max rewak - drones and international terrorism

Drones and International Terrorism: An Evaluation of Drone Strikes’ Effectiveness Against al Qaeda

By

Max Eric Rewak

A Thesis submitted to

The Faculty of

The Elliott School of International Affairs

of The George Washington University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of Bachelor of Arts

May 19, 2013

Thesis directed by

Dr. Stephen D. Biddle

Professor of Political Science and International Affairs

ii

Dedication

The author wishes to dedicate his thesis to his wonderful mother, without

whom none of this would have been possible.

iii

Acknowledgements

In writing this thesis, I would like to thank Professor Stephen Biddle for his

invaluable guidance, advice, and contributions. Additionally, I am grateful to my

friends and colleagues at George Washington for their encouragement along the

way. Finally, I thank my family for their unwavering love, support, and

understanding throughout the process.

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Abstract of Thesis

Drones and International Terrorism: An Evaluation of Drone Strikes’ Effectiveness Against al Qaeda

Drones are new tools in the Global War on Terror that have received lots of

attention due to the unique advantages they present over conventional

counterterrorism tactics. While the American drone campaign has been criticized

and championed for a variety of different reasons, analyses of U.S. drone strategy in

Pakistan have largely been based on the assumption that drones have effective in

causing al Qaeda to lose effectiveness. This paper evaluates the validity of that

assumption by comparing al Qaeda’s effectiveness since 2001 to the frequency of

drone strikes targeting al Qaeda over the same period. According to data from the

New America Foundation and the RAND Corporation’s Global Terrorism Database,

drone strikes on al Qaeda did not begin until after the group’s effectiveness had

already begun to decline. This means that drone strikes were not responsible for a

decline in kills by al Qaeda. While drones may have other possible uses, these

findings challenge the assumption that drones were responsible for the decline in al

Qaeda’s effectiveness since 2001.

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………………………………...ii

Dedication…………………………………………………………………………………………………………..iii

Abstract of Thesis ………………………………………………………..…………………………………......iv

List of Figures……………………………………………………………………………………………………..vi

Summary Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………1

The Debate About Drones…………………………………………………………………………………….4

Arguments for Drone Use…………………………………………………………………………..5

Arguments against Drone Use…………………………………………………………………….7

Assumptions in the Debate………………………………………………………………………12

Data…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..15

al Qaeda International Terrorism Data………………………………….………………….16

American Drone Strike Data…………………………………………………………………….17

Analysis…………………………………………………………………………………………………..21

Results………………………………………………………………………………………………………………26

Conclusions……………………………………………………………………………………………………….28

Works Cited……………………………………………………………………………………………………….31

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List of Figures

Figure 1……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..18

Figure 2……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..21

Figure 3……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..22

Figure 4……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..23

Figure 5……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..23

Figure 6……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..24

Figure 7……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..25

Figure 8……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..26

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Chapter One: Summary Introduction

Unmanned aerial vehicles, colloquially better known as drones, are

important new tools in the American global war on terrorism. They can gather

intelligence with advanced imaging systems and they can remotely destroy targets

of opportunity without putting American troops’ lives in danger. However, despite

the technological advantages that drones offer, they have become a controversial

aspect of American foreign policy in the past decade.

The drone campaign in Pakistan, run by the CIA, has focused on decapitation

strategy, targeting al Qaeda leaders in order to incapacitate the group’s

international terrorism operations. Supporters say that drones have hampered the

organization’s effectiveness via decapitation, saving American troops’ lives in the

process: since drones are unmanned vehicles, even if they are shot down soldiers

are not in harm’s way. Additionally, drones cost less money than their conventional

counterparts. For these reasons, drones are quite popular among American citizens.

Critics, by contrast, argue that the consequences of drone use outweigh its

advantages. Criticism of American drone policy comes from several different angles:

detractors argue that drones kill too many civilians, defy international law,

constitute human rights violations, or damage international public opinion of the

United States, to name a few. According to these arguments, while drones may be

useful in the war on terrorism, the drawbacks associated with American drone

strategy make it counterproductive.

Yet almost everyone in this debate shares an underlying assumption that the

drones have succeeded in their immediate purpose: it is generally accepted that the

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drone campaign has seriously diminished al Qaeda’s lethality against U.S. civilians.

This assumption lies at the heart of the debate. It is the assumed efficacy of drones

that underlies their supporters’ enthusiasm, and opponents’ counterarguments are

usually framed as effects that outweigh the presumed efficacy of the attacks.

Few, however, have actually studied the relationship between the drone

campaign and al Qaeda lethality in any specific detail. Political, legal, and ethical

issues have been extensively explored, but the drones’ ability to undermine al Qaeda

lethality is normally assumed rather than analyzed.1

This thesis is intended to provide such an analysis. In particular, I will use

data from the RAND Corporation Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents and

the New America Foundation’s drone strike data set to compare the frequency of

drone strikes with the number of kills per year resulting from al Qaeda’s

international terrorist operations. By comparing the number of kills resulting from

al Qaeda terrorist operations with the number of American drone strikes targeting

al Qaeda’s core in the Pakistani FATA, I assess whether or not there is a causal

relationship between drone strikes and a drop in al Qaeda’s lethality.

The results of this analysis show that drones were not responsible for

causing a decline in fatalities resulting from al Qaeda’s operations. Kills by al Qaeda 1 There are some exceptions. For example, see: Jordan, Jenna. "When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation." Security Studies 18, no. 4 (2009): 719-‐55. http://cpost.uchicago.edu/pdf/Jordan.pdf. Jordan evaluates the effectiveness of decapitation as a general strategy, not just by drones against Al Qaeda, and concludes that decapitation can be effective but does not work in all circumstances. Alternatively, see: Rollins, John. Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy. Report. January 25, 2011. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41070.pdf. Rollins notes that although drones may have been “disruptions” (p.13) to al Qaeda in Pakistan, al Qaeda may be resurgent and resilient even despite the deaths of some of its leaders.

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peak in 2001, then begin to fall sharply. However, drones were not used to directly

attack al Qaeda until 2005. Since al Qaeda started to become less lethal after 2001,

this analysis shows that drones were not responsible for this decline because it was

already happening before drones were employed. This suggests that the literature

on the subject has been based on inaccurate assumptions regarding drones’

effectiveness with respect to al Qaeda.

I present the analysis in five steps. First, I will review the literature and

debate on the subject, summarizing relevant arguments from supporters and critics

and demonstrating that writers on all sides of the debate do make the assumption

that drones have indeed been effective against al Qaeda. Second, I will discuss the

existing data sets that are relevant to this debate, and explain why I chose the RAND

Corporation Database of World Terrorism Incidents for data on al Qaeda’s

international terrorism operations and the New America Foundation’s data on

American drone strikes targeting al Qaeda over other similar data sets. Third, I will

identify the trends in the data, comparing al Qaeda’s kills per year to drone strikes

per year targeting al Qaeda over the same period. Fourth, I will analyze what these

trends show regarding drones’ effectiveness against al Qaeda, showing that al

Qaeda’s lethality was declining before drones could have caused it. Finally, I will

discuss the implications that this finding has with respect to the debate on American

drone policy.

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Chapter Two: The Debate About Drones

In the past few months, drones have come to the forefront of American

foreign policy conversations. Recently, concerns voiced during Sen. Rand Paul’s

filibuster at the confirmation hearing of new CIA director John Brennan have

sparked debate about the nature and procedure of drone use. Top officials in the

Obama administration, including Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and even

President Obama himself, have stated publicly that al Qaeda’s leadership has been

“decimated.”2 Obama’s reluctance to explicitly acknowledge drone use despite his

indirect praise of drone policy is typical among American politicians’ remarks on the

subject. According to a study on media coverage of the drone campaign, political

figures tend to play up successful killings of terrorist leaders while keeping most

drone information secret because of security concerns.3 Panetta, however, has

gone so far as to refer to drone strikes as “the only game in town in terms of

confronting or trying to disrupt the al Qaeda leadership,” characterizing drones as

“very effective” against terrorist leaders in Pakistan.4

2 Brannen, Kate. "Leon Panetta: Al Qaeda’s Leadership ‘decimated’." Politico. November 21, 12. http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1112/84131.html; Obama: "Al Qaeda Has Been Decimated" YouTube. November 01, 2012. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GQjztrnJzCM. Note especially that Panetta’s comments include Atiyah Abd Al-‐Rahman among the al Qaeda leaders killed by drone strikes. 3 McKelvey, Tara. "Media Coverage of the Drone Program." Harvard Kennedy School Joan Shorenstein Center. February 2013. http://shorensteincenter.org/wp-‐content/uploads/2013/02/D-‐77-‐McKelvey.pdf, p. 14 4 Benson, Pam. "U.S. Airstrikes in Pakistan Called 'Very Effective'" CNN. May 18, 2009. http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/05/18/cia.pakistan.airstrikes.

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Arguments for Drone Use

Drones can provide significant advantages over conventional platforms in

some respects. For instance, drones are able to “loiter over their targets at slow

speeds,” allowing drones to gather better surveillance information and wait for

hours for targets of opportunity to appear. 5 Further, instead of putting American

troops in clear and present danger, drones allow Americans to remotely attack

targets of interest while mitigating the risks of conventional combat. If a drone is

shot down, no American is at risk of losing his life. Even the 2010 report to the

United Nations Human Rights council submitted by Phillip Alston, UN Special

Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions, acknowledges the

advantages of drone use in wartime, citing foremost the avoidance of “risk to a

State’s forces.”6

This helps make drone use a domestically popular policy7. While the

American government has been tight-‐lipped about its use of drones as part of its

global war on terror, the majority of Americans agree with its drone strategy.

5 Williams, Brian Glyn. "The CIA's Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004–2010: The History of an Assassination Campaign." Taylor & Francis Online 33, no. 10 (2010): 871-‐92. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2010.508483, p. 872 6 Alston, Philip. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston: Study on Targeted Killings. Report. May 28, 2010. http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf, p. 24 7 Wilson, Scott, and Jon Cohen. "Poll Finds Broad Support for Obama’s Counterterrorism Policies." Washington Post. February 09, 2012. http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/poll-‐finds-‐broad-‐support-‐for-‐obamas-‐counterterrorism-‐policies/2012/02/07/gIQAFrSEyQ_story.html.

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According to a 2013 Pew research study, 56% of Americans approved of drone use

against international targets while only 26% disapproved.8

Additionally, despite criticism of how many civilians are killed via drone

strikes, some argue that drones still cause less collateral damage than other

weapons that have been used in bombing campaigns.9 Micah Zenko at the Council

on Foreign Relations compares drone strikes with the 1998 bombing campaign

targeting Osama bin Laden, noting that in 1998 cruise missiles were fired “based on

predictions of [bin Laden] would be in four to six hours.”10 In contrast, missiles fired

by drones allow a much more versatile response.11 Drones fire missiles “faster than

the speed of sound, striking a target…often before it is heard by the people on the

ground.”12 This means that drone strikes have the potential to be much more

accurate than conventional bombing strategies.

Furthermore, drones are cheaper than their conventional counterparts.

According to an American Security Project cost analysis, “drones are generally

slightly cheaper to both acquire and operate than conventional fighter jets.”13 For

example, an MQ-‐9 Reaper drone has an Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) per

8 "Continued Support for U.S. Drone Strikes." Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. February 11, 2013. http://www.people-‐press.org/2013/02/11/continued-‐support-‐for-‐u-‐s-‐drone-‐strikes/. 9 Zenko, Micah. "Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies." Council on Foreign Relations. January 2013. http://www.cfr.org/wars-‐and-‐warfare/reforming-‐us-‐drone-‐strike-‐policies/p29736, p. 6 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 Boyle, Ashley S., and Joshua Foust. "The Strategic Context of Lethal Drones." American Security Project. August 16, 2012. http://americansecurityproject.org/ASP%20Reports/Ref%200077%20-‐%20The%20Strategic%20Context%20of%20Lethal%20Drones.pdf, p. 6

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unit of $25.93 million, and an Operations and Support average annual cost per unit

of $2.988 million.14 Despite a higher mishap rate, the Reaper is less expensive than,

for instance, an F-‐22 fighter, which carries an APUC of $185.73 million along with an

Operations and Support cost of $11.255 million each year.15 Drones are much

cheaper than ground forces as well: according to an article by David Francis of The

Fiscal Times, “the 60,000 American troops in Afghanistan cost the Pentagon $51

billion last year,” while “over the next decade, the Pentagon only plans to spend $40

billion on unclassified drones.”16

Arguments Against Drone Use

According to drone opponents, however, the associated drawbacks outweigh

these benefits. For instance, some have criticized the drone campaign on the

grounds that it violates human rights concerns, emphasizing collateral impact on

Pakistani civilians. The Living Under Drones report, the result of a collaborative

effort between the law schools of Stanford University and New York University,

specifically notes that the public debate about drones has failed to give adequate

weight to the voices of civilians living in impacted areas.17 This exhaustive report

raises many objections to the drone war based on its negative impact on Pakistani 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Francis, David. "Death by Drones: Are They Worth the Cost?" The Fiscal Times. February 07, 2013. http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2013/02/07/Death-‐by-‐Drones-‐Are-‐They-‐Worth-‐the-‐Cost.aspx. 17 International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic, Stanford Law School, and NYU School of Law Global Justice Clinic. "Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians From US Drone Practices in Pakistan. Livingunderdrones.org. September 2012. http://www.livingunderdrones.org/wp-‐content/uploads/2012/10/Stanford-‐NYU-‐LIVING-‐UNDER-‐DRONES.pdf, p.5.

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civilian communities, and the authors’ anonymous interviews with Waziris who live

with the consequences of drone strikes are shocking.18

Building on these criticisms, many authors have suggested that drone strikes

cause an unacceptable level of blowback, defined by Hudson, Owens, and Flannes at

the MEPC as “the unintended consequences of policies not subjected to the scrutiny

of the American public.”19 Their report on drone use cites five different blowback

reactions associated with drone strikes in Pakistan which are independently

detrimental to American objectives: retaliation, creation of new insurgents,

complication of strategic objectives, destabilization of Pakistan, and the

deterioration of the U.S. -‐ Pakistani relationship.20 An article by Aliya Deri at

Stanford University supports this conclusion, arguing that drones “can actually turn

civilians into terrorists.”21 Even General Stanley McChrystal, despite overseeing the

development and deployment of the first American combat drones, cautions that

their overuse can create mistrust between governments and between peoples.22

18 Ibid., p. 55-‐101. 19 Hudson, Leila, Colin Owens, and Matt Flannes. "Drone Warfare: Blowback from the New American Way of War." Middle East Policy Council. 2013. http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-‐east-‐policy-‐archives/drone-‐warfare-‐blowback-‐new-‐american-‐way-‐war, p. 1 20 Ibid. 21 Deri, Aliya Robin. ""Costless" War: American and Pakistani Reactions to the U.S. Drone War." Intersect 5 (May 23, 2012). http://ojs.stanford.edu/ojs/index.php/intersect/article/view/367/167, p. 12 22 Alexander, David. "Retired General Cautions against Overuse of "hated" Drones." Reuters. January 07, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/07/us-‐usa-‐afghanistan-‐mcchrystal-‐idUSBRE90608O20130107.

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According to McChrystal, Pakistani civilians hate drones “on a visceral level.”23 This

argument is supported by a Pew Research Center project done in 2011, which

shows that Pakistani civilians are overwhelmingly opposed to drone attacks.24

Taking a broader view, a report written by Imtiaz Ali for the Institute for

Social Policy and Understanding asserts that drone strikes negatively affect U.S. –

Pakistani relations on the grounds that they violate Pakistani sovereignty.25 Ali does

note that opinions are mixed – some Pakistani civil society organizations have

supported these strikes, and furthermore Pakistani leaders have requested an

increase in drone strikes in the past.26

Because Pakistan’s FATA, where American drone strikes are concentrated,

has “never been fully integrated into Pakistan's administrative, economic or judicial

system,” some critics argue that media sources prioritize reports about drones and

overlook more important problems facing Pakistan. 27 A team of researchers from

Iqra University (Hameed, Soomro, and Kaimkhani) has argued that public attention

to the drone war drowns out real concerns about Pakistan’s economic woes.28 This

23 Ibid. 24 "U.S. Image in Pakistan Falls No Further Following Bin Laden Killing." Pew Global Attitudes Project. June 21, 2011. http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/06/21/chapter-‐3-‐death-‐of-‐bin-‐laden-‐and-‐the-‐battle-‐against-‐extremists/. 25 Ali, Imtiaz. United States/Pakistan Relations: Facing a Critical Juncture. Report. May 2012. http://www.ispu.org/pdfs/Imtiaz%20Ali%20Report%20final.pdf, p. 14-‐15 26 Ibid. 27 "UN Denounces US Drone Use in Pakistan." Al Jazeera. March 15, 2013. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2013/03/201331523115707202.html. 28 Hameed, Irfan, Yasir Soomro, and Sana Kaimkhani. "Drones Further Drowning Down Real Issues from Pakistan Economy and Business Sector." European Journal of Scientific Research 87, no. 3 (September 15, 2012). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2170519.

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paper argues that by paying too much attention to simply the drones, international

media outlets fail to address other main issues facing the Pakistani economy.

The Living Under Drones report, along with other works including a 2009

piece that appeared in the New Yorker, additionally mentions that drone strikes

may violate international laws of war.29 Among other criticisms, the report argues

that the American government has failed to meet transparency standards,

specifically by failing to submit a report to the UN Security Council.30 According to

the authors, this constitutes a violation of international law.31 Alston’s report to the

UN Human Rights Council, which included a look into the international legality of

drone strikes, reaches a similar conclusion. Alston indirectly characterizes the

American drone campaign against al Qaeda as problematic, citing concerns about

drone strikes and “the context of armed combat.”32 The fact that drone strikes in

Pakistan have been “planned and executed” by the CIA instead of a branch of the

military complicates the situation: these intelligence officers stretch the definition of

“unlawful combatant” by attacking enemy soldiers without being in combat

themselves.33

29 See Stanford Law School and NYU School of Law, “Living Under Drones”, especially p. 110-‐111; and Mayer, Jane. "The Predator War." Editorial. The New Yorker, October 26, 2009. http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer. 30 Stanford Law School and NYU School of Law, “Living Under Drones” 31 Ibid. 32 Alston, Philip. “Study on Targeted Killings,” p. 25 33 Gregory, Derek. "The Everywhere War." The Geographical Journal 177, no. 3 (September 2011): 238-‐250. doi:10.1111/j.1475-‐4959.2011.00426.x, p. 241

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Lack of transparency has been another important criticism of drone use.34

Alston notes: “transparency is required by both IHL and human rights law. A lack of

disclosure gives States a virtual and impermissible license to kill.”35 Transparency

and accountability are domestic concerns as well.36 Despite the assertion that

“targeting even low-‐level operatives can make a contribution to the U.S. war effort

against Al-‐Qaeda,”37 national security specialist Gregory McNeal argues that the

bureaucracy associated with drone strike decision-‐making renders analysis of the

accountability for these decisions “inherently complex and opaque.”38 He cites

domestic apathy for foreign policy issues as a detriment to accountability,

exacerbating this problem.39 Echoing similar concerns, University of Illinois law

professors Radsan and Murphy cite drones’ “ever-‐increasing power”40 as a factor

that necessitates more open, transparent procedures to ensure the legality and

sustainability of current and future drone warfare.41

34 Alston, Philip. “Study on Targeted Killings,” p. 25 35 Ibid., p. 26 36 Alston, Philip. "The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders." Harvard National Security Journal, Forthcoming. (September 18, 2011). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1928963. 37 McNeal, Gregory S. "Kill-‐Lists and Accountability." Georgetown Law Journal, Forthcoming. Accessed March 5, 2013. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1819583, p.40 38 Ibid., p. 41-‐43 39 Ibid., p. 105 40 Radsan, AJ, and Richard Murphy. "Measure Twice, Shoot Once: Higher Care for CIA-‐Targeted Killing." University of Illinois Law Review 2011, no. 4 (August 1, 2011): 1204. http://illinoislawreview.org/wp-‐content/ilr-‐content/articles/2011/4/Murphy.pdf. 41 Ibid., p. 1207

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Assumptions in the Debate About Drones

Drone strikes have killed important and senior al Qaeda leaders including

Ilyas Kashmiri, leader of the Harkat-‐ul-‐Jihad-‐al-‐Islami fundamentalist movement;

Abu-‐Zaid al Kuwaiti, al Qaeda’s second-‐in-‐command before his death; Atiyah Abd-‐al

Rahman, top al Qaeda leader and purported al Qaeda number two; and Anwar al-‐

Awlaki, the radical imam, al Qaeda recruiter, and social media propagandist who

controversially became the first American citizen killed in an authorized targeted

killing.42 High-‐profile kills like these are feathers in the hat of the drone program. In

the words of Jenna Jordan, who has done excellent work in the study of decapitation

strategy, “optimism towards the success of decapitation is based primarily on

42 Khan, Ismail. "U.S. Drone Strike Kills a Commander for Al Qaeda in Pakistan." The New York Times, December 9, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/world/asia/us-‐drone-‐strike-‐kills-‐a-‐senior-‐al-‐qaeda-‐commander.html?ref=asia&_r=2&; Windrem, Robert. "Senior Al-‐Qaida Leader Killed in Drone Strike in Pakistan, Jihadis, US Officials Say." NBC News. December 7, 2012.; http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/12/07/15760065-‐senior-‐al-‐qaida-‐leader-‐killed-‐in-‐drone-‐strike-‐in-‐pakistan-‐jihadis-‐us-‐officials-‐say?lite.; "Al Qaeda's Second in Command Killed during Drone Strike on House in Pakistan's Tribal Region." Daily Mail. December 9, 2012. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-‐2245516/Abu-‐Zaid-‐al-‐Kuwaiti-‐Al-‐Qaedas-‐second-‐command-‐killed-‐drone-‐strike-‐house-‐Pakistan.html.; Mazzetti, Mark. "C.I.A. Drone Is Said to Kill Qaeda's No. 2." The New York Times. August 28, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/28/world/asia/28qaeda.html?_r=0.; Ross, Brian, and Lee Ferran. "How Anwar Al-‐Awlaki Inspired Terror From Across the Globe." ABC News. September 30, 2011. http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/anwar-‐al-‐awlaki-‐inspired-‐terror/story?id=14643383. For a more exhaustive list of high-‐level al Qaeda and TTP leaders killed by drones, see: Roggio, Bill, and Alexander Mayer. "Senior Al Qaeda and Taliban Leaders Killed in US Airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004 -‐ 2013." The Long War Journal. January 3, 2013. http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-‐strikes-‐hvts.php.

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theories of charismatic leadership.”43 Since members of terrorist groups form tight

social circles around top members like these who perform vital organizational

planning, it is widely assumed that eliminating these leaders will significantly

reduce their groups’ effectiveness.

Given these successful drone strikes, it seems logical to assume that drones

are working effectively as part of a decapitation strategy, and that al Qaeda’s

operations have suffered accordingly as a result. In fact, many people make exactly

this assumption. For example, in a 2011 evaluation of drones’ accuracy, University

of Massachusetts authors Plaw, Fricker and Williams assume that killing al Qaeda’s

leaders constitutes a “tactical success” and devote the majority of their analysis to

whether the costs of drone use have been correctly assessed.44 Though he reaches a

different conclusion about these costs, Zenko also argues that the United States’

drone campaign has “significantly degraded the capability of al-‐Qaeda to plan or

conduct acts of international terrorism.”45

This assumption is typical of the literature: instead of questioning whether or

not drones are effective against al Qaeda, most criticism of American drone policy

acknowledges drone use’s benefits, and makes a judgment about drone strategy

based on weighing these benefits against a variety of different costs. Critics address

43 Jordan, Jenna. "When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation." Security Studies 18, no. 4 (2009): 722. http://cpost.uchicago.edu/pdf/Jordan.pdf. 44 Plaw, Avery, Matthew S. Fricker, and Brian Glyn Williams. "Practice Makes Perfect?: The Changing Civilian Toll of CIA Drone Strikes in Pakistan | Plaw | Perspectives on Terrorism." Perspectives On Terrorism 5, no. 5-‐6 (2011): 51-‐69. http://terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/practice-‐makes-‐perfect/336, p. 65. 45 Zenko, Micah. “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” p.10

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the drone war through the lens of moral questionability, blowback, human rights, or

public opinion, while portraying drones as highly lethal, highly advanced killing

machines.46 For example, despite citing concerns about transparency and

accountability, McNeal notes that drones are capable of killing with “amazing

efficiency.”47 There exists a wide range of criticism of drone policy, but drones’

benefits, and particularly their effectiveness against terrorist groups, are seldom

questioned.48 It is easy to assume that drones are indeed as effective at killing

terrorists as they are advanced, but in the case of the drone campaign against al

Qaeda, this is actually an oversimplification that requires further review. The

effectiveness of decapitation campaigns in general remains unclear: decapitation as

a broader strategy has been characterized as counterproductive, useful, and

everything in between.49 But in order to assess the usefulness of drones in the

46 For a few examples, see Plaw, Fricker and Williams “Practice Makes Perfect.” p. 56; Kaag, John, and Sarah Kreps. "The Moral Hazard of Drones." The New York Times. July 22, 2012. http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/the-‐moral-‐hazard-‐of-‐drones/.; Mayer, Jane. "The Predator War." 47 McNeal, Gregory S. "Kill-‐Lists and Accountability," p. 4 48 Again, exceptions exist. See: Bergen, Peter, and Katherine Tiedemann. "The Year of the Drone." New America Foundation. February 24, 2010. http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/bergentiedemann2.pdf. p. 4-‐5; Zenko, Micah. "Killing Isn't Cool." Foreign Policy. February 12, 2013. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/12/killing_isn_t_cool?page=0,0. The latter is especially interesting because it includes criticism of the drone campaign from American officials inside the Pentagon. This criticism is mostly based on the argument that too much reliance on drone use can lead to the neglect of other important methods to achieve strategic objectives. 49 Jordan, Jenna. "When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation." P.723; Johnston and Sarbahi. "The Impact of US Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan.”; Price, Bryan C. "Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism." International Security 4, no. 36 (2012): 9-‐46.

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specific decapitation campaign against al Qaeda, this paper will examine the

correlation between American drone strikes targeting al Qaeda and kills from al

Qaeda operations to evaluate the impact of the American drone campaign on al

Qaeda’s effectiveness.

Chapter Three: Data

The objective of this study is to evaluate the relationship between drone

strikes on al Qaeda and the effectiveness of al Qaeda’s international terrorist

operations. Two types of data are thus required: information on drone attacks, and

information on al Qaeda lethality. With respect to drone attacks, I require data on

when the attacks happened, and who each attack targeted., With respect to al

Qaeda’s effectiveness, I require data on al Qaeda attacks conducted, when they were

conducted, how deadly they were, and who their target was.

For the purposes of this study, terrorist “effectiveness” has been quantified

as the number of kills resulting from al Qaeda’s international terrorist operations

each year. This definition intentionally omits other aspects of al Qaeda operations,

such as aiding and advising the TTP, because al Qaeda’s support of regional terrorist

groups is less relevant to the global war on terror than international terrorist

operations.

(continued): http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21915/targeting_top_terrorists.html.

16

Al Qaeda International Terrorism Data

Both the RAND Corporation and the National Consortium for the Study of

Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland

maintain excellent data on the frequency and lethality of terrorist attacks.50

However, the RAND data set pertains more directly to this study because it contains

more relevant information about the nature of each attack. For each individual

operation, the database includes information on the date of the attack, the date that

sources about the attack were published, whether the attack was domestic or

international, whether it was a suicide mission, what group was responsible, the

attack’s tactics and weapons, and the target. Furthermore, each attack is

accompanied by a detailed description of what happened.

The data used in this study all pertain to attacks on Western targets. For the

most part, this means attacks on American civilians, but the data also include attacks

on Westernized institutions and corporations. For instance, the data count the

fatalities that resulted from attacks like the 2003 bombing of a Marriott hotel in

Jakarta and the 2004 attack on the American consulate in Jeddah because these

attacks were targeted at Western civilians. Based on this information, the RAND

database provides better access to information about which terrorist operations

threaten Americans’ safety.

50 "Global Terrorism Database." National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland. Accessed March 2, 2013. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/. ; "RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents." RAND National Defense Research Institute. March 2, 2012. http://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism-‐incidents.html.

17

Note that al Qaeda operations that are not targeted at Western civilians are

not included. This means that attacks on American soldiers are excluded, along with

attacks on Pakistani government officials. As a result, most of al Qaeda’s operations

in Iraq are not included in the data because they are part of an insurgency, as

opposed to terrorism. The numbers on insurgency attacks might be relevant to a

study of military counterinsurgency, but they are not relevant to the drone war

because drone use is a counterterrorist tactic.

American Drone Strike Data

Moving on to the drone campaign, there are three main databases that

maintain information about the frequency, accuracy and deadliness of drone strikes.

The New America Foundation, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, and the Long

War Journal all maintain distinct data sets that are based on government, media, and

academic sources.51 Some criticism has been aimed at the credibility and reliability

of these data sets,52 but the vast majority of this criticism is based on the

discrepancies of civilian death counts between the three data sets. These

discrepancies are irrelevant in the context of this paper, which focuses on the

frequency of drone strikes instead of their kills of civilians.

51 "The Year of the Drone." New America Foundation. Accessed March 2, 2013. http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones.; "Covert War on Terror -‐ the Datasets." The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. Accessed March 02, 2013. http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drone-‐data/.; Roggio, Bill, and Alexander Mayer. "Charting the Data for US Airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004 -‐ 2013." The Long War Journal. April 17, 2013. http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-‐strikes.php. 52 Stanford Law School and NYU School of Law. “Living Under Drones,” p. 45-‐54

18

The number of drone strikes that have occurred each year, unlike the

number of civilians who have been killed by drones, has not been widely disputed.

In fact, the data sets report very similar numbers for this frequency, as illustrated in

Figure One.

The three data sets closely follow the same trend. Because all three data sets

tell a similar story in terms of the frequency of drone strikes, the results are robust,

and hold no matter which drone strike data set is used. For the purposes of the

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

Num

ber of Drone Strikes

Year

Fig. 1: Drone Strike Frequency

Long War Journal

Bureau of Investigative Journalism

New America Foundation

19

analysis to follow, it was most convenient to select the data set with the best

information about targeting.

The Long War Journal’s data set includes information about where each

drone strike occurred by district, how many civilians died in each strike, how many

militants died, which faction each strike targeted, and how many leaders of each

faction were killed. While these details may be important to other analyses, they are

not relevant to this study because they do not consider al Qaeda independent of the

TTP and other militant factions. As a result, this data set is less useful for this

particular study despite the unique details it offers.

The Bureau of Investigative Journalism’s data set offers a detailed write-‐up of

each strike based on information compiled from various news sources. While this

data set offers the most detailed analysis of each individual strike, it makes

judgments about targeting based on media sources that may conflict with each

other. Instead of labeling a strike’s target unclear in the absence of information on

what group the target belonged to, this data set references information about the

individuals who were killed in the strike. Since one individual may be affiliated with

multiple terrorist networks, and since different reports may attribute different

drone strikes to different targets, use of the Bureau of Investigative Journalism’s

data without in-‐depth research into each unclear strike may have resulted in an

overestimation of the frequency of strikes against al Qaeda. While this data set

would be the most useful for a detailed analysis of individual strikes, this study aims

to examine drone policy on a broader level.

20

The New America Foundation data set assigns a target by group to each

strike. This may seem counterproductive because the targets of many strikes are

unclear and impossible to ascertain, but in fact this system makes analysis based on

strike frequency more robust. The New America Foundation data counts targets as

“unclear” if there is no consensus about the assumed target instead of noting based

on conflicting reports that al Qaeda or another group may have been the real target.

But even under the assumption that none of the “unclear” strikes targeted al Qaeda,

the results of my analysis turn out the same as if all of them had. The New America

Foundation’s data set is the most useful for this study because it minimizes the

chance that the amount of drone strikes targeting al Qaeda could be overestimated.

Since the trend in drone strike frequency is weakest when no unclear strikes are

assumed to target al Qaeda, this condition has been assumed for the purposes of the

analysis.53

These data do not take into account other al Qaeda activities besides terrorist

attacks, because these activities are not likely to result in the loss of American

civilian lives. It is possible, for instance, that al Qaeda’s core began to move into an

advisory role with respect to the TTP instead of directly engaging in attacks

themselves. This, however, would have little to do with al Qaeda’s global terrorism

operations and therefore has little relevance to the safety of American citizens.

53 See: Bergen and Tiedemann, “The Year of the Drone” for a more detailed explanation of the methodology that went into the New America Foundation data set.

21

Analysis

Figure Two shows the total number of drone strikes in Pakistan over the

years 2003 – 2012 against the number of drone strikes targeting al Qaeda and the

number of drone strikes targeting the TTP.

The same trend emerges regardless of whether the unclear drone strikes are

attributed to al Qaeda or not. Figure Three removes the information on total

number of drone strikes and number of drone strikes targeting the TTP, zooming in

on the drone strikes that targeted al Qaeda. Note that the first drone strike targeting

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013

Drone Strikes

Year

Fig. 2: Drone Strikes by Target

Total Number of Drone Strikes

Drone Strikes Targeting AQ

Drone Strikes Targeting TTP

22

al Qaeda occurs in 2005. In 2006 and 2007, there are a few strikes, then in 2008 the

frequency of drone strikes peaks at 12 – one strike per month – before beginning to

decline in 2009. Drone strike frequency then fluctuates slightly in 2010 to 2012.

Figures Four and Five show the number of kills by al Qaeda attacks over the

period from 2001 to 2011. Because of the peak in 2001, which is much higher than

any other value from this period, these graphs represent the same data in two

different ways. In order to demonstrate the trend in al Qaeda kills, Figure Four uses

a logarithmic scale, while Figure Five uses an arithmetic scale that simply zooms in

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Drone Strikes Targeting Al Qaeda

Year

Fig. 3: Drone Strikes Targeting AQ

23

on the lower y-‐values from 2002 to 2009. Note that the value of 0 for 2009 cannot

be represented on a logarithmic scale, so it does not appear in Figure Four.

1

10

100

1000

10000

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

Kills by Al Qaeda

Year

Fig. 4: Al Qaeda Kills per year (log scale)

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

Kills by Al Qaeda

Year

Fig. 5: Al Qaeda Kills per year (Arithmetic)

24

The most important finding in these two figures is the trend downward in al

Qaeda’s lethality since 2001, when al Qaeda killed 2,982 people. After this peak,

there was only one other year in which al Qaeda operations killed over 100 people.

By the year 2004, al Qaeda’s kill count drops into the low double digits and does not

increase again, and finally in 2009 it hits zero.

These final graphs compare drone strike activity with kills by al Qaeda

operations from the period between 2001 and 2011. Figure Six depicts both series

on the same logarithmic scale. This representation avoids arbitrary assigning of

maximum and minimum values, which can move the crossover point of the graph.

1

10

100

1000

10000

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

Kills by Al Qaeda

Year

Fig. 6: Drone Strikes on AQ and Kills by AQ (log scale)

Kills by AQ

Drone strikes on AQ

25

Since no zero values are represented on this logarithmic scale, however, an

arithmetic scale is more informative with respect to the data’s trends. In order to

avoid confusion regarding the crossover point, two figures using arithmetic scales

have been represented together. The following figures use the data from Figure Six,

but are split up and represented on individual y-‐axes using the same time series.

Figure Seven shows only kills by al Qaeda, while Figure Eight shows only drone

strikes against al Qaeda.

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Kills by Al Qaeda

Year

Fig. 7: Kills by AQ

26

Chapter Four: Results

These graphs show that no causal relationship can be established between

drone strikes on al Qaeda and kills by al Qaeda. The precipitous drop in kills by al

Qaeda’s international terrorist operations begins after the attacks of September

11th, 2001, but there are no drone strikes at all on al Qaeda until 2005.

Furthermore, strike frequency does not peak until 2008, well after al Qaeda kills

have dropped to the low double digits.

Therefore, the data clearly demonstrate that the drop in al Qaeda’s lethality

was not caused by drone strikes. In fact, there were no drone strikes at all when al

Qaeda’s lethality began to decline, and furthermore drone strikes only peaked after

al Qaeda’s kills had dropped from thousands to hundreds to single digits. These

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014

Kills by Al Qaeda

Year

Fig. 8: Drone strikes on AQ

27

data do not support the assumption that drone strikes on al Qaeda had a significant

effect on al Qaeda’s kill count. If drone strikes had indeed made an impact on al

Qaeda’s effectiveness, al Qaeda’s kills would not begin to drop until after drone

strikes began. However, since drone strikes only begin in earnest after the number

of al Qaeda’s kills has nearly stabilized close to zero, the data do support the

conclusion that drone strikes had nothing to do with the decline in al Qaeda’s

effectiveness.

These results can be interpreted in a few meaningful ways. First, and most

importantly, the graphs support the idea that drone strikes are actually not the

cause of the decline in al Qaeda’s lethality. Al Qaeda’s kill count begins dropping

precipitously in 2001-‐2, going from several thousand in 2001 to several hundred in

2002 to several dozen in 2004 without any drone strike activity at all. Drone attacks

could not have caused this drop in al Qaeda’s effectiveness, because when the

decline started, and for a few years thereafter, there were no drone strikes targeting

al Qaeda. No matter how the “unclear” strikes are explained, drone strikes against al

Qaeda do not begin until 2005, meaning that drones could not have caused the

beginning of the decline in al Qaeda’s effectiveness.

With that said, the data do not show that drones are inherently ineffective

against al Qaeda. It is possible that if drones had been employed earlier they may

have contributed to a faster decline in al Qaeda’s effectiveness. This analysis does

not address whether drones could be effective; it argues only that drones were not

the cause of al Qaeda’s effectiveness decline since 2001, because the latter predates

the drone campaign and thus could not have been caused by it.

28

Chapter Five: Conclusions

The argument that drone strikes did not cause the drop in al Qaeda’s lethality

should influence debate on the subject of American drone policy. These findings

make no direct argument about whether drones should be employed or not, but

they do suggest that a re-‐examination of the benefits of the drone campaign could be

useful. As discussed in Chapter Two, most drone policy studies are based on a

comparison of the costs and benefits of using drones. These studies assume that

drones are effective and focus on describing the costs associated with using drones,

but this assumption is not supported by these data. Analyses of drone policy that

cite drones’ impressive efficiency must take into account this challenge to the

assumption that drone strikes were responsible for a decline in al Qaeda’s lethality.

Some of the claims made in the articles cited above are challenged by these

results. While drones represent an undeniable technological advantage for the

United States, the data do not support the notion that drone use has significantly

hindered al Qaeda’s ability to carry out acts of international terrorism. Therefore,

works that cite drone use outright as a strategy that made an important impact on al

Qaeda’s international terrorism capabilities considerably overestimate the

effectiveness of the American drone strategy. Most articles do not explicitly make

this claim, focusing instead on weighing the benefits of drone strikes that accrue to

the United States against concerns like blowback, international legal issues, or

public opinion. But since these findings support no positive correlation between

increased drone use and a decrease in al Qaeda’s lethality, they challenge the

argument that drones have been useful in preventing al Qaeda’s global terrorism.

29

This finding does not, however, constitute in itself an argument against the

use of drones in other places or other times. If al Qaeda’s effectiveness had

remained steady when drones were first deployed, perhaps drone use could have

had a significant impact against them. It may be that drones are useful to the United

States in other conflicts, or in other ways. For instance, the Pakistani government

may be requesting help from the United States via the employment of combat

drones, or drones may be useful against militants in other areas or other conflicts

like the insurgency in Iraq. These findings only pertain to drones’ effectiveness

against al Qaeda’s core in Pakistan. The expansion of the drone war to other

militant groups may have a different impact. The refocusing of drone strikes against

the TTP in particular is an important policy topic that deserves a more thorough

examination.

Alternatively, drones may be useful from a diplomatic perspective. On April

11th, 2013, former president Pervez Musharraf “acknowledged his government

secretly signed off on U.S. drone strikes.”54 Despite a 2008 cable uncovered by

Wikileaks in which Pakistani General Ashfaq Kayani asks American Admiral William

Fallon for “continuous Predator coverage of [Waziristan],”55 Musharraf’s

54 Robertson, Nic, and Greg Botelho. "Ex-‐Pakistani President Musharraf Admits Secret Deal with U.S. on Drone Strikes." CNN. April 12, 2013. http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/11/world/asia/pakistan-‐musharraf-‐drones. 55 Allbritton, Chris. "Pakistan Army Chief Sought More Drone Coverage in '08: Wikileaks." Reuters. May 20, 2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/20/us-‐pakistan-‐wikileaks-‐idUSTRE74J3UV20110520.

30

announcement was “the first time a top past or present Pakistani official has

admitted publicly to such a deal.”56

In conclusion, these findings suggest that political discourse regarding drone

policy has been largely based on an overestimation of drones’ effectiveness against

al Qaeda. While drones have killed al Qaeda leaders and operatives, the group’s

lethality was already trending towards zero before the first drone strike on it

occurred. This means that those authors and politicians who have argued implicitly

and explicitly that drones were responsible for decimating al Qaeda’s capabilities

are overestimating the effect of drone use on al Qaeda. Drones have many uses,

applications, and advantages, but according to these findings, causing a reduction in

al Qaeda’s effectiveness cannot be reasonably counted among them.

56 Robertson, Nic, and Greg Botelho. "Ex-‐Pakistani President Musharraf Admits Secret Deal with U.S. on Drone Strikes." CNN. April 12, 2013. http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/11/world/asia/pakistan-‐musharraf-‐drones/.

31

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max rewak - drones and international terrorism

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