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African
Develop
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Working
Pape
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n°283
Septe
mber 2
017
Louis Moussi Sopp and Anthony Leiman
Mineral Resource AccountingMeasures in Africa
Working Paper No 283
Abstract Prior to the end of the prolonged commodity boom that led up to the 2008 recession, much was made of the rapid growth in GDP demonstrated by many African countries. The continent’s rising GDPs were held to be heralding a new dawn: a turn in the evolutionary economic downward cycles that had typified many of its economies since the end of the colonial era. The rapid fall in commodity prices as the global recession took hold showed the limitations of these high hopes, and the weak foundations on which some of them had been based. In this paper, we will begin by checking the veracity
of this economic portrait, assessing the dependence of the income of eight mineral-resource-rich sub-Saharan African countries on their mineral commodities. The paper then compares the relationship between an economy’s fiscal deficit before borrowing and National Income as conventionally recorded, as opposed to that between the deficit and the National Income as calculated following the El Serafy method. It then discusses some of the challenges towards efficient resource management in low-income mineral-resource-rich sub-Saharan African countries.
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Correct citation: Sopp L. M. and A. Leiman (2017), Mineral Resource Accounting Measures in Africa, Working Paper Series N°283, African Development Bank, Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire.
Mineral Resource Accounting Measures in Africa1
Louis Moussi Sopp and Anthony Leiman
JEL Codes: E01, Q32, Q56
Keywords: National income, ‘El Serafy’ method, accounting, mineral resources
1 School of Economics, University of Cape Town, Private Bag| Rondebosch 7701, South Africa, email: [email protected]. School of Economics| University of Cape Town, Private Bag, Rondebosch 7701, South Africa, email: [email protected]
2
[N]atural resources are not purchased from mother nature who produced them so
that their valuation must inevitably be artificial and controversial. … the national
accounts ought not to show the using up of assets whose creation has not first been
recorded in the accounts.… Nature is not recognised as a factor of production by
economists or national accountants and nature’s production of resources is not,
and perhaps could never be, recorded in the accounts.
Derek Blades (1989, 215)
1. Introduction
Good policymaking needs good information. In the 1989 paper from the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) cited above, Blades argued that the United
Nation’s System of National Accounts then in place gave little aid to resource planners and
decision makers. Four years later, the UN adopted satellite accounting to mitigate this
deficiency. Despite their adoption by the United Nations, satellite accounts have not become
universal, nor have the policy lessons they offer been fully recognised. Nowhere has this
problem been clearer than in Africa’s recent growth surge, so much of which was mineral
based.
Prior to the end of the prolonged commodity boom that led up to the 2008 recession,
much was made of the rapid growth in gross domestic product (GDP) demonstrated by many
African countries. The continent’s rising GDPs were held to be heralding a new dawn; an up-
turn that was reversing the downward economic trends that had typified so many of the
continent’s economies since the end of the colonial era. Unfortunately, the rapid fall in
commodity prices that ensued as the global recession took hold, showed the limitations of these
high hopes and the weak foundations on which some of them had been based. Since then
commodity prices have begun to recover, but the lessons of the price shocks have not
necessarily been built into the fiscal policies of those economies most susceptible to such
shocks.
In this paper, we will begin by checking the veracity of this economic portrait, assessing
the dependence of the continent’s income on primary commodities, and the performance of its
non-commodity sectors in the past decade. An index of risk is calculated for African
economies. This is based on the contribution of major minerals to GDP and to Gross Exports,
together with the historic variances in their prices (i.e. the amplitudes and frequencies of
historic price fluctuations).
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While many countries, following the lead of 1993 UN System of National Accounts,
have begun compiling satellite accounts, and while the interpretation of these has been
significantly improved (see United Nations et al., 2009, chapters 12 and 29), the real message
of this data may have been missed by policy makers. A simple test can be used to reveal the
extent to which policy makers have internalised the message of the satellite accounts. This
would take the relationship between an economy’s fiscal deficit before borrowing and its
nominal net domestic product (NDP) as conventionally recorded, significantly improved (see
and compare it to the relationship between the country’s fiscal deficit and its National Income
as calculated using the El Serafy method (which follows Hicks’s view of income as the time
derivative of wealth). Such a comparison would provide a mechanism to test the fragility of
economies (or the risk their fiscal policies entail in the face of commodity price fluctuations).
A more complete indicator of an economy’s exposure to fluctuating commodity prices
would be relationship between national debt and NDP as computed in these two manners. Such
tests will provide the remainder of the paper. The data to be used is taken from a sample of
eight selected sub-Saharan African countries for the period 1990-2015. These countries are
Angola, Botswana, Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Mauritania, Nigeria, and
South Africa. The essential data comprises GDP, NDP, specific mineral rents, sector shares
(minerals and mining as percentage of NDP or NY), budget deficit, and national debt.
2. Literature review
Macroeconomic analysis usually focuses on GDP growth as the principal measure of economic
performance; however, as is now widely established, GDP gives an incomplete picture of an
economy’s true situation and the welfare of its inhabitants. Other indicators, while harder to
quantify, can provide valuable information on the state of an economy.
This is particularly true for countries with a large endowment of mineral resources, as
is the case of many sub-Saharan African countries. GDP and comparable measures describe
the value of total production in the economy without accounting for changes to the capital stock
(which would be captured in NDP or in National Income if ideally calculated). Particularly
important are the depreciation of capital assets, including the exhaustion of non-renewable
resources, damages to the ecosystem, the accumulation of human and physical capital, and new
mineral discoveries. In resource-rich economies, these subtleties have vital implications for the
sustainability of long-term growth and the design of fiscal policies.
The relationship between natural resources and economic success has confounded
economists for a long time now. In spite of being endowed with considerable natural resources,
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many African countries are still considered among the poorest nations in the world and have
neither been able to embark on sustainable long-run economic growth paths, nor implement
stable fiscal policies necessary to sustain that growth. The role of natural resources in
established theories of economic wealth ranges from highly beneficial for economic growth to
deeply undermining. The empirical weak relationship between resources and economic
performance has promoted an emphasis on country-context-specific factors that promote the
success or failure in harnessing resource wealth. It is in this environment that wealth accounting
can be used to measure the natural and intangible capital that contribute to economic growth.
The subsequent analysis attempts to identify patterns in natural capital depletion in
Angola, Botswana, Congo (Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Mauritania, and Nigeria,
and to discuss the implications for the long-term growth and development. This analysis uses
the methodology developed by El Serafy to determine the value of mineral resources.
One of the most valuable indicators of changes in an economy’s underlying productive
capital stock is the ratio of Adjusted Net Savings to Gross National Income. To derive Adjusted
Net Savings we need five main components namely:
Gross National Saving
Current education expenditures
Depreciation of produced capital
Depreciation of natural resources
Damage caused by CO2 emissions
The main advantage of this measure is that it allows an assessment of the degree to which the
investment of natural resource rents and consequent increases in the stock of produced and
human capital compensate for the present depletion of natural resources. This has significant
consequences for intergenerational equity in the exploitation of natural resources and welfare.
Numerous studies on Adjusted Net Savings rates have revealed a disturbing trend
among natural resource-rich countries in sub-Saharan Africa, where high GDP growth rates
often hide decreases in the underlying stock of natural capital. While a very few countries have
been able to successfully transform their natural capital into human and produced capital, the
vast majority have failed to do so. In several cases, the exploitation of natural resources has
created an unsustainable surge in current consumption expenditure at the expense of long-term
sustained economic growth. Furthermore, some studies have shown a strong correlation
between negative adjusted savings rates and persistently low socioeconomic development
5
indicators, such as literacy rate, infant mortality and access to water and electricity (Collier et
al., 2010).
Figure 1: Contribution of mining to GDP
Source: United States Geological Survey, IMF International Financial Statistics, The World Bank
As Figure 1 shows, mineral resources play an important role in the growth of the
economies we shall be examining. It is for this reason therefore that the focus of this analysis
is restricted to mineral resources. Natural resources also include elements like wildlife, forest,
fisheries but these are excluded for the purpose of this analysis. In the remainder of this paper,
any reference to natural resources should be taken to mean mineral resources alone.
Before starting the analysis, it is important to calculating resource rents for each
category of mineral resource. Resource rents can be defined as grossly be defined as:
Unit Rents*Production where Unit Rents = Unit Price – Unit Cost
In the 1990s, attempts to measure sustainability were popular and numerous studies attempted
to provide a good measure of sustainability for single countries or a selection of countries.
These included Repetto et al. (1989) for Indonesia, Repetto and Cruz (1991) for Costa Rica,
van Tongeren et al. (1993) for Mexico, Bartelmus et al. (1993) for Papua New Guinea, Serôa
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
6
da Motta and Young (1995) for Brazil, Pearce and Atkinson (1993), and Hamilton and
Atkinson (1996). In this analysis, the El Serafy method will be used to compute resource rents
for the eight countries to ascertain which of them can be classified as weakly sustainable and
formulate the appropriate policy recommendations.
The El Serafy method for computing resource rents
In order to calculate the user costs for resource depletion according to the El Serafy method,
we need to get four different terms:
P-AC (net price of the resource)
R, Production (Resource Depletion)
r, the real discount rate (discount rate used in analysis is 4 percent p.a.)
n, the number of years of reserves remaining at current production rates and current
extraction technologies (reserves to production ratio).
The El Serafy formula for user cost can be expressed as shown below:
Source: Neumayer (2000)
It is an estimate of the total Hotelling Rent (only an estimate, since Hotelling used marginal
rather than average extraction cost) that the resource could provide, but following Keynes’s
terminology is called the ‘user cost’ of resource depletion as it indicates the share of resource
receipts that should be considered as capital depreciation. With this method, an explicit
correction term for resource discoveries is not needed because discoveries and new
technologies that affect effective reserves enter the formula via changes to n, and the formula
is re-calculated again for each year.
The logic behind the formula for the El Serafy method is that, sustainability need not
require that all resource rent be invested (as Hartwick, 1997 suggested) but that a portion can
be consumed. While the earnings from the resource stock will end at some finite time,
sustainable income by definition must persist. Therefore, a finite cash flow has to be converted
into an infinite one. Sustainable income is that part of resource receipts which if received
infinitely would have a present value just equal to the present value of the finite stream of
7
resource receipts over the lifetime of the resource; i.e. if each year’s resource rents were used
to purchase an infinitely long lasting annuity, sustainable income (and the El Serafy user cost)
would be the annual pay out from that annuity.
An advantage of using the El Serafy method is that it does not presume efficient
resource pricing i.e. resource rent growing at the rate of interest according to Hotelling’s rule.
This is because the El Serafy method does not depend on an optimisation model. It is an ‘after
the fact’ approach thus making it more flexible than competing resource-rent calculation
methods (World Bank, 2013). Consequently, future resource receipts have to be discounted
and the El Serafy method requires the selection of a discount rate r. If either the remaining
lifetime of the mineral resource, n, or the discount rate r are quite small, then user cost value
will consequently be relatively large.
Computing resource rents according to the El Serafy method In the following section, resource rents have been computed using the El Serafy method. Table
1 shows which resources we used for the analysis, and that for Angola, Congo (Brazzaville),
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Nigeria the dominating resources are oil and natural gas. For
Mauritania, the dominating resource is iron ore and for Botswana it is diamonds. Figure 1
(above) indicates the share of mining (includes oil and natural gas) as a percentage of GDP.
Table 1: Share of single natural resources of total resource rents
Share of Oil & Natural Gas of Rents in percent 1990-1999 2000-2009 2010-2016
Angola 99.35 92.04 91.5
Congo (Brazzaville) 90.34 97.49 98.91
Equatorial Guinea 95.00 96.00 97.00
Gabon 86.30 85.00 85.41
Mauritania
Nigeria 99.77 99.59 95.17
Share of Iron Ore of Rents in percent
Mauritania 100.00 97.00 91.30
Share of Copper & Nickel of Rents in percent
Botswana 0.00 0.04 0.03
Share of Diamonds of Rents in percent
Angola 0.00 0.04 0.03
8
Botswana 90.16 93.31 96.68
Sources: United States Geological Survey, IMF International Financial Statistics, The World Bank
Figure 2: Mineral exports as a percentage of total exports
Sources: United States Geological Survey, IMF International Financial Statistics, The World Bank
Figure 2 shows that the exports of these countries also tend to be very concentrated and
dominated by mineral exports. This makes them very vulnerable in terms of trade shocks when
the prices of the primary commodities suddenly fall.
Results
Figure 3: Angola adjusted net savings (percentage GNI) and gross national savings
(percentage GNI) 1994-2012
Source: Author’s own calculation
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
-100.00
-75.00
-50.00
-25.00
0.00
25.00
50.00
75.00
100.00
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Extended Genuine Saving II (El Serafy 4% p.a) Gross Savings (% GNI)
9
Figure 4: Botswana adjusted net savings (percentage GNI) and gross national savings (percentage GNI) 1992-2014
Source: Author’s own calculation
Figure 5: Congo (Brazzaville) adjusted net savings (percentage GNI) and gross national savings (percentage GNI) 1994-2012
Source: Author’s own calculation
0.00
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
50.00
60.00
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Extended Genuine Saving II (El Serafy 4% p.a) Gross Savings (% GNI)
-80.00
-60.00
-40.00
-20.00
0.00
20.00
40.00
60.00
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Extended Genuine Saving II (El Serafy 4% p.a) Gross Savings (% GNI)
10
Figure 6: Equatorial Guinea adjusted net savings (percentage GNI) and gross national savings (percentage GNI) 1994-2012
Source: Author’s own calculation
Figure 7: Gabon adjusted net savings (percentage GNI) and gross national savings
(percentage GNI) 1992-2005
Source: Author’s own calculation
-150.00
-125.00
-100.00
-75.00
-50.00
-25.00
0.00
25.00
50.00
75.00
Gross Savings (% GNI) Adjusted Net Savings_El Serafy (%GNI)
-30.00
-20.00
-10.00
0.00
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
50.00
60.00
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Extended Genuine Saving II (El Serafy 4% p.a) Gross Savings (% GNI)
11
Figure 8: Mauritania adjusted net savings (percentage GNI) and gross national savings (percentage GNI) 1992-1998
Source: Author’s own calculation
Figure 9: Nigeria adjusted net savings (percentage GNI) and gross national savings (percentage GNI) 1992-2014
Source: Author’s own calculation
0.00
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
50.00
60.00
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Extended Genuine Saving II (El Serafy 4% p.a) Gross Savings (% GNI)
-55.00
-40.00
-25.00
-10.00
5.00
20.00
35.00
50.00
65.00
80.00
95.00
110.00
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Extended Genuine Saving II (El Serafy 4% p.a) Nigeria
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Figure 10: South Africa adjusted net savings (percentage GNI) and gross national savings (percentage GNI) 1992-2014
Source: Author’s own calculation
The figures above are illuminating. Much has recently been made of who should be
appointed to head the Angolan sovereign wealth fund, a body whose objective is to accumulate
assets that parallel the hypothetical ones in the El Serafy calculation. The persistence of
negative Adjusted Net Savings for Angola and Congo (Brazzaville) certainly highlights the
need for better resource management in the future. As the figures show, there are large
discrepancies between Gross Savings and Adjusted Net Savings (El Serafy) for Angola, Congo
(Brazzaville), and Equatorial Guinea. These discrepancies suggest that these countries have not
been able to capitalise on the considerable opportunities given to them through their natural
resource endowments to build up and maintain their physical and human stock of capital in
exchange for the exhaustion of their stock of natural capital. Botswana consistently experienced
positive Adjusted Net Savings and, with very high reserves to production ratios, there seems
to be no indication of weak sustainability. Although it is true that the El Serafy method allows
for some of the resource rents to be consumed, the widening of the gap in recent years between
Gross Savings and Adjusted Net Savings (El Serafy) suggests that some amount of the national
wealth that is consumed is in excess of what should be the case under efficient resource-rent
management.
It is a stylised fact that commodity prices are more volatile than manufactured goods.
It is also well documented that many resource-dependent countries experience more
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
Gross Savings (% GNI) Adjusted Net Savings_El Serafy (%GNI)
13
generalised macroeconomic volatility and have a strong tendency towards procyclicality
(Hausmann and Rigobon, 2003; Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009). Lastly, it has been shown
repeatedly that such volatility is not good for sustainable long-term economic growth and
welfare (Ramey and Ramey, 1995).
Table 2: Sustainability risk index
Angola 3.3
Botswana 4.1
Congo (Brazzaville) 3.2
Equatorial Guinea 4.3
Gabon 2.7
Mauritania 1.8
Nigeria 1.9
South Africa 0.8
We then construct a sustainability index (Table 2) that indicates how at-risk an economy
is to shocks or fluctuations in the price of the dominant natural resource. The higher the index
value, the more at risk the economy is to fluctuations in the price of the dominant natural
resource. According to this index, we see that Equatorial Guinea is the most at risk followed
by Botswana and then Angola. South Africa is the least at risk followed by Mauritania and then
Nigeria. It should not be surprising that South Africa is the least exposed given that its economy
is more diversified relative to the other countries.
5. Discussion and policy implications Robinson et al. (2006) produced one of the most comprehensive studies on the relationship
between abundance of resource revenues, political accountability and the quality of institutions
in the economy. Their argument and empirical evidence suggest that governments that do not
have to introduce socially tolerable and consistent systems of taxation, but can rather finance
themselves through resource revenues, have reduced incentives to be accountable and
responsive to their citizens. Consequently, they do not have a stake in the development of a
thriving market-based, non-resource economy that is otherwise required to establish a taxable
economic base and secure the fiscal sustainability of the state. In contrast, governments in non-
resource countries have an incentive to promote the development of such a market-based
economy as it generates a multitude of corporate and individual taxpayers, providing a steady
and stable source of revenue for the state.
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In the Robinson et al. (2006) model, the existence of resources and the associated rents
increases the utility of holding political power for too long. As a result, political horizons across
a range of policy issues are short sighted and sub-optimal from a social welfare perspective.
Most of the resource revenues are directed towards the single purpose of keeping political
power. One manifestation of this is a bloated public sector that establishes a stake in keeping
the status quo and is paid off through the rents emanating from the resource sector.
Unsurprisingly, a number of prominent studies have found strong evidence that resource
abundance is associated with higher levels of corruption.
The rent-seeking and broader political economy literature on the resource curse helps
explain the prevalence of poor public investments financed by resource related public revenue
windfalls. Torvik (2009) suggests that one of the biggest issues concerning resource-rich
countries is why massive domestic investments in some of them have not resulted in greater
growth gains. Gelb (1988) estimated that more than half of the bonus gains from the rise in oil
prices in the 1970s were invested in domestic projects. Any of the leading growth models
would have predicted that, following such significant public investments, strong and
sustainable economic growth will have occurred, but this was not the case for most if not all of
the countries in this study.
There are a number of reasonable arguments that may be brought forward to explain
why the expected growth failed to happen. In a study of the response by the Nigerian
government to positive terms of trade shocks during the oil boom, Gavin (1993) found that the
government largely invested in projects with high prestige and political gains but which made
little economic sense. Nigeria is not the only country with this issue. The tendency of investing
in projects with negative social surplus is typical of many resource-rich African governments.
Several studies have also highlighted the strong relationship between resource
abundance and conflict and war. Collier and Hoeffler (1998 and 2004) argue that resource-rich
countries face conflict for two main reasons. Firstly, the resource rents are used to buy weapons
and pay the soldiers. Secondly, because resources often have a winner-takes-all quality with
big payoffs for the winner, and limited need for cooperation with losers in the future to extract
rents, resources trigger fierce struggles over control.
The Brundtland report’s approach to sustainable growth (WCED, 1987) is broad:
‘growth that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs and the management of human, natural and financial assets
15
to increase long term economic wellbeing’. An economy that experiences rapid expenditure
growth funded by extraction of mineral resources, and does so without increasing its overall
stock of wealth by investing in physical and human capital, will not be able to sustain its
economic growth in the long run and risks sacrificing the wealth of the future generations to
finance current consumption; i.e. it fails even the Brundtland definition of sustainability.
A growth strategy that is sustainable needs to account for the temporal and
intergenerational dimensions of resource wealth by ensuring that current growth does not come
at the expense of future growth. It is important to acknowledge that a new discovery of mineral
resources, or an increase in the stock of reserves of existing mineral resources can also play a
positive role.
Adopting and implementing policies that increase savings and maximise rents from
mineral resources, sustaining human capital investment, putting in place transparent and
consistent fiscal policies will be vital to building the government’s policy credibility and
expanding the available space for public investment or to free up resources to build fiscal
reserves. It is also important for sustainable economic growth to be achieved that the revenues
from mineral resources are reinvested into different types of productive capital. This requires
a strong policy framework grounded by clear policy commitments. According to the World
Bank (2013) such policy commitments should include
(i) efforts to promote efficient resource extraction with a view to maximizing
resource rents;
(ii) a fiscal regime for the resource sector that enables the government to recover an
equitable share of resource rents;
(iii) well-designed investment policies that use resource rents to generate sustainable
returns over the long term.
6. Challenges in efficiently managing resource rents The first issue is the availability of information to estimate the stock of mineral resources and
total wealth. With the exception of Botswana, there is no comprehensive data or statistics on
wealth accounting, nor a facade by the governments of Angola, Congo (Brazzaville),
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, and Mauritania to even create and regularly update this
accounting to show the evolution of the stock of mineral resources. The full or even partial
implementation of the United Nations SEEA System by these countries would be an important
16
first step towards preserving, protecting, and enhancing their national wealth, thus building the
foundation for the prosperity of all generations.
Another difficulty with efficiently managing resource rents in order to achieve
sustained economic growth involves determining the right amount of the resource rents to
invest and consume. A key element in this trade-off is the marginal returns offered by different
types of public investment. Mauritania for example suffers from a considerable lack of
infrastructure in the form of reliable roads, like many African countries. This deficiency may
suggest that increased investment in physical infrastructure will generate strong economic
returns. Even though shortages of physical capital certainly constrain development, on the other
hand and in the medium term especially, the absorptive capacity of Mauritania is likely to be
low and an overemphasis on these forms of capital may result in unproductive investments.
Therefore, the time path for the use of revenues needs to be carefully thought out. One
possibility could be to keep at least some part of the revenues in a sovereign wealth fund in the
short term, as is the case with many of the oil-rich middle-eastern Arab countries. The quality
of institutions as well as the roles they play in the management of resource revenues forms an
important part of this discussion.
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APPENDIX 1 Data sources Angola Oil and natural gas production figures source: OPEC Database. Diamond production estimates from the Kimberley Process Website. Botswana Diamond, gold, coal, copper, and nickel production data sources: Botswana Mineral Accounts Report, Statistics Botswana and Economic Accounting of Mineral Resources in Botswana. Congo (Brazzaville) Oil and natural gas production data source: OPEC Database. Equatorial Guinea Oil and natural gas production figures data source: OPEC Database. Gabon Oil and natural gas production figures data source: OPEC Database. Another major mineral is manganese but production figures were unavailable. Mauritania Iron ore and crude oil production figures data source: the Mauritania Natural Wealth for a Sustainable Future Report. Nigeria Oil and natural gas production figures data source: the OPEC Database. Other minerals such as lead, zinc, and tin are also present in Nigeria but data on production and reserve levels for these minerals were unavailable. South Africa Data on coal, gold, platinum and diamond production data sources: Statistics South Africa, the South African Department of Trade & Industry and the Kimberley Process Website.
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APPENDIX 2 Figure A1: Platinum $/Oz price fluctuations
Source: International Monetary Fund: World Economic Outlook
Figure A2: Gold $/Oz price fluctuations
Source: International Monetary Fund: World Economic Outlook
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Figure A3: Volatility crude oil
Source: International Monetary Fund: World Economic Outlook
Figure A4a: Mineral exports as a percentage of total exports (countries A-Le)
Source: International Monetary Fund: World Economic Outlook
Figure A4b: Mineral exports as a percentage of total exports (countries Li-Z)
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Source: International Monetary Fund: World Economic Outlook
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