mps foia disclosure - whatdotheyknow · introduction /executive summary /recommendations and 5-11...

Restricted-Babar AHMAD Review

A Review of the Arrest and Detention of

BabarAHMAD

CR221 / 09 / 1 3

Not For Disclosure

SC

Reviewing OfficerCommander Maxine de BRUNNE R

Metropolitan Police ServiceTPHQ Westminster3rd December 2009

"Working Together for Excellence'

Restricted-Babar AHMAD ReviewThe contents of this report should not be disclosed without the

authority of the Deputy Commissioner Tim GODWINMPS

FO

IA D

iscl

osur

e


Freedom of Information Ac t

Protective Marking Restricted - Crime

Suitability for Publication Scheme? No

Title and Version Review Babar AHMAD

Purpose Review of Arrest and Detention of Babar AHMAD

Relevant to S015 / TSG

Summary As per Terms of Reference

Author and Warrant Number Commander de BRUNNER

Creating Branch SCD20(2)

Date Created 16th June 2009

Review Date 16th June 201 1


The contents of this report should not be disclosed without theauthority of the Deputy Commissioner Tim GODWINM

PS F

OIA

Dis

clos

ure


Summary Sheet

Date of Incident 2nd December 200 3

Name Babar AHMAD

SCD Dealing / Team No. Sal 5 / TSG

Operation Name Review Babar AHMAD

SIO / 10 Detective Chief Inspector '

Status of Enquiry Civil Claim

Type of Review Arrest and Detention

Reviewing Officer Commander de BRU NN ER

Date Review Started 16th June 2009

Date Review Completed 22nd September 2009



PS F

OIA

Dis

clos

ure

Restricted -Babar AHMAD Rev iew

Index

Section

1 . The adequacy of the response to the arrest and 12 - 25circumstances of Mr Ahmad 's detention and allegation sof misconduct by arresting officers .

2 . The Oversight Methods employed throughout the case . 26 - 31

Introduction /Executive Summary /Recommendations and 5-11Learning Points

Page No

3 . The Effectiveness of the Complaint Intervention Scheme . 32 - 34

4 . 35-412

5 . Conclusions 42 - 43

6 . Appendices 44

Restricted-BabarAHMAD Review 4

The contents of this report should not be disclosed without th eauthority of the Deputy Commissioner Tim GODWINM

PS F

OIA

Dis

clos

ure


Introduction and Executive Summary

This review is conducted within the parameters of the following terms of reference :

To review the circumstances surrounding the case of Babar AHMAD .

Commissioning Officer - Deputy Commissioner GODWI N

Reviewing Officer- Commander de BRUNNE R

The Reviewing Officer will examine the following areas to identify any actio n

required and lessons to be learnt :

• The adequacy of the response to the arrest and circumstances o f

Babar AHMAD 's detention and allegations of misconduct by th e

arresting officers .

• The oversight mechanism employed throughout this case .

• The effectiveness of the Complaints Intervention Scheme .3

The review will not examine the following areas :

• The offences and surrounding intelligence that led to the arres t

• The extradition issues surrounding Babar AHMAD .

• The truth of the allegations made by Babar AHMAD .

The Reviewing Officer will undertake the review under the guidance of Si r

Geoffrey GRIGSON who will be provided with full access to all available material .


The contents of this report should not be disclosed without theauthority of the Deputy Commissioner Tim GODWIN

5

MPS

FO

IA D

iscl

osur

e


Reviews held after events are always vulnerable to the suggestion that , with the

benefit of perfect hindsight where all the information is available for scrutiny , it is

much easier to judge what could and should have been done by those involved .

At the time , it is rare that individuals have all the information they need , the time to

verify , analyse and evaluate what information they do have , are able to exercise

any control over the actions of other players in the scenario or have sufficient time

available properly to plan . It is nearly always a dynamic and complex situation

beset with conflicting information and inherently dangerous assumptions . In

addition , the ` hot' emotional effect on any human being brought about by the

anticipation of physical danger should never be over-looked by the cool ,

dispassionate reviewer .

It is now almost 6 years since the events subject of this review and much has

changed , not least that the stark reality of the terrorist threat to London unfolded

during July 2005 leading to significant changes in the way that arrest and search

operations are managed in the arena of counter terrorism . The amount of

resources dedicated to these activities within the Government 's CONTEST

strategy has quadrupled . Many contingency exercises and actual arrest operations

in the field of counter-terrorism have been unde rtaken and the learning from

events taken forward .

Furthermore , policing has also been subject to the Taylor reforms of police

misconduct (Police Conduct Regulation 2008) that have set a revised code of

Standards of Professional Behaviour . The Taylor Repo rt has an emphasis on

improvement rather than punishment to move the police service towards a culture

of learning and development . Therefore , taking the learning from these events , it

is considered appropriate when highlighting issues of concern arising from the

review to suggest `points for consideration ' going forward as well as

recommendations for remedial action within the Terms of Referenc e

Restricted-Babar AHMAD Review 6


PS F

OIA

Dis

clos

ure


Executive Summary

On the 2nd December 2003 the Anti Terrorist Branch , formerly S013 and

renamed S015 , led an operation (Operation QUARRIER) designed to effect the

arrest of several suspects and search related prope rty in relation to terrorist

matters . Mr Babar AHMAD was one of the subjects of this operation . S015 used

their own officers and also officers from the Territorial Suppo rt Group (TSG) in

order to car ry out this operation .

Mr AHMAD was arrested at his home address at 05 : 30 hrs on the 2nd December

2003 . TSG officers gained ent ry to the premises using a rapid ent ry technique

designed to secure and control the premises and persons within it as quickly as

possible .

The officers state they completed incident repo rt books (IRB's) following this

arrest . These IRB 's were mislaid and have never been found . The officer's did

make statements from these notes before they were mislaid , so there is an

account of what happened . It is unknown whether there is any additional evidence

within the IRB 's that would help inform this review .

Six officers from the TSG were involved in the operation at Mr AHMAD'S address .

They were all subject of a formal complaint by Mr AHMAD and therefore the DP S

who initially investigated the allegation , and subsequently the IPCC , did examine



PS F

OIA

Dis

clos

ure


outstanding complaint allegations against the officers involved .

On 12th Janua ry 2004 the Depa rtment of Professional Standards (DPS) referred

all complaints to the PCA (Police Complaints Authority) now IPCC . The DPS

investigated the complaints under the supervision of the IPCC . On 25th May 2004

the DPS submitted their repo rt to the IPCC and the CPS . The IPCC approved the

DPS investigation by letter to the MPS dated 5th August 2004 . On 6th and 10th

September 2004 the CPS informed both agencies respectively that no criminal

charges would be brought against the officers .

On 25th October 2004 the IPCC recommended that disciplinary proceedings b e

brought against one of the officers and released un-redacted copies of their report

which identified the officers and led to their details being published o n6

On the 13th April 2005 at the Discipline Hearing at Woolwich Crown Cou rt the

case against PC was dismissed .

This operation was led by S015 in 2003 . Mr AHMAD subsequently issued civi l

action proceedings against the MPS . The civil action was managed and led by th e

Directorate of Legal Services (DLS) in conjunction with the DPS Civil Action Unit .

The MPS settled this matter and admitted full liability .



PS F

OIA

Dis

clos

ure


Recommendations and Learning Points

Recommendations .

1 . A protocol be put in place with the IPCC to ensure that the identities of

officers are not disclosed where the circumstances are such that to do s o

may put the officers at risk and/or where it is envisaged that an applicatio n

may be made to a Cou rt for special measures to prevent their identification .

2. In the light of the O'BRIEN ruling, to devise and implement a system o f

recording and analysis of both complaints and the tracking/flagging of case

files

3 . Review all SOPs and protocols applicable to critical incident managemen t

within civil actions to recommend a single SOP for agreement between th e

Commissioner and MPA

4 . The Commander DPS should assess the high profile cases as identified b y

the DLS when the civil action is received . He should set the strategy and

make the assessment as to whether or not the case is or could be a critical

incident in conjunction with the originating business group and lead and be

responsible for this case from this point until the final conclusion . He should

also have the responsibility to authorize both settlement and the terms of

any settlement rather than base the authority at a more junior level on the

amount involved . Full use should be made of the central oversight system

for all high risk cases (both civil and operational) through the Deputy

Commissioner's Risk Management Oversight Board .

5 . It is recommended that SO and CO review their systems regardin g

oversight of critical incidents and mechanisms required to maintain and lea d

gold groups

6 . It is recommended that instructions are considered and issued regardin g

officers duty to attend cou rt and give evidence in civil proceedings .

Learning points for consideration by ACCO - rapid entry searches



PS F

OIA

Dis

clos

ure


➢ Constructive discussions should be conducted with public order trainers to

understand the inappropriateness of colloquialisms to describe ACP O

approved tactics .

➢ When conducting rapid entry searches , every attempt should be made to

provide a written briefing to all , including any cultural advice , so that team

supervisors can check the understanding of all involved in the operatio n

➢ Any subsequent tactical considerations and choices by the team leade r

should be suppo rted by a written rationale and , when time is a limiting

factor, these considerations and choices should be recorded as soon a s

practicable after the event

➢ Consideration should be given to completing a documented handover

between rapid entry teams and investigation teams to ensure that both

evidence which may justify the use of force and evidence probative of th e

offence is secured .

➢ When planning for rapid entry where violence may be reasonably

anticipated , consideration should be given to :

o Where space allows , briefing all the rapid ent ry teams together .

o The deployment of a digital camera as close as possible behind th e

rapid entry team in order to capture as much information as possible

regarding the arrest and transport to the custody suite for late r

review .

o Making secure transpo rt for detainees available in advance where

possible .

o Detainee reception teams to have a check list to recover and exhibi t

original notes and to ensure photography of any injuries to detainees

and officers on arrival .Restricted-Babar AH MAD Review 10


PS F

OIA

Dis

clos

ure


Learning points for consideration - ACCO - training emphasis

regarding injuries

• Central Operations officers likely to be involved in arrests where violence i s

reasonably anticipated should be reminded in the course of their inductio n

and refresher training programmes to carefully account for how and b y

whom any inju ry has been sustained .

Learning Point - DPA .

A protocol should be considered for MPS/MPA Press Liaison in regard t o

the prior notification of the release of Press Statements by eithe r

organisation .

Learning Points - Commander DPS

• It would be pertinent to check and review the effectiveness of the

current complaint monitoring procedures to ensure they continue

to remain fit for purpose .

• The Commander DPS should consider the management of police

witnesses within the gold strategy during all high profile cases .



PS F

OIA

Dis

clos

ure


The adequacy of the response to the arrest andcircumstances of BabarAhmad ' s detention and allegations o f

misconduct by the arresting officers

It is felt that the first area above can be sub-divided for the purpose of clarity .

1 .1 The arrest and detention of Babar AHMAD (Operation Quarrier)

1 .2 On 2nd December 2003 the Anti Terrorist Branch , then S013 and now

combined with Special Branch (S012) as S015 , mounted Operation

QUARRIER to search simultaneously ten separate premises on the

authority of Schedule 5 Terrorism Act 2000 search warrants and effect the

arrest of individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism . Following risk

assessment , four addresses were designated for rapid ent ry by specially

trained officers . One of the subjects of Op Quarrier was Babar AHMAD

(from whose subsequent arrest this review has eventually followed) and the

arrest/search team led by S013 included officers from No 5 Territorial

Support Group (TSG) whose task it was to make the rapid ent ry .

1 .3 Briefing for supervisors in the operation was held that morning at New

Scotland Yard whilst their teams were operationally fed , it not being

possible to conduct a briefing with all those involved due to numbers and

available space . In common with most large scale operations , it was

expected that supervisors attending the briefing would pass on relevant

information to their respective teams .

1 .4 At 02 . 00 , officers attended for duty at Paddington Police Station for a

briefing that commenced at 03 . 30 . Following a general briefing and

notification of deployments by Chief Inspector (Silver Commander) ,

Detective Chief Inspector 9 (Gold Commander) provided a

detailed briefing on the entry and arrest phase . It was intended that all ten

premises would be entered after 05 .00 and no later than 05 .45 .



PS F

OIA

Dis

clos

ure


1 .5 DCI 10 considered it relevant and appropriate to highlight the

circumstances that led to the murder earlier in 2003 of Detective Constable

OAKE , Greater Manchester Police (GMP) , at the hands of a terrorism

suspect named BOURGASS . Some time after his house was entered , the

arrest made and a search commenced , BOURGASS was able to take

advantage of poor prisoner handling and vigilance to arm himself and attack

the searching officers during the course of which DC OAKE was mo rtally

wounded .

1 .6 DCI 11 was duty bound to highlight to supervisors the potentia l

threat identified from the GMP experience , I1 2

13 The purpose

was to ensure proper plans were made for not only the safety of the officer s

but also for all suspects and any others present at the places to be entered

and searched . Each rapid ent ry search supervisor would then be required

to assess the pa rt icular risks for their premises , develop their plan and brief

accordingly . It follows that the threat and risks would be prominent in the

minds of officers conducting the searches .

1 .7 There then followed a cultural briefing by a senior Muslim police officer

which set out the protocols to be observed when entering a Muslim 's house ,

specifically to be respectful to the prayer room and the Koran , together with

general advice for respecting the Islamic religion .

1 .8 Police Sergeant 14 (5 TSG), was the officer in charge of the rapi d

entry to 15 Wandsworth, where Mr AHMAD was to be

arrested . Sergeant 16 was concerned with the late start to the briefin g

and the lack of detail provided with respect to the address and its occupant s

which gave him li tt le oppo rtunity to conduct reconnaissance and properly

plan the ent ry . His concern was echoed by other team leaders in the

subsequent written debriefing report following such operations .



PS F

OIA

Dis

clos

ure


1 .9 Co-incidentally and unknown to DCI " Sergeant 1 8 and some

others in his team had been deployed as security for the prisone r

BOURGASS at Paddington Green Police Station so possessed a persona l

perspective of the threat posed by him even when in custody .

1 . 10 Sergeant 19 verbally briefed his team regarding their task in the

operation , in pa rticular his assessment of the method of entry and how M r

AHMAD would be detained . He 20

21 articulated his concerns about the

adequacy of the briefing he had been given and lack of reconnaissance .12 8

1 .11 He made a decision that the entry team would adopt the tactic to `deck an d

dominate ' the suspect . It appears that this was a colloquial phrase used by

instructors when training officers for public order duties of this nature on the

approved tactic for police to `secure and control ' premises and people

following rapid ent ry . While the phrase graphically describes an approach ,

it is clearly not appropriate given the legal requirement that officers use no

more force than is reasonably necessa ry to effect the arrest .

1 . 12 Unsurprisingly , given the limitation of time already evident , no notes of hi s

briefing were made and the rationale for the decision to adopt the `deck and

dominate ' tactic was not recorded . 22

2 3

1 . 13 After members of a ` Special Ent ry Team ' forced the front door to the house ,

the TSG arrest team rapidly entered to implement the plan and take control

of all persons present . 24

25

The contents of this report should not be disclosed without theauthority of the Deputy Commissioner Tim GODWI N

rcesmctea-banar ANMHU rceview 14

MPS

FO

IA D

iscl

osur

e


1 . 1 4

1 . 1 5

1 . 1 6

1 . 17



MPS

FO

IA D

iscl

osur

e

1 . 1 8

1 . 19 Notes of the event were recorded by the arresting officers in Incident Repo rt

Books (IRB) from which they immediately completed written witness

statements . The IRBs have been mislaid and have not been found despite

a thorough search . Subsequently , the officers depended on their witness

statements to refresh their respective memories of events . However , due to

the loss of IRBs , it cannot be asce rtained what additional information may

have been available to assist their recollection when fresh medical opinion

was served some 5 years later .

1 .20 S013 officers took control of the searches once suspects had been

detained and were similarly responsible for prisoner reception and ongoing

enquiries at the various custody suites . On completion of their IRBs an d

witness statements, the TSG officers had no further contact with M r

AHMAD .

1 .21 Issues of concern

1 . The supervising officer feels he was not adequately briefed concerning the

premises to be searched and the suspect to be detained and had insufficient

time to develop a plan for the rapid ent ry28

2. I




MPS

FO

IA D

iscl

osur

e

29

3 .

4 . Notes were not made of the briefing given to the rapid entry team and the

rationale for the decision to deploy the `deck and dominate' tactic no t

recorded

5

6 .

7 .

8 .

9 .

1 .22 Discussion

1 .23 As has been set out in the introduction , this arrest operation was large an d

complex with 10 addresses and 7 vehicles to be searched almost

simultaneously , with four of the homes assessed as requiring the use of

special ent ry teams and rapid ent ry search teams . There appeared to be

considerable pressure of time and the team leader for this se arch was not

alone in feeding back this concern in the de-brief repo rts . 3 13 2

1 .24 This operation was 2 years after the signal 9/11 event in New York an d



Racfiri rFarl -Rahar AHMAII Rav iaw

Trainers responsible for training of public order officers at level 1 would

appear to have inappropriately adopted the colloquialism `deck and

dominate ' to describe the taught methods for `secure and control ' operations

MPS

FO

IA D

iscl

osur

e


soon after the murder of DC OAKE in Manchester . Some of the officers

had encou nte red the suspect later convicted o f the killing of D C OAKE and33

34 The colloquialism ` deck and dominate ' for the tacti c

1 .25

1 .26 Learning points for consideration by ACCO - rapid entry searches

➢ Constructive discussions should be conducted with public order trainers to

understand the inappropriateness of colloquialisms to describe ACP O

approved tactics (issue 5 )

➢ When conducting rapid entry searches, every attempt should be made t o

provide a written briefing to all , including any cultural advice , so that tea m

supervisors can check the understanding of all involved in the operatio n

(issues 1 - 4)

➢ Any subsequent tactical considerations and choices by the team leade r

should be suppo rted by a written rationale and , when time is a limiting

factor, these considerations and choices should be recorded as soon a s

practicable after the event (issue 4 )

➢ Consideration should be given to completing a documented handove r

between rapid entry teams and investigation teams to ensure evidence

required to help justify the use of force and evidence required to help prov e

offences are seized (issue 7 )



to be used may also have heightened the anticipation of physical danger .

MPS

FO

IA D

iscl

osur

e


➢ When planning for rapid entry where violence may be reasonably

anticipated , consideration should be given to :

o Where space allows , briefing all the rapid entry teams togethe r

(issue 2)

o The deployment of a digital camera as close as possible behind th e

rapid entry team in order to capture as much information as possible

regarding the arrest and transport to the custody suite for later

review (issue 6 )

o Making secure transpo rt available for detainees in advance where

possible (issue 7 )

o Detainee reception teams to have a check list to recover and exhibi t

original notes and to ensure photography of any injuries to detainees

and officers on arrival (issue 8 )

1 .27 Allegations of misconduc t

1 .28 While Mr AHMAD made the formal complaint that has led to this review, i t

should be noted that no other complaints arising from Operatio n

QUARRIER were received . In addition to Mr AHMAD, three others were

detained on suspicion of having been involved in the commission ,

preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism . One search resulted in minor

damage to a door which was resolved under the claims procedure .

1 .29



MPS

FO

IA D

iscl

osur

e

37


1 .30 The following sequence of events describes the progression of Mr

AHMAD's complaint :

• 3rd December 2003 - complaint formally lodge d

• 17th December 2003 - complaint registered at DPS

• 12th January 2004 - referred to the Police Complaints Authority (PCA), now

Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC )

• 26th January 2004 - DC138 DPS appointed to investigate

under IPCC supervision

• 25th May 2004 - report to Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) with a copy to

the IPCC

• 5th August 2004 - investigation approved by IPC C

• 6th and 10th September 2004 - CPS inform IPCC and MPS respectively

that insufficient evidence to support criminal charge s

• 25th October 2004 - IPCC recommend misconduct proceedings against PC39

• 14th January 2005 - IPCC produce their repo rt ,ao

41

Subsequently, the names of the officers appeared on two web-sites : 42

43and 44 Threatening and

abusive messages personal to the officers were posted on those site s

• 10th February 2005 - IPCC serve misconduct papers on the office r

• 11-13th April 2005 - misconduct hearing held at Woolwich Crown Court (for

reasons of security) and all misconduct charges dismisse d

• 16th June 2005 - civil action proceedings issued by45

Solicitors

• 8th March 2007 - civil action taken over by 46 Solicitors



PS F

OIA

Dis

clos

ure


• 18th March 2009 - admission of liability by the MPS a7

48

49

1 .31 1

501 .32 I

1 .33

1 .34 A recent House of Lords judgement (O'BRIEN v Chief Constable, South

Wales Police 28/04/2005) requires that a party to civil proceedings

discloses `similar fact evidence' and that includes all relevant allegations of

misconduct, whether those allegations have been substantiated or not . As

the result of this ruling , DLS practice is to consider officers ' previous

complaint histo ry in order to enable them to comply with their duty of



PS F

OIA

Dis

clos

ure


1 .35

1 .36

1 .37

1 .38

disclosure and to assess more accurately the prospects of successfull y

54



contesting the action .

MPS

FO

IA D

iscl

osur

e


56

55

As most civil action cases

proceed slowly , the system for dispatch and receipt of files has remained a

somewhat antiquated `post room ' approach and depends on human

efficiency and effective communication to deliver in the relatively rare cas e

that is under time pressure .

1 .39 Issues of concern

1 .

2 .

3. The O'BRIEN case has introduced a new requirement in civil proceeding s

to discover and disclose prior `similar fact ' complaints

4 . The file handling system for civil action proceedings was not fit for purpos e

in this case

1 .40 Discussion

1 .41 In the context of the exercise of police powers of arrest and detention , it is

fundamental and primary learning for police officers that proper records are

maintained of how and by whom injuries are sustained and there is no

difference in this regard for counter-terrorism operations or for TSG officer s

who are especially trained for some of the most dangerous of thes e



PS F

OIA

Dis

clos

ure


necessa ry police actions . However, in this case the original notes have

been mislaid and it was not until six years after the events that `new '

medical opinion was adduced by the complainant and 5 8

59

1 .42 The unhelpful disclosure by the IPCC of the officers' personal details, whic h

subsequently appeared on some

significant concern for their safety 61

controvers i a l web-s i tes , generated

6 2

1 .43 It is apparent that the O ' BRIEN case requires a different approach to police

complaint pattern analysis and file handling .

1 .44 Learning points for consideration - ACCO - training emphasis

regarding injuries

• Central Operations officers likely to be involved in violent arrests should be

reminded in the course of their induction and refresher training programmes

to carefully account for how and by whom any injury has been sustaine d

1 .45 Recommendations - Commander DPS

1 . A protocol be put in place with the IPCC to ensure that the identities of

officers are not disclosed where the circumstances are such that to do

so may put the officers at risk and/or where it is envisaged that an

application may be made to a Cou rt for special measures to prevent

their identification .



It is wo rthy to note that the (;PS are reconsidering the case against

the officers to asce rtain whether any criminal charges should be brought .

MPS

FO

IA D

iscl

osur

e


2. In the light of the O'BRIEN ruling, to devise and implement a system o f

recording and analysis of both complaints and the tracking/flagging o f

case files



PS F

OIA

Dis

clos

ure


Oversight Mechanisms employedthroughout this case .

2 .1 Oversight mechanisms

63

2.2 It has already been noted that, following the acquittal of P C

64 in April 2005, Mr AHMAD issued civil action proceedings against

the MPS for assault and other matters . The civil action was managed by

the Department of Legal Services (DLS) in conjunction with the DPS (Civil

Actions Investigation Unit) . However, the issues arising there from also

included the two operational departments of Specialist Operations (Counter

Terrorism - S013 now SO 15) and Central Operations (TSG - CO 20) .

2 .3 While the MPS has significant experience of managing ` critical incidents ' for

the 10 years since the Stephen Lawrence Inqui ry where cases of public

interest are identified and a senior officer appointed as ` Gold ' to ensure the

efficacy of the police response , it is unclear from research across business

groups what level of scrutiny and oversight occurs post a criminal trial and

where civil proceedings are possible or even probable . In this case it is

apparent that neither SO or CO identified that the complaint by Mr AHMAD

was , or had the potential to become , a critical incident . (Critical incident -

any incident where the effectiveness of the police response is likely to have

significant impact on the confidence of : the victim , their family and /or the

community)

2 .4 Actions for civil proceedings are sent to the DLS where an Assistant

Director will grade the case on a scale between A and C . Catego ry `A'

cases are allocated to a DLS lawyer and recorded as High Profile . Such

cases are reviewed and updated bi-weekly and the progress monitored by

the DPS ` Silver Risk' management group chaired by Commander DPS at

which Business Groups are represented . However , it is not apparent what

steps are taken to develop a tailored strategy for individual cases or wha t



PS F

OIA

Dis

clos

ure


ownership is provided from the originating Business Group in Catego ry `A '

cases .

2 .5 There is a Standard Operating Procedure available for the management o f

critical incidents , guidance for Gold Groups published within TP (appendix

D) and a SOP for the management of Civil Actions (appendix J) . A

MPS/MPA protocol on compensation cases was agreed in October 2001

and current delegated authority limits (appendix G) are approved and

published periodically by the Commissioner .

2 .6 The net effect of these various approaches may have been that th e

progress of the civil proceedings action was monitored at a level

commensurate with the delegated approvals level for compensation (which

for a lengthy period was at £20,000 and thereby within the authority of a

DCI in DPS) rather than the level for a Category `A' case that was inherently

also a critical incident .

2 .7 Set out below are the significant dates in the management of the civi l

proceedings with respect to the Babar AHMAD case :

• 16 th Februa ry 2004 - placed on the DLS High Profile list .

• 29tH July 2004 - Gold group meeting chaired by DAC Suzannah BECKS13 2

133 (meeting minutes recovered )

• 5th August 2004 - follow up meeting scheduled but no minutes foun d

• 6th August 129

• 16th June 2005 - civil action proceedings issued by6s

Solicitors

• 22nd November 2005 - MPS deny any liabilit y

• Stn March 2007 - civil action taken over by 66 Solicitors

• 29tH October 2007 - DLS instruct Counse l

• 15th December 2007 - Counsel's written advic e

• 10th January 2008 - settlement offer made 6768

Restricted-Babar AH MAD Review 2 7


PS F

OIA

Dis

clos

ure


• 26th June 2008 - date for trial set for March 200 9

• 15 th Februa ry 2009 - `new' medical opinion served 6 9

.7 0

• 16 th Februa ry 2009 - "72

• 19th February 2009 - MPA asked for approval to settle with higher offer .

• 3rd March 2009 - Gold group meeting chaired by DAC Stuart OSBORN E

attended by CEO Catherine CRAWFORD MPA 7 374

• 10th March 2009 - written offer of £60,000 to complainant

• 12th March 2009 - TSG officers shown `Giving Evidence' DV D

• 17th March 2009 - Gold group chaired by Commander Moir STEWAR T75

7 6 MPA invited but unable to attend .

• 18` " March 2009 - Gold group chaired by Commander STEWART agreed

settlement figure plus admission of liability by the MPS , a ttended by Jane

Harwood MPA .

2.8 Directorate of Public Affairs (DPA) involvement

2 .9 Due to the high profile of the Babar AHMAD case , the Directorate of

Public Affairs has been involved since 2003 .

2 . 10 The initial arrests on Operation QUARRIER led to a number of press

releases130

13 1

2.11 The Directorate of Public Affairs SOP dictates that `The DPA will share

press statements with the Metropolitan Police Authority Press office and

keep them informed of breaking news to assist Police Authority

Members who may have to respond to media enquiries ' . There appears



PS F

OIA

Dis

clos

ure


to be no reciprocal arrangements regarding the Metropolitan Police

Authority keeping the Metropolitan Police Service informed .

2 . 12 The DPA representative , " has maintained close liaiso n

with the Metropolitan Police Authority .

2 . 13 At the three main Gold group meetings in 2009 the DPA were i n

attendance on each occasion with media strategies and press release s

agreed regarding the admitted liability and judgement against th e

Commissioner.

Learning point - DPA /MPA .

It is recommended that a protocol is considered for MPS/MPA Press Liaiso n

in regard to the prior notification of the release of Press Statements b y

either organisation . (Issue 3 )

2.14 Issues of concern

1 . Civil action proceedings were not managed as a critical incident with prope r

ACPO oversight in either SO (responsible for Operation Quarrier) or C O

(responsible for the officers complained of )

2 . There are many SOPs and protocols for dealing with critical incidents , civi l

action claims and compensation authorities , including the recording of thi s

action as a Category `A' case by the DLS, but there was no responsibilit y

for oversight assigned to an ACPO office r

3 . The MPS DPA and the MPA do not share the same arrangements .

2.15 Discussion

2 . 16 This case which has been damaging to the professional reputation of th e

MPS, particularly within the Muslim community, and has attracted scrutin y

from the MPA that it was not managed as a critical incident . With hindsight ,



PS F

OIA

Dis

clos

ure


it is obvious that the circumstances of the civil action were inherently critical

and could and should have warranted consideration within critical incident

management guidance by either or both SO and CO commands . However ,

the oversight of this case had been conducted through the standard

approach to civil actions , albeit as a Category 'A' High Proflie case .

2 . 17 It could be argued that , following a long period of tranquillity (November

2005 to March 2007 when fresh lawyers were instructed) the ` tipping point '

that should have ale rted and provoked higher level interest within the two

business groups was in June 2008 upon the announcement of a trial date in

the following March .

2 . 18 It is apparent that the plethora of SOPs and protocols applicable in this area

would benefit from review and consolidation into one process .

2 .19 Recommendations - Commander DPS

• Review all SOPs and protocols applicable to critical incident management

within civil actions and concern for MPS reputation to recommend a single

SOP for agreement between the Commissioner and MPA (issue 2 )

• The Commander DPS should assess the high profile cases as identified by

the DLS when the civil action is received . He should set the strategy and

make the assessment as to whether or not the case is or could be a critical

incident in conjunction with the originating business group and lead and be

responsible for this case from this point until the final conclusion . He should

also have the responsibility to authorize both settlement and the terms of

any settlement rather than base the authority at a more junior level on the

amount involved . Full use should be made of the central oversight system

for all high risk cases (both civil and operational) through the Deputy

Commissioner's Risk Management Oversight Board .

• It is recommended that SO and CO review their systems regarding

oversight of critical incidents and mechanisms required to maintain and lead

gold groups (Issue 1 )



PS F

OIA

Dis

clos

ure


3 . The Effectiveness of the ComplaintIntervention Schem e

3 .1 Complaints Intervention Scheme

3 .2 The Complaints Intervention Scheme (CIS) in its current form wa s

published in 2006 has been in operation within the C020 Territorial

Suppo rt Group (TSG) for the past two years . (See Appendix E) .

3 .3 Prior to 2006 the TSG system for monitoring complaints was that upo n

receipt of a complaint the details were sent to the Unit Inspector to

attempt a local resolution . If this was unsuccessful the complaint was

forwarded to the Directorate of Professional Standards (DPS) fo r

investigation .

3 .4 This was the system in operation in 2003 at the time of the arrest of M r

AHMAD .I'$79

3 .5 During 2003 , the TSG relied upon either a local resolution or submissio n

of the complaint to Directorate of Professional Standards but neve r

proactively managed or analysed them with a view to reducing

complaint levels . Since the introduction of the Complaints Intervention

Scheme the situation has dramatically improved and those charged with

overseeing the system are confident it is working well .



PS F

OIA

Dis

clos

ure


3 .6 Currently , under the Complaints Intervention Scheme they now actively

supervise and monitor officer 's complaints records and in essence

operate a `traffic light system ' of monitoring complaints at an early stage

with bi-annual reviews coupled with monthly publications of outstandin g

complaints .

3 .7 The TSG on demand can furnish details of any of their officer 's

complaints records , including those of a similar nature together with

details of what action the management has taken and can includ e

analysis , personal interviews , action plans , further training and

monitoring of performance . The TSG would include this routinely on the

monthly return to the DPS .

3 .8 The 5 Area TSG has more complaints per officer than elsewhere an d

therefore , as a result a more robust system has been put in place for

them that include additional measures to those already outlined .

3.9 Following the O'BRIEN judgement, the Directorate of Legal Services

obtain details of officers' substantiated and unsubstantiated complaint s

from the Directorate of Professional Standards in order to conside r

whether they are of a similar nature and may require disclosure . This

could have significant implications in deciding on "Fight or Settle " .

3 . 11 At present only interim checks are carried out during course of a cas e

and just prior to trial . A `flagging ' system is required on the DPS

computer database `TRIBUNE ' to indicate any new misconduct or

criminal charges officers may be subject to whilst awaiting a civil action .



PS F

OIA

Dis

clos

ure


3.12 Point of concern

1 . There still remains a gap in the `flagging system' of officers whic h

effectively allow the DLS and the DPS to monitor other complaints

which may have a bearing on civil action cases .

2 . The complaints intervention scheme was not effective at the tim e

3.13 Discussion .

Although officers are subject of monitoring in respect of the complaints

they receive individually or as a group , the absence of a ` flagging system '

means complaints which , come to notice following an issued civil action

do not get notified to the DPS or the DLS .so81

Although the complaints intervention scheme was certainly a cause fo r

concern at the time , more effective systems have been put in place sinc e

to monitor complaints more effectively .

3 . 14 Learning Points - Commander DPS

It would be pertinent to check and review the effectiveness of the curren t

complaint monitoring procedures to ensure they continue to remain fit fo r

purpose .

3 .15 Recommendatio n

See recommendation 2 regarding the tracking /flagging of case files .



PS F

OIA

Dis

clos

ure


82

4 .

83

4.1

84

4 .285 After the publication of the names of the

officers on websites , threats against the officers were posted on those

websites . (See Appendix F) . 8 6

8 7

88as some precautions

were taken to protect the Officers .

4 .3 Under the Civil Procedure Rules signed statements from the witnesse s

upon whose evidence the Commissioner wished to rely had to be

served upon the claimant 's solicitors . 8990

4 .4 9 1

92 On the 18th March 2008 a conference

with 93 Counsel instructed by the DLS to act for th e

Restricted-BabarAHMAD Review 34


Commissioner, took place attended by the DPS, DLS and the officers .

MPS

FO

IA D

iscl

osur

e

4 .5

4 .8

4 .999

in a briefing

note from Edward SOLOMONS of the Directorate of Legal Services , to

the Deputy Commissioner on the 25th March 2009 . He makes three

points ;




On the 17th March 2009 the personal details of the officers were again

published on the96

website . 97

MPS

FO

IA D

iscl

osur

e

Points of concern .




MPS

FO

IA D

iscl

osur

e

Discussion

4 . 10 It is to state the obvious that a police officer has a duty to give evidence

on matters arising from the exercise of his/her office . His or her position

is the same as any other witness . If a witness can give evidence

relevant to an issue before the Cou rt and is competent then the witness

is compellable subject only to the right not to answer questions which

would implicate him or her in crime . (See CPR 34 / Cross and Tapper

on Evidence . 11th Ed P244) . In this case no officer admitted to any

wrongdoing . Each asse rted that the force that was used was both

necessa ry and reasonable . Consequently no issue arose as to self

incrimination .

4 . 11 In any case , civil or criminal , where threats are made against a witness it

may be necessa ry to take steps to ensure the safety of the witness and

his or her family . The assessment of the level of threat and of the

measures necessa ry to ensure the safety of the witness must be

matters for the judgement of those responsible for the prosecution of the

case . 104 Whilst it may

be appropriate to give a witness an assurance that all reasonable steps

will be taken to ensure their safety , it should always be made clear that

what is or is not necessa ry must be a matter for those responsible .

4 . 12105



Racfiri rFarl -Rahar AHMAII Rav iaw

MPS

FO

IA D

iscl

osur

e

106


Issues of concern .

1 .

2 .

10 7

On the 17th March 2009, 108

109the decision was made at a Gold group chaired by

Commander STEWART to make the admission of liabilit y

11 0

3 . The admission of liability and settlement left both the MPA and the

4 .

Muslim community very concerned about the way the case had bee n

conducted and impacted on their confidenc e



PS F

OIA

Dis

clos

ure


Discussion

4 . 1311 2

113 Given that most officers and staff will rarely become involved

in civil cases it would seem logical to brief officers at the outset of any

civil case as to the probable course and manner in which the case is to

be conducted , time frames for a trial and their obligations and

responsibilities as a witness for the Commissioner . At present this point

does not seem to be covered specifically by either the Directorate of

Legal Services or Directorate of Professional Standards when dealing

with officers involved in civil cases expected to go to trial . (Issue 2 )

4 . 14 The MPA were under the impression that the action would be defende d

and senior members of the Muslim community were also briefed to tha t

effect .11 4

11 5

4 . 15



PS F

OIA

Dis

clos

ure


Learning Point - Commander DPS

The Commander DPS should consider the management of police

witnesses within the gold strategy during all high profile cases .

Recommendation

It is recommended that instructions are considered and issue d

regarding officers duty to attend court and give evidence in civi l

proceedings .

Restricted-BabarAHMAD Review 4 0


PS F

OIA

Dis

clos

ure


6 . Conclusions

The difficulties that have occurred are highlighted throughout this repo rt ; however

these issues must be seen in the context that much has changed within the MPS

since 2003 with the introduction of new systems and procedures . A plethora of

SOP 's and instructions have been produced to aid organisational learning ,

however it may be useful to consolidate these as highlighted .

The officers deployed to secure entry to Mr AHMAD 's address did not feel that

there was sufficient time to develop a plan for the rapid ent ry )' 17

11 8

119 The

supervising officer inappropriately adopted the colloquialism ` deck and dominate '

to describe the taught methods for ` secure and control ' during the rapid ent ry to Mr

AHMAD 's address .'zo

12 1

122 The arrest notes made by these officers (IRB 's) were mislaid and

have never been found . The term `deck and dominate ' is not officially taught

however , the term is still used unofficially . Steps need to be taken to eliminate thi s

phrase from public order training .

This case was managed by S013 as a high profile case and it was subject of gold

groups . Not all the minutes for these meetings have been found which , indicates

that the systems at the time within this business group were not robust . The

overriding cause for concern by the reviewing officer throughout the review of this

case was the lack of consistent senior oversight , leadership and direction and the

failure by business groups to recognise and identify this case as a critical incident

at the point the civil action was issued .

It is clear that the Commander DPS has a pivotal role when high profile grade `A '

cases are identified and these cases must be managed through the ris k

management system identified in the attached recommendations in order t o



PS F

OIA

Dis

clos

ure


prevent this from happening again , and originating business groups may need t o

review their own systems to help and fully inform the Commander DPS of al l

available facts .

The complaints intervention scheme was not in force at the time of this incident,12 3

124 however, there is

now a robust complaints monitoring system in place within the TSG which ha s

been established since 2006 . The lack of `flagging cases' still remains an issue .

12 5

126 There was a lack of consistent senio r

oversight and direction from the point the civil action was issued , and it is this tha t

is the main contributing factor to the failure of this case .



PS F

OIA

Dis

clos

ure

Restricted -BabarAHMAD Review

7 . Index to Appendices

Appendix A

Appendix B

Appendix C '

Appendix D

Appendix E

Appendix F

Appendix G

Appendix H

Appendix I

Appendix J

Terms of Reference

Form 3353 - Allegations of Babar Ahmad Complaint

127

Gold Group SOP

Complaints Intervention Schem e

Text of Threats Against Office r

Delegated Authority Limits

MPA/MPS Protocol on Compensation Cases - October 200 1

Risk Management of Civil Action Litigatio n

Civil Actions SOP

Appendix K Recommendations and Learning point s


The contents of this report should not be disclosed without theauthority of the Deputy Commissioner Tim GODWIN

43

MPS

FO

IA D

iscl

osur

e

mps foia disclosure - whatdotheyknow · introduction /executive summary /recommendations and 5-11...

Documents