mr. by joseph coslett

7/28/2019 Mr. by Joseph Coslett

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This is a Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Afghanistan publication. Contents are not necessarily the official views of, or endorsed by, the U

ment, Department of Defense or CJSOTF-A. The content is edited, prepared and provided by the SOTF-32 Public Affairs Office, Kandahar Air Field, Afg

Kandahar

Oruzgan

Helmand

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4

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22

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Zabul

Herat

Farah

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NOVEMBER 2007 OUTLOOK - The enemy

situation in Helmand Province was the worst

it had been since the initial US Forces infiltra-

tion in 2002. The Musa Qala district was often

described as The Taliban Gem of Helmand. In2006 the British brokered a peace agreement

with the tribal elders of Musa Qala. This deci-

sion resulted in a much publicized, immediate

hostile take over by insurgent forces, followed by

the withdrawal of British forces that were unable

to defend themselves. The deal between the Brit-

ish and the de facto insurgent leadership set the

stage for a year-long build up of fighters, ammu-

nition stores, and the inevitable establishment

of a Taliban run governorship in the Musa Qala

district. Insurgents continued to flow into the prov-

ince bringing everything necessary for them to

create a base of operations from which to expand

their control. While the insurgency grew and man-

aged to establish itself as a force to be reckoned

with, British forces made a minimal attempt to

establish what the British Commander described

an enduring effect throughout the province. The

political dynamic in Helmand deteriorated into

an explosive situation within the Government of

Afghanistan. These volatile conditions allowed

insurgents to control a majority of the province

for an extensive period of time while the Govern-ment of Afghanistan grappled with the issue that

a large part of Helmand Province was in a state

of open rebellion. Within the district of Musa

Qala, multiple sources estimate that insurgents

numbered over 700 fighters, the largest concen-

tration of enemy fighters throughout the country.

Task Force 71 fought throughout the entire month

of May in 2007 in an attempt to gain a foothold

within Helmand Province. However, throughout

the year leading up to November 2007, insur-

gent elements were able to effectively gain and

maintain control of a MSR, Highway 611, as wellas a six district stretch consisting of Narhi Surhk,

Kajaki, Now Zad, Baghran, Sangin, and Musa

Qala. Highway 611 was key terrain for the insur-

gents due to the lucrative profits from the poppy

grown along the highway and river. The exact

profit yielded from the poppy crop and subse-

quent allocation of that profit has been something

coalition elements have never been able to accu-

rately depict. However, 90% of the worlds opium


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trade is produced in Afghanistan which is taxed locally

by insurgents throughout the country. Since the war

began in 2001, it is a common notion that much of

the revenue yielded by the poppy crops in Helmand

is used to continue the insurgency in the tri-provincearea.

Insurgents utilized tactics throughout the province

that were not typically seen in Afghanistan. Insurgents

used trenches and miles of tunnel systems to maneu-

ver rapidly on the battlefield, allowing the to stand

and fight against heavily armored or more technologi-

cally advanced coalition forces. This tactic degraded

the coalitions ability to pursue and destroy enemy

forces while conducting mounted operations. Attacks

were an everyday occurrence, and as in the case

with Fire Base (FB) Robinson, you could virtually set

your watch each day knowing when an attack would

occur on the FB itself. It was also common to see IED

emplacements within sight of the camp and all routes

coming in and out of the camp had insurgent check-

points controlling all traffic in the area. Insurgents

controlled Musa Qala, which meant they controlled

northern Helmand. Ultimately, this meant insurgents

controlled the vast majority of terrain used by coalition

forces which gave insurgents access to the rest of

Regionally Command South.

JUNE 2008 OUTLOOK -As the rotation was com-ing to a close, insurgents in Helmand were attempting

to reorganize despite previous operations conducted

by coalition forces. Special Operations Task Force-32

operations conducted to liberate Musa Qala, to disrupt

enemy forces in the Kajaki district, and the consistent

pressure in Narhi Surhk district, forced insurgents to

expend limited supplies in an attempt to defend their

sanctuaries. This kept the insurgents off balance

allowing for slight changes in the sentiment of the

local population. The insurgents entered into a period

where leaders were low on funds and unable to pay

for medical attention required for wounded insurgents,weapons, and other supplies. As a result of continu-

ous operations by elements of SOTF-32, insurgents

were forced to decrease the operational tempo and

attempt to defend their established sanctuaries in

northern Helmand. Despite the efforts of the insur-

gents, SOTF-32 elements broke through their defens-

es in the Kajaki District while other SOTF-32 elements

focused on disrupting an insurgent sanctuary in a

village five kilometers south of FB Robinson known

as Hyderabad. These operations were conducted by

small U.S. Special Forces elements along with their

Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police

partner units, but despite a relatively small number

of maneuver elements, USSF and partner units man-aged to accomplish what entire British Armor units

could not. One of the most important effects of these

operations was that it demonstrated to the enemy that

elements of SOTF-32 and their partner units could

go anywhere, pursue any objective, and accomplish

any task with sufficient determination despite their

lack of combat power. Throughout northern Helmand

and along highway 611, insurgents were forced to cut

back operations and try to defend against the continu-

ous onslaught from SOTF-32.

By the end of the winter, the insurgent leadership

in Helmand was all but eliminated. The strength of

insurgent groups faced by SOTF 32 was significantly

diminished and was forced to retrench in their strong-

holds in Kajaki, Now Zad, Baghran, and the Upper

Gereshk Valley. SOTF-32 continued to pressure the

second string insurgent leaders of which many were

killed, captured, or wounded. The lack of quality lead-

ership further degraded the insurgencys ability to

reorganize, re-supply, find effective local leaders, gain

uncontested control of areas, and coordinate attacks.

The province is no longer in a state of complete gue-

rilla warfare and chaos, but can best be described asa cesspool of disjointed and hapless groups of insur-

gents. Needless to say, the areas in which SOTF-32

conducted operations are where the vast majority of

change could be observed. Over the course of five

months, significant changes in the operating envi-

ronment that worked in the coalitions favor became

apparent. Insurgents still remain throughout the prov-

ince, but have lost much of the popular support of

the population. One clear example of this success

can be found in Musa Qala where the majority of the

population has accepted a legitimate Afghan govern-

ing authority that was facilitated by coalition opera-tions led by elements of SOTF-32. The British, who

owned the battle space and had over 5,000 soldiers

deployed in Helmand, conducted minimal operations

that achieved negligible effects. SOTF-32 was able

to effectively disrupt and degrade the insurgency in

Helmand with the employment of only one company

level headquarters, three ODAs, and a company of

U.S. Marine Special Operations Forces.


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BAGRAM AIRFIELD, Afghanistan In operations span-ning two months from late October to December, Afghan

National Security Forces, U.S. Special Forces and

Marine Special Operators defeated several insurgent

ambushes and propaganda campaign by going into

their lair and taking them down to include a top Tal-

iban commander, IEDs and killing numerous insur-

gents in northern Helmand Province.

Musa Qala is a well known insurgent safe haven,

from there most attacks were planned and supplied

to the surrounding areas. Highlighted below are someof the battles.

In November, insurgents engaged friendly forces with small arms,

rocket, mortar fire from trenches, civilian homes, and other fighting

positions. In all cases ANSF and Special Operations Forces responded

using escalation of force starting with small arms and mortars and then

precision air strikes to eliminate the insurgent threat. On several occa-

sions insurgents under a futile attempt would disengage and reinforce

and try to attack again. However, the result was the same defeat or

death. Several dozen Taliban fighters were killed after all the engage-

ments.In another engagement, the Afghan National Army dis-

rupted the emplacement of an improvised explosive

device. ANA engaged several insurgents with small

arms fire when they were in the act of placing an

IED

ANSF, SOF set stage for libera-

tion of Musa Qala, Helmand

Afghan National Security Forces combat advised by Special Operations Forces Soldiers and Marines conduc

key leader engagements and combat reconnaissance missions to deny insurgents freedom of movement in

northern Helmand Province, Afghanistan, from the end of October to December. Friendly forces defeated insur

gents during every battle and earned the trust of local village elders with each victory. The operations resulted

in multiple insurgents killed or captured, weapon caches discovered and IEDs destroyed saving Afghan lives

CJSOTF-A photos by Air Force Capt. Joseph Coslett.


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near a major road. The insurgents quickly fled

the area. SOF recovered portions of the IED

for further exploitation.

ANA decisively engaged the Taliban insur-

gents, disrupting another attempt to harm

Afghan citizens and ANA, Capt. JosephCoslett, Special Operations Task Force-32

spokesman. ANA have taken an active role

in improving the security and stability within

their region.

In another fight, ANA saved two SOF

lives during a reconnaissance patrol in the

Chineh Village. The Taliban engaged ANA-

led force with small arms and machine gun

fire. Two SOF members were pinned down

in a life threatening situation, but the ANA

quickly charged towards the members and

suppressed the enemy fire. Friendly forces

returned fire eliminating the Taliban fighting

positions.

The ANA soldiers performed with tacticalprecision and demonstrated bravery under

fire, said the USSF operational commander.

They maneuvered and provided suppressive

fire against the Taliban who had pinned down

two Soldierssaving their lives.

ANA, Afghan National Police, and USSF

respond after a suicide bomber killed himself

and injured six Afghan citizens in Gereshk.

The quick reaction and assessment of

A special operator finds a weapons cache in Musa Qala as part of many operations over two months to prep the battle

field for the future liberation of the city in Northern Helmand.


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the ANA and ANP saved the six Afghan lives, the spokes-

man said. This is another example of a violent extremist

disregard for innocent Afghan lives.

Another suicide bomber attempted to take out a Coalition

Forces convoy in Gereshk. Using a vehicle IED, the suicidebomber aimed at the lead vehicle and only damaged the

humvee and killed himself.

In the beginning of December, USSF killed Mullah Ikhala,

senior Taliban commander of Musa Qala, with a precision

munitions strike. He is reported to be responsible for the

March 5, 2007 kidnapping of Italian journalist, Daniele Mas-

trogiacomo, his interpreter, and his driver. Mastrogiacomos

interpreter and driver were executed by Taliban insurgents.

Afghan National Security Forces combat advised by Special

Operations Forces Soldiers and Marines bring the fight to theTaliban fighters in Musa Qala, Helmand Province, Afghanistan,

from the end of October to December. The operations resulted

in multiple insurgents killed or captured, weapon caches dis-

covered and IEDs destroyed saving Afghan lives. CJSOTF-A

photos by Spec. David Gunn.


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M r .

C o p y r i g h t 2 0 0 9 b y J o s e p h C o s l e t t

A l l r i g h t s r e s e r v e d . N o p a r t o f t h i s b o o k m a y b e r e p r o d u c e d i n a n y f o r m o r b y a n y e l e c t r o n i c o r

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C o s l e t t

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