mcgee-the visible and invisible liga patriótica argentina

The Visible and Invisible Liga Patriótica Argentina, 1919-28: Gender Roles and the Right WingAuthor(s): Sandra F. McGeeSource: The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 64, No. 2 (May, 1984), pp. 233-258Published by: Duke University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2514516Accessed: 02/12/2010 15:47

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unlessyou have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and youmay use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=duke.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Duke University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The HispanicAmerican Historical Review.

http://www.jstor.org

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=duke

http://www.jstor.org/stable/2514516?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=duke

Hispanic Amnericans Historical Revietv 64 (2), 1984, 233-258 Copyright (C 1984 by Duke University Press

The Visible and Invisible Liga Patri6tica Argentina, 1919-28: Gender Roles and the Right Wing'

SANDRA F. MCGEE*

R IGHT-WING nationalist groups have long fascinated scholars and observers of twentieth-century Argentina. Yet the Liga Patriotica Argentina, once described as

"the most powerful political association in the country" between 1919 and 1922, has not received the attention that its size and influence warrant.2 The Liga's campaign against workers in the post-World War I years merits study not only because it weakened the labor movement, but also because it foreshadowed the antileftist tendencies of fuiture nationalistic leaders, including Juan Domingo Peron. Another important reason for ex- amining the Liga is that it does not fit the image of the Argentine right that historians have created. According to most of the literature, the right wing has consisted exclusively of men; and it has devoted itself to ideological formulations, political maneuvers, and, on occasion, violence. The

*Research was fuinided by a Fulbriglbt-Havs granit from the U.S. Office of Edlucationl (1977) and a Sumiiimer Stipenid grant from the National Enidowmlient for tbe Humil-anities (1981). The auithor wouild like to tlanik Charles Bergquist, David Busbliell, and Kristinie Jonies for their comments on this work; they are niot responsible for anv of its deficienicies.

1. The year 1919 marked the founidinig of the Liga Patri6tica Argenltilna (beleillaftel, Liga), anid 1928 was the last year for which proceedings of its aninual congresses were available. Also, after 1928 the Liga's primary foe became the Yrigoveni regimiie, rather tlhani the labor ml-ovemiienit, as discussed below. The Liga still exists.

2. David Rock, Politics in Argentitna, 1890-1930: The Rise anld Fall of Radicalismll (Camii- bridge, 1975), p. 1i1. Eniriquie Zuleta Alvarez discussed the historiograplhy of the Argenitinie right at lenigtb in El nacionalismo argentino, 2 vols. (Buenios Air-es, 1975), II, 565-811. Ani- other descriptioni of the literature is founid in Alistair Henniessv, "Fascismii anid Popuilisml- in Latini Aml-erica," in Walter Laquetir, ed., Fascismn: A Readlers Giuide. Analy ses, Interpreta- tions, Bibliography (Berkeley, 1976), pp. 272-280. For informilationi oni the workinigs of the Liga, see Sanidra E McGee, "The Social Originis of Counter revolutioni in Argenitinia, 1900- 1932" (Phl. D. Diss., Uniiversity of Flor-ida, 1979), pp. 1211-237; Rock, Politics in Argentiila, pp. 180-202, passim; Osvaldo Bayer, "1921: La imiasacre de Jacinito Arauz," Todo Es Historia (Buenios Aires), n1o. 45 (Jan. 1971), 40-55; anid referenices in Bayer's Los vengadoares de la Patagonia trdagica, 3vols. (Buienos Aires, 1972-74). Works oni the right have genierally emii- phasized the year-s after 1929, anid thus have not treated the Liga in detail.

234 HAHR I MAY I SANDRA F. MCGEE

Liga engaged in these activities, but it also recruited womien, whose membership broadened the focus of the organization. Scholars have ignored this female component, riendering it invisible.

Although researchers have begun to look at womeni's rightist activity in Latin Amer-ica, thus far they have not examinied male and female contributions to the same movements in a single coml-parative franlework.4 Yet this kind of study can yield fresh insights into the nature of riight-wing organizations and the relationships among gender roles, class, and forms of political participation. This approaclh can also be valuable historio- graphically, for it would constitute a step toward a universal history incorporating both sexes.

In this article, I will use this approach in anialyzing the Liga's origins and roles. Comparison of male and female Liguistas' social backgrounds, motives for affiliations, r-ecruitment, methods of organization, and actions rieveals that the participation of both sexes was vital for the fulfillml-ent of the Liga's aims. It also demonistrates that the sexual division of labor within the Liga resem-bled that which characterized the upper sectors of the larger society, where women served as nurturers and housekeepers while men were responsible for public activities.6 Ironically, despite their domestic role and their future historical obscurity, Liga women gainied a degree of public exposure, which male leaders encouraged for their own ends. Thus, the female members of a politically and socially conservative organization sometimes overstepped the boundaries of their usual sphere of activity.

The Origins of the Liga

The roots of the Liga lay in the social tensions generated by the fuill- scale integration of Argentina into the interniationial economy after 1870.

3. Ail exception, Bayer mentionied female brigades in Los vengadlores, I, 48. 4. Works on right-wing womiien incluide Michele Mattelart, "Chile: The Femininie Side

of the Coup or Wheni Bourgeois Women Take to the Streets," NACLA's Latitn. Amterica & Emnpire Report, 9 (Sept. 1975), 14-25; Maria de los Angeles Cruimmett, "El Podel Feme- nino: The Mobilizationi of Women against Socialism in Chile," Latin Ametricani Perspectives, 4 (Fall 1977), 103-113; "Feminismo Balaguerista: A Strategy of the Right," NACLA's Latin America & Empire Report, 8 (Apr. 1974), 28-32; Sanidra F. McGee, "Right-Wing Female Activists in Buienos Air-es, 1900-1932, in Bar-bara J. Harr-is and Jo Anni K. McNamara, eds., Women and the Social Strutcture. Papersfromn the Fifth Berkshire Coniference on the IIistory of Women (Durham, forthcoming). Jean A. Meyer, in The Cristeto Rebellion: The Mexican People betweeni Chturch and State, 1926-1929, trans. by Richard Soutlherni (Cambridge, 1976), discussed both men and women, but Meyer anid some of the other stuclenits of the Cristeros do nlot consider them right-wing.

5. Gerda Ler-ner described this approach in The Majority Fitnds its Past: Placing Women in History (New York, 1979), p. i8o.

6. In Womanhood in America. From Colonial Timlles to the Presetnt, 2d ed. (New York, 1979), pp. ix, 77-8o, Mary P. Ryani defined the female domestic sphere and the male puiblic sphere.

LIGA PATRIOTICA ARGENTINA, 1919-28 235

Between this date and World War I, Argentina became one of the world's great exporters of corn, wheat, wool, and beef. The production of these and other raw materials led to the creation of processing industries in the capital and surrounding areas. The years 1895 to 1913 witnessed the dou- bling of industrial enterprises and a fivefold increase in capital investment in Buenos Aires. Mass immigration from Europe helped stimulate economic development. Largely as a result of this influx, the national population tripled between 1870 and 1g1o. By 1914 foreigners composed almost one-third of all inhabitants, two-thirds of the skilled and white-collar workers in the capital, and more than 8o percent of the unskilled laborers in that city.7

The immigrant labor movement posed a threat to the social hierarchy presided over by the landowning elite. By the early 1920S, there were unions of anarcho-communist, socialist, communist, and syndicalist per- suasion, organized in several federations, as well as a Socialist party, which was represented in Congress. Women, who composed 22 percent of the national adult labor force in 1914, also participated in unions, strikes, and the Socialist party, although rarely at leadership levels.8 Mostly of immigrant backgrounds, socialist women also formed the core of the Argentine feminist movement, which advocated improvements in female labor conditions as well as civil and political equality.9 These men and women con-

7. Republica Argentina, Direcci6n Nacional de Servicio Estadistico, Cuarto censo general de la naci6n, 3 vols. (Buenos Aires, 1947-52), I, lxii, 1; Adolfo Dorfinan, Historia de la industria argentina, 2d ed. (Buenos Aires, 1970), p. 285; James R. Scobie, Bulenos Aires: Plaza to Suburb, 1870-1910 (New York, 1974), p. 273. Also see Carl Solberg, Immigration and Nationalism; Argentina and Chile, 1890-1914 (Austini, 1970); Roberto Cortes Conide, El progreso argentino, 1880-1914 (Buenos Aires, 1979); Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro, Essays on the Economic History of the Argentine Republic (New Haven, 1970); James R. Scobie, Revo- lution on the Pampas. A Social History of Argentine Wheat, 1869-19zo (Austin, 1964).

8. Republica Argentina, Comisi6n Nacional del Censo, Tercer censo nacionial, 10 vols. (Buenos Aires, 1916), I, 252. On womeni and the labor force, see Donina J. Guy, "Women, Peonage, and Industrialization: Argenitina, i8io- 1914, Latin American Research Revietv, 16:3 (1981), 65-89.

Standard labor sources include Hobart A. Spalding, Jr., La clase trabajadora argentina (documentos para su historia-189o11912) (Buenos Aires, 1970); Sebastian Marotta, El movimiento sindical argentino: Su genesis y desarrollo, 3vols. (Buenos Aires, 1960-61, 1970); Richard J. Walter, The Socialist Party of Argentina, 1890-1930 (Austin, 1977); Rich- ard Alan Yoast, "The Development of Argentine Anarchism: A Socio-ideological Analysis" (Ph.D. Diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1975); Ruben Iscaro, Origen y desarrollo del inovimiento sindical argentino (Buenos Aires, 1958).

9. On feminism and women of the left, see Katharine S. Dreier, Five Months in the Argentine from a Woman's Point of View. 1918 to 1919 (New York, 1920); Yoast, "Argentine Anarchism," pp. 299-300; Maria del Carmen Feijo6, "Las luchas feministas," Todo Es His- toria (Jan. 1978), 7-23; Nancy Caro Hollander, "Women in the Political Economy of Argen- tina" (Ph.D. Diss., U.C.L.A., 1974); Cynthia Jeffress Little, "Education, Philanthropy, anid Feminism: Components of Argentine Womanhood, 186o- 1926," in Asunci6n Lavrin, ed., Latin American Women: Historical Perspectives (Westport, Conn., 1978), pp. 235-253; Marifran Carlson, "Feminism and Reform: A History of the Argentine Feminist Movement to 1926" (Ph.D. Diss., University of Chicago, 1983).


stituted the largest and most active labor movement in early twentieth- century Latin America. In opposition to organized workers under the sway of "imported" doctrines, the elite increasingly defined itself as "nationalist" and attempted to suppress labor radicalism.'0 These attempts would culminate in the Liga.

The labor movement and leftist ideologies were not the only threats to the social hierarchy. One of the bases of the social structure was the family, and the right believed that demographic forces were besieging this institution. Many more men than women had come from abroad; in 1914 there were i 15.5 men for every ioo women in Argentina, and the proportion was even more lopsided in Santa Fe and Buenos Aires Provinces and in the capital. This imbalance was not typical of either exporting countries or immigration centers." Of nineteen countries surveyed in 1914, including European nations, the United States, and Australia, Argentina had the smallest percentage of legally married men and women in its adult population, although this figure did not differ markedly from that for Mexico.'2 About 22 percent of the children born in Argentina between the years of 1914 and 1919 were brought into the world by single mothers-again, not a high proportion by regional standards. 13 Nevertheless, these conditions disturbed many portefios, who preferred to compare themselves with Europeans rather than with other Latin Americans. Pos- sibly many of the legally unmarried adults had stable common-law relationships, and many "illegitimate" children were the offspring of these unions. Nevertheless, the annual migration of harvest workers to and from Europe, and widespread seasonal unemployment, must have con- tributed to the incidence of illegitimate births and the abandonment of wives and children. Finally, the large supply of single men created a high

lo. Employers' associationis' tactics and other examples of repression are described in Spalding, Clase trabajadora, pp. 354-362; Marotta, Movimiento sindical, II, 69-79; Eduardo Gilim6n, Un anarquista en Buenos Aires (189o-191o) (Buenos Aires, 1971), pp. 99-107.

11. Comparable figures for the United States, another immigrant country, were 1o6 men for every 100 women, and for Mexico, a rapidly developing nation barely affected by immigration, 98.5 men, in i0oo. Neither did the demographic imbalance of the littoral zone characterize the Argentine interior. See Argentina, Tercer censo, I, 128, 130-131; Mexico, Direcci6n General de Estadistica, Quinto censo de poblaci6n, 15 de mayo de 1930, 8 vols. (Mexico City, 1932-36), VIII, Part32, xix.

12. Argentina, Tercer censo, I, 188. According to Mexico, Quinto censo, VIII, Part 32,

50, 48 percent of Mexican adult males and 44 percent of its adult females were legally married in 1900.

13. Repuiblica Argentina, Direcci6n General de Estadistica, La poblaci6n y el movimiento demogrdfico en el periodo 1910-1925 (Buenos Aires, 1926), p. 29. The illegitimacy rate in the interior was much higher than in the capital. According to Charles C. Cumber- land, Mexico. The Struggle for Modernity (New York, 1968), p. 193, 45 percent of Mexican children born in the early twentieth century were illegitimate, although some of these were offspring of couples married in religious rather than civil ceremonies.


demand for prostitutes, and Buenos Aires became a world center of the white-slave trade.

It was the large numbers of homeless children and prostitutes and the low percentage of married adults that observers perceived as evidence of the decline of the family. Female participation in the labor force was also seen as a divisive influence on the family, for taking the mother out of the home lessened her moral influence and control over her children. The weakness of the family as an institution, according to rightist spokesmen, led to the decay of morality and authority, and thus to social disorder. The future Liga president would blame discord on disorganized foreign households and on those who had families outside of matrimony.'4 Meanwhile, upper-class women, together with the church, established a plethora of charitable organizations to ameliorate the poverty and misery of broken homes and, they hoped, to strengthen the existing order. '5

If the Liga's origins can be traced back to the effects of economic development and immigration, the immediate occasion of its founding was the global crisis at the end of World War I. Europe was the scene of massive strikes, widespread economic hardship, and leftist revolutions. Linked through trade and culture to Europe, Argentina also experienced economic difficulties and labor militancy. During the war the nation suf- fered a severe depression, worse than that of the 1930s. From 1914 to 1919 the cost of living in Buenos Aires climbed by about 6o percent, while salaries fell i6 percent.'6 Protesting the decline in real wages, the labor movement became increasingly active. News of radicalism abroad encouraged union activists and, more important, alarmed the upper classes. The

14. See Manuel Carles's speeches in Liga Patri6tica Argentina, Catecisino de la doc- trina patria (Buenos Aires, 1921), p. 14; Discurso pronunciado por el Dr. Manuel Carles ante la honorable Sociedad de Beneficencia el 26 de mayo de 1919 (Buenos Aires, 1919), p. 6. Contemporary comments on these social problems can be founld in Dreier, Five Months, pp. 18-20, 168; Revista Militar (Buenos Aires), 19 (Feb. 1919), 386; Manuel Galvez, La trata de blancas (Buenos Aires, 1904); La Prensa, May 18, 1919; Enrique Ruiz Guifiazu, "Las fuerzas perdidas en la economfa nacional," Instituto Popular de Conferencias, 3 (Aug. 10, 1917), 178.

15. On such organizations, see McGee, "Female Activists"; Little, "Components of Ar- gentine Womanhood." The memberships of these groups overlapped. The tipper-class female philanthropic works differed from socialist and feminist projects for the poor in their religious and class bias, amateurism, and sense of noblesse oblige. On these distinctions, see the feminist medical doctor Cecilia Grierson's Decadencia del Consejo Nacional de Mujeres de la Repusblica Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1910), pp. 3-32. Many of the well-known feminists, like Grierson, were professionals. Catholic social-welfare organizations, staffed by men and women, would strongly influence the Liga. N6stor Tomas Auza described these groups in Los cat6licos argentinos: Su experiencia politica y social (Buenos Aires, 1962).

i6. Vicente Vasquez-Presedo, Estadisticas hist6ricas argentinas (comparadas), 2 vols. (Buenos Aires, 1976), II, Segunda parte 1914-1939, 46. On the depression, see Guido Di Tella and Manuel Zymelman, Los ciclos econ6micos argentinos (Buenos Aires, 1973), pp. 129- 186; Joseph S. Tulchin, "The Argentine Economy during the First World War," Review of the River Plate (Buenos Aires), June 19 and 30, July 10, 1970.


incidence of strikes and the number of strikers in the federal capital, which grew from 8o and 24,231 in 1916 to 367 and 308,967 in 1919, respectively, seemed to confirm the danger of leftist revolution.'7 More- over, for the first time in Argentina, landless peons were organizing unions and affiliating with the anarcho-communist and syndicalist federations.'8

The Tragic Week (Semana Tragica) of January 19L9 took place in this atmosphere of economic crisis, labor militancy, and upper-class fear. It began with a paralyzing general strike in the capital, where workers left their jobs and fought strikebreakers and police, and then it spread to the provinces. Shortly after national troops arrived in Buenos Aires, the general strike and worker-led violence ceased. The disorganized week-long conflict achieved few concrete ends for strikers, but its mobilization of thousands terrorized the upper classes, who were convinced that a revolution had begun.'9

From the beginning of the general strike, many upper- and middle- class portefios believed that the government needed their assistance to restore order. Rear Admiral Manuel Domecq Garcia and the Centro Naval, a club for naval officers, coordinated efforts to gather, arm, and train young civilian volunteers. At the same time that troops entered the capital, local security forces and armed vigilantes attacked working-class and Jewish neighborhoods, destroying labor centers and beating and arresting thousands, including innocent bystanders. Distinguished by white arm- bands, the vigilantes continued to patrol the streets after the general strike ended. These self-styled civil guards were responsible for many of the casualties of the Tragic Week, estimated at anywhere from 141 to 700 killed and between 8oo and 2,000 wounded.20

Meanwhile other organizations were forming to help "maintain order." Civilians and military officers gathered in police precinct headquarters, with official approval, to discuss means of protecting their neighborhoods against future worker assaults. The Centro Naval eventually assumed control over these precinct self-defense groups as well as over the civil guards.

17. Vasquez-Presedo, Estadisticas, II, 47. 18. Carl Solberg, "Rural Unrest and Agrariani Policy in Argentina, 1912- 1930," Joutrnal

of Inter-Anmerican Stutdies and World Affairs, 13 (Jan. 1971), 30-36; Yoast, "Argentine Anar- chism," pp. 208-210, 226-227.

19. Works on the Tragic Week include Nicholds Babini, "La Semana Tragica. Pesadilla de una siesta de verano," Todo Es Historia (Sept. 1967), 8-20; Hugo del Campo, "La Se- mana Tragica," Polemnica, No. 53 (1971), 63-84; Julio Godio, La Semnana Trdgica de enero de 1919 (Buenios Aires, 1972); Jose R. Romariz, La Semiiana Trdgica. Relato de los hechos sani- grientos del anio 1919 (Buenos Aires, 1952).

20. Hobairt A. Spalding, Jr., Organized Labor in Latin America. Historical Case Stud- ies of Workers in Dependent Societies (New York, 1977), p. 87 n.8. Also see Victor A. Miiel- man, "The Semana Tragica of 1919 and the Jews in Argentina," Jewish Social Studies (New York), 37 (Jan. 1975), 61-73. A longer description of these evenlts is found in McGee, "Counterrevolutioll," pp. 129-139.


Domecq Garcia and fellow naval officers, vigilante leaders, and members of the C(irculo Militar, the army counterpart of the Centro Naval, decided to integrate these forces into a new and larger group: a standing civil mili- tia, with brigades throughout the capital. A committee headed by Do- mecq Garcia called for volunteers. At the same time, it invited prestigious figures and representatives from social clubs to join the directorate of the new organization, named the Liga Patri6tica Argentina. One of these clubs was female: the Asociacion de Damas Patricias. Founded in 1912, this primarily upper-class group awarded prizes to the best Argen- tine history teachers and otherwise encouraged patriotism.2'

Delegates to the first meeting, on January 20, 1919, decided that the purpose of the Liga would be to defend the Argentine nationality against immigrant radicalism. It would teach foreigners to abide by the constitu- tion, which permitted peaceful and constructive change within the given order. The Liga would help the poorer classes, constantly elevating their moral level and keeping tranquility within the home. When anarchism, communism, or violent strikes threatened public peace, however, the Liga would also be prepared to help authorities safeguard life and property. 22

Thus the Liga would have two roles, one peaceful and one repressive. Liga members claimed to oppose revolutionary ideologies on patriotic

and moral grounds. The left, they said, was evil and anti-Argentine because it pitted class against class, dividing the nation and undermining authority. A natural hierarchy of intelligence, culture, and wealth existed in every society. To destroy this hierarchy, as the left proposed, would be disastrous for the nation, for it would lead to the rule of the ignorant over the rest of society. The Liga would prevent the uneducated masses from rebelling against their betters, and yet at the same time it would keep the rich from exploiting the poor, thus removing the cause of revolution. Also immoral and divisive was the left's intention to demolish other corner- stones of the social order, such as property, religion, and the Christian family. As previously indicated, Liga members believed that other forces also threatened the family: for example, the already mentioned women's work outside the home; widespread immorality; and, to a much lesser ex- tent, feminism. The Liga's first elected president, Manuel Carles, defined feminism simply as "the fight against men to masculinize women and femi- nize men."23 In comparison to the left, the ranks of feminists were so

21. Revista Militar, 19 (Jan. 19L9), 198-202; La Raz6n, Jan. 17, 1919; La Naci6n, Jan. 12-13, 19L9. This and other upper-class female organizations are described in Adolfo Sciurano Castafieda, ed., Album de oro de la mujer argentina (Buenos Aires, 1930).

22. La Epoca, Jan. 20, 19L9; "La Semana Tragica," La Naci6n, Jan. 19, 1969. 23. Manuel Carl6s in Liga Patri6tica Argentina, Octavo Congreso Nacionalista (Buenos

Aires, 1927), p. 57. Liga speakers and publicists presented their views in the organization's


sparse that the Liga did not view them as much of a danger. Nevertheless, the threats to the family would have to be defused.

To the Liga, public tranquility depended on the strength of the home. Thus, in its view, the issues of nationalism, order, morality, and family were inextricably linked. In turn, the strength of the home rested on motherhood. As one Liga member had previously observed, nationality had its roots in the home, and the mother was the "queen bee-teacher" of argentinidad.24 Mothers were the ones responsible for teaching children to love God and country, be obedient to authority, follow their moral duty, and resist unreasonable passions. The educators of future genera- tions of Argentines and the moralizers of society, women would have to be enlisted in the Liga's cause.

That the male founders of the organization glorified home and motherhood was nothing unusual in Hispanic culture. Enlisting women, however, was a novel idea on several grounds. Of all Argentine political parties, only the Socialist had mobilized women. While not a formal party, the Liga was the first permanent organization of the right, and therefore the first such entity to recruit females-in Argentina and perhaps in Latin America.25 This role was not totally new for women; the Liga drew upon the heritage of conservative female philanthropists. Nevertheless, the threat of social dissolution and the dictates of its ideology pushed the Liga into actions that no establishinent party had taken before. Yet the mobilization of women also seemed to contradict that ideology, which empha- sized a domestic role for women as against a public role for men. Im- plicitly the Liga would evade this dilemma by calling itself a "moral" and "patriotic" organization and denying political or partisan motives. Fur- thermore, its female members would assume "social housekeeping" du- ties, extensions of those they had traditionally performed in the home. Unlike numerous social housekeepers elsewhere in the hemisphere, however, Liga women were indifferent to the struggle for women's rights.26

annual congresses and pamphlets. Examples of these views include Carles in Liga, Octavo Congreso, pp. 52-53; Liga Patri6tica Argentina, Septirno Congreso Nacionalista (Buenos Aires, 1926), pp. 6o-61; Liga, Catecismito; Liga Patri6tica Argentina, Discursos pronunciados en el acto inaugural y veredicto del Jurado de la Tercera Exposici6n Nacional de Te- jidos y Bordados (Buenos Aires, 1922), pp. 6-7. Also see M. J. Lagos in Liga Patri6tica Ar- gentina, El prograrna de la Liga Patri6tica Argentina y la educacion por el ejemplo (como una consagraci6n del concepto Patria) (Buenos Aires, 1923).

24. Estanislao Zeballos, "Discurso inaugural," Instituto Popular de Conferencias (Bue- nos Aires), 1 (July 8, 1915), p. 23.

25. Women belonged to the Braziliani Integralists, the Mexican Cristeros, and the Chilean Conservative party, but only years after- women had begun to participate in the Liga. More studies on rightist women are needed in order to deter-mine whether there wer-e cases predating the Liga.

26. For examples of social housekeeper-s who wer-e also feminists (such as Jane Addams), see K. Lynn Stoner, "From the Houise to the Streets: The Ctuban Woman's Movement for


Recruitment and Organizational Patterns

In the months following its first meeting, the Liga concentrated its organizing efforts on men, gradually broadening its base of operations from metropolitan Buenos Aires to the entire republic. The precinct self- defense units formed during the Tragic Week expanded into brigades, numbered according to police precinct; the Liga began with brigades in all but two of the forty-five precincts in the capital.27 Civic and professional associations declared their adherence to Liga principles and organized themselves as brigades. During and after the January strike, white guards had arisen in other parts of the nation, particularly where labor unions were active. They, too, joined as the brigades of their locality. Liga authorities also entrusted friends in the interior with the task of raising brigades, or sometimes local landowners or businessmen contacted the Liga and volunteered their services. Feaiful of strikes by landless peons, farmers in the pampas and Mesopotamian region (i.e., between the Pa- rana and Uruguay Rivers) asked the Liga to help them organize brigades, and often the Liga sent recruiters to rural areas of labor strife on its own initiative. Occupational groups, such as teachers, doctors, pilots, and even inventors, formed brigades based on profession. The Liga also claimed to have brigades of "free laborers," not affiliated with unions: taxi-drivers, bakers, stevedores, cigar-makers, telephone operators, peons, and others. Eventually, men's brigades were established in each province and national territory.

While brigades arose around the country, Liga officials perfected the structure of the organization. Under statutes passed at the end of May, the brigades enjoyed a large degree of autonomy but were ultimately responsible to the Junta Central, composed of delegates elected by the brigades, and to the Consejo Ejecutivo, chosen in turn by the Junta Central. The Consejo formulated policy, appointed commissions, coordinated the activities of the brigades, and supervised the organization's finances. The wealthy and prominent men who constituted the Treasury Commission (Comision de Hacienda) solicited funds from businessmen and employers'

Legal Change, 1898-1958" (Ph.D. Diss., Indiana University, 1983), p. 219; Cynthia Jeffress Little, "Moral Reform and Feminism," Journal of Inter-Amnerican Studies and World Af- fairs, 17 (Nov. 1975), 386-397; Ryan, Womanhood in America, pp. 136-150. (I take the term "social housekeeper" from Ryan.) Not all of the women discussed in these works opposed class conflict, however, and even those who did, such as Jane Addams, maintained some sympathies for the labor movement, unlike female Liguistas.

27. Republica Argentina, Policia de la Capital, Orden del dia, 34 (1920), 832-834; Liga Patri6tica Militar, Solemnne homenaje de la Liga Patri6tica Militar de Chile a la Liga Pa- tri6tica Argentina (Santiago, 1922), p. 16. Information on brigade formation was taken firom daily news items in La Prensa and La Fronda, 1919-21. The national press described the Liga's activities extensively, on a day-to-day basis, through the period under study.


associations. The brigades corresponded with the central authorities, in- forming them of local activities and requesting funds, manpower, or inter- cession with the government. Periodically the brigade presidents met with the Junta Central in Buenos Aires and, in turn, received its representatives sent on fact-finding missions to the provinces. In addition, delegates from the brigades gathered at annual congresses to discuss policy, present papers on national problems, and hear reports from Junta members and Liga commissions.28

A microcosm of the national level of the Liga, each brigade had its own elected officers, commissions, and treasury. The most important of these commissions was a paramilitary force, which in the cities was called the "neighborhood defense commission" and in the countryside the "commission in defense of rural labor." The urban paramilitary groups were organized hierarchically, under precinct, barrio, and block chiefs. Less formally structured, the rural commissions consisted of peons led by landowners and foremen.29 The free labor brigades were also organized for the purpose of breaking strikes and repressing workers.

The person largely responsible for this impressive organization was Manuel Carles, a former national deputy (1898-1912). Sympathetic to electoral reform, he had ties to the Radical party, particularly what would become its Anti-personalist wing, although he never joined it. Before the Liga's first elections of April 19i9, Domecq Garcia announced his deci- sion to vacate the presidency in favor of a civilian, and Carles was chosen. Possessing considerable oratorical and administrative skills, as well as wide-ranging contacts among politicians and military officers, Carles presided ably over the Liga until his death in 1946.30

Carles and other members had not overlooked the potential role of women in the first few months of Liga activity. According to the statutes,

28. Liga Patri6tica Argentina, Estatutos (Buenos Aires, 1919), pp. 23-29; Caras y Caretas, May25, 1919.

29. La Fronda, Apr. 11, 1920; Liga Militar, Solemnne homenaje, pp. 33-34; Estatutos de la Liga Patri6tica Argeintina, Gualeguaych6i, n.d., private papers, Julio Irazusta, Las Casua- rinas, Gualeguaychu, Entre Rios, notebook 1. I thank Sefior Irazusta for letting me use his papers. Also see Liga Patri6tica Argentina, Brigada 19, Libro de Actas, 1926-1930, Liga Patri6tica Argentina office, Buenos Aires, for information on the inner workings of brigades.

30. Information on Carl6s was found in Archivo de La Prensa, Buenos Aires, leg. 21037. Alain Rouquie stated in Poder militar y sociedad politica en la Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1981), tranis. by Arturo Iglesias Echegaray, p. 145, that the civil guards and the Liga had "undeniable links" to the Radical party. This is somewhat overstated. While Radicals were active in the civil guards and Liga, conservatives vastly outnumbered them. As long as these groups seemed to oppose only workers, the government accepted them. When the Liga's growing support among the upper sectors and the militar-y seemed to threaten the government, however, the Yrigoyen regime and the UCR began to oppose it. I discuss the rela- tionship between the Radicals and the Liga in more detail in The Argentine Patriotic League and the Forces of Counterrevolution, 1900-1930 (in progress).


Argentine citizens of both sexes were eligible for membership. Indeed, the Asociacion Nacional Pro-Patria de Sefioritas, a patriotic organization active for twenty years, announced its adherence to the Liga in May 1919,

and delegates from this and other women's groups attended Liga meetings. The Liga's independence-day parades on May 24 and July 9, 1919,

included participants from upper-class female charitable and civic groups such as the Asociacion Nacional Pro-Patria, Asociacion de Damas Patri- cias, and Sociedad de Beneficencia. In fact, Carles and these women led the May 24th parade.3'

The leadership demonstrated considerable acumen in its search for a female constituency. Knowing that women were among the most devout of parishioners, Carles and other Liga orators delivered speeches in churches. Carles also addressed upper-class women's groups, urging them to spread the message of God and fatherland.32

In June 1919 the Junta Central invited representatives of women's charitable and civic groups in the capital to join the Liga. Believing that women could not remain indifferent to the task of ending social convul- sions, sixty-five matrons and twelve young women met to create a Liga Patriotica de Sefioras (hereinafter, Sefioras). The organization would be dedicated to nationalist and beneficent ends. At the end of July, a permanent Junta Ejecutiva was elected. The Sefioras' first president was Julia Acevedo de Martinez de Hoz, an activist in many Catholic charitable organizations and the wife of a prominent rancher and Liga member. By early October young women had split away from the Sefioras, forming their own body, the Liga Patriotica de Sefioritas (hereinafter, Sefioritas). More than one hundred attended the first meeting in early November and elected their leaders.33

Women also established another branch of the Liga. In January 1920

an association (gremio) of female primary- and secondary-school teachers founded the Liga Patriotica del Magisterio Argentino (hereinafter, Ma- gisterio), which men later joined. The original proponent of the Magis- terio, Maria Contreras Feliui, teacher and officer of the Asociacion de Damas Patricias, was elected its president. Mostly composed of women,

31. Liga, Estatutos, p. 23; La Prensa, May 13-15, 1919; Caras y Caretas, Apr. 26 aild July26, 1919. See Cynthia Jeffress Little, "The Society of Beneficence in Bueinos Aires, 1823- 1900" (Ph. D. Diss., Temple University, 1980), on this powerftul womeni's organizationi.

32. Critica, Oct. 25, 1946; La Protesta, Apr. 29, 1922 and Apr. 1i, 1923; La Vantguar- dia, Dec. 15, 1921; Bayer, Los vengadores, I, 49; and Brigada 19, Libro de Actas, Apr. 16, 1928, refer to speeches in churches and before female audiences. Also see Discur^so pronzun- ciado ante la Sociedad.

33. Caras y Caretas, July 12, 1919; El Pueblo, June 30, July 1, July 21-22, 1919; La Naci6n, Sept. 2, 1919; La Fronda, Oct. 18 and Nov. 1, 1919; Jorgelina Cano in Liga Patri- 6tica Argentina, Tercer Congreso de Trabajadores (Buenos Aires, 1922), p. 327.


the Comision Directiva was located in Buenos Aires, and it headed brigades of maestras and rnaestros organized by province. The aim of this branch was to spread nationalist ideas in the schools, and the authors of its first manifesto attributed this mission largely to women not sur- prisingly, considering their preponderance in the lower levels of education. Although women continued to serve as Magisterio presidents, the branch's main spokesperson was Justo P. Correa, a high-school professor. This delegation of tasks reflected traditional gender roles: men spoke in public and women did not. The fact that the Magisterio was subordinate to the male Junta Central may have frirther limited women's power within it.34 At any rate, the branch never spread to all the provinces, and its educational mission was assumed by the other women's brigades.

Meanwhile, women had begun to join and constitute brigades, at first affiliating themselves with male brigades. In one such case, that of the city of Mendoza, the first and second vice-presidents and some of the other officers were women.35 Women formed only a handftul of free labor brigades, in comparison to the many founded by men. Brigades of Se- fioras and Sefioritas, based on locality and, of course, marital status, con-

stituted the overwhelming majority of the women's affiliates. The first of these were formed when the Junta Ejecutiva de Sefioras chose representatives to establish brigades in eighteen precincts of the capital. Other brigades were formed on their members' own initiative. Catholic parish groups and other existing organizations declared their adherence to the Liga and transformed themselves into the brigades of their respective precincts, or, in the interior, of their respective cities. In the 192os, small groups of Sefioritas organized not only around localities but also around their main charitable projects, sixteen of the factory schools they established for female workers. In other cases, male brigade leaders suggested to women of the same precinct or town that they form sister organizations. Sometimes female officials in Buenos Aires urged male brigade presidents to establish female auxiliaries in their localities.36 Liguistas of both sexes, therefore, collaborated in the formation of the women's brigades.

While the Magisterio branch and the female brigades of free laborers were responsible to the male junta, the Sefioras and Senioritas each were governed by their own ruling bodies, in theory largely autonomous from

34. La Prensa, Jan. 12 and 31, 1920.

35. La Fronda, Aug. lo, 1920.

36. Information on brigade for-mation was taken from the daily press. Examples iinelude La Vo.z del Interior- (C6rdoba), Oct. 23, 1919; Los Principios (C6rdoba), Apr. 29, 1919; El Pueblo, Aug. 10-12, 1919; La Fronda, Aug. 28, 1920; La Prensa, Feb. 2 and 8, 1920; La Naci6n, Nov. 13, 1919 and May 19, 1921.


the male: the Junta Ejecutiva de Sefioras and the Comision Central de Sefioritas, respectively. Nevertheless, although the lines of command were never explicitly outlined, women clearly were subordinate to the Liga president. As if to underline this fact, Carles usually appeared at important women's meetings, elections, and public events. Female Liguistas regularly elected their own brigade and national officers, just as their male counterparts did. Ironically, Carles opposed women's suffrage in the wider political arena, and he never, to my knowledge, explained why he thought it permissible for women to vote within the Liga but not outside it. 37 The internal organization of the women's national authorities and brigades. also resembled that of the men, except that the women did not have paramilitary commissions.

There were many differences between the male and female brigades. The most obvious was that the men, unlike the women, did not organize themselves on the basis of marital status. This difference may simply reflect the fact that married and single women were commonly distinguished from each other by nomenclature and role, and no comparable distinction was made between married men and bachelors in society. Fur- thermore, while men formed over a dozen professional brigades, women established only those of the Magisterio. Women as yet had barely pene- trated professions other than primary and secondary education, and the small number with university degrees preferred feminism and socialism to the Liga. Also, since fewer women than men participated in the labor movement, it is not surprising that male and female Liga authorities found little reason to recruit "free laborers" among women. There were, however, a few exceptions. For example, female department-store em- ployees in Buenos Aires happened to strike in 1919, and, significantly, a brigade for that group was established at the same time as the labor conflict. 38

Since the Liga rarely released membership statistics, the size of the organization is difficult to judge. In May 1919 a United States diplomat estimated that there were 52,000 members.39 Three years later the Liga announced that there were 1,527 brigades; by 1927 it claimed 1,200 bri-

37. Carles, "El ferminismo en la Repu6blica Argentina," in Miguel J. Font, ed., La inujer. Encuesta feminista argentina. Hacia la formaci6n de una liga ferninista sudamitericana (Buenios Aires, 1921), p. 163.

38. El Puteblo, Aug. 15, 1919. The female Magisterio brigade in Mendoza also arose at the time of a teacher's strike; see La Naci6n, Aug. 13, 1920.

39. Ambassador Frederick J. Stimsoni to Secretar-y of State, Buenlos Air-es, May 8, 1919, despatch no. 81o, U.S. Department of State, Records of the Departmenit of State Relatiing to the Initernal Affairs of Argentina, 1g9o-1929, National Archives Microfilm Copy M5i4, 835.00/171 (hereinafter, U.S. Dept. of State, File No.).


gades and 6oo,ooo registered members.4" Even if one takes inactive sup- porters into account, these figures are clearly exaggerated. A more ac- curate measure of Liga strength is the number of brigades regularly mentioned in the press and represented in the annual congresses, along with the officers elected by each. Not counting the groups of Sefioritas organized around schools, 41 women's brigades and 550 men's brigades fall into this category. Brigades elected anywhere from seven to forty-one officers each. Assuming an average of twenty officers per brigade, one may estimate that the Liga's core consisted of about 820 female and n ,ooo male activists throughout its first decade of existence. That men vastly outnumbered women is not surprising, given the novelty of mobilizing women and another reason to be discussed below.

The Liga's rank and file, however, alternately expanded and shrank according to the perceived gravity of the threat from workers. When necessary, the militant core was prepared to draft additional persons for the cause. This was particularly true of the male brigades. As one member explained, there was a "visible" and an "invisible" Liga.4' The invisible Liga appeared only during labor disturbances, sometimes creating new brigades, which dissolved after quelling workers' militancy. In this manner, hundreds of men's units arose and then faded. The women's sector, in contrast, was more stable, as the problems it tackled did not readily disappear.

The male sector also differed from the female in regional strength. Men's brigades were heavily concentrated in areas of bitter labor strife essential to the export economy: the cereal zone, the littoral ports, the northern lowlands and quebracho forests, and Patagonia. Considering its share of the national population, the Andean region was underrepre- sented, especially Mendoza and Tucumarn, but here the workers were not, in general, as active as elsewhere. Through debt peonage, police vig- ilance, and traditional paternalism, plantation and sugar-factory owners in Tucumain managed to control the labor force. The lack of employment op-

40. Liga Militar, Solemne homenaje, p. 18; Liga, Octavo Congreso, p. 409. Even the Brigada 19, Libro de Actas, 1926-1930 did not state the number of brigade members. Its entry for May 18, 1927, however, did list 15 officers. The C6rdoba brigades of men and of Sefioras had 275 and 550 members, respectively, according to La Voz del Interior, Oct. 23-26, 1919, but it is not clear whether these brigades were typical. Normally the press listed only brigade officers, not members. According to La Naci6n, May 9, 1921, there were forty-five women's brigades, but I could confirm the existence of only forty-one. My esti- mates may be low; Bayer, in "Jacinto Arauz," p. 42, claimed that there were about i,ooo brigades, but he did not indicate sources. Whether one accepts the estimate of almost 12,000 activists or the Liga's figure of hundreds of thousands, these numbers compare very favorably to, for example, the Socialist party membership of 8,339 in 1921. See Walter, So- cialist Party, p. 173.

41. Liga Militar, Solemne homenaje, pp. 19-20.


portunities in the depressed northwest further limited unionization. The prevalence of small- and medium-sized landholdings and possibilities for upward mobility helped curb rural labor conflicts in Mendoza. Slightly over half of the male brigades were rural, headquartered in ranches, sugar and tannin mills, railroad junctions, and towns with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants. This reflected the fact that many of the postwar era's major strikes took place in the countryside.42

In contrast, the female brigades were urban. Half were located in the capital and another 17 percent in cities and towns of Buenos Aires Prov- ince. Aside from these areas, only the relatively urbanized provinces of Mendoza and Cordoba had more than one brigade apiece, and only four were located in rural areas. Like their male counterparts, female Liguis- tas were found where the need for their services was the greatest: cities with large concentrations of male and female workers, where the upper classes could not ignore the glaring problems of poverty and family in- stability. This was also where most female philanthropies already existed. Although women had far fewer brigades than men, their location gave them a greater visibility in the press than their numbers or gender might have suggested. Generally the men preferred to keep their repressive activities "invisible," although this was not always possible.

Social Backgrounds and Motives

Men and women of the Liga differed somewhat in social background. The entire Junta de Sefioras and 97 percent of the Comision Central de Sefioritas from 1920 to 1928 belonged to the upper class, in contrast to 70 percent of a sample of Junta Central and Consejo Ejecutivo members.43 Male leaders were of higher social standing than brigade members: only i8 percent of male brigade delegates to the congresses belonged to the

42. I classified all brigades located in cabeceras as urbani. Some of these governmental seats, however, had fewer than 5,000 inhabitants. Therefore, more brigades were located in the countryside than the figure in the text suggests. On Mendoza anld Tucuiia'n, see Donna J. Guy, "The Rural Working Class in Nineteentlh-Century Argentina: Forced Planitation Labor in Tucuman," Latin American Research Review, 13:1 (1978), 135-157; William J. Fleming, "The Cultural Determinants of Entrepreneurship and Economic Development: A Case Study of Mendoza Province, Argentina, 1861-1914," Joutrnal of Economic History, 39 (Mar. 1979), 222.

43. I classified men as upper-class if they were listed in a prestigious social register or if they belonged to one or more of the following: Jockey Club, Sociedad Rural Argentina or local rural association, Circulo de Armas. The sample consisted of 217 Liguistas: 146 brigade delegates to the annual congresses from 1920 to 1928, and 71 members of the Junta Central and Consejo Ejecutivo for these years. I classified women as upper-class if they belonged to a prestigious philanthropic group, were listed in a social register, or were the wives or daughters of upper-class men. Forty-five women participated in the Junta de Sefioras and seventy-one in the Comisi6n Central de Sefioritas during these years. I also checked my


TABLE I: Male brigades, 1919-28

Provincial Population as

Location Percentage Percentage of (Province or Number of of Total National Territory) Brigades Brigades Population, 1920*

Buenos Aires 165 30.0 26.8 Patagonia* * 75 13.6 1.6 Federal Capital 61 11.1 19.4 Santa Fe 55 10.0 11.6 Entre Rios 51 9.3 5.3 C6rdoba 40 7.3 9.3 Corrientes 17 3.1 4.1 La Pampa 14 2.5 1.4 Santiago del Estero 10 1.8 3.1 Chaco 7 1.3 1.1 Misiones 5 0.9 0.8 San Juan 5 0.9 1.5 San Luis 5 0.9 1.4 Mendoza 4 0.7 3.6 Catamarca 4 0.7 1.2 Salta 3 0.5 1.7 La Rioja 3 0.5 0.9 Tucuman 2 0.4 3.9 Jujuy 1 0.2 1.0 Formosa 1 0.2 0.3 Unclassifiable 22 4.0

550 99.9 99.6

* Source: Vazquez-Presedo, Estadisticas, II, 43-45 * * I have added up all the Patagonian brigades because many operated across provin-

cial and territorial lines.

TABLE II: Male brigades, 1919-28, by region

Regional Population as

Percentage Percentage of Number of of Total National

Region Brigades Brigades Popuilationi, 1920*

Pampas 279 50.7 50.4 Federal Capital 61 11.1 19.4 Andean 22 4.0 13.8 Northern lowlands

and Mesopotamia 91 16.5 14.8 Patagonia 75 13.6 1.6 Unclassifiable 22 4.0

550 99.9 100.0

* Source: Vazquez-Presedo, Estadisticas, II, 43-45 Percentages in Tables I and II may not add up to 100, because of rounding procedure.

LIGA PATRIOTICA ARGENTINA, 1919--28 249

TABLE III: Women's brigades (Sefioras and Sefioritas), 1919-28*

Location (Province or Percentage Territory) Number of Total

Federal Capital 20 48.8 Buenos Aires 7 17.1 C6rdoba 4 9.8 Mendoza 3 7.3 Entre Rios 1 2.4 Santa Fe 1 2.4 Santiago del Estero 1 2.4 Tucuinal1 1 2.4 Chaco 1 2.4 Tierra del Fuego 1 2.4 Catamarca 1 2.4

41 99.8

*The groups of Sefioritas organized around factory schools are nlot included. The percentage does not add up to 100 because of roundiing procedure.

upper class. Most brigade members seem to have come from the middle sectors. Women did not conform to this pattern, except for the Magis- terio. According to the Liga and other observers, female brigade members were of "the highest lineage." 44 Both female leaders and rank and file were more aristocratic than their male counterparts.

As is common in Latin American politics, family networks helped determine affiliation to the Liga, particularly in the case of women. Thirty-six percent of the Junta de Sefioras and 23 percent of the Comision Central de Sefioritas were closely related to men in the Liga. At least 40 percent of the Junta and an overwhelming 86 percent of the Comision were closely related to other Liga women. The male authorities, however, drew upoil

designiations (of both sexes) by showing the lists of namiies to two prominienit Ar-genitinie scholars, N6stor Tomas Auza and Jose Luis de Imaz, autlhor of Lo clase aita de Buenios Aires (Buenos Aires, 1962), and I thank them for their help. The most important sources were Archivo de La Prensa; Album lde oro; Libro de Oro (Buenos Aires, 1911, 1923, 1936, 1943 eds.); Carlos Calvo, Nobiliario del antiguo virreynato del Rio de la Plata, 6 vols. (Buenos Aires, 1936-43); Jockey Club, N6mina de los socios (Buenos Aires, 1926 and 1943 eds.); "N6mina de socios," Anales de la Sociedad Rural Argentinra, 52 (Feb. 1918), 1 i6-134; So- ciedad Rural Argentina, N6mina de socios (Buenos Aires, 1938 and 1962 eds.). For a comil- plete list of sources, see McGee, "Female Activists," n. 43, and "Counterrevolultion," pp. 349-351. I found only fiagmentary evidence oni the social backgrounlds of rank-anld-file members in the press and Liga publications. See La Frotnda, Apr. ii, 1920; Liga Patii6tica Argentina, Primero de Mayo Argentino. Connemoraci6n del prontunlciamttentto de Urquiza en Entre Rios (Buenos Aires, 1921), p. 75; identifications of members in Brigada 19, Libro de Actas.

44. La Voz del Interior, Oct. 24, 1919. Also see La Fronda, Nov. 1, 1919.


a wider group than did the female: only 17 percent of the Junta Central and Consejo Ejecutivo were closely related to other male Liguistas. Simi- larly, only 8 percent were closely related to members of the Junta de Sefioras and io percent to those of the Comision. Female Liguistas came from a smaller, more cohesive group than the male.45

These patterns reflected differences between men's and women's socialization. The figures above suggest that male Liguistas, usually hus- bands, may have influenced the Sefioras as much as their female kin, yet women's relationships exercised the decisive influence on Sefioritas. Young society women were largely secluded from men other than close relatives, and in general they were discouraged from public activities. They developed ties with female relatives and classmates at elite Catholic schools. Frequent visiting and, after marriage, contact through charity work bolstered these friendships.46 Indeed, 58 percent of the Sefioras studied had actively participated in philanthropic and civic associations, whose memberships overlapped. These kinship and associational networks nourished the Liga, yet they were narrowly upper-class. By re- cruiting exclusively among these women, male and female leaders drew upon their rich organizational experience but limited the breadth and size of the female ranks.

Men enjoyed greater opportunities to broaden their networks than women, beginning in the universities and continuing throughout life. Many Liga men were acquainted with each other through politics; about a third of the central authorities were active in parties opposed to the Radi- cal government. Another third belonged to the powerful Sociedad Rural Argentina or an affiliated rural association, while 48 percent were members of the prestigious Jockey Club. Others knew each other through their contact with the military. Seventeen percent of the central authorities had served as officers, and a few others, including Carles, taught in military schools or belonged to military clubs.

Despite these differences, the principal motive behind male and female participation was the same: to preserve the class hierarchy. The social backgrounds of Liguistas, the stated goals, the circumstances surrounding the creation of the group, and the activities of the "invisible" Liga all prove this point. In the Argentine context, however, female mem-

45. The most important sources for tracing family ties were Calvo, Nobiliario, and social registers such as Libro de Oro. "Close relationships" include parents, children, siblings, spouses, aunts and uncles, nieces and nephews, grandparents, grandchildren, first cousins, and brothers- and sisters-in-law.

46. Two memoirs were valuable sources for the socialization of upper-class women: Ce- lina de Arenaza, Sin memoria (Buenos Aires, 1980); and Carmen Peers de Perkins, Eramos j6venes el siglo y yo (Buenos Aires, 1969). Little information exists on the upbringing of middle-class women in this period.


bership in the Liga was unique and merits additional explanation. The founders of the Cordoba women's brigade echoed this aim when they declared that "the moment had arrived for the Argentine woman to incorpo- rate herself into the movement of defense against the designs of demoli- tion."47 In addition, one could say that female (and male) Liguistas' concern for the state of the family among the poor led them to join the Liga, yet this preoccupation was also tied to the issue of social stability. Nevertheless, women's networks and prior experience with social welfare projects constituted a secondary motive for participating in the Liga, which they regarded as another benevolent institution. Another reason for their activity in the Liga was that the male leaders' recruitment drives among women gave them a sense of importance. Finally, the Liga's emphasis on home and motherhood was appealing because it confirmed women's own traditional roles.

Activities

In keeping with their roles as mothers and philanthropists, Liga women were responsible for strengthening and "argentinizing" (argenti- nizar) working-class families, with the object of engendering social peace. Brigades of Sefioritas and the Magisterio carried out this task mainly through education. The teachers urged the hiring of native-born instruc- tors in the public schools and the spread of nationalist ideas through the classroom. The Sefioritas concentrated on influencing female workers through tuition-free schools in factories and workshops, beginning in July 1920. One reason for creating the schools was moralistic. Jorgelina Cano, president of the Comision Central, argued that they would serve as a wholesome alternative to bars or "sensual" tango schools, places that women frequented after work.48

The schools served purposes other than the moral. Although the Liga theoretically opposed women's work outside the home, its members recognized that many households depended on this source of income. Fur- thermore, they believed that teaching mothers the principles of nutrition and hygiene would improve the health of impoverished families. There- fore, another goal of the schools was to enhance working women's capaci- ties as wage-earners and housewives. In this regard, the schools offered

47. La Voz del Interior, Oct. 23, 1919. For a similar statement of pturpose, see La Prensa, May25, 1919.

48. Comisi6n de Sefioritas de la Liga Patri6tica Argentina, Sus escuelas de obreras en lasfdbricas (Buenos Aires, 1922), pp. 1-2; La Fronda, July 2, 1920; Marcela Bosch in Liga Patri6tica Argentina, Primer Congreso de Trabajadores (Buenos Aires, 1920), pp. 10I- 105; Comisi6n Central de Sefioritas, Memoria de cliez escuelas obreras, 1924-mnayo-1925 (Buenos Aires, 1925), pp. 9, 44-50.

252 HIIAHR I MAY I SANDRA F. MCGEE

instruction in reading, writing, arithmetic, typing, sewing, cooking, and other domestic and vocational skills.

The most important purpose was, however, "to transform the hatred of the working class into the friendship of the workers for their patrones and benefactors," as one Liguista put it.49 To further this end, pupils were taught Argentine civics and such "Argentine values" as piety, obedience, punctuality, deference toward one's betters, love of country and work, and the "virtue of contentment," values conducive to the creation of a pliant labor force. The singing of patriotic anthems reinforced the ideological messages of these lessons. Ironically, the daily La Nacio6n claimed that the schools in no way manifested any class interest, yet added that by reaffirming "the conservative feminine sense," they would give female workers "a social vision of the real woman, not of the red lady,"50 meaning socialist feminists. As the "real woman" was religious, teaching the cate- chism became an integral part of the Liga curriculum. Carles considered religious training for women particularly important, not only because it encouraged obedience to authority, but because he thought it neutralized feminism.5' Lest anyone fear that education would encourage rebellious- ness, one student assured a Liga congress that the schools' aims were limited to teaching women to be conscientious mothers and to hate disorder.52

The Liga hoped that pupils would disseminate their knowledge at home and raise their first-generation children to follow Argentine values. Immigrant women would teach their families to ignore subversive doctrines, attend church, work diligently, and rise throuigh the system. In this manner, class conflict would be resolved largely through the efforts of mothers. The Sefioritas seemed to assume that the female proletariat was inherently susceptible to their message, despite its participation in labor conflicts. It is difficult to determine whether their assumption proved ac- curate. By 1927 the Liga claimed to have taught about io,ooo women; more than twenty years later it announced that about fifty schools were still in operation.53 Another possible measure of success was the fact that male workers, whom the Liga considered more prone to leftism than women, gradually joined the student body. Their numbers, however, re- mained small.

The Sefioritas served as school administrators rather than teachers.

49. Juan de Dios Gallegos in Liga Militar, Solemnzle homiienaje, p. i8. 50. La Naci6n, July 5, 1920.

51. Octavo Congreso, p. 57. 52. Carmen Lasse in S6ptino Congreso, p. 435. 53. Comisi6n Central de Sefioritas, Meniioria, 1927-a ayo-1928 (Btuenos Aires, 1928);

Brigada 19 y 21, La verdad de la Liga Patri6tica Argentina (Buenios Aires, 1950), p. II. I found mentioni of niineteen factory schools by 1927, in the press and Liga publicationis. Ani interview with Maria Ltujain Baylac de Eizagtuirre, formiier head of social services in the GCrafa Factory, Butenos Aires, July 6, 1981, confirmed the existence of schools in that workplace anid others.


They solicited space and equipment from management, hired the teachers, inspected the operations, designed the curriculum, and collected funds and books. Aside from administering the factory schools, which proved to be the single most important Liga social project, the Sefioritas also performed other services. Their precinct brigades sometimes served as adjuncts to the male brigades, organizing their funld-raising drives and other events. The Sefioritas donated textbooks to poor children and opened lending libraries and homes for juvenile delinquents.

Meanwhile the Sefioras also established an array of social projects. They created free neighborhood schools and kindergartens, maternity hospitals, day-care centers for children of working mothers, free medical facilities, and other services for underprivileged families. They sponsored free entertainment in working-class areas, always with a nationalistic slant, such as films on Argentine themes. Organizing celebrations of national holidays and traditions, such as folk dances (other than the tango), salutes to the flag and armed forces, and typical meals was another activity. Sometimes they solicited contributions for these functions in the streets. Perhaps their best-known venture was the annual exposition and sale of textiles produced by Indian women in cottage industries, held from 1920 at least through the early 1930S. These expositions had several purposes: to stimulate Argentine industry and the spirit of free enterprise among Indians; to help an impoverished and truly "national" group; to honor the ability of traditional craftswomen; and to help women whose participation in the labor market had not uprooted them from their homes.54

Seemingly contradicting their sanctioned role, female Liguistas carried out many activities in public view. Women organized events and appeared in parades and annual congresses, where they occasionally gave speeches. The presidents of the Sefioras and Sefioritas even participated in the executive committees of these congresses. Nevertheless, in keeping with the wife's role as helpmate, some of the women's public functions, such as fund-raising, were designed to help male brigades. Fur- thermore, most of their projects were aimed at female workers and their families and concerned health, educational, religious, and other matters traditionally in the woman's sphere of duty. Even the leaders' speeches focused on specific remedies for such issues, or on the "unique" feminine qualities that enabled Liga women to join men in the struggle against social disorder.55 Never did they voice any feminist sympathies. Female Liguistas only barely trespassed into the male sphere of public life.

54. Hortensia Berdier in Discursos pronunciados, pp. 1-2. Brigade activities of Senio- ritas, Sefioras, the Magisterio, and men are discussed extensively in the press.

55. For example, see Jorgelina Cano in Tercer Congreso, pp. 327-328. In Supermnadre: Women in Politics in Latin America (Austin, 1979), Elsa M. Chaney noted how women in

254 HAHR M MAY I SANDRA F. MCGEE

Men carried out the not-quite-invisible repressioni of labor. Througlh- out the nation, the Liga attacked unlionls and attempted to reinistate 'Ar- gentine values" in labor-management relations. In the taxicab drivers' strike in Buenos Aires of May 1921, for example, armed Liguistas invaded union headquarters, killing two drivers and forcing others to kneel and sing the national anthem.5' During the same year, Liga brigades in Entre Rios fired upon peacef-ul workers' demonstrationis, destroyed Socialist party offices, and assaulted individual militants in the streets. At harvest time in the pampas, Liga members posted themselves at railroad stations and prevented suspicious characters from getting off the trains, while rural commissions patrolled the countryside.

Supported finanicially and logistically by the Asociaci6n Nacional del Trabajo, a powerful employers' group, the Liga organiized its brigades of free laborers in strike-prone industries and rural areas. Theoretically these brigades were supposed to provide their members with the same economic benefits as unions, without "subjugating" them to the ideological demands of leftist labor federations. In practice, lhowever, the workers' brigades were merely the armies of businessmieni and landowniers used againlst unionl foes. Sometimiies workers whose unlionls had been simiaslhed by employers, the Liga, or official forces wer-e compelled to join the raniks of free labor. This, for example, took place in Patagonia, after other brigades supplied and assisted the army in its massacre of strikers in 1921. It was common for Liga landowniers to deny jobs to harvest workeris unless they joined the organization and could show their membership cards. The workers' brigades also included agenits provocateurs hired by management to fomen-t strife between laborers and to spy on uInlionl mllemllbers.58

As a result of repression and economic recovery, the labor movemient diminished in numbers and activism. Thlus, after 1922 Liga men joined

p)iblic life have uisuially been conicerined with social welfare, pnblic milor-alit, ainid otier matter-s that pariallel womilen's roles in the famiily.

Femiiinists also extolled the -nniqne" qutalities of womiiein at this timie. Tlheir social back- grounnds, labor syml-pathies, anid opinlionls on1 female rights, however, distin-gtnislhecl tlhe from Liga woimen. In this regard, Eva Per6n votild occnpv a miliddle positionl betweeni Liga "social lhotisekeepers" anid socialist feminiiiists. Shle, too, sav lher-self as the "mnother" of Ar- gentina, aniid wlhile slhe favored female suffrage anid other r-iglits, slhe devoted little attenitionl to such isstnes anid vieNved feminisin coniteimpttiotuslv. See Chanev, Supemrandre, p. 2a, anid Niclholas Fr-aser- anid Marvsa Navxarro, Eca Per-on (New York, 198o), p 10o.

56. Unisigined entry, Btuenios Aires, May 2s5 1921, U.S. l)ept. of State, 835.oo/326G

57. Oni the evenits in Enitre Rfos, see Liga, Pm mrietro de Alamlo; Liga Patri6tica Ar-genltinia, Humnanitarismno pr'ictico. La Liga Patriotica Amgetiila enl Gmalcgmmamicimlim (Btnenios Aires, 1921); La Vanguardia, Feb. 15-28 anid Mav-Jtnlv 1921; Estattitos dle la Liga, Gtialegtiavelich.

58. Oni Patagoniia, see Bayer, Los vcen gado-es; anid Liga Patiri6tica Ar-genitinia, El ctulto (lc la Patagomsia. Stmcesos de Santa Crtmz (Btuenios Aiies, 1922). La Protesta, jtunie 14, 1922, offered a good descr-iptioni of a fiee workei s' b1 igade. Agenlts provocateurs wvere descrlibed in La Vanguarcdia, Aug. 24, 1920.


their correligionarias, abandoning tactics of confrontation for those of social peace. Although male brigades set up their own social projects, often financed by the proceeds of women's fund-raising efforts, these charitable works rarely assumed the scope of the women's. Men directed more attention to publicity and lobbying campaigns, aimed primarily at influen- tial male leaders and secondarily at the public. As part of these efforts, male Liguistas routinely delivered speeches, put up posters, and dis- tributed notices of their activities to the press. Local brigades and the central authorities interceded with provincial and national governments, alerting them to educational, economic, security, and other needs.59 Men's and women's peaceful activities, then, were aimed at different groups and carried out in different arenas.

Gender roles within the Liga also differed in another respect. The Sefioritas' factory schools and other women's projects were designed to improve the workers' lot in limited, practical ways, without increasing the autonomy of workers. The Liga recognized, however, that broader means were necessary to alleviate the misery of the poor while preserving the essentials of the capitalist system. Carles and other male leaders assumed the task of analyzing national problems and formulating an ideological alternative to both leftism and laissez-faire capitalism. In the congresses and other important meetings, male Liguistas and guest speakers discussed such possible measures as social security, public housing, a national labor code, industrialization policy, and even limited land reform. No clear consensus on these ideas emerged within the organization, and, partly for this reason, the Liga had little effect on national legislation in the 1920S. There was also no urgent need to adopt the reforms enter- tained by the Liga because the labor movement had declined and pros- perity had (temporarily) returned. Nevertheless, the Liga left a heritage of a "third way," which would influence future politicians such as Manuel Fresco, a Liga member, and perhaps Juan Peron.'; At any rate, this dis- cussion demonstrates another division of labor within the Liga: the men served as ideologues, while the women were the practical reformers. In this respect the Liga also prefigured the division of labor between Juan and Eva Per6n, although Eva had a greater role in speechmaking, propa-

59. For examples of these activities, see Brigada 19 y 21, La verdad, pp. 17-i8; La Fronda, Nov. 21, 1919; Brigada 19, Libro de Actas, May i8, 1927 and Aug. 1, 1927.

6o. No evidence directly links Per6n and the Liga, but Carl6s or other Liguistas could have been his teachers at military school, and he probably knew other officers who belonged to the organization. Some of his ideas on capitalism, the left, and the recruitment of women were similar- to those of the Liga. On Fresco, see Ronald Dolkart, "Manuel A. Fresco, Gov- ernor of the Province of Buenos Aires, 1936-1940: A Study of the Argentine Right and its Responses to Economic and Social Change" (Ph.D. Diss., U.C.L.A., 1969). The deepening par-tisan conflict in Congress during this decade would have also made it difficult, if not im- possible, to accomplish substantive refor-ms.


ganda, and labor policy than female Liguistas, and she was much more of a compafiera to the poor than they were.

Conclusion

The Liga's failure to unite behind and implement a coherent set of proposals did not overshadow its successes. Its multiple responses to the leftist threat reflected its ability to attract both sexes. Friendly and hostile observers alike recognized its unique appeal for women. When the Sefno- ritas held their organizational meeting, Carles proudly announced that for the first time in Argentine history, young women had dedicated themselves to the advancement of the fatherland.62 Socialist women might well have disputed this claim, but Carles did not consider them to be true na- tionalists. The editors of the left-of-center Cordoba newspaper, La Voz del Interior, commented extensively on the local Senioras' brigade. They found it difficult to believe that women had created a group and had writ- ten manifestos; surely men were behind these actions. Only rarely were women, capable of exercising such strong feelings. Weak, tame, and in- genuous, they had traditionally been manipulated by the church, and now the Liga was taking over that role.63

In contrast to this "progressive" publication, Liga men did not conde- scend to their female counterparts, at least not as obviously. In the congress of 1925, for example, Carles singled out the Sefioritas for special commendation, calling them "the saintly women of the Republic who serve as models of the true Argentine civilization." 64 The male leadership believed that the collaboration of women rounded out the social mission of the Liga.6 Clearly they valued the importance of the feminine contri- bution; otherwise, there would have been no reason to recruit women.

Whether Liga men organized and controlled female members, as the opposition claimed, is a more complex question. Both men and women created female brigades; that women exercised no comparable role in organizing male brigades is understandable, considering that men had entered the Liga before most women. While women followed Carles's

6i. According to Elsa M. Chaney in "The Mobilization of Women in Allende's Chile," in Jane S. Jaquette, ed., Woment in Politics (New York, r974), Latin American women in government and politics have leaned towar-d the task of practical reform rather than concep- tualization. On Eva Per6n's role and image, see Fraser and Navarro, Eva Per6n, and J. M. Taylor, Eva Per6n: The Myths of a Woman (Chicago, 1979).

62. La Fronda, Nov. 1, 1919. 63. Oct. 24, 1919. Also see La Protesta, Oct. 29, 19L9, for similar- sentiments. 64. Liga Patri6tica Argentina, Sexto Congreso Nacionalista de Trabajadores (Buenos

Aires, 1925), p. 46. Chaney in "Mobilization of Women" noted that Allende's government and the leftist press also expressed condescending views of women.

65. Justo P. Correa in La Capital (Rosario), Jan. 17, 1921.

LIGA PATRIOTICA ARGENTINA, 1919-2-8 257

leadership and the geneiral policies set by imale authlorities, thev con-- trolled their own welfare programs. Despite the organization's antifemi- nist views, its female mem--bers gained valuable experience in adminiist-a- tion, voting, holding meetings, and other activities related to politics more thani twenty years before Argentine wom-ieni achieved suffrage r-ights. Finally, if one simply assumes that male Liguistas "used" womnen, one ig- nores the many compelling reasons why the latter joined the organization. Men heacded the Liga, but its female mnembers wer-e far friom passive.

In at least one sense, however, the m-iale leaders did manipu-late women. The Liga issued many photographs to the press, aind women appeared much more frequently in them than the size of their membership would have warranted. A favorite outlet for these pictures was the imlass- circulation magazine Caras 1 Caretas. One of their purposes was to present female Liguistas as a model of womanhood to be imitated by upwardlv mobile women, similar to the intent of the factory schools. Another, more important fiunction related to the iml-age of the Liga that niale leaders wished to cultivate. The entire ideological spectrum revered womenl as mothers and peacemakers, and tbe Liga took advantage of this view. Photo- graphs of women inaugurating schools or sitting among men at meetings commi-unicated the more peaceful and benevolent values of the organization. At the same time, they helped camouflage those repressive acts that detracted from its respectability.66 In an ironic reversal of roles, women 's heightened visibility helped mask the "invisible" male ranks. The Liga's attempt to cover its violent side, however, was not very successful, aiil hiistorians have since overlooked the "visible" women.

The Liga's manipulation of the female mystique demonstrates that one should not overestimate women's autonomy in the group. Despite the fact that their activities were politically oriented, they did not directly challenge the prevalent definition of gender roles. In conformity with tradition and prior experience, Liga women, although few in number, generally served as the philanthropists and behind-the-scenes organizers, while the men were the combatants, publicists, lobbyists, and ideologues.The dual nature of the Liga suppressive and cooptative, invisible and visible-relied upon the participationi of men and women aiil a sexual division of labor.

The Liga's programs and recruitment of both sexes ultiml-ately proved attractive to groups other than the upper class, wh7ose interests they were originally designed to protect. National governmenits before the 1940S did not implement social welfare reforms because they did not view the small

66. Plhotographs were founi-d in Archivo Grhfico, Ar-clhivo Gen-er-al de la Naci6n, Buenos Aires. I thank Robert Roten-beirg for hiis ideas oni political symbolism.


and divided labor movement as a threat. Partly for the same reason, na- tionalists between the late 1920S and early 1940s, including Liguistas, directed most of their opposition to liberal democracy and economic de- pendency rather than labor. Women continued to join some rightist organizations, such as the Legion Civica Argentina, the largest one of the early 1930s, but the shift in emphasis robbed their tasks of significance. By the 1940s, however, industrial growth, rural-urban migration, and re- newed labor militancy created the conditions for a revival of Liga-style nationalism-this time with a vastly different leadership and social base. Juan and Eva Peron helped fulfill working-class economic aspirations and mobilized male and female laborers, thus incorporating them into the given order, while at the same time they repressed leftist and indepen- dent unions. In effect they carried out much of the Liga's program, although they inspired a greater sense of power and self-esteem in the masses than the Liga had ever intended, and they took political control away from the elite. These two changes would make this comparison odious to Liga members and Peronists alike.67 Ironically, as a result of dec- ades of ruling-class intransigence, what was initially an antirevolutionary program appeared revolutionary when put into practice.

67. Two former Liga women I interviewed, anid Monsignor Miguiel de Andrea, a Li- guista, for example, opposed Peronism, and uindoubtedly many other Liga member-s did as well. The interviews were with Marta Ezctirra, Buenos Aires, Julyv6, 1981, anid Elsa Meyer Pellegrini de LaFranco, Buenos Aires, Jully 17, 1981.

In a similar argument, Solberg (Im7nigration and Nationalismi, p. 171) nioted that Per6n appropriated the Argentinie elite's traditional tool, cultural niationalismll, to destr-oy its imo- nopoly of power.

mcgee-the visible and invisible liga patriótica argentina

Documents