muller on indian thought

8/7/2019 Muller on Indian Thought

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APPENDIX.

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.APPENDIX.

-OIl INDIAN LOGIc., .


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ON INDIAN LOGIC.-

llHE sciences of Logic and of Grammar were, 88 &r . .history allows us to judge, invented or originally conceived by two nations only, by Hindus and GreeD.All other nations, if they ever cultivated these sciences, received the first impulse from without. TheRomans from the GreeD, the Germans from the Romans, the .Atabtfrom the GreeD, the Jews from the Arabs.That the two most highly gifted nations....of the world, the Hindu.

and the Greeks, should both have been led, each in its own way, toa study of the laws of thought and the laws of language, seems initself perfectly natural.At t h ~ time, however, when the different systems of Hindu philosophy.becamefirst known to the scholars of Europe, at the beginningof this century, every thing that came from the E88t was lookedupon 88 of extreme antiquity. There had been vague traditions ofIndian phllosophylong before the time of Aristotle. There werereports of early Greek sages t r a v ~ l l i n g to India 88 the fountain-headof ancient wisdom. Alexander himself had found himself in Indiaface to mcewith a whole nation of philosophers. It was readily admitted, therefore, that the Hindu system of Logic W88 more ancien'than that of Aristotlc, and that the Greeks borrowed the first elements of their philosophy from the Hindus. Alexander, who has.been himself in conversation with the Logicians of India, might haveBent some of their treatises to his tutor at home, and Aristotle would

chave worked them up into a system of his own. This view W88actually taken and defended by men like ffiirres.t They were struck Communicated by Profess;,r Mu Miiller.t Gorres undertook to prove that the Greeks had borrowed some technloaJ terms from the Sanskrit. Indian philosophers admitfivo elements, andthe fifth is called akds; ether. This ether has quite a different meaninefrom the alafJp which some Greek philosophers considered as the fifth or

hi&belt element. Gorres, however, quotes (",ithout giving a reference)

ON INDIAN LOGIC.-

MIDE """"" or Loglo'" or w . . . u ....history allows us to judge, invented or originally conceived by two nations only, by Hindus and Greeka.All other nations, if they ever cultivated these sciences, received the first impulse from without. TheRomans from the Greeka, the Germans from the Romans, the Arabtfrom the Greeks, the Jews from the Araba.That the two most highly gifted nations.-Of the world, the Hindu.and the Greeks, should both have been led, each in its own way, toa study of the laws of thought and the laws of language, seems in

itself perfectly natural.At thll time, however, when the different systems of Hindu philosophy.became first known to the scholars of Europe, at the beginningof this century, every thing that came from the East was lookedupon as of extreme antiquity. There had been vague traditions ofIndian philosophy long before the time of Aristotle. There werereports of early Greek sages t r a v ~ l l i n g to India as the fountain-headof ancient wisdom. Alexander himself had found himself in Indiaface to face with a whole nation of philosophers. It was readily ad mitted, therefore, that the Hindu system of Logic was more ancientthan that of Aristotle, and that the Greeks borrowed the first elements of their philosophy from the Hindus. Alexander, who hallbeen himself in conversation with the Logicians of India, might havesent some of their treatises \0 his tutor at home, and Arilltotle would have worked them up into a system of his own. This view wasactually taken and defended by men like GOrres.t They were struck

Communicated by P r o f e s 8 ~ r Max Miiller.t mirres undertook to prove that the Greeks had borrowed some technIcal terms from the Sangkrit. Indian philosophers admit five elements, andthe fifth is caIIed akds; ether. This ether has qnite a different meaningfrom the alMJp which some Greek philosophers considered as the fifth or

hi&beat element. mirres, however, quotes ('lfithout giving a reference)


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826 APPENDIX.by m,any points of uncidence in both systems of Logic. In eachthere were Categories, Genus, and Species, and even Syllogisms!I t could not be otherwise-the Greeks must have borrowed it fromthe Hindus. That two nations; i f they once conceived the idea ofanalyzing the laws of thought, could possibly arrive at similar re.ults even on the most general points, and that it would require coin.cidencel in many minute details or in palpable errors, to prove beyond, doubt that the two systems had a common origin, seems never tohave occurred to these enthusiastic Orientalists.

But on the other hand, does it show a higher power of l">Jical rea-soning or historical criticism, i f we find men like Niebuhr taking theopposite view 'of the matter, and deriving Indian philosophy fromGreece , Niebuhr is reported to have said in his Lectures on Ancient History, " I f we look at Indian Philosophy, we discern tr&ceIof a great similarity with that of the Greeks. Now as people havegiven up the hypothesis, that Greek philosophy formed itself afterIndian philosophy, we cannot explain this similarity except by theintercourse which the Indians had with the G1'IIlco-macedonic kingsof Bactra."

To Niebuhr and to most Greek scholars it would natural lybe nento impossible to believe that Greek Logic and Greek philosophy ingeneral were of foreign origin and a mere importation from India.They know how Greek philosophy grew up gradually, how its courseruns parallel with the progress of Grecian poetry, art, and civilization. They know that it is a home-grown production as certainly 88that Plato and Aristotle were Greeks and not Brahmans.

But, then, a Sanskrit scholar has just the same conviction withregard to Indian philosophy. He can show how the first philosophi.cal ideas, though under a vagne form, existed already in the mind ofthe early poets of the Veda. He can trace their gradual development in the BrAhmanas and Upanishads, He can show how theygave rise to discussions, how they took a more distinct form, andwere at last fixed and determined in the most scienti1l.c manner. Hetoo is as certain that Indian philosophy was a native production ofIndia, as that Gotama and Ka.n!da were Hindus and not Greeks.Until, therefore, it can be proved historically that Greeks receiTelltheir philosophy from India or Indians frQm Greece-or until coinoi.dences can be pointed out which it is impossible to explain otherwise,it will be best to cousider both Greek and Indian philosophy as an-pusaga from Aristotle, where this fifth element is mentioned under thename of luwr-cTllOptJTW, and this he translates by "akAs-nominatum,""""-0fAGT'W being evidently an ingelio118 conjecture for IucIJTOII6ptJt1fT111.


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ON I N m A ~ LOGIC. 821tochthonic, and to derive from their mutual similarities only thiaconsolatory conviction that in philosophy also there is a certa.iJIamount of truth which forms the common heirloom of all mankind,and may be discovered by all nations i f they search for it with hon-esty and pel'8everance. According to the accounts which the Brahmans themselves giveof the history of Indian philosophy, there have been, and there stillexist, six systems of philosophy. They are called the Slnkhya,Mtmlnsl, Nyll.ya, Yoga, Vaiseshika, and Vedlnta. These systeJDIare not represented to us in a successive order, they do not apparentlyarise one upon the ruins of the other, like the schools in the historyof Greek and German philosophy. Th'ey always seem to run paral-lel, each maintaining its place side by side with the others, and eachreprellenting 8! distinct view of the Universe, and of the relation ofthe seeming to the real world. Even at the present day the Brahman unites three or more of them in his course of study.

Each of these systems is complete in itself. Each contains something of what we should call Physics, Metaphysics, Logic, and evenEthics. In one system, h o w e v ~ , certain topics occupy a more prominent place and are discussed at greater length. Thus, while theMtm'nsll. is more theological, and the S8.nkhya more metaphysical,the Nylya system, in which the reasoning faculties of man are moreclosely examined, has become known to us by the name of "IndianLogic." In India also, a Naiy&yika, or follower of the Nydya, meansas much as a Logician, or a man who understands the laws of rea-soning, and still more the art of logical wrangling. The other systems refer to t h ~ Nyll.ya, whenever logical questions have to be settled.Nevertheless, it would be wrong to call the Nylya, ;Logic, in ourl18D8e of the word. The Nylya, as well as the other systems, has forits highest object the solution of the problem of existence, and onIy.. a means towards accomplishing this object, does i t devote particular attention to tile instruments of k n o w l e ~ d , .. one of them,to syllogistic reasoning.

In order to explain what in the mind of a Hindu philosopher wouldcorrespond to our Logic, it will be necessary to give a short sketchof the Nylya. We shall there see the exact place which Logic 0c-cupies in the system of Hindu philosophy, and be able to judge howfar it correspon:la to that which Aristotle and other philosophers afterhim have assigned to this philosophical discipline. The reason whythe Nylya is chosen in preference to other systems, is not because italone contains an account of the syllogism. The syllogism finds it.place in the Vedl\nta and BAnkbya &8 well; but it is more ftJIy t r e a ~


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328 APPESDIX.by the NaiyAyika8. Again, KanAda's work, called the Vaisellhlkaphilosophy, is chosen in preference to the NyAya-sfttras of Gotama,because there is so much of mmute technicality in the latter, that i1would be very diftlcult to give a complete account of it in a shortcompass.KanAda st$rtB boldly by declaring that he is going to explain howa man can obtain the most exalted and exalting knowledge of reality,and by means thereof arrive at a state of complete blessedness, theSummum Bonum. The way to blessedness, according to him, illknowledge, but knowledge of a particular kind, that is to say, a dis-criminating knowledge of the seven'" Categories.

These Categories are, Substance, Quality, Action, Genus, Individ .uality, Concretion. and Non-existence.The Sanskrit word which has been translated by category is "ps.d&rtha," which in common usage means a thing. The etymologicallignification, however, is "meaning of word," which, i f interpretedphilosophically, comes to express "the most general meaning ofwords," "what is commOn to al l words," what is predicated bywords without any regard to their special meaning, as given in theDictionary. Like the Categories of the Greek system, the PadArthaa

are wide classes of" first intentions." They are the last and highestpredicates, and the only thing that can be predicated of them according to ViBvanli.tha, is their" perceptibility."

But does this perceptibility involve their reality 1 We must hearthe objections which the Hindu Materialist raises against this supposition. Taking the first category, that of substance, he says, "Allwe really perceive, if we speak for instance of water, is water. Wedo not perceive any thing of water being a substance. Thereforeyou have no right to speak of substance as a category." But, answers the Vaiseshika, though we do not perceive substance with oureyes, yet we perceive that there must be something in which qualities can reside; something which remains unchanged though thequalities change i-which rests the same whether it becomes a cauaeor an effect. This then we call substance

. . Originally there were but six, Non-existence being omitted in KanAda ISutrss. The statements given here are taken from AnnambhaUa's Tarklllangra!la, published at Bennres without the name of the editor. This publication, and many most valuable works lately issued from the SanskritCollege of Benares, aN due to Dr. Ballantyn6, the Principal of this Col.legt'o A Hindostani translation, together with an English translation, WIllalan published at Benares, from the hand of Mr. F. Edward Hall, thaqllwithout his name


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ON INDIAN LOGIC. 329Qualit;. again, is what resides in a substance. QwJity itself ha

JlO qualities, but substance has.Quality produces by itself no change. Wllat produces change, or -combination and separation of qualities, is what we comprehendunder the third Category, or Action, and this also resides in su}).atance only.These are the three principal categories, and they seem to correspond very nearly with Aristotle's ooaia, l1'OtOV and l1'Oaov, andwweZv. After these three, follow the two categories of Genus andIndividuality.Genus resides in Substance, Quality, and Action, and it is twofold,higher or lower. The l}ighest genus, which is shared by every thing,la "being," the summum genus. Next to it we get as lower genuathat of being a category, of being substance, earth, a clod, &c.Individuality is endless. I t resides in substance only, and as weshall see, in- .ubstance before it becomes material and perceptible bythe senses, that is to say, in atomic substances. Individualities mutually exclude eacll other.

The next category stands as it were by itself, and forms the topof the pyramidal arrangement of the categories, which tapers_ fromthe fundamental three, to the qualifying two, and ends in that whictJwe translate by " Concretion." It is peculiar to Indian philosophyand ditIlcuIt to be rendered into the philosophical language ofEurope_ It expresses the intimate relation of things which cannotexist separately. A quality, for instance, cannot exist by itself, buSonly as the quality of a substance, nor can substance exist exceptwith reference to qualities. Now, substance and quality are noSconsidered as merely together, but as interwoven, as inseparable,and mutually dtlpendent; and this relation is expressed by thecategory of Concretion. The same relation exists between thewhole and its parts, between Genus and S ~ c i e s , between causeand effect.

The last category, which, as we saw, is omitted by some of theVaiseshikas, is that of Non-existence. It is of four kinds, accordingas it applies to things: 1. WhiCh are not yet, but may be afterwards; 2. Which are no more, but have been; 3. Which are not,and never will be; 4. Which are not what something elae is, i. &which differ.Of these seven categories, which exhaust the universe of knowledge (omne scibile), Substance comprehends the five elements,earth, water, light, air, and ether; it comprehends time and space ilOul and self.The five elements may be either eternal. uncreated Dot percep


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530 APPENDIX.tible by the senses, but established by inference: or created. pelIoceptihle and destructible. In the former state they "xist as infinitely.mall, in the latter they are products. Considered as products again.the elementary substances are threefold: organic, organ, or inorganic. Earth, which is determined as that which has the qualityof Odour, exists, as organic, in animal bodies. As organ it is theapprehender of odour. As inorganic 'it consists in stones. In thiamanner we get five organs: the organ of hearing corresponding tothe substance of ether; that of feeling to the substance of air; thatof seeing to light; that of tasting to water; that of smelling to earth.Ether has one quality, and the organ of hearing apprehends onequality, that of sound. Air has two qualities, and the organ offeeling apprehends two, those of sound and tangibility. Light h..three qualities, and the organ of sight apprehends three, th08e ofsound, tangibility, and colour. Water has four qualities, and theorgan of taste apprehends four, th08e of sound, tangibility, colourand savour. Earth has five qualities, and the organ of smell apprehends five, those of sound, tangibility, colour, savour, andodour.Here then we have something very like the doctrine of Empedocles, rat, Pv 'Yap 'Yaiav 6mnra,uv, ~ & m d' ~ & . I p ,

AUJep d' aUJepa diw, aTOP f f V P ~ rip atd7jAov,l:rofflv aropY;, 1Iei/COf de Te 1IetlCei Avypiil,only carried out to too great an extent, and thereby caricatured.The only remark which it is necessary to make, is that" ether 11 i ttreated differently from the other elements. While the other fourelements exist both in an atomic and in a terrestrial state, ethernever leaves its transcendental reality, but is eternal, one, and in'finitely ~ a t (all.perfading). .The next two substances, which, like ether, exist as eternal only,as one and allpervading, are Time and Space. Time is the causeof what we call Past, Present, and Future. Space is the cause ofwhat we call East, West, North, South, &c. Both time and spacebeing eternal substances, and eternal only, it follows that they arenever perceptible by the organs of the senses.

The eighth substance IS' Self. I t is the substratum of the qualitiesof knowledge, wish and will. It is twofold, the living Self and theSupreme Self. The Supreme Self is the Lord, the Omniscient; Heis One only. free trom joy and sorrow. The living Self is attachedto different bodies, but it is still eternal and. all-pervading. WhereTerthe body is, there is the living Self; but .the living Self itself remaiDI


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ON INDIAN LOGIC. 8811Jilcreat.ed and eternal. Its existence can be proved, but it cannottall under the cognition of the senses.

The last substance is Soul, the cause of perception, of pleasureand pain, and the passions. As Self, though attached to bodies, i,all-pervading and infinite, we should not be able to account for thEfact of our successive or discursive knowledge. Self, like the Omniscient, would know every thing at once, unless there W8.1 the soul,through which all impressions must pass in succession and becomeindividualized. Soul, too, is eternal only, but it is endless ;-nof infinitely great, but infinitely small, and attached, not to the Supreme,but to living Selves only.It is not necessary to enter into a more detailed account of thelubstances, for it is clear that there is only one Substance which willfall under our more immediate consideration, the Substance of Self,and this ouly as the substratum of the quality of knowledge. I t iswhere the quality of knowledge is examined, that we shall recognizewhat by E u r o ~ n philosophers is treated as Logic.Before we prqceed, however, to that Chapter, we must at )east;cast a glance at the di1ferent headings of the two categoriell of qualityand action.Qualities are, 1. Colour; 2. Savour; 8. Odour; 4. Tangibility,6. Nuinber; 6. Dimension; 7. Distinction; 8. Conjunction; 9. Disjunction; 10. Priority; 11. P08teriority; 12. Weight; 18. Fluidity;14. Viscidity; 16. Sound; 16. Perception; 17. Pleasure; 18. Pain;19. Desire; 20. Aversion; 21. Effort; 22. Merit; 28. Demerit;24. Faculty. They are eternal if residing in eternal substances,and non-eternal if residing in material bodies. Knowledge, Plwureand Pain, Desire and A version, Effort, Merit and Demerit, are qual- .ities of the Self only. Perception, Desire, and Effort are eternal 8.1

qualities of the Supreme Self, but non-eternal as qualities of livingSelves.Actions are, Lifting up, Throwing down, Contraction, Expansion,anll Processien. They exist only. in the four elements and inSoul.The fourth Category, or Genus, is something which resides inlubstance, qualities, and actions, but is 'eternal, and a8 such not;sensuously perceptible. It is one, but it always resides in many. I tis that by which it becomes possible to comprehend seTeral thingsinto one class, and to predicate something of them, which they have

in common. We call this an abstraction; but to the Hindu theGenus of things, or the General, is something real, inherent in sublta.lce, or quality, or actiQn, though of course not material or perceptible by the senses. The Genus, therefore, or the cause of what


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332 APPENDIX.we call general, is lOncelved as something independent of singleobjects, though it is mown to us only aa inllerent in the objects ofIntuition. I t is inh !rent in substances, qualities, and actions, and itperceived by us as "'e perceive either substances, actions, or qualities. What KanAda means by calling Genus inherent, is that substances, qualities, and actions cannot exist, not even in their eternalstate, without the Genus. The same applies to Individualities, onlythat they do not inhere in qualities and actions, but in substancesonly. Individuality is what makera thing to be itself, and not anything else. And ifwe hear Kanlda expressing his opinion, that" in-dividualities which mutually exclude one another, exist in substancesonly," we-almost seem to read the words of Aristotle, 1il T' tt1TAlmrAclr Tj ooa,


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)NINDIAN LOGIC. ssstruth (pramA). Wrong perception represents the thing as the lIhinlis not, mother-o'-pcarl as silver.Right perception is fourfold, sensuous, conclusive, comparative,and authoritstive. It is 'produced by the senses, by inferring, bycomparing, and by revealed authority. 'l'his fourfold division ofknowledge, is takpn from Gotama and not from KanD.da. Kan,daadmits but two sources of knowledge, perception (pratyabha) andinference (laingika); that is to say, he comprehends all knowledgewhich does not arise from the senses, under the general title ot" inference. The different systems of Hindu philosophy have beenarranged by Colebrooke, according to what each considers to be theonly trustworthy means of knowledge. The KarvUka or Materialistadmits but one source of knowledge, sensuous perception. TheBuddhist and the Vaiseshika admit two, perception and inference.Manu (xii. 105) and Sankhya philosophers a d ~ i t three, for theyac-knowledge, besides perception and inference, the authority of revelation. The followers of Gotsma add comparison as a fourth instrument of know.ledge; the PrabhAkaras presumption as a fifth, and theMimansakas privation or negation as a sixth. To the Self it is indifferent whether its knowledge is produced by anyone of theseinstruments, as long as each represents the thing such as it is.We pass over the chapter on causation, which serves as an introduction to the chapter on'sensuous perception. Nor do we enter intothe intricacies of sensuouII perception, of which six different kindsare enumerated and explained. They arise from the different waysin which the organs of sense are brought into contact with theirobjects, which objects may be either substantial matter, or qualitiesand actions, as inherent in substance, or the Genus, as inherent insubstances, qualities, and actions. .

After sensuous knowledge comes, conclusive knowledge, which isgained by means of inferring. Conclusive knowledge is, for instance, cc This mountain is a volcano," whereas our sensuous perception is only that the mountain smokes. In order to arrive fromthis at the conclusion that it is a volcano, we must be in possessionof what is called a pervading rule, or a VyApti. This pervadingrule, which sometimes might be called a law, is, that smoke is inseparably connected with fire, or, as the Hindu calls it, that smokiness is pervaded by fieriness, that wherever there is smoke there isfire. I f we possess this V y i l p t i ~ which we may remember by suchinstances as a culinary hearth, &c. then, in ?rder to arrive at conclusive knowledge, we only require consideration (parilmarsa) in orderto find out in any sensuous impression something which can bepervaded, lomething whicll can make the 'mountain the member


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_\PPENDlX.(palnha) of a VyApti, this something being, in our case, the smoke.I f we know that the smoke which we perceive, is qualified to becomepart of a VyApti (this VyApti being, .. wherever there is smoke thE.reIs fire"), then we know conclusively that this mOUlltain is fiery, be-cause it smokell.It would have been easy to tnmalate these definitions into moretechnical language. We might have clothed KanAda in a Greciangarb, and made him look almost like Aristotle. Instead of saying.that conclusi.,e knowledge arises from a consideration that there i.IOmething in an object which is pervaded by something else, andthat the pervading predicate is predicable of all things of which thepervaded predicate is, we might have said, the conclusive knowledgethat S is P, arises from the consideration that S is M, and M is P, orwith Aristotle, /) t1V7.J.uyU1p)Jr .nu roii piaau rillUcpov 1plTC,ldeUcvvaw.What KanAda calls member of a pervasion (paksha, e. g. mountain),we might have translated by subject or terminus minor; what per-vades (vyftpaka or si\dhya, e. g. fieriness), the predicate or terminusmajor; and what is to be pervaded (vyftpya, e. g. smokiness), theterminus medius. But what should we have gained by this? Allthat is peculiar to Indian philosophy would have been eliminated,and what remains would have looked like a clumsy imitation ofAristotle. Multa jilJnt eadem sed aliter, and it is this .. aliter" whichconstitutes the principal interest in a comparative study of philosophy.Even such terms as conclusion or syllogism are inconvenient here,because they have with us an historical colouring, and throw a falselight on the subject. The Sanskrit Anumftna is not t1Vpmpaapa, butit means .. measuring something according to something else." Thisis done by means of "parimarsa," which means "groping," or try-ing to find in an object something which elm be measured by some-thing else, or which can become the member of a pervasion. Thiscorresponds to the discovery of a terminus medius. In Kapila'esystem (I. 61), the principal object of inference is said to be tran-scendental truth. Things which cannot be seen with our eyes, areperceived by inference, as fire is from smoke, and he defines infer-ence (I. 101) by "knowledge of the connected, arising from percep-tion of a connection or a law." But, again, the relation of whatpervades and what is pervaded is very different from what we should.call the relative extension of two conceptions. This will becomemore evident by what follows. For the present we have learnt, thatme act of proving (anumAna) consists in our knowing that there iaon the mountain firepervaded smoke. Through this we arr ive . tlJIIumin or conclusive knowledge, that the mountain is a volcano.

What follows is traT.slated from Annambhatta's Compe.ndium


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ON INDIAN LOGIC."The act at concluding is twofold, it being intended either for one'.own benefit or for others. The former is the means of arriving forones's selfat conclusive knowledge, and the process is this. By repeated observation, as in the case of culinary hearths and the like, we haTeobtained the general rule (vy&pti), that wherever there is smoke thereis fire. We now approach a moulltain, and wonder whether theremight not be fire in it. We see the smoke, remember the generalrule, and immediately perceive that the mountain possesses 1lre-peJloTaded smoke. This is, as yet, called only groping after signs (lingapadmarsa). But from it arises the conclusive knowledge, that themountain itself is fiery. This is the actual process when we reasonwith ourselves."

" I f we try, however, to convince somebody elae of whatwe knowto be conclusively true, then we start; with the assertion, The mountain is fiery. Why 1 Because it smokes; and all that smokes,' asyou may see in a culinary hearth and the like, is fiery. Now youperceive that the mountain does smoke, and hence you will admitthat I was right in saying, that the mountain is fiery. This is calledthe five-membered form of exposition, and the five members are se.,,erally called, 1. Assertion, the mountain has fire; 2. Re8son, becauseit smoke; 8. Proposition, all that has smoke has fire ; 4. Assumption, and the mountain has smoke; 6. Deduction, therefore it hasfire. The means of inference in both cases is the'same. It is whatwas Called the groping after signs, or the handling of the demonstrative tokens, in which the essential process of inferring consists."Whu is caIied by ADnambhatta the conclusion for one's self corre-sponds totidem verbis with the first form of Aristotle's syllogism:

All that smokes is fiery,The mountain smokes;Therefore the mountain is fiery :

What is called the conclusion for others seems more irregnlar, ODaccount of its five members, and of the additional instances, whichseem to vitiate the syllogism.We must not forget, however, that whatever there is of Logic inthese short extracts, has'but one object, that of describing knowledgeu one of the qualities of the Self. Knowledge, as KanAda has.hown, is not c o n 1 l n ~ d to sensuous perceptions, and therefore knowl

edge gained by inference is examined next. The question is, how isit that we know any thing beyond what we percei.,e with our senses!The answer is, by inferring. I f we place ourselves on this point ofnew, which Kanl\da has taken, it becomes clear, first, that we cannot-upect from Kanll.da a treatise OD formal Logic. The formal LogiciaD


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APPENDIX.take. a purely scientific interest in the machinery of the hUIII8Dmind He collects, arranges, and analyzes the functions of our rea.BOning faculties, as they fall under his observation. But the questiOllwhich occupies KanMa is, how is i t that we know things which wedo not see, and how can we prove that we do know them 1 Now theinstrument by which we know things which we do not perceive withour senses, is inference. Hence, KanAda has to explain :first, whatinference is, and how we do inter; secondly, how far inference canbe made to yield the same certainty as our sensuous impresaions.For this purpose, it seems that neither the deductive nor the inductive syllogism, i f aken by itself, would have been sufficient. Deductive reasoning may in itself be most valuable for formalizing facts, itmay give a variety of different aspects to our knowledge, but ourknowledge will never be substantially increased, no new fact will evelbe discovered by it. And if on one side KanAda cannot use deduction because it teaches nothing new, he cannot use induction either,at least not in its general acceptation, because it teaches nothing cer-tain. ,

The only object of all knowledge with KanAda, as we saw before,was absolute truth, or pram'. Now Aristotle does not make a secretof it, that the bra:ywrfl, in order to prove the ilAwr, must be dUi 7raVTCoIV,and that this is impossible. Knowlejge gained by-epagogic reasoning is, strictly speaking, always tm TO 7rOA.V, not what KanAda wouldcall prama. The conclusion which .Aristotle gains by way of induction, " Animals which have little bile are longlived," might be ealleda Vyllpti. Aristotle arrives at this, by saying, man, horse, and mule(C) are long-lived (A); man, horse, and mule (C) have little bile(B) ;'therefore all animals with little bile are long-lived. But KanA-da would express himself in a different way. He would Say, wherever we perceive the attribute of little bile, we also perceive the attribute of long life, as, for instance, in men, horses, mules, &C. Buthere he would not stop, but he would v;alue this vyApti merely aBa means for establishing a new fact; he would at once use it as ameans of deduction, and say, "now the elephant has little bile, therefore is he long-lived."One thing can be said in favour of the Indian method. I f weon accumulating instances, as in the case before mentioned, if we addhorses, mules, mel'l and the like, we approximate more and moretowards a general rule, but we never eliminate real exceptions, not tospeak of possible exceptions. The Hindu, on the contrary, by lIIty-ing, "Wherever we see the attribute of little bile, we observe longlife," and then giving a number of instances by way of.illustraticm,excludes the reality, tllough he does not exclude the possibility,


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ON INDIAN LOGIC. 387exceptions, He states it as a_fact, that wherever the one haR beea.aIlere has been the other, which throW! the onus probandi as to a caseto the contrary, upon the other side. In our sY81001, there isnothinllID force an opponent to admit a hundredth case, because in ninety-nineeases the rule happened to be true-while, if it is impossible to attackthe "Wherever" of the Hindu, there is in this Wherever a realpower that brings conviction for. every case that comes under it. I fit can be proved that there never was an instance where smoke wasleen without fire, the mutual inherence and inseparable connectionof smoke and fire is established more stringently than by any number of accumulated instances where the two have been seen together.The conditions under which it is allowed to form a Vyipti, that is tosay, to form Universals, have occupied the attention 'If Hindu philosophers more than any other point in Logic. They distinctly excludethe mere accumulation of observations. For things, they say, maybe together a hundred times, and may still not be mutually inherent.They make exceptions for practical purposes. There repeated observations may be turned into a general rule, but not in philosophicaldiscussions. Volumes after volumes have been written on this subject, and though 1 do not believe they will throw new light on thequestion of the origin of Universals, yet they would furnish a curiousparallel to the history of the European Intellect.

It will be necessary, before closing these remarks, to say a fewwords in answer to the attacks which have been made on IndianLogic.I t has been said that the instances which occur in the third member of the five-membered argument, vitiate the conclusion. Theproposition that wherever there is smoke there is fire, was supposedto lose its universal character i f it was followed by an instance, "asin the culinary hearth." Against this we have to remark, first, that,according to Hindu logicians, this instance is not essential, and istherefore occasionally left out altogether. Next, the instance is neverused to confirm the universal proposition, but to illustrate it, and forthis very reason it is chie1iy used in rhetoric8I inductions. From the8o.tras of Gotama (I. 85), it might certainly appear, as i f tbe objectof the third member was to give an instance. He says, "the proposition, or the third member, is an instance which, from the fact that;moke accompanies fire, shows that fire must be there." However.the Commentator explains that this is not strictly a definition of thethird member, but merely an explanation. What the third membersuppHes is a statement that fieriness pervades smokiness, togetherwith an example to make the connection between them more appal'>

'ent.


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838 APPENDIX.In the onginal work of KanAda, of which the Library of the Eua

India House possell8eS a MS., containing text and commentary, wele e still more clearly that the third member is simply an universalproposition. We read there (p. 76, a.) : " Inference is twofold, eitherfor one's self or for others. That for others consists of five sentences,which are called Assertion, Reason, Proposition, .Assumption, andDeduction. A88ertiOll does not mean more or 1e88 than the wordingof the conclnsive knowledge which is to be established. Reason is'that member which expre88es in the ablative the means of proof.Proposition is the third member, which shows that the means ofproof and what has to be proved by it, are never one without theother. -The .Assumption shows that the means of proof (heretoforedetermined as inseparable from what is to be proved) belongs to thesuqject of our assertion. And the Deduction shows that thereforewhat is to be proved belongs to the subject. The argument therefore proceeds in the following way, A word is n o n ~ t e r n a 1 , becauseit is composed; whatever is composed is n o n ~ t e m a 1 ; a word pos_ the quality of being composed, such quality being pervadedby n o ~ t e m i t y ; therefore a word is n o n ~ t e m a 1 . " He furtherstates that the names of the five members mean with the Va4eBhlkas, Promi1le, Pretext, Authority, Scrutiny, and Repetition.In KanMa's system, therefore, it would seem as i f the i n s t a n ~ , belonging to the proposition, was altogether ignored, and we mightfeel inclined to admit that it occurs only incidentally in Gotama'.philosophy. But i f we inquire more carefully, we find that theinstance in Gotama's syllogism has its own distinct office, not tostrengthen or to limit the universal proposition, but to indicate, i f Imay say so, its modality. Every VyApti must, of course, admit atleut one instance. These instances may be either positive only, ornegative only, or both positive and negative. I f it is said, " Thejar is nameable, because it is knowable; every thing that is knowable is nameable;" we can only have positive instances, as tree.table, and the like. It is impossible to bring a negative instance ofBOmething which is not provable, beCause every thing is provable.On the contrary, i f we have a case, like "the earth is difterent fromal l the other four elements, because it has odour," it is impossible togo on-".All that is dift'erent from the other elements has odour,"because the only case in point would again be "earth." Thereforewe must here employ the negative VyApti, and say, Whatever is notdiffilrent from the other elements, has no odour, and then it is poll-Bible to add an instance, namely, water, light, &C. After this theBindd proc.-eeds, Now earth is not 80 (not inodorous); Therefore I tle not 80 (not diffilrent from the other elements).


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ON INDIAN LOGIC. 389Brahmans have been told by European Logicians that they coulcl

bave all this more cheaply, by saying, "Whatever is odorous dilfenfrom the other inodorous elements;" "Earth is odorous; " "There-fore earth dilfers from the others; " But the \TaiseshikJ,l stops us atthe very first word, he does not admit the " Whatever," because itis not a "Whatever," but only one single case. It would be impossible to give instances, nay, to give a single instance for the VyApti,proposed by the European Logicians, except earth over again.The third case is, where the Vyi\pti admits both of positive andnegative instances, as in the hackneyed syllogism of the volcano.Here we can say, Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in cul-inary hearths'and the like. And wherever there is no fire thereis no smoke, as in the lake.So much for the instances added to the third member, which weresupposed to vitiate the syllogism.Still more unfounded is another objection. It was said that theformalities of the Science of Logic were perfectly satisfied with threeont of the five members of. the Indian syllogism. Of course theyare; and the Hindus knew this 2000 years ago. We have seen thatthe flve-membered method was employed 'Fh.en a person, after

having himself arrived at conclusive kllowledge, wished to persuadesomebody else of the truth of his belief. Now, if"the sole o b j ~ of Logic is the guidance of our own thoughts, and the comm.unica-tion of those to others is under the consideration of Rhetoric," it isclear that the scheme of the flve-membered syllogism belongs to -Rhetoric and not to Logic. Whether or n6 the five steps as theTfollow one another, according to Kanlda, represent what does actually take place in a welhconducted argument, we may leave toRhetoricians to decide. But, in order to show that even this far..fetched objection would not take the Brahman philosopher by surprise, we quote the following passage from the Vedlnta-paribhbhA. :"Inference is twofold, intetlded either for ourselves or for othen.The former has been explained. As to the latter it is to be accomplished by means of an argument. An argument consists of severalmembers. And real members there are only three; assertion, rea-.Im, proposition; or proposition, assumption, and deduction. Notfive; for three are sufficient to exhibit the pervading rule and itatwo members, the other two can theretbre be dispensed with."Now, in the first case, which would give us "the mountain is fiery,for it smokes, all that smokes is fiery," it must be admitted therewould be a want of all syllogistic alTlmgement. The first two members might be called an Enthymema, but then the third would be'llperfiUOUS. But the fact is that Hindu philosophers never ua. the


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840 A.'PENDIX.three members iD this succession; and if they say, that theftrat are .u1Iicient for a conciuaion, they take no account of their,uclleuive collocation, but simply mean that Proposition, Reason,and Anertion would form a syllogism as well as Proposition,Assumption; and Deduction. But, although the Hindu Logician.admit, in common with their brethren in Europe, that a complete.yllogism consists of three members, they do by no means restrictthemselve. to the use of the threemembered syllogism. Gotama,for instance, says there are three kinds of syllogism, from Muae toe1fect, from effect to cause, and from the Special to the GeneraLThua we infer that it will rain from the rising of clouds, it has rainedfrom the rising of rivers; we infer that a thing is substance becauseit i . earth. But, with the exception of the last l.'&8e, it wouldimponible to frame an absolute proposition, or a vyApti, from whichthe deductions could be established.So much in answer to objections which have repeatedly been madeagainst Indian Logic. I should like to see the Brahmans them-aelve. take up the gauntlet and defend their Logic against theattacks ofEuropean critics. Till very lately they entertained a verylow opinion of European Logic, some account of which. had been.upplied to them from the popular work of Abererombie. TheEuropean style is to them not sufliciently precise. The use of anabstract, instead of a concrete term is enough to disguat a Brahman.Besides, he wants to see all results put forward in short and clearlanguage, and to have all possible objections carefully weighed andrefuted. By the exertions of Dr. Bail

muller on indian thought

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