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Algorithms associating appearance and criminality have a dark past Catherine Stinson is a postdoctoral fellow in philosophy and ethics of artificial intelligence at the Center for Science and Thought at the University of Bonn in Germany, and at the Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence at the University of Cambridge. 1,400 words Edited by Sally Davies REPUBLISH FOR FREE ‘P hrenology’ has an old-fashioned ring to it. It sounds like it belongs in a history book, led somewhere between bloodletting and velocipedes. We’d like to think that judging people’s worth based on the size and shape of their skull is a practice that’s well behind us. However, phrenology is once again rearing its lumpy head. In recent years, machine-learning algorithms have promised governments and private companies the power to glean all sorts of information from people’s appearance. Several startups now claim to be able to use articial intelligence (AI) to help employers detect the personality traits of job candidates based on their facial expressions. In China, the government has pioneered the use of surveillance cameras that identify and track ethnic minorities. Meanwhile, reports have emerged of schools installing camera systems that automatically sanction children for not paying attention, based on facial movements and microexpressions such as eyebrow twitches. Perhaps most notoriously, a few years ago, AI researchers Xiaolin Wu and Xi Zhang claimed to have trained an algorithm to identify criminals based on the shape of their faces, with an accuracy of 89.5 per cent. ey didn’t go so far as to endorse some of the ideas about physiognomy and character that circulated in the 19th century, notably from the work of the Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso: that criminals are underevolved, subhuman beasts, recognisable from their sloping foreheads and hawk-like noses. However, the recent study’s seemingly high-tech attempt to pick out facial features associated with criminality borrows directly from the ‘photographic composite method’ developed by the Victorian jack-of-all-trades Francis Galton – which involved overlaying the faces of multiple people in a certain category to nd the features indicative of qualities like health, disease, beauty and criminality. Sign up to our newsletter Updates on everything new at Aeon. Technology commentators have panned these facial-recognition technologies as ‘literal phrenology’; they’ve also linked it to eugenics, the pseudoscience of improving the human race by encouraging people deemed the ttest to reproduce. (Galton himself coined the term ‘eugenics’, describing it in 1883 as ‘all inuences that tend in however remote a degree to give to the more suitable races or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over the less suitable than they otherwise would have had’.) In some cases, the explicit goal of these technologies is to deny opportunities to those deemed unt; in others, it might not be the goal, but it’s a predictable result. Yet when we dismiss algorithms by labelling them as phrenology, what exactly is the problem we’re trying to point out? Are we saying that these methods are scientically awed and that they don’t really work – or are we saying that it’s morally wrong to use them regardless? here is a long and tangled history to the way ‘phrenology’ has been used as a withering insult. Philosophical and scientic criticisms of the endeavour have always been intertwined, though their entanglement has changed over time. In the 19th century, phrenology’s detractors objected to the fact that phrenology attempted to pinpoint the location of dierent mental functions in dierent parts of the brain – a move that was seen as heretical, since it called into question Christian ideas about the unity of the soul. Interestingly, though, trying to discover a person’s character and intellect based on the size and shape of their head wasn’t perceived as a serious moral issue. Today, by contrast, the idea of localising mental functions is fairly uncontroversial. Scientists might no longer think that destructiveness is seated above the right ear, but the notion that cognitive functions can be localised in particular brain circuits is a standard assumption in mainstream neuroscience. Phrenology had its share of empirical criticism in the 19th century, too. Debates raged about which functions resided where, and whether skull measurements were a reliable way of determining what’s going on in the brain. e most inuential empirical criticism of old phrenology, though, came from the French physician Jean Pierre Flourens’s studies based on damaging the brains of rabbits and pigeons – from which he concluded that mental functions are distributed, rather than localised. (ese results were later discredited.) e fact that phrenology was rejected for reasons that most contemporary observers would no longer accept makes it only more dicult to gure out what we’re targeting when we use ‘phrenology’ as a slur today. Both ‘old’ and ‘new’ phrenology have been critiqued for their sloppy methods. In the recent AI study of criminality, the data were taken from two very dierent sources: mugshots of convicts, versus pictures from work websites for nonconvicts. at fact alone could account for the algorithm’s ability to detect a dierence between the groups. In a new preface to the paper, the researchers also admitted that taking court convictions as synonymous with criminality was a ‘serious oversight’. Yet equating convictions with criminality seems to register with the authors mainly as an empirical aw: using mugshots of convicted criminals, but not of the ones who got away introduces a statistical bias. ey said they were ‘deeply baed’ at the public outrage in reaction to a paper that was intended ‘for pure academic discussions’. Notably, the researchers don’t comment on the fact that conviction itself depends on the impressions that police, judges and juries form of the suspect – making a person’s ‘criminal’ appearance a confounding variable. ey also fail to mention how the intense policing of particular communities, and inequality of access to legal representation, skews the dataset. In their response to criticism, the authors don’t back down on the assumption that ‘being a criminal requires a host of abnormal (outlier) personal traits’. Indeed, their framing suggests that criminality is an innate characteristic, rather than a response to social conditions such as poverty or abuse. Part of what makes their dataset questionable on empirical grounds is that who gets labelled ‘criminal’ is hardly value-neutral. One of the strongest moral objections to using facial recognition to detect criminality is that it stigmatises people who are already overpoliced. e authors say that their tool should not be used in law-enforcement, but cite only statistical arguments about why it ought not to be deployed. ey note that the false-positive rate (50 per cent) would be very high, but take no notice of what that means in human terms. ose false positives would be individuals whose faces resemble people who have been convicted in the past. Given the racial and other biases that exist in the criminal justice system, such algorithms would end up overestimating criminality among marginalised communities. e most contentious question seems to be whether reinventing physiognomy is fair game for the purposes of ‘pure academic discussion’. One could object on empirical grounds: eugenicists of the past such as Galton and Lombroso ultimately failed to nd facial features that predisposed a person to criminality. at’s because there are no such connections to be found. Likewise, psychologists studying the heritability of intelligence, such as Cyril Burt and Philippe Rushton, had to play fast and loose with their data to manufacture correlations between skull size, race and IQ. If there were anything to discover, presumably the many people who have tried over the years wouldn’t have come up dry. e problem with reinventing physiognomy is not merely that it has been tried without success before. Researchers who persist in looking for cold fusion after the scientic consensus has moved on also face criticism for chasing unicorns – but disapproval of cold fusion falls far short of opprobrium. At worst, they are seen as wasting their time. e dierence is that the potential harms of cold fusion research are much more limited. In contrast, some commentators argue that facial recognition should be regulated as tightly as plutonium, because it has so few nonharmful uses. When the dead-end project you want to resurrect was invented for the purpose of propping up colonial and class structures – and when the only thing it’s capable of measuring is the racism inherent in those structures – it’s hard to justify trying it one more time, just for curiosity’s sake. However, calling facial-recognition research ‘phrenology’ without explaining what is at stake probably isn’t the most eective strategy for communicating the force of the complaint. For scientists to take their moral responsibilities seriously, they need to be aware of the harms that might result from their research. Spelling out more clearly what’s wrong with the work labelled ‘phrenology’ will hopefully have more of an impact than simply throwing the name around as an insult. Computing and artificial intelligence History of science Future of technology 15 May, 2020 REPUBLISH FOR FREE Email Save Tweet 607 Aeon for Friends Find out more Physiognomies of Russian criminals from The Delinquent Woman (1893) by Cesare Lombroso. Courtesy the Wellcome Collection Your email address Daily Weekly See our newsletter privacy policy here Subscribe T From Wu and Zhang (2016) Ceramic coral reefs and sawdust houses – the architects 3D- printing the future from scratch 4 minutes Video / Future of technology e good scientist Science is the one culture that all humans share. What would it mean to create a scientifically literate future together? Essay / Philosophy of science Gentle medicine could radically transform medical practice Idea / Medicine Money and modern life Sociologist Georg Simmel diagnosed the character of modern city life: finance, fashion and becoming strangers to one another Essay / Cities Why a Jackson Pollock masterpiece became an Australian tabloid sensation 17 minutes Video / Art We need highly formal rituals in order to make life more democratic Idea / Rituals and celebrations Aeon is not-for-profit and free for everyone Make a donation Get Aeon straight to your inbox Join our newsletter MENU DONATE NEWSLETTER SIGN IN / / / / / Essays Ideas Videos About Contact RSS Feed Donate Community Guidelines Follow Aeon Follow @aeonmag YouTube 21K Sign up to our newsletter Updates on everything new at Aeon. © Aeon Media Group Ltd. 2012-2020. Privacy Policy. Terms of Use. Like 277K Follow Your email address Daily Weekly See our newsletter privacy policy here Subscribe

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Page 1: MENU Algorithms associating appearance and criminality ...lcfi.ac.uk/media/...appearance_and_criminality_have... · and criminality have a dark past Catherine Stinson is a postdoctoral

Algorithms associating appearanceand criminality have a dark pastCatherine Stinson is a postdoctoralfellow in philosophy and ethics ofartificial intelligence at the Center forScience and Thought at the University ofBonn in Germany, and at the LeverhulmeCentre for the Future of Intelligence atthe University of Cambridge.

1,400 words

Edited by Sally Davies

REPUBLISH FOR FREE

‘Phrenology’ has an old-fashioned ring to it. It sounds like it belongs in ahistory book, filed somewhere between bloodletting and velocipedes.

We’d like to think that judging people’s worth based on the size and shapeof their skull is a practice that’s well behind us. However, phrenology is onceagain rearing its lumpy head.

In recent years, machine-learning algorithms have promised governmentsand private companies the power to glean all sorts of information frompeople’s appearance. Several startups now claim to be able to use artificialintelligence (AI) to help employers detect the personality traits of jobcandidates based on their facial expressions. In China, the government haspioneered the use of surveillance cameras that identify and track ethnicminorities. Meanwhile, reports have emerged of schools installing camerasystems that automatically sanction children for not paying attention, basedon facial movements and microexpressions such as eyebrow twitches.

Perhaps most notoriously, a few years ago, AI researchers Xiaolin Wu and XiZhang claimed to have trained an algorithm to identify criminals based onthe shape of their faces, with an accuracy of 89.5 per cent. They didn’t go sofar as to endorse some of the ideas about physiognomy and character thatcirculated in the 19th century, notably from the work of the Italiancriminologist Cesare Lombroso: that criminals are underevolved, subhumanbeasts, recognisable from their sloping foreheads and hawk-like noses.However, the recent study’s seemingly high-tech attempt to pick out facialfeatures associated with criminality borrows directly from the ‘photographiccomposite method’ developed by the Victorian jack-of-all-trades FrancisGalton – which involved overlaying the faces of multiple people in a certaincategory to find the features indicative of qualities like health, disease,beauty and criminality.

Sign up to our newsletterUpdates on everything new at Aeon.

Technology commentators have panned these facial-recognitiontechnologies as ‘literal phrenology’; they’ve also linked it to eugenics, thepseudoscience of improving the human race by encouraging people deemedthe fittest to reproduce. (Galton himself coined the term ‘eugenics’,describing it in 1883 as ‘all influences that tend in however remote a degreeto give to the more suitable races or strains of blood a better chance ofprevailing speedily over the less suitable than they otherwise would havehad’.)

In some cases, the explicit goal of these technologies is to deny opportunitiesto those deemed unfit; in others, it might not be the goal, but it’s apredictable result. Yet when we dismiss algorithms by labelling them asphrenology, what exactly is the problem we’re trying to point out? Are wesaying that these methods are scientifically flawed and that they don’t reallywork – or are we saying that it’s morally wrong to use them regardless?

here is a long and tangled history to the way ‘phrenology’ has beenused as a withering insult. Philosophical and scientific criticisms of the

endeavour have always been intertwined, though their entanglement haschanged over time. In the 19th century, phrenology’s detractors objected tothe fact that phrenology attempted to pinpoint the location of differentmental functions in different parts of the brain – a move that was seen asheretical, since it called into question Christian ideas about the unity of thesoul. Interestingly, though, trying to discover a person’s character andintellect based on the size and shape of their head wasn’t perceived as aserious moral issue. Today, by contrast, the idea of localising mentalfunctions is fairly uncontroversial. Scientists might no longer think thatdestructiveness is seated above the right ear, but the notion that cognitivefunctions can be localised in particular brain circuits is a standardassumption in mainstream neuroscience.

Phrenology had its share of empirical criticism in the 19th century, too.Debates raged about which functions resided where, and whether skullmeasurements were a reliable way of determining what’s going on in thebrain. The most influential empirical criticism of old phrenology, though,came from the French physician Jean Pierre Flourens’s studies based ondamaging the brains of rabbits and pigeons – from which he concluded thatmental functions are distributed, rather than localised. (These results werelater discredited.) The fact that phrenology was rejected for reasons thatmost contemporary observers would no longer accept makes it only moredifficult to figure out what we’re targeting when we use ‘phrenology’ as a slurtoday.

Both ‘old’ and ‘new’ phrenology have been critiqued for their sloppymethods. In the recent AI study of criminality, the data were taken from twovery different sources: mugshots of convicts, versus pictures from workwebsites for nonconvicts. That fact alone could account for the algorithm’sability to detect a difference between the groups. In a new preface to thepaper, the researchers also admitted that taking court convictions assynonymous with criminality was a ‘serious oversight’. Yet equatingconvictions with criminality seems to register with the authors mainly as anempirical flaw: using mugshots of convicted criminals, but not of the oneswho got away introduces a statistical bias. They said they were ‘deeplybaffled’ at the public outrage in reaction to a paper that was intended ‘forpure academic discussions’.

Notably, the researchers don’t comment on the fact that conviction itselfdepends on the impressions that police, judges and juries form of thesuspect – making a person’s ‘criminal’ appearance a confounding variable.They also fail to mention how the intense policing of particular communities,and inequality of access to legal representation, skews the dataset. In theirresponse to criticism, the authors don’t back down on the assumption that‘being a criminal requires a host of abnormal (outlier) personal traits’.Indeed, their framing suggests that criminality is an innate characteristic,rather than a response to social conditions such as poverty or abuse. Part ofwhat makes their dataset questionable on empirical grounds is that who getslabelled ‘criminal’ is hardly value-neutral.

One of the strongest moral objections to using facial recognition to detectcriminality is that it stigmatises people who are already overpoliced. Theauthors say that their tool should not be used in law-enforcement, but citeonly statistical arguments about why it ought not to be deployed. They notethat the false-positive rate (50 per cent) would be very high, but take nonotice of what that means in human terms. Those false positives would beindividuals whose faces resemble people who have been convicted in thepast. Given the racial and other biases that exist in the criminal justicesystem, such algorithms would end up overestimating criminality amongmarginalised communities.

The most contentious question seems to be whether reinventingphysiognomy is fair game for the purposes of ‘pure academic discussion’.One could object on empirical grounds: eugenicists of the past such asGalton and Lombroso ultimately failed to find facial features thatpredisposed a person to criminality. That’s because there are no suchconnections to be found. Likewise, psychologists studying the heritability ofintelligence, such as Cyril Burt and Philippe Rushton, had to play fast andloose with their data to manufacture correlations between skull size, raceand IQ. If there were anything to discover, presumably the many people whohave tried over the years wouldn’t have come up dry.

The problem with reinventing physiognomy is not merely that it has beentried without success before. Researchers who persist in looking for coldfusion after the scientific consensus has moved on also face criticism forchasing unicorns – but disapproval of cold fusion falls far short ofopprobrium. At worst, they are seen as wasting their time. The difference isthat the potential harms of cold fusion research are much more limited. Incontrast, some commentators argue that facial recognition should beregulated as tightly as plutonium, because it has so few nonharmful uses.When the dead-end project you want to resurrect was invented for thepurpose of propping up colonial and class structures – and when the onlything it’s capable of measuring is the racism inherent in those structures –it’s hard to justify trying it one more time, just for curiosity’s sake.

However, calling facial-recognition research ‘phrenology’ without explainingwhat is at stake probably isn’t the most effective strategy for communicatingthe force of the complaint. For scientists to take their moral responsibilitiesseriously, they need to be aware of the harms that might result from theirresearch. Spelling out more clearly what’s wrong with the work labelled‘phrenology’ will hopefully have more of an impact than simply throwing thename around as an insult.

Computing and artificial intelligence History of science

Future of technology 15 May, 2020

REPUBLISH FOR FREE

Email Save

Tweet 607

Aeon for FriendsFind out more

Physiognomies of Russian criminals from The Delinquent Woman (1893) by Cesare Lombroso. Courtesy the Wellcome Collection

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From Wu and Zhang (2016)

Ceramic coral reefs and sawdusthouses – the architects 3D-printing the future from scratch4 minutes

Video / Future of technology

The good scientistScience is the one culture that all humans share. Whatwould it mean to create a scientifically literate futuretogether?

Essay / Philosophy of science

Gentle medicine could radicallytransform medical practice

Idea / Medicine

Money and modern lifeSociologist Georg Simmel diagnosed the character ofmodern city life: finance, fashion and becomingstrangers to one another

Essay / Cities

Why a Jackson Pollockmasterpiece became anAustralian tabloid sensation17 minutes

Video / Art

We need highly formal rituals inorder to make life moredemocratic

Idea / Rituals and celebrations

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