muad'dib's submissions of the appellant

8/8/2019 Muad'Dib's Submissions of the Appellant.

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/muaddibs-submissions-of-the-appellant 1/22

THE SUPREME COURT No. 143/09

IN THE MATTER OF THE EUROPEAN ARREST WARRANT ACT 2003

Between/

THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, EQUALITYAND LAW REFORMApplicant

Respondent-V-

Anthony John Hill

Respondent Appellant

SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANT

The first thing that needs to be clarified is that the Appellant does not submit to any Earthly jurisdiction, and has had to use the terminology “Submissions of the Appellant” because it isthe recognized standard form and there is no other way to bring these supremely importantmatters to the attention of the Irish Nation, officially, on the record, except via their representatives in the Supreme Court of Ireland.

1. On 2nd day of April 2009 the High Court (Peart J.) ordered the surrender of theAppellant to the United Kingdom on foot of an European arrest warrant to facilitatehis prosecution for an offence described in the warrant as “doing an act tending and

intended to pervert the course of justice contrary to common law.”

Background

2. Two packages each containing DVDs entitled “7/7 Ripple Effect” and featuringwidely available video-footage were sent to Kingston Crown Court in Surrey,England. One package containing 5 DVDs (delivered on 13th May 2008) wasaddressed to the foreman of the Jury and the other containing one DVD (delivered on10th June 2008) was addressed to the presiding trial Judge. The EAW states that theDVD drew heavily from a BBC Panorama programme entitled “London under Attack” which sought to put London anti-terror plans to test and the thrust of the videois that the UK government and security forces conspired to cause explosions inCentral London on 7th July 2005 and the alleged 7/7 bombers were innocentindividuals duped into participating in what they thought was a training exercise.

3. The packages which were posted in the Republic of Ireland were delivered bystandard mail but did not reach the addressees as they were received and “intercepted”

by court staff who informed the police. The subsequent police investigation indicatedthat the handwriting on the DVDs and the envelopes was that of the Appellant. The

Affidavit of the arresting Garda Sergeant avers that the Applicant conceded that hehad sent the DVDs because he believed the alleged 7/7 bombers were innocent.

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4. The Appellant appeals against the High Court Order for his surrender and he maintainsthat his surrender is prohibited by five distinct provisions of the European ArrestWarrant Act 2003: in sections 37, 38 and 44. The Appellant’s surrender and

prosecution is also prohibited because He has Sovereign Immunity from prosecutionand surrender, by virtue of, amongst other things, the Preamble to the IrishConstitution; Article 6.1; Article 31.4; Article 34.5.1 - the Judge’s Oath; Article 44.1;Article 44.2.1.

(i) Breach of Constitutional rights. Section 37.

(ii) No crime has been committed. The prosecution is a malicious prosecution,fraudulent and politically motivated. Section 37.

(iii) Appellant’s body’s life would be in danger. Section 37.

(iv) “No corresponding offence”. The offence alleged in the body of the Europeanarrest warrant does not correspond with an offence in this jurisdiction. Section38.

(v) Ingredients of the alleged offence committed outside the issuing state. Section44.

(i) Breach of Constitutional Rights.

5. Freedom of expression / Right to communicate:The Appellant maintains that he is entitled to freely express his convictions andopinions and to communicate with others. There is no rule of law, legislativestipulation or other legal principle to warrant or otherwise justify the negating of that

constitutional freedom in deference to a potential impact the exercise of that freedommight have on the justice system of another State.

6. The available information suggests that the Appellant genuinely believes that thealleged 7/7 bombers were innocent. In that regard he simply posted packages inIreland that contained DVDs with a thesis largely drawn from a BBC panorama

programme. There is nothing in that state of affairs that constitutes a crime or justifiescircumscribing his Constitutional and/or Convention freedoms.

The Law – that is recognised by the State as being the Supreme Law of Irelandand thus superior to Common Law

Bunreacht Na hÉireann: Article 40

40.3.1° The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by itslaws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen.

40.6.1° The State guarantees liberty for the exercise of the following rights, subject

to public order and morality:

i. The right of the citizens to express freely their convictions and opinions.

The education of public opinion being, however, a matter of such graveimport to the common good, the State shall endeavour to ensure that

organs of public opinion, such as the radio, the press, the cinema,

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while preserving their rightful liberty of expression, including criticism

of Government policy, shall not be used to undermine public order or morality or the authority of the State.

Bunreacht Na hÉireann: Article 44

44.2.1° Freedom of conscience and the free profession and practice of

religion (the bonded obligation to obey God [our conscience] not men*) are , subject to public order and morality, guaranteed to every citizen.

* The Holy Bible, New Testament, Acts of the Apostles 5:29 Then Peter and the [other]Apostles answered and said, “We ought to obey God [our conscience] rather than men”.

European Convention on Human Rights.Article 10

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedomto hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without

interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema

enterprises.

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and

responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society,

in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the

prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure

of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and

impartiality of the judiciary.

The European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 provides:

37. —(1) A person shall not be surrendered under this Act if—

(a) his or her surrender would be incompatible with the State'sobligations under

(i) the Convention, or

(ii) the Protocols to the Convention,

(b) his or her surrender would constitute a contravention of any

provision of the Constitution (other than for the reason that the offence specified in the European arrest warrant is an offence to which section 38 (1)

(b) applies),

Framework Decision.

(12) This Framework Decision does not prevent a Member State from applying its

constitutional rules relating to due process, freedom of association, freedom of the press and freedom of expression in other media.

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http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2003/en/act/pub/0045/sec0038.html#partiii-sec38

http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2003/en/act/pub/0045/sec0038.html#partiii-sec38



7. The legal framework is quite clear. There is a fundamental Constitutional right to holdand express opinions and a constitutional right to communicate. Furthermore, there isa constitutional imperative and a duty upon the State to defend and vindicate those

rights.

By Section 37 of the European Arrest Warrant Act the State hasacted to defend and vindicate these rights by prohibitingsurrender where surrender would impinge upon a person’s

constitutional rights or convention rights or fail to vindicate them.

8. In Attorney General –v- Paperlink Ltd. [1984] ILRM 373, a case concerning the posting of letters, the defendant opposed the Attorney General’s application for aninjunction to restrain it from conveying letters in breach of the Post Office Acts 1908-1969. The defendant argued that the restriction infringed the right of citizens tocommunicate with one another. Costello J. stated:

It seems to me that as the act of communication is the exercise of such a basic humanfaculty that a right to communicate must inhere in the citizen by virtue of his human

personality and must be guaranteed by the Constitution. But in what Article? The

exercise of the right to communicate can take many forms and the right to expressfreely convictions and opinions is expressly provided for in Article 40.6.1° (i). But theactivity which the defendants say is inhibited in this case is that of communication byletter and as this act may involve the communication of information and not merelythe expression of convictions and opinions I do not think that the constitutional

provision dealing with the right to express convictions and opinions is the source of the citizen's right to communicate. I conclude that the very general and basic humanright to communicate which I am considering must be one of those personalunspecified rights of the citizen protected by Article 40.3.1°.

A constitution which guarantees personal rights imposes co-relative constitutional

duties on the State. In the case of those protected by Article 40.3.1° the duty imposedon the State is to guarantee in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its lawsto defend and vindicate the right to communicate. Considering the 1908 Act from the

point of view of the defendants as citizens wishing to communicate by letter I fail tosee how the Act infringes their constitutional rights. The 1908 Act does not prohibitthem from delivering a letter themselves nor from employing someone else to deliver it for them and in fact by making provision for a nation-wide service for the deliveryof letters facilitates the exercise of their rights.

The Act, as has been pointed out, prohibits the activity of making a collection of letters for delivery to others but that prohibition does not in itself involve an

interference with the citizen's right to communicate (whether it interferes with a rightto do business is a question for separate consideration). Neither the enactment itself nor its mode of operation infringes in any way the basic right to communicate whichthe defendants enjoy.

9. In Kearney –v- Minister for Justice [1986] I.R. 116, Costello J. again accepted that“the right to communicate” was protected by Article 40.3.

10. In Murphy –v- Independent Radio and Television Commission [1999] 1 I.R. 12,Barrington J. delivering the judgement of this Court considered the right tocommunicate pursuant to Article 40.3 and the right of freedom of expression

guaranteed by Article 40.6.1 and accepted the right of the citizen to express his or her needs “by words and gestures as well as by rational discourse”. He stated that theright to communicate

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...must be one of the most basic rights of man. Next to the right to nurture it is hard to

imagine any right more important to man’s survival. But in this context one is speaking of a right to convey one’s needs and emotions by words or gestures as well

as by rational discourse.

11. In Murray –v- Ireland [1985] IR 532 the State argued that the right of prisoners to beget children should be balanced against the right of the State to imprison them.Costello J. in the High Court deemed this argument to be conceptually unsound.

It is common enough in every-day discussion on human and political rights to refer to

the "right" of the State to punish, or to take life, or to expropriate property etc.

However, the indiscriminate ascriptions of "rights" to the State can lead to confusionand is not appropriate when what is in issue is the exercise by one of the organs of

government of a power conferred by law.

This is the position in the present case. The Governor of Limerick prison is detaining

the plaintiffs in custody, by virtue of a warrant issued by a court of law, after a finding of guilt in a criminal trial. The State, through the governor, is thus exercising a legal

power to deprive the plaintiffs of their constitutional right to liberty. The court is,

therefore, being asked to adjudicate on the validity of the exercise of a legal power and not on a conflict between the exercise of two competing rights. This distinction,

between the exercise of a power and the exercise of a right, (a point emphasised by some legal theorists), is a useful one to bear in mind in the context of constitutional

disputes. The Constitution, in protecting and guaranteeing the citizens' rights, has

imposed very clear and specific correlative duties on the State to protect and vindicatethem, but it has also designated the State the guardian of the common good and has

empowered it to restrict those rights in certain circumstances. So, this is not a case inwhich the court should balance the so-called "right" of the State to imprison

wrongdoers against the plaintiffs' right to beget children. The issue is, whether the

restrictions on the plaintiffs' rights, caused by the exercise of the State's power to

imprison the plaintiffs, are constitutionally permissible...

"Lawful imprisonment necessarily makes unavailable many rights and privileges of

the ordinary citizen, a 'retraction justified by the consideration underlying our penal

system.'...

12. In Herrity -v- Associated Newspapers [2008] IEHC 249 Dunne J. held that whilst incertain cases the right to privacy, which right was an unspecified right deriving fromthe Constitution, demanded an intervention of the courts, in general it was desirablethat the legislature and not the courts should prescribe the exceptions to the right of freedom of speech.

13. This Court in Mahon Tribunal –v- Keena [IESC 64] this Court noted that where, asin that case, fundamental rights are invoked as a restraint on the exercise of statutory

powers, the courts are increasingly called upon to strike a balance.Fennelly J. analysed the High Court determination and observed:

The Court reiterated the high order of importance of freedom of expression in ademocratic society and that “the non-disclosure of journalistic sources enjoys

unquestioned acceptance in our jurisprudence and interference in this area can onlyhappen where the requirements of Article 10(2) as set out above are clearly met.”

The Court addressed itself to the requirements of Article 10(2) of the Convention. Itheld that the order of the Tribunal was “prescribed by law.” Finally and mostcrucially, it had to ask whether the relief restricted “as it is now to simply a direction

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to answer questions, can be said to be necessary in a democratic society for the

prevention of the disclosure of information received in confidence in this case” and concluded in the circumstances of this case..

that the defendants’ privilege against disclosure of sources, is overwhelmingly

outweighed by the pressing social need to preserve public confidence in the

Tribunal and as there is no other means, by which this can be done other thanthe enquiry undertaken by the Tribunal, we are of opinion that the test

“necessary in a democratic society” is satisfied.”

Fennelly J. reviewed decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and concludedthat the decision in Lingens –v- Austria (1986) 87 EHRR 329 showed the generalapproach of the Court:

In exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, the Court cannot confine itself to

considering the impugned court decisions in isolation; it must look at them in the light

of the case as a whole, including the articles held against the applicant and thecontext in which they were written. The Court must determine whether the

interference at issue was ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’ and whether

the reasons adduced by the Austrian courts to justify it are ‘relevant and sufficient’.

In this connection, the Court has to recall that freedom of expression, as secured in paragraph 1 of Article 10, constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic

society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual’s self-

fulfilment. Subject to paragraph 2, it is applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference,

but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no ‘democratic

society’.

14. Unlike Murray, Paperlink et al , there is no State interest or “common good” aspectto justify the purported restriction placed upon the Appellant in this case, on thecontrary, the Appellant acted in the “public interest” and the interest of fairness and

justice. Furthermore there is no State power or other legislative provision that deservesto be balanced against the Appellant’s constitutional and convention rights as was thecase in cases such as Mahon –v- Keena supra.

15. In that regard, Peart J. does not make any distinction between what (and this is notconceded) might give rise to a legitimate balancing exercise between the Appellant’sconstitutional rights and the interests of the State or the “common good” had the

packages been directed at the justice system of this State rather than an alien jurisdiction. Nor does Peart J. identify why he felt it justifiable to interfere with theAppellant’s constitutional rights so as to his surrender exercising those rights. There isnothing contrary to Irish public interest to consider and therefore the Appellant’sconstitutional rights and presumption of innocence reign absolute. Whereas before theHigh Court the Appellant argued that it was necessary to have regard to and make adistinction between any overriding restrictions that might pertain in this State vis-à-visthe facts of this case where it was sought to dilute the Appellant’s constitutional rightsin deference to a purported public interest in another jurisdiction. However the HighCourt determined the issue in a perfunctory manner.

16. Whereas as Fennelly J. stated in Mahon –v- Keena:

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Generally, therefore, restrictions on freedom of expression must be justified by an

"overriding requirement in the public interest.”1

No such overriding requirement was identified in this case and inadequate regard washad to the rights of the Appellant and his statement that it would be an unreasonableabridgment or curtailment of his right to hold and communicate his views for him to

be surrendered.

The High Court concluded that:There is no possible merit in this point of objection. It goes without saying that in

certain circumstances and with proportionate restrictions, every citizen of, and other

person in, this State enjoys freedom to express his views, religious or otherwise. But it is clearly recognised that this is not an absolute right to say what one wishes in all

situations and to whom one chooses in all circumstances. Certain offences can becommitted by the expression of certain extreme views, opinions and statements.

Equally an expression or statement of opinion, which may not be considered to be

extreme, but which is communicated to certain persons with a criminal intent or anobjective which is contrary to law is an offence. Such expressions are prohibited by

law, and it includes any statement or communication made to or with a jury foremanor a trial judge which is intended or designed or likely to influence the outcome of a

trial. To so provide by law is a reasonable restriction on the freedom of expression.

There is no basis in this case for the surrender of the respondent being prohibited onthis ground.

17. The difficulty with the rationale of the High Court under this head is that it purports to balance and thereby circumscribe the constitutional rights of the Appellant tocommunicate his views and opinions on the basis that “certain offences” can becommitted by the expression of certain extreme views, opinions and statements or bythe expression of any views communicated with a criminal intent or objective.

However, there is no support for the contention that any extreme views were advancedin the DVDs or any finding of a criminal intent or objective on the part of theAppellant.The only evidence of object is of a genuine belief on the part of the Appellant thatthose accused of carrying out the 7/7 bombings (and not those on trial ) were innocent.The DVDs were lawfully sent to the court as an Amicus Curiae Brief* and there is nosuggestion whatsoever of a desire to cause an injustice. More fundamentally, whereasit is accepted that in certain circumstances restrictions may be imposed on one’sconstitutional rights in the interests of the common good, what was at issue here wasthe constitutional rights of the Appellant, acting in the common good and the interestof fairness and justice, vis-à-vis potentially influencing a court in another jurisdiction.

* http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amicus_curiae

The proscription on the Appellant in this case was imposed by a foreign State and theHigh Court Judge fell into error in treating that in identical terms to a proscription inthe public interest imposed by the legislature, or even a proscription under commonlaw, in this jurisdiction. Whatever about the situation were the Appellant alleged tohave inappropriately interfered with courts in this jurisdiction, the communication thattook place in this case was not prohibited as a matter of Irish law nor contrary to anyIrish public interest. It thus deserved protection. There was no perversion of the courseof justice here, or anywhere. It is maintained that it is not for the Irish Courts todeclare that an action carried out in this jurisdiction and which carries constitutional

1 IESC 647



protection i.e. the right to communicate and freedom of expression, may be interferedwith in the absence of clear and precise lawful authority to so interfere.It is maintained that this is an issue of some considerable importance and which couldhave grave ramifications for free speech in this country.For example, in an age of global communications what if an open internet letter had

been posted in this jurisdiction on a website hosted in this jurisdiction through a server also hosted in this jurisdiction to the jury in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.By virtue of the rationale of the High Court this would also be a communication which

is not protected by free speech and would render the maker subject tosurrender/extradition. It is not fanciful to imagine other types of offences which byvirtue of an expression of views on the internet (although lawful in this jurisdiction)render one liable to extradition e.g. insulting royalty or criticising governments wherethis is an offence in the other country.

The High Court dismissed the objection of the Applicant under this heading out of hand and it is maintained that the claim of the Appellant deserved more expansivescrutiny. The acts complained of in the European Arrest Warrant were committed “inthe Republic of Ireland ” (sic). Surrender is therefore prohibited by the EAWA Section38 (1)(a) for an act undertaken in Ireland, which is not an offence in this State. Section

37 provides for the exercise of such a right to express one’s views and to communicatein a clear and unhindered fashion. Had his objection received more thoroughconsideration the order for his surrender would not have been made. It is prohibitedunder sections 37 and 38 of the Act.

(ii) No crime was committed. The prosecution is a malicious prosecution, fraudulentand politically motivated.

18. Peart J. erred by not viewing the contents of the 7/7 Ripple Effect DVD, because, hadhe done so, as requested and as he said he would do, he would have seen that no crimewas committed and that this is a malicious-prosecution and politically-motivated to

punish the Appellant for his political opinion, and for exposing the Britishestablishment’s evil nature and crimes against its own and other peoples, includingIrish victims (remember the Barron Report into the Dublin and Monaghan Bombings,and the [alleged MI5] 1998 Omagh Bombing); with the assistance of their Israelicounterparts; for the whole world to see, in his film “7/7 Ripple Effect”.

Peart J. erred in law by not then prohibiting the surrender of the Appellant under theEuropean Arrest Warrant Act 2003, Part 3, Prohibition on Surrender,Section 37 (1) continued:

A person shall not be surrendered under this Act if—

(c) there are reasonable grounds for believing that –

(i) the European arrest warrant was issued in respect of the person for the purposes of facilitating his or her prosecution or punishment in the issuing state for reasonsconnected with his or her sex, race, religion, ethnic origin, nationality, language,political opinion or sexual orientation, or . .

19. There is ample evidence that the European Arrest Warrant was issued as a result of the political opinion expressed in “7/7 Ripple Effect”. The European Arrest Warrant

vaguely describes the contents of the film, and falsely claims it could have pervertedthe course of justice in the trial of the three men accused of involvement in the London

bombings 7th July 2005, who were on trial at Kingston Crown Court in 2008.

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“7/7 Ripple Effect” at no time mentions anything to do with those three men who wereon trial.

Proof of all of this can be ascertained by watching the video, as has been requested to be done by this court.

Peart J. on March 19th 2009 said he would watch “7/7 Ripple Effect” before making

his ruling. Then on April 2

nd

2009 he said he had not watched “7/7 Ripple Effect”. Indoing so Peart J. has failed to fully and to properly examine and scrutinise evidencethat is vital in this case, as the European Arrest Warrant was issued based on thecontents of the film.Furthermore this failure to watch the DVD “7/7 Ripple Effect” is akin to writing amovie or book review based on the back page summary, but without watching or reading it. Therefore, by doing so, one could never fully assess and understand all of the small details and intricacies involved to properly gain a true and validunderstanding of the subject matter.For an Irish judge to act in this way is to violate a person’s right to a just and fair trial

based on facts and evidence. Peart J. refused to look at the facts and evidence by

watching the DVD “7/7 Ripple Effect”, but relied on the Issuing State’s biasedsummary, which is nothing but their own spin / interpretation of what the DVD “7/7Ripple Effect” is about.Peart J. stated in his judgement April 2nd 2009 that he had not viewed the video on the

basis that to do so would “run the risk of entering upon the merits of the prosecutioncase” against the Appellant. While at the same time Peart J. accepted that thesummary of what the DVD was about contained in the Issuing State’s EAW, whichthe Minister's case is based upon, was all he needed to understand what the DVD wasabout. He stated that watching the film would clearly “run the risk of entering uponthe merits of the prosecution case” against the Appellant. Yet Peart J. was prepared toand did accept this version / interpretation without ever watching and examining the

content of the DVD. This shows a clear contradiction in the judgement given by PeartJ and bias against the Appellant and favour towards the prosecution.In accepting the summary of the DVD from the Issuing State, i.e. their biasedinterpretation of what they think the DVD is about, Peart J. entered upon the merits of the prosecution case. That summary was written by people who are seeking to

prosecute the Appellant with the prospect of potentially life imprisonment, so clearly,to accept their summary version without examining it and without watching the DVDhimself is entering upon the merits of the prosecution case, while at the same timeclaiming he did not watch the DVD in order to avoid this situation.It would appear to be quite ironic that Peart J. created the opposite effect of what hissaid intention was, and thus it must be corrected by this court to ensure that this favour shown to the Minister is overturned by this court, by watching the DVD “7/7 RippleEffect” with an open mind, i.e. without fear or favour, affection or ill-will towardseither side in this case, as is stated in the Judge’s Oath of Office.

European Arrest Warrant 2003, Part 3 Prohibition on Surrender

(ii) in the prosecution or punishment of the person in the issuing state, he or she will be treated less favourably than a person who –

(ll) does not hold the same political opinions as him or her,

Or (iii) were the person to be surrendered to the issuing state –

(ll) he or she would be tortured or subjected to other inhuman or degrading

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treatment.

The issuing authority is a criminal organisation, that has no jurisdiction, and has beenfound guilty of facilitating extraordinary rendition and the torture of innocent Britishcitizens. Thus surrender is prohibited under the EAW Act, Part 3, above.

This charge against the Appellant is clearly politically-motivated, fraudulent and is acriminally malicious-prosecution, contravening the constitutional right to express

political opinion that is also guaranteed by the European Convention on HumanRights, Article 10.1. Thus surrender is prohibited under the EAW Act, Part 3, above.

20. For a crime to have been committed under Common Law there are two conditions thathave to be satisfied, or there is NO crime:-

(1) There must be a victim.(2) Harm and/or loss must have been caused to the victim.

In this case there is no victim and there has been no harm or loss caused, therefore NOcrime has been committed and the charge is not only malicious, but also fraudulent,

for the former reasons and the following reason, and is a heinous and treasonous crimeagainst the Appellant.

The British “crown” is not only acting fraudulently by bringing this false andfraudulent charge against the Appellant, but also in fraudulently claiming to be the“crown”. As the “crown” is fraudulently and criminally claiming to be the Crown,which is a criminal enterprise, then any act that it commits is also fraudulent, criminaland thus not only null and void, but also punishable by law.

Mrs. Elizabeth Battenberg/Mountbatten; unlawfully residing in Buckingham Palace,London; also known by the criminal aliases Windsor and QE2, was knowingly andwillfully, with malice-aforethought, fraudulently crowned on a fake CoronationStone / Lia Fail / Stone of Destiny in 1953; has broken her Coronation Oath oninnumerable occasions; thus also nullifying the fraudulent coronation, and has beenfraudulently masquerading as the rightful British Sovereign/Crown for the last 57years, which the Appellant can prove beyond doubt, and is a major part of why thefraudulent British so-called “crown” is attacking the Appellant with this false,malicious charge and warrant. Mrs. E. Battenberg should be arrested for her innumerable acts of high-treason against God and Christ, whose church she claims tohead.

The fraudulent British so-called “crown”, which has no jurisdiction, then compoundedtheir crimes by fraudulently applying, without jurisdiction, to the European Court for an European Arrest Warrant.

In an effort to try to hide their crimes, and make it impossible for the Appellant to beable to defend himself, they then had their agents in the Dublin Extradition Branch of An Garda Siochána fraudulently, wrongfully arrest the Appellant, burgle his home andsteal the Appellant’s computers, printer , ancilliary equipment and importantdocuments that were not listed in the fraudulent arrest warrant; because they provethese facts to be true.

(iii) Appellant’s body’s life would be in danger.

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21. The Appellant maintains that there are more than enough grounds to reasonsably believe, for the foregoing reasons, amongst others, that there is a great risk to his body’s life, and thus to the lives of all of mankind, if he is extradited to the U.K., because they are mass-murderers; they hate him; they have a “shoot-to-kill policy”and have already admitted to having shot and killed a number of innocent peoplewhom the authorities have falsely and wrongfully accused of being terrorists; and theauthorities have been found guilty of assisting in “extraordinary rendition” and thetorture of innocent British citizens. Thus surrender is prohibited by the EAW Act.

Please see the cases of Moazzam Begg and Binyam Mohamed and the ruling by theU.K. Court of Appeals for proof, and there are at least 15 other cases under investigation.http://www.reprieve.org.uk/2010_02_10binyam_secrecy

The issuing authority can and do also imprison people for 42 days without charge, andcan keep releasing and re-arresting anyone and thus detain them indefinitely withoutcharging them.

22. The Appellant maintains that He would not get a fair trial in the U.K., like the

Guildford 4, the Birmingham 6, the Maguire 7 and countless others.

23. The British government’s official propaganda organ, the BBC, has already made and broadcast a television programme (Conspiracy Files 7/7) publicly attacking theAppellant, thereby committing contempt of court in blackening His name, by inferringthat He is a fugitive criminal, and this is further proof that He could not receive a fair trial from the fraudulent British “so-called” authorities in the U.K.http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8124540.stm

24. Peart J. erred in law by not prohibiting the Appellant’s surrender under the EuropeanArrest Warrant Act 2003, Part 3, (ll) as quoted above.

(iv) No corresponding offence.

25. Section 38 of the Act prohibits surrender for offences not specified in Article 2.2 of the Framework Decision, (ticked offences) unless the ingredients of the offence, theacts or omissions alleged, correspond with an Irish offence.

38.—(1) Subject to subsection (2), a person shall not be

surrendered to an issuing state under this Act in

respect of an offence unless—

(a) the offence corresponds to an offence under the lawof the State, and— ….

Article 2 of the Framework Decision provides:

(1.) A European arrest warrant may be issued for acts punishable by the law of theissuing Member State by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum

period of at least 12 months or,

where a sentence has been passed or a detention order has been made, for sentencesof at least four months...

(4.) For offences other than those covered by paragraph 2, surrender may be subject to

the condition that the acts for which the European arrest warrant has been issued

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constitute an offence under the law of the executing Member State, whatever the

constituent elements or however it is described.2

26. The single offence outlined in the warrant against the Appellant is not a “tickedoffence” and thus for a valid surrender requires that the “correspondence” bedemonstrated. Section 5 defines “correspondence” for the purposes of the Act.

For the purposes of this Act, an offence specified in a European Arrest Warrant

corresponds to an offence under the law of the State, where the act or omission that constitutes the offence so specified would, if committed in the State on the date on

which the European arrest warrant is issued, constitute an offence under the law of

the State.3

The definition of “correspondence” is thus predicated on the basis that if the relevantalleged act or omission was committed in Ireland it would constitute an offence here.That requires an analysis of what was done.

27. In Attorney General –v- Dyer 4 this Court reviewed the authorities and endorsed thetest for assessing “correspondence” as previously outlined in Hanlon –v- Fleming 5

The required correspondence of offences is not shown by the mere proof that the

offence specified in the warrant has the same name as that of an offence in this State.

It is the essential factual ingredients that determine whether two offences have the

necessary correspondence. If an offence is specified in the warrant merely by thename by which it is known in the requesting State, it does not follow that because

there is an offence in this State which goes by the same name, the two offencescorrespond with each other. They may be crucially different in essence. 6

The [correspondence issue] raises the question whether the specified offence has the

required correspondence with an offence under the law of this State. The relevant decisions of this Court, such as The State (Furlong) –v- Kelly, Wyatt –v- McLoughlinand Wilson –v- Sheehan show that it is a question of looking at the factual

components of the offence specified in the warrant, regardless of the name given to it,

and seeing if those factual components, in their entirety or in their near-entirety,would constitute an offence which, if committed in this State, could be said to be a

corresponding offence of the required gravity. 7

28. In Attorney General –v- Hilton8 this Court examined Irish Law for a correspondingoffence to “cheating the public revenue”:

The test for determining “correspondence” when analysing an offence of another jurisdiction is well established in Irish law.

The court looks to the alleged acts of the person sought as stated on the warrant and

considers whether they would constitute an offence in this jurisdiction.

2 Our emphasis3 Our emphasis4 [2004] 1 IR 405 [1981] IR 4896 [2004] 1 IR 40 at p 48 per Fennelly J.7 Ibid at page 49. Our emphasis.8 [2005] 2 IR 375 at page 380 per Denham J.

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29. In the cases of Ferenca9 and Desjatnikovs10 this Court approved of this test in thecontext of EAWs.

The learned High Court judge pointed out that the law in this State required adishonest intent, he reviewed the facts on the warrant and held:-

"…[the] facts do not seem to me to correspond to an offence of theft under s.4 giventhe absence of dishonest intent alleged in the factual background."

Peart J. looked at the facts and acts alleged on the warrant, analysed whether they

would constitute an offence in Ireland, and reached a conclusion. I would affirm the

finding of the High Court that there is no corresponding offence. 11

30. On the basis of the foregoing, it is the “constituent elements,” 12 the “essential factualingredients”13 of the offence in the requesting State that is of concern in assessingwhether or not there is correspondence, subject to the rider that where the relevantalleged acts are committed in the State it is an offence here too.

31. The ingredients of the common law offence that the prosecution will be required to

prove are outlined in the warrant as:

• The accused did some act or a series of acts which has a tendency to pervertthe course of justice.

• The accused did that act or that series of acts intending it to pervert the courseof justice.

• A course of justice had been embarked upon.

32. On the assumption that the common law offence subsists in this jurisdiction and thesame factual ingredients constitute that offence, it is necessary to examine the facts

disclosed in the warrant to see if that which is alleged against the Appellant meets thestatutory definition of an offence and “correspondence” so as to override the prohibition against surrender.

33. The Oxford Dictionary definition of “pervert” is (1) to alter from an original meaningor state to a distortion of what was first intended. (2) Lead away from what is right,natural or acceptable.“Justice” is defined in the dictionary as “just behavior or treatment” or “the quality of

being fair and reasonable” whereas “injustice” is defined as “a lack of justice” or “anunjust act or occurrence”.

34. The surrender of the Appellant is sought, so that he can be put on trial in England, or so they claim, for posting packages in Ireland addressed, c/o the Court , to an EnglishJudge and to the foreman of an English Jury. We know the packages containednothing except DVDs but the only information provided in the warrant is that thevideo drew heavily from a BBC Panorama programme, the footage of which is widelyavailable and the “thrust of the video” suggested that the alleged 7/7 bombers (not the

three men on trial ) were innocent.

9 [2008] 4 I.R. 48010 2009 1 I.R. 61811 Ibid per Denham J. at 626.12 Article 2 of the Framework Decision13 A.G. –v- Dyer [2004] 1 IR 40

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35. The affidavit of Sergeant Fallon supports the assertion that this was the genuine belief of the Appellant. There is nothing to suggest any intent or tendency to cause aninjustice and despite the fact that at the request of the Appellant a copy of the DVDwas tendered to the High Court and it was requested that it be viewed in the surrender

proceedings, the DVD was not viewed by the High Court and accordingly the precisefactual nature of the alleged offence is not readily apparent such that the High Courtwas not properly in a position to conclude that the alleged acts constituted an offence.

36. It is maintained that the alleged act of sending a DVD containing an alternative thesisin which the Appellant firmly believed, does not have a tendency to “pervert” thecourse of justice. If there was no pre-determination, as is mandatory in a fair trial,there was nothing to alter. There is no suggestion that the Appellant wanted anythingother than a result that was right, natural and acceptable. He believes the alleged 7/7

bombers were innocent and sent the DVDs as an Amicus Curiae Brief . There isnothing to suggest he made any assertions in relation to the persons on trial.

37. The Appellant sought to rely on the DVD as evidence to support a lack of correspondence and prove that no crime was committed. This was indicated to theCourt on a mention date in advance of the hearing and a court-room with DVD

facilities was specially allocated for the hearing. However on the hearing date theCentral Authority objected to the playing of the video on the premise that it might

provide the Appellant with a platform for his opinions. In doing so the Minister clearlysought to breach the Appellant’s Constitutional Right to freely express his politicalopinion, which is contrary to the Minister’s sworn duty to uphold the Constitution, andthat very same constitutionally-protected right that the Minister soughtunconstitutionally to breach, for which the Minister should be fired.In the circumstances the Court declined to view the video at the hearing, but Peart J.stated that he would view it in private in the course of his deliberations. However,when delivering judgement, Peart J. stated that he had not viewed the video on the

basis that to do so would “run the risk of entering upon the merits of the prosecutioncase” against the Appellant.It is accepted that it is not for the Irish Courts to consider the strength of the

prosecution case against the appellant (See Minister for Justice, Equality and LawReform –v- Stafford, Supreme Court, 17th December 2009). However, the Appellant’sargument here is that the Court is required to engage with the facts of this case incircumstances where correspondence is in issue.

38. It is maintained that the Judge was in error in so concluding, firstly because thecontent of the DVD went to the very core of the assessment of correspondence. If thecontents of the DVD did not disclose a tendency to pervert the course of justice, thenno crime was committed and correspondence is not made out and surrender is

prohibited. The High Court had a duty to investigate that matter as part of thesurrender process and in that regard the merits of the prosecution case is highlyrelevant. If there is no factual basis to sustain an allegation of perversion of justiceand/or intent towards that end, surrender is prohibited. The High Court was notentitled to curtail its enquiry in deference to the U.K. authorities, or to the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform.

39. Secondly, the Judge erred in determining that the DVD “obviously contained material

which is believed by the [Appellant] to be at least relevant to the subject matter of thecharges before the Crown Court, as otherwise he would not have sent it .” In the first

instance that finding engages with the merits of the prosecution case and runs contraryto the Trial Judge’s reason for not viewing the video, and furthermore, in so far as itrepresents a determination that the Appellant committed the actus reus of the offenceit does not factor into the equation the relevant mens rea, an intent to prejudice, an

14



essential element of the offence and in respect of which the only evidence before theCourt was the belief of the Appellant that the alleged 7/7 bombers were innocent. It isthe absence of any of the requisite mens rea that proved fatal to “correspondence” inthe Dyer case. In any event there was no basis for a conclusion that an “injustice”might have been caused, rather than an injustice being prevented. In that regard PeartJ. erred as a matter of law in correlating influencing the “outcome” of a trial with theconcept of “injustice”. In any event, the rationale of the High Court Judge amounted tosupposition, ignored available factual ingredients and it was not a valid basis for

concluding there was a crime or correspondence.

40. Whereas in his judgement Peart J. quoted from Archbold at paragraph 28-15 to theeffect that “any approach to a jury to discuss a case may amount to an attempt to

pervert the course of justice” it is clear from that statement that not every approachwill amount to such an attempt. Whether it does or does not will depend on the facts of the particular case. In the Mickleburgh case cited by Archbold there had been anumber of discussions with and statements taken from a jury foreman concerningdeliberations and votes by the jury. The House of Lords held that the leave of theCourt would be required in such circumstances.By contrast, in this instance the contents of the DVD represent the entirety of the

attempted communication with the court, it does not tend to pervert justice and it isimperative that the DVD should have been viewed. In any event, there was noapproach to or any engagement or discussion with the jury in this case.

41. Peart J. held that whereas certain DVDs might be sent to the jury without incurringliability, the DVD in this case is not regarded by the issuing judicial authority as beingso benign. However, the issuing judicial authority in this case makes no suchassertion.Of importance in this case is the failure to assert at any point in the European ArrestWarrant that there was an act which had (a) a tendency to pervert the course of justiceor (b) that the Appellant did the act or acts intending it to pervert the course of justice.This is not asserted in any manner in the case.

42. As it happens in this case, the relevant acts were committed here, and thus if it is a“corresponding offence” then what it is alleged against the Appellant must also be anoffence contrary to Irish law. As a corollary, if it is not an offence contrary to Irishlaw, it cannot be a “corresponding offence” and his surrender is prohibited.The Appellant maintains there was no crime and it is not a corresponding offence suchthat his surrender is prohibited by section 38 of the Act.

43. Peart J. erred in law by allowing the Minister to submit the statement that, from thelearned judge’s legal-experience, he must have known was a lie; for which the

Minister should be charged with committing perjury; and the learned judge also erred by then accepting that lie into the hearing. That false statement/lie being that there isno definition in Irish law of perverting the course of justice. Perverting the course of

justice, as the Minister MUST know, is clearly defined in the Irish Criminal JusticeAct, 1999,http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1999/en/act/pub/0010/sec0041.html#partvi-sec41

Section 41. – (1) Without prejudice to any provision made by any other enactment or rule of law, a person – who harms or threatens, menaces or in any other way intimidates or puts infear another person who is assisting in the investigation by the Garda Siochána

of an offence or is a witness or potential witness or a juror or potential juror in proceedings for an offence, or a member of his or her family,with the intention thereby of causing the investigation or the course of justice

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to be obstructed, perverted or interfered with, shall be guilty of an offence.44. Peart J. erred in law by then allowing the Minister to build on that lie; that there is no

definition in Irish law of perverting the course of justice; to introduce into the hearing,a different offence in English law, not Irish law: stating that we have to accept theEnglish law, in an Irish court: that of attempting to influence a judge or jury. If it is acrime to attempt to influence a judge or jury, then every barrister and solicitor is guiltyof that crime, in every case.

45. Peart J. erred in law by allowing the Minister to advance this argument when it is based on a lie and it is a different offence from that with which the Appellant ischarged, and now the Minister is at it again having subsequently introduced embracery(from 1360AD) and contempt of court, that appear nowhere in the EAW that is thesubject of this case, as is required by law. Who is he serving?

46. Peart J. erred by not viewing the contents of the 7/7 Ripple Effect DVD as requestedand thereby seeing that the contents of the DVD, and the act of sending them, are notthreatening, menacing, or in any way intimidating or fear inducing. Also that itcontains nothing that would be to the detriment of public order, nor to public moralityand it absolutely does not mention the 3 men who were on trial at Kingston Crown

Court in 2008, in whose trial the Appellant is falsely and maliciously accused of tryingto pervert the course of justice. It mentions 4 other men not accused of the crimesthese 3 men were accused of. If Peart J. had viewed the contents, as was requested andhe said he would do so, he would have seen that nothing in the contents, or thesending of the DVDs, corresponded with an offence in Irish law.If the four alleged 7/7 bombers were guilty, and a DVD proving their guilt had beensent, would the Appellant be facing this charge? No. Thus demonstrating their lack of impartiality, and that it is a politically-motivated malicious-prosecution.

47. Peart J. erred in law by refusing to allow the Appellant to present his defence duringthe surrender proceedings.

(v) Place of Commission

48. Section 44 of the EAWA prohibits surrender if the offence alleged in the EAW wascommitted outside the issuing State unless the act or omission constitutes an offencehere. Thus, as a pre-requisite to the making of a surrender order it is incumbent uponthe Court to determine and be satisfied that there was an offence and it was committedin the issuing State. The Court did not and could not do so here. In such circumstancesit is maintained that surrender is prohibited under Part 3 of the Act.

Section 44: A person shall not be surrendered under this Act if the offence specified in the European arrest warrant issue in respect of him or her wascommitted or is alleged to have been committed in a place other than the

issuing state and the act or omission of which the offence consists does not, by

virtue of having been committed in a place other than the State, constitute anoffence under the law of the State.

49. In the High Court the Minister asserted that though often couched as “an attempt”, theoffence in question here is not an inchoate offence, and the full offence is committedwhen the DVDs were posted. That is consistent with the substance of the charge“doing an act tending and intended to...” In the circumstances the offence specified in

the European Arrest Warrant was not committed within the jurisdiction of the issuingstate and surrender decision is governed by section 44.

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50. The learned Judge erred in law by deciding this issue and the case in general on the basis of a lie and a proposition of law and/or cases not raised or opened at the hearingand which the Appellant had no opportunity to address. Without prejudice to theforegoing the learned Judge erred by considering and applying the cases of Reg. –v-Doot [1973] AC 807 and DPP –v- Stonehouse [1978] AC 55 which concerned theoffence of conspiracy and related to persons present in the territory of the U.K. duringthe currency of that conspiracy. There is no allegation of a conspiracy in this casemuch less any suggestion that a party to a conspiracy set foot in the U.K. jurisdiction

during the currency of a conspiracy, a requirement of the case law upon which theHigh Court made its determination. In the absence of other precedent, the Appellantshould have been afforded an opportunity to address this issue.Further the extra-territorial effect of criminal law must be clear and unambiguous asotherwise the effect is merely within the jurisdiction. The legislature has now giventhe offence of conspiracy extra-territorial effect by virtue of section 71 of the CriminalJustice Act 2006. Other offences have been given such extra-territorial effect in other Acts, see, for example, the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2009.There is no suggestion that the offence of perverting the course of justice, which itself is a little used offence in this jurisdiction, has any such extra-territorial effect.

51. The surrender of the Appellant is prohibited and/or cannot be ordered because therewas no offence committed and he was, at all times, outside the boundaries of theissuing State. Thus the precondition prescribed by the legislature is not satisfied andhis surrender is prohibited by section 44 of the Act. As this Court ruled in Ministerfor Justice, Equality and Law Reform -v- Tobin14,

It follows that the High Court was neither entitled nor bound, on the basis of a correct interpretation of the relevant section to order the surrender of the respondent. It

follows that his surrender cannot be ordered. 15

Conclusion

52. The surrender of the Appellant is prohibited under the EAWA 2003 on the fivedistinct grounds. In the first instance the alleged acts of commission, the factualingredients of the offence as outlined in the European arrest warrant do not correspondwith an Irish offence. The factual matrix disclosed by the issuing judicial authoritydoes not meet the definition of the charge under Irish law, “correspondence” is notsatisfied and thus surrender is prohibited by section 38 of the Act.Secondly, all the acts and the completion of the alleged offence occurred in Irelandand thus if an offence was committed, it is punishable under Irish law and surrender is

prohibited by section 44 of the Act.Furthermore, the act of posting a letter or package because one believes in theinnocence of certain parties is a constitutionally protected freedom to hold an opinionand/or communicate a view, there is no legitimate basis for curtailing that right indeference to the justice system of another state. In that regard inter alia the surrender of the Appellant is prohibited by section 37 of the Act.

53. The Appellant’s surrender and prosecution is also prohibited because He hasSovereign Immunity from prosecution and surrender, by virtue of, amongst other things, the “Preamble to the Irish Constitution”; Article 6.1; Article 31.4; Article34.5.1 – “The Judge’s Oath”; Article 44.1 and thus the Minister of State and the Stateitself and any and all other states have no jurisdiction over the Appellant.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

14 [2008] IESC 315 Ibid per Fennelly J.

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Preamble to the Irish Constitution.

In the Name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is allauthority and to Whom, as our final end, all actions bothof men and States must be referred,We, the people of Éire,Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our DivineLord, Jesus Christ, Who sustained our fathers through

centuries of trial, . . . .

ARTICLE 6.1All powers of government, legislative, executive and

judicial, derive, under God, from the people, whose rightit is to designate the rulers of the State and, in final appeal,to decide all questions of national policy, according tothe requirements of the common good.

ARTICLE 31.4Every member of the Council of State shall at the first

meeting thereof which he attends as a member take andsubscribe a declaration in the following form:“In the presence of Almighty God I, , do solemnlyand sincerely promise and declare that I will faithfullyand conscientiously fulfil my duties as a member of the Council of State.”

ARTICLE 34.5.1Every person appointed a judge under this Constitutionshall make and subscribe the following declaration:“In the presence of Almighty God I, do solemnlyand sincerely promise and declare that I will duly andfaithfully and to the best of my knowledge and power execute the office of Chief Justice (or as the case may be)without fear or favour, affection or ill-will towards anyman, and that I will uphold the Constitution and the laws.May God direct and sustain me.”

ARTICLE 44.1ReligionThe State acknowledges that the homage of public worshipis due to Almighty God. It shall hold His Name inreverence, and shall respect and honour religion.

ARTICLE 44.2.1Freedom of conscience and the free profession and practice of religion (the

bonded obligation to obey God [our conscience] not men*) are, subject to public order and morality, guaranteed to every citizen.

* The Holy Bible, New Testament, Acts of the Apostles 5:29 Then Peter and the [other]Apostles answered and said, “We ought to obey God [our conscience] rather than men”.

54. It follows that the Minister was not entitled to bring any charge against the Appellant,and the High Court was neither bound nor entitled to order the Appellant’s surrender.The Order for His surrender should not have been made. It is respectfully maintained

18



that the decision of the High Court should be reversed. The appeal should be allowedand the Appellant discharged for the benefit and the safety of all of mankind.Also for the Record.

The Appellant finds it ironic, appalling and disgusting, that the Minister who swore a solemn oath before Almighty God to uphold the God-givenand constitutionally-protected rights of the Appellant and everyone who

believes in freedom and justice, who’s duty it is to God [their conscience]and their fellow-man to stand-up and speak truth to power in defence of that freedom and justice; instead of being presumed innocent; is beingattacked and having vile, slanderous, blasphemous, evil accusations madeagainst him for exercising those rights, by the very person (the Minister)who swore to uphold and defend those very same rights and duties, thatthe brave and honourable founders of this Irish Republic fought, bled anddied for. The Minister is acting like a lick-spittle lackey of the evilcriminal U.K. Nazi fascist police-state, instead of doing his duty of

protecting the citizens of this country, as he solemnly swore to do. By sodoing the Minister is breaking his oath of office and is therefore lawfullyno longer the Minister with immediate-effect and should clear his desk and vacate his office, so that a more honourable and righteous man cantake his place. He should not judge other people by his own evil standardsand should be ashamed of himself. Éireann go Brách.

Gospel of Luke 4:18 The Spirit of the Lord [is] upon me, because He hath anointed me to preach the gospel to the poor; He hath sent me to heal the brokenhearted, to preachdeliverance to the captives, and recovering of sight to the blind, to set at liberty them that are

bruised,4:19 To preach the acceptable year of the Lord (Isa. 61:1-3).4:20 And he closed the Book, and he gave [it] again to the minister, and sat down. And theeyes of all them that were in the church were fastened on him.4:21 And he began to say unto them, This day is this Scripture fulfilled in your ears.

NOW HERE COMES THE REAL REASON THAT THIS CASE HAS BEENBROUGHT BEFORE THE IRISH SUPREME COURT:-

THE FINAL WARNING FOR THE IRISH NATION.

The last page of the Holy Bible, Old Testament:-

Malachi 4:1 For, behold, the Day cometh, that shall burn like an oven; and all the proud, yea,and all that do wickedly, shall be stubble: and the day that cometh shall burn them up, saiththe "I AM" Lord of hosts, that it shall leave of them neither root nor branch (nothing).4:2 But unto you that fear My name shall the Sun of Righteousness arise with healing in hiswings; and ye shall go forth, and grow up as calves of the stall.4:3 And ye shall tread down the wicked; for they shall be ashes under the soles of your feet inThe Day that I shall do [this], saith the "I AM" Lord of hosts.4:4 Remember ye and return to The Law of Moses My servant, which I commanded unto himin Horeb for all Israel, [with] the Statutes and Judgments ( see Psalm 2:10, below).

4:5 Behold, I will send you Elijah the Prophet before the coming of the great and dreadfulDay of the "I AM" (Sura 43:61):4:6 And he shall turn the heart of the fathers to the children, and the heart of the children to

19



their fathers, lest I come and smite the earth with a curse (for details of the curse, please seeverse 1, above).

In plain English, that means that unless the Irish Nation repeals and ceases anddesists from enforcing ALL man-made legislation, including, but not limited to:Common Law and Precedents; man-made Statutes and Acts; European Unionlegislation; Canon Law; Roman Law; English Law, Talmudic Law and keepsand enforces ONLY the “I AM” God’s Laws, Statutes and Judgements; that Wegave to Moses at Sinai and which are written in the five Books of Moses in theHoly Bible; and NO other, and listens to me, and acknowledges my Sovereigntyand does EXACTLY as I say, my Father is going to burn all of your bodies toashes, as He has clearly stated in Malachi ch. 4 above, and your souls (theREAL you) will spend eternity in the Lake of Fire and Brimstone, regretting it.

The choice is yours, so please take your time and choose EXTREMELYcarefully.

Amen – So be it.

Now please study and live, “The Way home or face The Fire” – http://thewayhomeorfacethefire.net- the title of which is self-explanatory.

The King of kings’ Bible - Psalm 2

2:1 Why do the unenlightened rage, and the people imagine a futile thing?2:2 The kings of the earth set themselves, and the rulers take counsel together, against the "I

AM", and against His Anointed, (2 Esd. 13:34) [saying],2:3 Let us break Their bonds asunder, and cast away Their cords from us.2:4 He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh: the Lord shall make fools of them.2:5 Then shall He speak unto them in His wrath, and terrify them in His fury.2:6 Yet have I set My King (to govern - Isa. 9:6-7) upon My Holy Hill of Gathering (Isa.33:16; 2 Esd. 13:35).2:7 I will declare the decree: the "I AM" hath said unto me, Thou [art] My Son; this day haveI created for thee.2:8 Ask of Me, and I shall give [thee] the unenlightened [for] thine inheritance, and theuttermost parts of the earth [for] thy possession.2:9 Thou shalt break them with a rod of iron; thou shalt dash them in pieces like a potter's

vessel (Rev. 12:5).2:10 Be wise now therefore, O ye kings: be instructed, ye judges of the earth.2:11 Serve the "I AM" with fear, and rejoice with trembling.2:12 Kiss My Son, lest he be angry, and ye perish [from] The Way, when his wrath iskindled just a little (Luke 19:27). Blessed [are] all they that put their trust in him.

http://jahtruth.net/kofkad.htm

Now please study “On The Way To Emmaus Again” – http://jahtruth.net/emmau2.htm - for further confirmation of who I REALLYam, and what this is really all about.

Right now you probably have two questions, the first being: Is he serious? Theanswer to that is: Yes. Absolutely.

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http://thewayhomeorfacethefire.net/


http://jahtruth.net/emmau2.htm

http://thewayhomeorfacethefire.net/


http://jahtruth.net/emmau2.htm



The second question that logically follows from that is: Does he really expect usto believe that he is Christ? The answer to that is twofold and to answer the first

part of it I will quote for you the Scripture that quotes what I said 2,000 yearsago.

Luke 17:26 And as it was in the days of Noah, so shall it be also in the days of the Son of Man.17:27 They did eat, they drank, they married wives, they were given in marriage, until the day

that Noah entered into the ark, and the flood came, and destroyed them all.17:28 Likewise also as it was in the days of Lot; they did eat, they drank, they bought, theysold, they planted, they builded;17:29 But the same day that Lot went out of Sodom it rained fire and brimstone from heaven,and destroyed [them] all.17:30 Even thus shall it be in the day when the Son of Man is revealed.

In the days of Noah everyone wrongly thought he was insane, and very foolishlylaughed at him, except for just seven members of his family, and EVERYONEelse who disbelieved him was executed in The Flood. Only eight people out of

the entire population of the Earth survived The Flood.So that statement that I made 2,000 years ago means that only the people who

believe and obey me will survive The Fire, and EVERYONE who chooses todisbelieve me will burn, which is completely in harmony with the other Scriptures that I have previously quoted.

So the first part of my answer to your second question: Do I really expect you to believe that I am Christ? The answer is: Yes. Absolutely.

And in reply to the second part of the twofold answer: Do I think that you will

believe that I am Christ? The answer is: Probably not, as I already said so 2,000years ago, and said what will happen to every single person who does not

believe me and does not want me to rule over them.

My Father and I can’t make it any plainer than that.

So now it is up to you to decide the fate of not only yourselves, but the entireIrish Nation, which is why this had to come to the Irish Supreme Court.

Please choose wisely.

Anthony John Hill

Christ - Rí na hÉireann* / Rex MundiKing of kings and of the whole World

* Christ Rí na hÉireann – Ireland’s Destiny, for which Ireland, the Isle of Destiny, was given its name – Inis Fáil.

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THE SUPREME COURT No. 143/09

IN THE MATTER OF THE EUROPEAN ARREST WARRANT ACT 2003

Between/

THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, EQUALITYAND LAW REFORM

ApplicantRespondent

-V-

Anthony John Hill Respondent

Appellant

SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANT

Anthony John Hill,[email protected]

muad'dib's submissions of the appellant

Documents