MILITARY AND POLICEIN COLOMBIA

3/31/2010

Military Spending in Colombia

2010 National Budget 27.3% Debt Service 19.9% Social Protection 14.2% Defense and

Security 13.9% Education 7.0% Housing 3.9% Interior and Justice 2.8% Transportation 2.3%Action and Social Aid 1.7% Environment and

Development 1.6% Mines and Energy

The Colombian Military: FunctionThreats to State Sovereignty and Security The government lacks a monopoly on power and

violence within its territory, esp. in the interior Insurgency Narco-State

Crime Homicides (2008): 16,140 (33/100,000

inhabitants) Kidnapping (2008): 437 (total +/-1,500 held in

2009)Threats to Human Security: Between 3 and 5 million Internally Displaced

Persons (6% to 10% of the total population) Poverty 46% Unemployment 12%

National Police Armed force under

the Ministry of Defense

Personnel: 143,557 (2008)

Armed Forces Army: 230,373 Navy: 28,796 Airforce: 8,227

The Colombian Military: Corruption Inflating Military Success

29 Oct 2008: 3 Generals and 24 other officers were fired and face criminal murder charges for their involvement in a scheme to murder poor, unemployed young men and pass them off as guerrillas killed in combat with the army

Complicity with Right-Wing Paramilitaries Organizational support Deliberately fail to take action to prevent abuses or massacres Participation in abuses or massacres

Complicity with Left-Wing Guerrillas and Drug Cartels Deliberately fail to take action to prevent abuses Information sharing

Human Rights Abuses The military is responsible for over 300 "extrajudicial executions”

each year. Oct 2008: Police opened fire on thousands of Indian marchers

demanding land, killing two protesters.

Paramilitary Actors in Colombia Other Military-Like Organizations

Paramilitary Police: Colombian National Police; Personnel: 143,557

Paramilitary Groups; Personnel: 129,000 Groups:

Leftist Guerrillas: FARC-EP, ELN Right-Wing Paramilitary: AUC Drug Cartels: Medellin, Cali

Private Security Companies CONVIVIR: a self-defense and intelligence gathering group;

when Congress restricted their operations in 1997 they reorganized as the illegal AUC

US companies are contracted to carry out counternarcotics activities and support activities in Colombia.

DynCopr Petroleum companies hire private security to protect pipelines

and other infrastructure (the military and paramilitaries also play a role here)

Timeline: Colombia

2002: Uribe elected President 2004: Ammendment to the Constitution

allows Uribe to run for a second consecutive term

2005: Justice and Peace Law 2006: Uribe reelected

Timeline: Colombia

2008: Extradition of 14 right-wing paramilitary leaders to the

US on drug charges Three of FARC's seven-man secretariat are killed

Raul Reyes is killed by a Colombian bombing raid on his camp in Ecuador

Ivan Rios is killed by his bodyguard leader Mr Marulanda dies of a heart attack

Betancourt and 14 other hostages are rescued 2009:

Illegal phone and email eavesdropping by the Administrative Security Department (DAS)

Signes bases agreement with U.S. 2010 Constitutional Court rejects a re-election law

that would have allowed Uribe to run for a 3rd term

Demilitarization v. Armed ConfrontationDemilitarization Weakens the military’s ability to intervene in

politics History of failure Risks legitimizing paramilitary activity Progress:

The AUC reached agreement with the government in 2003 (implementation in 2005) to demobilize. By 2006 31,000 paramilitaries had demobilized and the

AUC as a formal organization ceased 92% are covered by an amnesty declared by presidential

decree The remaining 8% come under the Justice and Peace Act

and are eligible for reduced penalties and sentences There have been four major peace processes involving

the guerrilla groups, all of which have failed.

Demilitarization v. Armed ConfrontationArmed Confrontation: Augments military power in all arenas Risks intensifying conflict and triggering side-

conflicts Risks increasing military corruption Achieving total victory is unlikely and impractical