manchester rapid transit study, volume 1
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Manchester Rapid Transit Study, volume 1. Report of the Working Party, Sept. 1967TRANSCRIPT
Manchester rapid transit study
Volume 1
Report of the Working Party
September, 1967
THE MIN I S TRY 0 F TRANS P 0 RT. MANCHESTER C 0 RP 0 RAT I 0 N , BRITISH ' RAILWAY S
Manchester Rapid Transit Study, Volume 1 Report of the Working Party, Sept. 1967
This report has been digitised by Martin Dodge from
the Department of Geography, University of
Manchester. The digitisation was supported by the
Manchester Statistical Society’s Campion Fund.
Permission to digitise and release the report under
Creative Commons license was kindly granted by
Manchester Libraries, Information and Archives,
Manchester City Council.
(Email: [email protected])
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License. 20 April 2014.
Copies available from MANCHESTER CITY TRANSPORT,
2 Devonshire Street North . Ardw ick . Manchester, 12.
Copyright Reserved.
Printed by The William M orris Press Ltd.
Wythenshawe, Manchester. 22.
Price £2. 2s. Od.
Plans based upon Ordnance Survey map reproduced with the sanction of the Controller of H.M. Stationery Office.
Manchester rapid transit study
Commissioned jointly by:
The Corporation of Manchester ;
The Ministry of Transport;
in association with British Railways.
Consulting Engineers:
De Leuw Cather & Partners in
association with Hennessey,
Chadwick, 0 hEocha & Partners.
Volume 1
Report of the Working Party
I
Manchester rapid transit study MEMBERS OF THE WORKING PARTY
CHAIRMAN: R. F. Bennett,
General Manager,
Manchester City Transport
MEMBERS : Lieut. Col. I. K. A. McNaughton- Headquarters
D. J. Lyness- Headquarters
}
Ministry
of
Transport
CO-OPTED MEMBER:
J . D. Wallace, Divisional Road Engineer, North West
C. P. Millard, Divisional Manager. Manchester
F. W. Young, Assistant Planning Manager
J. Hayes, City Engineer & Surveyor
J . S. Millar, City Planning Officer
H. R. Page, City Treasurer
D. McCorquodale,
Project Manager of the
Feasibility Study
HONORARY Town Clerk of Manchester
SECRETARIES: Sir Philip B. Dingle, C.B.E.,
(to July 1966)
G. C. Ogden, C.B.E.,
(from July, 1966)
}
London Midland
Region
British Railways
Manchester
Corporation
}
Representing
the
Consultants
The Working Party wish to thank the very many persons in the Ministry, British Railways, and the Corporation who have
contributed to the Study, and in particular the following who were directly engaged in the work of the Study and in the
preparation of the Report:
City Planning Dept.: J Dean
R. P. Ross
City Engineer's Dept.: A. W. Egan
W. A. Lewis
City Transport Dept.: E. H. Stiff,
H. Gibbon
G. Watson
British Railways: F. Mitchell
Artist's impression of Duorail rapid transit for Manchester, prepared by Associated Electrical Industries and Metropolitan Gammell
Contents
Page
Frontispiece
Section 1 Introduction Summary and Recommendations
1 .1. Introduction 13
1.2. Summary of Main Conclusions 13
1.3. Recommendations 15
Section 2 Manchester's Structure and Transport System
2.1. Manchester and the Conurbation 19
2.2. Preservation of the Central Area 19
2.3. The Transport System 19
2.4. The Need for an Improved Public Passenger Transport System 28
2.5. Difficulties Facing Public Transport 28
2.6. The Case for Rapid Transit 28
Section 3 A Rapid Transit System
3.1. The Consultants 33
3.2. The Consultants' Terms of Reference 33
3.3. Systems Studied 33
3.4. Final List for Evaluation 38
3.5. The Route 38
3.6. Costs 39
3.7. Effect of Reducing Route Length 39
3.8. Special Study of '2-mile' Elevated Route 41
3.9. Civil Engineering Costs 42
3.10. Rolling Stock 42
3.11. Operating Costs 42
3.12. Stations 42
3.13. Quality of Estimates 42
3.14. Underground or Overhead? The Environmental Problem 42
3.15. Final Choice of System for Manchester 43
7
Contents Figures Index
Page Page Page
Section 4 The Potential of t he Existing Public Frontispiece Artist's impression of Duorail rapid 3.8. Westinghouse vehicle and test track 39
Transport System transit for Manchester 3.9. Total annual cost (operating, maintenance and
4.1. Studies Commissioned 49 1.1. A possible rail rapid transit network 14 debt charges) and annual maintenance and operating expense 41
4.2. Possible Improvements to the 2.1. Individual local authorities and major central Suburban Rail System 49 business areas in the conurbation 20 3.10. Photo-montage comparing visual impact in a
4.3. Feeder Bus Services and Station 2.2. Urbanisation of the area over the last 120 years 21 low density residential area (structures seen at 25 feet and 50 feet) 44
Improvements 51 2.3. Main concentrations of employment in the
3.11. Photo-montage comparing visual impact in a 4.4. Traffic Management and Bus Operation 53 central area, and their relationship to bus
routes and railway stations 22 low density residential area (structures seen at
4.5. Restraint of Traffic at Peak Periods- 100 feet and 150 feet) 45
Parking Policy 55 2.4. Growth in numbers of vehicles and car ownership 23 4.1 . Railway links showing alternatives 'A', 'B'
and 'C' 57
Section 5 T he Future for Public Transport 2.5. Railway network 24 5.1. A possible primary transportation network for
5.1. Results of Studies 61 2.6. SELNEC highway plan 26 Manchester In pocket at back
5.2. Parking Policy 63 2.7. Network of bus services 29 5.2. Concept of Duorail vehicle for Manchester,
5.3. The Development of Rail Rapid Transit 63 2.8. Lost bus miles 30 prepared by Associated Electrical Industries and Metropolitan Cammell 61
3.1. Safege prototype vehicle 34 5.3. Concept of Duorail vehicle for Manchester,
3.2. Safege beamway and vehicle suspension 35 prepared by Associated Electrical Industries and Metropolitan Cammell 62
3.3. Duorail, steel wheel on steel rai l 36
Guided Busway, standard buses with side 5.4. Duorail concept of vehicle interior for
3.4. Manchester, prepared by Associated Electrical guidance 36 Industries and Metropolitan Cammell 63
3.5. Alweg train, Seattle 37 Station interior, Montreal 64 5.5.
3.6. Alweg vehicle suggested for use in Station interior, Montreal 64 Manchester 37 5.6.
3.7. Westinghouse vehicle and test track, Pittsburgh 38 5.7. Shops in station mezzanine, Toronto 65
9 8
Tables Index
Page
2.1. Summary of parking accommodation in and around the central area 25
2.2. Cities which have or are constructing rapid transit systems 27
2.3. Cities without rapid transit where stud ies are in progress 28
2.4. Traffic trends - London Transport 30
3.1. Comparative cost of special busways 34
3.2. Attitude considered for systems evaluation 39
3.3. Capital cost- 16-mile route 40
3.4. Annual maintenance and operating costs-16-mile route 40
3.5. Total annual cost-16-mile route 40
3.6. Cost comparison- 16-mile and 9-mile routes 39
3.7. Cost estimates for '2-mile' study 41
3.8. Comparison of systems 46
4.1 . Carrying capacities of railway lines 50
4.2. Cost estimates - railway improvements 51
4.3. Survey of Altrincham line 52
4.4. Comparative costs-busways and duorail 54
10
INTRODUCTION, SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Section one
Introduction, Summary and Recommendations
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The Working Party was constituted in June 1966, following a decision by Manchester City Council and the Ministry of Transport to commission Consultants to undertake a comparative study of various forms of rapid transit* for Manchester.
The terms of reference were :
(a) to supervise the work of the Consultants.
(b) to examine ways in which the existing road and rail public passenger transport services in Manchester might be improved.
The main objective has been to find out, within the limits of time and resources available, how to improve public passenger transport to the centre of the city, especially at peak periods. Everyone who travels at these times knows how the bus services have deteriorated in recent years through the effects of severe traffic congestion. Many are also aware of the arguments, given publicity in this country by the Buchanan Report, that there is not the space in our bia cities for more than a small proportion of people who work in the centre to travel to their work by private car. The truth of this is borne out by experience in North American cities where massive investment in urban highways has failed to solve the peak hour traffic problem, and where great efforts are now being made to revive public transport.
Although there is widespread appreciation of the need to improve public passenger transport, there seems to be relatively little reliable information and certainly no agreement on how this can best be done. To some the word 'monorail' has magical properties; others pin their faith on 'banning private cars'. If progress is to be made, those responsible for planning our larger cities must have more information on the practical possibilities of improvements to public passenger transport. How do the various new systems perform; what can be done at modest cost and what might be achieved with greater investment ; what is involved for people and for the urban environment? There is a need too for greater awareness of the complexity of the problem and of the action that is essential if the centres of our biggest cities are to survive as places of dense employment and activity.
It is hoped that the Manchester Rapid Transit Study will help answer some of these questions. The Consultants' report, which is published in full as Volume 2 of this Study,
*Rapid Transit, i.e., public passenger transport operating on its own reserved track with close station spacing and frequent services. The London Underground and tube network and the Glasgow underground railway are the only existing rapid transit systems in this country, although some British Rai l suburban services approach rapid transit standards.
examines and compares various rapid transit systems, including monorails, and provides detailed information of their costs and other characteristics. Section 3 of this Volume 1 summarises the Consultants' main conclusions. The examination of the potential of existing road and rail public passenger transport services by officers of the City of Manchester and British Rail shows how the suburban rail services cou ld be improved by such measures as station car parks, feeder bus services, re-equipment and the construction of links under the city centre. This part of the Study also considers various ways of providing better road conditions for buses. The results are summarised in Section 4 of this Volume. The conclusions from Section 3 and Section 4 are considered in Section 5.
This Study points the road ahead but does not conclude with a specific and detailed plan for a complete rapid transit network, nor does it make out a detailed economic case for specific investments in public passenger transport. There are general arguments, put forward in Section 2, which point to the conclusion that a rapid transit system will be needed in Manchester, as indeed has been found to be necessary for other cities of comparable size and development all over the world . The social and economic benefits of such a system are indeed obvious and of great magnitude but the Working Party did not have the time, information or techniques at its disposal for making accurate assessments of the benefits to travellers and to the prosperity of Manchester, which would result from specific investments in rapid transit; neither was it possible to quantify the social and economic harm to the area which would result from failure to make these investments.
A major land-use/transportation study for the South East Lancashire/ North East Cheshire (SELNEC) area is in progress, with the object of producing by the end of 1968, a tentative strategic transportation plan covering highways and publ ic passenger transport for the year 1981 . The SELNEC study will provide much of the basic information required to evaluate the benefits, and specific proposals for rapid transit development will have to be justified in the light of this plan.
1 .2 SUMMARY OF MAIN CONCLUSIONS
(i) Although only 15% of those who work in Central Manchester now come to work by car, there is acute traffic congestion at the peak hour, especia lly in the winter months. Congestion prevents the buses keeping regular schedules, and the bus services-used by the great majority of central area workers- are giving a progressively worse service to the public.
(ii) As bus services get less reliable and as more people come to own cars, more will want to use them for the
13
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UPGRADED ALTlllNCttAM & WILMSLOW SUIJORBAN •IN(
POSSIBLE NORTtt SOUftt {NEW COM~lRUC110N RAPID TRANSIT SYSTEM
USINQ BAlllSH RAIL fRACI(
14
BURY BOLTON ST -----·-
MANCHESTER AIRPORT
1JtL MSLOW
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MA~CHESTEA
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CllCAOLE •lC:AfH
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1 .1 - A possible rail rapid transit network
. ~ journey to work. But future increases in road capacity over the next few years will be fully taken up by the anticipated growth of business and industrial traffic. Even in the long term the space that can be provided for roads and parking, while preserving the character of the city centre, will not allow more than 25-30% of people to commute by car.
yii) As car ownership grows, as industry in the centre is V replaced by offices and as new residential areas are developed
at greater distances from the centre, the commuter of the future will demand and will deserve public passenger transport services of higher standards of comfort, convenience and speed. If these are not provided the future prosperity of Central Manchester as a regional centre of employment will decline.
(iv) There are very great difficulties in bringing bus services up to the required standards for radial journeys during the peak periods. Traffic management schemes can only exceptionally be designed to give buses a major advantage. Special facilities for buses such as reserved stretches of road or tunnel have only limited application and are extremely expensive to construct. A parking policy aimed at reducing all-day parking space and giving priority to uses such as shopping and business calls outside the peak hour, can have some impact on peak hour traffic congestion. All measures to alleviate the conditions under which ordinary buses operate should be pursued, but they cannot be expected to do more than halt the present trend of deterioration in bus services. They will not achieve any radical improvement to public transport for long journeys to the city centre.
(v) Other conurbations throughout the world comparable in size and development to Manchester have similar traffic problems. Many have decided that these can be solved only by putting more public transport onto its own reserved tracks. Those with old rapid transit systems are extending and modernising them. Most others have decided to build or are investigating new systems.
(vi) Of all developed rapid transit systems, a modern urban electric railway (Duorail) is preferable for Manchester on grounds of cost, proved reliability and compatibility with the existing suburban rail system. If an entirely overhead route had been acceptable the Consultants' report indicates that the various monorail systems, and especially Alweg, would have been competitive with a railway. In the Working Party's view an overhead route would not be acceptable in the densely built-up inner area of Manchester because of the visual intrusion of the structure and the noise of passing trains. Where an overhead structure can be accepted, that required to support a railway is no more intrusive than the various monorail structures. Architectural treatment and quality of construction are visually far more important than the inherent shape of the structure necessary for any particular system.
(vii) On the 16-mile route investigated by the Consultants, underground construction is recommended for the central
five miles. The estimated capital cost of constructing and equipping a railway to rapid transit standards, with a capacity of 30,000 passengers per hour, would be £61,000,000 for the whole 16-mile route, or £43,000,000 for the central section of 9 miles on which most of the traffic would be generated.
(viii) A rapid transit system for Manchester could most economically be developed by taking the maximum advantage of British Rail rights of way. The linking of suburban lines, and the construction of new lines, would be a major investment which would need to be considered in the context of the SELN EC Transportation Study but whatever rapid transit network may be recommended in the study it would take at least five years to design and construct the first stage, which would be certain to involve a tunnel under the city centre.
(ix) It would take many more years to develop a network to serve the main corridors. Thus the great weight of demand for central commuting will have to be met by buses for many years. Even with a developed rail system, buses would have a major role in feeding the railway system and providing services for cross-town journeys, local journeys and along radial corridors not served by rail. Thus the possibility of rail development does not affect the need for urgent measures to help alleviate the road conditions under which buses operate.
1.3 RECOMMENDATIONS
(a) In view of the evidence that a rail rapid transit system is needed for the Manchester area, consultants should be retained to:
(i) investigate possible realistic rail rapid transit networks (such as those illustrated in Figure 1.1)
' with a view to determining performance character-istics, capital and continuing costs and quality of service to the public.
(ii) undertake the detailed planning of any central section which could be constructed as a first stage of development.
(b) The SELNEC Transportation Study should be pursued with all possible speed so as to evaluate suburban rail, rapid transit, and bus services as part of a detailed land use/transportation plan for the whole conurbation designed to make the best possible use of limited resources for investment in transport and urban renewal.
(c) To improve the quality of peak hour bus services, present car parking policies should be so phased that greater priority is given to short period parking for shopping and business calls, at the expense of the all day parker.
15
I
• .
MANCHESTER'S STRUCTURE AND
TRANSPORT SYSTEM
T Section two
Manchester's Structure and Transport System
-·· 2.1 MANCHESTER AND THE CONURBATION
Manchester (population 600,000 plus) is the largest city within the SELN EC conurbation (population 2f millions), an area covering some 470 square miles. Figure 2.1 shows the individual local authorities in the area, and the important town centres.
The structure of the conurbation is largely a result of industrial development in the last two centuries which has made the area a world centre for the cotton industry and engineering. Figure 2.2 illustrates the dramatic urbanisation of the last 120 years and shows how once individual market towns have grown together into almost continuous built-up areas though population is unevenly distributed. Until the 1920's growth largely followed the tracks of publ ic transport facilities (both suburban railways and trams) which developed on a radial pattern with Manchester as the dominant centre. After the first world war the move towards better housing standards, lower residential densities, and the replacement of trams by buses led to development between main radial roads. More recently, the growth in motor-car ownership has enabled some residential development to be sited with little regard to public transport services.
The central area of Manchester has become the commercial, shopping, educational, cultural and entertainment centre both of the conurbation and of a wider region within the North West. About 160,000 people work in this area of less than 2 square miles and a larger area of 12 square miles in and around the centre provides jobs for about 280,000. Figure 2.3 shows the main concentrations of employment in the central area and their relationship to bus routes and railway stations.
The main trends in land-use development are:
(a) the decline of industry and warehousing, the growth in offices and the development of the higher education precinct in and around the central area ;
(b) the clearance of slums in the inner suburbs, and the subsequent development at lower densities of new municipal housing mainly at some distance from the City Centre;
(c) the growth of private housing in North East Cheshire and in areas north of Manchester; and
{d} the greater concentration of shopping in local centres.
2.2 PRESERVATION OF THE CENTRAL AREA
Because some people argue that decentralisation is inevitable once traffic congestion and the difficulties of finding parking space reach a certain level, it may be useful to
summarise why the Working Party took as a basic assumption that it is intended to preserve the city centre as the focal point of activity.
Manchester's centre, like the central area of other major cities, has grown and changed in response to regional and national ecdnomic pressures. This has been evident over the years, and while the size and function of the city centre has altered, the location has not shifted; at all times it has been the point of maximum accessibility. The components of a central area do change, and in recent years there has been a decline in the industrial and warehousing functions of many cities, and a rapid increase in the amount of office floor space. Nevertheless, with the growth in motor-car ownership and the increasing congestion in central areas and also, in part, arising from improvements in telecom ~ munications, there are now factors which could stimulate growth of a kind normally associated with city centres at points away from the historic cores of our urban regions. In recent years proposals have been put forward to build offices and shops outside central areas on a scale previously considered unique to conurbation centres. The North American city centre has shown a notable deoree of resilience, despite the development of shopping and commercial areas outside it.
In the City of Manchester about 30% of the rateable value is in the central area which comprises only 3% of the total area, but the preservation of the central area is important not only in terms of rateable value. The life of the whole area around Manchester would clearly be poorer if the vitality of the city centre were sapped. Suburban centres, because of the limited population on which they can draw, can never support the wide variety of specialised shops and services which thrive in a busy city centre. Furthermore, art galleries, museums, theatres, symphony orchestras, and other cultural institutions rely for their existence on their accessibility to concentrations of population. Western civilisation, from the classical era onwards, has depended for its advancement on the concept of 'living in cities'. Whilst it is clear that the basic functions of a city centre are worth preserving, it is also clear that the transportation needs of such a city centre cannot be met on the basis of private transport alone. A choice has to be made between preserving the central area and permitting the unrestrained use of the private motor car. If we want cities to be all that they can be, good public transport is essential.
2.3 THE TRANSPORT SYSTEM
Growth in numbers of vehicles and car ownership is illustrated in Figure 2.4 which shows the anticipated
19
t County Boroughs
Municipal Boroughs
Urban Districts
8ural Districts
0 3<1'iles
SALFORD
Hyde
HORWICH .
FOOTNOTE. POPULATION FIGURES ARE 1965 MID- YEAR ESTIMATES
2.1 - lndividual local authorities and major central business areas in the conurbation
20
1890
1924 1965
2.2-Urbanisation of the area over last 120 years 21
1 I
Persons per Acre
0- 62
ttftf~ 126 - 250
- 251 - 500
- 501-1000
111111111111001 -2000
--Bus Routes
S.i1lorcJ S1,~
0 IM1le
2.3- Main concentrations of employment tn the central area. and their relationship to bus routes and railway stations
22
-
increase in the SELN EC area. It will be seen that by 1981 there will be one car to every three persons. The network of main roads and railways in the Manchester area has changed little in the last 30 years and, as in other urban areas in this country, is not adapted to the recent rapid growth in road traffic.
2.3.1 The Railways
There is an extensive network of railway lines, many of w hich carry heavy freight traffic, but some no longer carry passenger services. Figure 2.5 shows the railway networks and highlights those lines on which passenger services still operate. The railway system has suffered, because, built as it was a hundred years ago, it often goes through industrial areas which are now decaying or of poor environmental quality. Residential development in recent decades has taken place mostly well away from the railway system. There are, at present, no parking facilities at many suburban railway stations and the bus services compete with the railway lines rather than feed them. A further adverse factor is that the main stations are some distance from the heart of the city as shown in Figure 2.3. For example, a commuter to the Town Hall has a ten minutes' walk from any of the central area stations (except Central Station, which is to be closed). Nonetheless, the railways still carry a substantial number of passengers in the morning peak period at which time 22,000 arrive at stations in the central area ; about 15% of those who work in the central area commute by rail. The railways are operating well below capacity; in consequence the operation is costly and commuter rail services do not pay their way.
2.3.2 The Road System
The main road system is inadequate. Some fine arterial roads were built before the war, but their capacity is limited by intersections and at peak periods these are severely con gested at points as far as 10 miles from the city centre. Following a road traffic survey in 1960, the Surveyors to the local authorities in the SELNEC area produced a plan shown in Figure 2.6 (known as the SELNEC Highway Plan) for new roads and improvements to provide sufficient capacity to take 2t times the 1960 volume of traffic. Some of the schemes in the plan have already been completed (e.g. Mancunian Way) or are in the course of construction, and others are near the construction stage. The City Engineer, however, estimates that the increase in capacity from schemes in the present programme will be more than absorbed by the general increase in traffic levels over the next few years. The SELNEC Highway Plan estimated that by 1982, when it was envisaged that the highways system would be completed, the road capacity would be sufficient to allow approximately 25% to 30% of central area workers to commute by private car. The original estimate of the cost of implementing the plan was £300,000,000, but in the light of more realistic schemes and estimates, and higher design standards, this figure is more likely to be not less than £500,000,000. Furthermore, because of the increased demands being made upon the National Exchequer for road schemes, and the limitations on resources available, completion of the plan by 1982 is unlikely.
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1•sO 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
YEAR
2.4-Growth in numbers of vehicles and car ownership
23
• EXISTING PASSENGER LIN ES
2.5- Railway Network
2.3.3 The Bus System
There is an extremely dense network of bus services, as illustrated in Figure 2.7, provided by 11 municipal undertakings, and by three large bus companies which also serve rural areas outside the conurbation. About 70% of those working in the central area travel to work by bus, but the services are becoming increasingly less reliable, and the cost of running them (and thus the fares that have to be charged) is rising at an alarming rate. Figure 2.8 shows how 'lost bus miles' i.e., miles not operated because of traffic congestion, incurred by Manchester City Transport, the largest bus operator in the conurbation, have increased over the last eight years.
2.3.4 Car Parking
Parking facilities in and around the central area are an important feature of the total transport system. Table 2.1 summarises the existing parking accommodation available both 'on' and 'off' the street. within the 2.1 square miles which comprise the central area of the City and its fringes.
The number of on-street parking spaces is expected to be reduced by the extension of parking meter control and parking restrictions, and in the long term it is envisaged it will be necessary to eliminate on-street parking at least in
the central core of the city. In addition all off-street temporary car parks will eventually be extinguished as redevelopment of the central and fringe areas proceeds. However, these losses may be balanced by an increase in permanent offstreet parking spaces, and in the city's present proposals 40,000 new off-street spaces will be provided in the central area in the long term. The total long term parking requirement is estimated to be 47,000 spaces in the central area, of which 32,000 would be filled during the peak period. There is, however, no firm programme for the construction of these permanent off-street spaces. The provision of this number of spaces, based on a car occupancy of 1.5, would allow approximately 25% to 30% of those who work in the central area to travel to work by car, and this is consistent with the road capacity contemplated in the SELNEC Highway Plan. It is well known that it is impossible to plan in Manchester on the basis that all those employed in the city centre could use their own private transport for the journey to work. If every car carried two persons, more than a third of the total floor area of the city centre would be devoted to car parking, in addition to the space occupied by a highway system designed on a corresponding scale. Apart from the questionable desirability of the final result, the cost of a surgical operation of such magnitude would be prodigious and the difficulties of phasing almost incapable of solution.
TABLE 2.1
SUMMARY OF PARKING ACCOMMODATION IN AND AROUND TH E CENTRAL AREA
OWNERSHIP
Private
Municipal
Other parking under various ownerships, for which no charge is made to the motorist.
Total number parking spaces within survey area
TYPE OF PARKING SITE
Permanent
Multi-storey
Temporary
Permanent (underground)
Temporary
Meters (on-street)
Private user (permanent) Car parks (temporary)
Fly parking on vacant sites (temporary)
Other on-street parking
DAILY RATE
5s. 9 hrs. 6s.6d.-8s. 12 hrs. 8s.-9s. 24 hrs.
2s.-3s.
5s.
2s. 3s. (Chepstow St.)
SHORT PERIOD RATE
3s.-3s. 6d. 2 hrs.
4s.-5s. 5 hrs.
3s. 4 hrs.
No. OF SPACES AVAILABLE
1,150
3,600
320
1 s. 3d. 4 hrs. 1,350 (aher 10 a.m.)
6d. 1 s.
hr. 2 hrs. 1.450
2,800 6,100
5,300
6,630
28,700
25
SELNEC HIGHWAY PLAN
LEGEND t. EXISTING AND PROPOSED MOTORWAYS AND
MAJOR ROADS
2. LONG TERMED PROPOSED MAJOR ROADS (CONSTRUCTION COSTS NOT INCLUDED IN OVERALL ESTIMATE) .............. - .• - .. ..... . - - -
3. CONTINUATION OF MAJOR ROADS NOT INCLUDED IN SELNEC ESTIMATES ..... ..
2.6- SELNEC highway plan
26
JMl.S.
CITY
ATH ENS BAKU BARCELONA BERLIN (W) BOSTON
BUDAPEST
BUENOS-AIRES
CHICAGO
CLEVELAND
COLOGNE ESSEN FRANKFURT
ON MAIN GLASGOW HAM BURG
KHARKOV
KIEV LENINGRAD
LISBON LONDON
MADRID MILAN MONTREAL MOSCOW MUNICH NAGOYA NEW YORK
OSAKA OSLO
PARIS
PRAGUE
PHILADELPHIA
ROME ROTTERDAM SAN FRANCISCO
STOCKHOLM
STUTTGART TBILISI TOKYO
TORONTO
VIENNA WASH INGTON
TA BLE 2.2
CITI ES WHI CH HAVE OR ARE CONSTRUCTING RAPID TRAN SIT SYSTEMS
ROUTE MILES (AT PRESENT)
15·9 1-1
11 ·2 57 40·9
2·3
19·6
85·4
14·9
2
6·5 47 ·2
5·9 15·2
5·3 244·2
20·7 9·0.
14·9 80·8
6·1 237
20·1 16·6
127·1
28·9
6·8
73·9
35·7
6·2 51 ·3
14·5
10·2
POPULATION (000)
1,852 1.137 1,696 2,201 3,177
1,928
7,000
6,591
1,958
841 728 694
1,018 1,856
1,070
1,332 3,641
813 8,186
2,558 1,661 2.260 6,423 1,182 1,935
11 ,260
3,156 484
7,369
1,017
4,617
2.417 732
2,894
1,179
635 805
11 ,370
1,989
1,640 2,323
PRESENT AND FUTURE PLANS
Underground being considered. Further line being planned. Two lines being extended. Plans for another 100 cars. Two lines being extended. Final target 119·2 miles. Aiming to build 29 ·8 miles of track and buy approximately 100 more cars. Existing tramway to be linked w ith 5 mile underground line. First section by 1970. finished 1973. 3·7-mile extension completed. Plans to integrate lines under different ownership and extend system to 41 miles. Building new terminal and 14·9 miles of track. Plans to order 100 cars and put present 'Elevated' underground. Building 4-mile extension to airport. Three further extensions being considered. 12·4-mile system under construction, first lines in operation by 1975. Extensions under study. Goal 68·4 route miles. First 3·1 miles by 1968. Completed sections being worked with trams. No present plans. 0·9-mile extension open. Two new extensions of 8·6 and 2·9 miles being built. Greater integration foreseen through new overseeing agency. Construction starts on 10·6-mile line this year. A further 11 ·8 miles to be built later. New line being built in stages. Aim 18·6 miles. 5-mile extension opening this year. This with existing 7·8 miles to be operated automatically. Aim to have 26·7 miles of track. 0·9-mile extension to be opened this year. Aim to have 24·9-milesystem. 12·4 mile Victoria Line opens in 1968-fully automatic. Two airport links to be built. Further underground extension proposed. 7·5-mile extension opening 1967, 18·6 miles to be added. 1 ·24-mile extension completed. 12·7 miles under construction. Three lines opened this year. Possible future integration. 8·8 mile line opened, 9·5 miles being built. Goal 186·4 miles. 9 ·8 miles of track under construction. first services in 1972. 2·0-mile extension being built. Further 26·1 miles to be constructed. Three connecting lines being completed. Air conditioning being tried. Plans for East River Tunnel and two other lines. There is also 14·2 mile New York Path system. 21 ·1 miles of track being built. 70·8 miles planned by 1975. Section opened 1966. new branch 1967 and one further branch to be built. 28·6 miles of high speed track being built. Prototype car delivered, two further high speed and three radials under study. 18·6 miles of track being built. First section to be opened in 1975, initially with trams. 10·6 mile extension to be built. 13·1 mile DRPA line to be opened in 1968. 9 mile extension being built. Three lines to be added. Initial 3·1 mile line opens this year. Extension being considered. New system under construction including 4 mile Cross Bay Tube. 450 cars to be ordered. First lines by 1969, finished 1971. Three extensions being built. Further lines and new cars being designed. 10·6 mile line being built. First section opened this year, another 2·5 miles planned. 0·85-mile bridge across bay to carry railway being built. 94·4 miles of track to be built. High speed system being considered. 7·9 miles of track opened last year, 3 miles this year. 6·6 miles next year. First 24·9 miles approved. Goal 87 miles. First boring for 24·9 mile system begun. Construction starts 1967. First line by 1970, finished by 1972.
Population figures for cities taken from the U.N. Demographic Year Book 1965. Where available "Urban Agglomeration Population Figures" are given.
Summary compiled from a table 'Rapid Transit round the world' in the International Railway Journal, May, 1967.
27
TABLE 2.3
CITIES WITHOUT RAPID TRANSIT WHERE STUDIES A RE IN PROGRESS
CITY
ATLANTA AUCKLAND BALTIMORE BRUSSELS
CAIRO CALCUTTA CARACAS DORTMUND DUSSELDORF HANOVER HELSINKI
ISTANBUL JOHANNESBURG KOBE LOS ANGELES MANCHESTER MEXICO CITY MELBOURNE NUREMBERG PITTSBURGH SEATTLE ST. LOUIS SYDNEY YOKOHAMA ZURICH
POPULATION (000)
1,161 515
1,829 1,057
3,518 4,641 1,764
653 702 566 613
1,152 1,750 1,216 2,479 2,448 3,192 2,061
467 2,368 1,178 2,203 2,300 1,788
651
PRESENT AND FUTURE PLANS
Designing two lines of 29·8 miles. Aim 65 ·9 miles. Regional Agency considering partly underground railway. Considering 19·9 mile line, hoping to increase to 29 ·8 miles. 10·9 miles of tramway underground by 1975. Goal 29·2 mile four line system converted to railway with 204 two-car sets. £178·5 million system proposed. Eastern Railway suburban line may be put underground. Studies in progress. Studies in progress. Studies in progress. Aim to build 3·9 mile line. 9-4 mile line approved, aiming at three lines totalling 27 ·3 miles by 1980. Studies in progress. Studies in progress. Studies in progress. 63·4 mile system being designed. Aim 159·7 miles. Bond issue in 1968. Studies in progress ; recommendations due this year. £46·5 million credit for one line. Studies in progress. Possible underground system. Studies in progress. Studies in progress; report due this year. Designing 11 .8 mile system. Studies in progress. Commuter rail line may be put underground. Construction starts 1968 of a 40·1 mile system. First 7 ·5 miles by 1971 . Studies in progress.
Population figures for cities taken from the U.N. Demographic Year Book 1965. Where available "Urban Agglomeration Population Figures" are given.
Summary compiled from a table 'Rapid Transit round the world' in the International Railway Journal. May. 1967.
2.4 THE NEED FOR AN IMPROVED PUBLIC PASSENGER TRANSPORT SYSTEM
Assuming the central area is to be preserved as a focal point of activity, no highway and parking system could be designed, let alone financed, to cope with more than 25/30% of those working there to travel to their work by private car. It follows that the public transport system must be improved to a standard acceptable to up to three quarters of those travelling to work in the central area.
DIFFICULTIES FACING PUBLIC TRANSPORT
Traditional public passenger transport operators, both bus and train, have served the community well, but the trends outlined in this chapter will increasingly prevent them from offering services of the required standard. The main difficulties can be summarised as follows:
(a) Reduction in the 'captive' market.
By 1981 there will be one car'to every three persons in the conurbation. This in itself will exert a strong pressure to use the car for the journey to work.
(b) The effect of road congestion on bus services.
28
Traffic congestion has already seriously undermined the reliability of bus services making them less attractive to the public. As bus services become less reliable,
more people are encouraged to go by car, but future increases in road capacity over the next few years will be fully taken up by the growth of business and industrial traffic. Thus any increase in car commuting will make congestion worse, and bus services still more unreliable.
(c) Financial prospects of Public Transport.
National statistics show that increases in public transport fares over the last decade have been at a rate of approximately 5% per year compared with approximately 1 % in private motoring costs. Public passenger transport is suffering from rapidly falling revenues outside the peak periods, when services must stil l be provided for those without access to private transport.
2.6 THE CASE FOR RAPID TRANSIT
Radical improvements will be needed in the public passenger transport system if it is to succeed in providing an acceptable service for three-quarters of the commuters to the central area of Manchester. The opportunities for specific improvements in the Manchester area are described in the next few sections. This sub-section gives some general arguments for rapid transit, and shows how these arguments have been accepted and applied in many other cities with problems similar to Manchester's.
2.7- Network of Bus Services
29
The general objective of improvements to the public passenger transport system must be to make it competitive with the private car predominantly in terms of speed, cost and comfort. Services must give shorter journey times than do bus services operating under existing conditions, and for the longer distances a quicker journey than is possible by private car. Fares must bear comparison with the perceived cost of motoring, i.e. what the commuter has himself to pay in running costs and parking charges arising directly out of his decision to drive to work. The highest possible standards of passenger convenience, reliability, comfort and safety must be provided. A particular factor in Manchester is weather protection-on average some rain falls on 17 days in each month. Lastly, these service improvements must be achieved in ways acceptable to the community; they must not be too expensive, they must not affect the urban environment too greatly, and they must be achieved without unreasonable restrictions on private motorists.
Other great cities faced with similar traffic problems to those of Manchester, have decided to modernise and extend existing rapid transit networks, or to build new systems, and have accepted the high cost involved. Such systems can provide services competitive with the private car. New systems opened in 1966 in Montreal, Oslo and Tbilisi, and new systems are opening in 1967 in Rotterdam and Baku. Other systems are under construction in San Francisco, Washington, Philadelphia, Kharkov, Frankfurton -Main, Cologne, Munich, Vienna and Prague. Numerous
2000
"' w 1000 ...J
:e I-
"' g500
others are being planned and almost all existing systems are extending their lines.
Table 2.2 gives a list of cities which have or are constructing rapid transit systems, and it can be seen that well over half these have a smaller population than the Manchester conurbation . Table 2.3 lists the cities which do not have a rapid transit system at the moment, but where studies are in progress. The fact that half the world's total rapid transit mileage has been constructed since the end of the second world war is very significant. It has been aptly said that a 'world rapid transit boom' is in progress.
Experience in London in recent years illustrates the enormous value of the immunity of a rapid transit system from traffic congestion. Table 2.4 below shows the traffic trends for London Transport bus and rail services:
TABLE 2.4
TRAFFIC TRENDS- LONDON TRANSPORT
Passengers Carried-Millions
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
Bus and Coach 2,522 2,485 2,430 2,252 2,132 1,978 Underground 675 668 673 674 637 667
It was against this background of a growing problem in Manchester, the general arguments in favour of rapid transit, and known developments in other cities, that the Manchester Rapid Transit Study was conceived.
Q ,__~_._~_._~--'~~......_~-L-~-'-~~'--~-'-~-'-~--'~~-'-~-'-~--'-~~.L-~--'---~-'-~---''--~-'-~_J 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
YEAR
2.8- Lost bus miles
·30
A RAPID TRANSIT SYSTEM
3.1 THE CONSULTANTS
The comparative study of rapid transit systems and concepts was undertaken by De Leuw Cather and Partners, Consulting Engineers specialising in transportation, in association with Hennessey, Chadwick, 0 hEocha and Partners.
3.2 TH E CONSULTANTS' TERMS OF REFERENCE
The following is an extract from the Consultants' terms of reference:
'The Consultants should assess the cost of building, operating and maintaining alternative forms of rapid transit systems along a route to be specified, and to provide a quality of service and to cater for traffic volumes also to be specified.
The forms of transport for study should include:
(i) the Safege Monorail.
(ii) an urban electric railway with a 4 ft. St in. gauge.
(iii) a reserved track for buses (special 'busway') .
(iv) any other comparable systems for urban mass transport which, in the opinion of the Consultants, have reached a stage in development which justifies consideration of installation within the next five years.
The Consultants should undertake:
(i) capital cost estimates for the whole route for each system investigated with sufficient breakdown to show the cost of representative sections.
(ii) estimates of all costs of operation including traction power requirements, · manpower requirements, maintenance costs etc. for each system.
(iii) an evaluation of the noise and light effects of each system'.
The Working Party required the work to be done within the limits of a budget of less than £40,000, and a time period of one year.
3.3 SYSTEM S STUDIED
A list of systems was compiled based on those known to the Working Party and the Consultants. To ensure that the list of systems was complete, announcements were placed in the international press requesting interested developers to submit details of their systems. Comments on some of the systems follow.
3.3.1 The Safege M onora il
This system was specified as it had already been studied in the Manchester context by Taylor Woodrow Construction
Sect ion three
A Rapid Transit System
Limited, the licensees of the system in this country. In the Safege system illustrated in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, vehicles are suspended from a hollow concrete beam in which the rubber-tyred bogies are enclosed. The system is not in operation commercially, but its feasibility is demonstrated by a full scale prototype vehicle and elevated test track near Orleans in France.
3.3.2 An Urban Railway
The urban railway consisting of flanged steel wheeled vehicles operating on steel rails is the most familiar form of rapid transit, and there are installations in at least 30 of the world's major cities (see Table 2.2). Many of these installations are very old (e.g. London's Metropolitan Line opened in 1863), but new lines are being built incorporating the latest technology in vehicle design and control systems. Perhaps the most significant of these is the Bay Area Rapid Transit District system at San Francisco. An illustration of a modern Duorail carriage is shown in Figure 3.3.
3.3.3 ' Busways'
The Working Party were concerned that more information should be obtained on the possible role of buses using an exclusive track. It has been argued in some theoretical studies* that buses on exclusive roadways could prove the most economical and efficient method of rapid transit for volumes of passengers up to 20,000 per hour. Further economies in the construction of a special road for buses might result from a guided system such as that proposed by Throughways Transport Ltd., and illustrated in Figure 3.4. However, one of the most attractive features of the busway concept-that vehicles can leave the reserved track and distribute their passengers in residential areas- proved to be an obstacle to studying it in comparison with the other reserved track systems in the compass of this study. In order. however, that the Working Party might assess the main costs involved in constructing guided and unguided busways, the Consultants were requested to investigate the civil engineering costs of roads reserved for ordinary buses, as compared with the busway proposed for guided buses by Throughways Transport Ltd. The results of this investigation are given in Table 3.1. Two possible lane widths are given and these delineate a range of possible cost advantages for the Throughways system from approximately 10% to approximately 20%.
The Consultants also draw attention to some of the operating problems that the system would need to overcome. Examples are the possibility of delays on the ordinary road system interfering w ith schedules on the reserved track, and the difficulties of vehicles leaving stations merging with
• For example •The Urban Transportation Problem' by Meyer, Kein and Wohl.
33
TABLE 3.1
COMPARATIVE COST OF SPECIAL BUSWAYS ESTIMATES PER 1,000FT.
ATIITUDE THROUGHWAYS UNGUIDED BUS ROADWAY
1,000 ft. of Tunnel (bunter sandstone, no faults or special ground water problems) on the straight
1,000 ft. of Cut and Cover
1,000 ft. of Earthworks (Open cut, average depth 16 ft.)
1,000 ft. of Elevated Structure, on 40 ft. piles. (Average height from roadway surface 20 ft.)
9 ft. 8 in. w idth
£315,000
£302,000
£45,000
£92,000
14 ft. width 11 ft. width (recommended minimum) (not recommended)
£416,000 £357,000
£381,000 £339,000
£57,000 £51,000
£112,000 £106,000
The Consultants recommend 14 ft. as the minimum width for a high speed unguided bus. In practice 11 ft. lane widths have been used on motorways and might be acceptable in certain circumstances.
through vehicles. It is understood that the Road Research Laboratory and Throughways Transport Ltd .. are making a detailed operational study of the system. Further comments by the Working Party on reserved tracks for buses are contained in Sub-Section 4.4.4.
3.3.4 T he A lweg Monorai l
In this system (illustrated in Figures 3.5 and 3.6) trains run on paired wheels (like those on heavy road vehicles) along a narrow concrete beamway of near rectangular cross section and are kept upright and guided by horizontal wheels running against the sides of the beamway. There are several examples of the system in operation includ ing an
34
8-mile line to Tokyo Airport which is in commercial service.
3.3.5 T he Westinghouse System ('Skybus' or 'Transi t Expressway')
In this system (illustrated in Figures 3.7 and 3.8) lightweight rubber-tyred cars, operating singly or in trains, run on two parallel concrete tracks and are steered by small horizontal wheels which bear on the sides of a steel rail running midway between the concrete tracks. The system is not in operation commercially, but its engineering feasibility has been demonstrated by a prototype installed at Pittsburgh. A striking featu re of this installation is the fully automatic control- the vehicles have no driver.
3.1-Safege prototype vehicle
1
9
7----- ---
4
5 ~--2
--~-.\~~~~~~,;;.;;~~~~~a
Precosr co11crttt beomwoy 6 Pneumo tic domper a ond 2 Running '"' foce outomot1c te vellono
3 Troe 1ton motor , reduct.011 7 Roll domper oeo r , 0 1ffere nt1ol. 8 High ten• •'• • tt•I totety
• Guide wheel coble
5 M11nn1no wllee t 9 8ro1te•
3.2- Safege beamway and vehicle suspension
35
36
3. 3- Duorai/, steef wheel on steel rat!
3.4- Guided Busway, standard buses with side guidance
3. 6-Alweg vehic'.e suggested for use m
Manchester
3.5- Alweg train, Seattle
Unit W11h 8ogfes ALWEG T"'°.Qr
3.3.6 Other Rapid Transit Systems
Many of the rapid transit systems investigated proved to be unsuitable for study because they had not been fully developed and/or no prototype existed. It would have been impossible to evaluate systems which had not been mechanically proved and for which no firm cost data cou ld be made available. Examples of systems rejected for this reason are the British 'Automatic Taxi Train' and the American 'Teletrans' which are made up of small personal vehicles automatically directed to their destination.
The only system rejected from the detailed study, although it is in full operation for rapid transit purposes, was that installed on some lines in the Paris Metro, and more recently in Montreal, consisting of rubber wheeled trains guided by lateral wheels. The bogie is in fact similar to the Safege bogie. The Consultants' conclusion was accepted that while this system offers no real advantage over steel wheeled trains, it would certainly cost more to build, more to operate because of the additional power requirements of rubber wheels, and more to maintain because of the complexity of the bogies. The system was therefore not studied in detail. The Paris Authorities have recently decided to stop con verting lines in the Paris Metro to this system, in view of the difficulties of doing this while maintaining traffic, and instead to re-equip the remainder of the system with steel wheeled vehicles.
3.4 FINAL LIST FOR EVALUATION
Four systems therefore emerged from this initial appraisal as being worthy of further detailed study in regard to the route specified for Manchester, and lhtise were:
38
Safege. Urban electric railway (Duorail) . Alweg. Westinghouse.
3.5 THE ROUTE
3.5.1 The Study Corridor
For the purposes of the study a 16-mile route was defined from Manchester Airport (Ringway) in the south to Langley in the north. The route followed a corridor passing through or adjoining major traffic generators such as the Wythenshawe Estate (population 100,000), the University area, the city centre, the proposed redevelopment at Harpurhey, and the Manchester overspi ll estate at Langley (population 20,000). _,... In the absence of detailed survey information no firm figures for the traffic potential on this route were available. However, from information available it was clear that:
(a) passenger demand would diminish towards the ends of the route, and
(b) at least 10,000, and possibly as many as 30,000, passengers per peak hour wou ld use the system in the centra l area.
The Consultants therefore produced costings for all four systems for assumed passenger loadings of 10,000, 20,000 and 30,000 passengers during the peak hour and also for comparison purposes abstracted the costs for a central section of some nine miles.
3.5.2 G radi ents and Curves
For costing purposes, a detailed alignment had to be establ ished and the Consultants adopted standards for curvature and gradient considered reasonable in the light of experience and generally accepted as good practice in the transit field. These were:
(a) maximum gradients of 4%; and
(b) curves having a minimum radius of 600 ft.
The three bottom-supported systems have an equal ability to negotiate curves, but Safege can negotiate tight curves at
3. 7- Westinghouse vehicle and test track, Pittsburgh
greater speeds. In dry conditions, rubber-tyred vehicles can climb steeper gradients than the maximum of 4% used in this study. In the Consultants' view there would be little economic advantage in using steeper gradients or tighter curves in Manchester. Steeper gradients would result in high rates of power consumption and brake wear and might create operating problems for the Alweg and Westinghouse systems whose running surfaces are exposed and could suffer from conditions arising from snow, ice or water.
3.5.3 Vertical A lignment
After a careful study of the environmental effects of the various systems (see Section 3.14) it was decided that the route used for systems evaluation should be made up as follows:
TABLE 3.2
ATTITUDE CONSIDERED FOR SYSTEMS EVALUATION
TYPE OF CONSTRUCTION
Elevated Cut and cover Tunnel Open cut At ground level
TOTAL
Length in miles
5·0 5·7 1 ·6 2·5 1 ·3
16·1
Note. Safege varies slightly from the above as fol lows: Elevated structure, 5·5 miles; open cut, 3·3 miles; at ground level nil.
3.6 COSTS
The Consultants have established for the 16-mile route:
(a) the capital cost.
(b) the annual maintenance and operating costs.
(c) the total annual cost including debt charges,
and these are shown respectively on page 40 in Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5. It will be seen from the tables that the capital cost for Duorail (at 30,000 passengers per hour, £61,000,000) is lower than that of any other system. Duorail also has the lowest annual maintenance and operating costs, and the lowest total annual costs as shown graphically in Figure 3.9 on page 41 .
3.7 EFFECT OF REDUCING ROUTE LENGTH
The effects on costs of reducing the route length from sixteen to nine miles are shown below in Table 3.6, using Duorail as an example.
TABLE 3.6
COST COMPARISON-16-MILE AND 9- M ILE ROUTE (Duorail- Design Capacity 30,000 passengers per hour)
16-Mile Route 9-Mile Route
Rolling Stock £6,700,000 £5,200,000
Fixed facilities and property £54.400,000 £38,300,000
Total capital cost £61, 100,000 £43,500,000 Annual maintenance and operating cost £1,410,000 £760,000
3.8 Westinghouse vehicle and test track
39
TABLE 3.3
CA PITAL COST-16-MILE ROUTE
ALWEG DUORAIL SAFEGE •WESTINGHOUSE
DESIGN CAPACITY 10,000 PASSENGERS PER HOUR Fixed faci lities £46,800,000 £43,700,000 £54,300,000 £43,300,000 Rolling stock £3,100,000 £2,300,000 £5,200,000 £3,900,000 Property £7,600,000 £7,600,000 £7,800,000 £7,500,000
TOTAL £57,500,000 £63,600,000 £67,300,000 £54,700.000
DESIGN CAPACITY 20,000 PASSENGERS PER HOUR Fixed facilities £48,900,000 £45,500,000 £56,300,000 £45,500,000 Rolling stock £6,000,000 £4,500,000 £10,200,000 £7,800,000 Property £7,600,000 £7,600,000 £7,800,000 £7,500,000
TOTAL £62,500,000 £57,600,000 £74,300,000 £60,800,000
DESIGN CAPACITY 30,000 PASSENGERS PER HOUR Fixed faci lities £50,300,000 £46,800,000 £58,000,000 £47,000,000 Rolling stock £9,000,000 £6,700,000 £15,300.000 £11,700,000 Property £7,600,000 £7,600,000 £7,800,000 £7,500,000
TOTAL £66,900,000 £61, 100,000 £81, 100,000 £66,200,000
•A revised lower cost for rolling stock submitted by Brush, recently appointed licencees for the Westinghouse system, was received too late for consideration in this study. Rolling stock prices shown for this system are based on costs in the United States of America.
TABLE 3.4
A NNUA L M AINT ENANCE AN D OPERATIN G COSTS 16-M ILE RO UTE
ALWEG DUORAIL SAFEGE WESTINGHOUS E
DESIGN CAPACITY 10,000 PASSENGERS PER HOUR Annual costs £850,000 £810,000 £940,000 £880,000
DESIGN CAPACITY 20,000 PASSENGERS PER HOUR Annual costs £1,280,000 £1.070,000 £1,480,000 £1.320,000
DESIGN CAPACITY 30,000 PASSENGERS PER HOUR Annual costs £1,760,000 £1,410.000 £2,040,000 £1,800,000
TABLE 3.5
TOTA L ANN UAL COST- 16-M ILE ROUT E Annual Maintenance and Operating Cost plus Debt Charges at 6% per annum
ALWEG DUO RAIL SAFEGE WESTINGHOUSE
DESIGN CAPACITY 10,000 PASSENGERS PER HOUR Annual maintenance and operating cost £850,000 £810,000 £940,000 £880,000 Annual debt charges £3,630,000 £3,380,000 £4,280,000 £3.470,000
TOTAL £4,480,000 £4,190,000 £5.220,000 £4,350,000
DESIGN CAPACITY 20,000 PASSENGERS PER HOUR Annual maintenance and operating cost £1,280,000 £1,070,000 £1,480,000 £1,320,000 Annual debt charges £4,000,000 £3,670,000 £4,800.000 £3,920,000
TOTAL £5,280,000 £4,740,000 £6.280,000 £5,240,000
DESIGN CAPACITY 30,000 PASSENGERS PER HOUR Annual maintenance and operating cost £1,760,000 £1,410,000 £2,040,000 £1,800,000 Annual debt charges £4,330,000 £3,920,000 £5,310,000 £4.330,000
TOTAL £6,090,000 £5,330,000 £7,350,000 £6,130,000
40
~
£ 9' 000,000 PER ANNUM
£ 8' 000,000
I: 7 '000,000
£ 6' 000,000
£ 5, 000,000
£ 4 I QQQ,QQO
£ 3, 000,000
£ 2, 000,000
£ I I 000,000
0
TOTAL ANNUAL
COST
__ _.. ---------- __ .::;:::-::I
----- ~:::::: --------~~::::::::::~~~-.. ----~-;;:::::::::::---- --
ANNUAL MAINTENANCE 1§::::::::::---$ OPERATING EXPENSE
Legend - A - Alweg D - Duorail S - Safege
W - Westinghouse
10,000 20,000
Passengers -30,000 Peak Hour Capacity
3.9-Total Annual Cost (Operating, Mamtenance and Debt Charges) and Annual Maintenance and Operating Expense
3.8 SPECIAL STUDY OF '2- M ILE' ELEVATED ROUTE a residential road in the outer suburbs adjacent to the route used for systems evaluation. The capital cost estimates for the '2-mile' study, i.e., 1.9 miles elevated, compared with the alignment of the equivalent portion of the '16-mile' study, i.e. 1.40 miles cut and cover and 0.50 miles elevated are shown in Table 3.7. The significance of this is discussed in 3.14.4.
During the course of the Study, it was decided that further comparative study of the environmental impact and the construction costs of building the four rapid transit systems over a roadway was desirable. An additional study was undertaken of approximately 2 miles of elevated route over
TABLE 3.7
COST ESTIMATES FOR '2-MILE' STU DY (Actual Length - 1 ·90 mi les)
ALWEG DUORAIL SAFE GE
2-Mile 16-Mile 2-Mile 16-Mile 2-Mile
Route' Route• Route' Route• Route'
Civil Engineering• £754,000 £3,040,000 £1,368.000 £2,849,000 £1, 149,000
Services £134,000 £252.000 £134,000 £252,000 £134,000
Stations £500,000 £630,000 £500,000 £630,000 £500,000
Property £291.000• £220,000 £291,0004 £220,000 £258,0004
TOTAL £1,679,000 £4,142,000 £2,293,000 £3,951,000 £2,041,000
NOTES : 1. The total length of the '2-Mile route' is elevated.
2. The '16-mile route' consists of 1 ·40 miles cut and cover and 0·50 miles elevated.
3. (a) Civil engineering includes road reconstruction, traffic diversions, etc. (b) Civil engineering costs do not include: (a) an allowance for contingencies
(b) engineering design and supervision (c) signals (d) crossovers (e) wayside power equipment (f) allowance for 'undertrays' for Safege.
16-Mile Route•
£3,244,000
£252,000
£630,000
£220,000
£4,346,000
WESTINGHOUSE 2-Mile 16-Mile Route' Route'
£1,038,000 £2,896,000
£134,000 £252,000
£500,000 £630,000
£291,0004 £220,000
£1.963,000 £3.998,000
4. Property costs do not include the purchase for environmental reasons of abutting property along the '2-mile route'. The acquisition of all property within 150 ft. of the structure (see Sub-Section 3.14.4) would add costs of approximately £500,000.
41
3.9 CIVIL ENGINEERING COSTS
The estimates of cost for the supporting way are based on commonly accepted construction techniques and materials. The work was divided into over 60 items, for which a specification was prepared and unit prices developed, making use of rates tendered for similar works from various contracts in Lancashire. No soil borings were taken, and the types of foundation necessary were based on an analysis of available soils and geological data along the route. The prices were current in May 1967.
Westinghouse has the lowest cost for supporting way, though the Consultants point out that on elevated sections the low structural costs for Westinghouse are not inherent to the system but result from a choice of small vehicles with low axle loading which could be applied to other systems. On elevated sections Alweg is the cheapest to construct, but suffers from requiring a relatively large diameter tunnel for the central section. Safege has the most expensive supporting way costs.
In all three rubber-tyred systems the cost of switches is an important element, and the need to continue the beamways into yards and shops makes these items substantially more expensive than for duorail.
3.10 ROLLING STOCK
Passenger comfort in terms of seating arrangements, noise levels within the vehicle, interior finish, ventilation and heating can be made of equal quality for all systems, and good, but not luxurious standards, hav~ b~en assumed. Brakes and motors for all systems are assumed to give rates of acceleration and deceleration of three miles per hour per second. The much greater rates possible with rubbertyred systems would not be feasible in practice where standing passengers have to be carried.
The differences in cost of rolllng stock arise because of fundamental features of the bogies and guidance arrangements. Steel bogies are simpler and can carry more weight than rubber tyres, and the rail car used for this evaluation is 70 ft. x 10 ft. (that is a similar width to London Transport's District and Metropolitan stock, though considerably longer), while the rubber-tyred systems all have smaller, and thus less economical cars. Safege has an inherent cost disadvantage in that both top and bottom of the vehicle have to be built to load bearing strength, whereas the roof of a bottom-supported vehicle is required only for protection against the weather.
The vehicle cost per passenger was :
ALWEG
£194
DUO RAIL
£143
SAFEGE
£324
•see footnote to table 3.3
3.11 OPERATING COSTS
WESTINGHOUSE
£246 *
There are many elements common to all systems (or with only minor variations) such as the cost of operating staff, and station maintenance. Costs for duorail can be established
42
on the known costs of existing systems, but costs for other systems can only be estimated. In the Consultants' view the cost of operation of the rubber-tyred systems would be significantly higher than for duorail, mainly because of:
(a) the complication of the switches, and the resulting high maintenance costs,
(b) the maintenance of bog ies, including tyre replacement.
(c) higher power costs for rubber tyres due to increased rolling resistance.
3.12 STATIONS
The Consultants' estimates include almost £10,000,000 for twenty stations on the route. The estimates are based on attractive and functional ly appropriate designs of varying complexity according to their location-the costs of individual stations range from £300,000 to £1,000,000. The Consultants point out that careful study would be required to establish the precise location of each station, to provide the best access both for pedestrians and road vehicles, and a layout of maximum convenience to passengers. Some stations 4ould be integrated with developments such as shopping and offices.
3.13 QUALITY OF ESTIMATES
The Consultants' estimates cover all aspects of the construction of the system, and a 15% contingency item has been included. The Working Party consider that the estimates are realistic (at 1967 prices) and that unless exceptional difficulties in sub-soil conditions were encountered (no bore holes have been taken), the estimates would not be exceeded.
3.14 UNDERGROUND OR OVERHEAD ? TH E ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM
3.14.1 Introduction
The cost figures given in the preceding paragraphs relate to a route of which 7.3 miles are underground, 1.3 miles are at ground level, 5 miles are elevated and 2.5 miles are in cutting. This vertical alignment was decided on after a careful study of the environmental effects of the various systems. A rapid transit system, other than underground, could be objectionable to people living and working in its area for a great number of reasons, but examination showed that the noise of passing trains and the visual intrusion of the structure were by far the most important.
3.14.2 Noise
The Consultants organised a number of noise measurements at varying distances from existing installations- the Safege test track, the Alweg test track, the Toronto Subway (built within the last ten years} , London Transport's Bakerloo and Metropolitan lines and British Rail's suburban lines. It is difficult to describe noise, and the following can only
be taken as a broad interpretation of the Consultants' findings ; detailed figures and a description of the methods used in taking measurements are contained in the Consultants' report.
These are the broad conclusions concerning the systems considered for Manchester:
(a) All the systems are noisy when trains are travelli ng at ground level or on elevated structure at speed, although from nearby the maximum noise made is somewhat less than that experienced at the side of a heavily trafficked urban road.
(b) The rubber-tyred systems are only slightly quieter, if at all, than a steel on steel system.
(c) There are very substantial noise reductions to be achieved both by noise shielding on the trains, and through arrangements such as barriers or cuttings.
(d) Noise only becomes of critical importance when a system is to be run above a residential road, or adjacent to residential property.
3.14.3 Visual Intrusion
To help the Working Party assess the impact of the structures on urban environment, the Manchester City Planning Department made models and montage photographs (see Figures 3.10 and 3.11 ) of the various elevated systems set against typical urban backgrounds. The Working Party also inspected the route and attempted to visualise the effects of the structures in situ over the road adjacent to it. Photographs and films of monorail systems, and of sections of elevated railway on the Stockholm and Rotterdam systems, were examined. The following conclusions were reached:
(a) The structural characteristics of the various systems are not so different that one would be acceptable where another was not. In so far as there is any significant difference the Safege structure, which is some 15 ft. taller than the others. seems most obtrusive, and the Alweg system the least obtrusive. Architectural treatment and quality of construction are far more important factors than the inherent shape of the structure associated with each system.
(b) All the systems require a structure which is massive when compared with ordinary housing of two to four storeys, and there wou ld be a severe loss in the amenities of frontagers and others if such a structure was to be built alongside or over a residential road.
3.14.4 General Conclusions o n Environment
For reasons of noise and visual intrusion the Working Party do not think it would be acceptable for an elevated system to be built along residential roads or within 150 ft. of residential property (though where re-development is taking place the opportunities for special architectural treatment and sound insu lation might allow this distance to be reduced}. It is thought that a reduction in this standard could only be justified by very severe physical or financial difficulties in adopting any alternative. Generally speaking, as the Consu ltants' cost estimates show, building cut-and-
cover rather than elevated roughly doubles the supporting way cost, and it is considered that this is a reasonable price to pay for the preservation of existing amenity and flexi bility in the future development of the area through which the system runs. In practice, a detailed examination would be needed of every section of a proposed route to get the optimum compromise between economy and environment. The results of the two-mile study (see Sub-Section 3.8) suggest that in outer suburban areas where property and land values are relatively low the acquisition of a swathe of land broad enough to build and landscape an overhead structure might prove the best solution.
The Working Party are convinced. however, that:
(a) the City would not tolerate overhead structures in the central area, and
(b) an elevated structure in inner residential suburbs could only be contemplated as part of a large scale redevelopment or by making use of the central reservation in a radial motorway. However, the practical difficulties of planning the development of a system in the inner suburbs of an existing City so as to phase in with the highway and redevelopment programme are probably too great to make this a real possibility.
These are basically the reasons which lie behind the choice of vertical alignment shown in Table 3.2, for the 16-mile route used for systems evaluation. In the Consultants' view the proportion of underground, ground level and elevated construction reflect desirable standards for a transit line through the study corridor and accord with decisions taken by other cities with comparable densities and property values.
3.15 FINAL CHOICE OF SYSTEM FOR MANCHESTER
The Consultants recommended that a steel wheel on steel rail duorail system be adopted for rapid transit in Manchester. This system would have a lower capital cost and would have similar, if not lower, operating costs than the Alweg, Safege and Westinghouse systems. The duorail system would equal the other systems in terms of vehicle performance and passenger comfort. It has the additiona l advantages of being thoroughly tested and proved. Duorail would be compatible with the existing British Railways commuter network serving Manchester, should joint use of tracks prove advantageous. The duorail structure appears to lend itself to adaptability in conversion to likely new concepts in the rapid transit industry. Modern duorail vehicles and well designed elevated or ground level structu res would be as acceptable in the community in terms of disturbance and visual intrusion as any of the other systems considered. A further advantage of the duorail system is that the source of supply of vehicles and parts, track fittings and structural members is not restricted to a limited number of licensees.
These factors are summarised in Table 3.8 on page 46.
The Working Party fully endorse the Consultants' recommendation.
43
ALWEG ALWEG ALWEG ALWEG
DUORAIL DUORAIL DUO RAIL
SAFEGE SAFEGE
WESTINGHOUSE WESTINGHOUSE WESTINGHOUSE
44 25 FEET 3.10- Photo-montage comparing visual impact in a low density residential area (structures seen at 25 feet and 50 feet)
50 FEET 150 FEET 100 FEET 46 3.11-Photo montage comparing visual impact in a low density residential area (structures seen at 100 feet and 150 feet)
TAB LE 3·8
COMPARISON OF SYSTEMS
ITEM ALWEG DUO RAIL
Development status In operation In widespread at 5 locations use
Safety Acceptable Acceptable
Reliability and operating experience Limited to 5 Fully known and locations understood
Switching device Yes Yes
Compatibility with present Not compatible Fully compatible railway systems
Prospects for adaptability to Fair Excellent future concepts
Testing required Vehicles only None or minor vehic le testing
Environmental effects- Acceptable Acceptable elevated or in open depending on depending on
location location
Maintenance and operation Costs and Costs and techniques not techniques well known well known
Ability to handle capacity above Good Greatest 30,000 passengers per hour
Source of supply Limited to No restriction Licensees
Vehicle costs Fairly high Lowest
Capital cost property and fixed facilities Fairly low Lowest
Annual operating expense Low Lowest
46
SAFEGE
One test track and vehic le
Acceptable
Limited to test track
Yes
Not compatible
Poor
Extensive for track and vehicles
Acceptable depending on location
Costs and techniques not well known
Good
Limited to Licensees
Highest
Highest
Highest
WESTINGHOUSE
One test track three vehicles
Acceptable
Limited to test track
No
Not compatible
Good
Extensive for track and vehicles
Acceptable depending on location
Costs and techniques not well known
Limited
Limited to Licensees
High
Lowest
Low
THE POTENTIAL OF THE EXISTING PUBLIC TRANSPORT SYSTEM
Section four
The Potential of the Existing Public Transport System
4.1 STUDIES COMMISSION ED
As described in Section 2 the existing public transport system, in so far as it serves the central area of Manchester, consists of:
(a) suburban rail services on lines serving Knott Mill, Oxford Road, Victoria, Exchange and Piccadilly stations, and Central station which is shortly to be closed, and
(b) buses operating on an intensive network of roads which are becoming increasingly congested.
The Working Party commissioned various studies designed to see what scope there was for radical improvement to the system. These studies were:
(i) an examination of the four suburban railway lines on the north/ south axis through Manchester;
(ii) an investigation on the four suburban rail lines in question of the potential for feeder bus services, interchange and parking facilities and residential development in and around the stations;
(iii) consideration of whether traffic management measures could be used to give priority to buses, and of the potential of reserved tracks for buses; and
(iv) an examination of traffic and parking in central Manchester to see what influence parking policy might have on peak traffic conditions and thus on the reliability of bus services.
4.2 POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS TO TH E SUBURBAN RAIL SYSTEM
The study of possible improvements carried out by British Railways related to the following four suburban railway lines:
Altrincham- Manchester Oxford Road serving nine intermediate stations
Wilmslow-Styal- Manchester Oxford Road serving seven intermediate stations
Bury- Prestwich-Manchester Victoria serving eight intermediate stations
Rochdale- Castleton- Manchester Victoria serving two intermediate stations.
8 miles
12
1 Ot,,
Collectively these four lines carry 36% of rail passenger traffic to the central area between 8-00 a.m. and 9-30 a.m., the Altrincham line being the busiest.
Land use trends indicate a potential growth of commuter traffic from north-east Cheshire and the areas north of
Manchester and make the Altrincham, Styal and Bury lines the most promising in terms of future traffic.
Historically these railway lines formed part of different systems and are differently equipped:
Altrincham line
Styal line
Bury line
Rochdale line
1500 volt DC overhead.
25 kilovolt AC overhead.
1200 volt DC third rail.
Diesel Multiple Unit.
4.2.1 Sc hemes for Improvem ent
Improvements to the suburban rail services were examined by British Railways under three headings:
Scheme 1. Intensification of services within the limits of the present signalling and terminal capacities.
Scheme 2. Improvement of the signalling systems and lengthening of platforms to permit higher density services with longer trains.
Scheme 3. As Scheme 2 plus the construction of an
underground rail link between Oxford Road and Victoria stations, so as to allow throughrunning between Bury and Altrincham, with an underground station in the heart of the City.
4.2.2 Scheme 1
The requirements for this upgrading by intensification of services would be limited to the provision of additional rolling stock. It would not be possible to increase the peak hour passenger carrying capacity of the Altrincham line on this basis because of the limitations imposed by the track, platform and signalling arrangements at Oxford Road station.
On the other three lines the additional peak hour passenger carrying capacities would be:
Styal line
Bury line
4718
2083
Rochdale line 5537
The approximate cost of these improvements on a mileage basis would be:
Styal line Bury line Rochdale line
Capital cost per mile
£103,000 £ 52,000 £ 90,000
Additional annual cost per mile including debt charges at 6% p.a.
£15,000 £ 8,000 £19,000
49
4.2.3 Scheme 2
(a) This scheme would involve platform lengthening; some track alterations; installation of additional signalling; conversion of the Altrincham line to a 25 kilovolt AC overhead traction system and the provision of additional rolling stock to permit the operation of more intensive services of longer trains.
(b) The assessment of the possible train services has taken into account the proposed closure of Manchester Central station and the consequent diversion of all trains to Piccadilly and Oxford Road stations.
The pattern of the train services at the peak hours would be 12 trains per hour between Altrincham and Wilmslow via Styal; 12 trains per hour between Bury and Manchester Victoria and 10 trains per hour between Rochdale and Manchester Victoria.
(c) The additional peak hour passenger carrying capacities of the four l ines would be:
Altrincham line 5,338
Styal line 9,161
Bury line 9,374
Rochdale line 8,277
To meet these requirements a total of 376 new vehicles would be needed.
The approximate cost of these improvements on a mileage basis would be:
Altrincham line }
Styal line
Bury line
Rochdale line
Capital cost per mile
£338,000
£390,000
£133,000
Additional annual cost per mile including debt charges at 6% p.a.
£42,000
£49,000
£28,000
4.2.4 Scheme 3
(a) This scheme would embrace the works outlined in Scheme 2, with the addition of a tunnel connecting the Altrincham and Bury lines, with an underground station in Albert Square (link A on Figure 4.1 ), see page 57.
The underground link would connect with the Altrincham line east of Old Trafford station and proceed to join the Bury line at Collyhurst tunnel. The total length of the new line would be 3.46 miles.
Stations would be constructed on the new underground railway adjacent to the present Oxford Road and Victoria stations and in A lbert Square. Direct access would be provided between the existing high level Oxford Road and Victoria stations and the new underground stations by escalators.
(b) Construction of this tunnel would permit the operation of through train services between Altrincham and Bury with direct access to the city centre.
It would be possible to operate at least 24 trains an hour between Altrincham and Manchester with a carrying capacity of over 23,000 passengers. A similar number of trains could be operated between Bury and Manchester.
Journey times to Albert Square would be of the order of 22 minutes from Altrincham and 26 minutes from Bury.
The total carrying capacities of the services possible are shown below in table 4.1 :
On a mi leage basis the approximate cost would be:
Capital Additional annual cost Line cost per mile including debt
per mile charges at 6% p.a.
AltrinchamWilmslow via Styal and Altrincham- Bury Rochdale
£871,000 £133,000
£92,000 £28,000
TA BLE 4.1
CARRYI NG CA PACITIES-SCHEME 3
LINE
Altrincham to Oxford Road. Piccadilly and via Styal to Wilmslow
Wilmslow via Styal to Piccadilly,
Oxford Road and Altrincham
Altrincham to Oxford Road, Albert Square and Bury
Bury to Albert Square, Oxford Road and Altrincham
Bury to Albert Square and Oxford Road
Oxford Road and Albert Square to Bury
NOTE: Peak carrying capacity Altrincham- Manchester
Bury-Manchester
Wilmslow- Styal- Manchester
No. of Trains
12
12
12
12
12
12
Seated
5,760
5,760
5,760
5.760
5,760
5,760
TRAIN CAPACITIES per hour Seated and Seated and Standing Standing•
11,520 17,088
11,520 17,088
11,520 17,088
11.520 17,088
11,520 17,088
11,520 17,088
=23.040 34,176
= 23,040 34,176
= 11,520 17,088
•The seated and standing figures in the end column are based on 2·75 standing to 1 seated passenger with space allowance as used in the Consultants" Scheme for a rapid transit line between Ringway Airport and Langley and are quoted for comparative purposes.
50
...
4.2.5 Ro lling Stock
New rolling stock would be provided, with power controlled sliding doors, automatic safety train stopping device, automatic coupling and uncoupling between each four-car set, a maximum speed of about 50 mph and an acceleration rate of not less than 1.5 mph per second.
4.2.6 Tractio n Syst em
British Railways have concluded that a 25 kilovolt AC overhead traction system is preferable for the underground railway and the proposals have been costed on this basis.
The British Railways Board has under consideration conversion of the Altrincham line traction power supply from 1500 volts DC to 25 KV AC, which would permit through running between Altrincham and Wilmslow via Oxford Road and Piccadilly stations. As this alteration, which would be consistent with the proposed underground link, has not yet been authorised (August 1967) the ful l cost has been included in the estimates for Scheme 2 and Scheme 3.
4.2 .7 Estimat es of Cost
British Railways have prepared approximate estimates of
station would increase the capital expenditure by approximately £1,800,000 at an annual cost of £50,000, bringing the total capital cost of the scheme to £31,700,000, annual cost £3,350,000.
The diversion via Hulme would add no more than two minutes to the total journey time between Altrincham and Albert Square.
(b) The University is expected to become a major traffic generator, with an estimated day time population of 43,500 by 1984. The construction of the tunnel on the second alternative route, Link C, would provide a service for the Ayres Road area, the Moss Side District Centre and the University. This extension, which would involve the construction of approximately 1.58 miles of twin tunnel and three additional stations, would increase the capital expenditure by approximately £7,400,000, and the annual cost by £200,000, bringing the total cost of the scheme to £37,300,000, annual cost £3,500,000. This diversion would add approximately five minutes to the total journey time between Altrincham and Albert Square.
cost for the three schemes and these are shown in Table 4.V FEEDER BUS SERVICES AND STATION 4.2, w hich includes also the estimated passenger carrying v IMPROVEMENTS capacities per hour.
4.2.8 Alternative Rout es for Tunnel
Two alternative ways of linking the Altrincham line to the Bury line appear feasible (links B and Con Figure 4.1 ).
(a) Link B could pass via the residential area to be bui lt at Hulme, with a station at that point. This extension which would involve the construction of approximately 0.36 miles of twin tunnel and an additional
The suggested improvements to the railway system would be more effective if combined with improvements in access to suburban railway stations, and other steps to increase the potential passenger demand, as follows:
(a) Properly designed bus feeder services serving the outer stations. Station approaches modified so that bus passengers can conveniently transfer to rail, and cars conveniently deliver and collect passengers ('kiss and ride').
TA BLE 4.2
COST ESTIM AT ES- RAILWAY IM PROVEM ENTS
SCHEME 1 SCHEME 2 SCHEME 3 Present Additional Additional Additional Additional Additional Additional Additional Additional Additional max. peak hr. peak hour capital working peak hour capital working peak hour capital working
LINE capacity capacity outlay costs capacity outlay costs capacity outlay costs (Seating/ (Seating/ per annum (Seating/ per annum (Seating/ standing standing standing standing ratio 5 :2) ratio 5 :2) ratio 5 :2) ratio 1 :1)
Altrincham to Oxford Rd. 6,182 Nil Nil Nil 5,338} 16,858
Wilmslow to £6,800,000 £800,000 Oxford Rd. 2,359 4,718 £1,200,000 £200,000 9,161 9,161 £28,500,000 £3,000,000
Bury to Victoria 3,125 2,083 £500,000 £100,000 9,374 £3,800,000 £500.000 19,915
Rochdale to Victoria 1,435 5,537 £1,000,000 £200,000 8,277 £1.400,000 £300,000 8.277(A) £1.400,000 £300,000
TOTAL 13,101 12,338 £2,700,000 £500,000 32,150 £12,000,000 £1,600,000 54,211 £29,900,000 £3,300,000
(A) Seating/standing ratio 5 :2
NOTE : If on the Altrincham, Wilmslow and Bury lines the new stock was designed to permit a seating/standing ratio of 1 :2·75 the additional peak hour capacities would be increased by 11, 136, 11, 136 and 5,568 respectively.
51
TABLE 4.3
SURVEY OF AL RINCHAM LINE
FEEDER BUSES
STATION MILES FROM OXFORD RD. STATION
MINUTES FROM TOTAL TOTAL PARKING No. OF No. OF BUSES CO NGESTION REMARKS OXFORD RD. DESCRIPTION OF AREA AROUND POPULATION STATION STATION WITHIN ii- MILE
ALTRINCHAM 8 20
NAVIGATION ROAD 7! 19
TIM PERLEY 18
BROOKLANDS 6 15
SALE 14
DANE ROAD 4f 12
STRETFORD 10
WARWICK ROAD 2t 7
OLD TRAFFORD 2 5
*Typical all -day parking charges: 1 /6d.
(b) Adequate car parking at outer stations, at low or nominal charges, for those who wish to 'park and ride'.
(c) In the long term the exploitation of the potential of undeveloped land adjacent to certain stations by high density residential development within 5 minutes' walk.
(d) The discontinuance of the competitive trunk bus services.
A survey of each station on the four suburban lines was carried out to establish the potential for improvements (a), (b) and (c) above, and large variations were found. The Rochdale line was found unsatisfactory for the immediate development of rail rapid transit services because of the small number of people living in the station catchment areas and travelling to Manchester. The Altrincham, Styal and Bury lines had scope for substantial improvements. As an illustration, Table 4.3 summarises the present position at stations on the Altrincham line.
The general conclusions of the station survey were:
(a) The lines could be made effective and attractive commuter lines by a comprehensive policy for the intensification of services and the development of individual stations. Each station should be developed
52
Sub-regional centre. Bus Station near. Large railway yard.
Largely residential. Some open space. Current development at station.
Low density residential. Current housing development opposite station.
Neighbourhood centre. Low density housing.
District centre. Low density housing. Redevelopment of shopping centre. Large railway coal yard.
On fringe of green belt. Mainly low density housing. Some industry.
District centre. Mixed density housing. Redevelopment of shopping centre. Large railway goods yard.
M ainly industry and open space. Some low density housing.
Mainly industry, shops and public buildings. Poor quality housing. Large railway yard.
TOTAL
3,000
5,000
3,000
4,000
3,000
2.000
5,000
1,000
3.000
29,000
as a 'feeder bus', 'kiss and ride', or 'park and ride' terminal, and/or as a centre of high density residential development, or should provide a combination of these facilities; if this cannot be achieved the station should be closed and possibly re-built in another suitable location.
(b) In deciding the future role of a station it would be essential to consider total travel time for journeys to the city centre. Feeder bus services and 'park and ride' facilities would be attractive to people living some distance from outlying stations, but with stations nearer the centre it would usual ly be better to con centrate on residential development within easy walking distance. Any possibility of improvements to stations would have to be considered in the light of the physical relationship of each particular station with the road system, and the number of existing or potential city centre workers in its catchment area.
(c) There would be no technical or operational difficylties in changing bus and rail fares, and altering bus services so as to make the rail alternative competitive in time and cost with the comparable through bus or car journey for many commuters. There would, however, be severe financial and organisational difficulties in
. ., POPULATION SPACES AT SERVICES MORNING WITHIN 1t MILES STATION* PEAK HOUR
26,000 70 Frequent
5,000 3
26,000 3
22,000 30 2 7
8,000 10 6 27
32.000 Nil
31,000 8
12,000 4
36,000 15
198,000
doing this in advance of the establishment of a Passenger Transport Authority for the Greater M anchester area.
(d) Within the present organisational framework, some modest improvements might be made in the short term in access to stations and in the provision of car parking space.
4.4 TRAFFIC MANAGEM ENT AND BUS OPERATION
Generally speaking the improvement of bus services is something for which individual bus operators must take responsibility ; much can be and is being done through more careful planning of services. improvements in vehicles, and measures- such as the adoption of one-man operationto reduce costs.
In this study, however, the Working Party has confined itself to consideration of the effect of road cond itions on bus services and the measures that might be taken to improve those conditions. On the radials to the central area, whatever improvements the operator attempts to introduce are likely to be insignificant in comparison with the effect of worsening traffic conditions. The Working Party has
NEAR STATION
Severe
Heavy {level crossing)
None
Severe
Severe
Light
Severe
None
Severe
Bus Station adjacent to Railway Station.
Bus stop 100 yards from station.
Bus stop 25 yards from station.
Bus stop 100 yards from station.
Bus stop outside station entrance.
Bus stop 600 yards from station.
Bus stop 25 yards from station.
Bus stop 500 yards from station.
Bus stop 25 yards from station.
therefore examined four ways in which buses might be given priority over other traffic. These are:
(a) general traffic management measures, such as one -way systems,
(b) reserved lanes along existing radial roads,
(c) exclusive bus lanes on new roads, and
(d) the construction of special reserved tracks for buses off the normal highway.
4 .4.1 Convent ional Traffic M anagement M easures
Traffic management schemes designed to improve the flow in general traffic, such as one-way systems, often do result in better bus speeds, especially for express services, but buses do not benefit as much as other traffic because :
(a) tidal flow schemes and linked traffic signals are designed to enable the smooth flow of traffic along a route without the need to be constantly halted at junctions. The local bus cannot take full advantage of this since it has to stop in between junctions to load and off load. This wi ll usually put it out of phase with the main traffic flow. Limited stop and express services benefit where not required to stop.
53
(b) one-way systems often divert buses away from major loading points. Again this applies mainly to local services and will not affect services not requiring to stop in the particular area.
(c) the introduction of a one-way system over any appreciable area may increase route mileage for buses.
There may be opportunities to use conventional techniques of traffic management to give buses priority in particular places, e.g., against a one-way flow in a busy shopping street, but the Working Party do not believe that the spread of conventional traffic management schemes can provide any radical sustained improvement to bus services. In terms of the relative attractiveness of public and private transport, it is probably true to say that traffic management schemes tip the balance in favour of private transport. The Working Party believe, therefore, that it is all the more important that traffic management should be used to help public transport wherever this can be done.
4.4 .2 Bus Lanes Along Existing M ain Radial Roads
Reservation for buses at peak hours of part of the carriageway of substantial lengths of the existing main radials would obviously give buses considerable advantage; but study has shown the existence of serious problems :
(a) To avoid interference with other traffic, at least 5 lanes of carriageway would be needed, and even so the operation would need to be 'tidal'. If local and express services were to operate on the same route, bus bays, most desirable in any case, would become essential. Land would need to be acquired for any necessary road widening .
(b) Delays at junctions could only be overcome by extensive changes in intersection layout and control. The position of turning bays would often involve the purchase of expensive property.
(c) Where inner or offside lanes are given to exclusive use by buses, turning traffic must be allowed to use the restricted lane prior to the junction. This involves lane switching which may be dangerous.
(d) No physical separation of the reserved lane from the rest of the carriageway is possible, if the lane is to be made available to other traffic outside the peak. The reservation of the lane may be difficult to enforce where motorists see a relatively empty space beside them which they would be allowed to use if they were about to turn at the next junction.
(e) Reservation of the centre or offside lane would involve expensive measures of passenger handling (subways, platforms, etc.) at each stop.
In general. the existing radial roads to central Manchester are, at best, four lane highways and are intersected at frequent intervals by busy cross traffic. The Working Party do not think that a long and continuously separated bus lane could be a practical possibil ity in the near future. While exemptions from banned turns and the provision of short lengths of 'bus only' road would be valuable to the efficient operation of the buses, they would not achieve a major change in the balance of advantage between the bus and the private car.
54
4.4.3 Exclusive Bus Lanes o n New Roads
A completely new system of high capacity roads, built to urban motorway or near motorway standards, would offer a means of providing a reserved bus lane system. However, the programme of motorway construction in the SELNEC Area, particularly in the heavily built-up urban areas of the conurbation, would mean that it would be many years before such a reserved bus lane system could be implemented.
Exclusive bus lanes in urban motorways should be considered for other than local services :
(a) whenever a new motorway is being planned.
(b) wherever bus lanes can be provided without excessive cost of land acquisition.
(c) whenever passenger demand does not warrant high capacity rapld transit.
4 .4 .4 Reserved Tracks for Buses
Another alternative would be the construction of special reserved tracks for buses off the normal highway. Unit costs of busways have already been given in Table 3.1 . Applying these to the Consultants' profile used for the Ringway-Langley route, it was possible to make an approximate comparison between the cost of building various widths of busway and the cost of a duorail system along the same alignment. The total track and structure costs are given in Table 4.4 below:
TABLE 4.4
COMPARATIVE COSTS-BUSWAYS AND DUORAIL
SYSTEM
Duorail
Unguided (14 ft. single track)
Unguided (1 1 ft. single track)
Throughways (9 ft . 8 in. single track)
COST OF DOUBLE TRACK AND STRUCTURE ONLY 16-Mile Route Ringway to Langley
£ 28,000,000
36,000,000
31,000,000
28,000,000
9-Mile Route Barlow Moor Road to Victoria Avenue
£ 19,000,000
25,000,000
21,000,000
19,000,000
It should be noted that the Consultants recommended a 14 ft . track as being the minimum width for unguided buses travelling on a single lane at high speeds.
It is clear from the above table that although the costs are approximate, In order for a busway structure to be competitive with the cost for duorail it must be reduced to the minimum possible width only achievable by a guidance system. The guided bus system proposed by Throughways Transport is in a preliminary stage of development and is under examination by the Road Research Laboratory. It thus was not sufficiently advanced in development to fall within the criteria for full consideration in this Study.
Nevertheless, assuming that a guided bus system could eventually be perfected, the Working Party gave broad consideration to the advantages and disadvantages of a bus rapid transit system operating partly in reserved track and partly on the normal street system.
The most important advantage of the bus system would be its ability to run off the reserved track and carry out its own residential distribution without the necessity for passengers to change vehicles. This advantage may not be of major significance when compared with a well designed trunk line system providing co-ordinated feeder schedules and well designed facilities to eliminate annoying waiting and physical discomfort. In any case the advantage would accrue to only a proportion of the passengers as outlined below:
(a) It would not affect those passengers who either walked or drove by car to the reserved track station or who could not be provided with a through service for practical reasons due to limited demand. Indications in other cities with Rapid Transit are that increasing proportions of rapid transit journeys start as a journey by car from home to station.
(b) To provide the maximum number of passengers with the benefit of a through journey from home to city centre without transfer, buses would require to feed otf the reserved track at frequent intervals and provide a close mesh of residential services. The provision of the many spur roads on and off the reserved track which this would entail would be expensive and space consuming, especially when they joined the reserved track in an underground or elevated position. An attractive frequency of service to a great number of residential terminals would be difficult to justify.
(c) The benefit of a through journey would not in any case accrue to a passenger wishing to alight at a reserved track station further out from the city than the point where his particu lar bus service joined the reserved track.
The disadvantages of the busway system may be summarised as:
(a) The cost of tracks and structure for a bus rapid transit system is at least equal to that for duorail.
(b) The cost of stations with links to the highway system, and bays for waiting vehicles, is likely to be higher than for duorail.
(c) There are problems in ventilating underground sections.
(d) The crew costs of a bus system are considerably higher than those for a rail system because of the necessity of providing a bus driver for say every 60 passengers, compared with a train crew of one or two for 1,000 passengers.
(e) A reliable and close frequency of services on the main line, which is one of the most attractive features of any rapid transit system, would be affected by any traffic congestion on the non-reserved track portion of the journey. The Working Party are of the opinion that the high standard of reliability which the travelling public will demand of any new rapid transit system is unlikely to be achieved in the foreseeable future by any
system which does not operate completely on reserved track.
(f) There is a low upper limit to the number of passengers per hour which could be carried on a reserved busway. Preliminary investigations indicate that this is about half the number which can be carried by a modern duorail system if all stops are served. World experience indicates that the building of a rapid transit line often results in substantial urban development along the line. Against this background, the heavy capital investment to build a rapid transit system with a limited capacity would not appear to be justified.
4.5 RESTRAINT OF TRAFFIC AT PEAK PERIODS-PARKING POLICY
4.5.1 General
Finally the Working Party has considered to what extent the problems of bus operation might be alleviated, and a better public transport service provided, through a policy of restraining private car traffic at peak hours. The main justification of restraint on peak hour commuting is that. as compared with the bus, the car represents a very uneconomical use of road space, and bus passengersthe great majority-are being unduly inconvenienced by a relatively small minority of people who are travelling to the city centre by private car at the peak hour. General arguments justifying some restraint of private car traffic are given in a report recently published by the Ministry of Transport. entitled 'Better Use of Town Roads'. and in this report it is shown that for Central London over half the benefits of a system of restraint would be in the form of savings in time to bus passengers.
The possible contribution of a policy of restraint will depend on the relationship between the quality of bus services and the amount of traffic on the road, and the practicability of measures to reduce the volume of traffic to that which allows tolerable bus operations. Although there Is no measure of congestion as such, the records of lost miles of Manchester City Transport (see Figure 2.8) show:
(a) that congestion has been a growing problem for bus operation since 1957, and
(b) that seasonal variation in the Manchester area is such that in August, even at the present time, conditions are tolerable.
To achieve tolerable conditions all the year round would require a very large reduction of traffic, not as far as 1957 volumes, because capacity has been slightly increased by traffic management schemes and road improvements since that date. But restraint of the order required to get back to even 1960 volumes of traffic could certainly not be achieved by any techniques available at the present time.
Some reduction in present volumes of traffic could, however, be achieved through a parking policy directed at giving priority to the short period parker, business caller or shopper at the expense of the car commuter. As shown in Table 2.1, there are over 20,000 potential parking spaces available ln the central and fringe areas which are free to the all day parker, including nearly 10,000 spaces available for private use only. At the same time there is a serious shortage
55
of short period parking space. Well proved measures such as parking meters and limited waiting traffic orders could be used to give priority to the short period parker and it is relevant that the report ' Better Use of Town Roads' concludes that 'the most promising method of restraint, at least for the shorter term, would be to intensify control over the location, amount and use of parking space, on and off street, especially in order to restrict long term parking, which is a characteristic of car commuting'.
Measures such as the extension of parking meter control, and parking restrictions, operational and financial control by the Corporation of all public parking places including those privately owned, and the closure of vacant sites used solely by commuters for 'fly' parking, would all tend to reduce volumes of traffic at the peak period and assist the operation of more reliable bus services.
4.5.2 The City's Joint Report on Car Parking
The importance of parking control as a means of making a better use of the road system is recognised in the Joint Report On Car Parking approved by the Manchester City Council in August, 1967. The objectives of the new parking policy as stated in the report are as follows:
(a) to ensure that the scale of provision of car parks is related to the capacity of a highway network with a view to making the best and fullest use of the road system without causing undue congestion to essential traffic.
(b) to ensure that car parking facilities are located where they can be adequately served by the highway network, as existing and proposed, and where they can best and most conveniently be related to pedestrian circulation within the City centre and to local public transport connections.
(c) to ensure that adequate operational car parking on ly is permitted within the boundaries of new development.
(d) to ensure the provision of adequate non-operationa l short period parking space of which, consistent with items (b) and (c) above, the maximum proportion should be located well within the Central area.
(e) to provide long period parking spaces consistent with the residual carrying capacity of the road system after items (c) and (d) have been met.
(f) to ensure that a unified system of administration and control is applied to all major car parks within the central area, whether public or privately owned or constructed. This is an essential corollary to making the best use of the limited capacity of the highway system and a necessarily limited amount of parking.
56
In the Joint Report it was suggested that parking control should be implemented immediately to cover the whole central area as defined in that report.
4 .5.3 Findings Subsequent to the Joint Report
Work carried out for the Working Party by the City Engineer's Department has shown the extent of parking sites in the central area fringe, in areas of mixed land uses, obsolete property, vacant sites. and newly redeveloped areas. If parking control is to be successful as a means of restraining car commuting it must be implemented not only over the central area as envisaged in the Joint Report on Car Parking but also over the fringe areas covered by the latest parking survey, so that the car commuter displaced from the central area does not merely move into the fringe. (See Table 2.1 ).
4.5.4 Implementati on of Parking Policy
The immediate need for additional short period parking space was stressed in the Joint Report, which suggested that these could be provided in the first place by extending the meter control area, and by converting several Corporation controlled car parks exclusively to short period use. Existing commuter spaces displaced by these proposals would then be replaced in new car parks in more outlying areas. However, in the light of the present analysis the Working Party consider that no such replacement of long period parking spaces should be provided at the present time and indeed. that it might be desirable to reduce the provision of commuter parks even further. Only when a balance has been achieved between the public and private sectors of transport, and more highway space has been provided, should the amount of space for all day parking be increased. Sites must have been acquired and be avai lable at that time in order to implement the recommendations of the Joint Report on Car Parking.
At the same time the Working Party recognise that there are several difficulties in fully implementing a parking policy aimed at restraining car commuting to the central area. Existing legislation does not cover the regulation of private parking sites, which have been in existence for four years or more, and affords only limited powers to control off-street parking. It would also be important to introduce the policy gradually, as the availability of commuter parking in some measure might be an important factor in ensuring that the City remains attractive to employers and employees alike. There is a further difficulty of timing. Commuters by private car would want to see some improvement of the public transport services before accepting any significant loss of parking facilities, but the improvement of bus services depends on a prior reduction in congestion.
-!
Proposed Line of Ringway/ • Langley Rapid Transit &Sins
Electric Bury, Altrincham & Q Stya l Lines
Other Suburban Lines Q
4.1 - Railway links showing alternatives 'A', '8' and 'C'
0
, /
Princess Road + (Future Motorway)
t ' Bury
mile.
57
·'
THE FUTURE FOR PUBLIC TRANSPORT
Section five
The Future for Public Transport
5.1 RESULTS OF STUDIES
The studies reported in the last two sections point to conclusions about travel to the central area which can be summarised as follows:
5.1 .1 Public Transport on Reserved Track
(a) The monorail systems that have been developed at the present time would offer no advantage over a modern urban elect ric rai lway in provid ing commuter transport to the centre of Manchester. Although the Consultants' detailed analysis was done on a single route- which might not be the best or the only route ultimately chosen for development- conditions on the route were typical for the conurbation and the conclusion in favour of a modern electric railway can be safely generalised.
(b) Busways are generally more expensive to construct than railways, and there would be special difficulties in ventilating a bus tunnel under the central area. There may be places where a special track for buses would be justified, but the extensive system necessary to support services of rapid transit quality would give less value for money than rail development.
5.2- Concept of Duorail vehicle for
Manchester, prepared by Associated
Electrical Industries and Metropolitan
Cammell
(c) It would be possible to improve existing suburban rail lines through feeder bus services, station car park improvements and, if justified by the extra traffic, quite modest expenditure on re-equipment. In the long term the existing network could be greatly improved by a link under the central area. But the development of a ra il rapid transit network requires heavy investment, and the first results cou ld not appear for several years.
5.1.2 Buses
(a) Whatever improvement or new construction by way of a rail rapid transit network is produced, the part to be played by buses, which at present carry 70% of people to work in the central area, should not be underestimated. They must, for many years, continue to carry the majority of commuters. Even in the long term with rail rapid transit developed they will have a major role in feeding railway stations, and providing services for cross town journeys, local journeys and along radial corridors not served by rail.
(b) Bus services have deteriorated in recent years. and will continue to do so unless better road conditions at the peak hour can be secured. The difficulties of
61
62
I
~ • I
~ -
~-
5.3-Goncept of Duorail vehicle for Manchester, prepared by Associated Electrical Industries and Metropolitan Gammell
I
..
. ~ I
·,,
5.4-Duorail concept of vehicle interior for Manchester, prepared
by Associated Electrical Industries
and Metropolitan Gammell
giving buses selective priority through traffic management schemes seem overwhelmin!=I. There is, however, some traffic on the roads at peak hours which could be restrained through parking policy, with a consequent improvement in operating conditions for buses.
5.1.3 Recommended Action The above conclusions do not hold out any prospect of quick, cheap or easy improvement to the public transport system. On the contrary they point to the need for policies which will be unpopular with some sections of the public, and for the spending of substantial amounts of money over long periods. Failure to take action of this kind is likely to prejudice the future prosperity of Manchester city centre and the benefits which flow from a strong regional centre. If central Manchester is to continue to be developed as a place of dense employment and of activity, immediate action must be taken to improve accessibility to it for the majority of people who will have to travel by public transport. The most important steps in the Working Party's view, are:
(a) the positive use of parking policy to restrain one category of private car use-namely its use for the journey to work in the central area-with the objective of making a better use of the existing road system;
{b) the development of a modern rail rapid transit system for the Manchester area, fully integrated with the bus and suburban rail systems.
5.2 PARKING POLICY The Working Party believe that the general public will see the merits of a policy of restraint on private car commuting to the central area provided it is stressed that:
l
(a) the policy is not aimed at shoppers and business callers in the central area. In fact, as the Joint Report stresses, more space should be made available for these uses though it may be necessary to limit this to off-peak times of day;
(b) although some individuals will be inconvenienced by being unable to drive to work in the central area, the great majority, both bus passengers and motorists will gain from an improvement in traffic conditions;
(c) restraint is not a complete solution, but only necessary as a means of holding traffic at manageable volumes until accessibility to the central area can be radically improved by investment in new transport facilities;
(d) investment in new facilities, whether railways or highways, will bring about a new situation in which parking control policy can be reviewed.
5.3 THE DEVELOPM ENT OF RAIL RAPID TRANSIT
5.3.1 Schemes Investigated
In this study the Working Party looked in detail at two possible rail schemes- the new 16-mile Ringway to Langley route, and the scheme for linking three British Railways suburban lines. Each of these schemes was conceived in isolation, i.e. not as part of a unified network, and it is clear that there is a very large range of possible rail networks combining aspects of each scheme, drawing on other parts of the existing rail network, and with lines extended into new corridors. A basic feature of any future rail network would almost certainly be the central link from Oxford Road to Victoria, but there are many ways in which a network might be built up from this link.
To achieve the full benefit of a developed rail network it
63
64
5.5-Station interior, Montreal
5.6-Statibn interior, Montreal
wou ld need to be integrated with the rest of the transport system, and with future land use developments. It would be necessary to make arrangements for feeder bus services and 'park and ride' faci lities at outlying stations on the line. Good interchange with the main highways system wou ld be essential to encourage motorists to leave the new radia l motorways and to make the final stage of their journey to the city centre by public transport.
5.3.2 Possible Integrated Road/ Rail Developments
The principles outlined above are il lustrated in Figure 5.1 (in pocket at back) which shows various ways in which a rai l rapid transit network might combine the use of existing British Railway tracks with new construction . Various networks can be visua lised, but as an example of the potential of such a rapid transit system Figure 5.1 illustrates the linking of the Altrincham and Wi lmslow (via Styal} lines and the use of a centra l tunnel to link existing and new tracks under the city centre.
One possibility described in paragraph 4.2.4 is the joining of the Altrincham and Bury lines through th is central tunnel with underground stations in the city centre close to major centres of employment. Another possibility would be to link the Bury line through the central tunnel to new tracks running south through the University along the line suggested by the Consu ltants for the Ringway/Langley rapid transit. This line could join and be extended along the existing British Railways 'Midland ' tracks as far as say, Cheadle Heath. Other possibilities illustrated in Figure 5.1 are the extension of the system north to Victoria Avenue, Langley and Oldham, and south to Wythenshawe. Ringway and Sale.
It would be possible to construct the whole of the above network in easy stages and the expensive central tunnel and stations could be used jointly by up to three lines.
5.7-Shops in station mezzanine, Toronto
Trains could operate through the central sections at 2t minute intervals and with six-car trains the system would be capable of transporting up to 30,000 passengers per hour from north and south into the heart of the city, as well as serving other important centres such as the University and Hospital complex on Wilmslow Road.
At a later date an east-west line might be added to the system by linking existing rail lines running into Piccadilly Station underground via Piccadilly Plaza and Market Street to Salford Station and ra il lines in the west of the conurba tion.
Specially designed road/rail interchanges cou ld be constructed at strategic positions on the radial road system so that feeder bus services and cars cou ld transfer passengers conveniently on to the trains. Adequate facilities could be provided at these interchange points for car drivers wishing to 'park and ride' and for car owners being driven to the station by other members of their family.
The new public transport system could be equipped with trains and buses of the latest design with every attention given to passenger comfort and conven ience by way of escalators, covered walkways and shelters at stations and bus stops. Illustrations of the type of modern rapid transit trains and stations visua lised for the Manchester system are shown in Figures 5.2 to 5.7.
5.3.3 Fut ure Planning Work
The above are illustrations of ways in which a rapid transit system could be developed by combining new construction with the use of existing British Rai lway rights of way and stations. The Working Party believe that these possibilities need detailed investigation. The case for rail rapid transit must finally be assessed in the context of a total land use/transportation plan for the conurbation, designed to make the best use of the limited resources for investment in transport and urban renewal.
65
POSSIBLE PRIMARY TRANSPORTATION NETWORK FOR MANCHESTER
TO BLACKBURN
& WIGAN
FARNWORTH
SOUTH ANCS
TRAFFORD PARK
INOUSTRIAl ESTATE
Mobbertey
t: ••,,,o,q J UTSFORD
/,0 NORTHWICH 11. CHESTER
UPGRADED AL TRINC HAM & WILM SL OW SUBURBAN LINE
POSSIBLE NORTH/ SOUTH RAPID TRANSIT SYSTEM {
NEW
USING
CONSTRUCTION
BRITISH RAIL TRACK
FUTURE RAPID TRANSIT EXTENSIONS CJ
TO RAWTENSTALL
0
• ( f
CJ D
(/}
~ I
> Cl)
z a: w rcn < w
Airport
D
Langley
E Y EDGE
.; ROCHDALE
CHEADLE
HANDFORTH
9 Alderley Edge
; TO CREWE 8t LONDON
POSSIBLE ROAD I RAIL INTERCHANGES
POSSIBLE RAIL I RAIL INTERCHANGES
EXISTING RAILWAYS
BRAMHALL
SCALE
0
-----(o~---
TO HALIFAX BRADFORD
& WAKE Fl ELD ETC
MACCLESFIELD STOKE
& LONDON
2 3
TO ROCHDALE
Junction
4
EXISTING l PROPOSED
M Al N HIGHWAYS
5 .1
HUDDERSFIELD
& LEE OS
STALYBRIDGE
S. GLOSSOP
TO HAYFIELD & CHINLEY
5 MLS.