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8/18/2019 Marsh Et Al 1997 Contributions of Inadequate Source Monitoring to Unconscious Plagiarism During Idea Generation
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Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition
1997, Vol. 2 3 , No. 4, 886-89 7
Copyright 1997 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
0278-7393/97/$3.00
Contributions of Inadequate Source M onitoring to Unconscious
Plagiarism D uring Idea G eneration
Richard L. Marsh, Joshua
D .
Landau, and Jason L. Hicks
University of Georgia
Participants engaged in a creative idea-generation task that required them to monitor source to
devise ideas not offered previously by others. In Experiment 1, inadvertent plagiarism
(cryptomnesia) occurred mo re often when participants were generating ideas than w hen they
were taking a recognition test. In Experiment 2, focusing participants on the origin of their
ideas during generation resembled the focusing that occurs in recognition performance and
reduced plagiarism. In Experiment 3, a speeded-response condition increased inadvertent
plagiarism by mimicking conditions in which people cannot or do not adequately monitor
source. In Experiment 4, plagiarism was reduced both when participants offered their new
ideas in a one-on-one context as compared with a more anonymous group setting and when
participants w ere specifically instructed to avoid plagiarism . The results are discussed in terms
of source-monitoring decision criteria and the conscious and unconscious processes that
support that monitoring.
In a variety of situations, properly ascribing the origin of a
thought, an idea, or a memory is crucial for normal human
functioning (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Auto-
biographical recollection is probably the best example of the
human need to be able to avoid source-monitoring errors
(e.g., Cohen, 1989; Rubin, 1986). Recalling a specific
experience in one's life depends on one's ability to assess
confidently and accurately that the event happened and not
that someone else related it as a story or that it occurred in a
dream. There are m any uses of memory, however, for which
the determination of source is unnecessary and even impos-
sible. In Brewer and Pani's (1983) taxonomy of memory, for
example,
personal
memories are acquired through a single
exposure (e.g., what one ate for lunch). These memories
seem to require that source-monitoring processes be en-
gaged to verify accurately that the event occurred. In
contrast, generic and skill mem ories do not appear to invoke
very much processing related to source ascription. Generic
memories result from repeated exposure to information and
can be either semantic (e.g., accessed through subjective lexicons
or timeless truths) or perceptual (e.g., knowing that a Dober-
man's ears are pointed rather than round). Skill mem ories include
cognitive skills such as knowing the rules of mathematics.
Although one m ay recall specific episodes related to the acquisi-
Richard L. Marsh, Joshua D. Landau, and Jason L. Hicks,
Department of Psychology, University of G eorgia.
This work was supported by grants from the University of Georgia
Research Foundation, Inc., and by Sigma Xi G rants-in-Aid.
Appreciation is expressed to Abraham Tesser for his helpful
comments in discussions of this w ork. We thank D. J. Amis, M ark
Wagerer, Robert Brown , Hesham Sharawy, Ted Parsons, and Shari
Nevins for their dedicated help in collecting and scoring the data.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
Richard L. Marsh, Department of Psychology, University of
Georgia, Athens, Georgia 30602 -3013. Electronic mail may be sent
via Internet to m [email protected].
tion of generic and skill memories, source monitoring does
not appear to be crucial to using that information.
Given that source monitoring is not necessarily required
for a variety of tasks that bring one's past experience to bear,
in this article we investigate the degree to which adequate
source-monitoring processes are invoked spontaneously.
Recently, the extensive literature on source monitoring and
related phenomena was comprehensively reviewed (Johnson
et al., 1993). Much of that literature used modified recogni-
tion memory tests to assess source monitoring as compared
with other indirect tests of source memory. By modified
these recognition tests required participants to determine the
original source through task instructions such as of the old
items, determine whether you gave it or another participant
did or of the items you generated, specify which you
spoke and which you imagined , and so forth. Although
source attributions have been made subsequent to recall
(e.g., Lindsay, 1990), many of those earlier tests of source
monitoring measured peo ple's abilities when source monitor-
ing was the primary cognitive task (e.g., Johnson & Raye,
1981; Johnson, Raye, Foiey, & Foley, 1981). Therefore,
modified recognition tests measure source-m onitoring perfor-
mance under best case conditions in which people are
specifically atten ding to origin information w ith task instruc-
tions that are simple and clear.
In contrast to a direct test of source, participants in this
study learned material that was critical to a later source-
monitoring task, but their source monitoring was in service
of performing a related, primary task. In brief, people tested
in these experiments were required to generate ideas to
problems in a group setting. Later, they were asked to
generate new ideas that neither they nor their fellow
participants had given before. Thus, for this task, partici-
pants were not provided w ith the ideas that were previously
generated and asked to d etermine their original sources (i.e.,
modified recognition); rather, they were asked to perform a
generative task that inherently required that source-
88 6
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232598172_Misleading_Suggestions_Can_Impair_Eyewitnesses'_Ability_to_Remember_Event_Details?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-733d53d1-251a-470b-aaaa-7fce273a0f46&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMjQ0ODUxNTtBUzoxMDQ3OTEzMTc0MTc5OTFAMTQwMTk5NTYwNjE0MA==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232598172_Misleading_Suggestions_Can_Impair_Eyewitnesses'_Ability_to_Remember_Event_Details?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-733d53d1-251a-470b-aaaa-7fce273a0f46&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMjQ0ODUxNTtBUzoxMDQ3OTEzMTc0MTc5OTFAMTQwMTk5NTYwNjE0MA==
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INADEQUATE SOURCE MONITORING
88
monitoring processes be engaged to offer genuinely new
ideas. In other words, participants had to be able to reject old
ideas to offer truly new ones. In each experiment, perfor-
mance on this generative task was compared with perfor-
mance on a modified recognition m emory test.
Many of the older studies on list discrimination (e.g.,
Hintzman, Block, & Summers, 1973) or intrusions in recall
(e.g., Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) similarly
required that source monitoring be performed in service of
some other task. What happens when task demands place
secondary, rather than primary, emphasis on source ascrip-
tion? Jacoby, Kelley, Brown, and Jasechko (1989) have
suggested that people may not spontaneously attempt to
recollect source and either largely ignore this important
cognitive component of the task or, perhaps, are able to
neglect it altogether. This latter possibility suggests that the
recollection of information and the ascription of its original
source can be separate cognitive acts (cf. Jacoby, Kelley,
Brown, & Jasechko, 1989).
In Johnson's source-monitoring framework (e.g., Johnson,
1988; Johnson et al., 1993), there are two kinds of decision
processes. First, determination of source can rely on heuris-
tic processing that inspects the am oun t of qualitative
aspects of activated information (e.g., perceptual detail,
affective comp onents, associated cognitive operations). Sec-
ond, source can also be determined by systematic processes
that are slower and more prone to disruption (e.g., a
plausibility check). In concert, then, heuristic and systematic
processes can guide and check one another, with their
mixture being determined by a person's goals and by the task
at hand (i.e., a person's adopted decision criteria). The
heuristic versus systematic distinction (as described by
Chaiken, Lieberman, & Eagly, 1989) proposes that system-
atic processing is likely to be controlled and intentional,
whereas heuristic processing may or may not be under
conscious control. With a slightly different emphasis, Jacoby
and his colleagues (e.g., Jacoby, 19 91; Jacoby, Kelley, &
Dywan, 1989) proposed that source determinations are
memorial ascriptions (or attributions) made by assessing
how fluently information comes to mind or is processed.
Cognitive processes that assess fluency, however, can be
opposed by effortful, conscious recollection. Both of these
accounts (as offered by Johnson and Jacoby and their
colleagues) describe an unconscious or heuristic set of
processes that can be opposed by a set of conscious
processes.
Our intuition is that source ascriptions, under some
circumstances, require m ore controlled (systematic) process-
ing. Clearly, the degree of controlled processing is deter-
mined by the person and the current set of task demands (cf.
Johnson et al., 1993). That is, the decision criteria that are
applied will affect the mixture (or balance) of heuristic
versus systematic processing on which source mo nitoring is
based. For example, a simple yes-no task about a particular
source tends to elicit more source m isattributions than does
asking about all potential sources (Dodson & Johnson,
1993). Similarly, the eyewitness suggestibility effect that is
often observed with recognition tests is substantially re-
duced by forcing people to consider all of the potential
alternative sources (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989). Given these
findings, in the current experiments we assessed the degree
to which systematic source-monitoring processes were spon-
taneously invoked when m emory for source was required in
service of another task (i.e., under source-monitoring con di-
tions that were not best case*'). We predicted that when
source monitoring is not the primary task, systematic
processing will be inadequate, and, therefore, people will
fail to use information that they could have used to avoid
source-monitoring errors.
In the experiments that follow, we adapted a generative
problem-solving paradigm from several studies that reported
a specific failure of source m onitoring known as cryptom ne-
sia, or inadvertent plagiarism (Brown & Halliday, 1991;
Brown, Jones, & Davis, 1995; Brown & Murphy, 1989;
Marsh & Bower, 1993; Marsh & Landau, 1995). In those
studies, people generated category exemplars in the pres-
ence of other participants (e.g., Brown & M urphy, 1989) or
offered solutions to word puzzles played against a computer
(e.g., Marsh & Landau, 1995). For a given participant in
both cases, information was either self-generated or offered
from another source. Later, participants were asked to
generate category exemplars or puzzle solutions that were
new and had not been offered before. Despite being adm on-
ished not to copy, participants who performed these tasks
inadvertently plagiarized a significant number of items that
were originally offered from another external source, and
they did so truly believing, as assessed by confidence
ratings, that their new contribution was a novel item devised
by their own innovation.
In the experiments that follow, we asked groups of
participants to offer ideas in the form of solutions to
common problems (e.g., How can traffic accidents be
reduced?). Later, we asked them to return and to generate
new, novel ideas. Our theoretical motivations were as
follows. The cryptomnesia reported in earlier studies could
largely reflect the concurrent cognitive dem ands of generat-
ing puzzle solutions or words out of semantic mem ory. That
is , given a demanding primary activity like solving a
problem, people may not have enough resources or, more
likely, simply m ay be less inclined to m onitor the source of
the ideas that they are generating. Thus, the four exp eriments
that we report here address whether cryptomnesia in a
generative paradigm is more frequent than when various
task instructions are given to induce people to monitor
source more carefully.
In a related way, we explicitly tested in Experiment 1
whether the plagiarism errors exhibited by g roups of people
naturally engaged in generative idea production accurately
reflect the knowledge they possess as compared with similar
groups engaged in source monitoring for a modified recogni-
tion test. If cryptomnesia arises because of inadequate
application of source-monitoring decision criteria, then the
inadequacy might reside in either the heuristic or the
systematic processing that supports source monitoring. If it
is in the more consciously controlled systematic criteria,
then manipulations of those criteria that improve source
monitoring should reduce cryptomne sia. Therefore, in Experi-
ment 2 we tested whether engaging people in source
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232522788_Creating_False_Memories_Remembering_words_not_presented_in_lists?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-733d53d1-251a-470b-aaaa-7fce273a0f46&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMjQ0ODUxNTtBUzoxMDQ3OTEzMTc0MTc5OTFAMTQwMTk5NTYwNjE0MA==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/20431507_The_eyewitness_suggestibility_effect_and_memory_for_source_Memory_Cognition_17_349-358?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-733d53d1-251a-470b-aaaa-7fce273a0f46&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMjQ0ODUxNTtBUzoxMDQ3OTEzMTc0MTc5OTFAMTQwMTk5NTYwNjE0MA==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232522788_Creating_False_Memories_Remembering_words_not_presented_in_lists?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-733d53d1-251a-470b-aaaa-7fce273a0f46&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMjQ0ODUxNTtBUzoxMDQ3OTEzMTc0MTc5OTFAMTQwMTk5NTYwNjE0MA==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/20431507_The_eyewitness_suggestibility_effect_and_memory_for_source_Memory_Cognition_17_349-358?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-733d53d1-251a-470b-aaaa-7fce273a0f46&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMjQ0ODUxNTtBUzoxMDQ3OTEzMTc0MTc5OTFAMTQwMTk5NTYwNjE0MA==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/9901359_Deese_J_On_the_prediction_of_occurrence_of_particular_verbal_intrusions_in_immediate_recall_J_Exp_Psychol_58_17-22?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-733d53d1-251a-470b-aaaa-7fce273a0f46&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMjQ0ODUxNTtBUzoxMDQ3OTEzMTc0MTc5OTFAMTQwMTk5NTYwNjE0MA==
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888
MARSH, LANDAU, AND HICKS
monitoring during idea generation reduced cryptomnesia
errors. Similarly, if insufficient systematic decision compo-
nents are what contribute to inadvertent plagiarism, then the
rate of cryptomnesia should be able to be manipulated
downward as well as upward. Consequently, in Experiment
3 we used a speeded-response paradigm to determine if
opposing (and limiting) conscious, systematic recollective
processes would negatively affect spontaneous source moni-
toring (thereby resulting in m ore cryptomne sia). Finally, in
Experiment 4 we investigated whether the contextual task
demands surrounding generation would change plagiarism.
That experiment manipulated two variables. First, partici-
pants offered new ideas to an experimenter in a one-on-one
session or anonymously in groups. Second, we specifically
asked half of the participants to avoid plagiarism errors. The
first manipulation of one-on-one interaction w as predicted to
cause participants to apply m ore systematic decision criteria
in a spontaneous fashion to avoid inadvertent plagiarism.
The second manipulation tested whether that spontaneous
application of decision criteria reduced plagiarism to the
same degree as being directly asked to apply more stringent
decision criteria.
Exper iment 1
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to compare the source
attributions made in a modified recognition memory para-
digm to the source attributions made while generating new
ideas.
That comparison was m ade 1 week after participants
had brainstormed solutions to two problems in a group
setting. Although source errors of all kinds have been
reported for the recognition memory test, our focus in this
experiment was on the only observable error that can occur
in new idea generation: an inadvertent plagiarism in which
an old idea is claimed to be one's new contribution. If the
source attributions demanded in a modified recognition
memory test rely on decision criteria supported by substan-
tial controlled processing, then we predicted that plagiarism
errors would be greater in the idea-generation task as
compared w ith the recognition task.
Method
Participants.
One hundred forty-nine undergraduates from the
University of Georgia volunteered and received partial course
credit for their participation. Participants were tested in modestly
sized groups that averaged about 20 participants each. Seventy-four
participants were assigned to a
recognition
condition (group sizes
of 24 ,2 4, and 2 6), and the remaining 75 participants were assigned
to a
generation
condition (group sizes of 18, 18, 19, and 20), as
detailed shortly. Group assignment was determined randomly by a
participant's arrival at the laboratory.
Materials and design. For the generative problem-solving
tasks,
we took two widely used problems from the brainstorming
literature. The two questions w ere (a)
What are some ways in which
the U niversity might be improved?
(Paulus, Dzindolet, Poletes, &
Camacho, 1993) and (b)
How can the number of
traffic
accidents
be reduced? (Diehl & Stroebe, 1991). Although it was unlikely that
participants would forget what question they were working on, the
question was projected clearly on a screen at the front of the room.
People in the recognition condition took a modified recognition
memory test after a week's delay. That test was individually
tailored to each participant to contain new items, items offered by
other group members the week earlier, and items they had offered
themselves, as detailed shortly. The basic design was one between-
subjects variable specifying whether participants were given a
modified recognition test or whether they were asked to generate
additional solutions, each after a we ek's delay.
Procedure.
Each person participated in two experimental ses-
sions that were conducted 1 week apart. Table 1 outlines the
procedure for this experiment and the ones that followed. During
the first session, all participants in each group were instructed that
Table 1
Testing Procedures Used During the First and Second Weeks by Condition
in Experiments 1-4
Experiment
and condition W eek l W eek 2
Experiment 1
Generation
Recognition
Experiment 2
No source
Source
Experiment 3
Control
Speeded
Experiment 4
Group testing
Stringent
Lenient
Individual testing
Stringent
Lenient
IGU5/Q/G)
IG(15/Q/G),FG(2/Q/P)
IG(16/Q/G)
IG(167Q/G)
IG(16/Q/G)
IG(16VQ/G)
IG(16/Q/G)
IG(16/Q/G)
IG(167Q/G)
IGQ6/Q/G)
FG(2/Q/P)
R E Q 3 4 / Q )
FG(4/Q/P),REC(32/Q)
FG(4/Q/P), REC(32/Q)
FG(4/Q/P, no time limit), REC(32 /Q)
FG(4/Q/P, 20 s each), REC(32 /Q)
FG(4/Q/P, on paper), REC(32 /Q)
FG(4/Q/P, on paper), REC(32 /Q)
FG(4/Q/P, tape recorded), REC(3 2/Q)
FG(4/Q/P, tape recorded), REC(32 /Q)
Note-
Numb ers refer
to
the number of ideas in the tasks. IG = initial generation; Q = question; G =
group; FG = final generation; P = person; REC = recognition. Thus, IG(15/Q/G) reads as follows:
During initial generation 15 ideas were generated for each question per group.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/200772617_Productivity_Loss_in_Idea-Generating_Groups_Tracking_Down_the_Blocking_Effect?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-733d53d1-251a-470b-aaaa-7fce273a0f46&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMjQ0ODUxNTtBUzoxMDQ3OTEzMTc0MTc5OTFAMTQwMTk5NTYwNjE0MA==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/200772617_Productivity_Loss_in_Idea-Generating_Groups_Tracking_Down_the_Blocking_Effect?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-733d53d1-251a-470b-aaaa-7fce273a0f46&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMjQ0ODUxNTtBUzoxMDQ3OTEzMTc0MTc5OTFAMTQwMTk5NTYwNjE0MA==
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INADEQUATE SOURCE MONITORING
889
they would b e required to collectively generate 15 novel solutions
for each of two problems. Participants volunteered their solutions
by raising their hands and waiting for the experimenter to call on
them. Because seating had been assigned, a second experimenter
was able to record the idea and its source (i.e., the person who
offered it). Although we adm onished participants not to duplicate
the solutions offered by others, we told them that they could offer
more than one solution per problem. This task was called initial
generation, and it lasted, on average, about 5 min p er problem.
At this juncture, the two experimental conditions diverged. We
dismissed people in the generation condition and asked them to
return a week later to finish the experiment. Because participants in
the recognition condition would perform a recognition memory
task the following week, after initial generation they were required
to write down individually two new solutions to each problem that
neither they nor their fellow participants had offered. This was the
identical task that the generation group would perform the follow-
ing week, and it was called final generation. This final generation
was required of the recognition group for two reasons. First,
because some participants could be social loafers (e.g., Harkins,
Latane, & Williams, 1980; Karau & W illiams, 1993) and not offer
any solutions during initial generation, by asking them to provide
two new solutions we ensured that each person in the recognition
condition would have a recognition memory test the following
week that was comprised of all three possible sources of ideas
(theirs, others, and new). Second, we were interested in whether
differences in cryptomnesia of ideas, which are contextually richer
and more related to one another than the single words used in past
research, would display similar patterns across immediate and
delayed testing. Final generation, which we conducted during the
first session for the recognition grou p and during the second session
for the generation group, was assessed by handing o ut two sheets of
paper w ith a question typed at the top of each page.
1
Participants in the recognition condition took a 3 4-item modified
recognition memory test for each problem that was individually
tailored to each participant. The test consisted of all the solutions
from initial generation (other-generated: approximately
42 % ,
range
40%-44%); their solutions from the final generation task offered
the previous week (self-generated: approximately 8%, range 6 % -
10%);
and an equal number of new, distractor items that were
legitimate solutions but had not been generated earlier in that
participant's group (50%). These lures were collected from ideas
generated previously by pilot groups and by other experimental
groups. The ideas were typed on separate sheets for each problem,
and participants were asked to identify the source of each idea by
marking an S if the solution was generated by someone else, an
M to indicate m in e if they had generated the solution during
either generation task , or an **N if the solution was new.
Results and Discussion
Unless stated otherwise, in this experiment and in those
that follow, statistical significance by chance does not
exceed 5%. No instances of cryptomnesia occurred during
initial generation. Following Marsh and Bower (1993), had
one occurred, it would not have been double counted during
final generation. Of central interest was the proportion of
responses during final generation that were claimed to be
novel solutions, when in fact, some other participant had
offered the same idea earlier. Identifying these inadvertent
plagiarisms was accomplished with little ambiguity. Two
raters, unaware of the aims of the experiment, were provided
with each participant's final generation sheet and a master
list of ideas that had been given during initial generation for
that particip ants group. After independently identifying
redundant ideas, we assessed interrater reliability at .94 ; we
settled disputes in conference with the two raters. The
pattern of results did not change when we excluded or
included the small number of disputed solutions, and we
chose the latter. Table 2 is used to com pare plagiarism in the
final generation task with that elicited on the recognition
tests in all experiments. As can be seen in that table, the
recognition group, for which final generation immediately
followed initial generation, plagiarized fewer of their new
solutions as compared with the generation group that
returned after a week's delay, F(l, 147) =
15.91,
MSE =
.05. Thus, more inadvertent plagiarism occurred following a
delay as opposed to imm ediate testing. This delay effect on
the unintentional plagiarizing of ide as is not entirely surpris-
ing because both Brown and Halliday (1991) and Marsh and
Bower (1993 ) found similar results with words.
2
The results of the recognition group's modified recogni-
tion mem ory test are set forth in Table 3 as the percentage of
correct identifications and source confusions contingent on
an item's true origin (i.e., the columns sum to 100%) pooled
over the two questions. Even after a week's delay, partici-
pants' identification of the origin of ideas was quite good.
Averaging the entries on the diagonal yielded a mean
accuracy of 86.1% for the 68 ideas (new and old) to both
problems. Of the false positives (column 1), more errors
occurred in which a new item was attributed to another
group member rather than to
oneself,
r(73) = 11.51. The
tendency to attribute a false alarm to another person rather
than to oneself has been dubbed the it-had-to-b e-you
effect and has been found consistently with modified recog-
nition memory tasks that have been used to assess source
monitoring (e.g., Johnson et al., 1981; Marsh & Bower,
1993; Marsh & L andau, 1995). Identification of other group
members' solutions (column 2) was also remarkably good
(90.3%).
Of critical interest is the proportion of other-
generated responses that were claimed as one 's own solution
(i.e., inadvertent plagiarism). As shown redundantly in
Tables 2 and 3, the critical percentage is 0.8%. Following
1
The experimental design w as not optimal in the sense that
participants in the recognition group each generated tw o ad ditional
ideas during the first session as compared with the generation
group. This problem wa s corrected in Experiments 2- 4 and did not
seem to have affected the conclusions that can be drawn from this
experiment.
2
Our original motivation for testing large groups of people w as
that we had ho ped to find a difference in plagiarism between tho se
people who generated an idea and the social loafers who did not
(on the basis of a finding of better source monitoring when
comparing active participants to passive observers from an experi-
ment by Johnson and Raye, 1981). We failed somewhat in that
quest because the 31 loafers (even pooled across conditions) did
plagiarize much mo re (19.8% , SEW = 3.6) than the 118 generators
(11.8%, SE M
= 2.3), but this difference failed to reach signifi-
cance,
F(l,
147) = 2.65,
p >
.10,
MSE -
.06. Because we lacked
control over who would generate and who would not, we aban-
doned this examination in Experiments 2-4 in favor of an
experimental design that caused all participants to be generators.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/209410290_Social_Loafing_A_Meta-Analytic_Review_and_Theoretical_Integration?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-733d53d1-251a-470b-aaaa-7fce273a0f46&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMjQ0ODUxNTtBUzoxMDQ3OTEzMTc0MTc5OTFAMTQwMTk5NTYwNjE0MA==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/14698751_Eliciting_Cryptomnesia_Unconscious_Plagiarism_in_a_Puzzle_Task?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-733d53d1-251a-470b-aaaa-7fce273a0f46&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMjQ0ODUxNTtBUzoxMDQ3OTEzMTc0MTc5OTFAMTQwMTk5NTYwNjE0MA==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232514669_Reality_Monitoring?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-733d53d1-251a-470b-aaaa-7fce273a0f46&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMjQ0ODUxNTtBUzoxMDQ3OTEzMTc0MTc5OTFAMTQwMTk5NTYwNjE0MA==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232514669_Reality_Monitoring?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-733d53d1-251a-470b-aaaa-7fce273a0f46&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMjQ0ODUxNTtBUzoxMDQ3OTEzMTc0MTc5OTFAMTQwMTk5NTYwNjE0MA==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/14698751_Eliciting_Cryptomnesia_Unconscious_Plagiarism_in_a_Puzzle_Task?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-733d53d1-251a-470b-aaaa-7fce273a0f46&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMjQ0ODUxNTtBUzoxMDQ3OTEzMTc0MTc5OTFAMTQwMTk5NTYwNjE0MA==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/209410290_Social_Loafing_A_Meta-Analytic_Review_and_Theoretical_Integration?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-733d53d1-251a-470b-aaaa-7fce273a0f46&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMjQ0ODUxNTtBUzoxMDQ3OTEzMTc0MTc5OTFAMTQwMTk5NTYwNjE0MA==
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MARSH, LANDAU, AND HICKS
Table 2
Differences in Plagiarism Tested by F Ratios) Between Final Generation and Modified
Recognition for Experiments 1-4
Experiment
and
condition
Experiment 1
Generation
Recognition
Experiment 2
No source
Source
Experiment 3
Control
Speeded
Experiment 4
Group testing
Stringent
Lenient
Individual testing
Stringent
Lenient
Final
generation
M
21.0
(5-7)
21.2
7.8
11.5
24.5
10.2
21.2
6.3
11.0
SE
2.3
(3-D
3.5
1.6
3.0
3.3
2.0
3.6
2.3
2.8
Recognition
M
0.8
7.4
5.1
6.5
5.5
2.0
3.5
3.8
3.5
SE
0.2
1.6
1.0
1.3
1.1
0.8
1.2
1.2
1.1
F
11.6**
1.8
2.2
30.4***
17.6***
21 9***
0.9
6.7*
df
1,25
1,28
1,23
1,24
1,15
1,15
1,15
1,15
MSE
.020
.010
.010
.010
.001
.010
.001
.010
Note.
Recognition data are redundant with the tables reported for Experiments 1-3. The data in
parentheses for Experiment 1 are not directly comparable but are included for completeness.
*p
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892
MARSH, LANDAU,
AND
HICKS
Table 5
Percentage of Correct Identifications
and
Source
ConfUsions in Recognition Me mory for Experiment 2
for Groups Who
Were
Not Encouraged to Focus
on Source and or Those Who Were
Group
an d
response
No source
N e w
Other
Self
Source
N e w
Other
Self
New
84.9
12.5
2.6
87.0
11.7
1.3
SE
2.2
1.7
0.8
1.6
1.6
0.4
Item origin
Other
9.0
83.6
7.4
10.8
84.1
5.1
SE
1.4
2.1
1.6
1.4
1.4
1.0
Self
1.9
11.0
87.1
2.4
8.2
89.4
SE
0.8
2.8
2.7
1.1
1.6
2.1
Note. Columns for each group sum to 100%.
Tables
2 and 5,
both source
and
no-source groups plagia-
rized about the same number of items when tested by a
recognition memory test, F( l, 53) = 1.44,
p >
.13,
MSE =
.001. We found the same nonsignificant difference between
the groups with the remaining eight cells of each condition
in Table 5, even before a Bonferroni correction for multiple
comparisons. However, as highlighted in Table 2, com paring
the incidence of cryptomnesia in the context of generating
ideas during final generation with the inadvertent plagiarism
elicited under the demands of the recognition test revealed
greater plagiarism during generation for only the no-source
group. When analyzed as a mixed-model analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) with task (generation vs. recognition) as a
within-subjects variable
and
group (source vs.
no
source)
as
a between-subjects variable, a significant interaction was
present, F(l, 53) = 6.57, MSE = .01. Participants who
focused on the origin of their new ideas plagiarized other
group members to the same small degree during final
generation and on the recognition test. In contrast, the
no-source group plagiarized far greater numbers of ideas in
the context of generative production than they did when they
were specifically asked to monitor source on the recognition
test. These results suggest that people may not spontane-
ously monitor source to a sufficient degree, or monitor it by
using very different criteria, when engaged in everyday,
generative problem-solving tasks. Similarly, the results
suggest that people do not spontaneously use information
that they possess
to
avoid inadvertent plagiarism.
Exper iment 3
In Experiment 1, the frequency of inadvertently claiming
someone else's idea as one's own was shown to depend on
whether one was asked specifically about source (recogni-
tion) or whether one was required to monitor source in
service of another task (generating truly novel ideas). In
Experiment 2, we replicated that comparison by using a
cleaner experimental design and a specific manipulation that
instructed some participants to consider the origin of their
new ideas. Without those instructions, participants left to
their own devices inadvertently plagiarized many m ore ideas
than did participants given those instructions. Notice that
those instructions acted to change the context in which
participants generated their new ideas, rather than explicitly
directing them to adopt more stringent decision criteria as in
the context
of a
modified recognition test. Although
the
results of that manipulation certainly suggest that people do
not spontaneously monitor source to an adequate degree, it
was not a demonstration that people completely neglect to
monitor source when generating ideas.
We designed Experiment 3 to demonstrate that source
monitoring is critical to a variety of tasks (Johnson et al.,
1993) and that it is based on the theory that source
monitoring is supported by both conscious (systematic) and
unconscious (heuristic) processing. In this next experiment,
we used a manipulation that should increase, rather than
decrease as in Experiment 2, the source-monitoring error of
inadvertent plagiarism. Using the identical paradigm to the
no-source group in Experiment 2 (see Table 1), we required
half
of
the participants
to
give speeded responses during
the
final generation task.
4
We expected this manipulation to
reduce the conscious contributions to source monitoring,
thereby imitating real-world circumstances in which people
are pressured to devise new ideas o r to have their ideas heard
by others. On the one hand, if that amount of source
monitoring that spontaneously occurs under normal circum-
stances involves systematic and conscious decision criteria,
then the speeded condition should show increased cryptom-
nesia relative to a control condition in which people are left
to their normal modes of cognitive processing. On the other
hand, if very little systematic processing naturally occurs
during idea generation, little difference in performance
should be observed between these two conditions. As in
Experiment 2,
we
measured recognition performance subse-
quent to final generation for both groups, and we collected
confidence ratings during final ge neration.
Method
Participants. Forty-nine undergraduates participated in ex-
change for partial course credit. Twenty-five were randomly
assigned to a speeded condition and the remaining 24 to a control
condition, as detailed shortly. Participants were tested in small
groups that ranged from 2 to 4 people. None had participated
previously.
Materials and procedure.
The same brain storming problems
were used. Procedurally, the experiment was identical to the
no-source group
in
Experiment
2
(see Table 1). Grou ps offered
16
solutions to each of two problems and returned the following week
to generate individually
4
additional solutions
for
each problem.
In
each phase, we admonished participants not to copy, repeat, or
otherw ise offer
an
idea that had been generated earlier. Participants
were also required to complete a modified recognition test com-
prised
of
50%
new
items, with
the
remaining items being either
their own or one of the group member's earlier solutions (see
Experiments 1
and 2 for
details). These procedures constituted
the
control group's participation with only one deviation from the
4
We thank Larry Jacoby for suggesting this alternative to a
divided attention task.
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INADEQUATE SOURCE M ONITORING
893
procedure used for the no-source group in Experiment 2. In that
earlier experiment, participants returned in groups to offer their
new ideas on paper and to take their recognition test. In this
experiment, participants returned individually to have us tape-
record their responses. This procedural deviation was necessary
because when participants in the speeded condition returned, we
gave them only 20 s to generate a solution (insufficient time for
their responses to be recorded in writing). We placed a large
mechanical clock in front of them at the beginning of the session
with 0 s showing. The clock was started, and participants were
required to offer a new solution within that 20-s interval. In the
three cases in which no solution had been offered after 20 s, the
experimenter reset the clock and reminded the participant to
respond before the allotted time expired. Resetting the clock
between ideas took the experimenter about t s. In summary,
participants in the control condition had unlimited time to offer
their solutions, and participants in the speeded condition were
allotted 20 s to offer each new idea. Procedural I y, the two
conditions were otherwise identical. All participants made a
judgment of confidence on a 5-point Likert scale that they had
indeed offered a new idea.
Results and D iscussion
As before, no participant plagiarized another group mem -
ber during initial generation. Plagiarisms during final genera-
tion were identified, as before, as redundant ideas given by
other group members during initial generation. Two raters,
unaware of the aims of the experiment, had an interrater
reliability of .89. We settled disputes in conference with the
two raters. As seen in Table 2, on returning after a week's
delay to complete final generation, participants in the
speeded group (who were allotted only 20 s per response)
inadvertently plagiarized more ideas from their fellow
groups members as compared with participants in the
control group who were under no such time pressure. This
difference was reliable, F(l, 47) = 8.38, M SE = .02, and it
suggests that source monitoring critically depends on the
conscious processing that the speeded manipulation presum-
ably reduced. (Later, we discuss why the plagiarism rate in
the control group was low, as compared with the rates
in Experiments 1 and 2.) As in Experiment 2, however,
plagiarism rates were the same across groups number-
ing from 2 to 4 participants, F( 2 , 46) = 1.71, p > .20,
MSE = .03.
We examined the distributions of confidence ratings for
plagiarized responses (given in the final two columns of
Table 4) for each group. People in the control condition were
fairly confident that their inadvertently plagiarized ideas
were new because approximately 47% of their ideas were
given ratings of 4 or 5, and 62% were given a rating of 3 or
above. Time pressure, however, not only reduced people's
accuracy but their confidence as well. Over 40% of their
ne w ideas were rated at the lowest confidence. Evidently,
participants were aw are of the fact that they had little time to
determine if their offering was truly novel, and this fact was
reflected in their confidence ratings. However, the speeded
manipulation did allow some plagiarisms to be offered with
a reasonable degree of confidence, with about 2 3% assigned
a 4 or 5 and approximately 47% offered with a confidence
rating of
3
or greater.
The recognition memory test was administered after
completion of the final generation task in both groups. The
results for the control and speeded conditions, respectively,
are set forth in Table 6. As can be seen in that table,
performance was remarkably similar in both conditions. In
fact, the two conditions did not differ in any of the nine cells
(all
ts <
1.5,
ps >
.15). When the inadvertent plagiarism
committed in this recognition task was compared with that
committed in the generation task (see Table 2), the speeded
group 's performance showed a marked difference consistent
with the previous two experiments. More cryptomnesia
occurred when participants were engaged in generation than
when taking a recognition test. The control group also
committed more inadvertent plagiarism when generating
new ideas as compared with when the demands of the
recognition memory test explicitly focused participants on
source monito ring, but, unexpec tedly, this difference failed
to reach significance. However, the manner in which we
collected new ideas in this experiment may have contributed
to a depressed level of cryptomnesia in the control group.
Unlike previous experiments, participants were seated one-
on-one with the experimenter in front of a tape recorder.
Those demand characteristics may have placed special
emphasis on participants in both groups to perform as best as
they could, thereby causing them to adopt more stringent
decision criteria than they normally otherwise would have.
Two results serve as corroborating evidence. First, the
11.5% plagiarism rate exhibited by the control group in this
experiment was far less than that of the relevant groups in
Experiments 1 and 2, which plagiarized 2 1.0% and 21.2% ,
respectively. Second, we noticed while collecting the data
that people in the control condition took much longer
to
offer
their eight ideas than did participants in the generation
condition of Experiment 1 or the no-source condition of
Experiment 2. If extended source monitoring is time-
consuming (Johnson, Kounios, & Reeder, 1994), then the
control participants who adopted more stringent criteria should
have taken longer man participants in the two previous experi-
ments. Nevertheless, we conducted a fourth experiment to
demonstrate that the context of having to generate items
Table 6
Percentage of Correct Identifications and Source
ConfUsions in Recognition Memory for Experiment 3
for the Control and Speeded Conditions
Group and
response
Control
N e w
Other
Self
Speeded
N e w
Other
Self
New
85.0
13.7
1.3
89.5
9.4
1.1
SE
2.6
2.5
0.5
1.6
1.5
0.3
Item origin
Other
%
9.3
84.2
6.5
9.8
84.7
5.5
SE
1.8
2.1
1.3
1.8
1.8
1.1
Self
%
1.3
9.2
89.5
2 .0
8.0
90.0
SE
0.8
2 .0
2.2
0.9
1.6
2.0
Note. Columns for each group sum to 100% .
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894
MARSH, LANDAU, AND HICKS
face-to-face with the experimenter changes the decision
criteria that people apply when generating new ideas.
5
Exper iment 4
We designed Experiment 4 to examine whether different
contexts at the time of final generation Lead people to change
their decision criteria spontaneously. More specifically, the
purpose was to determine whether people who are seated
one-on-one with an experimenter (as in Experiment 3)
spontaneously use a set of decision criteria that contain more
systematic and controlled source monitoring. Observed
differences between modified item recognition versus the
generation conditions of Experiments 1-3 suggest that they
might. This investigation of context is important in its own
right because the current laboratory m anipulations described
in this article correspond directly to different contexts in
which unconscious plagiarism may be observed outside the
laboratory. A poet penning verse for his or her own musing
may monitor source in a way very different from writing the
last of several verses for a published collection. Likewise, a
musician composing a score for a close friend may have
decision criteria different from when an album is being put
together. And, most interesting, a group of musicians
collectively working on a mutual goal may monitor source
differently from each working independently (cf. Foley,
Ratner, & Passalacqua, 1993). Rather than using a straight-
forward replication of Experiment 3, however, we also
manipulated task instructions in Experiment 4. In one
condition (the lenient criterion g roup), we gave participants
our standard admonition to avoid plagiarism, just as in all
conditions of Experiments 1-3. In another condition (the
stringent criterion group), we gave the standard admonition
to avoid plagiarism, but we also warned that people often
commit plagiarism errors and they should work hard to
avoid such errors. When crossed orthogonally with the
manipulation of context (generating individually with the
experimenter versus generating more anonymously in a
group setting with pencil and paper), four experimental
conditions were produced (see Table 1). On the one hand,
being told to apply stringent decision criteria may not reduce
inadvertent plagiarism any more than being placed in a
context that demands m ore stringent criteria (alone with the
experimenter who may be viewed as scrutinizing those
ideas).
On the other hand, there may be even more system-
atic processing that can be mustered such that even when
working in front of an experimenter, additional instruction to
avoid plagiarism actually does reduce it even more.
Method
Participants and design. Sixty-four students who had not
participated in Experiments 1-3 volunteered in exchange for partial
course credit. Although group size was never found to influence the
rate of plagiarism in the three previous experiments, we held g roup
size constant at 4 people in this experiment. Four groups of 4
participants were assigned to each cell of the 2 (instruction:
stringent or lenient) X 2 (context: individual or group) experimen-
tal design. Thus, 16 people were randomly assigned to each
condition.
Materials and procedure. With only slight modifications regard-
ing task instructions, the materials and procedure w ere identical to
the control group of Experiment 3 (see the summary in Table 1).
During the first week, groups generated 16 solutions to each
problem. On returning the following week, each person was asked
to generate four brand new ideas (for each problem) that had not
been offered the week before. Only the context and the instructions
differed for the groups of participants. We tested half of the
participants in the lenient condition, and we gave our standard
admonition to avoid duplicating someone else's idea given the
week before. We tested the other half of the participants in the
stringent condition, and w e gave the following additional statement
spoken aloud to participants:
When people attempt to generate ideas, often they will
produce an idea that som eone else had provided at an earlier
point in time and not even realize they have accidentally m ade
this error. Please be careful to avoid m aking this mistake w hen
you generate your own new ideas. In other words, you w ant to
avoid generating an idea that was offered last week.
Half of the participants assigned to each of these stringent and
lenient groups returned in groups to offer their new ideas on paper.
The remaining people returned in groups, but we tested them
individually in a face-to-face session to have their responses
recorded on tape. Unlike Experiment 3, however, we placed no
time constraints on idea generation in any of the four experimental
conditions. All participants completed a modified recognition
memory test (identical to that in Experiments 2 and 3 ) at the end of
the second session.
Results and Discussion
We identified plagiarisms in an identical manner as
described in Experiments 1-3. No plagiarism occurred
during initial generation in the first week. During final
generation, however, both the manipulations of context, F ( l,
60) = 6.67,
MSE
= .01 , and task instructions, F (l , 60) =
8.36, MSE = .01 , affected the amount of inadvertent
plagiarism. The results of final generation are set forth in the
last four rows of Table 2. For participants who worked more
anonymously in group settings, stringent task instructions
(10.2%) greatly reduced plagiarism as compared with the
lenient condition (21.2%). For participants who worked
individually in front of the experimenter and spoke their
ideas into a tape recorder, plagiarisms were slightly more
frequent in the lenient condition (11.0%) than under more
stringent task instructions (6.3%). In this second compari-
son, observed plagiarism in the lenient condition replicated
the control condition of Experiment 3 in which 11.5% of
participants' responses were plagiarized. In addition, the
2 1%
plagiarism in the group-testing context that received
the normal admonition instructions replicated Experiments
1-3. Of importance, although the effect size of the stringent
versus lenient manipulation was twice as great in the group
context (11% difference) as compared with the experimenter
context (4.7% difference), there was no reliable interaction
ofthe two manipulations, F(l, 60) = 1.31, p> .25, MS£ =
.01. This pattern of results suggests that more systematic and
5
We thank M arcia Johnson for outlining the importance of
conducting this fourth experiment.
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INADEQUATE SOURCE MONITORING
895
controlled decision criteria can be invoked either by specific
instructions or more spontaneously by placing people in a
demanding situation in which they may feel that their ideas
are being scrutinized.
The critical results of the modified recognition task are
also presented in Table 2. As can be seen in that table, the
incidence of cryptomnesia was greater when participants
were generating ideas as compared with when they took a
modified recognition test. The only group that violated this
general claim was the one in which participants were tested
individually and given stringent instructions to avoid plagia-
rism. Evidently, when testing people under conditions of two
specific manipulations designed to reduce plagiarism du ring
generation, their performance approaches that of actually
taking a source-monitoring test. This null result between the
recognition test and final generation for that group comple-
ments the equivalence during final generation of (a) the
group-testing situation with stringent instructions and (b) the
individual situation with lenient instructions. Each of those
two groups received only one manipulation designed to
reduce plagiarism. Thus, greater systematic criteria were
applied in the context of
a
recognition test than in the context
of generating new ideas. And, on balance, these results
support the conclusion mat more systematic, conscious
decision processes can be either invoked spontaneously
when the situation demands them or invoked explicitly by
task instructions to m onitor source more carefully.
General Discussion
Together, the results of these four experiments demon-
strate differences in source monitoring that depend directly
on contextual demands and, importantly, on its method of
assessment. The results also provide one mechanism and a
theoretical framework for understanding why unconscious
plagiarism might occur. In all four experiments, source
monitoring was generally better when assessed by a modi-
fied recognition memory test than when the assessment of
errors was made in a generative problem-solving task, at
least in terms of cryptomnesia. Many of the previous
investigations of source m onitoring have used accuracy in a
modified recognition m emory paradigm (e.g., Johnson et al.,
1981,
1994; Lindsay, Johnson, & K won, 1991; Raye &
Johnson, 1980). Performance on that task reflects best case
conditions in which a large contribution of conscious and
systematic recollective processes are brought to bear. In the
generation of ideas, and perhaps in many other real-world
situations of interest as well, people's decision criteria may
be quite different (Johnson et al., 1993 ). Most likely, people
fail to apply sufficiently stringent decision criteria to av oid
source-monitoring errors such as the cryptomnesia demon-
strated in Experiment 1. Inadvertent source errors can be
reduced by forcing people to consider the origin of their
ideas (Experiment 2) or by forcing them to apply more
stringent and systematic decision criteria (Experiment 4).
Likewise, the belief that one's ideas might be closely
scrutinized (Experiment 4) resembles situations outside the
laboratory in which the application of more stringent
systematic processing may be more spontaneous. How-
ever, people do spontaneously monitor source to some
degree; otherwise the increase in cryptomnesia would not
have been observed in Experiment 3 when conscious
recollective processing was reduced by speeded responding.
As a package, these four experiments demonstrate that
asking people to make source judgm ents inherently change s
the criteria that people naturally use to make such judg-
ments, especially when those judgments are in service of
another primary task. The different distributions of confi-
dence ratings observed in Experiment 2 support that claim.
For example, Johnson et al. (1994) demonstrated that source
judgm ents require more time to make than old-new recogni-
tion judgments. That finding suggests that old-new judg-
ments require less differentiated input and a different milieu
of decision criteria on which to base those judgments. The
results presented here support the theoretical account of how
people go about source monitoring (Johnson et al., 1993).
People use a different mixture of decision criteria, or perhaps
less stringent criteria, when assessments of source are mad e
for som ething other than a m odified recognition test because
their agenda is different. People left to their own devices in
the current experiments could be making simple old-new
recognition judgments about some of the ideas that come to
mind rather than attempting more detailed ascriptions of
source. The results of these experiments suggest that the
detailed assessments of source may o ccur less frequently (or
less accurately) in everyday cognitive processing as com-
pared with assessments based on modified recognition
memory tests.
Dual process models of recognition m emory (e.g., Jacoby
& D allas, 1981; Mandler, 1980) are similar to the theoretical
account of source monitoring (e.g., Johnson et al., 1993) in
that both involve two components: heuristic and systematic
processes. In recognition, the heuristic process is character-
ized as an automatic assessment along the lines of assessing
fluency or familiarity (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981), whereas
the systematic process is based on recollection or retrieval,
perhaps with an all-or-none outcome. In contrast, source
monitoring requires processing to inspect memories in
greater detail to arrive at a determination of source. Al-
though we have implicitly equated the systematic processes
with conscious cognitive processes and the heuristic pro-
cesses with unconscious cognitive proce sses, this character-
ization denies the mutual influence of both conscious and
unconscious processing in any given task (e.g., Jacoby,
1991).
On balance, however, the experiments reported here
suggest that if source judgm ents are typically made
heuristically; [and] systematic processes are engaged less
often (Johnson et al., 1993, p. 5), then either those heuristic
processes have a large conscious component to them or
systematic processes play a large role in source m onitoring.
In Experiment 3, people under time pressure presumably
had less conscious recollection to oppose ideas that came to
mind and, as a consequence, inadvertently plagiarized more
(cf. Jacoby, Kelley, Brown, & Jasechk o, 1989).
The very fact that reducing the available conscious
processing increased source-monitoring errors suggests a
large conscious and systematic component t o source monitor-
ing. Moreover, to the extent that systematic processes are
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/15214714_Time-Course_Studies_of_Reality_Monitoring_and_Recognition?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-733d53d1-251a-470b-aaaa-7fce273a0f46&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMjQ0ODUxNTtBUzoxMDQ3OTEzMTc0MTc5OTFAMTQwMTk5NTYwNjE0MA==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/15214714_Time-Course_Studies_of_Reality_Monitoring_and_Recognition?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-733d53d1-251a-470b-aaaa-7fce273a0f46&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMjQ0ODUxNTtBUzoxMDQ3OTEzMTc0MTc5OTFAMTQwMTk5NTYwNjE0MA==
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896 MARSH, LANDAU, AND HICKS
slower and more prone to disruption (and the manipulations
in Experiment 3 demonstrated a disruption of source moni-
toring),
the results suggest a disruption of those systematic
processes. Recently, Ste-Marie and Jacoby (1993) drew a
similar conclusion that recognition may never be spontane-
ous in the sense of being fully divorced from the intention or
the activity in which a person is engaged (p. 787; cf.
Johnson et al., 1993, who drew a similar conclusion about
the effect of task demands). Intuitively, source memory tests
seem to demand greater conscious processing directed at
source monitoring than does a generative problem-solving
task such as the one used in the present experiments. One
goal of these experiments wa s to assess the degree to which
people spontaneously apply systematic, conscious decision
criteria to m onitor source in a generative cognitive task. As
we noted earlier, because source monitoring could be made
both better (Experiments 2 and 4) or worse (Experiment 3),
people do spontaneously monitor source to some degree,
even if the basis of that monitoring is to make a simple
old-new recognition judgment. Clearly, the good perfor-
mance on the recognition memory tests in the present
experiments suggests that cryptomnesia results neither from
people forgetting the source of the ideas that they heard nor
from forgetting the ideas themselves and simply regenerat-
ing them. Rather, inadvertent plagiarism occurs because
people working on creative tasks fail to engage in the
systematic decision processes specified by the source-
monitoring framework (e.g., Johnson et
al.,
1993; cf. Jacoby ,
Kelley, Brown, & Jasechko, 1989; Marsh & Landau, 1995).
Only when people are specifically warned that they will
likely commit plagiarism (Experiment 4) do they con-
sciously take steps to avoid doing so.
Given that source monitoring is not adequately invoked in
a generative problem-solving task, why were ideas gener-
ated earlier plagiarized in the first place? Most likely, as the
problem context is reinstated, ideas come to mind and they
are assessed by means of familiarity or fluency (Jacoby,
Kelley, & Dywan, 1989) or perhaps even by the level of
activation they have retained to the reinstated context
(Marsh & Landau, 1995). Ideas that fluently come to mind
because they have been previously experienced may have a
higher probability of having that fluency be misattributed to
current thinking rather than to past experience. G iven tasks
that do not necessarily demand, or do not allow for (e.g.,
Experiment 3), extended conscious source monitoring, these
ideas may then get offered a s one's novel co ntribution. Such
an error is even m ore probable given that one's current goal
is to generate a new idea. Thus, the experiments reported in
this article are conceptually similar to Jacoby's studies on
promoting false fame judgments of nonfamous names (e.g.,
Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989). In those experiments,
people who were exposed to nonfamous names had a higher
probability of calling those old names fam ous after a
1-day delay than did people who made their judgments
shortly after presentation. Presumably, people possess the
ability to invoke conscious processing at immediate testing
but are unable to do so after a delay. With less conscious
processing available, the relatively larger role of uncon-
scious processing goes u nchecked.
To proponents of the source-monitoring framework, the
results of these experiments support that theory and serve to
answer their call for empirical work and manipulations
predicted to affect the systematic rather than the heuristic
contributions to source monitoring that have dominated
earlier inquiry (Johnson et al.,
1993,
p. 10). In Experiment 1,
we demonstrated effects consistent with the different deci-
sion criteria associated with a modified recognition test
versus a generative task. Experiment 2 can be viewed as
explicitly creating a situation in which greater systematic
processing was invoked. Likewise, Experiment 4 explicitly
created two situations in which more stringent decision
criteria were applied, one in which people were instructed to
be cautious and one in which they spontaneously did
so.
And
in Experiment 3 , we demonstrated the failure (or perhaps the
inability) of source monitoring when systematic, or con-
scious, processing is opposed. Thus, these experiments
support predictions made by the source-monitoring frame-
work.
Our goal in assessing the degree to which source monitor-
ing is spontaneously engaged in creative problem-solving
tasks highlights the importance of source monitoring to
everyday cognitive functioning. As Johnson et al. (1993)
described, when source monitoring fails, the results range
from mildly disturbing to characteristic of the most densely
amnesic patients (Hirst, 1982). More severe failures of
source monitoring can even result in a variety of delusions
and confabulations (e.g., Oltmanns & Maher, 1988). Given
the importance of source monitoring to everyday cognition,
the fact that people do not always spontaneously and
adequately invoke these processes to a sufficient degree to
avoid, say, inadvertent plagiarism is of some interest.
Speculating on the consequences may be premature; how-
ever, we began this article with Brewer and Pani's (1983)
classification of memory that is based on single versus
repeated exposures to information. In mat classification,
personal memories derived from single exposure appear to
be associated w ith spontaneous source-monitoring processes
to a greater degree than do generic memories derived from
multiple exposure. As such, we cannot help but wonder: As
we repeat the ideas of our colleagues each day in teaching
our courses and in our casual conversations—o ften without
properly crediting the source—do those failures to engage
source-monitoring processes combined with these repeated
exposures lead to a greater level of inadvertent appropriation
than many of us would ever imagine? Whatever the answer
to that question, these experiments have shown that investi-
gating source monitoring in contexts other than recognition
mem ory may be a theoretically fruitful avenue of inquiry.
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https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232429408_Item_Availability_in_Cryptomnesia_Assessing_Its_Role_in_Two_Paradigms_of_Unconscious_Plagiarism?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-733d53d1-251a-470b-aaaa-7fce273a0f46&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMjQ0ODUxNTtBUzoxMDQ3OTEzMTc0MTc5OTFAMTQwMTk5NTYwNjE0MA==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232429408_Item_Availability_in_Cryptomnesia_Assessing_Its_Role_in_Two_Paradigms_of_Unconscious_Plagiarism?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-733d53d1-251a-470b-aaaa-7fce273a0f46&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMjQ0ODUxNTtBUzoxMDQ3OTEzMTc0MTc5OTFAMTQwMTk5NTYwNjE0MA==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/16148118_The_amnesic_syndrome_Descriptions_and_explanations?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-733d53d1-251a-470b-aaaa-7fce273a0f46&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMjQ0ODUxNTtBUzoxMDQ3OTEzMTc0MTc5OTFAMTQwMTk5NTYwNjE0MA==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232429408_Item_Availability_in_Cryptomnesia_Assessing_Its_Role_in_Two_Paradigms_of_Unconscious_Plagiarism?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-733d53d1-251a-470b-aaaa-7fce273a0f46&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMjQ0ODUxNTtBUzoxMDQ3OTEzMTc0MTc5OTFAMTQwMTk5NTYwNjE0MA==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232429408_Item_Availability_in_Cryptomnesia_Assessing_Its_Role_in_Two_Paradigms_of_Unconscious_Plagiarism?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-733d53d1-251a-470b-aaaa-7fce273a0f46&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMjQ0ODUxNTtBUzoxMDQ3OTEzMTc0MTc5OTFAMTQwMTk5NTYwNjE0MA==https://www.researchgate.net/publication/16148118_The_amnesic_syndrome_Descriptions_and_explanations?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-733d53d1-251a-470b-aaaa-7fce273a0f46&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzIzMjQ0ODUxNTtBUzoxMDQ3OTEzMTc0MTc5OTFAMTQwMTk5NTYwNjE0MA==
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Received October
6,1995
Revision received August 26, 1996
Accepted August 26 ,199 6