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Mega-projects: Dealing with PitfallsHugo Priemus aa Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management , OTB ResearchInstitute for the Built Environment, Delft University ofTechnology , Delft, The NetherlandsPublished online: 07 Jun 2010.

To cite this article: Hugo Priemus (2010) Mega-projects: Dealing with Pitfalls, European PlanningStudies, 18:7, 1023-1039

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Mega-projects: Dealing with Pitfalls

HUGO PRIEMUS

Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management, OTB Research Institute for the Built Environment, Delft

University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands

(Received March 2008; accepted March 2009)

ABSTRACT This paper is about the many pitfalls in the decision-making process on mega-projects,and how to deal with them. I present first a summary of the pitfalls, derived from hands-on experienceand recent publications on large-scale projects in transport infrastructure. Then I explain howexperts and the author of this contribution think these pitfalls should be tackled. Finally, Iformulate some conclusions and recommendations. The basic idea behind the recommendations isthat the decision-making process on mega-projects could be defined as a learning process, inwhich many stakeholders are involved. As early as possible alternatives have to be consideredand options have to be maintained to guarantee flexibility, which enables the initiators to copewith changing markets, a changing political landscape, new technologies and new insights.Although not an exhaustive picture of all potential pitfalls and remedies is presented, I expectthat the presentation adds to the knowledge on mega-projects and will assist an adaptivedecision-making processes.

1. Introduction

Mega-projects cast a powerful magnetic spell on ambitious politicians. The thought of

going down in history as the person who had the vision to start and perhaps even

realize a mega-project is both tantalizing and irresistible. Many politicians will not have

the good fortune to do both, because several decades are likely to elapse between the

initial proposal, the decision to realize and the handover.

Recently, research and management practices have exposed other dimensions. Studies

by Short and Kopp (2005), Altshuler and Luberoff (2003), Flyvbjerg et al. (2003), Pickrell

(1992), Wachs (1989, 1990) and many others have revealed that mega-projects mostly do

not generate the political success that they should because so many things go wrong along

the way. Hall (1981) even uses the expression “great planning disasters”. A lot has been

written about the fact that, initially, the costs are often grossly underestimated and the

(transport) benefits grossly overestimated. The result is usually a scenario of the “survival

of the unfittest” (Flyvbjerg, 2007): in other words, the project with the most underestimated

Correspondence Address: Hugo Priemus, Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management, OTB Research

Institute for the Built Environment, Delft University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands. Email: h.priemus@

tudelft.nl

European Planning Studies Vol. 18, No. 7, July 2010

ISSN 0965-4313 Print/ISSN 1469-5944 Online/10/071023–17 # 2010 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/09654311003744159

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costs and the most overestimated benefits is best placed to win political approval at an early

stage. From the democratic perspective it is crucially important in the stages before the

political decision-making to have reliable information on costs and benefits. Flyvbjerg

has argued on numerous occasions for reference class forecasting (Kahneman, 1994),

namely, the quantification of costs and benefits based on information from a series of com-

parable completed projects instead of an interim budget forecast that relates specifically to

the project in hand.

It would however be naive to expect that all the pitfalls in the decision-making on mega-

projects could be prevented or solved by following these words of advice. Experience has

shown that there are many pitfalls that need to be identified and as far as possible removed.

This paper is about these pitfalls and how to deal with them. It is based on a literature

review, discussions with experts and my own experience as research coordinator for the

Temporary Commission on Infrastructure Projects (TCI, 2004), a body set-up by the

Dutch Parliament in 2004 to investigate the decision-making on the Betuwe Line, the dedi-

cated freight rail line connecting Rotterdam and the German hinterland, and HSL-South,

the dedicated high-speed railway connecting Amsterdam and the Belgian border on the

Brussels–Paris route. The position of Dutch Parliament stood at the centre of this

inquiry. The paper also draws on Hertogh et al. (2008), a report on best practices and

lessons learnt in large infrastructures in Europe, from the Netlipse knowledge network.

The basic idea in this paper about the way mega-projects should be prepared and

political decisions should be taken is that the process between initiative and start of the

construction is regarded as a knowledge-intensive learning process, in which many

stakeholders and citizens are involved, in which both knowledge and critical reflections

are mobilized and in which many options remain open. This guarantees flexibility and

adaptivity as long as possible to cope with changing markets, changing political land-

scapes, changing technologies and changing knowledge and insights. This improves the

quality of the outcome and it strengthens the democratic dimensions of the decision-

making process. To my knowledge such an integrated view on the decision-making on

mega-projects has not been presented earlier.

Section 2 presents a summary of the pitfalls with information derived from hands-on

experience and recent publications on large-scale projects in transport infrastructure.

Section 3 explains how these pitfalls should be tackled. Section 4 presents some con-

clusions and recommendations.

I do not claim to provide a full and exhaustive picture of all potential pitfalls. Nor do I

guarantee that the recommendations presented will bring a perfect ending. I expect,

however, that this paper will add to the knowledge on mega-projects and assist the

decision-making processes.

2. A Summary of Pitfalls

2.1. Absence of an Adequate Problem Analysis

It is not uncommon for a solution to present itself early in mega-projects—the solution

which suits the initiators and then heads off in search of a problem. Hence, the process

rarely begins with a proper problem analysis and an impartial appraisal of alternatives

(Priemus, 2008). Samset (2008, pp. 173–188) illustrates this phenomenon with an

onshore torpedo battery and a regional aviation control centre, both in Norway, which

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he considers as complete failures because they were never operated shortly after

completion.

Often, in the earliest phases, we see lobby groups hard at work mobilizing support for

a particular solution that is thought to be superior. Feasible alternatives are not even

put forward, let alone analysed. Any alternatives proffered by opposing camps further

down the line are usually too late. It is not unusual for the government to back the—

supposedly—superior solution at an early stage. Alternatives that are suggested by

others in the later stages of the process are often whittled down to nothing.

The absence of an adequate problem analysis often goes together with a supply-driven

approach. Each mega-project considered should meet the current and future demands. So

one of the first questions which should be addressed is which demands are at stake and how

are those demands going to develop in the future?

2.2. Lack of Alternatives

In order to arrive at good political and social decisions, it is essential to develop alterna-

tives and allocate costs in each alternative at an early stage (Priemus, 2007). The various

alternatives can be weighed up in a responsible manner if the cost-benefit ratio has already

been worked out in each case. In a democratic environment it is important that people

know which alternatives were discarded in favour of the ultimate choice.

2.3. Absence of a Functional Programme

Contracting authorities tend to mark out the contours of a project at an early stage. Seldom

is there a well-organized functional programme which sets out what needs to be firmly

established (programme, minimum performance, public values) and which leaves plenty

of openings to tap into the creativity of the parties competing for the tender.

2.4. Ambiguities about the Scope of the Project

Some pitfalls are connected with the scope of the project. It is imperative to decide on the

“right” scope at an early stage. In general, the scope will not be limited to the line infra-

structure, but will extend to the development of a wider area. Hence, it is important to

develop nodes near and around stopping places or junctions, as the anticipated increase

in the value of land around these nodes can be used to finance unprofitable constituents

and/or enhance the quality of the plan. The Japanese experience to combine rail infra-

structure planning and real estate development is based on a scope which is mostly

more fruitful than the planning of rail infrastructure in isolation (Priemus & Konings,

2001).

Often, it takes a lot of brain-racking to spatially accommodate a mega-project. It is all

about finding the best fit between the infrastructure and the city, the landscape and the

natural environment and therefore involves questions relating to noise pollution, eyesores,

conservation and harmful emissions (such as CO2, NOx and particulate matter).

One crucial question is whether a mega-project should be prepared and realized in one

single process or whether it is more prudent to split it into manageable constituents and

take the political decisions in phases. Admittedly, the latter might lead to incomplete,

less-than-optimal pieces of infrastructure, but it usually makes for greater flexibility.

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It would also keep various options open and perhaps facilitate the decision-making at later

stages (Miller & Lessard, 2008). Flexibility is extremely important in order to cope, for

example, with changing markets and changing policies. In practice, sometimes the scope

of a project is modified in a rather later stage in order to reduce costs. This happened for

instance in the tunnelling work of the Unterinntalbahn in Austria, the Brenner Base

tunnel of 40 km length for rail transport which will be in operation in 2012/2013

(Hertogh et al., 2008, p. 236). The costs of the Gotthard Base Tunnel between Zurich and

Milan could be reduced by a reduction of the project scope (Hertogh et al., 2008, p. 1166).

On the other hand, many cost overruns are the result of changes in the scope during the

process (Hertogh et al., 2008, p. 36).

2.5. Flawed Process Architecture

In general, agreement will have to be reached on the process architecture either beforehand

or along the way. In particular the question is important, which space can and will be

presented in which stage to the public, the politically elected and empowered bodies

(especially local authorities) and the potential private players. When creating this space

the project managers will have to be prepared for strategic moves from all parties who

are—in principle—involved. They will, at all events, have to consider the official

regulations at EU, national, regional and municipal level.

The Design & Construct (D&C) model has been specifically developed to give the

contractors competing for the tender, plenty of scope (ideally within the framework of

the functional programme) to work out their own solutions and come up with smarter

alternatives for the execution of the project.

Frequently, the parties have to be selected via market forces. This calls for a level

playing field where candidates do not enjoy an unfair advantage because of state

support and/or inside knowledge. Market recruitment and political decision-making are

a complex combination which often creates difficulties. How can one prevent (overly)

transparent public decision-making from damaging the market position of the govern-

ment? And how do you stop parties who feel bypassed or unfairly treated from filing

claims for damages? It is not a superfluous luxury to seek legal advice on the intended

process architecture.

Most of the time, the actual process is soon dominated by concerns about costs. An

approach is needed which precludes lopsided emphasis on cost reduction and clears the

way for more quality and innovation.

2.6. Questions Regarding Cost-Benefit Analysis

We are still coming across methodological shortcomings in the ex-ante appraisal of mega-

projects. Network effects are often underestimated in the social cost-benefit analysis, not

least because they are difficult to quantify beforehand. Talks are held between researchers

and policy officers about the internal interest rate and the deadline for working out the net

cash value of costs and benefits. Calculations to measure the effects on the sustainability

aspects of alternatives are particularly susceptible to shifts in assumptions about the

internal interest rate. There is a persistent problem in monetarizing external and indirect

effects like impacts on social cohesion, exclusion of groups of people, impacts on the

value of landscapes, biodiversity and emissions of greenhouse gases.

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2.7. Contested Information

Many pitfalls are tied in with the process architecture and the interaction between the

players. It appears that misinformation—and sometimes even blatant lies—is dissemi-

nated on a large scale (Wachs, 1989, 1990; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). Leijten and De

Bruijn (2008) call this “contested information”, that is, information that is explained in

different ways by the different players. They recommend that agreements be reached

beforehand on how the parties will deal with the information as it becomes available.

2.8. Problems with Land Acquisition

One well-known factor that can undermine market forces in the construction sector is the

land position of parties who appeal to the principle of self-realization under the Expropria-

tion Act. Land owners cannot be dispossessed if they are able, and prepared, to develop the

land in accordance with the government’s wishes. But the government may have ideas

about the designation and organization of the land, which are not the same as those of

the owners. The government can then stand its ground and make demands on the cost

recovery, whereby an expropriation procedure can be set in motion. Theoretically, land

positions have no influence on zoning plans or on the recovery of land costs, but things

are different in practice, largely because expropriation may cause substantial delays and

many local officials and politicians do not know enough about the law to put up a fight

and appear to have insufficient negotiating capacity. Land acquisition caused delays in

the realization of the Leziria Bridge over the Tangus river (Portugal), opened in 2007

(Hertogh et al., 2008, p. 184). To speed-up land acquisition legislation had to be improved

for the A2 and A4 motorways in Poland (Hertogh et al., 2008, pp. 210 & 214).

2.9. Nature of the Technology

The choice of technology is also important. Often, a decision has to be made between, on

the one hand, innovative, relatively unknown technologies and, on the other, proven, less

risky technologies, which may be regarded as outdated by some parties. If possible, it is

better to postpone the choice of technology until the phase in which the competing

parties submit a tender for the execution of the project.

Engineers are often in favour of the most innovative, not yet proven technology. This

had a dramatic impact on the decision-making process of the Bay Bridge near

San Francisco (Trapenberg Frick, 2008) and the further delays in starting the operation

of the HSL-South Line between Amsterdam and Belgium, where the officials decided

to adopt an advanced, but not yet operational safety level of the European Rail Traffic

Management System (Stoop et al., 2007). In the decision-making process on the

Lotschberg Base Tunnel, south of Bern (Switzerland), the experts decided to add a

fallback solution, which meant the installation of a traditional signalling system and a

considerable reduction of risks (Hertogh et al., 2008, pp. 192–197).

2.10. Changing Markets

Mega-projects figure in different phases of decision-making in certain markets and spill

over into many other markets in the meantime. Facts that can be empirically established

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usually have only limited validity in different market constellations. In general, prognoses

and estimates—implicit and explicit—are based on assumptions about the trend in supply

and demand, and hence the price developments in a number of relevant markets. A whole

host of factors come into play, such as the availability of engineers and other experts for

the preparation phase, the supply of tradesmen, building materials, installations and raw

materials for the execution phase, developments in energy prices, the overall economic

situation, the capital market (including trends in long-term interest rates), inflation,

changes in currency exchange rates in the case of international projects (Hertogh et al.,

2008, p. 44) and the land market (important in the programming phase and the preparation

and execution phase). All these uncertainties can be “put in cold storage” until a later date,

but this is no guarantee that crucial factors will follow the anticipated pattern. Moreover,

certain deviations can have a profound impact on the final analysis of costs and benefits.

Mobility patterns can change within the course of a single decade as a result of, among

others, competition from other modes of transport than those envisioned in the project.

Inland shipping, for example, is competing strongly with rail and road for the transport

of goods to and from Rotterdam and Antwerp. And one can safely assume that the

advent of budget airlines such as Easy Jet is undermining the demand for transport by

high-speed trains in Europe.

2.11. Political Discontinuity and Inconsistencies

One very well-known pitfall in the decision-making on mega-projects is the frequent

changes that occur in the political affiliations of the government responsible for the

project. In relation to the Lisboa-Porto High Speed Line in Portugal, Hertogh et al.

(2008, p. 189) state that “Political changes have brought significant changes to the

project”. This is certainly not an exception.

Mostly, mega-projects take a longer period than the length of one government (Hertogh

et al., 2008, p. 39). As the entire process, from proposal to handover, takes decades rather

than years, every mega-project has to endure government elections and—more often than

not—shifts in the balance of political power. Some mega-projects are so emotionally

charged and so bound up with differences in political ideologies that they are used as

part of the stakes during elections and the formation of coalitions. This happens not

only at federal or national level (parliament, cabinet), but also at regional and local

level and—most crucially—around the political consensus or dissensus between different

tyers of governments (central, regional and local). In Europe, the projects often cross

national borders and thus involve international negotiations and treaties, and sometimes,

international tension. Crossing borders may push up the costs. Hertogh et al. (2008,

p. 234) write about the Øresund link: “(T)he Swedish and Danish rail systems operate

at different voltages”. (. . .) As a result: “All trains that operate on the line need to be

equipped with dual electrical systems”.

In some cases the European Commission is also involved in the decision-making with a

view to subsidy arrangements and/or specific EU themes such as the Trans European

Networks. Lack of political continuity and public consensus can have a direct effect on

a mega-project; this may stem from diametrically opposed backgrounds and exert an

adverse influence on the decision-making as well. When this happens the parties are

confronted with tensions which have spilled over from other domains. Fortunately, this

can also work in the other direction: if the government units collaborate well in other

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spheres and if they share similar views, there may be more consensus. The Oresund link

could be realized, partially as a result of positive political relations between Sweden and

Denmark (Hertogh et al., 2008, pp. 228–234). The rallying cry of “One subject at a time

please”, which is emblazoned across the stationery of many public sector organizations,

does not mostly apply to political–administrative business.

2.12. Changing Standards and Changing Legislation

Mega-projects need a long period of preparation. Legislation can lead to planning delays

and cost overruns (Hertogh et al., 2008, p. 42). Standards can change in the meantime,

sometimes resulting in a radical revision of the plans and unforeseen costs. For

example, tighter safety demands after severe accidents in road and railway tunnels in

the Alps pushed up the costs and postponed the completion date of the Gotthard Base

Tunnel (Hertogh et al., 2008, p. 169), the Betuwe Line and the HSL-South Line (Stoop

et al., 2007). The postponement of the completion date generated even more additional

costs as it meant that the rail link would become operational later than anticipated.

Secondly, the E18 Muurla-Lohja highway in Finland (51 km, including seven tunnels)

experienced a delay of 3 years as a result of new EU regulations governing the protection

of endangered species (Hertogh et al., 2008, p. 216). Also in this case cost overruns were

the outcome.

A third example is the intensification of the European legislation on air quality, particu-

larly in the case of Particulate Matter. These new measures took Dutch planners totally by

surprise and enabled environmentalists to successfully protest against many infrastructure

projects whose promoters had failed to show that they complied with the new criteria. The

ensuing situation created long delays and necessitated adaptations to the plans (Priemus &

Schutte-Postma, 2009).

One particularly memorable example of inconsistent policy occurred in the planning of

HSL-South in the Netherlands. This is extensively documented in the reports by the Par-

liamentary Commission on Infrastructure Projects (TCI, 2004). Around 1990, the Ministry

of Transport had decided that the line would follow the most direct route between Schiphol

and Rotterdam, which cuts right across the Green Heart. In the same year the Fourth

Spatial Planning (VINEX) Memorandum (Ministerie van VROM, 1990) was published,

but without the railway line. Indeed, the Memorandum reflected Dutch planning tradition

and continued to protect the Green Heart against the encroachment of spatial planning.

The Second Chamber quickly spotted this contradiction in Cabinet policy and threatened

to support a route along existing highways A4 and A13 that would save the Green Heart.

The then Prime Minister Wim Kok, after more or less threatening a government crisis,

saved the day by proposing the construction of a long tunnel running underneath the

Green Heart so that the initial route could go ahead without affecting the landscape.

This change of plan pushed up the costs by approximately 700 million euros and was

partly to blame for the substantial excess costs of HSL-South.

2.13. Prioritization of Mega-projects

Lastly, governments are often faced with the implicit or explicit need to prioritize different

mega-projects. There is simply not enough public money to fulfil all the proposals. Then,

the government has to take account of the anticipated capacity in the construction market

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and (sometimes) factor markets. How should the government handle competition among

projects? At what stage can or should it categorically state that the project will go ahead?

Could the uncertainty during the preparation process perhaps be utilized to keep the par-

ticipants on their toes and to optimize the conditions for private participation? Experience

has shown that early confirmation encourages passivity among market players, weakens

the motivation for private finance and reduces the willingness of private parties to

accept risks.

The TCI (2004) refers explicitly to the last of these three problems in its recommen-

dations for better decision-making procedures in large-scale infrastructure projects.

3. How to Deal with Pitfalls: Maintaining Uncertainties

Most politicians, managers and consultants prefer to speed-up decision-making processes,

take firm decisions after hearing the opinions and suggestions of the stakeholders and offer

certainty at a relatively early stage. For many people the problem lies in the failure to

provide certainty in good time (WRR, 1994; Commissie-Elverding, 2008). However, in

order to deal effectively with the pitfalls in Section 2, we need to increase uncertainty

instead of certainty. This approach creates time and space for learning processes and

for reaching consensus, it encourages people to organize private funding and other

private commitments, it offers the government a better opportunity to benefit from the

competition between projects and it enhances the probability that the commitments at

the start of a mega-project can be optimally aligned with the state of public finance and

conditions on the markets. This kind of scenario presupposes an open culture within

and between the project delivery organizations and between internal and external

players (Hertogh et al., 2008, p. 37). The Dutch government needs to be able to temporize,

adapt or even cancel a project at different strategic moments. This strategy will form the

main discussion topic in the next sections.

To create structure and increase flexibility the decision-making process should be split

into the following phases:

(1) The problem analysis: What is the problem and whom does it affect?

(2) The compilation of a functional programme of requirements: What criteria does the

project have to meet?

(3) Elaboration of the technical, functional and economic aspects and preparation of the

project until it is ready for execution.

(4) The realization of the project from the moment the first spade hits the soil to the handover.

(5) The operation of the infrastructure after completion.

When an initiative is launched to prepare and realize a mega-project, it is prudent to

approach the entire decision-making process (in particular, Phases 1, 2 and 3 above) as

process with a learning curve. Also, Phases 4 and 5 can take advantage of learning,

within the definitions at the end of Phase 3. Much can be learned from realization and

operation of other mega-projects.

The brief is to gather as much relevant information as possible about the investment

and management costs, the technical requirements and possibilities, the characteristics

of the area that will be occupied and crossed by the project, the wishes, concerns,

knowledge, determination and stalling capacity of the stakeholders, and the expected

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and sought-after development of transport flows and performances. The decision-makers

will also have to investigate the options for reducing costs, increasing the contribution of

private finance and private risk acceptance, to identify the risks, uncertainties and oppor-

tunities in different stages and different areas, and to ascertain the expected levels of

energy consumption, noise and emissions and determine how these negative external

effects can be reduced to protect local residents, travellers and personnel.

4. Problem Analysis

4.1. Do Not Start with a Solution

An infrastructure project is—at best—a solution. This statement implies that there are goals,

objectives and ambitions and there are one or more problems to which an infrastructure

project is the most expedient response. A valid problem analysis is essential in order to deter-

mine whether a proposed alternative is effective, efficient and legitimate. The first question

that should be asked is, “What is/are the problem(s)?”. Then, “What is the problem ‘now’

and what is it likely to become in the short and the long term?”. And finally, “Who is affected

by the problem?”. One actor’s problem might be another actor’s solution.

Pretty soon the problem will emerge in the form of locations that are insufficiently

accessible at present or in the future. This may go hand-in-hand with an increased risk

of stagnation (measured in lost vehicle hours) due to growing congestion. Sometimes

there are additional health and/or safety problems as a result of emissions (air quality).

As all of this impinges on mobility, people tend to see the problem in wider terms than

just accessibility or stagnation. They point to the decline in residential and commercial

appeal and the prospect of a deteriorating living climate, reduced quality of life and a

decline or stagnation in business leading to job insecurity and uncertain economic

growth. This implicit connection between mobility and the living and economic climate

is usually difficult to substantiate and often bears witness to a long list of policy ambitions

which cannot be supported by valid insights.

Mostly a supply-side approach is dominating above a demand-driven attitude. In prac-

tice, it is barely possible—and usually impossible—to establish a causal relationship

between improved accessibility and an upturn in the regional economy (Rietveld, 1989;

Vickerman, 1989, 2000; Banister & Berechman, 2000). A positive exception is the fast

growth of the Skane region in Sweden (2000–2007) after the completion of the

Øresund crossing in 2000 between Denmark and Sweden (Hertogh et al., 2008, p. 231).

As problems are often perceived differently by different parties, it is not only essential

to conduct a problem analysis but also to reach the strongest possible consensus. A shared

problem analysis enhances the possibility that the selected alternative will still be endorsed

by everyone at a later stage. If there is still a difference of opinion on the analysis, it is

usually the authorized political body that decides on the problems that will serve as the

departure point.

Any later alternatives must be tested against the problem analysis. Hence, certain

aspects need to be concretely and promptly specified:

. the values and criteria adopted;

. the objectives of the parties and the political bodies who bear responsibility;

. the boundaries and constraints.

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The various parties may have different ideas about these issues, so conflicts can easily

arise. The best approach is to identify potential stumbling blocks at an early stage and to

establish a workable consensus, not so much about one preferred solution, but about a

range of solutions which deserve further investigations.

4.2. Project Alternatives

Once the problem analysis has been sorted out, it is time to think seriously about potential

solutions. It is best to appraise alternatives in the initial stages. After all, more than one

road leads to Rome. An investment project is not always the right answer, so the Dutch

Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (Ministerie van Verkeer

en Waterstaat, 2004) differentiates between three types of solution for transport infrastruc-

ture: utilization, pricing and building. First, attempts can be organized to make better use

of the capacity of the existing infrastructure. Congestion might easily arise on certain

routes during the rush hour. But has the capacity in the opposite direction to be enlarged?

Or the capacity outside rush hours? That is the first question. The second is whether a price

tag can be attached to the use of infrastructure in the form of a user charge, such as road

pricing. Experience has shown that people curtail their use of infrastructure if it hits their

pocket. If the price is differentiated in terms of time and place, pricing can lead to better

utilization. If utilization and pricing are not enough, then new infrastructure or expansions

to the current infrastructure can be considered.

The “construction” category embraces various alternatives: different routes, different

modalities (e.g. road, rail, inland shipping), different cross-sections (e.g. two-lane, four-

lane, six-lane) and different types of spatial integration (for instance, to conserve nature

or prevent urban pollution).

Situations must be avoided in which alternatives are put forward at the last minute by,

for example, only those opposed to the government-favoured plan. Alternatives must be

systematically recognized at a very early stage.

5. Functional Programme

5.1. Programme of Requirements

It is crucial to think first mainly in terms of a functional programme of requirements: What

criteria does the project have to meet? And which public values need to be secured? Only

in the second stage is concretization addressed. It is best to spend some time thinking of

alternative solutions and even to consciously generate and design extra ones. Then the

various options can be tested against the functional programme and the social costs and

benefits can be determined in each case. The options can be ranked, starting with the

project with, on balance, the best score and finishing with the project with the lowest

score. The empowered authority takes a decision on the basis of this information. If the

authority gives the go-ahead the work can begin. Once the project has been given the

go-ahead, the rest of the decision-making is much more demarcated and structured.

A process which uses a concrete functional programme of requirements as its starting

point creates space for a tendering procedure in which candidates compete in terms of

quality and innovation as well as price.

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5.2. Scope of the Project

The scope of the project is decided during the initial phases of the decision-making. Which

area will form part of the project, that usually extends beyond the line infrastructure alone?

Particular attention will be paid to intersections and junctions, where amenities such as

offices, homes, hotels, shops and conference space can be built. In many cases, the land

at, and near, the intersections will rise in value. The question is whether this extra value

can be used to co-fund the line infrastructure.

More generally, the spatial accommodation of various plan alternatives will have to be

considered. The best alternative is often selected with a view to the best possible spatial

accommodation.

The decision-makers will have to decide whether the mega-project is to be realized in

one production process or split into phases so that the implementation and details of later

phases are decided further down the line. In later stages one can take advantage of more

up-to-date knowledge.

5.3. Process Architecture

The recurrent risk of strategic behaviour can be contained by linking as many benefits

and burdens as possible for each player and by reducing opportunities for passing the buck.

In an early stage, sustainable stakeholders have to be identified and a consistent stakeholder

management is needed to take advantage of the knowledge of these stakeholders and to be

informed about their interests and preferences (Hertogh et al., 2008, p. 45). Stakeholders

management is an important aspect of project management and process management.

Obviously, project managers should also be aware of the European, national and local

rules and regulations in all relevant domains, from fair competition to air quality.

Public players are increasingly displaying a preference for public–private partnerships.

Private players are recruited in areas where they are quite simply superior to government

organizations, namely entrepreneurship, creativity and risk-awareness. Time and again the

question arises as to how the various tasks and activities—and more importantly—the risks

and opportunities are divided between the public and private players beforehand. This presup-

poses that each party already has a valid idea of the nature and extent of the risks. This

presupposition is rarely borne out in practice. Hence, when a mega-project is split into

components, overlap risks often emerge (which can be reduced by interface management)

which tend to be underestimated (not to say neglected) by governments and are sometimes

overestimated by market players (whether or not on the basis of strategic considerations).

Contracted alliances in which benefits and risks are shared are gaining in popularity.

This is where a new complication crops up. If innovative forms of tendering are

considered (D&C, risk-sharing, tenders that include several decades of management and

maintenance) there is a fair chance that there will soon be very few serious candidates

who can guarantee healthy competition. A shortage of competent and available construc-

tion firms/consortia can turn a system that was intended to stimulate market forces into a

constraint. One question which can better be asked once too often than not at all is, “What

exactly happens if a business goes bankrupt during the contracted management period?”.

This happened in the case of the West Coast Main Line in the UK, Europe’s busiest

mixed-use railway linking London with Scotland. During the decision-making process,

Railtrack went bankrupt, the privately owned infrastructure owner, which complicated

the development of the project considerably (Hertogh et al., 2008, p. 243). In such

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situations often the government is asked to do the bailing out. It would be worth taking the

trouble to find out which risks can be insured. In more general terms, construction firms

can learn a lot from the methods of insurance companies, who are better at identifying

and quantifying risks than many other organizations.

5.4. SCB Analysis

Ongoing improvement and more realistic social cost-benefit ratios are still key areas of

research. The results would benefit parties who are directly involved in the development

of mega-projects and would be particularly helpful when the urgency levels for different

mega-projects are being weighed up. The TCI (2004) recommendations could be used for

this purpose. The government can only guarantee public (co-)funding when the costs and

benefits of the project are definitive, when the benefits are larger than the costs and when

the parties are ready to start work.

5.5. Contested Information

The risk of misinformation can first be curtailed by deciding together at an early stage on

how information is to be treated. Supporters and opponents can agree in advance which

sources of information to accept as authoritative. If conflicting information is mobilized

by both the supporters and the opponents, those involved can decide which independent

expert or institute is to be consulted. Are there any underlying uncertainties? Is it possible

to pursue a no-regret policy which takes these uncertainties into account? Is it clearly under-

stood who bears the risks of underestimations or overestimations? Can these risks still be

allocated, if necessary? Does awareness of individual responsibility for risks result in

revised estimates for investment costs, management costs and transport performance?

6. Preparation and Realization of the Project

6.1. Problems with Land Acquisition

The problem of land acquisition can be solved by negotiations. This problem is mentioned

for Eastern European countries in particular (Hertogh et al., 2008, p. 43). Very satisfying

projects can be realized by combining the interests of private and public players. One

could also consider legislation to regulate cost recovery and thus nip free-riding in the

bud. This concerns the way to deal with planning gain: financial contributions towards

greenery, water, neighbourhood roads and so forth from cost-bearers such as owner-occu-

pier dwellings, shops and offices. Finally, the solution can be sought in disconnecting land

ownership from building and development rights (Healey, 1997; Priemus & Louw, 2003).

If this were the case, building rights could not be derived from the ownership of land and

competition on the building market would be stimulated.

6.2. Technology

Once the optimal proposal has been selected, the next question concerns the kind of tech-

nology. It is best to be wary of anything resembling a “technological sublime” (Trapenberg

Frick, 2008), a fascination with modern, futuristic technology or dubious technologies

adopted to reduce costs, which often brings high risks and crippling costs.

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A specific technological problem is the nature of the soil, where tunnels are planned. In

the preparation of the A2 Motorway (Nowy Tomysl-Konin) in Poland problems associated

with soft ground conditions occurred (Hertogh et al., 2008, p. 210). In the case of the

Nurnberg-Ingolstadt High Speed Rail Line in Germany complications with Karst-

ground in tunnelling were mentioned (Hertogh et al., 2008, p. 226). Recent complications

with soft soil in densely built urban areas occurred with the construction of deep

underground lines in Koln and Amsterdam.

6.3. Changing Markets

During the elaboration, the realization and the operation of the mega-projects, markets and

policies may (and will) change.

The best way to deal with unforeseen changes in the market is to apply scenario

techniques, to conduct sensitivity analyses and to maintain options to safeguard flexibility.

Changes in policy are often intertwined with changing markets. The introduction of a user

charge (policy) on rail and/or road infrastructure can have an immediate and profound

impact on the mobility market.

Full protection against the impact of changing markets is not possible. The management

of mega-projects will always entail uncertainties and risks.

It may be possible to ascertain on a case-by-case basis whether some risks are insurable

or whether hedging is possible. Insurance companies have built up extensive experience in

the identification and quantification of risks. Any risks that a promoter decides to bear

himself must be included in the budget.

In the contractual relations between the parties it is vitally important that potential

uncertainties and risks be identified and quantified so that the risks can be allocated as

far as possible. Each player will try to determine the nature and extent of the risks and

to incorporate them in his price. If such issues are not settled (on time) there may be

huge surprises in store. For example, in the public tender for the five-part substructure

of HSL-South there were price overruns of approximately 40% between the externally

verified budget of the Ministry of Transport and the bids from the private consortia.

The causes were collusion between the building firms, an overheated building market

(too many mega-projects in the same period) and serious underestimation of the overlap-

ping risks on the part of the Ministry of Transport (and, presumably, serious overestima-

tion on the part of the construction firms) (TCI, 2004).

6.4. Political Discontinuity and Inconsistency

In Section 2, we noted that those involved in the decision-making on mega-projects have

no weapons against political discontinuity and inconsistency. Even so, there are still

lessons to be learned in this domain. The experience with the fast decision-making on

mega-projects in China is tempting. One can, however, hardly object to the workings of

democracy even though the results may not be to one’s liking. Sometimes attempts can

be made to depoliticize parts of the decision-making; for example, when empirical or tech-

nical data are being collected. There are useful tasks here for independent researchers and

consultants. It is also important to consistently pass on useful and relevant information to

the public and private players, the professional world at large and the general public,

including the press. This raw information may generate some opposition, but it is better

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to amend or even call off a mega-project for valid reasons instead of going ahead with it on

the basis of loosely founded insights.

In the investigatory stage it is desirable—but not always easy—to keep a step ahead of

the collection and dissemination of information. It is better not to confront political bodies

or the public with surprises, but to mention in good time the (strategic) choices which will

present themselves in the near future and to state the case for and against them. It is also

advisable to share the dilemmas with these political bodies and the public and to invite

them to consider and put forward arguments. In the long run political continuity and con-

sistency will be enhanced by prompt and relevant insight into facts, prognoses, scenarios

and circumstances. Evidence-based policies are a godsend for decision-making on mega-

projects (regardless of the nature of the final decision) and for democracy (TCI, 2004).

A number of frequently cited pitfalls—also mentioned in this paper—are often, upon

closer examination, caused by a lack of political continuity and consistency. Many of

the notorious interim rises in the costs of mega-projects are the result of fresh insight

by the competent political bodies, who change the scope of the project along the way to

make it fit more neatly into the spatial planning and to protect the environment against

noise and air pollution, blots on the landscape and other negative effects. Missed deadlines

and deteriorations in the cost-benefit ratios are often the result of changing political views

or a perceived need for political compromises. A promising approach of course is to seek

“all party support” for ambitious mega-projects (Hertogh et al., 2008, p. 39). In such cases,

the change of government will not disturb the continuity of the project.

There are no universal recipes for preventing political complications. The watchword is

“Be alert at all times!”.

6.5. Changing Standards and Changing Legislation

Sometimes, changes to standards are like “Acts of God” insofar as there is no way of insur-

ing against them. National governments and professional sectors are often unaware that

the European Commission has made any such changes. The changing air quality standards

and tunnel safety are notorious examples.

Standard-setting governments should be asked to desist from formulating absolute stan-

dards, to observe reasonably long transition periods and, in certain incontestable cases, to

compensate anyone damaged by these new standards, particularly those who were unable

to prepare for them.

The importance of information and communication about new standards cannot be

underestimated. The parties involved must be informed in good time of any (likely)

changes. This happened in the case of the Nurnberg-Ingolstadt High Speed Rail Line in

Germany, where changes to safety rules and regulations had to be embraced during the

construction period (Hertogh et al., 2008, p. 227).

Then, once the change comes into effect, information and training programmes should

be organized to bring them up to speed. This did not happen or barely happened in the

cases referred to in Section 2: the standards were prescribed in absolute terms far too

soon (despite numerous uncertainties about safety and environmental problems), there

was no transition period and no information or training. Even Dutch ministries who

were closely involved with the ministry in question had no idea what had been cooked

up in Brussels (Rood et al., 2005). Project managers need to be alert to surprises like

these. Managers of mega-projects also need eyes in the back of their head.

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7. Operation of the Project

The call for tenders, which precedes the selection of the contracting consortium and sets

out the price, quality requirements and timescale for the project, can stretch across one or

more decades of operation. Combining investment with maintenance can payoff in terms

of sustainability. Political empowerment to, for example, set and approve user charges can

also play an important role in the operational phase.

The risk-sharing, the governance of the operation and the role of public and private

players in the operational phase will have to be explored and ascertained during the pro-

gramme phase and the preparation phase. On the basis of the anticipated cash flows,

returns, costs and risks, a decision will have to be taken with the private parties in particu-

lar on whether the operation constitutes a business case that promises an attractive ratio

between risk and return. More and more, a life cycle analysis is needed to ascertain a sus-

tainable solution.

8. Conclusions

The preparation and execution of mega-projects are plagued by pitfalls. This paper pre-

sents a brief summary of some of these pitfalls and suggests ways of dealing with them.

The pitfalls which often occur in the decision-making on mega-projects are as follows:

. no adequate problem analysis;

. lack of project alternatives;

. no functional programme;

. uncertainty about the scope of the project;

. inadequate process architecture;

. questions on the SCB analysis;

. contested information;

. land acquisition;

. type of chosen technology;

. changing markets;

. political discontinuity and inconsistencies;

. changing standards and changing legislation.

Finally, there are also questions that need to be asked when comparing different mega-

projects.

In practice the decision-making is usually pretty chaotic; sometimes steps are retraced

and decisions are reconsidered. It is absolutely crucial that a process architecture be

designed beforehand and agreed by the parties. The above-mentioned division into five

phases can help point the way. Each phase ends with a go/no-go decision. The problem

analysis delivers a document which enables the competent authority to decide whether

the next phase can begin: the programme phase, leading to a functional programme includ-

ing the first estimate of costs, based on a reference class. If the functional programme leads

to a “go” decision, the “preparation phase” which leads to an execution decision (go/no

go) can begin. A “go” decision gives rise to fundamental commitments: the public and

private funding is made available and the project is fleshed out in minute detail. The

“execution phase” is followed by the operation decision and the “operation phase”.

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It is not inconceivable that part of a phase may have to be repeated; for example, the

functional programme may need some adjustments to keep pace with insights that have

emerged later. The phasing must always make clear which stage the infrastructure

project has reached.

The preparation of mega-projects is for a large part a matter of knowledge management.

In practice, we observe a lack of interest in learning from other projects. Nevertheless, the

actors involved in the decision-making on the Lisboa-Porto High Speed Line (305 km) in

Portugal explicitly state that they have learned a lot from other High Speed Rail Lines in

France, Spain, the UK and the Netherlands (Hertogh et al., 2008, p. 189). Learning from

best practice of course does not mean that it is useful to copy automatically a best practice

(Hertogh et al., 2008, p. 47).

It is very important to keep open as many options as possible so that unexpected surprises,

new insights and changed circumstances can be tackled in a flexible way (Miller & Lessard,

2008). In the early stages alternatives have to be generated, first in the form of functional

programs, later in technological specification and finally in the hardware of the mega-

projects. During the preparation and elaboration of the mega-projects it is crucial to maintain

many options, which give the opportunity, at least at a number of strategic moments to

make choices: adapt to changing environments, changing insights and improved knowledge,

changing the scope or changing the time planning (WRR, 2008).

There must be a continuous pressure on increasing private finance, increasing private

commitment and increasing the share of the risks, accepted by private actors. As long

as there is uncertainty, there is flexibility and there are opportunities to take into

account changing markets and changing political environments. After 70 years with no

lessons learned (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003), it is time to get down to some serious work.

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful for the comments and suggestions by two anonymous referees. The

usual disclaimer applies. A first version of this paper was presented at the international

research conference “Governance of Major Investment Projects”, Trondheim (Norway),

25–26 September 2008.

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