A Multitude of Selves: Contrasting the Cartesian and Nietzschean views of selfhood

One’s identity as a being distinct and independent from others is vital in order to interact

with the world. A self identity allows one to make decisions, actions, and to make interpretations

of experiences. A self is difficult to define, though. The current cultural definition of human

nature as rational is limiting because it ignores other aspects and explanations for actions and

feelings. Is a logical, internal self truly valuable? The Nietzschean conception of self rejects the

Cartesian view of the internal thinker in order to provide a more holistic approach.

The traditional view that humans are rational beings is supported by René Descartes’s

view of the self. Though early in his meditation he rejects the idea that he exists as a rational

being, due only to lack of definition, his reliance on thought processes to uncover truth does

require logic and rationality. In the Meditations, Descartes sets out to discover the truths and

falsehoods of the world and of human experience. He asserts that the one most basic truth is that

he does in fact exist, and that he exists as “precisely nothing but a thinking thing, that is, a mind,

or intellect, or understanding, or reason.” 1 Descartes turns away from reliance on sensations and

bodily perception because of their aptness to deceive and trick the mind into believing or

creating falsehoods. He holds the mind to higher standards than the body and asserts that only

through thinking may one discover truths. External things “are not perceived through their being

touched or seen, but only through their being understood” 2 by using the power of the mind.

Though it seems that people see and understand with the eyes, those objects and ideas are

“grasped solely with the faculty of judgment, which is in [the] mind.” 3

1 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy in Which the Existence of God and the Distinction Between the Soul and the Body are Demonstrated, pg 65 2 Ibid 69 3 Ibid 68

Everything exists in the mind and is therefore able to be understood through the mind and

conscious thought. Descartes’s meditation on the wax reveals that perception is “through the

mind alone” 4 and that “though it previously seemed” based in sense perception, sensation is

deceptive due to the constant external changes it reports to the mind. Objects may manifest in

certain ways at one time and in other ways at a later time, as the wax did, 5 but the one constant

is that the wax remains recognizable as a stable object to the perceiving mind. “The perception of

the wax is neither a seeing, nor a touching, nor an imagining … rather it is an inspection on the

part of the mind.” 6 Descartes imagines the self as the powerful agent of thoughts, which one is

conscious of and thus able to control. The self created out of this exclusivity is very limited.

What is the value of defining a self in terms of itself? Descartes wonders “who is this ‘I’ whom I

know?” 7 and can only go as far as ascribing himself as author of his own thoughts. 8 His

definition of self is circular and does nothing to shed light on the dilemma of selfhood.

Friedrich Nietzsche rejects Descartes’ view that the completely internal thinker

constitutes the definition of self. The idea that there is a dominant and controlling self or agent of

thought is “something added and invented and projected” 9 by humans. There is no true self, but

rather a constructed self that allows interpretation and understanding of the external world.

Nietzsche rejects the notion that the “I” created by Descartes’s thinking being is “the given cause

of thought,” 10 and asserts that the sensation of thinking is a fictional phenomenon. “What

4 Ibid 5 Ibid 67 6 Ibid 7 Ibid 65 8 Ibid 63 9 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, ed. Walter Kaufmann, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967), pg 267 10 Ibid 268

Descartes desired was that thought should have, not an apparent reality, but a reality in itself ” 11

which does not exist. All reality is relative and is interpreted by individuals in order to organize

and understand their surroundings. All reality is based on the world of appearances, on the

physical and sensible world.

Friedrich Hegel also conceptualizes selves as social creatures, dependent on the presence

of others. Selves “recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.” 12 Selves may

only become aware that they are individuals when “one individual is confronted by another

individual.” 13 There only arises a need for selfhood in a social context, when one self must

differentiate from another. In the social context, one self is given the tools to differentiate from

another. This would account for how the Nietzschean ego, the internalized subject, is created.

The construction of a “doer” allows an individual to understand what actions arise from

themself, rather than from others. In the physical world, one needs to be aware of what actions

are ones own and what are another’s in order to avoid utter chaos. The need to understand

concepts or to recognize objects arises when people wish to communicate to others. Having

knowledge of the properties of wax is no good if one cannot communicate them to others, or use

these ideas to enlighten world experience.

The world of appearances may deceive, as Descartes states, but without sensation and

deception, there would be no thinking thing. There would be no reason to think, no things to

think about. Rather than being destructive, deceptions may allow a thinking thing, to gain a

better understanding of itself and its place in the world, among other selves. Descartes’s rejection

11 Ibid [italics in original] 12 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. AV Miller (Dehli: Shri Jainendra Press, 1998), section 184, http://books.google.com/books?id=xOnhG9tidGsC&lpg=PP1&pg=PR4#v=onepage&q&f=true [italics in original removed] 13 Ibid 186

of the world of appearances severely limits the value of his idea of self. He rejects those things

that are unknown to him – “some subtle air … a wind … a fire … a vapor … a breath” 14 – as

nothings. Though it is difficult to challenge his assertion that all concepts are already present in

the mind and within the self, one wonders what the value of these ideas and objects are without

context. An internal self has no true value. Raising the logical self up is problematic because it

dismisses all other aspects of the self and its experience in the world.

At one point in the Meditations, Descartes seems to entertain the notion that each thought

may come from a different self, a different “I”, though he quickly reasserts that “it is the same ‘I’

who imagines,” senses and thinks.15 Nietzsche grasps this concept and turns it around. The

postulate “I think therefore I am” and “there is thinking: therefore there is something that

thinks”16 are both severely flawed. Rather than accepting the single thinking core labeled as “I”,

Nietzsche instead “assume[s] a multiplicity of subjects” 17 – one for each thought. Thus, the only

claim Descartes can make is simply: “there is thinking, therefore there are thoughts.” 18 One

cannot so easily assign a thinker without proof, especially if one is being radically sceptical

about the rest of the appearances of the world as Descartes is. Nietzsche’s theory of multiplicity

and created unity more fully accounts for human experience.

“The subject is a multiplicity of mental processes, actions, feelings, and desires…. all

intertwined.”19 Though traditional views hold that the subject is a thing-in-itself, a single thinker,

14 Descartes 65 15 Ibid 66 16 Nietzsche 268 17 Ibid 270 18 Ibid 268 19 T Le, "Overview of Nietzsche's Philosophy", The Le Foundation, 2002, pg 10, http://www.le-foundation.org/files/Le_Overview_of_Nietzsche_s_Philosophy.pdf

Nietzsche asserts that our selves are “the sum of all those perceptions” 20 we gain from

interacting with the physical world. Nietzsche likens the traditional, Cartesian understanding of

selves to a ranked aristocracy. It is believed that there is a ruler – the thinker – and subjects – the

thoughts and other aspects of character – but this is a constructed falsehood. “The ruler and his

subjects are of the same kind, all feeling, willing, thinking” 21 in equal measure. The ruler is

created in order to organize thoughts, actions, and feelings and to give a sense of control. It is

merely created out of utility rather than truth. The traditional self relies too heavily on this view

and restricts and represses the experience of self as a sensing, changing being. Sometimes this

hierarchy is necessary for understanding, but the “value relations” must take into consideration

“usefulness and harmfulness.” 22 The repression of impulses and lack of recognition that selves

are complex beings may limit one’s experience of the world or cause psychological traumas.

Logic cannot solve all problems and cannot adequately perceive all phenomena of the world

Nietzsche asks: “are the axioms of logic adequate to reality or are they a means and

measure for us to create reality, the concept ‘reality,’ for ourselves?” 23 It is most definitely the

latter. Though Descartes holds logic to be the key to truth and understanding, there is no great

truth to reach. Reality is relative and is created by each individual. Every experience and each

contact with other individuals effects perception and understanding of the world. Logical

analysis is only one aspect of the perceiving self; it is not the core or dependent agent. Nietzsche

consequently proposes that selves are in constant flux, a constant state of becoming. The

traditional view that selves are beings comes about “because we have to be stable in our beliefs if

we are to prosper, we have made the ‘real’ world not of change and becoming, but one of

20 Nietzsche 274 21 Ibid 271 22 Ibid 278 23 Ibid 279

being.”24 The need to be comes from the Cartesian self of a core thinker that can control its

actions and thoughts and must therefore be a constant and stable agent, though this is not the true

experience of the world. Individuals are able to recognize a change in their selves over time, yet

are hesitant to extend this definition of self to others. Every experience and impulse, every

instant results in a slightly different self. One may believe that they keep track of these changes

internally and so gain a sense of control, but this sensation cannot be extended to others.

However, these changes are minute and only noticeable over time. “One can argue that there are

certain aspects of the personality that are relatively stable…. Dominant aspects of the ‘self’”25

called character traits allow recognition by others even amid internal change.

There is a need for consistency and control, which creates the delusion that selves are

constant and stable. Though the stability of self created by the Cartesian view has merit, the

internal thinker is extremely limiting as the only measure of self. In order to account for the full

human experience, one must recognize that there are many more aspects that constitute the self.

Nietzsche’s assertion that selves are created out of necessity and from a social context is more

sensible. Selves are a product of change, of experiences, feelings, logic, and many more

impulses. Though this seems problematic and chaotic, there are character traits, and external

bodily form, which allows others to identify an individual. Selves are very complex ideas, which

might even be false completely. In order to make sense of the world, though, a sense of self

identity is necessary in some form or another.

word count: 1883

24 Ibid 276 25 Le 4