforcedmedicalization. [Box 4] In addressing suchissues, a post-normal scientific approach mayinvolve engagement of a wider ‘extended peercommunity’ to assess information from a

Box2Whatsciencecan(andcannot)tellusScienceisasetofprocessesforproducingknowledge–waysofobserving,thinking,experimentingandevaluatingthathasallowedustoachieveanincreasinglycomprehensiveunderstandingofourselvesandourenvironment.Thescientificmethod isbasedonfundamentalprinciplesof logicandreasoning– linking ideaswithevidencetoformconclusions.Sciencereliesonevidence–theaccumulationofobservations,historicaldata,andexperimentalfindingsthatleadstotheformulationoftheoriestoexplainnaturalphenomena. Theprocessof science involvesongoingeffortstotestthesetheoriesandmakerevisionsbasedontheoutcomesofthetests.KarlPopper’sphilosophyofscienceassertsthatscientifictheoriesmustbe‘falsifiable’–thatis,abletobedisprovedby testing or further observation. If a falsifiable hypothesis is repeatedly tested and the results are statisticallysignificant,itcanbeacceptedasscientific‘truth’-buttruthscanstillbefalsifiedwhenmoreknowledgeisgained.Science is thereforealways contingent – itholds thepossibilityofarrivingatdifferent explanations forobservedphenomena. New observations may challenge the prevailing theories, prompting their revision. But sciencegenerallyprogressesthroughthemodificationofideas,ratherthanoutrightrejection–therearefewtruescientificrevolutions. A lone experiment, or a single publication, will not provide a new truth. The progress is towardsscientific consensus,building from the consistency, coherence,andvolumeofevidence.While the completeandabsolute‘truth’maybeelusive,scientificmethodsallowincreasinglyaccurateapproximationsandpredictionstobemade.It is important for scientific theories, and the ‘truths’ they uncover, to be continually challenged and adapted –especially if they impact on important decisions, policies, and regulations that affect society. But it is equallyimportant to recognise the questions that cannot be addressed in the scientific process – those that cannot beprovedordisprovedbecausetheyareaboutbeliefsandvalues.Eveninsomecaseswheresciencecanprovidesomeanswers,thescientificapproachmayberejectedasirrelevantifitconfrontsstronglyheldbeliefs.Uncertaintymaybeexploitedormanufacturedinordertodiscreditthescience.Butuncertaintyisinherentinscience,whichstrivestotestatheoryagainsttheevidenceinordertoreducetheuncertainty.


16

perspectivethat isbeyondwhat isfoundinpeer-reviewed scientific literature. (Ravetz, 2004;Gluckman, 2012) This type of work sets‘scientificallyrobust’informationinthecontextof‘socially robust’ processes for using thatinformation. In a sense this iswhatpolicymakersdo when they incorporate science into theiradvice to politicianswithin a democratic system.This will be further elaborated in Part 3 of thisseries.

3.3.1Thepost-normalperspective:EvidenceandcontestedvaluesMuchofthecontentionaroundriskassessmentofanewtechnologyorsomeotheractivity(e.g.useof1080forpestcontrol)relatestothesometimesproblematic interaction between disputed socialvaluesandhowscienceisadoptedtosupportoneview or another. In the case of climate change,muchofthedebatethatledtoaslowacceptanceofhumancauseswasnotthecomplexsciencebutrather the contested views regarding the

Box3Sprayingpoisonfromthesky–Anecessaryevil?NewZealandisknownforitsnaturalassetsandveryhighbiodiversity.Evolvingintheabsenceoflandmammals,alargenumberofendemicbirdandplantspeciesthatareuniquetoNewZealandhavenonaturaldefencesagainstpredators. Thearrivalofhumans inthe13th century,andthe introductionofanumberofnon-nativemammalianpredatorssincethattimehasbroughtononeofthehighestextinctionratesinthemodernworld.Howevermassiveextinction rates, particularly of megafauna, also accompanied the arrival of humans in both Australia and theAmericasmuchearlier.Itisarecognizedproblemofhumaninvasion,withoutacomfortablesolution.Thepesticide1080(sodiumfluoroacetate)isused inNewZealandtocontrolmammalianpests (rabbits,possums,ratsandstoats)thatthreatenthesurvivalofournativeplantsandanimals.Possumsarealsothemain carrierofbovinetuberculosis,asignificantthreattoouragriculturaleconomy.Thesealieninvadersarecurrentlyuncontrolledonmostareasofconservationland,andcontributetoongoingbiodiversitydecline.Aerial sprayingofthepesticide ismuchmorecost-effectivethangroundcontrol,and in realitytheonlypracticalapproach formany regions. However, dispersing a poison over large tracts of land is an emotionally evocativeconceptthatarousesstrongnegativeresponses.Opposition isunderstandable.Understandabletoo istheequallyemotionaldesiretopreserveournativeforestsandbirdsfromdestructionbyinvasivepests.Onthe surface,theremayappeartobe reasonableargumentsonbothsides.Huntersandanimalrightsactivistsalike oppose 1080 at high doses as an inhumane killer of dogs and deer, and a risk to the food chain andenvironment.Conservationists,farmers,andgovernmentbelievethatitisthebestavailablesolutiontomitigatetheriskofcatastrophic lossoftheuniqueNewZealandnaturalhabitatandbirdspecieslivingin it,andtopreventthespreadofdiseaseto livestockviapossums.What istobedonewhentwosuchunderstandablegoalsareindirectconflict?Diggingalittledeeper,itisclearthatsciencefavoursonesideofthedebate.The2011independentreviewbytheParliamentaryCommissionerfortheEnvironment(Wright,2011)putsentimentsasideandexaminedtheevidenceandthepracticalitiesofcriticalpestcontrolandfoundthat1080sprayingwasthemosteffective,cost-effectiveandlowestriskoptioncurrentlyavailableforhaltingthedevastatingeffectsofpossums,ratsandstoatsonnativeplantsandbirds,andforhaltingthespreadofbovinetuberculosisbypossums.There isnodoubtthat1080isapoison-thatiswhyitisaneffectivepesticide.However,thecontrolledsprayingregimensnowusedinNewZealandhavebeenshowntoposeverylowrisktohumansandlargermammalssuchasdogsanddeer. 1080 isbiodegradableand therefore isnotapersistentpollutant.Amoreuniversallyacceptableweaponagainstthesepestsissurelydesirable,butwehavenone. Inthefuturebiotechnologicalsolutionssuchasgene editingmay emerge, but these toomight create public debate. A choicemust bemade. Claims of hiddenagendasandissuesoftrustabouthowpestcontrolismanagedhaveinterferedwithacceptanceofthe1080aerialspraying policy. Increased transparency and community engagement are needed to support social licence forimplementationofthiscurrentlynecessarystrategy.


17

economic implications of addressing thechallenge. The inevitable scientific uncertaintiesaround projections for global warming and thecontributionofgreenhousegaseshavebeenusedor exaggeratedby some to rationalisenot takingaction that would conflict with certainworldviews, sociopolitical perspectives orentrenched habits. In reality the questions havebeenlessaboutsciencethanabouthowandwhyonegenerationshould incurcosts for thebenefitof later generations, or why countries that hadnot contributed massively to greenhouse gasproduction should incur costs because of theactivitiesofothercountries.

Similarly,thedebateovergeneticmodificationofcrops to produce foods is often placed in thecontextofscience,buttheevidenceforthesafetyofsuch foods isveryrobust. (Nicoliaetal.,2014;Panchin & Tuzhikov, 2016) The underlyingdebates are those of economics, philosophy,attitudes to corporate control over foodproduction,viewsonthemanipulationofnature,and so forth, which in turn have beenincorporated into various political agendas. It isnot the place of science to resolve such largelyirreconcilable worldviews – indeed it cannot doso. Rather science can inform discussion bysocietyoversuchvalues,whichbecomereflectedinhowanyparticularsituationisperceived.

4.MediamessagesandriskperceptionWhen the risk relates to complex – and oftenpoorly communicated – science and technology,resistance can stem from fear of ‘unknowable’future consequences. Achieving societalconsensus on such risks is difficult; with little ornopersonalexperiencewiththerisks,peoplearedependent on news and social media forinformation.

Conventionalmassmedia and socialmedia haveenormous influences on the public’s perceptionsofrisk,becausethis iswheremostpeopleobtaintheir information. Public riskperceptiondependsfar more on what is portrayed via television,radio, the internet and socialmedia than it doesonexpertopinion.Media canbea veryeffectivetool to increase awareness of hazards and risks,but at times it can also disseminate incorrect orbiased information, which can reduce trust andsupportindecision-makingprocesses.Conventional journalism still has a responsibilityto maintain journalistic integrity and ensurefactual reporting. It is critical that news mediaaddress the scientific validity of claims to whichthey give airtime. However, news coverage ofscience often omits caveats and limitations thatare conveyed in the original scientific literatureand by scientists themselves, presenting storiesbasedonpreliminaryevidenceasifthedatawereconclusive. Decreasing budgets for sciencejournalism, compounded by a need to cater toaudiences that see news as a form ofentertainment,furthercompromisethequalityofcoverage. Vivid or horrific incidents are morelikely to be aired than other less gruesome butmore common accidents or harmful events.Similarly, rare but catastrophic technologicalfailures are reported more frequently than theeverydaybenefitsthesetechnologiesbring.In some cases fears can be magnified byadvocates of particular positions. Celebrityadvocates may act through the mainstream orsocial media and can perpetuate misleadingmessages – for example much of the negativepublicityaboutvaccinescontinuestobebasedonthe debunked myth linking vaccines to autism,despite their being absolutely no evidence tojustifysuchalink.[Box4]


18

4.1Strivingforbalance:QuestioningconsensusInattemptingtopresentanunbiasedportrayalofacontroversialissue,themassmediamayconveya misleading sense of balance of opposingscientificviews,givingafalse impressionthattheweight of evidence is equal on both sides. Forexample, media debates on climate change orwater fluoridation tend to pit a single expertagainst another opposing expert, suggesting that

views on the issue are evenly divided, eventhough in reality the weight of evidence heavilyfavours one side of the argument. Sometimespitchingamarginalormaverickargumentagainstthe mainstream scientific consensus is done tocreate debate and entertainment, but isessentially a form of bias itself – it has beentermed‘balanceasbias’.Truescientificconsensuscan often be completely overshadowed by suchfalse balance in reporting, though someresponsible news media outlets have begun toestablishstandardsagainstthispractice.(Jones&BBCTrust,2011)

Box4Vaccineopposition–howdiditarise,andhowdoesitpersist?In 1998, themedical journal The Lancet published a paper that suggested a link between the MMR vaccine (acombinedvaccineagainstmeasles,mumpsandrubella),andthedevelopmentofbowelinflammationandautismspectrumdisorders. (Wakefieldetal.,1998)Itreportedontwelveboys,ofwhom8,accordingtotheirparents’orphysicians’ recollections, developed symptoms of a developmental disorder soon after immunisation. Small andinsignificant,thestudyneverthelessinstigatedacontroversyconsideringthesafetyandeffectsofthevaccine.Atitsheightintheearly2000s,theconfidenceinthevaccinefellnotonlyamongtheparentsofchildrenwithautismbutalsoamongpublicleadersandevenphysicians.Despitemediainquiries,thethenBritishPrimeMinisterTonyBlairfailed to disclose the vaccination status of his infant son. In some communities and countries the rates ofvaccinationfellbelowthethresholdrequiredtosecureherdimmunityandoutbreaksofmeaslesappeared;in2008,forthefirsttimein14years,measleswasdeclaredendemicinEnglandandWales. (Godleeetal.,2011)Andyet,afterthisarticleWakefieldpublishednonewdataandmultiplelargeepidemiologicalstudiesfoundnolinkbetweenMMRvaccineandautism.In2004,10outof11Wakefield’sco-authorsretractedtheinterpretationsofthedata.Inthe following years it was found that not only was the research problematic but that the data had beenmanipulated and Wakefield had received payments from solicitors involved in a legal case against vaccinemanufacturers.TheLancetfinallyretractedthepaperin2010andWakefieldwassanctionedbytheMedicalCouncilandlosthismedicalregistration,buttheoppositiontoMMRvaccinedidnotdisappear.Thereareseveralexplanationsforthiscontroversyanditspersistenceagainstscientificevidence.Theparentswerecomparingtworisks:ofmeaslesandofautism.Bytheearly2000s,thankstoimmunisation,manyhadneverseenmeasles; by contrast, many had personally seen or at least read about cases of autism, a spectrum ofneurodevelopmental disorders that appears to be on the rise across the developed world. While some of theincreaseislinkedtochangeddiagnosticcriteriaandpractices,theremaybeenvironmentalcausativeagentsatplay.Thefearofautismvstheperceivedinnocuityofa‘rash’andignoranceofthesevereeffectsofmeaslesmayexplainsuchindividualriskassessments.Thisexplanationforwhytheriskofmeasleswasjudgedmoreacceptablethanthenon-existentriskofautism,andthe preference for the small study on 12 children (which was exposed as fraudulent andmisleading) over largeepidemiologicalones,maybefound in confirmationbias. Inthenineteenthcentury, resistancetothemandatorysmallpoxvaccinationwaswidespreaddespitethehugeriskthatthisdiseaseposed.(Durbach,2004)Whilesomeofthe resistancewas causedby the (real)potential riskof thevaccine,manyobjectedonprinciple. For some, thevaccine, and in particular attempts to make it compulsory, went against assumptions about the limits of Stateintervention in personal life. Finally, vaccination conflicted with cultural ideas about the body, whereby healthdependedonpreservingthebodilyintegrityandpreventingtheintroductionofanyforeignmatter.Tracesofthisideamaybefoundamong‘anti-vaxxers’whooftenalsosupporttheideaof‘naturalhealing’withminimalrecoursetomedication,througheatingorganicfood,andboostingimmunity‘naturally’.Somecelebritieshavebeencooptedtotheanti-vaccineargumentandtheirviewsareoftenconsideredbytheiraudiencemoreauthoritativethanexpertopinion. Conspiracy theories involving themedical expertshavebeen invoked.ThearticleagainstMMRvaccinewasthuseagerlyreceived.Thismisleadinganddamagingsocietalmemehasprovedtobemostpersistent.


19

Scientific consensus is generally arrived at bycareful evaluation of evidence from a largecollectionofconsistentfindings.Itisaprocessbywhich the science community reaches aconclusion aboutwhat constitutes evidence, andabout what the evidence demonstrates. [Box 2]The consensus need not be constant and willevolve as new knowledge accumulates – indeedthat willingness to evolve conclusions is core tothecultureofscience.Despite sometimes overwhelming agreement ofscientific views, there may some scientists whodisagree with the majority, and can maketechnical arguments about the shortcomings oftheavailabledataandthe ‘mainstream’scientificconsensus. They can make their voices heard,and, if given ample exposure, can sow seeds ofdoubt in theminds of the public. Themedia, bygiving outlying, and often scientificallyquestionable ideas equal airtime allows socialcontroversytoappear(andindeedbecome)largerthanitwouldotherwisebe.Whenitcomestoenvironmentalorpublichealthrisks,minorityvoicesclaimingthataparticularriskis high often get disproportional attentioncomparedwitha scientificmajority that sees theriskasmuch lower (Kortenkamp&Basten,2015)(e.g.asinthefluoridedebate).Insuchcases,evena small group of dissenting voices claiming highrisk can sway public perception. If controversy ispresentedwithout context that explainsmajorityvsminorityscientificopinions,peoplearelikelytoperceive the science as uncertain. Uncertainty,whether real or constructed, canbe exploited toadvanceaparticularcauseoragenda,obstructingthe development of policy informed by scientificevidence.It also can be difficult to distinguish betweenthose scientists who are speaking outside of theconsensus (and potentially misinterpreting ormisrepresenting the science) for their ownagenda, and those who are speaking outside ofthe consensus responsibly and who genuinelyrepresent an emerging, valid view. While theformer can be very damaging, the latter can bevital incertainsituations.Thehistoryofviewsonplate tectonics is a prime example of a radical

shift in understanding that was first seen asmaverick: when first introduced, the theory ofplate tectonics was 'against the consensus', buthas now been proven correct. The challenge isidentifyinganddistinguishingbetweenthese,andhow they affect the public trust in science.Conversely the argument that HIV-AIDs was notcausedbyaviruswaspromotedbyonemaverickscientistwhohadtheearofpower–anddelayedtheintroductionofeffectiveinterventioninSouthAfrica, with tragic consequences. (Cohen, 1994;Nattrass,2008)

4.2Goingviral:ThesocialmediaeffectSocial media can provide communities with asense of connection and stability during crisissituations, providing updates, instruction andreassurance where needed. Its two-way naturehelpsauthoritiesunderstandpublicconcerns.Butsocialmediacanalsorapidlyspreadfearsthatareat odds with the evidence. Exchanges on socialmedia areoften emotional and very subjective –andcanbetransmittedessentiallylikeavirus.Onthe way, communication chains can distort themessage.Preconceptionsaffectwhat informationistransmitted(peoplesingleoutinformationthatfits their preconceptions) – and in turn influencetheperceptionsof the receiver. (Moussaidetal.,2015)Mainstream and social media effectively nowwork in tandem,with editors seeking out storiesthat will get clicks or that are inspired by viralstories. Mainstream media picking up socialmedia’sviralstoriesorlookingto‘listener/reader’feedbackassignificantcontentisincreasinglyhowstoriesaredeveloped.

4.3Riskcommunication:SendingtherightmessagesRisk communication is the process of providingpeople, communities and decision makers withthe information needed to make sound choices.Good risk communication provides a balancedevidence-based summary of risks and harms – itshould help to answer pertinent questions, suchas ‘what does the science say about the level ofrisk?’, ‘what is known and what is not known’,‘what are the implications?’ and ‘what can bedone about it?’ However facts and numbers are


20

notwhatmostpeoplerespondtowhen itcomesto risky decisions. Risk assessmentsmadeby thepublic are almost always framed in qualitative,rather thanquantitative terms,andawiderangeof values-based criteria are applied to the samesetof‘facts’.Risk communication strategies that only provideinformation about the output of scientific riskanalysis and the probabilistic thinking of riskexperts are inappropriate and insulting to boththedemocraticprocessandtotheempowermentof individuals. Such one-way communicationabout risk is destined to fail – especially fortechnological risks, and is outdated in today’sdigitally-aware social environment where rapidmessaginghasdiffused the influenceof technicalexpertsasprincipalinformationsources.

4.3.1PressureforcertaintyNonetheless, experts must still be called on toprovide information about risks, and are oftenpressured by either media or decision makerstoward expressing certainty. Although mostpeoplerecognizethatcertaintyisanillusion,itisanatural preference to seek it, despite theimpossibility of the task. We tend to hear,rememberandreportwhatcommunicatorssayasbeingmorecertainthanitwas,andyetwepunishcommunicatorswhosoundcertainbutare foundto be wrong – for example the scientists whowere put on trial following false assurances ofsafety before the deadly earthquake in Aquila,Italyin2009.Bothoverconfidentfalsealarmsandoverconfident false reassurances lead to lostcredibility.Neither risk communicators nor the public canwait for certainty, because it will never come.Absolute proof of zero risk is impossible. Howlongshouldtheywait,andhowmuchevidenceisneeded, in order tomake a judgment call? If anengineernotedwarningsignsofapossiblebridgecollapse, should she allow people to keep goingoverituntilthereismoreevidence?Orifadoctorreceivesa cancer test result thatmightverywellbefalsepositive,shouldhewarnthepatient?Wemight sayyes inbothof these cases,butwhat ifthere’s a chance of irreparable harm in takingaction?It isusuallybettertoprovide informationonrisk,buttoclearlyconveylevelsofuncertainty

orconfidence,becausethepriceoffailuretowarnis often higher than price of a false alarm. Thecurrent dilemma over prostate cancer testingusingbloodtestshighlightstheseissuesformanymen(seePart1ofthisseries(Gluckman,2016)).Acknowledging uncertainty admits a degree ofsubjectivity, and this needs to be handled in aclear and transparent manner, explaining wheretheuncertaintieslie,howtheyarehandledintherisk assessment, andwhat steps are being takento reduce them. How the ‘goals’ of riskassessmentorsafetymarginsareselectedshouldbe elaborated through open dialogue, whereinthepubliccanengageinasocial learningprocessto come to mutual understanding of the issues.Risk-related behaviour is more likely to changewhenrisksareunderstoodandcollectivelysharedbythecommunity.

4.3.2UnderstandingvaluesandestablishingtrustIn reality there isnovalue-freewayof framingarisk issue. Clearly, the source of the informationaffectshowaudiencesinterpretandrespondtoit.The communicator first needs to be trustworthyand credible, but also ‘likeable’, and viewed assharing values with the receiver of theinformation. Because people often care moreabout trust, credibility, competence, fairnessandempathy than about statistics and details,focusingonpresentationoftechnicalfactswillnotnecessarily provide audiences with what theywant to know. Public sentiment, values, andconcerns first need to be addressed.Acknowledging the validity of people’s startingviews and emotions is key to engaging them inmeaningfuldiscourseaboutrisks.Thus, a key to effective risk communication isunderstandinghow risk isperceived, andwhat isrequiredforpeopletobeconcernedenough(butnot unduly anxious) in order to take appropriatemitigating action. While many solutions to riskproblems liewithintherealmofscience, it isnotenough to know what risk-reducing actions maybe effective. Even when the message is clear,there may be other barriers (e.g. insufficienteconomic or social resources) that limit theresponse. The messages need to consider both


21

thewillingnessand theabilityof theaudience torespond.

5.Makingthedecisions:DealingwithrisksanduncertaintyTo this point, we have considered the complexfactorsthatinfluencehowwethinkaboutriskanduncertainty both consciously and unconsciously,andonbothanindividualandcollectivelevel.Weutilize this thinking inorder tomanagethemanyrisks that we encounter frequently, and othersthat might confront us rarely. Decisions have tobemade.

5.1Trade-offsDecision-making inevitably involvessome levelofuncertainty, but uncertainty is not always aboutnegatives. There are two sides to the risk coin:riskcanbeviewedasaburden–thepossibilityofloss–or anopportunity– thepossibilityof gain,and its management necessarily involves trade-offs between these, on both individual andsocietal levels. Bymaking a choice between twoalternatives that both have advantages anddisadvantages, we dismiss the opportunity toenjoytheadvantagesoftheunchosenalternative,and accept whatever disadvantages exist for thechosenone.In managing the uncertainties and risks weinevitably face, trade-offsmustalmostalwaysbemade.Veryfewdecisionsaremadeinavacuum–therearealwaysotherconsequences(intendedorotherwise)andspilloverstootheractivities.Whenwe decide to speed down the road we areweighing the advantage of getting somewherefasteragainsttherisksofbeingcaughtandfined,or even losing our driver’s license. But we arelikely to be ignoring the fact that we haveincreased the probability of being in a roadaccidentthatmightharmusorothers,withalltheconsequences that would then follow.Whenwetakeoutamortgageweweighupthebenefitsofhavingahouseversusthecostsofthemortgage,andthinkaboutallthetradeoffsthatfollowfromhaving less discretionary spending for things wemight enjoy. We may or may not weigh up theconsequences of massive interest rate rises in 5

years’time,orafall inhouseprices,andhowwerate these risks may influence the size of themortgagewetakeout.We make such trade-offs in our every-daydecision making. When we spend resources toreduce some risks it may be at the expense ofaccepting others. We may also make trade-offsbetweenpayingforspeculativelong-termbenefitsover other immediate, tangible benefits, orlikewise, between mitigating potentiallycatastrophic future risks over current small risks.Shouldweputawaymoneyforretirementorpayfor insurance to guard against possible futurelosses,orspenditnowonwhatseemlikeurgentneeds–likeaholidayoranewcar?Similarquestionsexistattheheartofgovernmentdecision-making.Atasocietal level,actionstakento reduce the potential for harm could restrictdevelopment of a technology or utilisation of aresource,andthelossofbenefitsfromthese,justas choosing not to invest money in promisingshares for fear of loss obligates individuals toforegothepotentialbenefits.Should dairy intensification be limited to protectwater quality even if there might be immediatefiscal costs for farmers, the structure of ruralcommunities, and for the economy as a whole?Should we consider gene editing as a way ofdealing with mammalian pests? Should wedecriminalize or legalize the social use ofmarijuana? Shouldwebuildmoremotorways todeal with traffic jams? Should we massivelyincrease access to very expensivepharmaceuticals? Should we have free tertiaryeducation? Should we reduce the number ofprisoners by changing the criteria forimprisonment,becauseofthecostofprisonsandthe social costs of incarceration? All these andmany other issues have an evidence base tosupportdecisions,butallhavemanyuncertaintiesand different perceptions of the risks, the costs,and thebenefits involved.All involvehighvaluescomponents and these values are very much indisputeacrossour society. Yetdecisions ineverycase have to bemade, andwhatever decision ismadeinvolvestradeoffsandsomedegreeofrisk.And in every case there is a danger of theevidencebeingdrownedoutbyrhetoric.


22

Reducing risk involves both costs and benefits,anddecisionsastowhatrisksareacceptableandwhich are not. We must consider the costeffectiveness (whether financial, emotional orreputational)ofmitigatingorpreparing fora riskwith that of coping with its consequences. Thecostofriskreductionbecomesprohibitivebelowacertain level of risk. But there are also situationswhere inaction generates its own risks, as isclearly the case with some natural hazards. Ingeneral we do not try for ‘no risk’, but ratherdecide on a residual level at which cost ofmitigation does not exceed the value of thebenefit received from themitigationactivity [seePart1].(Gluckman,2016)

5.2ComplexrisksandprecautionThe riskswe faceasa societyarebecomingevermore complex because of an interconnectedrange of causal factors, mainly resulting fromhuman action and invention. Interdependenciesbetween the built environment, transport,communication and lifeline utilities can causecascading failures that amplify the consequencesof a single natural or human-induced event or aseries of interrelated circumstances. Such risksoften have no clear boundaries. The nature andextent of the risk is hard to define and differentstakeholder views – none ofwhich are verifiablyrightorwrong–makedecision-makingevenmorechallenging.An anticipatory approach is generally used toconfrontcomplexrisks–byfocusingonenhancingresilience and preparedness through theappropriate use of precaution. Sometimes,however, attempts to address the risks can leadtounforeseenconsequences–whethertheriskisfrom a natural hazard on one hand or humanactivityandinnovationontheother.Forexample,precautions against erosion using ‘hardened’defenses such as seawalls in one area cancontributetounnaturalerosionorsedimentationelsewhere.Conversely, uncritically applied extremeprecaution can lead to paralysis and inaction,making innovation virtually impossible.Prohibitionofanactivityortechnologybecauseofperceived risks, even if these are remote, cancreate risks elsewhere in society or in the

economy. The nature of our species is one ofserial innovation, yet we face some difficultchoices about the introduction of newtechnologiestoaddressmanyglobalchallenges.Effective approaches to addressing risk anduncertaintywill require adaptivepolicies to copewitha rangeofscenarios thatcanandshouldberevised when the context changes and/or newinformation is available. The policies and actionsmust be robust – not just designed for themostlikelyoutcomes,as thiscan increasevulnerabilityto less likely, but more catastrophic events bycreating a false sense of security. For example,structuresdesignedtoavoidfloodingin‘standard’high rain or tide conditions can result in higherflood damages in extreme storm conditionsbecauseofalackofpreparationoranticipationoftherarerbutpossiblesevereevents.The need to cope with scientific uncertaintiesaround potentially catastrophic risks led to theemergence of the frequently misunderstood‘precautionaryprinciple’.ThiswillbediscussedinPart3ofthisseries.

6.Movingforward:Risk-takingandinnovationInnovation,whethersocialortechnology-based,isinherent to our human nature and is importantfor our continued wellbeing as a society –providing better human and environmentalhealth,sustainablecitiesandindustries,improvedefficienciesandourqualityof life. Innovationwillbeessentialinthefaceofincreasingpressuresonnatural resources and to address the sustainabledevelopment goals that every nation has agreedto. But innovation is inherently a risk-takingactivity, as there is always some degree ofuncertainty involved. As a society we need tothinkabouthowtoembracenewandpotentiallydisruptive technologies that may carry risks butcould ultimately lead to much greater benefits.But equallywe need to be prepared to limit theuse of such technologies if they are found to domore harm than good. Of course there are, andshould be, strong values-based debates aboutthesedecisions.[Box5]


23

NewZealandisatechnologicallyadvancednationthat is rightfully proud of its history ofinventivenessandinnovation–bothtechnological(e.g. navigation aids, dish-drawer dishwashers)andsocial(e.g.world-leadingsuffragelaws).Bothtechnologicalandsocial innovationareviewedasimportant for the future of our society. But wealso place great value on our natural resources,our cultural heriatge, and our health andwellbeing, and by definition will always haveincomplete knowledge of the risks that newtechnologiesmayimposeonthem.Sometechnologiestouchpublicsensitivitiesmoreacutely than others; for example nuclear power,genetic modification, nanotechnology, andhydraulicfracturing(fracking).Thepublicmayfeelthat rules and regulations are not keeping pace

with new scientific developments (Chalmers &Nicol, 2004) and indeed for some advancedtechnologies, such as artificial intelligence, wehave little or no experience fromwhich to drawlessonsforpolicy.Thisentersinacomplexareaofthe interaction between technologicaldevelopmentandsociety,whichwillbeaddressedin Part 3 of this series. We will discuss howsocietal decisions involving risk are made in ademocracy and how social license can benegotiatedandmaintainedinorderforsocietytobe comfortablewithmany innovations. Andwewilldiscusshowgovernmentsmustmakemany,ifnot all, decisions in the face of uncertainty andhow they undertake their primary role ofprotecting their citizens, assets and environmentfromabroadrangeofrisks.

Box5SocietalcognitivebiasesanddisruptiveinnovationThesamecognitivebiasesthataffectourowndecision-makingalsoaffecthowweactasasociety.Considertwodistinct disruptive technologies of the last three decades – genetic modification of agricultural crops and thedevelopment of social media. The use of genetic modification to manipulate agricultural production has had amixed reaction in different societies. Some have embraced it readily, other have rejected it. Initially there wasjustified concern over safety, and some countries, including New Zealand, adopted very stringent precautionaryapproaches.Othersdidnot,andnowthesafetyofgeneticallymodified(GM)foodisnolongerindoubt,atleastinthe minds of major scientific academies that have reviewed the evidence. The claims of adverse healthconsequenceshavebeenshowntobetotallyunfounded,althoughthisdoesnotstopsomeadvocatesofatotalbanonthistechnologycontinuingtoclaimthatsuchevidenceexists.Cognitivebiasesandoutragefactorsatleastpartiallyexplainwhyahistoryofsafetyhasnottranslatedintouniversalacceptance of GM crops by societies. The way GM organisms were introduced into agriculture meant that thebenefitsaccruedverynarrowlytoagribusinessandwerenotspreadacrosssociety.Othershavefeltuncomfortablethat putting genes fromone species into another specieswas ‘playing god’ and therefore inherently distasteful.Slogans like “Franken-foods” were used to influence public impressions, sometimes for political or marketingpurposes.Yet consider another disruptive technology - the introduction of internet-based socialmedia. Society has neveractivelyengaged inadiscussionabout itsadoptionbecausethepersonalbenefitswereobviousandaccessibletoevery user of it – better communication and the democratization of formerly closed-shop institutions such aspublishingorjournalism.Butsocialmediaisnotwithoutserioussocialconsequences–theriseincyber-bulling,adhominem but anonymous attacks that impact on many people quite adversely, the loss of personal space andprivacy,andthetrivialisationofseriousdiscussionthatmaybeimpactingondemocracyitself.Looking back on how we have or have not accepted these technologies, wemight consider these hypotheticalscenarios:• WhatifGMcropshadbeendevelopedbyagovernmentlabtoproducefoodsthatpreventedthedevelopment

ofdiabetes,andtheintellectualpropertywasnotprotectedsoallcouldbenefit?• What if the first use of social media had been by a terrorist group for propaganda, and had been directly

implicatedinmajorterroristevents?Perhapsthenthepositioningofsociallicenceforthesetwotechnologieswouldhavebeenreversed.

ReferencesBero,L.A.(2005).Tobaccoindustrymanipulationof

research.PublicHealthRep,120(2),200-208.

Chalmers,D.,&Nicol,D.(2004).Commercialisationofbiotechnology:publictrustandresearch.Int.J.Biotechnology,6(2/3).

Cohen,J.(1994).TheDuesbergphenomenon.Science,266(5191),1642-1644.

Durbach,N.(2004).BodilyMatters:TheAnti-VaccinationMovementinEngland,1853-1907.Durham,NC:DukeUniversityPress.

Edwards,A.,Elwyn,G.,Covey,J.,Matthews,E.,&Pill,R.(2001).Presentingriskinformation--areviewoftheeffectsof"framing"andothermanipulationsonpatientoutcomes.JHealthCommun,6(1),61-82.doi:10.1080/10810730150501413

EPACancerAssessmentReviewCommittee.(2015).CancerAssessmentDocument:Evaluationofthecarcinogenicpotentialofglyphosate.RetrievedfromWashington,DC:

EuropeanFoodSafetyAuthority.(2015).Conclusiononthepeerreviewofthepesticideriskassessmentoftheactivesubstanceglyphosate.EFSAJournal,13(11).

Evans,J.S.,&Curtis-Holmes,J.(2005).Rapidrespondingincreasesbeliefbias:Evidenceforthedual-processtheoryofreasoning.Thinking&Reasoning,11(4),382-389.

Festinger,L.(1957).Atheoryofcognitivedissonance.Evanston,Ill.,:Row.

Fischer,F.(2000).Citizens,experts,andtheenvironment:Thepoliticsoflocalknowledge.Durham,N.C.:DukeUniversityPress.

Gluckman,P.D.(2012).ScienceandNewZealand’sFuture:ReflectionsfromtheTransitofVenusForum.Retrievedfromhttp://www.pmcsa.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/Transit-of-Venus-Forum-report.pdf

Gluckman,P.D.(2016).Makingdecisionsinthefaceofuncertainty:Understandingrisk.Retrievedfromhttp://www.pmcsa.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/PMCSA-Risk-Series-Paper-1_final_11May2016.pdf

Godlee,F.,Smith,J.,&Marcovitch,H.(2011).Wakefield'sarticlelinkingMMRvaccineand

autismwasfraudulent.BMJ,342,c7452.doi:10.1136/bmj.c7452

Gruning,T.,Gilmore,A.B.,&McKee,M.(2006).TobaccoindustryinfluenceonscienceandscientistsinGermany.AmJPublicHealth,96(1),20-32.doi:10.2105/AJPH.2004.061507

Guyton,K.Z.,Loomis,D.,Grosse,etal.InternationalAgencyforResearchonCancerMonographWorkingGroup,I.L.F.(2015).Carcinogenicityoftetrachlorvinphos,parathion,malathion,diazinon,andglyphosate.LancetOncol,16(5),490-491.doi:10.1016/S1470-2045(15)70134-8

Haughton,A.J.,Champion,G.T.,Hawes,C.,etal.(2003).Invertebrateresponsestothemanagementofgeneticallymodifiedherbicide-tolerantandconventionalspringcrops.II.Within-fieldepigealandaerialarthropods.PhilosTransRSocLondBBiolSci,358(1439),1863-1877.doi:10.1098/rstb.2003.1408

Howarth,C.C.,&Sharman,A.G.(2015).Labelingopinionsintheclimatedebate:acriticalreview.WIREsCimChange,6,239-254.

Jones,S.,&BBCTrust.(2011).ReviewofimpartialityandaccuracyoftheBBC’scoverageofscience.RetrievedfromLondon:http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/our_work/science_impartiality/science_impartiality.pdf

Kahan,D.M.(2007).Thecognitivelyilliberalstate.StanfordLawReview,60(1),115-154.

Kahan,D.M.,&Braman,D.(2006).Culturalcognitionandpublicpolicy.YaleLawPolicyRev,24(1),149-172.

Kahan,D.M.,Braman,D.,Slovic,P.,Gastil,J.,&Cohen,G.(2009).Culturalcognitionoftherisksandbenefitsofnanotechnology.NatNanotechnol,4(2),87-90.doi:10.1038/nnano.2008.341

Kahneman,D.(2011).Thinking,FastandSlow.NewYork:Farrar,StrausandGiroux.

Kahneman,D.,&Tversky,A.(1979).Prospecttheory:Ananalysisofdecisionunderrisk.Econometrica,47,263-291.

Kahneman,D.,&Tversky,A.(1982).Thepsychologyofpreference.ScientificAmerican,246,160-173.

Kortenkamp,K.V.,&Basten,B.(2015).Environmentalscienceinthemedia:Effectsofopposingviewpointsonriskanduncertaintyperception.SciCommunication,37(3),287-313.


25

Kuhn,T.S.(1962).Thestructureofscientificrevolutions.InternationalEncyclopediaofUnifiedScience,II(2).

Leviston,Z.,Walker,I.,&Morwinski,S.(2013).Youropiniononclimatechangemightnotbeascommonasyouthink.NatureClimateChange,3,334-337.

Lewandowsky,S.,Gignac,G.E.,&Oberauer,K.(2013).Theroleofconspiracistideationandworldviewsinpredictingrejectionofscience.PLoSOne,8(10),e75637.doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075637

Lofstedt,R.E.(2005).RiskManagementinPost-TrustSocieties.London:Earthscan.

Lord,C.G.,Ross,L.,&Lepper,M.R.(1979).BiasedAssimilationandAttitudePolarization-EffectsofPriorTheoriesonSubsequentlyConsideredEvidence.JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,37(11),2098-2109.doi:Doi10.1037/0022-3514.37.11.2098

Moller,N.,&Wikman-Svahn,P.(2011).Blackelephantsandblackswansofnuclearsafety.Ethics,Policy&Environment,14(3),273-278.

Moussaid,M.,Brighton,H.,&Gaissmaier,W.(2015).Theamplificationofriskinexperimentaldiffusionchains.ProcNatlAcadSciUSA,112(18),5631-5636.doi:10.1073/pnas.1421883112

Myers,J.P.,Antoniou,M.N.,Blumberg,B.,Carroll,L.,Colborn,T.,Everett,L.G.,...Benbrook,C.M.(2016).Concernsoveruseofglyphosate-basedherbicidesandrisksassociatedwithexposures:aconsensusstatement.EnvironHealth,15,19.doi:10.1186/s12940-016-0117-0

Nattrass,N.(2008).AIDSandtheScientificGovernanceofMedicineinPost-ApartheidSouthAfrica.AfricanAffairs,107(427),157-176.

NewYorkTimes.(2015).WashingtonStateProfessorallieswithorganicsindustry.Retrievedfromhttp://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/09/06/us/document-benbrook.html

Nicolia,A.,Manzo,A.,Veronesi,F.,&Rosellini,D.(2014).Anoverviewofthelast10yearsofgeneticallyengineeredcropsafetyresearch.CritRevBiotechnol,34(1),77-88.doi:10.3109/07388551.2013.823595

Panchin,A.Y.,&Tuzhikov,A.I.(2016).PublishedGMOstudiesfindnoevidenceofharmwhencorrectedformultiplecomparisons.CritRevBiotechnol,14January,1-5.

Pielke,R.(2007).Thehonestbroker:makingsenseofscienceinpolicyandpolitics.Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Ravetz,J.(2004).Thepost-normalscienceofprecaution.Futures,36,347-357.

Ropeik,D.(2016).Monsanto,biasedscientists,orthemedia:Whichonescaresyoumost?Retrievedfromhttp://bigthink.com/risk-reason-and-reality/pesticides-monsanto-biased-scientists-a-gullible-news-media-which-one-scares-you-the-most

Sandman,P.M.(1989).Hazardversusoutrageinthepublicperceptionofrisk.InV.T.Covello,D.B.McCallum,&M.T.Pavlova(Eds.),EffectiveRiskCommunication:TheroleandresponsibilityofGovernmentandnongovernentalorganizations.NewYorkandLondon:PlenumPress.

Temple,W.(2016).Reviewofevidencerelatingtoglyphosateandcarcinogenicity.RetrievedfromWellington:

Thornton,I.W.B.(1997).Krakatau:TheDestructionandReassemblyofanIslandEcosystem.Cambridge,MA:HavardUniversityPress.

Wakefield,A.J.,Murch,S.H.,Anthony,A.,Linnell,J.,Casson,D.M.,Malik,M.,...Walker-Smith,J.A.(1998).Ileal-lymphoid-nodularhyperplasia,non-specificcolitis,andpervasivedevelopmentaldisorderinchildren.Lancet,351(9103),637-641.

Wright,J.(2011).Evaluatingtheuseof1080:Predators,poisonsandsilentforests.Wellington:ParliamentaryCommissionerfortheEnvironment.


26

GlossaryAmbiguitySituationswherethelikelihood(probability)ofeachoutcomeisunknown(see‘decisionsunderuncertainty)BiasAparticulartendency,trend,inclination,feeling,oropinion,especiallyonethatispreconceivedorunreasoned.Cognitivebiasescancauseustomakedecisionsorreachconclusionsthatdonotalignwithfactsandlogic.ConsequenceInriskassessmentterms,consequenceistheoutcomeofaneventthathasaneffect(positiveornegative)onpeopleand/orassetsDecisionsunderrisk/decisionsunderuncertaintyThesetwotermsareusedinsomesectors:‘decisionsunderrisk’assumesthattheprobabilitiesofoutcomesareknowabletosomeextent,whereas‘decisionsunderuncertainty’occurwhentheprobabilities,andpossiblytheoutcomesthemselves,areunknowable.EventAneventcouldbeoneoccurrence,severaloccurrences,orevenanonoccurrence(whensomethingdoesn’thappenthatwassupposedtohappen).Itcanalsobeachangeincircumstances.Eventsaresometimesreferredtoasincidentsoraccidents.ExposurePeople,property,systems,orotherassetspresentinhazardzonesorexposedtohazardsthataretherebysubjecttopotentiallosses.HazardAnintrinsiccapacitytocauseharm.Ahazardcanbeanevent,entity,phenomenonorhumanactivity,andcanbesingle,sequentialorcombinedwithotherhazardsinitsoriginandeffects.Eachhazardischaracterisedbyitstiming,location,intensityandprobability.Theoriginofhazardscanbenatural(geological,hydro-meteorologicalandbiological)orinducedbyhumanactivity(environmentaldegradationandtechnologicalhazards),andincludelatentconditionsortrendsthatmayrepresentfuturethreats.Probability(Likelihood)Probabilityisdefinedasthelikelihoodofahazardoccurringorthechanceofahazardhappening.Probabilityisusuallydescribedquantitativelyasaratio(e.g.1in10),percentage(e.g.10%)orvaluebetween0and1(e.g.0.1),orqualitativelyusingdefinedandagreedtermssuchasunlikely,almostcertain,possibleetc.RiskRiskisdefinedasthelikelihoodandconsequencesofahazard.Riskcanalsobedescribedastheeffectofuncertaintyonobjectives(RiskManagementStandardISO31000RiskassessmentTheprocessofevaluatingthelikelihoodandconsequenceofahazardousevent.Riskassessmentinvolveshazardidentification,riskcharacterization,likelihood/probabilityestimation,andconsequenceanalysis.RiskattitudeAperson’sororganisation’sgeneralapproachtorisk,influenceshowrisksareassessedandaddressed(i.e.whetherornotrisksaretaken,tolerated,reducedoravoided).RiskreductionRiskreductionreferstoeffortstodecreaseinriskthroughriskavoidance,riskcontrol,orrisktransfer–thiscanbeaccomplishedbyreducingvulnerabilityand/orconsequences


27

ResidualriskTheriskthatremainsafterrisktreatmenthasbeenappliedtoreducethepotentialconsequences.ResilienceResiliencemeansbeingshock-ready,andhavingtheabilitytoresist,survive,adaptand/oreventhriveinresponsetoshocksandstresses.Resiliencecanbedefinedintermsofsocietal,economic,infrastructure,environmental,culturalcapital,socialcapital,and/orgovernancecomponents.ShockTheterm‘shock’isusedtodenoteasudden,disruptiveeventwithanimportantandoftennegativeimpactonasystem/sanditsassets.Sociallicense‘Sociallicensetooperate’generallyreferstotheacceptanceorapprovalbyalocalcommunityofacompany'sprojectorongoingpresenceinanarea.Itisincreasinglyrecognizedbyvariousstakeholdersandcommunitiesasaprerequisitetodevelopment.Theneedtogainandmaintainsociallicensecompelsindustrieswithpotentialdetrimentalsocialorenvironmentalimpactstoprovetheywillactresponsiblyinordertoavoidchallenge.StressAstressisalongterm,chronicissuewithanimportantandoftennegativeimpactonasystem/sanditsparts.SystemAsystemisdefinedassetofthingsworkingtogetheraspartsofaninterconnectingnetwork;acomplexwholee.g.society(individual,community,nation),theenvironmentandphysicalentities(e.g.infrastructure).ThreatAthreatisapotentiallydamagingphysicalevent,phenomenonoractivityofanintentional/maliciouscharacter.Itisaman-madeoccurrence,individual,entity,oractionthathasthepotentialtoharmlife,information,operations,theenvironment,and/orpropertyVulnerabilityThecharacteristicsandcircumstancesofanasset(populations,systems,communities,thebuiltdomain,thenaturaldomain,economicactivitiesandservices,trustandreputation)thatmakeitsusceptibleto,orprotectedfrom,theimpactsofahazardWorldviewTheoverallperspectivefromwhichoneseesandinterpretstheworld.Aparticularphilosophy(collectionofbeliefs)onlifeheldbyanindividualoragroup.

making decisions in the face of uncertainty: · pdf fileoffice of the prime minister’s...

Documents