mysticism and transcendence in later neoplatonism

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Mysticism and Transcendence in Later Neoplatonism

Author(s): John M. RistSource: Hermes, 92. Bd., H. 2 (1964), pp. 213-225Published by: Franz Steiner VerlagStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4475300 .

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JOHN M. RIST,MysticismandTranscendencen LaterNeoplatonism 2I3

Wagelchen des Dichters gezogen haben und jetzt ausgespannt werden (ars

3, 80gf.), gelingt ihm ein Bild von spielerisch heiterer Anmut, das an die

Randstreifen pompejanischer Wandmalerei mit ihren Putten und spielzeug-ahnlichen Geratenerinnert.Daneben bringt er die Sphragis1und den erwarteten

Nachruhm als AbschluB (am. 3, I5. ars 2, 733-744. 3, 8iif. rem. 8I3 f.). Aber

wie sich am Anfang der ovidischen Gedichte neben der deutlichen Aufforderung

zu Lektuireund Aufmerksamkeit vor allem eine suggestive Beeinflussung des

Lesers durch Anapher, Versprechen u. a. findet, so wird dieser auch auf das

Ende innerlich vorbereitet. Wenn mittelalterliche Werke mit dem Topos des

ermuidetenDichters schlieBen(CURTIuS. 0. ioof.) -so auch Ovid rem. 8II ,

so ist das eine Begriindung, die auch dem Leser Ermiudungund Neigung

zum Aufh6ren nahelegen will. Es ist psychologisch geschickt, wenn Ovid dem

Leser am SchluB das Wichtigste mitteilt, das zugleich die Lust suggeriert, sich

nunmehr schlafen zu legen (ars 2, 703-732. 3, 769-808. rem. 803-8IO).

K6ln DIETMAR KORZENIEWSKI

MYSTICISM AND TRANSCENDENCE IN LATER NEOPLATONISM

There are a number of rather puzzling passages in the Enneads where

Plotinus seems to distinguish within the Second Hypostasis, the Intellect,

a kind of prime element of Intellect. At 6, 9, 3, 26-27 we read that with pure

intellect and with the summit of the intellect we are to see what is purest of all.

At 5, 3, I4, I5 Plotinus speaks of *the intellect within#, which gives Being.

Normally the hypostasis of voig is equated with Being and it is the One which

is Being's source, yet here we have the idea that in some way voig at its

highest can represent the One, though Plotinus is careful to add that the two

are quite distinct. Again at 5, 5, 8, 22 we read that in the vision of the One

vovi sees by that element of itself which is not vovig cir &zavrovir vCp).Finally

the idea is expressedin a different form and at greaterlength at 6, 7, 35, I9-24.

)>Intellectual-Principlethus has two powers, first that of grasping intel-

lectively its own content, the second that of an advancing and receiving

whereby to know its transcendent. . . the first is that of Intellect knowing,

the second that of Intellect loving# (MAcKENNAand PAGE).

Professor HADOT2 has pointed out that these ideas of Plotinus may be

part of the foundation of the later Neoplatonic doctrine of the dvOog vovi,

1 Vgl. W. KRANZ,Sphragis, RhM I04, I96I, 3ff. 97ff.; zu Ovid I22-I24. E. PARATORE,

Atti del Convegno internazionale Ovidiano I, 1959, I82ff.

2 p. HADOT, ))Fragments d'un Commentaire sur le Parmdnide((, Rev. Et. Grecques 74,

ig6i, 425 and note 73.







2I4 JOHN M. RIST

and this suggestion deserves further consideration. But before such consid-

eration can have any value, it is necessary to determine, if possible, whatprecisely Plotinus means. Until this has been determined, it is impossible to

see whether his doctrine has been copied, deliberately modified or misunder-

stood by his successors.

ARNOU'S' explanation of the attitude of Plotinus towards the immanence

and transcendence of the One is generally very satisfactory. Strictly speaking,

Plotinus insists that voig is in the One, not that the One is in vovi, but at the

same time he is willing to speak of the One'snuaoovoda.his doctrine of naQov-ala has as its corollary the notion that there is in vojq a certain element

most akin to the One since it is due to the One's presence. Yet this presencedoes not detract in any way from the One's transcendence. Plotinus is most

insistent on this point. The One is present yet separate (6, 4, 3, I2), for it is

possible to be present though separate (6, 4, II, 2I).

If in some sense the One is present in the hypostasis of voig, this presence

should be apparent in the formal structure of the hypostases. There should be,

in voig, an immanent unity which is the element of that hypostasis most

akin to the One. Such a unity rightly be called the supreme aspect of voivg(Toiv

vov3TCi eCodrco, 9, 3, 27), and it would not be surprising if Plotinus were

to speak of it when dealing with those rare moments of human experiencewhen union with the One is becoming a reality. In this connection it is of

value to examine a passage of 6, 9, 4. At the beginning of this chapter Plotinus

tells us that awareness (aivwetg) of the One arises not by intellection, as

does awareness of the Forms, but by a presence that surpasses knowledge.

Later in the same chapter (lines 24-30) he proceeds as follows: *From none

is that Principle absent and yet from all: present, it remains absent save to

those fit to receive, disciplined into some accordance, able to touch it closely

by their likeness and by that kindredpower within themselves hrough which,

remaining as it was when it came to them the Supreme, they are enabled tosee in so far as God may at all be seen# (MAcKENNAand PAGE).

We may conclude that there is within voi3 a kind of unity derived from

the One's presence, but not damaging to the One's transcendence, which is

actualized at the moment of the return to the One in the mystical union.

This unity is not of course a separate hypostasis. It is the fundamental power

of VoVg, erived from the One, to return to its source. It is a reminder that

the One is in the fullest sense both cause and sustainer of the reality of the

Second Hypostasis. We should not regard it as an indication that vofg has

in its own nature the means of transcending itself. Nof ; can transcend itselfonly in virtue of what is not itself, but is in itself, as we have seen Plotinus

say at 5, 5, 8, 22.

1 R. ARNOU,Le Desir de Dieu dans la Philosophie de Plotin, Paris I92I, I70-I77.







Mysticismand Transcendencen LaterNeoplatonism 2I5

Finally we must remember the most important point that whatever

precise significance Plotinus attached to this )>highestaspect of vovg((, the

possession of such a power should not lead a man to suppose that union withthe One can be achieved in a quasi-mechanical fashion. It will perhaps seem

rather shocking to suggest that Plotinus means that some kind of superadded

grace is required for the attainment of union, but his language certainly tends

in that direction at times. In 5, 5, 8, 3-5 we read as follows: )>Wemust not

run after it, but fit ourselves for the vision and then wait tranquilly for its

appearance as the eye waits on the rising of the sun((. Plotinus is certainly

confident that purification and dialectic will lead to their goal of union, since

the universe has been providentially arranged to allow for this possibility and

since man possesses a faculty capable of attaining this goal; but there is an

element in the procedurethat is outside the control of even the noblest philoso-

pher. The One is present to those who look, but no man can be the judge of

his own fitness to receive the vision, and hence, even with the aid of the

highest aspect of voVg,no man can attain union with the One by a quasi-

magical or ritualist fulfilment of obligations. The One is ineffable and un-

knowable in terms of intellect, and for Plotinus union is, so to speak, on his

terms, and when he appears,rather than the automatic result of the cultivation

of the highest aspect of vofg.HADOT1 as pointed out that Porphyry appears to make a similar analysis

of vovs, according to Proclus2 Porphyry describes vovgas atcvtog, but adds

that it also contains something that is aeoatcbvloo (o'vovig 8,, cti Xq8Trrov

ev EavTc Tof ahoviov). The idea is to be found again in the anonymous

commentary on the Parmenides , once preserved in the library at Turin, and

which HADOT lso believes to be from Porphyry's hand. Yet the relation of

these ideas to those of Plotinus is difficult to discern. We must first in-

vestigate an apparently similar and muchbetter documented approach to the

problem in later Neoplatonism.

There are a number of passages in which Proclus discusses what he calls

the #flowerof the intellect(( (a'vOogoi vov). This faculty, apparently a develop-

ment of Plotinus' )>prime art of voi3<<,s the means by which we can attain

union with the One. In apparently Plotinian fashion it is described as ))ahidden

trace of the One4((.Yet Plotinus is certainly not the only sourcefor the Procine

position. Perhaps Proclus' clearest exposition5 is in chapter four of the Com-

mentary on the Chaldaean Oracles, where we read that the flower of vojg is

prior to voi;, and that just as in other things it is not voii which is the highest

I P. HADOT,op. cit. 424 and note 72. 2 Theol. Platonica I, II p. 27, 33 m. PORTUS.

3 Cf. W. KROLL, )Ein neuplatonischer Parmenidescommentar in einem Turiner Palim-

psest((, Rh. Mus. 47, I892, 6I6-6I8. 4 De decem dubit. 64, 9, P. Io6 BOESE.

5 Cf. H. KOCH, Ps-Dionysius Areopagita in seinen Beziehungen zum Neuplatonismus

und Mysterienwesen, Mainz I900, I56. Proclus, Comm. in Alcib., p. I44 WESTERINK.







2I6 JOHN M. RIST

cause, so in souls the highest activity is not voseo'v but something more

divine than vov6g. ust as we reach the hypostasis of vovi5by becoming voEtbelg,

so we attain to unity by becoming lvoeu5eg. When we have done so, we stand

on the highest point of voi3g(er' a'xbcorcooXEt'1 aoravresgc). Proclus goes

on to add in a most bafffing manner that even the flower of voivgwill only

raise us to the highest member of the first triad of Being, but this may be left

aside till later in the paper. At the moment we may assume that the Plotinian

distinction within the Second Hypostasis between voig and voig 1e60vhas

been enlarged so that the a'vOogvov (standing for the vovogcQiv)has almost

assumed the status of a superior hypostasis This is an example of the tendency

of the later Neoplatonists to disregard the warnings against the proliferationof hypostases uttered by Plotinus in his treatise against the Gnostics. Un-

doubtedly the doctrine of the Chaldaean Oracles that an V@cagV=eQ V0oiV

links the human being with 6 rartqxogvovig elped to further this unplotinian

development. Indeed it is to the uses of the word EVcratg hat we must now

turn our attention.

The word is rare in the Enneads and does not appearto have any particular

association with voi3. It appears to mean ))unitya,as in 6, I, 26, 27, where

Plotinus asks about the origin of the Evwcoatgn matter and points out that

matter is not itself an gvwatgbut that it gains its evcoctg by participation

in unity.

In contrast with Plotinus, however, Proclus uses the term continually.

ProfessorDODDS'ndex to the Elementsof Theology ists twentytwo occurences

in that work alone. The word has more than one meaning2 but it is the sense

of ))unity((uch as occurs at the end of Proposition I5I 3 which is our immediate

concern. Td ;aretxeo0vs present in each of the henads, says Proclus, and each

henad must proceed from the paternal unity (6chnr4g naretxig COcasot)g).

This unity is apparently envisaged as some sort of power parallel but superior

to voVg: yvcoatv VEq voyv xai ,zavt'av .. vei ro voTov, eVwcae To gv, writes

Proclus in the De Providentia4. The same meaning is probably present in

the phrase nrv V'6QdoVv evwoatvthat occurs in the Platonic Theology5.This

gvcoortgs sometimes styled simply 'or v - a term which refers to the element

of unity in the voVgand not to the One itself. In this sense it is linked with

the other common phrase in Proclus for the highest part of vov-g, amely the

))flowerof vof3a. We see already therefore that the tentative, rather general

1 W. KROLL, >>DeOraculis Chaldaicis#, Breslauer Philologische Abhandlungen 7, I,

Breslau I894, II.

2 J. VANNESTE in Le Mystere de Dieu, Brussels I959, I94-I96 distinguishes three

senses of ivcwatg n Ps.-Dionysius.

3 E. R. DODDS, The Elements of Theology, Oxford I933, 134.

4 De Prov. 3I, 6ff. (P. 14I BOESE). 6 Theol. Plat. I, 3, p. 6 PORTUS.

6 Cf. Hermias, in Phaedrum p. 79 AST.







Mysticismand Transcendencen LaterNeoplatonism 2I7

suggestions of Plotinus about the crown of voi- have been worked up by

Proclus into the formal theory that just as by soul we attain likeness to Soul

and by voig to the Intelligible World, so it is by the flower of vov5g, y our

gsvovtg, ur unity, that we attain to union with the One.

At this point we must mention a further complication which Proclus'

system seems to involve. In the passage from the Commentary on the Chal-

daean Oracles about the flower of vovs discussed above, we are amazed to

observe Proclus thinking not only of a flower of vov&g,ut of a flower of the

whole soul, which is distinct and superior. #But if we grasp this voto'v by

the flower of voig in us-the vo?jTo'v,hat is, situated at the top of the first

intelligible triad-by what further means would we be linked to the One? . . .

Therefore the flower of voa; is not at all the same as the flower of the whole

soul.a There is no other specific reference in Proclus to this flower of the

whole soul, but ROSANhas rightly compared the doctrine with that expressed

on page ii8 of the Platonic Theology (PORTUS) here Proclus writes of the

)>firebrand f the soul<, and the expression avOogov'alaaof the Commentary

on the Alcibiades2may have a similar significance (Jog yae vov 4t8T8Xo,EvxaTa dov 8itQyd6vov vow, oairmat' Toag nec&rovi aq' oV 7aortv7 yvcrtg

xaTa To Ev %at otov avOog Trg ov'ortagu67v, xaO' o mat iaAtrTarTo OGeo

orvva7CT0,ieOa).

We cannot be certain what Proclus meant when speaking of this final

unity, but the doctrine looks like a further falling away from the Plotinian

economy. Proclus appears to be regarding this flower of the whole soul as

a further rung on the ladder between the One and Soul. Whereas Plotinus

thinks of a return to voig, Proclus subdivides this into a return in stages:

first to voig, then to the flower of vOVg,hen to the flower of the whole soul.

Yet since our remarks are in general applicable both to the flower of voig

and to the flower of the whole soul, and since the formeris better documented

and of more significance in the Platonic tradition, we shall temporarily leave

the flower of the whole soul on one side.

There is a further term whose relevance we must now consider, namely

v7rae$tg.This term, of no significance to Plotinus, is virtually technical in

later Neoplatonism. It has frequently been assumed that its meaning is more

or less the same wherever it occurs. This, as we shall see, is not necessarily

true. Let us then consider certain of its uses in Proclus, and in particular, its

relation to the flower of vov3 and gvwaqt. An easy source of information is

the passage of the Commentary on the Alcibiades (p.II4 WESTERINK)hat

we have already examined. Here we may find the phrase avw3v n)v a'xeav

v7aa0tv avEysteat Tr%; pyvXi7g, ao' rv ev uev. .. And in the Commentaryon

the Cratylos p. 66 PASQUALI) e find r-

y6q Oivsetof vov %a'TOV7tiel&

1 L. J. ROSAN, The Philosophy of Proclus, N. Y. I94 26, note I6.

2 Comm. in Alcib. p. I14 WESTERINK.







2I8 JOHNM.RIST

'r?g ovctag rs63v av3rolgavvdcbecrOaatxE"xa,ev. v7raeQtqlearly in one of its

meanings is that basic unity of voi3 which may be called g'v)ort or theflower of voig. Formally it is unplotinian-and philosophically too if it tends

to allot to voig a power within itself of attaining the mystic union in an

automatic fashion. But for the moment let us leave this in abeyance and con-

sider V'ia0tg further in the sense with which we are here concerned. We can

now be certain that what is true of v'raOttg s true of its equivalents Svwcatag,

and dvOog ov.

It is generally admitted that Proclus made iJ^aeztgthe first member of

the intelligible triad, Being, Life and Thought 1. This triad 2,deriving ultimately

from an interpretation of Sophist 248 E, is of increasing importance in post-Plotinian thought. Its first member, v'kaQtg, was equated by Proclus and

Damascius with )>theFather<x-a term which, due to the influence of the

ChaldaeanOracles,has thus changed its meaning in the post-Plotinian period.

The later Neoplatonists were apparently unable to understand that ))Father((

could mean anything but )>the ather (i.e. the highest aspect) of the Intelligible

Triad< and Damascius3 assumes that Porphyry must have used the word in

that sense. He therefore accuses Porphyry of making the One and the )>Father((

identical-which Porphyry, following Plotinus, doubtless did The point is

that for Plotinus and Porphyry the ))Father(<s the One (and Porphyry mayhave used the term v'kaetg also), but when Damascius hears ))Father((he

follows Proclus4 in thinking only of the prime aspect of the Intelligible Triad.

There are then a number of terms in Proclus for the highest aspect of the

Second Hypostasis. When Proclus is thinking of an anthropology he speaks

of it as &vOogov6 r 1vw'Mtg; hen he is speaking in terms of the ontological

structure of the Real World, he calls it V'7ae~tg r Father. Apparently when

man raises himself to the level of the Father of the Intelligible Triad, he is

standing at the highest point of vofg; he is living in accordance with the

flower of vojg. Hence we can see why Proclus has to postulate another higherunity (the flower of the whole soul) to account for the possibility of union

with the One. Perhaps there is some connection between the fact that he never

claimed to have attained such union and his shadowy comments on the flower

of the whole soul.

Before leaving Proclus for a while, we can conclude that he appears to be

thinking all the time from man's standpoint, while Plotinus thinks from the

standpoint of the One. Where Plotinus thinks of the presence of the

One and is vague about the unified state, v'kaeFtg,or whatever, of the voYg,

1 DODDS, op. cit. 253.

2 For the history of the triad see P. HADOT, ))ttre, Vie, Pens6e chez Plotin et avant

Plotin<, Entretiens Hardt 5, Les Sources de Plotin. Vandoeuvres-Geneve I960, I07-I57.

3 Damascius, Dubit. et Solut. 43 vol. I, p. 86, 9 RUELLE.

4 In Parm. p. 1070, 15.







MysticismandTranscendencen Later Neoplatonism 2I9

Proclus thinks about precise degrees of unification and of the powers within

man. This is not to say that Plotinus is not hopeful of success, or that he hasno confidence of uniting the One in himself to the One in the all; it is to say,

however, that he prefers to leave the unspeakable unspoken, to await the

mysterious presence, to disregard the state of his vovg, almost, I must repeat,

to hope for grace.

Confirmationof the results so far achieved can be found by a consideration

of the attitude towards union with God revealed in the writings of Pseudo-

Dionysius by Fr. VANNESTE 1. Ps.-Dionysius' dependence on the pagan Neopla-

tonists, and especially on Proclus, has been clear since the work of KOCH and

STIGLMAYR2 sixty years ago. Yet in his treatment of the mystical union hisparticularly Neoplatonic attitude has been far from universally understood.

VANNESTE however has shown that in 865C and 872B of the Divine Names

there is no doubt that Dionysius is accounting for the union of the soul with

God by the agency of an ?'tvwatgabove voig which is in fact the Procline

ivwacrtgr dvOogvov. The phrase ))Flowerof the Intellect<#does not occur in

Dionysius, yet the doctrine is fundamentally the same. In this connection the

association of evcoag with v'ae~tg at Divine Names 64I D is not insignificant-

and we should observe rg V'6ErroVvsvco"ecog t 592C.

VANNESTE has rightly compared Divine Names 865CD with Ennead6, 7, 35, 20-24, but there is a significant difference between the two passages

which he seems to have missed. Dionysiuswrites: &'ov ei&e'va Trdv aO'e A A Ir\ \18 Q

y[; voViv"Xewvrv 1u8vov'vauatv s1 -rTooElv... T7v ev(wootv v7rseat-

oovoav T)V TOiV VOVS9V'V 6t' avvdETat 7r6o'gra Fnexetva8avTov:

Plotinus on the other hand reads TOvvov&vot'vvv<&8r> )vV ?V EtV lv'va-

Ittv e8 Td VOEIV .. T) V j8' ? Ta e'extva a3oi tflRo2ftvtxal rraQ0afoX.Both Plotinus and Dionysius are talking about capabilities of vofg in some

sense, but while Plotinus refers to the bv'va4lw f voVgto attain to union

with the One, Dionysius speaks of lvoazg. The change of vocabulary is indica-tive of the fact that if Dionysius has the Plotinian doctrine in his mind-and

he is surely thinking of Ennead 6, 7, 35-then he is interpreting his Plotinus

in a Procline manner. Plotinus is thinking that vovg has the capacity to

receive (naeaboXi-); Dionysius is thinking rather in the Procline manner of

the power to ascend inherent in that gVwoatg3ervovVwhich is part of what

man is given by nature. VANNESTE is right to imply that the Dionysian

1 OP. Cit. I94-2II.

2 Cf. especially H. KOCH,Proklus als Quelle des Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita in derLehre vom B6sen, Philologus 54, I895, 438-454, and Ps-Dionysius Areopagita in seinen

Beziehungen zum Neuplatonismus und Mysterienwesen, Mainz I900; J. STIGLMAYR, Das

Aufkommen der ps-dion. Schriften und ihr Eindringen in die christliche Literatur bis zum

Laterankonzil 649, Feldkirch I895. For recent views see the article of R. RoQuEs, ))Diony-

sius Areopagitau in Reallexikon fiir Antike und Christentum, Vol. III, cols. 1075-II2I.







220 JOHN M.RIST

mysticism may well be classified as )>natural((mysticism1; Plotinus' position,

on this matter, is considerably less )>natural((.

II

We have so far observed a significant change of emphasis in doctrines on

the highest aspect of vovgand the mystic union between Plotinus and Proclus-

a change which almost symbolizes the different general attitudes of the two

principal Neoplatonists, for where Plotinus is a mystic, Proclus seems to know

only a theory of Mysticism. We must now consider the position of Porphyry,

Plotinus' most important disciple. We may start from the remark of Damas-

cius2, quoted by HADOT3, that, according to Porphyry, the Father of theIntelligible Triad (or the v`raaetg) is equivalent to the One. We can deduce

from this that whereas for Damascius the term V`raaetg or aa-re) does not

denote the highest principle, it is, according to Damascius, understood to

refer to this principle by Porphyry. Now V`raa4tgn Damascius is defined as

Tro dvat fiovov4 and as such is distinguished from ov3atla.Thus, if Porphyry

used the word in the same sense as Damascius, his first principle would have

to be ro elvat io'vov,and would thus appear to differ radically from the One

of Plotinus, which is spoken of as lbsxteva rof elvat. HADOT5 in fact suggests

that Porphyry made a radical departure of this kind from Plotinian princi-ples. As an aid to his case he suggests that an unplotinian First Principle of

to elvat uo'vov s to be found in the writings of Victorinus, and that these

are influenced by the work of Porphyry. We must therefore attempt to recon-

struct Porphyry's doctrine of the One, and to consider the divergences, if

they exist, between this One and the One of Plotinus.

I have been unable to trace the word V`raa$tgn Porphyry's own writings,

but some of his attitudes towards the One come out clearly in the Sententiae.

Twice he refers to it as ro lasmsxetva(X, p. 3; XII, p. 3)6, once as srdxetva Tov

YOVXXV, p. ii), twice as -r V TrA ,ut O'VXXVI, p. ii) and more thanonce as o OE6ge.g. XXXI, p. i6). This leaves us in some doubt of his precise

intentions. We learn that the First Principle is v3nEeo o'v,but it might be

suggested that to o'vand v'araltg are not synonomous and that perhaps rd

etvat juovovcould also be described as )>beyondrd 0JV#.HADOTwishes us to

believe that Porphyry's First Principle, which is called V57Qed o'v and iese`xtva

could also be calledboth V`aae4tgand rdetvatyouvov,but not Vire -ro5 etvat.

We must admit that the Sententiae cannot give a decisive answer to this

problem. What we must know is whether Porphyry would have insisted,

against Plotinus, that the One (which he may well have called v'kaeQtg)cannot

1 J. VANNESTE,Op. Cit. IO. 2 Dubit. et Solut. 43, vol. I, p. 86, 9.8 HADOT,Op. cit. 423 and note 66. 4 Dubit. et Solut. 120, vOl. I, P. 32I, IIff.

6 HADOT,OP. cit. 423.6 The following references are by chapter and page to MOMMERT'Sdition.







MysticismandTranscendencen Later Neoplatonism 22I

be described as VkCEQoi5 Elvat, but should rather be called, tr elvat OV'ov.

In other words, does fiiaeOt equal tordvat ,Io'vov or Porphyry? As we have

mentioned, HADOTcompares the doctrines of Porphyry with those of the

fourth-century rhetorician Marius Victorinus. We must therefore consider

what the Roman author, some of whose ideas are certainly influenced by

Porphyry, has to say on this particular problem.

Both Victorinus and his Arian opponent Candidus1 distinguish exsistentia

from substantia in the way Damascius distinguishes viaq4tg and ovata.

Candidus puts it thus: )>Exsistentiaa substantia differt, quoniam exsistentia

ipsum esse est et solun esse et non in alio esse aut subiectumalterius, sed unum

et solum ipsum esse, substantiaautem non esse solurnhabet,sed et quale aliquid

esse.(( (Ep. ad Marium VictorinumI,2, Ig). Victorinus offers the same ideas

on a number of occasions. At Adv. Arium I, 30, 20, he has: )>Etdant differen-

tiam exsistentiae et substantiae:exsistentiamquidemnt exsistentialitatem,prae-

exsistentem subsistentiamsine accidentibus,puris et solis ipsis quae sunt in eo

quod est solum esse, quod subsistent.((Again at Adv. Arium 4, I9, 4 we read:

)>Anteov et ante 2o'yov,vis et potentia exsistendi illa est quae significatur hoc

verboquodest esse, graece quodest to' Elvat .. Verurnesseprimurnita inparti-

cipatum est ut nec unum dici possit, nec solum sed per praelationem,ante untrm

et ante solum, ultra simplicitatem,praeexsistentiampotius quam exsistentiam.(

This passage continues in line twenty with the remark that God is not o'v

(unde nec 0'v),a new view which occurs again in the Ad Candidum (4, II) in

the form )>Supra 'v gitur deus est<x.n a sense God may be called y?) o'v.

From these passages we can begin to form an idea of how Victorinus

thought of God. He is esse solum, -d Elvat as distinct from ro a'v; n so far as

He is not o'v,he may be described as to' Yn 0'v.We know too that this God is

enrxEtva -rl; ovat'ag, since He is v'kaetg and V'iraQ$tgs e`rze'Xevarig ovatag.

Thus He is 85e'testvarovi v-cogand exemstvaTrqg v?at'a;and He is Td etvat

,uovov. Now Plotinus' First Principle is also s5dxetva -r4gov3at'agnd Inrxestva

rov o'vrogand the difference betweenVictorinus and Plotinus would seem to

be that Victorinus uses the phrase rd etvat ,o'vov where Plotinus does not.

What we must investigate is whether the two theories are really distinct, or

whether the differences are simply a matter of words.

Let us resume our conclusions to this point. The First Principle of Vic-

torinus is esse so/urtn,VM tg. The First Principle of Porphyry is v'kaQtg,

but we are not sure of the significance to be attached to the term. The First

Principle of Plotinus is completely transcendent. We can add further that

the author of the anonymous commentary on the Parnenides holds to a First

Principle akin to that of Victorinus. There is no need, however, for our argu-

1 All references to Candidus and Victorinus are to the edition of P. HADOT nd P. HENRY

(Sources Chr6tiennes 68).







222 JOHN M.RIST

mientto depend on HADOT'S iew that the author of this commentary is Por-

phyry.HADOTholds' that the First Principles of the anonymous commentator

and of Victorinus on the one hand, and of Plotinus on the other, are incom-

patible and suggests that the views of the anonymous commentator are more

akin to those of Numenius. Professor GILSON2,n the other hand, believes that

the views of Victorinus and Plotinus are fundamentally alike, despite Vic-

torinus' attempts to be a Christian. >>In oint of fact((, writes GILSON, >>Vic-

torinus is doing about as well as could be done without giving up the supremacy

of the One over Being(. GILSON,however, perhaps underestimates the signifi-

cance of the fact that although Victorinus made the One transcend TO O'V, emade it equivalent to To' lvat or V'7raetg,while Plotinus did not. Now if

the anonymous commentator is incompatible with Plotinus, then so is Vic-

torinus; and if they are both inspired by Porphyry, then he too is unplotinian.

We can be certain from passages like Ennead 5, 5, 5 that Plotinus derives ov,

To elvat, and ov3ata rom To ev, the One. In this passage he even derives slvat

etymologically from gv. Such a fanciful derivation indicates an ontological

principle. "Ov for Plotinus derives not from elvat, but from Ev; etvat also

derives from gv. It is certain that the Parmenides commentator and Victorinus

are here unplotinian. What about Porphyry, their supposed source?

All prima facie evidence would suggest that Porphyry could not have

broken away from Plotinus on so fundamental an issue as the relationship of

the One and To elvat without comment on such a divergence coming down to us.

We learn that Porphyry's view of the relation of the Forms to vovsg riginally

diverged from that of Plotinus and that this caused a discussion within the

school resulting in Porphyry's revising his position. Yet no such dispute about

the nature of the First Principle is known to us. The argument from silence

is in this case worth at least a little consideration. We may wonder, therefore,

what circumstances might lead us to accept the evidence to be deduced from

post-Porphyrian writings that Porphyry's na-r4-vkae is the equivalent

of the esse solum (ror Elvat uo'vov) of Victorinus and the anonymous com-

mentator-and dissimilar to the One of Plotinus.

Professor THEILERhas long ago proposed4 as a working hypothesis that

all doctrines which are clearly non-plotinian and occur both in Augustine and

in a late Neoplatonist must derive from Porphyry. It is this useful though by

no means universally valid suggestion which lies behind the view of HADOT

that the concept ofV'7rae5tg

s ro Etvat ,uovovfound in Victorinus and the

anonymous commentator must be due to the influence of Porphyry. Before

1 HADOT, Fragments 418.2 E. GILSON,Being and Some Philosophers2, Toronto I952, 32.

3 For Proclus' use of 7aT27Qee in Parm. p. 1070, I5 COUSIN.

4 W. THEILER,Porphyrios und Augustin, Halle I933, 4.







Mysticismand Transcendencen Later Neoplatonism 223

this assumption can be accepted, however, it is necessary to suggest why

Porphyry might give up the language of Plotinus and thus appear to lessen

the superiority of the One over Being'-as he must have done if he held that

the One is TdElvatyovov. The most obvious suggestion is that such a change

was brought about by his finding new accounts of v':rae&tand na-rqein the

ChaldaeanOracles.In what follows, therefore, we must analyse this possibility

and attempt to show that such a view explains certain features of later Neo-

platonism which are otherwise difficult to explain, especially the elaboration

of the doctrine of &vOogov that was discussed earlier in this paper.

The best account of Porphyry's life is still that of BIDEZ2. BIDEz holds that

Porphyry's Philosophy of Oracles was written before his association with

Plotinus and the School of Rome, and that his work on the ChaldaeanOracles

came out after Plotinus' death. This dating of Porphyry's works on oracles3

is helpful for the solution of our present problem, for it is in the Chaldaean

Oracles, if anywhere, that Porphyry might have found the inspiration to

revise the teachings of Plotinus. Let us assume, as seems certain, that during

Plotinus' lifetime Porphyry accepted the view that the One is the Father

of all things, that he is de'xetva rof stvat as well as re'=xetva ?4gov?tag.Later he came into contact with the Oracles where the Father is identical

with the first term of the Intelligible Triad, withV'kaet&

understood as to

elvat ,uovov. We know that Porphyry was a man whose opinions changed

radically several times during his lifetime. We know too that he was always

fascinated by oracles, even when, as at the time of the Letter toAnebo, he

was presumably sceptical of their powers. If, as BIDEZ thinks, he only dis-

covered the Chaldaean collection late in his life, such a discovery could well

have led to a modification of his Plotinianism.

Porphyry may have supposed that the significance of this modification

was slight, for Plotinus often speaks of his One in positive terms as well as

in negative, and the new outlook would not require any going back on the

1 Although it is true that Plotinus' main object in placing the One >>beyondBeinga

is to indicate that the first principle cannot be an Aristotelian vojq, the fact that he called

it )>beyondBeing# as well as *beyond intellectionw cannot be disregarded. Just as Plotinus

must have had good reason for his stress on the term sretisva, so must Porphyry have

had good reason for refusing completely to accept Plotinus' terminology of transcendence.

For this reason, see below.2 J. BIDEZ, Vie de Porphyre, Ghent 1913. J. J. O'MEARA's attempt to reorganize

BIDEZ' chronology (in: Porphyry's Philosophy from Oracles in Augustine) must be

accounted a failure.

3 H. LEWY, in his book Chaldean Oracles and Theurgy; Mysticism, Magic and Plato-

nism in the later Roman Empire, Cairo I956, has attempted to prove that many of the

oracles in Porphyry's Philosophy of Oracles are in fact of Chaldaean origin. For a sym-

pathetic discussion and final rejection of this view see E. R. DODDS' review of LEWY

entitled ))New Light on the Chaldaean Oracles#J,Harvard Theological Review 54, ig6i,

267.







224 JOHNM.RIST,Mysticismand Transcendencen LaterNeoplatonism

Plotinian interpretation of Republic 5ogB where the One is described as

6rE'XEtvaTcg ov'ata. The One seen as to' elvat ,io'vov (V7kaQtq in the Chaldaeansense) could still be seen as bestowing Toetvat and 7 ov3atcan the Intelligible

World in the way that the Republic describes. The new-style First Principle

could still be na-r4qand be eligible for the majority of the Plotinian epithets

and negative descriptions.

Yet in one important respect the new Porphyrian One would differ from

that of Plotinus, and Porphyry must have recognized the fact: its transcen-

dence would not be described in such extreme terms. How could Porphyry

have salved his conscience on this question? The answer is to be found in the

subject with which this paper opened, the doctrine of the ))primepart of vovi3(.We have already referred to traces of this doctrine in Plotinus. What could

Porphyry have made of these traces? We have already alluded to the passage

of Proclus' Platonic Theology (I, II, p. 27, 33 m. PORTUS)where voi3 is said

by Porphyry to contain within itself something that is prior to itself, some-

thing that is 'eoaucoviognd merely atcovtog. The Plotinian passages may have

been interpreted by Porphyry as an indication that there is less need than

Plotinus had supposed to emphasize the gap between the First and Second

Hypostases in so far as the Second Hypostasis is Being rather than volg.

Thus he would think that -rd vat jto'vov, he One, could supply ro sdvat tothe Second Hypostasis, and in fact does supply it, since the Second Hypostasis

clearly contains a trace of the One, something that is nqoawt$vtog. his means,

of course, that Porphyry has given up Plotinus' principle that for the One to

be the cause of -co esvat it must be itself 1rdexecvaTovielvat, but with the

support of the Oracles assured, he may have felt that serxetva T47g vaotag

and ?7'etx8tvaoiv5og were adequate.

There can be no doubt that this reconstructionof Porphyry's later thinking

is hypothetical. Yet it is the only explanation available which will fit the later

evidence about his understanding of v'kaqAtg, rrar4end ro 7rroatc'vtov. texplains too how Victorinus, whose doctrine of the First Principle is certainly

unplotinian, may still have derived inspiration from a major Neoplatonist.

It shows too how the anonymous commentary on the Parmenides, even if

not from Porphyry's hand, could be influenced by Porphyry's thought. And it

shows something of wider significance also: the nature of the influence of the

Chaldaean Oracles on Neoplatonism after Porphyry.

This paper began with a demonstration that the theory of mysticism held

by Proclus and Ps.-Dionysius differs radically from that of Plotinus in that it

seeks to explain mystical experience in terms of the power of the One seen asimmanent in individual men. Plotinus on the other hand offers a theory which

further emphasizes the One's transcendence and makes mystical union seem

almost an act of Grace bestowed on the most fortunate. It is now suggested

that aspects of the thought of Porphyry mark the division between the earlier







WOLFGANG SPEYER, Zu einem Quellenproblem bei Sidonius Apollinaris 225

and later Neoplatonic approachesto this question and that it is Porphyry who

begins both to emphasize the power present in the vofg in man and, at the

same time, to diminish the sheer transcendence of the One with his newtheology, derived from the Oracles, that the First Principle is -rto vat Jo'vov.

Trust in oracles had always been a vice of Porphyry's which he only managed

to restrain whilePlotinus was alive. His partial reversion to his old ways afterPlo-

tinus' death marks the beginningof a new trend towardsirrationalism n the Neo-

platonic school. Plotinus' rational expectation and patience beforethe comingof

the Onegradually lost its significance as later Neoplatonists added the practice

of theurgy to philosophicmeditation as a means of elevating the soul.

One minor point remains. If it was Porphyry who first began to build up

the theory of the &vOogvof and who offered some kind of identification bet-

ween the V'raQ$tgn man and the V'7raqtghat is the One, we can now under-

stand better why on one occasion Proclus was forced to postulate not only

a #flower of voV5<gut a )>flower f the whole soul<(as well. Proclus does not

accept that Porphyry's V'7xaQ$tg-iraT4Qs the First Principle; therefore he

finds himself baffled as to how the alvOogvofv-if it represents the v'kae~tg n

man-leads directly to union with the One. Yet he accepts the principle that

there is a power in man which can bring about this union, and he is compelled

to say that whereas the flower of vofg leads to union with the ))Fatherof the

Intelligible Triad?, the flower of the whole soul leads to union with the One'.

University College, Toronto, Ontario JOHN M. RIST

ZU EINEM QUELLENPROBLEM BEI SIDONIUS APOLLINARIS

(CARMENI5, 36-I25)

Die Hochzeit eines Philosophen war im Altertum weniger auffallend als imHochmittelalter. Ein gewisser Zwiespalt wurde aber auch in der Antike,

besonders seit hellenistischer Zeit, in der Ehe eines Philosophen gesehen. Das

Wort des Theophrast2 non est igitur uxor ducenda sapienti. primum enim

1 I should like to thank Professor A. H. ARMSTRONG for criticizing the first draft of

this paper.2 tberliefert durch Hieronymus, Adv. Iovin. I, 47 (Migne PL 23), C. 3I3 C (verbesserte

Textrezension bei E. BICKEL, Diatribe in Senecae philosophi fragm., Leipzig 19I5, 388).

Zu dem Werk des Theophrast s. W. v. CHRIST-O. STXHLIN-W. SCHMID, Gesch. d. gr. Lit.,

Muinchen 1920 (Nachdruck I960), II I, 66. Vgl. auch Sen. frg. 8 = Hier.Adv. Iovin,

I, 48 C. 3I6 A Cicero rogatus ab Hirtio, ut post repudium Terentiae sororem eius duceret,

omnino facere supersedit, dicens non posse se et uxori et philosophiae pariter operam dare

(s. BICKEL,Diatribe ... 390. 346); wiederholt von Ps. Hier.epist. 36 c. i6 (Migne PL 30,

258), unter dem sich W. Map 0. P. (I3. Jh.) verbirgt (s. P. LEHMANN, seudo-antike Lite-

ratur des Mittelalters, Leipzig I927, 23).

Hermes 92,2 15

mysticism and transcendence in later neoplatonism

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