managing ‘mega’ projects-and programmes

42
Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes. Project Managers Network https ://www.ops2020.gov.ie/pmn Michael Nolan CEO TII 28 May 2020 1

Upload: others

Post on 20-May-2022

17 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes.

Project Managers Network

https://www.ops2020.gov.ie/pmn

Michael Nolan CEO TII 28 May 2020

1

Page 2: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

Agenda• Roads Programme Partnership

• Context

• TII Cost Forecasting Processes- Roads

• De- Risking the Roads Programme.

• Measuring Cost Performance

• Realisation of Benefits

• The value of data

• Reference Class Forecasting – Public Spending Code

• Why Bother?2

Page 3: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

• Local authorities are the road authorities for all roads including national roads.

• Generally, TII’s national roads functions discharged through local authorities except for PPP roads and motorway service areas

• TII supports and works closely with a network of eleven local authority National Roads Offices .

• The delivery of the Roads Programme depends on this partnership.

Partnership With Local Authorities

3

Page 4: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

4

Page 5: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

5

Page 6: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

6

Page 7: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

7

Page 8: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

8

Page 9: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

Cost performance

Page 10: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

TII Cost forecasting Processes- Roads

• Experienced Cost Management expertise

• Outturn Cost Data Captured and Analysed Centrally

• Data for “Benchmarking”• Centralised Cost Rates Database• Clear, uncomplicated cost

forecasting approach -7 headings on a single budget sheet.

10

Page 11: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

De Risking the Roads Programme

• IFA Agreement –early access to site

11

Page 12: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

De Risking the Roads Programme

• Advance Archaeology Resolution

12

Page 13: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

De Risking the Roads Programme

• Advance works

13

Page 14: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

De Risking the Roads Programme

• Design & Build Contract Forms

14

Page 15: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

De Risking the Roads Programme

• Standardisation & Efficiencies

15

Page 16: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

Measuring Cost performanceMean Construction Cost /km Trend Vs Capital Goods Index (Materials & Wages)

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20100

2,000,000

4,000,000

6,000,000

8,000,000

10,000,000

12,000,000

Year

Mea

n Co

nstru

ctio

n Co

st/ k

m (€

)

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

Capi

tal G

oods

Inde

x (Va

lue)

Capital Goods Index (Materials and Wages) Mean Construction Cost /km (Trend) in Completion Year Values

16

Page 17: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

Measuring Cost performance

• Analysis of data and outcomes

17

Page 18: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

Realisation of Benefits

Note: In 2019 there were 51 fatal road traffic collisions resulting in 53 fatalities on national roads.

YearNational Road Fatal

Collisions2005 1302006 1282007 1302008 1012009 722010 832011 642012 512013 612014 672015 602016 762017 482018 502019 51

Fatal Road Traffic Collisions on National Roads (2005 – 2019)

18

Page 19: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

79

157145

205

125

48

104 105

128

86

N1 M50 - Border N4/N6 M50 - Galway N7 M50 - Limerick N7/N8 M50 - Cork N7/N9 M50 - Waterford

1999 2013

Realisation of BenefitsJourney Time Reduction

Page 20: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

Impact of road investment on employment accessibility 2006-2013

Improved ConnectionsRealisation of Benefits

Page 21: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

The value of data

• Use of centrally held data to identify reference class

21

Page 22: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

The value of data Analysis of data and outcomes

22

Page 23: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

The value of data

• Analysis of data and outcomes

23

Page 24: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

24

Public Spending Code - Reference Class Forecasting

Page 25: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

Reference Class Forecasting for National Roads

25

Page 26: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

Reference Class Forecasting : What is it?

• Predictors adopt an inside-view, which tries to extrapolate future performance based on current trends

• Predictions are overly optimistic, overestimating benefits, underestimating costs and completion times

• RCF is a forecasting technique that can be used in conjunction with, or as a substitution to other traditional forecasting techniques such as regression analysis

• Instead of making predictions about the case at hand, RCF builds classes of similar cases about which we already know the outcomes, RCF then uses those classes to make more accurate predictions of performance, including costs and benefits forecasts as well as completion times

• Introduces an unbiased, outside view, ignoring the details of the case at hand

• Reduces human error and judgement• Provides a prediction of success or failure based on

similar real-world cases

• RCF was developed from the work of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman in 1979• It has been endorsed by the American Planning Association• RCF is used by U.K., Hong Kong and Australian governments for large infrastructure projects• It is also used by investment banks as well as consulting firms to make predictions in large infrastructure projects, IT Projects,

M&A and market entry decisions

WHAT IS REFERENCE CLASS FORECASTING

KEY ISSUES WITH COMMON APPROACHES RCF BENEFITS

WHO USES RCF

Source: ICG analysis26

Page 27: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

Inaccurate forecasts often come from the use of an ”Inside View”

Source: Thinking Fast and Slow, by Daniel Kahneman, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011

THE INSIDE VIEW

• When making prediction about a case at hand, e.g.

estimating costs, revenues and completion time, we tend

to focus only on the case at hand, disregarding

information about past projects for which the outcomes

are known

• The inside view is the natural approach in making

forecasts

• This leads to a series of cognitive biases

COGNITIVE BIASES ASSOCIATED WITH THE INSIDE VIEW

• Cognitive biases are systematic errors in thinking

processes

• Some of these cognitive biases are

1. Planning fallacy: the tendency to underestimate the

duration and cost of an endeavour

2. Optimism bias: the tendency to be overly optimistic

when making predictions

3. Over confidence: the tendency of decision makers to

overestimate their abilities

4. Anchoring bias: the tendency to rely heavily on the

first prediction or even random numbers in

subsequent predictions

27

Page 28: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

Reference Class Forecasting overcomes the drawbacks of the Inside View by adopting the so-called “Outside View”

Source: Thinking Fast and Slow, by Daniel Kahneman, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011

THE OUTSIDE VIEW

• The Outside View provides solutions to the problems of the Inside View

• Ignores the specific knowledge that you have to the inner workings of your case and looks at the case from an unbiased perspective

HOW THE OUTSIDE VIEW WORKS

• Ignores the details of the case at hand and makes no attempt to forecast the outcome of the case

• Focuses on the statistics of a class of cases chosen to be similar in relevant respects to the case at hand

• Requires deliberate intentions to compare the case at hand to outcomes of previous cases

• Minimizes the adverse impact of cognitive biases

28

Page 29: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

Reference Class Forecasting follows a three step process

Source: ICG analysis. See also Delusion and Deception in Large Infrastructure Projects: Two Models for Explaining and Preventing Executive Disaster, by Flyvbjerg, Bent, Garbuio, Massimo and Dan Lovallo, California Management Review, 2009

Create a reference class Identify the best approach to use to build the predictions Construct predictions

• Can be built with limited data and cases from other similar ventures

• Should include both successful and unsuccessful cases

• Reference class should share key characteristics to the case at hand

• These key characteristics should be driven by theoretical and empirical studies on what is likely to work in that type of projects

• This step can take various approaches, with different levels of complexity, including

1. Identifying the values of the parameter that is to be forecasted

2. Building a probability distribution for the parameter that is to be forecasted

3. Building similarity weights that will assess to what extent the cases in the reference class are similar to the case at hand

• Estimations should be performed by unbiased experts and not the analysts who build the reference class

• Depending on the approach used in the previous step:

1. Use the average of the parameter to make predictions about the case at hand

2. Places the project at hand in a statistical distribution of outcomes from the class of reference projecs

3. If you have built similarity weights, apply weights to reference cases based on similarity to the current case

• Compare the predictions from RCF to the predictions of the inside view

29

Page 30: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes
Page 31: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

31

Page 32: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

Supplementary Slides- if time allows

32

Page 33: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

33

Page 34: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

In the news

• 8 out of 10 cost overruns

• 1 in 3 by more than 50%

34

Presenter
Presentation Notes
Amsterdam Nord Zuid Lijn original budget   €1.4bn, final cost likely to be €3.1bn (+120%) Work started in 2002, and was due to end in 2011 but massive buildings subsidence problems along the way. Metro Line C Roma 2004 3bn , 2012 3.5bn. 2018 4.3bn and still counting (+43%) Schedule tender started in 2005, mobilisation in 2007, section opening in 2015 no forecast for overall completion So, risk of being “Over budget, over time, under benefits, over and over again.” October 2018, six months before the NCH we engaged Bent, Alex and the team to develop methodology for MetroLink.
Page 35: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

Comparison of overruns in transport projects

Cost overrun (mean)

Frequency of cost overrun

Schedule overrun (mean)

Frequency of schedule overrun Sample size (n)

Metro +47% 77% +55% 63% 189

Roads +24% 72% +20% 71% 1,834

Bridges +27% 64% +23% 68% 96

Tunnels +38% 73% +22% 50% 75

Rail +29% 70% +25% 56% 257

35

Presenter
Presentation Notes
Metro cost overrun 2x roads and frequency higher than all other transport projects Schedule overrun even worse Time = money CR prolongation cost 30m per week
Page 36: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

Cost forecasting methodology

36

Presenter
Presentation Notes
Mature design (also for construction methodology, environmental controls and mitigations) Inside view Base cost Direct works, indirect costs and client costs. Developed by Jacobs/Idom and independently verified by Turner &Townsend and Chandler KBS . QRA - forecast risk exposure to provide an allowance to cover the potential impact of risk events occurring and identifying key areas of risk Outside view RCF Identify relevant reference class of past, similar projects. Establish probability distribution for that class. Compare specific project with distribution to establish most likely outcome. Role of expert judgement – to assess specificities of MetroLink, take the view on risk appetite, test key assumptions CBA – the culmination of the forecast is to inform a robust BC
Page 37: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

Emerging Metro Reference Class

P-level Uplift (%)

P80 TBA

P50 TBA

P30 TBA

37

Presenter
Presentation Notes
Unlike roads colleagues we do not have enough data on metro projects in Ireland Risk appetite and use of P-levels P80 at portfolio level P50 at project level P30 at contract level
Page 38: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

Cost variance at contract level

Different variances and average overruns by contract

Stations - key driver for overruns

Effect of integration not considered

38

Presenter
Presentation Notes
This suggests we need to break down further asset into classes Contracts for stations average overrun over 30% range from 15% to 50%
Page 39: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes
Page 40: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

Following a review of recent and relevantliterature, the methodology as set out by theInfrastructure and Projects Authority (IPA) UKGovernance Routemap was chosen as the mostappropriate guideline. This Routemap presents adual approach to validate a chosen governanceframework: bottom-up and top-down.

In line with this methodology of validation, TII undertook a reviewof recent reports on infrastructure mega-projects and extractedareas of concern. In Section 4, we set out areas of concern andthe manner in which concerns are addressed in the currentgovernance framework.

Review of literature and lessons learned from other projects

Page 41: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

Governance Framework - Decision making architecture & RACI matrix

Milestones and decisionpoints

Designer PM Team

ML Project Director

Expert Panel

ML Project Board

TII CEO

Viability of the programme

Affordability of the programme

Preferred Route

Production of cost forecast

Definition and realisation of benefits

Recommendation on risk appetite and appropriate

P-level

Presenter
Presentation Notes
Response from NTA (reflect role of Board) Response from DTTaS – sought advice from Jaspers – similar conclusions - looking into the formation of monitoring committee – when are we getting endorsement The RACI matrix for MetroLink describes the decision-making architecture and authority. Information is central to all programme activities. The responsibility for information rests at the level where it was created or should have been created. Project team members demonstrate accountability through production and safeguarding of accurate, unbiased and comprehensive information for their work areas. The quality of programme decision-making is dependent on the quality of information provided to decision-makers. Stakeholders require information that provides clarity around their areas of concern. Proper oversight demands that programme information is communicated through regular and well-structured reporting. programme information must also withstand scrutiny and challenge at the highest level. Overall, proper stewardship of programme information will contribute to successful programme delivery.
Page 42: Managing ‘Mega’ Projects-and Programmes

42